Attractive Nuisances in Finance
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DRAFT - please do not cite or circulate Attractive Nuisances in Finance Sung Eun (Summer) Kim1 Abstract Private equity – or the business of pooling funds for investment in other businesses – is one of the largest, fastest-growing and crisis-resilient asset classes in finance. Much of this strength comes from private equity firms’ ability to operate efficiently by eliminating standard investor protections, such as the fiduciary duty of loyalty to investors and investors’ monitoring and voting rights. While this structure is a radical departure from the public company norm, no was harm done as these were private entities marketed exclusively to sophisticated investors and retail investors had little to no opportunity to invest in private equity—until recently. In the last few years, however, a number of private equity firms have gone public, opening the door to less sophisticated retail investors, who are drawn to these publicly-listed private equity firms because of the promise of high returns, despite their high risk. If private equity firms have thrived on their private nature, how will the public version of private equity maintain their competitiveness? In this paper, I review a sample of 46 publicly-listed private equity firms (with a total market capitalization of US$ 106.4 billion) that are traded on the United States stock exchanges to reveal how these publicly-listed private equity, or PLPE, firms have succeeded at “going public” while “staying private.” Incumbent owners of PLPE firms have used complex contracts and availed themselves of various legal and regulatory exceptions to retain most of the private benefits of private equity while spreading the risks and losses to new owners by taking their firms public. This conferral of a significant benefit to a few by spreading the risk of small harms to the many directly offends the core principles of public company and securities regulations. I analogize the PLPE investment to an “attractive nuisance” that is given special treatment under tort laws, and propose a new mode of regulation for investments like PLPE that are attractive to less sophisticated investors specifically because of their elevated risks. Unlike the current regulatory system, which relies predominantly on disclosures of risks, the proposed Attractive Nuisance regulatory model would require PLPE to mitigate avoidable risks to less sophisticated investors. This model more appropriately mediates risks between PLPEs and retail investors by accounting for the imbalances of information and power between the incumbent and new investors as well as the heightened yet attractive hazards of PLPE investments. 1 Assistant Professor, University of California, Irvine, School of Law; (617) 455-9053; [email protected]. 1 DRAFT - please do not cite or circulate Introduction Private equity refers to the business of pooling funds from multiple investors and investing such funds in other businesses for a profit.2 Private equity touches virtually every aspect of everyday life, from the clothes we wear,3 the food we eat,4 to the books that are used in law school classrooms.5 According to a 2015 industry report, more than 11,000 companies headquartered in the United States are supported by private equity investments.6 The most frequently noted features of private equity firms in the legal and finance literature are the innovative legal and financial strategies that private equity has been able to develop to reduce agency costs.7 Notably, Professor Michael Jensen has praised the private equity model for its ability to reduce agency costs by using centralized control structures, high leverage and managerial incentives.8 Relying on this advantage, private equity has developed into a high- powered financial engine that has generated impressive returns for its investors.9 This elaborate yet durable model of private equity was initially developed with sophisticated investors (such as institutional investors and wealthy individuals) in mind.10 Even though the private equity model has been stripped of standard investor protections such as fiduciary duties11, monitoring rights12 and voting rights13, these sophisticated investors were satisfied with this arrangement because they received high returns and limited liability in exchange, and could rely on extralegal mechanisms such as reputation and market power14 to ensure that their investments 2 JOSH LERNER ET AL., VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY: A CASEBOOK 1-11 (5th Edition, 2012). 3 See e.g., Press Release, TPG Capital, TPG Capital and Leonard Green & Partners to Acquire J. Crew Group, Inc. for $43.50 Per Share in Cash (Nov. 23, 2010) https://tpg.com/images/news/101123_JCG.pdf (press release announcing private equity firm TPG’s buyout of J. Crew). 4 See, e.g., PRESS RELEASE, 3G CAPITAL, BURGER KING HOLDINGS (Sept. 2, 2010) http://www.3g- capital.com/bkw.html (press release announcing private equity firm 3G Capital’s buyout of Burger King). 5 See e.g., PRESS RELEASE, EUREKA GROWTH CAPITAL, EUREKA GROWTH CAPITAL ACQUIRES LAW SCHOOL PUBLISHING BUSINESS FROM THOMSON REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2014) http://www.eurekagrowth.com/news/eureka-growth- capital-acquires-law-school-publishing-business-from-thomson-reuters/ (press release announcing private equity firm Eureka Growth Capital’s buyout of West Academic). 6 Quick Facts, PEGCC, http://www.pegcc.org/education/pe-by-the-numbers. 7 Firms with multiple owners must coordinate the management of the firm through a centralized decision making body (or agent), and agency costs refer to the costs of monitoring and binding the agent to ensure that it acts in the best interests of the owners. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 10 (1991). 8 See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV. 326 (Sept. 1989) available at http://hbr.org/1989/09/eclipse-of-the-public-corporation/ar/1. Cf. Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 268 (2008) (criticizing private equity for “their exorbitant fees and the spectacular profits of some of their managers, their involvement in a number of high-profile, controversial transactions and investment scandals, and the systemic and idiosyncratic risks these investments pose.”) 9 See JOSH LERNER, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY: A COURSE OVERVIEW 1 (2001) (“Private equity’s recent growth has outstripped that of almost every class of financial product.”). 10 For a description of the prototypical private equity investor and the minimum investment requirements that have limited the pool of eligible investors to high net worth individuals and institutional investors see, e.g., Private equity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/07/private_equity.asp. 11 See infra [ ] (discussing contractual waivers of fiduciary duties in the private equity contract). 12 See infra [ ] (discussing removal of investors’ monitoring rights such as access to books and records in the private equity contract). 13 See infra [ ] (discussing removal of investors’ voting rights such as the power to elect/remove the board in the private equity contract). 14 Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution of SPACs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 928 (2012–2013) (“[R]eputational constraints hold the richly dynamic tension between traditional private equity investors and managers largely in equilibrium.”) (citing Matthew D. Cain, Steven M. Davidoff & Antonio J. Macias, 2 DRAFT - please do not cite or circulate were protected even beyond the levels that would have been provided under the standard protections that had been given away.15 However, the recent decision of several prominent private equity firms to go public has provided ordinary retail investors the opportunity to directly invest in private equity firms, even if they only have a small amount of money to invest. This is a relatively recent phenomenon that peaked during the boom years immediately prior to the 2007-2009 financial crises and has continued into the post-crisis period.16 The starting point of the paper is the question: why did these private equity firms choose to go public? The classic story of a young company coming to the capital markets as a rite of passage to seek a broader pool of investments for its next phase of operations does not fit with the private equity firms. In fact, the private equity firms that have chosen to go public were those among the most successful among their peers.17 The voluntary conversion into a public company by what is Broken Promises: Private Equity Bidding Behavior and the Value of Reputation, AFA 2012 Chi. Meetings 1, 11 (Sept. 2012); Lloyd L. Drury, III, Publicly-Held Private Equity Firms and the Rejection of Law As A Governance Device, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 57 (2013). Cf. Lee Harris, Critical Theory of Private Equity, A, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259, 264 (2010) (“However, recent empirical evidence by Kate Litvak suggests that a fund manager's performance does not necessarily predict her future success in terms of raising the next fund. This creates reason to believe that reputation may not work as a constraint as well as previous commentators have suggested.”). 15 The descriptor “sophisticated” in this context is used as shorthand to indicate whether investors have the capacity to appreciate the complexities and risks of investing in the capital markets, or possess the opportunity and resources to either directly or indirectly bargain for protections when entering into these investments. 16 While much has been written about the ways in which increased congressional scrutiny following the 2007-2009 Financial Crises has forced more light on the shadow of private equity, this Article focuses on private equity’s own emergence from the shadows into the public domain. Of the 46 firms reviewed in this study, there were three firms that were already public before the year 2000. Since the year 2001, there has been a steady stream of private equity firms that have made the decision to go public in every year (with the exception of 2002), including the years leading up to and out of the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis.