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1 Algeria – Researched and Compiled by the Refugee Documentation Algeria – Researched and compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 7 October 2015 Information on the following: Algerian FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) / Muslim Brotherhood generally. Treatment by Algerian Army of FIS / Muslim Brotherhood. Current status of FIS / Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria. A report commissioned by the UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, in a section titled “After the October 1988 riots” (section 2.3) refers to the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) as follows: “The FIS (Front Islamique du Salut - Jabha Islamiyya li’l-Inqadh) movement itself was formally legalized on 1 March 1989, when the new party law came into effect after the October 1988 riots and created the conditions for a pluralistic political scene. Its two founding fathers, Abbassi Madani and Ali Bel Hadj, had come to national prominence because of their roles in the immediate aftermath of the riots, when they were consulted by the presidency over the future course that Algeria should take and appealed to the population for support for an Islamist alternative. The creation of the FIS was also implicit evidence of the President’s intention to use the new movement to break the monopoly of the FLN, for, although the party law made illegal any reference to religion or language within party platforms, the FIS itself was registered without demur.” (UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research (May 2000) Algeria: A Country in Crisis, p.9) A report on Algeria published by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in a paragraph headed “background”, states: “After more than a century of rule by France, Algerians fought through much of the 1950s to achieve independence in 1962. Algeria's primary political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), was established in 1954 as part of the struggle for independence and has largely dominated politics since. The Government of Algeria in 1988 instituted a multi-party system in response to public unrest, but the surprising first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the December 1991 balloting led the Algerian army to intervene and postpone the second round of elections to prevent what the secular elite feared would be an extremist-led government from assuming power. The army began a crackdown on the FIS that spurred FIS supporters to begin attacking government targets. Fighting escalated into an insurgency, which saw intense violence from 1992-98, resulting in over 100,000 deaths - many attributed to indiscriminate massacres of villagers by extremists. The government gained the upper hand by the late-1990s, and FIS's armed wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, disbanded in January 2000.” (Central Intelligence Agency (24 September 2015) The World Factbook – Algeria) A UK Home Office Border Agency report, in a section titled “Events Between 1988 and 1998: Elections, Military Takeover and Civil Conflict” (section 3.02), 1 quotes from a 1994 US Library of Congress country profile of Algeria as follows: “In February 1989, the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut— FIS) was founded. Algeria‘s leaders were stunned in December 1991 when FIS candidates won absolute majorities in 188 of 430 electoral districts, far ahead of the FLN‘s 15 seats, in the first round of legislative elections. Faced with the possibility of a complete FIS takeover and under pressure from the military leadership, Benjadid dissolved parliament and then resigned in January 1992. He was succeeded by the five-member High Council of State, which cancelled the second round of elections. The FIS, as well as the FLN, clamoured for a return of the electoral process, but police and troops countered with massive arrests. In February 1992, violent demonstrations erupted in many cities. The government declared a one-year state of emergency and banned the FIS. The voiding of the 1991 election results led to a period of civil conflict that cost the lives of as many as 150,000 people. Periodic negotiations between the military government and Islamist rebels failed to produce a settlement. In 1996 a referendum passed that introduced changes to the constitution enhancing presidential powers and banning Islamist parties.” (UK Home Office Border Agency (17 January 2013) Algeria: Country of Origin Information (COI) Report, p.13) A document published by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada refers to the background to the Algerian crisis as follows: “In 1989, in an attempt to reestablish its credibility after the riots, the ruling FLN, led by President Chadli Benjedid, made constitutional changes that, among other things, paved the way for economic liberalization and multiparty elections, and guaranteed the right to freedom of expression and association. Several political parties emerged, including the FIS. In the June 1990 local elections, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) gained control of 854 out of 1,541 municipal councils and 32 out of 48 provincial assemblies. Three months after the elections, the Christian Science Monitor reported there was no major public dissatisfaction with local FIS rule. The FIS appeared to be addressing the problems of housing and unemployment, and did not seem anxious to uniformly apply the sharia. In some municipalities under its control, and where local circumstances permitted, the FIS imposed gender segregation at beaches, schools, cultural centres, and recreation halls, and prohibited ‘decadent’ music, cinemas, public dancing, and the sale of alcohol.” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (1 June 1995) Islamism, the State and Armed Conflict) This document also states: “In another major electoral victory, the FIS won 189 out of a total of 430 seats in the first round of national elections held in December 1991. According to one source, the result of this election, during which nearly half of eligible voters abstained, did not necessarily reflect strong religious conviction, but rather a sense that the FIS ‘would develop and modernize the country, and above all endow the political leadership with moral behaviour’. Unable to accept an imminent FIS-led government, and, in response to calls from several democratic parties, human rights organizations and women's groups, the security forces pressured President Chadli to resign, and cancelled the second round of national elections on 12 January 1992. On 16 January 1992, 2 a military-backed, five-member transitional High State Committee (HCE), took over the country's leadership. It is currently led by Liamine Zeroual. The first month of the HCE's mandate was marked by growing clashes between Islamists and government security forces as the latter attempted to enforce new decrees prohibiting public gatherings near mosques and arrested several imams. The government imposed a state of emergency on 9 February 1992 and banned the FIS in March 1992.” (ibid) A report published by the International Crisis Group, in a section titled “The FIS”, states: “The Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) was founded in March 1989 and legalised as a political party the following September. It quickly gained support, especially among the urban poor and urban youth, and on 12 June 1990 it won a sweeping victory in elections for the communal and regional assemblies -- the first pluralist elections in independent Algeria. Despite a crackdown in June-July 1991, in which its leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Ben Hadj, and many other activists were arrested, the party gained a spectacular lead in the first round of the legislative elections held on 26 December 1991, which placed it on course for a massive majority in the National Assembly if the second round went ahead on 16 January 1992. Instead, on 11 January 1992, the army commanders forced President Chadli to resign and cancelled the elections. In the following days, they invented a socalled High State Committee to serve as a collective presidency for the rest of Chadli's term and enforced a previously neglected law banning the use of mosques by political parties, thereby provoking violent clashes with FIS activists across the country. These disorders were then invoked to justify the decisions announced on 9 February 1992 to introduce a state of emergency and ban the FIS, both of which remain in force.” (International Crisis Group (20 July 2004) Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning The Page, p.4) This section of the report also states: “With the dissolution of the party, the initiative passed to the jihadi tendency, which had never believed in an electoral strategy. Several armed movements developed, to which FIS activists on the run soon gravitated. Those fragments of the FIS leadership still at liberty -- whether underground or in exile – were reduced to trading on a rebellion they had not organised and did not control in an effort to persuade the authorities to revoke the ban in return for the party's assistance in ending the violence. This effort was unsuccessful; by 1997, the FIS retained a connection with only one armed movement, the Islamic Salvation Army (Armée Islamique du Salut, AIS). When the AIS negotiated a cease-fire with the commanders of the Algerian army (Armée Nationale Populaire, ANP) in September 1997, it became clear that the party's investment in the rebellion had failed. Since the dissolution of the AIS in 2000, the FIS as an organisation has had no connection with the armed movements still active. Its prospects of being relegalised appear remote and probably depend entirely on the preferences of the Algerian authorities.” (ibid, p.4) See also the Introduction to an International Crisis Group report which states: “The war started when the Algerian Army refused to recognise the results of the legislative elections held in December 1991, which the Islamic Salvation 3 Front (FIS) won in the first round. This rejection immediately led to confrontation between FIS supporters and the national security forces. The following year, 1992, the assassination of President Mohamed Boudiaf, the dissolution of the FIS, the incarceration of its militant members in Saharan camps and the repression of its sympathisers all sharpened the sense of popular revolt against the regime.
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