DOCSLIB.ORG

About Plato's Laches in the Laches, As in Most Socratic Dialogues

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
About Plato's Laches in the Laches, As in Most Socratic Dialogues About Plato’s Laches In the Laches, as in most Socratic dialogues, Socrates asks his interlocutors to define a certain moral quality – in this case, courage. Socrates assumes that if one really knows what courage is, one will be able to give a definition that identifies the common essence that all instances of courage share – the feature that makes all courageous things courageous. An inability to provide such a definition will be regarded by Socrates as evidence that the interlocutor knows nothing about courage. (After all, how can I know that so-and-so is courageous if I don’t even know what courage is?) Following his usual pattern, Socrates asks the interlocutor to propose a definition of courage. Once the interlocutor has done so, Socrates will ask him more questions, in order to reveal that the interlocutor holds other beliefs that are inconsistent with his suggested definition. The interlocutor is then offered the opportunity to revise his beliefs in the face of the discovered inconsistency. If the interlocutor offers a revised definition, Socrates then seeks to elicit further beliefs that contradict it. As long as the interlocutor is still holding inconsistent positions, he has not yet reached the level of his deep beliefs. For understanding the Laches – Socrates’ discussion of the nature of courage – some background is helpful. Any contemporary reader of Plato would have known that Socrates’ two main interlocutors in this dialogue – Laches and Nicias – were both famous generals. Nicias, in particular, was responsible for one of the greatest disasters in Athenian history. During the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, the Athenians sent an expedition, under Nicias’ command, to conquer Sicily so as to secure its grain supply. Nicias’ excessive caution, conservatism, and reliance on omens led to the catastrophic failure of the expedition (the entire force was slaughtered, including Nicias himself) and ultimately to Athens’ defeat in the war as a whole. (Since Athens’ defeat created in turn the climate that led to Socrates’ execution, Nicias’ mistakes can be seen as indirectly responsible for Socrates’ own demise.) Given Nicias’ own poor military judgment in real life, there is a certain irony in his defending, as he does in the Laches, a conception of courage that lays great stress on accurate judgment about the future. The implication is that Nicias does not himself possess the virtue that he talks about. Nicias defends a highly intellectualized conception of courage. Laches, by contrast, defends a more traditional conception that lays primary stress on nonrational aspects of courage. Socrates tries to show both men that their beliefs about courage are inconsistent and confused. It is noteworthy that Nicias claims – and an examination of other Socratic dialogues (e.g., the Protagoras) seems to support the claim – that the intellectualized conception of courage he is defending is in fact that of Socrates himself. If this is so, why does Socrates attack his own view? Presumably because he doesn’t simply want Nicias to parrot Socrates’ own view back to him; he wants to see if Nicias understands the view. And it turns out that Nicias doesn’t, since he also continues to hold other beliefs that conflict with what he says about courage. As I have mentioned, once a definition has been proffered, Socrates then elicits further beliefs that can be used as premises for a deductively valid argument against that definition. As you read Plato’s dialogues, you should be trying to identify what the premises and conclusions of these arguments are. In the case of this dialogue I have done the job for you, but for later dialogues you will learn to do so yourself. (Note that the numbers I cite represent marginal line numbers, not page numbers.) Laches’ first definition of courage (190 e-192 b) Courage = standing firm in battle Socrates’ refutation: 1. Courage is a property that all instances of courage share. (premise) 2. Standing firm in battle is not a property that all instances of courage share. (premise) 3. Courage does not = standing firm in battle. (conclusion from 1 and 2) Laches’ second definition of courage (192 b-d) Courage = endurance Socrates’ refutation: 1. Courage is fine and noble. (premise) 2. Nothing harmful and injurious is fine and noble. (premise) 3. Courage is not harmful or injurious. (conclusion from 1 and 2) 4. Endurance is sometimes harmful and injurious, e.g., when it is in a foolish cause. (premise) 5. Courage does not = endurance. (conclusion from 3 and 4) Laches’ third definition of courage (192 d-193 c) Courage = wise endurance Socrates’ refutation: 1. If courage = wise endurance, then the more wisdom one has when enduring danger, the more courageous one is. (premise) 2. Skill is a kind of wisdom. (premise) 3. If courage = wise endurance, then the more skill one has when enduring danger, the more courageous one is. (conclusion from 1 and 2) 4. The less skill one has at doing the dangerous thing one is attempting, the more couragous one is. (premise) 5. Courage does not = wise endurance. (conclusion from 3 and 4) Nicias’ first definition of courage (194 d-199 e) Courage = knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful (i.e., of what is worth fearing and what is worth hoping for) Laches’ first attempted refutation: 1. Doctors have knowledge of illness and health. (premise) 2. Illness is fearful (i.e., worth fearing) and health is hopeful (i.e., worth hoping for). (premise) 3. Doctors have knowledge of the fearful and hopeful. (conclusion from 1 and 2) 4. Being a doctor doesn’t automatically make one courageous. (premise) 5. Courage does not = knowledge of the fearful and hopeful. (conclusion from 3 and 4) Nicias’ reply: (3) is ambiguous. Doctors may know various things about conditions that are in fact hopeful or fearful (e.g., illness and health), but they don’t necessarily know when or whether illness and health are hopeful or fearful. (3) is true if it means that doctors have the technical knowledge about how to produce sickness and health, but false if it means that doctors have the moral knowledge to evaluate whether sickness is worth fearing. [Notice how this answer enables Nicias to resolve Socrates’ puzzle about how wisdom in some cases seems to increase courage and in other cases seems to decrease it. Different kinds of wisdom are at issue. The technical wisdom about how to reduce risks makes one’s action less courageous. The moral wisdom about which risks are worth taking makes one’s action more courageous.] Laches’ second, and Socrates’ first, attempted refutation: 1. Few human beings possess knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful. (premise) 2. Whoever possesses knowledge that most humans lack is wiser than most humans. (premise) 3. If lions and boars possess knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful, then they are wiser than most humans. (conclusion from 1 and 2) 4. If courage = knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful, then either lions and boars possess knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful, or else lions and boars are not courageous. (premise) 5. If courage = knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful, then either lions and boars are wiser than most humans, or else lions and boars are not courageous. (conclusion from 3 and 4) 6. Lions and boars are not wiser than most humans. (premise) 7. Lions and boars are courageous. (premise) 8. Courage does not = knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful. (conclusion from 5, 6, and 7) Nicias’ reply: Reject premise (7). [Notice how in both Laches’ objections, Laches simply asserts his premises rather than drawing them from Nicias’ beliefs.] Socrates’ second refutation: 1. Fear is the anticipation of future evil; hope, of future good. (premise) 2. The knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful is the knowledge of future goods and evils. (conclusion from 1) 3. Knowledge has to have a unified subject-matter; knowledge of future F must also encompass knowledge of past and present F. (premise) 4. The knowledge of future goods and evils = the knowledge of good and evil generally. (conclusion from 2 and 3) 5. Knowledge of good and evil generally is the whole of virtue, not just a part of it. (premise) 6. The knowledge of future goods and evils is the whole of virtue, not just a part of it. (conclusion from 4 and 5) 7. Courage is only a part of virtue, not the whole of it. (premise) 8. Courage does not = the knowledge of future goods and evils. (conclusion from 6 and 7) Nicias does not know how to reply to Socrates’ argument, and the dialogue ends without resolution. But this does not necessarily mean that Socrates (or Plato) had no solution to offer. Just as Socrates prefers to elicit answers from his interlocutors rather than simply asserting his own views, so Plato may be trying to motivate us to figure out the answer for ourselves. Direction of Fit and the Euthyphro Problem A relation between the mind and the world has a world-to-mind direction of fit when the mind is bringing something about in the world (thus making the world fit itself to the mind). A relation between the mind and the world instead has a mind-to-world direction of fit when the mind is responding to or registering the way the world already is (thus making the mind fit itself to the world). Imagine that you make a shopping list and head off to the store. A spy follows you and writes down everything you buy on his own list. Your list has a world-to-mind direction of fit; you put a can of beans in your cart because the words “can of beans” appear on your list, so reality (the “world” item) is being made to respond to your list (the “mind” item).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Roles of Solon in Plato's Dialogues
    The Roles of Solon in Plato’s Dialogues Dissertation Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Samuel Ortencio Flores, M.A. Graduate Program in Greek and Latin The Ohio State University 2013 Dissertation Committee: Bruce Heiden, Advisor Anthony Kaldellis Richard Fletcher Greg Anderson Copyrighy by Samuel Ortencio Flores 2013 Abstract This dissertation is a study of Plato’s use and adaptation of an earlier model and tradition of wisdom based on the thought and legacy of the sixth-century archon, legislator, and poet Solon. Solon is cited and/or quoted thirty-four times in Plato’s dialogues, and alluded to many more times. My study shows that these references and allusions have deeper meaning when contextualized within the reception of Solon in the classical period. For Plato, Solon is a rhetorically powerful figure in advancing the relatively new practice of philosophy in Athens. While Solon himself did not adequately establish justice in the city, his legacy provided a model upon which Platonic philosophy could improve. Chapter One surveys the passing references to Solon in the dialogues as an introduction to my chapters on the dialogues in which Solon is a very prominent figure, Timaeus- Critias, Republic, and Laws. Chapter Two examines Critias’ use of his ancestor Solon to establish his own philosophic credentials. Chapter Three suggests that Socrates re- appropriates the aims and themes of Solon’s political poetry for Socratic philosophy. Chapter Four suggests that Solon provides a legislative model which Plato reconstructs in the Laws for the philosopher to supplant the role of legislator in Greek thought.
    [Show full text]
  • Plato's Project for Education in the Early Socratic Dialogues
    University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1996 Plato's project for education in the early Socratic dialogues. Heather Lynne Reid University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Reid, Heather Lynne, "Plato's project for education in the early Socratic dialogues." (1996). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2285. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2285 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PLATO'S PROJECT FOR EDUCATION IN THE EARLY SOCRATIC DIALOGUES A Dissertation Presented by HEATHER LYNNE REID Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY May 1996 Department of Philosophy © Copyright by Heather Lynne Reid 1996 All Rights Reserved PLATO'S PROJECT FOR EDUCATION IN THE EARLY SOCRATIC DIALOGUES A Dissertation Presented by HEATHER LYNNE REID Approved as to style and content by: ca Gareth B. Matthews, Chair Robert Ackerman, Member J^n Robison, Department Head philosophy ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my dissertation director Gareth B. Matthews for his special balance of support and criticism throughout this project, as well as Bruce Aune and Marios Philippides for their comments on early stages of the manuscript. I also wish to thank the Department of Philosophy of the University of Southern California for providing library privileges and research support necessary to the completion of this dissertation.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Arrangement of the Platonic Dialogues
    Ryan C. Fowler 25th Hour On the Arrangement of the Platonic Dialogues I. Thrasyllus a. Diogenes Laertius (D.L.), Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 3.56: “But, just as long ago in tragedy the chorus was the only actor, and afterwards, in order to give the chorus breathing space, Thespis devised a single actor, Aeschylus a second, Sophocles a third, and thus tragedy was completed, so too with philosophy: in early times it discoursed on one subject only, namely physics, then Socrates added the second subject, ethics, and Plato the third, dialectics, and so brought philosophy to perfection. Thrasyllus says that he [Plato] published his dialogues in tetralogies, like those of the tragic poets. Thus they contended with four plays at the Dionysia, the Lenaea, the Panathenaea and the festival of Chytri. Of the four plays the last was a satiric drama; and the four together were called a tetralogy.” b. Characters or types of dialogues (D.L. 3.49): 1. instructive (ὑφηγητικός) A. theoretical (θεωρηµατικόν) a. physical (φυσικόν) b. logical (λογικόν) B. practical (πρακτικόν) a. ethical (ἠθικόν) b. political (πολιτικόν) 2. investigative (ζητητικός) A. training the mind (γυµναστικός) a. obstetrical (µαιευτικός) b. tentative (πειραστικός) B. victory in controversy (ἀγωνιστικός) a. critical (ἐνδεικτικός) b. subversive (ἀνατρεπτικός) c. Thrasyllan categories of the dialogues (D.L. 3.50-1): Physics: Timaeus Logic: Statesman, Cratylus, Parmenides, and Sophist Ethics: Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium, Menexenus, Clitophon, the Letters, Philebus, Hipparchus, Rivals Politics: Republic, the Laws, Minos, Epinomis, Atlantis Obstetrics: Alcibiades 1 and 2, Theages, Lysis, Laches Tentative: Euthyphro, Meno, Io, Charmides and Theaetetus Critical: Protagoras Subversive: Euthydemus, Gorgias, and Hippias 1 and 2 :1 d.
    [Show full text]
  • Laches by Plato
    Laches By Plato 1 LACHES, OR COURAGE. PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Lysimachus, son of Aristides. Melesias, son of Thucydides. Their sons. Nicias, Laches, Socrates. LYSIMACHUS: You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armour, Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why my friend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him. I think that we may as well confess what this was, for we certainly ought not to have any reserve with you. The reason was, that we were intending to ask your advice. Some laugh at the very notion of advising others, and when they are asked will not say what they think. They guess at the wishes of the person who asks them, and answer according to his, and not according to their own, opinion. But as we know that you are good judges, and will say exactly what you think, we have taken you into our counsels. The matter about which I am making all this preface is as follows: Melesias and I have two sons; that is his son, and he is named Thucydides, after his grandfather; and this is mine, who is also called after his grandfather, Aristides. Now, we are resolved to take the greatest care of the youths, and not to let them run about as they like, which is too 2 often the way with the young, when they are no longer children, but to begin at once and do the utmost that we can for them. And knowing you to have sons of your own, we thought that you were most likely to have attended to their training and improvement, and, if perchance you have not attended to them, we may remind you that you ought to have done so, and would invite you to assist us in the fulfilment of a common duty.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ascent from Nominalism Philosophical Studies Series
    THE ASCENT FROM NOMINALISM PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES Editors: WILFRID SELLARS, University of Pittsburgh KEITH LEHRER, University of Arizona Board of Consulting Editors: J ON A THAN BENNETT, Syracuse University ALLAN GIBBARD, University of Michigan ROBERT STALNAKER, Cornell University ROBERT G. TURNBULL, Ohio State University VOLUME 37 TERR Y PENNER Department of Philosophy, The University of Wisconsin at Madison, U.S.A. THE ASCENT FROM NOMINALISM Some Existence Arguments in Plato's Middle Dialogues D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY ~~ A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER . ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP DORDRECHTj BOSTONj LANCASTERjTOKYO Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Penner, Terry, 1936- The ascent from nominalism. (Philosophical studies series; v. 37) Bibliography: p. Includes indexes. 1. Plato. 2. Aristotle. 3. Metaphysics-History. 4. Nominalism-History. I. Title. II. Series. B395.P347 1987 111'.2'0924 86·31641 ISBN-13: 978-94-010-8186-3 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-3791-8 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-3791-8 Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland. Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101 Philip Drive, Assinippi Park, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A. In all other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland. All Rights Reserved © 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland Softcover reprint of the hardcover I 5t edition 1987 No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical induding photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Much of this work was conceived and executed between 1971 and 1975, though some of it was done much earlier, and a few bits are quite recent.
    [Show full text]
  • Laches Before Charmides: Fictive Chronology and Platonic Pedagogy Autor(Es): Altman, William H
    Laches before Charmides: fictive chronology and platonic pedagogy Autor(es): Altman, William H. F. Publicado por: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra URL persistente: URI:http://hdl.handle.net/10316.2/42193 DOI: DOI:https://doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_10_1 Accessed : 26-Sep-2021 00:33:39 A navegação consulta e descarregamento dos títulos inseridos nas Bibliotecas Digitais UC Digitalis, UC Pombalina e UC Impactum, pressupõem a aceitação plena e sem reservas dos Termos e Condições de Uso destas Bibliotecas Digitais, disponíveis em https://digitalis.uc.pt/pt-pt/termos. Conforme exposto nos referidos Termos e Condições de Uso, o descarregamento de títulos de acesso restrito requer uma licença válida de autorização devendo o utilizador aceder ao(s) documento(s) a partir de um endereço de IP da instituição detentora da supramencionada licença. Ao utilizador é apenas permitido o descarregamento para uso pessoal, pelo que o emprego do(s) título(s) descarregado(s) para outro fim, designadamente comercial, carece de autorização do respetivo autor ou editor da obra. Na medida em que todas as obras da UC Digitalis se encontram protegidas pelo Código do Direito de Autor e Direitos Conexos e demais legislação aplicável, toda a cópia, parcial ou total, deste documento, nos casos em que é legalmente admitida, deverá conter ou fazer-se acompanhar por este aviso. impactum.uc.pt digitalis.uc.pt JOURNAL DEZ 2010 ISSN 2079-7567 eISSN 2183-4105 PLATO 10 Established 1989 http://platosociety.org/ INTERNATIONAL PLATO SOCIETY PLATO INTERNATIONAL PL ATO Société Platonicienne JOURNALInternationale Associazione Internazionale dei Platonisti Sociedad Internacional de Platonistas Internationale Platon-Gesellschaft ALTMAN, William H.
    [Show full text]
  • Laches. Protagoras. Meno. Euthydemus Ebook
    LACHES. PROTAGORAS. MENO. EUTHYDEMUS Author: Plato Number of Pages: 528 pages Published Date: 01 Jul 1989 Publisher: HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Publication Country: Cambridge, Mass, United States Language: English, Greek, Modern (1453-) ISBN: 9780674991835 DOWNLOAD: LACHES. PROTAGORAS. MENO. EUTHYDEMUS Laches. Protagoras. Meno. Euthydemus PDF Book About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Further Pure 2 and 3 for OCRIncludes Practice Test Questions Civil Service Exam Secrets helps you ace the Civil Service Examination without weeks and months of endless studying. If you want to see positive change now, you'll find the quickest path to fulfillment with prayer through God's love. This book is essential reading for policymakers, for counterterrorism scholars and professionals, and for members of the general public who are concerned about the direction of the international campaign against terrorism. The 11th Congress in Copenhagen was an excellent opportunity to pre- sent our broad spectrum of scientific activities at an international forum. Laches. Protagoras. Meno. Euthydemus Writer All-natural methods to help you quit smoking. In 1967 the National Library of Medicine (NLM) created an information resource, known today as the Toxicology and Environmental Health Information Program (TEHIP). The book includes an appendix with -quick tips- on how to take advantage of the cameras' features in the most efficient ways possible. And you don't even have to own a camper van or motorhome - we'll tell you the many places you can rent one to take you on the journey. hand or face cream) that clearly indicate their use and properties.
    [Show full text]
  • Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of Laches Gail L
    BYU Law Review Volume 1992 | Issue 4 Article 13 11-1-1992 A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of Laches Gail L. Heriot Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview Part of the Civil Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons Recommended Citation Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of Laches, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 917 (1992). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1992/iss4/13 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of Laches Gail L. ~eriot* Pity the poor statute of limitations. Throughout its long history, its invocation has often been regarded by the public and sometimes even by courts as somehow hypertechnical or downright unfair. A defendant who invokes its protection has sometimes been perceived as pulling a fast one on the hapless plaintiff. This does not mean that these courts believe that no limitation whatsoever should be placed upon the time period allowed for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit. Hardly anyone is foolish enough to suggest such a thing.' Rather, these judicial critics of the statute of limitations regard it as an overly rigid and mechanical method for determining which cases, in good conscience, ought to be time barred and which ought not.2 * Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A.
    [Show full text]
  • Notes and References
    Notes and References 1 'The Great Educators' 1. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay on Cosmology. 2 Plato 1. The Epinomis of Plato, trans. J. Harward, § 487. On the assumption that the Epinomis can be ascribed to Plato, see A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work, pp. 497-8. All the succeeding quotations from Plato's writings are from Jowett's 1875 translation, and the references are to the marginal page numbers of that work. 2. For Greek education see Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. G. Highet;H. I. Marrou,A History ofEducation in Antiquity, trans. G. Lamb; F. A. G. Beck, Greek Education, 450-350 B.C.; W. Barclay, Educational Ideals in the Ancient World. 3. § 313. 4. Protagoras, § 340. Cf. Euthydemus, § 277. 5. Protagoras, § 309. 6. Laches, § 186. 7. Protagoras was the first to accept payment (Protagoras, § 348): 'You proclaim in the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue or education and are the first that demanded pay in return.' His method of exacting payment - a form of payment by results - was as follows (Protagoras, § 328): 'When a man has been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no compulsion; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions, and he pays no more than he declares to be their value.' The result was, as reported by Socrates in the Meno, § 91: 'I know of a single man, Protagoras, who made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who created such noble works, or any ten other statuaries.
    [Show full text]
  • Courage and the Soul in Plato Helen Margaret Clare
    Courage and the Soul in Plato Helen Margaret Clare Mawby (0002542) Submitted for the degree: PhD Philosophy Department, Arts Faculty, Glasgow University January2006 © Helen Mawby Abstract In the Introduction I briefly lay out the history of the value terms that I will be consideringin my thesis and considerthe philosophical relevanceof the developmentof suchvalues in the 5t' century. The infiltration of modern ideasof morality into what was consideredto be good to the Greekshas a great influence on the literature and philosophy of this period. Plato prioritises thesequiet moral virtues, but also tries to hang on to some of what had come before, and thus facesdifficulties with his moral theory. I will show that couragepresents Plato with an acutedifficulty when attempting to develop a consistentethical theory. In Chapter 2I look at the Protagoras where the main issues about courage that Plato will continue to discuss throughout his life are introduced. The questions of the extent to which the virtues can be taught and the unity of the virtues are introduced early on. What follows is an attempt to explain and justify the Socratic idea that the virtues are co- dependent and that they all in some way boil down to knowledge. In Chapter 3 on the Laches I will show that the discussion focuses more particularly on the virtue of courage and is mostly a more sophisticated attempt to understand courage than the one presented in the Protagoras. The early dialogues are chiefly concerned with the Socratic idea that virtue is knowledge and my discussion in those chapters considers how well this theory works when related to courage.
    [Show full text]
  • A Case of Platonic Irony at Laches 191B Steve A. Maiullo
    A Case of Platonic Irony at Laches 191b Steve A. Maiullo (Ohio State University) Studying the dramatic irony of the Platonic dialogues, Diskin Clay (2002) has shown that many lively debates are darkened by the shadow of Socrates’ death. The poignancy we recognize when Socrates tells us that the philosopher may be killed upon his return to the cave in Republic 7, or when we watch Socrates head off to answer Meletus’ charges at the end of the Theaetetus, also allows for a certain comfort: that despite the anonymity of the dialogues, we share an intimate moment with Plato in the grief over the loss of Socrates. In this paper, I would like to suggest another example of Platonic irony that has gone unnoticed, involving the title character of the dialogue on andreia, Laches. I will argue that an allusion to Homer presents the same choice that Laches had to make at the battle of Mantinea [418 BCE]—to wisely retreat or impulsively hold ground—in the context of the Trojan War. This paper will show that just as with the trial and execution of Socrates, Thucydides’ narrative of Mantinea and the Homeric allusion to Aeneas’ divine horses ironize the position of Laches in the dialogue named after him by forcing us to reconsider the relationship between history, poetry, and the philosophical dialogue. In response to Laches’ initial definition of courage, that the courageous man will “remain at his post, defend himself against his enemy, and not run away,” Socrates indicates that a man can be courageous if he fights with the enemy while in retreat (190e-191a).
    [Show full text]
  • The Unity of the Philebus: Continuity in Plato’S Philosophy
    Distribution Agreement In presenting this thesis or dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known, including display on the world wide web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of the thesis or dissertation. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation. Signature: _________________________ ___________________ Jong Hwan Lee Date The Unity of the Philebus: Continuity in Plato’s Philosophy By Jong Hwan Lee Doctor of Philosophy Philosophy ___________________________________ Dr. Richard Patterson Advisor ___________________________________ Dr. Ann Hartle Committee Member ___________________________________ Dr. Richard D. Parry Committee Member Accepted: ___________________________________ Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph. D. Dean of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies ______________ Date The Unity of the Philebus: Continuity in Plato’s Philosophy By Jong Hwan Lee B.A., Seoul National University, 2002 M.A., Seoul National University, 2005 M.A., Emory University, 2010 Advisor: Dr. Richard Patterson, Ph.D. An abstract of A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy 2013 Abstract The Unity of the Philebus: Continuity in Plato’s Philosophy By Jong Hwan Lee The Philebus is Plato’s answer to the question what the human good is.
    [Show full text]