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Halfaya from Breaking North- Rommel's Dash to the Wire

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Halfaya from Breaking North- Rommel's Dash to the Wire Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za :2 A~TI- T4~K REGI~E~Tf SAA: - -A~K A~[) A~TI- TA~K I~ THE WESTER~ [)ESERTf 1940-1942 (Va•.• 2) Reorganisation on the frontier On the morning of the 28th detachments from 5 Indian Infantry Brigade were already moving On 28 November 1941 Rommel temporarily towards Capuzzo, accompanied by 1 Field abandoned the frontier garrisons to their fate Regiment RA and C Battery of 2 A/Tk Regi- and turned westwards to return to the To- ment SAA. bruk-Sidi Rezegh area. Freyberg's New Zea- At Menastir the enemy continued to be active landers had made the most of the Panzer Di- and 22 New Zealand Battalion, isolated from vision's absence and had taken Belhamed and the rest of its Brigade and perilously short of ed Duda, recaptured Sidi Rezegh and linked ammunition, felt unable to oppose the isolated with the garrison of Tobruk. The German German armoured formations in that area. On armoured divisions now turned back towards receiving the news from NZ Divisional Cavalry Sidi Rezegh along the Trigh Capuzzo where Regiment that 4 Indian Division Headquarters they were further damaged in encounters were at the Omars the commander of 22 with New Zealand units, but the poor tactical Battalion decided to withdraw there for sup- handling of the British 22 Armoured Brigade plies and fresh orders. After dark on 28 No- allowed Rommel's weakened forces through. vember 22 Battalion headed south with its The German artillery inflicted heavy losses 220 vehicles and halted at Point 201, five again on 7 Armoured Division and battle was once more joined around Sidi Rezegh, where miles north of the Omars, at 0230 hI'S the the British forces on 29 and 30 November next day. Later that morning Messervy, com- were employed with characteristic lack of manding 4 Indian Division, sent orders for co-ordination and were defeated in detail. Lt-Col Andrew of 22 Battalion to assume The unprotected New Zealand Division was command of 5 New Zealand Brigade, establish badly mauled in consequence and Belhamed a new headquarters to replace that captured and Sidi Rezegh changed hands once more; on the 27th and to hold a line from Capuzzo Tobruk was besieged again. through Musaid to Upper Sollum. Ritchie, commanding 8 Army, was under the erro- On the 28th with XIII Corps preoccupied by neous impression that the Afrika Korps was the renewed fighting around Tobruk, respon- being supplied largely from Bardia, and wanted sibility for the frontier area was assumed by the reconstituted 5 New Zealand Brigade, aug- Maj-Genl Messervy, the commander of 4 In- mented by 5 Indian Brigade, to continue dian Division. Having seen off Rommel's to mask that town. In addition to stopping tanks, his forces were now preparing to as- enemy maintenance parties from entering or sault the enemy still holding out in Libyan leaving Bardia the Brigade was to prevent Omar. Other preparations were also afoot the Axis frontier garrisons along the line from to tidy up the confused situation created by Point 207 to Halfaya from breaking north- Rommel's dash to the wire. wards. The departure of the enemy armour from the Messervy was eager to avoid weakening his vicinity of Capuzzo on the 27th and 28th left Division further by incurring heavy casualties 23 and 28 New Zealand Battalions of 5 New however and units engaged in the harrassment Zealand Brigade still in possession of this vital of enemy troops were to avoid fixed positions area. These units were now desperately short until the arrival of the field and medium ar- of food and ammunition however, and suc- tillery made possible a more strenuous pro- cour had been promised by 4 Indian Division. secution of the siege. 5 Indian Brigade would 49- Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za send patrols along the Trigh Capuzzo, and by 1 December 5 Indian Brigade had completed along the west of the frontier wire between its partial relief of 5 New Zealand Brigade Omar Nuovo and Bir Sheferzen. Meanwhile and had occupied the Capuzzo - Musaid - the New Zealanders would turn their full Sollum line while the New Zealanders con- attention to the Via Balbia, and shortly after centrated around the Via Balbia to the north. D Battery 2 A/Tk arrived in Omar Nuovo, its M and 0 Troops were detached to accompany Despite the setbacks around Belhamed and the mobile columns of the New Zealand Di- Sidi Rezegh and the elimination from the battle visional Cavalry. of most of the New Zealand Division, Ritchie remained optimistic about the eventual suc- For the next few days patrols were carried ces of 'Crusader'. He had concluded, rightly, out along the Bardia-Tobruk road, and on 30 that Rommel's forces were nearer exhaustion November 0 Troop found itself in action in than his own, and that the Axis lines of sup- support of the Divisional Cavalry's A Squa- ply and reinforcement were still effectively dron, accounting for four armoured vehicles blocked by Allied air and naval strikes. In and two 3-ton lorries. Ritchie's opinion it was vital for the Allies Ever since the excitement of the 25th, 2 to retain the initiative and give Rommel no A/Tk's A Battery had been operating with respite, and in this view he was emphatically mobile columns of the Central India Horse seconded by Auchinleck. and 6 South African Armoured Car Regiment With Rommel's armour now settling behind in the vicinity of FSD 50 and Bir Sheferzen. anti-tank defences in the Sidi Rezegh area On 28 November the 2-pdrs of A Battery Ritchie proposed to have XIII Corps hold its joined a mobile column of guns and light ar- ground in the Tobruk salient while he launched moured vehicles under Major Newall to sweep XXX Corps to seize EI Adem, a vital commu- the area south of the wire between the Omars nications centre whose capture would be and Halfaya. While engaged on these escort just as damaging to Rommel's position as tasks the anti-tank guns came under fire on another successful assault on Sidi Rezegh. several occasions but always at too great For the EI Adem operation XXX Carps wouid a range to join in the retaliation. Meanwhile use 7 Armoured Division, 22 Guards Brigade, A Battery's 18-pdr troop had been ordered 1 SA Infantry Brigade and 4 Indian Division. into Omar Nuovo, where 7 Indian Brigade From the latter 11 Indian Brigade had already had been told to hold the position at all costs, been moved south of the Omars to form part should Rommel return. Nand P Troops of D of XXX Corps reserve, and the remainder of Battery 2 A/Tk also formed part of the anti- the Division would follow as soon as it could tan k defence. be relieved a:ong the frontier by 2 SA Divi- sion which was earmarked for this more The Omars Secured static role as it was yet insufficiently equipped or trained for mobile operations. It had been decided now to try to take the remainder of the Omar positon and on the By 2 December Rommel realised he had won night of 30/31 November 3/1 Punjab Regi- the local battle around Sidi Rezegh and had ment attacked Libyan Omar from the north, once again prevented the relief of Tobruk. supported by 31 Field Regiment RA and the Central India Horse, and secured a lodgement Rommel Wayla!d in the position after very severe fighting. 4/16 Punjab Regiment was thrown into the battle Intercepted signals indicated that Ritchie was on the next day, and by nightfall on 31 No- unlikely to renew the offensive before the 3rd vember only a force of about a hundred Ger- and Rommel was therefore tempted to assay mans remained unvanquished. This small par- another relief of the frontier garrisons. His ty attempted to escape but were rounded up forces were now in far worse shape than by patrols, and dawn on 1 December the when he had mounted his previous dash to whole of the Omar position was in Allied the wire however, and he decided to try to hands. The severity of the Axis resistance had, disguise this fact by using advance guards however,caused some disturbance to the plans to clear the Gambut area. These advance for relocating 4 Indian Division. Nevertheless, guards were to move off immediately along 50 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za j '" ,..:. '", IT.":'~'L, ."."., '" 8'" '1"OiCl"l)t ~~~.~.... ., ",,'1,::~~.~.~;.~ :,' . ..p TO \~" _ •• , •••• '. " , ••• ',' •••••• , ... "','. '0', "" ••" __••.•,.,.._ ~ . , "<"'. •• ,-:;.. '" .",','','.' '" .. ' ..;;;-%:':0" ... -~: ~,j •..•;''i''l:''f,,'',.•••'''''''.~ ~.. 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" """ tf\ U l1Ilim:"iIDE, • D 'l'Q"'. 4Z' f i the Trigh Capuzzo and Via Balbia. At the cautiously and the German Infantry dismount- same time Rommel ordered General Gambara ed some two miles west of 28 New Zealand to move Ariete and Trieste Divisions to the (Maori) Battalion's positions.
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