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Download File Giuliano Torrengo Date and place of birth: 27/01/1975, Torino, Italy Home Address: Carrer de Sòria 18, 3-1, 08003 Barcelona (Spain) Office Address: Dept. Lógica, Història i Filosofía de la Ciència, Universitat de Barcelona LOGOS – Grup de Recerca en Lògica, Llenguatge i Cognició Montalegre 6; Barcelona 08001 Telephone: +34 934031914 Email: [email protected] or [email protected] Present Affiliation 3/2011 - 2/2014 Juan de la Cierva Fellowship, LOGOS Group - Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència - Universitat de Barcelona, Spain Other Affiliations Labont — Department of Philosophy, University of Turin (Italy) 2006 March – June: Visiting Scholar at the Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, NY. 2004 September – 2005 June: Visiting Scholar at the Department of Philosophy, Columbia Uni- versity, NY. 2004 August: Visiting Scholar at the Philosophy Department, Delhi University. Collaboration with Prof. N. Mukherjee. 2004 February – April: Visiting scholar at the Philosophy Department, Delhi University. Col- laboration with Prof. N. Mukherjee. 2003 March – April: Visiting scholar at the Institut Jean Nicod, Paris. Education 2002 October – 2007 September: Ph.D. Student in Philosophy of Language, UPO (Vercelli). Title of the dissertation: Cross-Temporal Relations. Supervisor: Alberto Voltolini. Commission: Michele Di Francesco, Marco Santambrogio, Achille C. Varzi. 2001 October: B.A., University of Turin, supervisors Prof. M. Ferraris and P. Kobau. Title of the Thesis: Descartes on the non-correspondence between stimulus and representation. 1999 I have spent a year as an undergraduate Erasmus-student at the Erasmus University of Rot- terdam (NL), under the supervision of Prof. Hans Blom. Summer Schools 2008 May, Scuola di Alta Formazione Filosofica, “Workshop with John Searle”, Torino, Italy. 2006 June, CNRS Summer School “Cognitive Bases of Scientific Images”, Roscoff, France. 2004 June: CNRS Summer School “Reference to Objects”, Ile d’Oléron, France. 2003 March: “Ray Jackendoff Workshop” at the Jean Nicod Institute, Paris, France. 1 Areas of competence Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Science, Epistemology, Cognitive science. Languages Native speaker of Italian Fluent in spoken and written English Fluent in spoken Spanish Good in spoken French Strong reading comprehension skills in German Elementary knowledge of spoken Dutch and German Notions of Portuguese and Catalan Bibliography Work in progress (provisory titles) Time Travel, Individuals, and the Space-time-actuality Manifold Metaphysical Explanations Error Theories and the Flow of Time Documentality: A Theory of Social Reality (with M. Ferraris) Are there any Austinian Propositions? (with S. Caputo) Books 2011 I Viaggi nel Tempo. Una Guida Filosofica [Time Travels. A Philosophical Guide], Roma- Bari, Laterza 2008 Time and Cross-Temporal Relations, Mimesis, Milano Peer Reviewed Articles in Journals and in Collective Works with a Scientific Board 2012, “Time and Simple Existence” forthcoming in Metaphysica (October 2012) In this paper I argue against scepticism toward the substantivity of the distinction between eternalism and presentism. 2012, “Time Travel and the Thin Red Line”, fothcoming in P. Graziani and M. Sangoi (eds.) Open Problems in the Philosophy of Science, London, College Pubblications 2 In this paper I argue that Time travel is compatible with a branching future topology of time, provided that we endorse the thin red line view. 2012, “La Filosofia del Tempo”, AphEx - Portale italiano di Filosofia Analitica, Giornale di Filo- sofia Network, 5 <http://www.aphex.it/public/file/Content20120201_APHEx5TemiTorrengoFilosofiadelTempo.pd f> This is an overview of the state of the art in philosophy of time and an attempt to draw the borders of this area of research. 2012 “The Metaphysics of the Thin Red Line” (with A. Borghini), forthcoming in F. Correia, A. Iacona (eds.), Around the Three, Berlin, Synthese Library, Springer Verlag. In this paper we defend the thin red line hypothesis against common misconceptions 2011 “The Modal Dimension”, Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies, 19: 105–120 In this paper I discuss Lewis modal realism and argue for a radical interpretation of it. 2011 “The Grounding Problem and Presentist Explanations”, forthcoming in Synthese (online first: http://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-011-9955-z) In this paper I argue against presentism, in particular against the deflationist solution to problem of grounding past truths. 2011 “The not so incredible shrinking future” (with R. Casati), Analysis, 71, 2: 240–44 In this paper we argue that the “shrinking future” view of time, that is the tenet that reality is composed only by the future (which keeps on shrinking or eroding) and the present, has no less intuitive appeal than the more common “growing block” view. 2010 “Perspectival Truth and Perspectival Realism”, in F. Recanati, I. Stojanovic, N. Villanueva (eds.) Context-dependence, perspective and relativity in language and thought, De Gruyter, Mouton Series in Pragmatics: 333-48 In this paper I argue that genuine relativism implies perspecitval realism; I raise then certain problems with the latter. 2010, “Time, Context, and Cross-temporal Claims”, Philosophia, 38: 281-296 (online first < U R L = http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1007/s11406-009-9225-1>) 3 In this paper I argue that a proper treatment of cross-temporal relations clashes with a A-theoretic view of time. 2009 “Bare Particulars and Persistence in Bergmann” (with Luca Angelone), in Bruno Langlet & Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (eds.) G. Bergmann : phenomenological realism and dialectical ontol- ogy, Frankfurt, Ontos: 137-154. A discussion and a critique of Bergmann’s theory of persistence. 2008 “Relative Truth and The Metaphysics of Tense”, in M. Carrara & V. Morato (eds.), Lan- guage, Knowledge, and Metaphysics: selected papers form the 1st SIFA Graduate Conference, College Publications, London: 211-228 In this paper I discuss MacFalane’s “retrospective assessment” semantics, and propose a metaphysics of time suitable for it. 2008 “Tensed Time vs. Tensed Truth-Makers”, in G. Bonino and R. Egidi (eds.) Fostering the Ontological Turn, Gustav Bergmann 1906-1987, Frankfurt, Ontos: 253-260 In this paper I criticize Dean Zimmermann’s distinction between taking tense seriously and tense realism. 2006, “Crimes and Punishments”, with A.Varzi, Philosophia, 34: 395-404. In this paper we argue that our criteria for counting actions, and therefore crimes and their punishments, only in few cases are ontologically grounded. 2006, “Tenseless cross-temporal Relations”, Metaphysica, Vol. 7, No. 2: 117-129 In this paper I argue that Berit Brogaard’s proposal of construing cross-temporal claims (such as “my son is now taller than my daughter was at twelve”) as expressing relations irreducibly tensed has two major problems that a tenseless construal of cross-temporal claims can cope with. Proceedings 2006, “Cross-temporal Relations”, in Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Spanish Society of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Granada In this paper I argue that presentism (the thesis that, quantifying on absolutely everything, only present things exist) is not compatible with a satisfying semantics for cross-temporal claims. Other Papers 4 2012, “Filosofia della Scienza” [Philosophy of Science] (with E. Casetta), forthcoming in T. An- dina (ed.) Filosofia Contemporanea. Di cosa si occupano i filosofi oggi, Roma, Carocci An opinionated introduction to central problems in contemporary philosophy of science (in particular, phi- losophy of physics and philosophy of biology). 2012, “Presentism and Cross-temporal Relations” (with R. Ciuni), forthcoming on R. Ciuni, K. Miller, G. Torrengo (eds.) New Papers on the Present. Focus on Presentism, Philosophia Verlag A detailed discussion of all arguments from cross-temporal relations against presentism to be found in re- cent literature. 2012, “Una nota sulla filosofia dei viaggi nel tempo” [A note on the Philosophy of Time Travel], forthcoming on a volume of the “Collana CIRFS”, Milano, Mimesis In this note I argue that the idea of time travel can be very useful in philosophical investigations. 2012, “L’ontologia del tempo” [The Ontology of Time], forthcoming in Carlo Tatasciore, Pier- luigi Graziani, Giorgio Grimaldi (eds.) Prospettive Filosofiche 2009: Ontologia, Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici An overview of the contemporary problems in the metaphysics of time. 2012 “Collective Intentionality, Documents, and Social Reality” forthcoming in Rivista di Es- tetica A critique of Searle’s notion of collective intentionality 2012 “Esistere” e “essere esistito” [“Existing” and “Having existed”], Rivista di Estetica, 49: This paper contains a critique of presentism based on the grounding objection with respect to past truths. 2012 “Perché l’intenzionalità collettiva non dà conto del mercato azionario e i documenti sì”, forthcoming in Rivista di Estetica, 50 An slightly expanded version of my paper of the same title published in Etica & Politica, 2010 2011, “L’assassino del nonno viaggia sulla macchina del tempo” [The grandfather’s killer travels on the time machine], L’Indice, XXVIII, n. 1: p. 10 An introductory short presentation of the philosophical problems connected to the issue of time travel. 5 2010, “Perché l’intenzionalità collettiva non dà conto del mercato azionario e i documenti sì”, [Why collective ontentionality cannot account for
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