The British and Spanish Intelligence Systems During the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739-1744)

View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by UCL Discovery MOBILIZING RESOURCES FOR WAR: THE BRITISH AND SPANISH INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS DURING THE WAR OF JENKINS’ EAR (1739-1744) IGNACIO RIVAS IBÁÑEZ UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON PhD DISSERTATION 1 I hereby declare, that the following disertation was my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. ___________________ Ignacio Rivas ___________________ 12th December 2008 2 CONTENTS Abstract 7 Acknowledgements 8 List of Maps 9 List of Abrevivations 10 Dates 11 Introduction 12 Chapter 1: The British Intelligence System (1739-1744) I-The British Government I.1-The Duke of Newcastle 24 I.2-Going to War against Bourbon Spain 25 I.3-The Organization of the British Intelligence System 28 II-The Flowing of Intelligence II.1-The Land Route with the British Agents 33 II.2-The Communication with the Squadron in the Mediterranean 35 II.3-The Communication with the Squadron in the West Indies 37 III-The Gathering of Intelligence in Europe III.1-The British Intelligence Network in Spain 40 III.2-The British Intelligence Network in Portugal 43 III.3-The British Intelligence Network in France 45 III.4-The British Intelligence Network in Italy 49 III.5-The British Squadron in the Mediterranean 52 IV-The Gathering of Intelligence in America IV.1-Going to War against Spain in America 56 IV.2-Information Provided by the British Merchants 58 IV.3-Information Obtained by the British Agents in Europe 61 IV.4-The British Squadron in the West Indies 63 3 Chapter 2: The Spanish Intelligence System (1739-1744) I-The Spanish Government I.1-The Marquis of Villarias 67 I.2-Going to War against Hanoverian Britain 70 I.3-The Organization of the Spanish Intelligence System 72 II-The Flowing of Information II.1-The Land Route with the Spanish Agents 75 II.2-The Communication with the Spanish Colonies 77 II.3-The Communication across the Spanish Colonies 80 III-The Gathering of Intelligence in Europe III.1-The Spanish Intelligence Network in Spain 83 III.2-The Spanish Intelligence Network in Britain 85 III.3-The Spanish Intelligence Network in the Dutch Republic 88 III.4-The Spanish Intelligence Network in Italy 90 III.5-The Spanish Intelligence Network in France 94 IV-The Gathering of Intelligence in America IV.1-The Spanish Intelligence Network in New Grenade 97 IV.2-The Spanish Intelligence Network in Peru 100 IV.3-The Spanish Intelligence Network in New Spain 104 Chapter 3: The Deceptive Expeditions to “His Majesty’s Dominions” Introduction 107 I-The Duke of Montemar and Spanish Military Strategy 110 II-The British Gathering of Intelligence from 1739 to 1740 118 III-The British Military and Naval Decisions in 1739 and 1740 127 IV-The Spanish Intelligence System in 1739 and 1740 134 V-The Departure of the Bourbon Fleets to America 141 VI-Conclusion 148 4 Chapter 4: The British Attack on Cartagena de Indias Introduction 150 I-The British Military Preparations at Home and America 154 II-The Spanish Intelligence System from 1739 to 1740 160 III-The Spanish Military Preparations in America 167 IV-The British Decision to Attack Cartagena de Indias 174 V-The British Attack to Cartagena de Indias 183 VI-Conclusion 189 Chapter 5: The British Attack and the Spanish defence of the Pacific Introduction 190 I-British Intelligence and Military Preparations in Europe 193 II-Spanish Intelligence and Military Preparations in Europe 201 III-Spanish Intelligence and Military Preparations in America 208 IV-British and Spanish Use of Intelligence in the Pacific 214 V-The Capture of the Covadonga 223 VI-Conclusion 229 Chapter 6: Spanish and British Operations in the Mediterranean Introduction 230 I-Spanish Intelligence and Military Preparations for Minorca 234 II-British Intelligence and the Squadron of Vice Admiral Haddock 240 III-Spanish Intelligence and the Military Expedition to Italy 246 IV-The British Intelligence and the Squadron of Vice Admiral Mathews 254 V-British Naval Reinforcements and the Battle of Toulon 262 VI-Conclusion 268 5 Concluding Remarks 269 Maps 271 Archival Material 280 Bibliography 283 6 ABSTRACT The topic of this study is the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739 – 1744) and this thesis concentrates on the close connection between the British and Spanish gathering of intelligence and the military decisions adopted in London and Madrid during the war. The ultimate purpose of this study is to put this war in a broader context and make a contribution to understand the development of the state in eighteenth century Europe. The first part of this study analyses the structure and functioning of the several British and Spanish Intelligence Networks, i.e. diplomatic and political support to these networks, expenditures, flowing of intelligence, messengers, agents, collaborators and counter intelligence. This part consists of two chapters, as follows: (a) the British Intelligence System and (b) the Spanish Intelligence System. The second part of the study explores the connection between the gathering of intelligence and decision-making in Madrid and London. However, the study of the use of intelligence can be problematic. This is because neither on the British nor the Spanish side are there official cabinet records for this period that could directly link one process with the other. In an attempt to solve this difficulty it has been decided to study the connection through four case studies. Each of them will concentrate on one of the military expeditions that Britain and Spain carried out or planned during the war. 7 ACKNOLEDGEMENTS Gratitude and thanks are extended to my primary supervisor, Professor Stephen Conway, lecturer of modern history at University College London, and my second supervisor, Professor Julian Hoppit, Head of History at University College London. Their valuable advice and assistance helped me to persevere in undertaking and writing this dissertation. Appreciation and thanks are also extended to Dr. Rafael Torres at University of Navarra; Dr. Michael Babula at Goldsmiths College; Dr. Antoine Lilti at l’École Normale Supérieure and Professor Christopher Storrs at University of Dundee. These scholars were instrumental in providing helpful advice. Of course, special thanks are given to the employees of archives in Britain, Spain, France and United States, whose valuable assistance has helped in gathering research sources. This thesis is dedicated to my parents Julio Rivas Sola and Virginia Ibáñez Eraso, and my sister Amaya Rivas Ibáñez. 8 LIST OF MAPS MAP 1: Western Europe 271 MAP 2: Iberian Peninsula 272 MAP 3: Great Britain 273 MAP 4: Ferrol 274 MAP 5: Italian Peninsula 275 MAP 6: The Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico 276 MAP 7: South America 277 MAP 8: The Philippines 278 MAP 9: Cartagena de Indias 279 9 ABBREVIATIONS Add. Additional Manuscripts Adm. Admiralty AGI Archivo General de Indias AGS Archivo General de Simancas AHN Archivo Histórico Nacional AO Archive Quai d’Orsay BL British Library Ch(H) Cholmondeley Houghton Papers, Cambridge University Library CO Colonial Papers CPE Correspondence Politique Espagne Eg. Egerton Papers HL House of Lords Record Office LC Library of Congress NS New Style MAE Ministère Affaires Étrangères Mss Manuscripts NMM National Maritime Museum OS Old Style PRO Public Record Office SP State Papers TNA The National Archives 10 DATES Some of the British documents for this period used the Julian Calendar (Old Style) as opposed to the Gregorian Calendar (New Style), which had been established in other European countries. The Old Style was eleven days behind the New Style and the new year started on 25 March. This can be problematic if information from the British and the Spanish documents are combined. As a result, in the present work, references to the British sources indicate the style in which they are written and are specifically translated into the New Style when necessary. 11 INTRODUCTION The purpose of this work is to make a contribution to the better understanding of the mobilization of resources for going to war during early modern times. Traditionally, the historiography has devoted much attention to the raising of money and the mobilization of manpower. In recent years, most of the studies on the mobilization of money and manpower have also served as analyses of the formation of the modern state. State building is defined as a complex, uneven and long process that began in the Middle Ages and culminated in the nineteenth century. During this period, the main purpose of the state was the making of war and the political elites created the necessary structures to mobilize the country’s resources for going to war.1 It was the mobilisation of resources for warfare that continually challenged the state’s expansion, and by the time of the Industrial Revolution, states developed new administrative responsibilities in terms of education, health care, urban infrastructure and social programs for the poor. My work looks at the British and Spanish attempts to gather intelligence during the War of Jenkins’ Ear (1739 – 1744) and explores the connection between information gathering and the military decisions adopted by the British and Spanish governments during the war. It will be argued that the creation and development by the British and Spanish governments of precursor intelligence agencies served as part of the process of the growth of the power of the state. Knowledge was – and is – power, and by working to acquire more accurate information, the British and Spanish states increased their capacity to wage war successfully. The literature indicates that fundraising was a highly important feature in the mobilization of resources for war. In 1989 John Brewer published The Sinews of Power.

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