Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
:2 A~TI- T4~K REGI~E~Tf SAA: - -A~K A~[) A~TI- TA~K I~ THE WESTER~
[)ESERTf 1940-1942
(Va•.• 2)
Reorganisation on the frontier On the morning of the 28th detachments from 5 Indian Infantry Brigade were already moving On 28 November 1941 Rommel temporarily towards Capuzzo, accompanied by 1 Field abandoned the frontier garrisons to their fate Regiment RA and C Battery of 2 A/Tk Regi- and turned westwards to return to the To- ment SAA. bruk-Sidi Rezegh area. Freyberg's New Zea- At Menastir the enemy continued to be active landers had made the most of the Panzer Di- and 22 New Zealand Battalion, isolated from vision's absence and had taken Belhamed and the rest of its Brigade and perilously short of ed Duda, recaptured Sidi Rezegh and linked ammunition, felt unable to oppose the isolated with the garrison of Tobruk. The German German armoured formations in that area. On armoured divisions now turned back towards receiving the news from NZ Divisional Cavalry Sidi Rezegh along the Trigh Capuzzo where Regiment that 4 Indian Division Headquarters they were further damaged in encounters were at the Omars the commander of 22 with New Zealand units, but the poor tactical Battalion decided to withdraw there for sup- handling of the British 22 Armoured Brigade plies and fresh orders. After dark on 28 No- allowed Rommel's weakened forces through. vember 22 Battalion headed south with its The German artillery inflicted heavy losses 220 vehicles and halted at Point 201, five again on 7 Armoured Division and battle was once more joined around Sidi Rezegh, where miles north of the Omars, at 0230 hI'S the the British forces on 29 and 30 November next day. Later that morning Messervy, com- were employed with characteristic lack of manding 4 Indian Division, sent orders for co-ordination and were defeated in detail. Lt-Col Andrew of 22 Battalion to assume The unprotected New Zealand Division was command of 5 New Zealand Brigade, establish badly mauled in consequence and Belhamed a new headquarters to replace that captured and Sidi Rezegh changed hands once more; on the 27th and to hold a line from Capuzzo Tobruk was besieged again. through Musaid to Upper Sollum. Ritchie, commanding 8 Army, was under the erro- On the 28th with XIII Corps preoccupied by neous impression that the Afrika Korps was the renewed fighting around Tobruk, respon- being supplied largely from Bardia, and wanted sibility for the frontier area was assumed by the reconstituted 5 New Zealand Brigade, aug- Maj-Genl Messervy, the commander of 4 In- mented by 5 Indian Brigade, to continue dian Division. Having seen off Rommel's to mask that town. In addition to stopping tanks, his forces were now preparing to as- enemy maintenance parties from entering or sault the enemy still holding out in Libyan leaving Bardia the Brigade was to prevent Omar. Other preparations were also afoot the Axis frontier garrisons along the line from to tidy up the confused situation created by Point 207 to Halfaya from breaking north- Rommel's dash to the wire. wards. The departure of the enemy armour from the Messervy was eager to avoid weakening his vicinity of Capuzzo on the 27th and 28th left Division further by incurring heavy casualties 23 and 28 New Zealand Battalions of 5 New however and units engaged in the harrassment Zealand Brigade still in possession of this vital of enemy troops were to avoid fixed positions area. These units were now desperately short until the arrival of the field and medium ar- of food and ammunition however, and suc- tillery made possible a more strenuous pro- cour had been promised by 4 Indian Division. secution of the siege. 5 Indian Brigade would
49- Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
send patrols along the Trigh Capuzzo, and by 1 December 5 Indian Brigade had completed along the west of the frontier wire between its partial relief of 5 New Zealand Brigade Omar Nuovo and Bir Sheferzen. Meanwhile and had occupied the Capuzzo - Musaid - the New Zealanders would turn their full Sollum line while the New Zealanders con- attention to the Via Balbia, and shortly after centrated around the Via Balbia to the north. D Battery 2 A/Tk arrived in Omar Nuovo, its M and 0 Troops were detached to accompany Despite the setbacks around Belhamed and the mobile columns of the New Zealand Di- Sidi Rezegh and the elimination from the battle visional Cavalry. of most of the New Zealand Division, Ritchie remained optimistic about the eventual suc- For the next few days patrols were carried ces of 'Crusader'. He had concluded, rightly, out along the Bardia-Tobruk road, and on 30 that Rommel's forces were nearer exhaustion November 0 Troop found itself in action in than his own, and that the Axis lines of sup- support of the Divisional Cavalry's A Squa- ply and reinforcement were still effectively dron, accounting for four armoured vehicles blocked by Allied air and naval strikes. In and two 3-ton lorries. Ritchie's opinion it was vital for the Allies Ever since the excitement of the 25th, 2 to retain the initiative and give Rommel no A/Tk's A Battery had been operating with respite, and in this view he was emphatically mobile columns of the Central India Horse seconded by Auchinleck. and 6 South African Armoured Car Regiment With Rommel's armour now settling behind in the vicinity of FSD 50 and Bir Sheferzen. anti-tank defences in the Sidi Rezegh area On 28 November the 2-pdrs of A Battery Ritchie proposed to have XIII Corps hold its joined a mobile column of guns and light ar- ground in the Tobruk salient while he launched moured vehicles under Major Newall to sweep XXX Corps to seize EI Adem, a vital commu- the area south of the wire between the Omars nications centre whose capture would be and Halfaya. While engaged on these escort just as damaging to Rommel's position as tasks the anti-tank guns came under fire on another successful assault on Sidi Rezegh. several occasions but always at too great For the EI Adem operation XXX Carps wouid a range to join in the retaliation. Meanwhile use 7 Armoured Division, 22 Guards Brigade, A Battery's 18-pdr troop had been ordered 1 SA Infantry Brigade and 4 Indian Division. into Omar Nuovo, where 7 Indian Brigade From the latter 11 Indian Brigade had already had been told to hold the position at all costs, been moved south of the Omars to form part should Rommel return. Nand P Troops of D of XXX Corps reserve, and the remainder of Battery 2 A/Tk also formed part of the anti- the Division would follow as soon as it could tan k defence. be relieved a:ong the frontier by 2 SA Divi- sion which was earmarked for this more The Omars Secured static role as it was yet insufficiently equipped or trained for mobile operations. It had been decided now to try to take the remainder of the Omar positon and on the By 2 December Rommel realised he had won night of 30/31 November 3/1 Punjab Regi- the local battle around Sidi Rezegh and had ment attacked Libyan Omar from the north, once again prevented the relief of Tobruk. supported by 31 Field Regiment RA and the Central India Horse, and secured a lodgement Rommel Wayla!d in the position after very severe fighting. 4/16 Punjab Regiment was thrown into the battle Intercepted signals indicated that Ritchie was on the next day, and by nightfall on 31 No- unlikely to renew the offensive before the 3rd vember only a force of about a hundred Ger- and Rommel was therefore tempted to assay mans remained unvanquished. This small par- another relief of the frontier garrisons. His ty attempted to escape but were rounded up forces were now in far worse shape than by patrols, and dawn on 1 December the when he had mounted his previous dash to whole of the Omar position was in Allied the wire however, and he decided to try to hands. The severity of the Axis resistance had, disguise this fact by using advance guards however,caused some disturbance to the plans to clear the Gambut area. These advance for relocating 4 Indian Division. Nevertheless, guards were to move off immediately along
50 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
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the Trigh Capuzzo and Via Balbia. At the cautiously and the German Infantry dismount- same time Rommel ordered General Gambara ed some two miles west of 28 New Zealand to move Ariete and Trieste Divisions to the (Maori) Battalion's positions. Sollum front to renew the battle of encircle- ment. At 1130 hrs a few shells landed on the escarp- ment south of the road and at 1200 hrs part On the afternoon of 2 December an advance of 28 Battalion was subjected to heavy auto- guard provided by 15 Panzer Division pushed matic fire. The enemy had now remounted along the Via Balbia towards Bardia. This and were moving towards the Maori positions force, under the command of Lt Col Geissler but concentrating their attention on the consisted of the Headquarters 200 Regiment, escarpment for any signs of ambush. Only at 15 Motor-Cycle Battalion, and detachments 1300 hrs, with the enemy vehicles well past of anti-tank and field artillery; Geissler Ad- the Maoris' advanced positions and only 60 vance Guard spent the night of 2/3 Decem- yards from the battalion's automatic weapons, ber at Gambut. did the New Zealanders open fire. The small arms and automatic weapons were aug- As we have seen, patrols of New Zealanders mented by fire from the supporting artillery were also making use of the Via Balbia, while and the front of Geissler's column was rapidly the escarpment overlooking the road from the reduced to a shambles. The Germans, once south was being watched by 'Goldforce', a they had begun to recover from this initial composite group consisting of the Central shock, attempted for the remainder of the India Horse with detachments of field and afternoon to find a way around the New anti-tank artillery. On the morning of the 3rd, Zealand position, but were held off by close A Squadron of the Divisional Cavalry with infantry-artillery co-operation. Eventually the o troop of D Battery 2 A/Tk in attendance column was forced into retreat and the New spotted Geissler's force. The New Zealand Zealand infantry and carriers rounded up large patrol pulled back quickly to Bir ez-Zemla to numbers of enemy troops. Geissler's report warn 5 Brigade Headquarters, and all other showed his casualties as 8 wounded and 231 patrols were rapidly withdrawn while the Bri- missing, although New Zealand Brigade Head- gade put itself in a state of defence. Geissler quarters claimed 239 killed, 129 wounded and Advance Guard came down the Via Balbia 100 prisoners. Whatever the correct figures it
51 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
had been a severe blow to German arms and yet undefined, menace from the south. The had caused the northern push to recoil, at Axis assault on Ed Duda was called off, the a cost to the defenders of only 2 dead and drive towards the frontier abandoned and 9 wounded. a Troop 0 Battery 2 A/Tk sup- various supply units stationed in the Gambut porting the Maoris suffered no casualties and area recalled. Ironically just as Rommel aban- claimed to have destroyed 24 troop carriers, doned his hitherto ineffective dash for the 1 armoured fighting vehicle, 4 gun tractors wire, Ritchie's concern about German activi1y and 2 guns, in addition to capturing 2 Ger- on the Trigh Capuzzo led him to divert man 50 mm anti-tank guns; BSM Mason was valuable forces to cope with a threat which commended for his gallant conduct and deci- had already been removed, and postpone his sive leadership during this encounter. push towards El Adem.
Further to the south, Knabe Advance Guard The Axis Withdrawal had been slightly more fortunate. Knabe's group consisted of II Battalion of 104 Infantry But Rommel was still unaware that his move- Regiment, an anti-tank company, artillery, and ments had belatedly pushed 8 Army off ba- three tanks. Armoured cars of the Central lance. His own thoughts were dominated by India Horse retreated tantalisingly in front of a meSSJge received from Italy on 5 December the German column until their victims were to the effect that only essential supplies could drawn on to the guns of 31 Field Regiment be ferried across the Mediterranean in the RA and 65 A/Tk Regiment RA. Blenheims and face of Allied interceptions; no reinforcements Hurricane fighter-bombers added their share would be forthcoming in the near future. This to the defenders' fire and by dusk Knabe was serious news to a commander who had pulled back, with considerable loss. only 40 of the tanks out of the 250 with Rommel's second dash to the wire had began which he had begun the battle, and with near- most inauspiciously, but this did not herald ly 20 000 of his troops now isolated in fron- any early abandonment of the plan. Cruwell's tier garrisons. At this stage the German com- anxieties about the situation at Ed Duda had mander began to consider a tactical withdra- some effect however and 21 Panzer Division wal to prevent a British outflanking movement was recalled to join Mickl's composite group through the desert to the south. in an attack on the meagre Allied forces 8 Army was still very dispersed and had taken holding that vital point. The push along the some heavy blows in the confused fighting Via Balbia was therefore abondoned, while which developed around Bir el Gubi on 4 and that along the Trigh Capuzzo was reinforced, 5 December. On 6 December Ritch:e was still and 15 Panzer Divis:on set off to join Ariete undertain of Rommel's intentions, although Division and Group Knabe at Gasr el Arid on the latter's withdrawal from the Ed Duda area the morning of 4 December. This move had allowed the second 'relief of Tobruk to created some alarm at 8 Army Headquarters, take place. and for a while threatened to divert forces from XXX Corps operations around Bir el Throughout the 7th the desultory fighting con- Gubi. News of Geissler's defeat was reassur- tinued, with constant intervention from the air ing however and even the greatly reinforced forces of both sides. No decisive combat took Knabe Group failed to do any more than push place on this day, yet Rommel now decided 'Goldforce' towards Bardia without inflicting that in the absence of a victory he could much loss. Before 15 Panzer Division could leave withdrawal no later. On 8 December come to grips with the New Zealanders or Rommel began his bitter retreat. towards the Indians in the frontier positions the whole Gazala position which had been constructed Axis force on the Trigh Capuzzo was sudden- in May 1941. ly recalled by Afrika Korps Headquarters.
The stout Allied defence of Ed Duda and XXX 2 SA Div:sion Enters the Fight Corp's sudden attack on the Italians at Bir el Gubi had thrown the Axis plans into disarray. 2 SA Division finally began to emerge from The Afrika I 52 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za A garrison of nearly 9000 men remained in Bardia under Maj-Genl Schmitt, while strung from Sollum through Halfaya Pass to Falten- bacher, Cirener (Point 207), Cova (Got Adhi- diba) and Bir Ghirba were a series of OUI- posts mustering over 6000 defenders under the command of Maj-Genl Fedele de Giorgis of the Savona Division. On the Divison's arrival at the frontier 3 SA Infantry Brigade was detailed to take over the northern part of the line isolating Bardia, relieving 5 Indian Brigade for tasks with XXX Corps. On 5 December 3 SA Brigade set out in two groups, with B Battery 2 A/Tk in support, the latter having finally made its way into the operational area in the company of 2 SA Division after nearly three weeks de- fending the Sofafi area. By 1700 hrs on 5 December the Brigade was in its new posi- tion at Menastir on the escarpment overlook- ing Bardia from the west, and experiencing Maj. Genl. I. P. de Villiers enemy artillery fire for the first time, although Commander of 2 SA Division. this inflicted no damage on the newcomers. The Brigade's task was to prevent any com- munication between Rommel and the Bardia VISion began to arrive at the Omars from garrison, and to keep the garrison in check Misheifa and MatrOh and the two remaining with demonstrative preparations for attack. brigades of 4 Indian Division were released from the frontier to join 11 Indian Brigade in On 6 Decem~jer a start was made with the the west. Headquarters of 2 A/Tk Regiment mopping up of the detachments of enemy SAA remained at the Omars and the unit re- support troops scattered through the wadis verted to South African command. In the along the coast to the north west of Bardia. north the withdrawal of 5 Indian Brigades In addition the Trigh Capuzzo and Via Balbia also brought 5 New Zealand Brigade under were to be kept open to beyond Gambut. To the command of the South African Division, carry out these tasks 3 SA Brigade organised for the New Zealanders, having been moved four 'Jock' columns, composite groups com- back to the line Capuzzo - Musaid - Sol- prising a platoon of infantry, a section of lum, had surrendered their transport to allow 25-pdrs, a troop of 2-pdrs, a troop of Bren- the Indians to move forward. C Battery 2 carriers from the Zealand Divisional Cavalry, A/Tk moved with the New Zealand Brigade and armoured cars. These columns would to Capuzzo. operate under the direction of Divisional Ccl- valry Headquarters, which had considerable Rommel's withdrawal towards Bir el Gubi, experience in such matters. and later towards Gazala, isolated the frontier area from the battle between the main forces. 'Vic Column' Enters Tobruk From now on for more than a month 2 SA Division, and 2 A/Tk Regiment, were more One of these columns was immediately de- or less separated from the clash of the main tached for a separate job however. Major V. forces of the 8 Army and OAK. A great deal E. Wepener, of 1 Imperial Light Horse, was of fighting remained to be done in this are3 to take his group, called 'Vic Column' to con- however, miles to the east of the central con- tact the garrison at Tobruk. Under the com- flict, for as has been seen, Rommel's retreat mand of Wall Phillips F Troop from B Battery had left substantial garrisons blocking the 2 A/Tk accompanied this force in its risky coast road which was increasingly important mission, which involved a move along the to the supply of Ritchie's forces in the west. Via Balbia through an area known to be 53 49 50 51 52 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 " i ' i I I I ---~-_. 44--- of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za Scientia Militaria, South African Journal I t-; [ft'VIC COLUMN'; ROUTE ---t~. 4 r~'1;;' '",,~; -'I -~I I S- 9 DECEMBER 1941 I i ':' TOBRUK I I I N { c ~~~,~, 1M' £ I D/ j ERN £ I A I '~ .. rf S I 'r-43~- .. 3 ":"_-.".~-"-"--~'1 _------'------=------!.!-~ R_A --T4; -4 ' .t.~'::~~r~o!~"" . 7"'~/{~=~ I '-il_,~;~ 2 ,oj ( ~£iI~' ,-,/:>:::- : If r" (, '" 'd" ' \ "<..;:'ii ,,:..•. (Jl --u ...•r.;l"." .j:>. ,-~- o , - " \ ~'- ""b- ,-~\~ARDIA . ,\\ ", .' -'. " " " \~~ •. l .' 1•• ;------=-~-;.3q ~ "\ .\- - .' " '''', SCALE 1: 250,000 __L_~ -,-~'1.,;-..~::",. "'" -'10 'f "',~B li MI~tS t::~=.kC:1 l=: "'; ~ _.:' - -- - '. ':..: w -','1-.4:./ \ I.. " """ ~'LOOol(T"[Si~ " - ,/, ---38 \' a '9 ", <:: IC- .. "F~-'I~~f"'::;/ i \ . ~_ ~':',r-:: ~i':::::.: P ..:_~~:::>~'5? "'dp.' 5i 45 46 47 48 49 50 41 42 43 44 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za occupied by hostile groups of unknown eastwards along the coast up to the Bardia strength. Vic Column' set off at 1830 hrs defences. The Imperial Light Horse's positions with the carriers of the Divisional Cavalry around Bardia would meanwhile be occupied leading the way down the escarpment to the by 1 Royal Durban Light Infantry which had road, and past the macabre relics of the arrived from the Omars on the 7th with B Maoris' ambush of Geissler's Advance Guard, Troop of A Battery 2 A/Tk in attendance. a solemn reminder of the fate which could When 1 Imperial Light Horse set out at 0800 overtake desert columns. Several derelict hrs on the 8th its artillery support included a German tanks were passed but no contact section of two 2-pdrs from E Troop, B Battery was made with the enemy until the column 2 A/Tk. moved through Gambut. Here one of F Moving along in the rear of this force was Troop's guns slipped from the road and an 'Met Column', a force commanded by Major Italian emerged from the surrounding dark- Metcalfe and consisting of two platoons from ness having mistaken the crew's Afrikaans 1 Royal Durban Light Infantry, with six anti- for German. He offered the men a cigarette aircraft guns of 2 Light A/A Regiment SAA and informed them that another 25 Axis and four 2-pdrs of B Troop, A Battery 2 A/Tk soldiers were hiding near the road. These under TSM Taylor, their task being to con- were promptly loaded into a truck as pri- solidate the defences of Gambut airfield, now soners. The column then proceed to Tobruk, occupied by 'Mac Column'. At 1330 hrs that waiting for an air raid to finish before entering day the combined columns reached Halfway the defences. House, due north of Gambut, and 'Met Co- While 'Vic Column' was making its way to lumn' was detached to occupy the aerodrome. Tobruk the three other 'Jock' columns from Here, just as Metcalfe's men were moving 3 SA Infantry Brigade were sent on patrols into position two vehicles packed with Ger- through the desert south of the escarpment. man troops hurtled through the lines and No contact was made with the enemy on the away before anyone realised what was hap- 7th however, and in the afternoon a more pening. This was not the last excitement for definite project was launched with the inten- 'Met Column' during their period of occupa- tion of securing the vital Gambut landing tion at Gambut. A few days later three motor ground for the Desert Air Force. A platoon cars were spotted on the far side of the air- of 2 Transvaal Scottish Regiment was detailed field. The Metcalfe's men had no armoured for this task, supported by a section of cars with which to investigate the visitors 25-pdrs from 1 Field Regiment SAA and G and as the latter appeared to be behaving Troop of B Battery, 2 A/Tk. This small force, suspiciously Taylor's anti-tank gunners de- labelled 'Mac Column', was fortunate in find- cided to open fire. The vehicles disappeared ing the airfield unoccupied that night and rapidly and the mystery of their identity was Allied fighters would soon be operating from only solved two days later when a patrol this landing ground in support of 8 Army's located them in the Sidi Rezegh area. The advance through Cyrenaica. occupants were American war correspondents who had been very badly shaken by their CleaTing the Coast Gambut experience, for they had seen the tracer heads of the anti-tank shells miss one The columns which 3 SA Brigade had sent vehicle by only two feet. to scout the escarpment had established that While the Royal Durban Light Infantry were Rommel had withdrawn his main forces from settling in at Gambut on the 8th the main this area. Enemy units still between Bardia column had lost no time. Blake's force had and Tobruk appeared to be situated below been reinforced by the troops of New Zealand the escarpment, towards the sea. The next Divisional Cavalry which had come to Gambut job was therefore to round up these scattered with 'Mac Column', and now had a full squa- forces. dron of Bren-carriers under command. 'A' and This work was left mainly to 1 Imperial Light 'B' Companies, Imperial Light Horse moved Horse under Lt-Col Blake; the plan was for out on their first sweeps eastwards and at this battalion to move out as far west as 1610 hrs patrols from 'B' Company saw an Gambut and then make a five stage sweep enemy tank moving along the wadis towards 55 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za the coast. Capt R. E. Bodley, commanding the same area as Blake's force, though ap- 'B' Company, decided to follow the tank, proaching it from the east, and had also which led the patrol to a wadi containing spotted the enemy concentration. about 15 tanks and 30 other vehicles. Capt By 1730 hrs 25-pdrs had also been borrowed Bodley went forward himself to make a per- from 'Mac Column' at Gambut and Brigade sonal reconnaissance with a Bren-carrier from had been asked to provide air and extra ar- the Divisional Cavalry, and accompanied by tillery support. These were expected in the the two anti-tank guns of E Troop. The 2-pdrs morning and meanwhile a section of B Com- were brought into action at about 1 000 yards pany was left in position to maintain contact and immediately drew fire from the 6-pdrs of with the enemy tanks through the night while the enemy tanks. Capt Bodley then withdrew the remainder of the force moved up to leager his Company about 1 000 yards and reported south west of Halfway House. to Lt-Col Blake by wireless. Maj S. B. Gedye with 'A' Company, Imperial Visibility was very bad, as a dust storm swept Light Horse was then sent to the east of over the area, and the force did not leager Bodley's position with three New Zealand until very late, to spend a cold and unpleasant Bren-carriers. In a wadi there he found another night under the imminent threat of an attack 15 tanks, and Lt-Col Blake decided to mount by enemy armour. an attack as soon as reinforcements could Early next morning the Divisional Cavalry's A be brought up. and C Squadron arrived with M and 0 Troops Since 5 December the carriers of the Divi- of 2 A/Tk's D Battery, to add their weight sional Cavalry, aided by two troops of D to the attack, and at 0800 hrs 'Mac Column' Battery 2 A/Tk had been sending mobile under Maj Sawyer joined forces with Lt-Col columns west of Bardia and on the 8th 'B' Blake's men, bringing G Troop of B Battery Squadron of the Divisional Cavalry, with M 2 A/Tk with them. At 0820 hrs 'A' and 'B' Troop, D Battery 2 A/Tk had been patrolling Companies were moved forward again with A German tank workshop destroyed on 9 December 1941, 56 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za artillery and carriers in support to make con- force had located the tank workship. Al- tact with the enemy armour. As the company though no enemy were encountered by 'Vic commanders felt their way around the enemy Column' at Marsa Lucch, Maj Wepener's and position a platoon from 'A' Company, Impe- Lt Col Blake's forces continued to scout the rial Light Horse, was sent northwards along coastal area for further detachments whose the enemy's wadi, and immediately drew presence was still suspected, and at 1410 heavy fire from the tanks, forcing it to go to hrs on 10 December 'C' Company, Imperial ground. The 2-pdrs were now brought into Light Horse, located 3 enemy tanks with action and their fire was augmented with nther vehicles and about 300 troops at Ras heavy rifle and machine gun-fire. The Germans (l! Aora, seven miles east of Marsa Lucch, now evidently concluded that the surrounding and requested reinforcement before attack- force was a more substantial one than they ing. The Regiment's 'B' Company was moved could cope with for they began to destroy up in support and Lt-Col Blake decided to their own tanks, and a large number of heavy carry out an attack at 1700 hrs despite fail- explosions were seen. Blake's force was now ing light. The supporting artillery opened the closing in very rapidly, and the Germans be- attack with a ten minute preparation and gan to break away westwards. Some were after only five minutes the enemy were seen intercepted and 1 officer and 22 men were to be withdrawing eastwards. The attack taken prisoner. Of the enemy tanks, only one was pressed home rapidly and by nightfall managed to break through the encirclement, the South Africans were in possession of a and this made off to the west. The remaining German orderly room which yielded a large tanks were now destroyed by fire by the Im- store of enemy documents for transfer to perial Light Horse, bringing the total destroyed Brigade Headquarters. The Imperial Light in this engagement to 38. The large quantities Horse had again had a bloodless victory, but of spares, stores, equipment and fuel indicated escaping enemy vehicles ran into an ambush that Blake's men had stumbled on a tank re- party of 1 Royal Durban Light Infantry at pair base. This explained the brevity of the Menastir II and inflicted losses of 4 killed and resistance and althoug~ with hindsight the 3 wounded before breaking away again. decision to complete the job of scuttling the Imperial Light Horse patrols continued to tanks was regrettable, it seems that Lt-Col search the coast area with their anti-tank es- Blake did not know that the Germans wer9 corts for the next few days. More prisoners unlikely to retake this particular area in the were taken on the 10th and three Australian near future. Indeed, only that afternoon, Maj sailors, survivors of HMAS Ballara were Genl de Villiers, who had arrived at 3 SA picked up. These sailors had been hidden Brigade Headquarters, gave instructions that from the enemy by friendly Libyan Sanusi no equipment captured east of Tobruk was to tribesmen, and spoke very highly of the"care be destroyed in future. At all events the South they had received from their rescuers. By the Africans had had a most successful baptism 12th the columns had reached the area of of fire, for their victory had been achieved Menastir II where they came across numer- without loss. ous abandoned enemy transport, motor- cycles and two anti-tank guns. These were On the same morning as Lt Col Blake's force probably the property of the force which had were attacking the tank workshops, Maj Genl clashed with the Royal Durban Light In- de Villiers, at 3 SA Brigade Headquarters, was fantry, the owners having fled by foot to the urging his commanders to prosecute their of- temporary safety of Bardia. By 13 December fensive more aggressively. Blake's men were all back at Menastir, pre- Maj Wepener's force had returned to Menas- paring to patrol the Bardia defences. The tir from Tobruk, escorting survivors of the sweeps along the coast had been remarkably battered New Zealand Division to the Egyp- successful for, in addition to the vehicles and tian frontier, and a new 'Vic Column' was equipment destroyed and captured, the comb- now sent out. Maj Wepener's new column ing of the rocks, caves and wadis had netted would include two 2-pdrs of E Troop B Bat- over two hundred prisoners, and the force tery 2 AfTk under Lt R. J. Robinson. Their had itself sustained no casualties throughout task would be to clear the Marsa Lucch area, the operation. some ten miles eastwards from where Blake's Meanwhile 'Met Column', including B Troop 57 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za of A Battery was still at Gambut, maintaining 'Its alright to go and kill.' its guard over the aerodrome and sending out At first light on the 13th Metcalfe left half occasional patrols. These were mainly in the a platoon and the anti-aircraft guns in de- nature of scrounging expeditions, for the lence of Gambut while he set out with the column was by now very short of food. One (emainer of his company and TSM Taylor's such party under Lt Goodwin received a se- four 2-pdrs from A Battery. There was no vere shock on the afternoon of the 12th when sign of the enemy at the wadi where they looking into a wadi on the coast near Marsa had been seen the previous day, but a Ger- Balafarit. There they saw two German Tanks man despatch rider appeared briefly and only fifteen yards away, with a group of quickly made his escape, having seen the eight enemy soldiers talking together. For anti-tank guns. The motor cyclist led Met- two hours the patrol watched before returning calfe's force to another wadi where there to report to Maj Metcalfe. The Major was in were two enemy tanks but no soldiers. The something of a quandary, for his essential 2-pdrs were put in a position overlooking job was to defend Gambut and he did not the tanks- and covered by the infantry, and know whether he should attack this position one gun was sent into the wadi with Lt Good- without reference to Brigade Headquarters. win as a passenger. Goodwin instructed the Deciding to inform Brigade of his discovery, gunners to fire a shell into a cave only 200 and having no code key, I\tlaj Metcalfe de- yards distant. After a second round had ex- cided to send the message in Zulu. This mes- ploded in the cave's mouth Germans poured sage and Brig Borain's reply have been re- from caves and dugouts all around the wadi. produced elsewhere, but nowhere correctly, The enemy troops were quickly rounded up and it is worth a digression to reproduce the and loaded into trucks for transport to Gam- exchange in its definitive version, as recorded but, there were 115 of them. Just as wel- on the message pads of 3 Brigade Head- come to the South Africans was the huge quarters. haul of food and wine which they uncovered and carried off. The anti-tank gunners were Maj Metcalfe's message, timed at 1950 hrs particularly fortunate in that they were able on 12 December was received as follows: to load an ample share of loot on to their 'Borneli shumi skelm ndawo mani hlanu portees. hlanu mani mabili hlanu. Munya sparrow The areas immediately to the west of Bar- bona lungela. Na imoto ezinge. Cela ngena dia had now been cleared and 2 SA Division bulala kosasa koseni na half impi uwani.' could safely turn its attention to the seizure It should be mentioned that this is an of the frontier defences. example of fairly corrupt 'fanakalo' Zulu, but translated it reads: Rommel Eludes 8 Army 'I saw fifteen skelms. Which place? Which five? Two fives. 0 ne sparrow can see very Before returning to the operations against the well. There are many motorcars. Ask to frontier garrison's it would be as well to go in. Kill early tomorrow. . . . A with sketch briefly the course of events on the your half impi.' main battlefield to the west. From which, according to the Brigade On 9 December, with Rommel pulling back message log, the following was understood: from Tobruk, an adjustment was made in the functions of the two British Corps. XIII 'Observed 50 enemy at Pt 455425. One Corps, with 7 Armoured Division and 4 In- tk [sparrow was the code for tank] seen dian Division, was to attempt to destroy the alright. Lots of MT. Can I attack tomorrow main enemy force while XXX Corps was to early with half my force.' take over control of operation to destroy any In answer to this, imperfectly understood, enemy still resisting to the east of Tobruk. message Brig Horain sent the reply: An attempt by Godwin-Austen, commanding XIII Corps, to outflank the Germans in the 'Kulungile hamba aba bulala.', Gazala position, ended in failure and Rom- meaning: mel was able to break off the battle success- 58 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za I fully on the night of 16/17 December to make Cova, the post immediately north east of Sidi his way to Mechili and Derna. On 17 De- Omar. He urged de Villiers to avoid heavy cember another British flanking move forced casualties and was optimistic that the fall of a further withdrawal to Benghazi and Ageda- some of the garrisons might be affected by bia, but Ritchie would have for preferred a simply cutting off supplies of food and water decisive engagement to a pursuit, however which were coming from Bardia. extensive. It was in Ritchie's interests to fight the 'final' battle as near to Egypt as While 3 SA Infantry Brigade had been isolat- possible, for this would enable him to supply ing Bardia from the west, since 5 December a larger force in the field than he could sup- 6 SA Infantry Brigade was gradually closing port in Western Cyrenaica. On 24 December in on the enemy still occupying the Sollum- Benghazi was taken, but the harbour was Halfaya area. badly damaged and would be of little use as a supply point for some time. On 7 December a troop of 25-pdrs from 2 Field Regiment SAA was detached with a Heavy losses were being inflicted on the re- Troop of A Battery 2 A/Tk as anti-tank pro- treating Axis transports and the German and tection to join Maj Henderson's Squadron of Italian air forces were being pushed off the 6 SA Armoured Car Regiment in an agressive valuable airfields of 'the Bulge', between reconnaissance of the line from Ghot Adhidi- Tmimi and Agedabia. But while the Desert ba through Point 207 to Abar Abu Talaq. Air Force caused losses, the gallant efforts Major Sired, commanding the artillery group, of the Jock columns had little chance of sent back some particularly useful information damaging the still intact formations of Rom- to Divisional Headquarters on the where- mel's army. On 27 December Cruwell ex- abouts of enemy batteries. Now the South ploited a gap between the British 22 Ar- African artillery began to concentrate on the moured Brigade and 22 Guards Brigade and eastern frontier positions of Cova, Bir Ghirba inflicted severe losses in the former. An- and D'Avanzo, and between 10 and 12 De- other attack on 30 December forced the Ar- cember the enemy evacuated these positions. moured Brigade to withdraw for a refit, and 2 SA Division's success here had the imme- Rommel was able to pull back his forces un- diate result, however, of providing reinforce- molested between 1 and 6 January 1942, to ments for the remaining positions centring make a defence along a line stretching south on Point 207, Faltenbacher and Halfaya, and from EI Agheila. this consequently strengthened the enemy hold on the vital pass at Halfaya. The Frontier Again Now the South Africans took over the line As has been mentioned, one of the main im- interposed between Bardia and the positions peratives for the reduction of the Axis posi- along the frontier from Bir Ghirba to Sollum tions on the frontier was the supply position and Halfaya. On the morning of 9 December, which became increasingly acute as the main 5 New Zealand Brigade pulled out of their army moved west. To enable operations to positions preparatory to moving west to re- continue beyond Benghazi it was essential join the main battle although their Divisional that the railway be extended seventy miles Cavalry remained on loan to the South Afri- westwards from Misheifa, to Fort Capuzzo. cans; in their place Genl de Villiers put 'Com- This would halve the mileage of lorried con- group', under Col J. O. Henrey. 'Comgroup' voys to Tobruk and would enable them to was a composite brigade group formed from use the Via Balbia and Trigh Capuzzo, instead elements of 6 SA Infantry Brigade and in- of the ruinous desert tracks which bypassed cluding 1 Rand Light Infantry, 2 Transvaal the frontier posts. The opening of this short- Scottish and, among its supporting artillery C;' route was obviously a matter of great ur- C Battery 2 A/Tk, which had previously aided gency and the commander of 8 Army soon the New Zealands during their tenancy of began to urge this enterprise forward. the line. 'Comgroup's main work was to con- tain the enemy south of their line from Bir On 7 December Ritchie instructed Maj Genl Hafid to Sollum Barracks and to prevent sup- de Villiers to begin his mopping up of the ply columns from Bardia from reaching these Axis frontier positions by moving against forces. In addition to this Col Henrey was 59 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za Bardia. instructed to destroy supply and maintenance the south, A Troop of A Battery 2 A/Tk had installations or other isolated Axis forces been providing anti-tank protection to 67 Me- found in his general area. C Battery's part in dium Regiment RA, now operating against this was to provide defence against such Got Adhidiba from the area of Abu Shalif. This tanks as might have found their way into the sector was reinforced by the arrival of Die Mid- frontier garrisons during Rommel's late push dellandse Regiment, and on 15 December, 2 to the wire. Royal Durban Light Infantry was ordered to this part of the front from 4 SA Infantry On 12 December 'Comgroup' was reinforced Brigade, the leading units of which had arrived by the arrival of 1 South African Police, and at the frontier on the previous day. Mean- the next day D'Avanzo was occupied by while, further to the east the element of 2 South African troops, who used the new posi- SA Infantry Brigade were using their artillery tion to intensify fire on Point 207. against Halfaya Pass. The forces around While 6 SA Infantry Brigade was moving in Halfaya and Sollum were thus steadily in- on Sollum and Halfaya the Divisional front to creasing in strength. the west was protected by patrols of 7 South African Armoured Reece Battalion, operating Be.':dia: Dingaan's Day 1941 between Omar Nuovo and Bir Hafid. Anti- tank defence for the Omars was still being The first determined blow however, was to provided by three troops of A Battery and N be struck against Bardia, and for this purpose and P Troops of D Battery 2 A/Tk. 1 Rand Light Infantry reverted to 3 SA In- Advance Headquarters of 2 A/Tk moved out fantry Brigade command on 14 December of the Omars on 12 December with 2 SA and moved northward from Capuzzo. The Division Advanced Headquarters, to Bir Hafid, first Brigade order for the attack was issued in closer touch with the besieging forces. To on the afternoon of 15 December, with zero 60 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za , ~~;'01"- .'53 \\ \~IS. "155 '. ~',', RR i-. _1- _~------ ,!59 REFERENCE Y.etall~~ Read A/T :-~e:\ch -=--...- Yator Track .7"eie?hc;",eLl:"eC;lro!es7.7:.-. "7: ,==,= c T:1g P~l:!.t [Metres) tJ' "t/'ite-.:F:pe,Lne Spilt Height" - 'Ndter :-c'm;" e""T Strong Pomts "€r" .• '''''ater ?cmt (1)"'~_ HospItal H:? .. FIre Trench. or Breastworlc ~~_ t 189 GO r 11198 SC[MMA.S ( <177 .," r---'T :~199 "'"' '" '''''''"')\\, "96 '192 '.L 0' Po. ,.. ~ -167 '. F ~ S'Pt~~Irr.an 3t1!l3 .186 .,.;:../~~~ , ' o COT CORAA £L FAR .'oJ~ " o .193 'A' .. " , - ("J' .., £" '~ r', ) ... ' .19J Cl87 "t.,J'187 , '61 (!) GOT E.T TAFUA '. H, 108/53, lt187 D .\186 r...-....-~ hour scheduled for 0630 hrs next day. In perial Light Horse. This adequately describes addition to the troops of 3 SA Brigade three 2 A/Tk's part in the plans for the first at- troops from B Battery 2 A/Tk were to par- tack on Bardia, which is perhaps just as well ticipate. The essence of the plan to capture in the light of events. Bardia was for 1 Royal Durban Light In- fantry to penetrate from the north and 1 Rand The plan for the Dingaan's Day attack on Light Infantry from the south, while elements Bardia was not a well-conceived one. Rit- of Die Middellandse Regiment and 7 SA chie's optimistic disposition had led him to Recce Battalion, under Lt Col W. L. King- beleve that de Villiers' troops could quite will, staged a demonstration from the west. possibly capture Bardia with little more than This latter force, known as Kingforce also strong fighting patrols and infiltration. The included G Troop of B Battery 2 A/Tk. B fortifications of Bardia had been developed Battery's F Troop would provide anti-tank steadily for nearly six years and were ac- protection to the guns of 68 Medium Regi- cordingly formidable; yet 3 SA Brigade had ment, RA and a battery of 1 Field Regiment, managed very little preliminary patrolling and SAA at Point 212, Bir Bel Chonfus, as part had little idea of the defensive layout of Bar- of Maj Burton's 'Burtforce' firing at Bardia's dia or of the number of the defenders. defences, while E Troop was with the Re- Divisional Intelligence put the garrison at serve Group, which consisted mainly of 1 Im- about 2 500 men; it was in fact nearer to 61 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za 8800. There was no reliable information christened Q Troop, was able to continue about either the enemy's artillery or armour. firing at night. For the next ten days the cap- This was the position which 3 SA Brigade, tured guns continued to shoot at Point 207 still inexperienced in serious fighting, was to expending some 4000 rounds in all. A few infiltrate, from two widely separated direc- days after starting the crews of Q Troop were tions and with its supporting artillery scat- replaced by men from Regimental Headquar- tered around a wide front. That 1 Rand Light ters, cooks and clerks included, who evident- Infantry's thrust from the south failed with- ly enjoyed this more violent role. A Battery's out casualties being sustained was little short A Troop was still with 4 SA Brigade to the of miraculous in the face of the fire they en- south near Abu Shalif where it was joined countered. To the north, 1 Royal Durban shortly by C Troop. After the failure at Bar- Light's Infantry's attack was less fortunate: dia, both patrolling and artillery bombard- by the time the operation was abandoned, ment were increased. on the afternoon of 17 December, this bat- talion had lost 21 killed and 32 wounded. 2 A/Tk was little involved in this work how- ever, except for providing anti-tank protec- Q Troop tion to the various medium and field bat- teries to guard against the unlikely event of While 3 SA Brigade was attacking at Bar- an attack by armour. D Battery continued dia, 4 and 6 SA Brigades continued to mask its task of escorting the patrols sent along the Sollum-Halfaya sector. Nothing particu- the perimeter west of Bardia by the New larly noteworthy was happening but on 14 Zealand Divisional Cavalry, while G Troop of December Lt Col Parkin, OC of 2 A/Tk, had B Battery operate with 'Kingforce' in the same told Maj Tuttle, commanding A Battery, to area. send the four Italian 75 mm guns captured by the Indians at the Omars to Bir Hafid. They would be manned by men drawn from Alarums and Excursions the 18-pdr troops of A and D Batteries, cur- rently inactive at Omar Nuovo, and would By 18 December 2, 4 and 6 SA Brigades aid the artillery bombarding Point 207. This were in positions right round Halfaya, Sol- move was delayed by dust storms and it was lum, Point 207 (Cirener) and Faltenbacher only on 17 December that Lt Masterax, from (Abar Abu Talaq). In addition to constant A Battery, had positioned his guns; on 18 patrols and heavy shelling there were a feu December the new zone was registered. On clashes as South African forces closed in; that first day a large fire was started in the one of the earliest of these involved a two enemy lines and this scratch troop, later gun section from 2 A/Tk. HALFAYA SECTOR I \\ / ...••...}:~~'i~I----_.Zc"'C'~ ~ .' ~'/ ii \ ::: \••~{';-~~1. NOT[:- Artillery diSpositions are ap'proximllte. Z S,A. _._' .,/ II \--5 B~~"" ,:.:g,~~/": - - ."rS.-A:R(CCE BN. /' /i Z ~D.,REa. -"ft~1t-i "'" :\~J' o 2 J 4 MI.!~,' " i: ~.~.:?,' : \, \~."., ~",<9r~NrteWells IolILlS I", • - =::J I '" ._~'J-i/); I a '.\ "~','. ,9'>"'=,======_ EffiHHL -- , :" --or", ,,' " , O.''''M '>', ' "'. ~.~ .•',,', / ,,/ J~/4"'~g';,), \ \',~ O'::':t1i-.:_--. , ,r u u ,1 /' •••• 'i)f'~•..'P : al'oqrt."1/" \ ' ! t . /"./--'!;~'G>'''' ,,/( /«;.~$i~~/\1~,"""'''''\ B,~:~.lo~rM, j " " "~._~~ ••••, , ./' J;t::;..-¥- \. fl.,. : O'HEr.l:',,'Rard~lqllp :~~~ .."<;_~_~,..:..:" i / ,'. --', / " :f(1.!''' \\ a..,\'P-_ ••.••._••..;,c>Z S.A:P .• 0J)- ",n~. ..), : .-/ " "\+';-"'!f-1?~ - ••••••".<.t!~"'•••:--.••;SoIo+W ••,••• --.G.••• ~. /: :'.:::/ :// /:/#ff:;" 5 f~~l,;,s.~;\\,.,<) ') .-// ,....\ ".:::,o~~~;~(._"oo ~,/,' I " ~ =0. \"." fAlTEN~CHER f1 "" o~.P. \,~ , " , ,g" .0 nl::lb~J.bqTIO'ln " " ,,,. }, ! " / ~t''JIO PL.KAff.R. ~O"@\,.:_,' " n \ \ -<"-~~---"f't"~ n"Q(\Ulj " " ., ,/ ••• /' ,/ /~'J' Qd:~ .n \, a CI~~R ~~n~:~lr'sulln ,1'" "', .,-:."" : \, :' ,/ ;t;J7 TP. 231 MED.BTY.R.A. :;)n \n : '20 nl'ln ~ '.,'~: WE.LLENBRlc\iER }L:~;'~', ')\/i/ Ll' ,~"..-~~'~i:o~:.0 •• / .;7"'~..:...;;:':~,i;; , .-' <~. -' "Q:"""'~ . , ",,'\,,\!' .. ,/" ~! ,5' ' . ./ "" \ \. ,.~",,,,c."'~ 7 KAFF R fl. ,...' ~~~" "'"~c=o \.\ ,.,'" 504io-.;~_. .• • // .•~ " :toc::o_'.,;;e~C>~D\ii.i,~'" TP231 ME.D BTY, -,..:;~ 'S'J,r,,'J ,,_~,/ \ '-Al tal;'eISfii~'!,/ ~ R" 'Js23t MEO STY. a.A. , " ~ ~~/,' AialT' B.!tl'.':' "', .•.:~~--~!!,:------_.-_..~"'".Q-". . \~S., S" •• .,- /. /~p 0 OTY '~~irll 0- Qlrtt ~ ffl'l$ " '~7 ':I\IZ FD REGTS.•.•. """j ., P. 1ft. H. IJJjS4. 62 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za On 18 December a patrol of 6 SA Armoured C Battery 2 A/Tk under TSM Vic Schweg- Car Regiment was fired on from an outpost man. On 24 December the enemy intensified south of Point 207. This post was also being their efforts to retake the wells at Silqiya, used to direct artillery fire on a South African beginning with a heavy bombardment at observation post and a patrol from 2 Royal 0700 hrs. This was followed by an attack Durban Light Infantry under Lt G. S. Ander- by four Italian tanks and the captured Matil- son was ordered to eliminate it. After mak- da, the same that had attacked Anderson's ing a reconnaissance that night, Anderson platoon five days previously; now however led his platoon the next day to seize the po- they were supported by lorried infantry. sition, which they did after killing seven Schwegman had his troop hold their fire un- Italians and capturing twelve. Anderson's til the Matilda was within 300 yards range. platoon now came under heavy machine-gun As the heavily armoured tank approached, fire from Point 207 and in the afternoon was some thirty to forty hits were scored, some repeatedly attacked by four Italian light tanks at a range of only 75 yards, without immo- and a captured British Matilda tank, although bilising the vehicle, although the latter made these were fortunately prevented from press- off towards Point 207, to be abandoned be- ing home their attacks by the defensive fore gaining the enemy lines. In engaging minefields. In order to aid Anderson's escape the heavy tank the 2-pdr teams had been from this predicament two 2-pdrs on portees compelled to expose their backs to machine- from C Troop A Battery 2 A/Tk were ordered gun fire from the light tanks and once the forward under Sgt C. Swart, with three ar- Matlda had retreated were able to turn quick- moured cars of 6 SA Armoured Car Regi- lyon their erstwhile tormentors. The four ment. The gallant handling of the guns and Italian tanks were knocked out with only urmoured vehicles forced the enemy to pull seven rounds, and thereupon the enemy in- back their own armour to a discreet dis- fantry withdrew. Then with machine-gun fire tZlnCC. Even this did not prevent the 2-pdrs from Point 207 sweeping the ground Schweg- from scoring hits with some of the 100 or so man and Sgt C. F. Meyer rushed out in an shells they fired. One Italian tank was put attempt to save a wounded Italian trapped out of action and abandoned by its crew, in one of the tanks. The man unfortunately but the thick armour of the Matilda prevented died after being rescued from the burning serious damage despite some twenty hits, hulk. For his part in this successful encounter, many of which had admittedly been at ex- which lasted only fifteen minutes, TSM Sch- treme range. As the afternoon wore on the wegman was awarded the Distinguished Con- fire from Point 207 became increasingly se- duct Medal. vere and the portees and armoured cars con- centrated on evacuating Anderson's wounded. Christmas 1941, Western Desert After destroying the weapons in the enemy position Anderson retired under cover of darkness. For his gallant leadership he was By 20 December de Giorgis's garrison was in awarded the Military Cross while Pte D. B. desperate straits, while at Bardia morale re- mained high, for limited supplies continued Clark also of the Royal Durban Light Infantry, to arrive by sea. By the 20th however, Rom- won the Military Medal. Sgt C. 'Bokkie' mel had decided that the eventual capitula- Clark's actions on this occasion contributed tion of the frontier fortress was only a matter to his winning the Distinguished Conduct of time and that their defence had delayed Medal after his further gallantry at Msus later in January 1942. XXX Corps for as long as could reasonably be expected of them. He therefore asked AI~o on 18 December a patrol from 2 South the Italian Navy to evacuate the garrisons to African Police operating north west of Point Crete and, when this request was refused as 207 discovered wells near Bir es Silqiya, con- too dangerous, he gave Genl Schmitt, com- taining upwards of 60 000 gallons of water. manding at Bardia, permission to surrender. A platoon sent out under Lt Coryndon-Baker Schmitt refused to accept defeat yet, asking to deny their use to the enemy came under Rommel for further supplies and for addi- immediate shellfire, which continued for the tional artillery with which, he believed, the next four days. Reinforcements were sent to frontier positions could hold out for another Coryndon-Baker's aid, including K Troop of three or four months. 63 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za Ritchie meanwhile was becoming impatient to be planned, rehearsed and for reconnais- to clear his shortest supply route and use sances to be made. The debacle of 16 De- the virtually unscathed 2 SA Division for his cember had provided a salutary lesson against opercftions in the west. On 19 December he rushing things, and it was important not to told Genl Norrie of XXX Corps that the ene- take unnecessary risks in an operation where my positions on the border must be secured the infantry battalions would be co-operating by 29 December. De Villiers was told there- with tanks for the first time. fore to produce plans to reduce Bardia, Hal- The attack on Bardia was to be in three faya and Sollum by that date at the latest. phases. Phase 1 was the responsibility of The Division would be reinforced by 1 Army 3 SA Brigade, which was to penetrate Tank Brigade for the purpose of reducing the the Bardia defences in two places south-east enemy positions as quickly as possible. of the Capuzzo-Bardia road. On 2 A/Tk's first Christmas on overseas ser- After gaps had been made in the wire, 1 Army vice Lt Col Parkin visited all the batteries of Tank Brigade, partially supported by infantry, his Regiment and Capt Daneel held services was to move through and secure the area at the gun positions, even coming under fire beyond the perimeter defences. The infantry on one occasion. That day three troop carriers would consist of 1 Imperial Light Horse, the arrived from Tobruk bringing 384 sacks of Rand Light Infantry and The Kaffrarian Rifles, parcels for 2 A/Tic Every man in the regi- the latter supported by th ree troops of 2 A/ ment received beer, lemonade, cigarettes and Tk under the command of Maj Tuttle of A sweets which had been provided from contri- Battery. The Kaffrarian Rifles with the sup- butions sent by friends and relatives of the port of two platoons of Die Middellandse unit in South Africa. Regiment and these twelve 2-pdr guns would 2 A/Tk's celebrations formed a sharp con- establish the western flank of the captured trast with the desperate strait of de Giorgis's area during Phase 1. garrison, for the latter, harrassed by South For his part in this job Maj Tuttle had B African artillery fire and constant offensive Troop of A Battery, under TSM Taylor, TSM patrolling, were suffering from a worsening Hooper's J Troop of C Battery, and TSM shortage of food and ammunition. Neverthe- Fowler's a Troop from D Battery. less the Italian commander was determined to continue his resistance for as long as pos- In Phase 2,1 South African Police and The sible and the last week in December provided Kaffrarian Rifles would advance north-west a brief respite as the South African forces from the Capuzzo-Bardia road and establish besieging Sollum and Halfaya were thinned a line linking with that formed in Phase I out to provide forces to attack Bardia. and giving the South Africans control of that section of the Bardia defences above the es- carpment. Phase 3 would complete the Plans for a Battle seizure of the fortress. While haste was the keynote of Ritchie's in- While the main assault was being prepared structions de Villiers was also told to keep and made, other forces were to maintain a casualties to an absolute minimum, evidently tight hold on the defences beginning in the because of the difficulty of obtaining South morning of 26 December. In the northern sec- Africa reinforcements should the Division tor was 'Northforce', consisting mainly of 1 suffer any great losses. By 23 December de Royal Durban Light Infantry and supported Villiers had presented his plans for an attack by the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry, with on Bardia to his brigade commanders; the M and N Troops of D Battery 2 A/Tk. 29th was set as the date for the assault, but 'Kingforce' and 'Southforce' completed the the artillery required more time to prepare net around Bardia. Some 32 medium and 104 and the operation was subsequently post- field guns were to provide support for the poned until the 31st. This delayed the at- attacking infantry. The artillery was placed tackIor longer than Ritchie had wanted, but in three groups named after their command- the South African con:mander was obviously ers: Du Toit; Sherwell and Dimoline. In the intent firstly on not wasting men and second- latter group P Troop of D Battery 2 A/Tk, lyon providing sufficient time for the attack with its 18-pdrs, provided anti-tank protec- 64 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za DIVISIONAL PLAN FOR ATTACK ON BARDIA Based on Trace issued with 2 S A. Div. OReration Order N° 2, 2300 hrs. 24 Dec 1941. n Menl1strrl :,.- Menastir ."". ., ~ ...•~.J~';T';.i;~i~.;~(:0\:'::(~'~ ...." PHASE:I ARE:l~~",:;;:, , I, ~" \0 •• 2 S.A. DIV. \ "" T, ~ r8ATJLE HQ. 0 el/Bir~!,T,fu. "", i '\t-Y.+.e,'i",;x~:,':!:r?~;" .. M~~ GOT ET TArUA 1/ ,\ " ""\ . ~"ff.'c~c ,-:--"<7.:, . ,ml, <- <-~~ ~------.:::-~ I i "\ '~~~~."i~~r~~~~~tt:~:L_ ",:- I : 'COT EL BESS /' DUTHFORC~ if:'" ~~I~ RESERVE ! \, "...",.(,.r:' //.1" {.":'.',,' Ie<- I <- : \; ,7 I ~~~ T ROO P S I\ d I\ // I .'~ I\ 1/ J <- I\ ~~ .' I \ /,-r \ J A "R"E A , ~ I ~ I "" I ~":- 0jl / \, if .; !.- ~---J & ",,' \ l' ~ ~~ ~<1~' ~I ,'\,'~ F.:' H 9/,10'3 <- ~ .':.~ ~~ tion for 211 Medium Battery RA, H Troop eter, especially as Intelligence persisted in from B Battery was with 253 Medium Bat- underestimating the defending garrison by tery R Aand 2 captured 50 mm guns were over 4000 men. Nevertheless the advantage provided for 234 Medium Battery by D Bat- lay with the attackers, for Genl Schmitt's tery RA and 2 captured 50 mm guns were troop had to defend a perimeter some 17 were situated with the Division's mobile re- miles long against a well-supplied and supe- serve near Battle Headquarters. rior force which could choose its point of concentration. 2 SA Division's plans were prepared in great detail, which tended in the event to demand To further complicate de Villiers's plans, verb- too precise an adherence to lines and objec- al arrangements modifying the original and tives. Plans of such intricacy could not written orders were made by battalion com- really be expected to fit any situation far be- manders, intending thereby to improve co- yond the initial entry of the defence perim- ordination. Nevertheless, rehearsals went 65 14 BTY.' ., ,,'f" .• FD REGl 5 A'i\ of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za Scientia Militaria, South African Journal i~5A :!,' ~~ ' HALFAYA SECTOR - 28DECI! 1941. iI' ." --~r+-,- \ " I\,.! . ,', ~:~_ \: S";raclSoc,,,,,,,IQatiara NOTE:-A'II" . , ,l~ ~~~'Z.~1$""a;~4,,,,,':: ,,,,,roPo,,,t rtl erY_p'osltlOns are ar-r-roxlmate. ----- \.:...~ f~~r~b~.~",..~,;~~':~''''ii'. - .~~... ..---- I' ~""DR fWa" r \, , I '" A;lff!l ~ " ~;:~._I,' I : "", ~.: /~." " Sid! Munammad=---. _ --==- ~~;;'~t,~~ fairly smoothly and the artillery began to pound the defences ",.IV '0':;::'. on one aided by the Ipontlcel\I' :. ~ bombers of the Royal Air Force. Second Bardia .,~;1~;"", " ';i:~~t: ',~22 • 27 '".', .:r ," ~ 9 At 1800 hrs on 30 December Maj Tuttle took il , ~{od' '.z~,' , ~ GSqr.".' ,"lfdBty.S Ai.; ~ .~ 2J~ cn44ItT.R, . ~ O~'-'. his three troops of 2-pdrs forward to the I _~,f)'.6.'R'1I 9Pohs~ Fd Regt, '~"II~.I N \ 21 \~ R~4qRT.R::\',~'f,;< assembly areas. He would retain Band J \ ;19"<"'1' ~lless ~:CS~i;'~'i I fll4 .\',' Troops with the Imperial Light Horse while : ~ \, l<19 fd Bly 5 A A ." \ 17 ~'2 Lt Wilson took a Troop to the Rand Light I ~ '. : 20fdBtY~ \ \ SAA 15 !if'IO ,,\"O~ Infantry positions. Maj Tuttle left Lt Robin- ) '- l" ()~ o..B;retTaf~.. %-3 \ .6 '. ..' ,9i:;'I' "" son in command of his two troops while he I R.D.L.I., ~.8 5 ~ went forward to join Lt Col Blake at Imperial (Ies/S'BCarl., I ~POIi5hTp. K.\. J" .~,,,:.,,,,,,,,,,"" , 1\ ~" .•- Light Horse Headquarters on the start line. t•• ~~•• , !\ ,'::':;::::,,..' . < At 0620 hrs gaps were blown in the wire, \ !THE\4F. R'I" // the artillery opened fire and the tanks went ,--~-1112fd. Bty, S,A,A'. \ ./,?' ~I..." in. Maj Tuttle accompanied the infantry and : L, G. ': /I l \ ~.:;;\:..,:- i~' REC E l;s.A. ijr !\ j/ :.-----.----::" 'I' \ '1\.<- ,~ ~SA, ~sj31 DECEM.B~R~ .''" ~o,:;::~.'"~~;,,;,~~,,,"- ! 'o,MIDNIGHTI' ,,:,., " !8 R.T,R. i ,MILE PAlt:)f> ',,,II,~ n . '. ••••,., •• ,:,~",,~~r~C/8RT II: fPontoE~.lIir"SCEM.,5 .. R ) .' &I.' ...... • ~, \~~ ; ,,.'? .,.",;:h;t~",~::(:;:~";~\;\,ii",,;YY t. I ~.~.,...:IIIj\\\\\\,,~ i' J.~'\~~y1(lm lUI) """'O~iijt~;;•....• I- ,I'll !<,~.•••- L.'.,l ~ ~, •• ~ ""~.r:.; . I .,l"ri' z~ . I ,,,. ~" ,,"r I .\ "" , ""22 ~ Z7 ' 't",,;,~;/~;' 8~ ~ ./ ~,. I. tJ. A C ~-,: , ~.. ", ,H. 0!l' / , 6.,6 ~5 .ZQ.,. @:a {.;:,~", E L H 0 (t~ISI~3~1 MER' . , ~~' " I . , C.p5 23 ...•-1•••..... , A \: ~.!6 Nil , \ \:\~,: :\ ,Yo ,, \\ R7 : ~"4,n< I '~" ,', ~" R5 ..... , "\ ; l!:'.!;".:' N ••. < ! / ',--' I, Gap4~" @I.'''\:');: ,I ., /I'.~\'I' ' , 17 " •. <.'. . A<...t '.... ' C .J~-_~-'+~~T~ I ,/ I -fi, "16 \ ,---,1',,_. ., ,PITS I G @,Z I, , \", ',', "•• ~, "~ ,. -~"<.. "!,"" )1."",'" " "',', I. ".:.~\ 1h'':i,,':'''!jt:::>i/'~f, I ' G"J~. '5\ @1~,.,,,>i.A \, \; C~~, ,6'0 '21"" as."." '.: '7' . ,.," ~' 27 \ •.•. ~ •.. ~: '0 Ga,1 \ @4 .•.• :t)' '~,>., 01 Bir et Tafua \ ,, ",' ' " 10 I . , 3 ,@6 ~.'" , , ~8 2 Morl:a ~3"~',,,, I "',,' " ,,'" ' , 0 \ .""Plrj ",,:--";-_.• , 0 'I c / "', ,!', ':;,<' , ' , P6/~5 .zo,! "",,,,;,..,, • 0 Ga,l ~ I ' ~ \).,i~" '. I "'! .,,,,,F: ..:'" . [I \ .c.. J , '' @9 ," t-~\~ . ,I .•• Gap~ ~13,." '.' ...., \t.l~ ">.. :.,.,,~ • 0 "'\\ "~ LottI". :;;,>,..• , 0 , ' , ' - ~;(, ,.,6 .... c" J"'~l:," ' '""~ , ....,... / ., / , / U / /",. ; 19 " 31 DECEM~ER.NOON! ,i , ~ .14, I,'''' I 'I. ", ". 0 G"4l\', \ I MIL~ I 1/. .,. ,I.' ,lUi, /b8.'55 "' \ P Mron -' --' I ,, ; .~. '" I,: , 31 DECEMBER -AFTERNOON 67 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za at first little Opposition was encountered. The first day of the new year saw the South Before long however the interdependant de- Africans trying to straighten their line for a fence posts were taking their toll although was resumed on the night of 1/2 January, it was only by afternoon that there was real the anti-tank guns were moved forward to cause for concern. On the left wing of the provide close support to the advancing in- Imperial Light Horse a gap was opening be- fantry. Fortunately the Regiment sustained tween the unit and its flanking battalion, The only one further casualty, a gunner in B Kaffrarian Rifles. This may have been caused fresh push into the Bardia defences. The by confusion over later verbal changes in situation was still confused however and at orders, and certainly owed something to the first light on 1 January 1942 Maj Chaplin of unexpected difficulties provided by the Wadi B Battery moved off with a small recon- Scemmas, which intelligence had underesti- naissance party to seek information about mated. Maj Tuttle of 2 A/Tk went forward the role they would be expected to fill. By to Kaffrarian Rifles Headquarters to investi- 0900 hI's disaster had overtaken this group, gate the situation, portioning B Troop on their Lt du Preez had been wounded and he, Maj left flank. At about 1400 hours a sharp ene- Chaplin and four other ranks captured, with my counter-attack was launched on Kaffra- their two 8-cwt trucks and all their equip- rian Rifles and Maj Tuttle ordered B Troop ment. The Battery's E and F Troops sat out to cover the subsequent withdrawal of the most of the remainder of the day at their battalion, whose Headquarters staff had all rendezvous. been captured in the confusion. In support of the South African Police still, Bdr Bacon and Bdr Taylor from a Troop ran The left flank of the Imperial Light Horse was their !~uns forward to drive the enemy from now in mid-air and this battalion began to a strongpoint which was holding up the in- suffer heavily. To fill the gap 1 South Afri- fantry TSM Fowler and S9t Layman mean- can Police was rushed in from the reserve, while, managed to get a captured 88 mm gun with Maj Chaplin's E and F Troops 2 A/T!< operating, and used it to some effect to si- in attendance. These guns were immediate- lence another post. When the main assault ly taken over by Maj Tuttle and moved to Battery being slightly wounded when his the support of the Imperial Light Horse, while portee was struck by an enemy anti-tank a Troop moved across to aid the Police. shell. @44 ,j;;':"~"' ~41 :040 ~ . ..' "" I Fa"" At!1 SA" :" ~16'" RII Polish Fd. Reut 21~'~9R7.. \ RS , - 68 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za Allied prisoners of war released at the capture of Bardia. By the morning of 2 January Genl Schmitt 2 SA Division was now being pressed to had realised that further resistance was hope- capture Halfaya. Just as the South Africans less and surrendered his garrison. The Allies began were preparing for this next stroke, or- total losses during the second battle for Bar- ders arrived from 8 Army which removed dia had been heavy, 9 officers and 130 men 2 A/Tk from 2 SA Division and propelled killed and 22 officers and 273 men wounded. them westwards, to the battle being fought Nevertheless nearly 8 000 enemy soldiers by XIII Corps in western Cyrenaica. On the were captured and over 1 000 Allied prisoners afternoon of 5 January Lt Col Parkin received released, including the six men captured only orders for the larger part of 2 A/Tk Regiment 24 hours earlier from 2 A/Tk Regiment. to move to EI Adem, where they would come under XIII Corps's command. Only the 18- Mopping Up pdr troops of 6 Battery and 7 Battery and the 2 50-mm guns of 8 Battery would remain The New Year heralded several change:; for at Capuzzo, under the command of Maj Hud- 2 A/Tk Regiment. Firstly, in accordance with son. a new policy of battery designation for units of the South African Artillery, numbers were It would be as well therefore, to provide a to replace the batteries' letter designations. brief sketch of events on the frontier during Thus, with effect from 1 January: Maj Hudson's detachment's participation, be- fore turning to the somewhat more dramatic A Battery became 5 A/Tk Battery events in which the main body of the Regi- B Battery became 6 A/Tk Battery ment was about to participate. C Battery became 7 A/Tk Battery D Battery became 8 A/Tk Battery. Economy was still the watchword in plan- ning the reduction of the remaining enemy The fall of Bardia did not, of course, solve strongholds. The attempt was to be made to the problem of the 8 Army supply route, and bring about de Giorgis's capitulation simply 69 Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za Scientia Militaria, South African Journal ,/ 5 f~4 :E~~~i~9~\< ~~.~t,~~.,t \,' ,~.,'":rti}t~ - -- HALFAYA SECTOR. 6 JAN. 1942 ~ ~Barracks. "~"B- NOTE:- ArtillerY_p'ositions' are ap-p-roximate 233"BTY" 11,\ Mu~n="'\'9~O. "" ",IQ,tLl"ra-'-- ",6~MEDRT, ,'"'/ •••~_"\ ,5a''O\''--'''''..#?t<';''~~.'''\i"",,, ~," ,'<,.B'a<:onfli,nt - MILES I 0 I . 2 3 MILES ,': ~R'/\, .}:,,;,. --C:;,"" '.. ",c:>,?":'} ",_:,,'~:f.." .' HHHH~ ~ " , : ~!o.,(-:MWal~ I * ~k it :~/-;{."!:" ~,! ~9Tr 5 fD ': .. 4-',-,7" ), ,,~RT5."'" Da,~ / - W" ~.',~' :' _( yO' ~'.? .....• RECT. S.A.' A ~' . 0' '" ," " " ,.--"/ 0n - :~ • , o ': \: ':" ':-i,FALT"~",!iHER ,)",7"",0' 0 0 "":"'''''I'':t:::;ii¥;:~i~lj.y.;;;" ~"" , =>, \, ; C1~I"" ,i'Go.ll'o 0 ,I. ;' \, "" ="<""_ •• 0. SAA.FD. ',DSU,0 '~,' ( .201 ooon ° "° 'llBirS,min, 9,1---0./'" , ' ~ .' / ," "" ,' " D ~(. -~:, ..-==°5,,-;;;;;- 0"__"'Yo'"LT, " ,,'"'" D,", '," ," ", " V w",,,'m'"" -"A ,'>,\ '"""",,' """""" ,,',,""W. • I" " ••". \ D~ "."" ...•:"d, Musa : 4 FD.HEGr. \""i"",,>_-- . . . ~"" ,,' " duh".•••4 MED.RT R ,," \,i~ j---- ~'"","""RECT, S /\ " ,\:""'''",''',",,' •• " ! a' /61-." II BTY.~~ •• <:;> ,~v...... a B .. ~ -- oB",1 M,ani ~~~: ,j;>"", ',_. / ,.>:- . N:Il'fet Fa'F"n B" F?~r"r, ll ,110 \).-,;,:, , Qaor,l Shaeq"DURSr. . If. , ",-" ~ - "',~ ",, Genl Schmitt on hi 5 way to captivity. with heavy artillery fire and a tightening of tied and on 16 January planning was begun the seige. Intensive artillery programmes were for a further assault. In the event this was fired and offensive patrolling was carried out, unnecessary, for de Giorgis, realising the gradually closing in on the Axis defences. hopelessness of the position, surrendered During the whole of these operations Maj with more than 5 000 men. Hudson's guns provided anti-tank protection for 5 Field Regiment, SAA near Capuzzo and The Crusader battle had ended at last. The for 2 Field Regiment, SAA near Siweiyat. Axis had lost 38300 men of an army which had numbered 119 000 on 18 November On 9 January it was realised that the con- 1941; the capture of the frontier garrison had tinued supply of de Giorgis's garrison from yielded over 14 000 prisoners in all. Of the the air and sea was prolonging the defence British forces numbering 118 000, 17700 had indefinitely and it was decided to make an become casualties, although losses in mate- direct attack, to take Sollum and to invest rial had been higher. An exhausting, slogging the Halfaya Pass more closely. The attack match rather than a brilliantly conceived or was carried out on 11 and 12 January, and was eventually successful despite the valiant executed rout, 'Crusader' had nevertheless resistance of the Axis troops. The fall of been a victory, won with a courage and dog- Sollum deprived Halfaya, Faltenbacher and gedness made all the more necessary by the Cirener of their only outlet to the sea, and absence of a sound body of British tactical placed the main water supply at Fig Tree doctrine and desert experience. Yet the Wells virtually in South African hands. The achievements of Rommel's armour sounded a artillery and aerial bombardment was intensi- warning note of what was to come. 71