The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project AMBASSADOR JAMES R. LILLEY Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: May 21, 1998 Copyright 2016 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Background Born and raised in China of American parents Japanese invasion and occupation U.S. schooling U.S. Merchant Marine, World War II Army Specialized Training Reserve Program Yale University China “Third Force” Hong Kong University Columbia University Japan late 1950s-1958 China intelligence objectives Philippines - U.S. Embassy 1958-1961 Chinese Affairs Taiwan Straits Crisis - 1958 “The Ugly American” Philippine leaders Operations Cambodia 1961-1964 China affairs Sihanouk “Dap Chhuon Affair” Thailand 1964-1965 China operation Laos 1965-1968 Ted Shackley 1 Ho Chi Minh Trail Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma Vietnam War Personalities Russians Ambassador Sullivan U.S. military Harriman MACV Ho Chi Minh Trail Inflated statistics Air strikes TACAN North Vietnamese in Laos Plaine de Jarres Meo Jane Fonda Hong Kong 1968-1970 “China watching” Press reporting Chinese communists British Chinese revolution Defectors Mao Zedong Information sources Vietnam War and China Taiwan State Department - China Desk 1970-1971 National Intelligence Survey Memorandums [NISMs] U.S.-China relations Chinese-Soviet relationship Kissinger China visit Marshall Green Taiwan National War College 1971-1972 State Department - Romanian Language Training 1972 Beijing, China - U.S. Liaison Office - “Declared CIA Officer” 1973-1975 Environment George Bush Information sources 2 Ambassador David Bruce Deng Xiao-ping “Group of Four” National Intelligence Officer for China 1975-1978 Taiwan Straits Crisis Duties Chinese-Soviet relations U.S. military contacts China-Vietnam relations President Carter Deng Xiao-ping Arms sales to China Normalization of relations Richard Holbrooke Tibet Hong Kong Chinese tactics George Bush Oil Gang of Four China analysts Stansfield Turner Korea Congress Taiwan independence Reagan and Taiwan Dallas, Texas - Hung Oil Company 1979-1981 Reagan-Bush campaign National Security Council 1981-1982 Responsibilities China-Taiwan Arms sales PRC and White House Taiwan - American Institute in Taiwan [AIT] - Director 1982-1984 “August Communiqué” Taiwan arms sales Taiwan “six assurances” China negotiations Secretary of State Shultz Taiwan-China “open door” Taiwan independence Taiwan-U.S. relations 3 Alaska oil Students Reagan China policy Otis Elevator Company 1984-1985 State Department - East Asian Affairs - Deputy Assistant 1985-1986 Secretary New Zealand Nuclear ship visits Soviet navy China relations Fishing boats Micronesia Compact Asia Development Bank South Korea - Ambassador 1986-1989 Paul Wolfowitz North Korea South Korean government Violence U.S. military presence Korean military Gaston Sigur Democratization President Chun Personalities Student demonstrations Kim Dae Jung Kim Yong Sam No Tae Wu Elections Olympic Games North Korea “GSP” trade DMZ Kim Jong II Economy Winston Lord China - Ambassador 1989-1991 U.S. naval visit Winston Lord Military relationship Human rights Fang Lizhi 4 Gorbachev-Deng Xiao-ping visit Peter Tomsen “May 4 Movement” Corruption Students Tiananmen Square Leadership Importance of “order” Evacuation of U.S. citizens Anti-foreign activity Foreign press U.S. response to Tiananmen Square U.S. sanctions Brent Scowcroft visit Loan issue Henry Kissinger Nixon visit Aircraft sales Satellites U.S. commercial interests Students to U.S. “Desert Storm” Tibet Congressional interest INTERVIEW Q: Today is May 21, 1998. This is an interview with Ambassador James R. Lilley. It is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. To start off, Jim, would you tell me when and where you were born and something about your family? LILLEY: I was born on January 15, 1928, in Tsingtao, China. In modern Chinese, Romanized script it is written as "Qingdao." Q: Where is Tsingtao in China? LILLEY: It is in Shandong Province. Q: That is the peninsula... LILLEY: Which juts out between the Yellow Sea and Po Hai, or the Gulf of Chihli, 5 opposite Japan. That is the Shandong Peninsula, and Tsingtao is on the southern side of it. Tsingtao is the best deep water port in China. Q: Why were you born there? LILLEY: Well, my father worked for what used to be called the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company [also known as "Stanvac"]. In Chinese it's called "Mei Fu Yang Hang." My father went out to China about 1916 from the company headquarters at 26 Broadway in New York City. Of course, this company was originally broken off from John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company. This was the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company, which was jointly owned by Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Standard Oil Company of New York. The company used to send out young men called "Classmen" in groups to China. Maybe they would be sent out in groups of 10 or 20 at a time. These young men would then fan out all over China. They would be trained to speak, read, and write Chinese for about a year. Then they would be sent to work at an "up country" post. As John D. Rockefeller used to convey to these young men: "I want you to sell all of the oil that's sold in your district." Shell Oil Company and Texaco Oil Company were the big competitors of Standard-Vacuum at that time. Anyway, my father came out to China around 1916 as a young man. The rule was that "classmen" couldn't marry during their first tour of duty in China, a tour of five years. Then my father came back to the U.S. and married my mother, who was from New York State. He took her back to China. They had four children: three born in China and one in Tuxedo Park, New York. I was the youngest of the four children. Q: How long were you in China after you were born? LILLEY: I was in China more or less continuously, from 1928 to October, 1940, when all American "dependents" were evacuated from China. I was evacuated from Shanghai, where I was in school. I also came back to the U.S. in 1930. Every three to five years my parents got six months' leave. In 1935 we returned to the U.S. for six months. In 1938 we went back to the U.S. and stayed there from 1938 to 1939, returning to China in late 1939. So I can say that I lived in China almost continuously from the time I was born to when I was 12 years old. During the period from 1928 to 1940 I spent a total of two years in the United States. During this period, then, I spent roughly 10 years in China. Q: Can you tell me something of what it was to be a young American boy living in China at that time? Could you describe your life in China? LILLEY: It was a privileged existence. Tsingtao, where my father was posted for 10 years, was a beautiful port city, built by the Germans. It was then expanded on by the Japanese, with these old, German-type buildings that often looked as if they came right out of Bavaria. The Germans leased Tsingtao from China in 1898, and the Japanese took 6 over the German leased territory in 1914, at the beginning of World War I. The Japanese constructed their type of buildings in Tsingtao, which was a city built on hills, with numerous wide beaches. It was a beautiful place. Foreign countries did not have a "concession" there, as they did in Tientsin or the International Settlement in Shanghai. The foreigners just lived well in Tsingtao. It was a nice posting. The U.S. Navy used to come up to Tsingtao from the Philippines every summer. The USS AUGUSTA, a light cruiser, and then the USS CANOPUS, a submarine tender, would come up. These two ships would go up to Chefoo (Yent'ai) on the North coast of the Shandong Peninsula, then come down to Tsingtao and, from there, return to the Philippines. Q: During this time were you learning Chinese? LILLEY: We didn't learn Chinese the way that the foreign missionaries learned it. We didn't live with the Chinese. We lived in a foreign enclave and attended American schools, where we were taught in English. However, we picked up "street Chinese" from the servants and people in town. We learned how to swear, how to talk, and how to make our way around. It was very primitive Chinese. After I returned to the U.S., I had to begin again and learn to speak Chinese properly. Q: During the 1930s what were the events that affected all of you? I can't remember when the Japanese moved into China, but I recall that it was during the 1930s. LILLEY: Well, let me "walk that process through." The status of Tsingtao was one of the "21 Demands" which the Japanese presented to China in December, 1915. The Japanese wanted to take over the German concession in Tsingtao during World War I. The "21 Demands" led to a furor of Chinese nationalistic demonstrations. The Japanese were talked out of pressing these "demands" by other foreign countries, and eventually they "backed off." However, the Japanese maintained Tsingtao as a "sphere of influence" after the Germans were forced to give it up formally at the end of World War I. The Japanese had lots of businessmen there in Tsingtao. Then the Japanese moved into Manchuria in 1931. In 1937 they moved into China proper. Up until 1937 Tsingtao was dominated by European Caucasians. The British were the strongest, but there were also the French, the Belgians, and the Dutch. The Germans had lost their settlements in China as a result of World War I.
Recommended publications
  • September 12, 2006 the Honorable John Warner, Chairman The
    GENERAL JOHN SHALIKASHVILI, USA (RET.) GENERAL JOSEPH HOAR, USMC (RET.) ADMIRAL GREGORY G. JOHNSON, USN (RET.) ADMIRAL JAY L. JOHNSON, USN (RET.) GENERAL PAUL J. KERN, USA (RET.) GENERAL MERRILL A. MCPEAK, USAF (RET.) ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER, USN (RET.) GENERAL WILLIAM G. T. TUTTLE JR., USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL DANIEL W. CHRISTMAN, USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL E. FUNK, USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT G. GARD JR., USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAY M. GARNER, USA (RET.) VICE ADMIRAL LEE F. GUNN, USN (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARLEN D. JAMESON, USAF (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLAUDIA J. KENNEDY, USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL DONALD L. KERRICK, USA (RET.) VICE ADMIRAL ALBERT H. KONETZNI JR., USN (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHARLES OTSTOTT, USA (RET.) VICE ADMIRAL JACK SHANAHAN, USN (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY E. SOYSTER, USA (RET.) LIEUTENANT GENERAL PAUL K. VAN RIPER, USMC (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL JOHN BATISTE, USA (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL EUGENE FOX, USA (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL JOHN L. FUGH, USA (RET.) REAR ADMIRAL DON GUTER, USN (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL FRED E. HAYNES, USMC (RET.) REAR ADMIRAL JOHN D. HUTSON, USN (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL MELVYN MONTANO, ANG (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL GERALD T. SAJER, USA (RET.) MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL J. SCOTTI JR., USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID M. BRAHMS, USMC (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES P. CULLEN, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL EVELYN P. FOOTE, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID R. IRVINE, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN H. JOHNS, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL RICHARD O’MEARA, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL MURRAY G. SAGSVEEN, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN K. SCHMITT, USA (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL ANTHONY VERRENGIA, USAF (RET.) BRIGADIER GENERAL STEPHEN N.
    [Show full text]
  • Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 11 Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Kathleen Bailey presents evidence of forgeries to the press corps. Credit: The Washington Times Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference Deception, Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group Made a Major Difference By Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 11 Series Editor: Nicholas Rostow National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. June 2012 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal Government.
    [Show full text]
  • CIA Director Documentary: 'The Attacks Will Be Spectacular'
    Case 1:15-cv-01954-CM Document 53-4 Filed 12/01/15 Page 1 of 7 Exhibit 54 November 2015 Panetta Statement CIA Director Documentary: Case‘The Attacks 1:15-cv-01954-CM Will Be Spectacular’ - POLITICO Document Magazine 53-4 Filed 12/01/15 Page 2 of 7 11/30/15, 8:17 PM THE FRIDAY COVER ‘The Attacks Will Be Spectacular’ An exclusive look at how the Bush administration ignored this warning from the CIA months before 9/11, along with others that were far more detailed than previously revealed. By CHRIS WHIPPLE | November 12, 2015 Getty in Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.” The CIA’s famous Presidential Daily Brief, presented to George W. Bush on August 6, 2001, has always been Exhibit A in the “B case that his administration shrugged off warnings of an Al Qaeda attack. But months earlier, starting in the spring of 2001, the CIA repeatedly and urgently began to warn the White House that an attack was coming. By May of 2001, says Cofer Black, then chief of the CIA’s counterterrorism center, “it was very http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/11/cia-directors-documentary-911-bush-213353 Page 1 of 6 CIA Director Documentary: Case‘The Attacks 1:15-cv-01954-CM Will Be Spectacular’ - POLITICO Document Magazine 53-4 Filed 12/01/15 Page 3 of 7 11/30/15, 8:17 PM evident that we were going to be struck, we were gonna be struck hard and lots of Americans were going to die.” “There were real plots being manifested,” Cofer’s former boss, George Tenet, told me in his first interview in eight years.
    [Show full text]
  • Interview with Jonathan Dayton (Jock) Stoddart
    Library of Congress Interview with Jonathan Dayton (Jock) Stoddart The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project JONATHAN (JOCK) DAYTON STODDART Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: January 19, 2000 Copyright 2002 ADST Q: This is an interview with Jonathan Dayton Stoddart which is being done on behave of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Jock let's start with when and where were you born? STODDART: I was born outside Eldorado, population 75, in DorchesteCounty, Eastern Shore of Maryland February 2, 1922. Q: Could you tell me a little about your family and theibackgrounds? STODDART: Both of my parents were from Philadelphia. My mother came from a relatively affluent family. She was born, as was my father, in 1896. She was a very bright, gregarious, and attractive young woman. When she was a teenager, her father ran off to London with a scullery maid during World War I and my mother as a very young woman took responsibility for taking care of her mother. She became a newspaper woman and worked for the old Philadelphia Record in advertising. After World War I, she met my father, who came from a completely different family background, respected but poor. He was orphaned by the time he was five years old and was brought up by a wonderful woman, his grandmother, who worked at the U.S. Mint in Philadelphia until her early 80s. He spent ages six through ten in an orphanage outside of Philadelphia. He graduated Interview with Jonathan Dayton (Jock) Stoddart http://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib001134 Library of Congress on an accelerated curriculum at the age of 16 from Central High School in Philadelphia, which was considered a very elite, good school.
    [Show full text]
  • Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Central Intelligence Tom Grassey
    Naval War College Review Volume 59 Article 16 Number 4 Autumn 2006 Burn before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Central Intelligence Tom Grassey Stansfield urT ner Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Grassey, Tom and Turner, Stansfield (2006) "Burn before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Central Intelligence," Naval War College Review: Vol. 59 : No. 4 , Article 16. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/16 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen 142Grassey NAVAL and WAR Turner: COLLEGE Burn REVIEWbefore Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Central Intel find a single plan laid out in such com- expected to produce an atomic bomb is plete detail. mid-1950 and the most probable date is mid-1953.” RICHMOND M. LLOYD William B. Ruger Chair of Turner recounts subsequent intelligence National Security Economics failures, but because the manuscript was Naval War College submitted to the CIA for security review, few readers should be surprised by this history. While most facts are familiar, Turner’s Turner, Stansfield. Burn before Reading: Presidents, thesis is that the director of Central In- CIA Directors, and Central Intelligence. New York: telligence serves the president in two ca- Hyperion, 2005. 319pp. $23.95 pacities: leading the CIA in providing Presumably Stansfield Turner did not unbiased intelligence; and heading the devise the nonsensical title of this history intelligence community, “fifteen federal of the DCI’s (Director, Central Intelli- agencies, offices, and bureaus within the gence) relationship with the president of executive branch.” Turner evaluates the the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • 1951-05-31.Pdf
    Full Local Coverage Complete News, Pictures A Newspaper, Devoted Presented Fairly, Clearly To the Community Interest • And Impartially Each Week VOL. XIII—NO, 25 FORDS, N. J., THURSDAY, fUNE 1, 1951 PRICE FIVE CENTS 223 to Receive Diplomas By CHARLES 15. GREGORY At Exercises Slated I hope the Board of Educa- IM Stadium at 6:45 an on Jnne tion will heed the storm WOODEHIDGE — Two hundred i warnings. an i tvrrni V-three- Woqdbridge High * * * School seniors will receive their diplomas next Wednesday at 6:45 Confab Is Set A big blow is on the way, as F. M. at the sixty-fifth annual n I see it, and I am afraid it commencement exercises at Wood- \ will destroy the hopes so bridge High School Stadium. many of us have so long held As PTA Urges that we were approaching a In case inclement weather caus- WOODBRZDGE—Demands were who are going to pay for the new es a postponement, four blasts will | freely made in letters received by high school, and the least they are time when we could offer ade- be sounded on the fire alarm at | The Independent-Leader this week entitled to is'the confidence that New Architect quate -high school facilities five o'clock and the exercises will! that the Board of Education con- jthey are getting the best building to more than a thousand of be held the next clear night. , j suit other architects before decid- possible for their tax dollars. WOODBRIDGE—In the face of our youngsters who have pa- The complete- program is as fol- ing on plans for the new high "May we take this opportunity a mounting storm of criticism and tiently sat out our diddling lows: Processional, "War March of school.
    [Show full text]
  • Vice President's Meeting with People's Republic of China Vice Premier
    W':' S C1 i NG'ON <!fOP ::!f!C~ / SENSITIVE / EYES ONLY MEMO~~DUM OF CONVERSA~ION SUBJECT: S~~ary of the Vice President ' s Meeting with People's Republic of China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping PARTICIPP.. NTS : Vice President Walter Mondale Leonard Woodcock, U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of China David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affa~rs Richard Moe, Chief of Staff to the Vice President Denis Clift, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affair Michel Oksenberg, St"_aff Member I NSC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping Huang Hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs Chai Zemin, People's Republic of China Ambassador to the United States Zhang Wenjin, Deputy Foreign Minister Han Xu, Director of American Depar~~ent Wei Yongqing, Director of Protocol Ji Chaozhu, Deputy Director of American Depart.:nent DATE, TD1E August 28, 1979; 9:30 a.m. - 12:00 Noon k'lD PLACE: The Great Hall of the People, Beijing, People's Republic of China Vi=e Premier Deng: I heard your speech ;vas war:nly ;.;elcomed. Vice ?res:":ient ~oncale: I W2.S thril2.ed by t.he opportunity to spea2< at your great unive.r·sity anc. -='0 speak to the people. It was an unprecedented occasion, and I t.hank you for that. cpport"..lni ty. DECLASSIFIED \E.O.12958, Sec.3.6 :~_R--I.~~__ NA~ ::T~31m;:J" ,TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/ EYES ONLY 2 Vice Premier Deng: It was published in full in today ' s People's Daily.
    [Show full text]
  • CLASSROOM | 9-12 Lessons
    CLASSROOM | 9-12 Lessons : JIMMY CARTER AND THE IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS President Carter announces sanctions against Iran in the White House Press Room. Jimmy Carter Library Jimmy Carter would say later, “No matter who was with me, we watched the big grandfather clock by the door.” Time was running out, for it was Tuesday, January 20, 1981. The scene was the Oval Office. In just hours this president would leave it for good, and a new leader, Ronald Reagan, would move in. As the clock ticked the time away, Carter tried to resolve a crisis that had almost destroyed his presidency. He was close, very close, and as he said, “At stake were the lives of 52 precious human beings who had been imprisoned in Iran for 444 days–and almost 12 billion dollars of Iranian assets.” 1 Prelude The beginnings of this crisis preceded Jimmy Carter’s term by almost thirty years. For that long, the United States had provided political support and, more recently, massive military assistance to the government of the shah of Iran. Iran was important because it provided oil to the industrial West and separated the Soviet Union from the Persian Gulf and the oil states. The United States had an enormous stake in keeping it stable and independent. By 1979, however, when Carter had been in office three years, the shah was in trouble, reaping the harvest of years of brutal and unpopular policies, including the use of secret police that controlled dissent with arbitrary arrests and torture.2 It was clear that the shah had lost the (next page) White House Historical Association | http://www.whha.org | Pg.
    [Show full text]
  • Trump's Generals
    STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY - PERSPECTIVE Trump’s Generals: A Natural Experiment in Civil-Military Relations JAMES JOYNER Abstract President Donald Trump’s filling of numerous top policy positions with active and retired officers he called “my generals” generated fears of mili- tarization of foreign policy, loss of civilian control of the military, and politicization of the military—yet also hope that they might restrain his worst impulses. Because the generals were all gone by the halfway mark of his administration, we have a natural experiment that allows us to com- pare a Trump presidency with and without retired generals serving as “adults in the room.” None of the dire predictions turned out to be quite true. While Trump repeatedly flirted with civil- military crises, they were not significantly amplified or deterred by the presence of retired generals in key roles. Further, the pattern continued in the second half of the ad- ministration when “true” civilians filled these billets. Whether longer-term damage was done, however, remains unresolved. ***** he presidency of Donald Trump served as a natural experiment, testing many of the long- debated precepts of the civil-military relations (CMR) literature. His postelection interviewing of Tmore than a half dozen recently retired four- star officers for senior posts in his administration unleashed a torrent of columns pointing to the dangers of further militarization of US foreign policy and damage to the military as a nonpartisan institution. At the same time, many argued that these men were uniquely qualified to rein in Trump’s worst pro- clivities. With Trump’s tenure over, we can begin to evaluate these claims.
    [Show full text]
  • Conduct and Support of Amphibious Operations from United States Submarines in World War II
    Conduct and Support of Amphibious Operations from United States Submarines in World War II A Monograph by LCDR Brian J. Haggerty United States Navy School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas AY 2010 Approved for Public Release: Distribution is Unlimited Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 074-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED blank) 9NOV2010 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Conduct and Support of Amphibious Operations from United States Submarines in World War II 6. AUTHOR(S) LCDR Brian Haggerty, USN 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER School of Advanced Military Studies 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for Public Release: Distribution is Unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words) The U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S
    United States Cryptologic History Cryptologic States United United States Cryptologic History Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941 Pearl Harbor Revisited Harbor Pearl 2013 Series IV: World War II | Volume 6 n57370 Center for Cryptologic History This publication presents a historical perspective for informational and educational purposes, is the result of independent research, and does not necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any other U.S. government entity. This publication is distributed free by the National Security Agency. If you would like additional copies, please submit your request to: Center for Cryptologic History National Security Agency 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6886 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755 Frederick D. Parker retired from NSA in 1984 after thirty-two years of service. Following his retirement, he worked as a reemployed annuitant and volunteer in the Center for Cryptologic His- tory. Mr. Parker served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1943 to 1945 and from 1950 to 1952. He holds a B.S. from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Cover: First Army photo of the bombing of Hawaii, 7 December 1941; the battleship USS Arizona in background is on fire and sinking. Signal Corps photo taken from Aeia Heights. Pearl Harbor Revisited: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941 Frederick D. Parker Series IV: World War II | Volume 6 Third edition 2013 Contents Foreword ...................................................................... 5 Introduction .................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • US-China Security Management
    CHILD POLICY This PDF document was made available CIVIL JUSTICE from www.rand.org as a public service of EDUCATION the RAND Corporation. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE Jump down to document6 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit POPULATION AND AGING research organization providing PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY objective analysis and effective SUBSTANCE ABUSE solutions that address the challenges TERRORISM AND facing the public and private sectors HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND around the world. INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Project AIR FORCE View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. U.S.-China Security Management Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship KEVIN POLLPETER Prepared for the United States Air Force Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-01-C-0003. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF.
    [Show full text]