By Philip Loft
9 August 2021 The Gulf in 2021
Summary 1 Human rights 2 The UK’s Gulf Strategy Fund 3 UK-Gulf relations 4 Relations with the US 5 Regional relations 6 Soft power and the World Cup
commonslibrary.parliament.uk
Number CBP 9284 The Gulf in 2021
Contributing Authors Louisa Brooke-Holland (Defence and security)
Image Credits Dust storm in Saudi Arabia by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center/Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0)/Image cropped
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Contents
1 Human rights 7
1.1 Regional overview 7
1.2 Country overview 8
2 The UK’s Gulf Strategy Fund 12
2.1 Programme objectives and funding 12
2.2 Calls to suspend the fund 14
3 UK-Gulf relations 15
3.1 Trading relationship 15
3.2 Defence collaboration and arms sales 16
3.3 Sanctions for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi 17
3.4 COP 26 and climate change 18
4 Relations with the US 20
4.1 Change under Biden? 20
4.2 Continuing collaboration 20
5 Regional relations 22
5.1 Qatar crisis 22
5.2 Yemen 23
5.3 Israel 24
5.4 Iran 25
5.5 Oil production 27
6 Soft power and the World Cup 28
6.1 Progress since awarding Qatar the World Cup tournament 28
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Summary
The six Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman collectively form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Both the UK and US have deep security and trading ties with the region and are active in patrols in the Gulf to protect shipping. UK support for the region through the Gulf Strategy Fund (GSF) has proved controversial, however. In 2021, the APPG on Democracy and Human Rights in the Gulf argued UK support lacks transparency and the GSF has compromised UK commitments to human rights—something the UK Government has denied.
GCC members do not act as a monolithic bloc, having competing foreign and economic policies. Relations between Qatar and other GCC states have been strained since the crisis of 2017 that saw a blockade introduced against the country, but an agreement to normalise relations was reached in 2021. Gulf states have also taken different approaches towards recognising Israel. Collectively they seek containment of Iran.
The paper also describes continuing human rights concerns in the Gulf and progress that Qatar has made in preparation for hosting the 2022 World Cup.
UK relations: Trade, security, and human rights The UK has a close security and trading relationship with the GCC, and funds human rights, governance and trade programmes in the Gulf through the GSF. In 2021, the GCC and UK concluded a trade review, which said the two would seek to make a trading agreement. The region is currently the UK’s third-largest non-EU trading partner.
Both the RAF and Royal Navy have bases in the region to protect shipping lanes and project power. The UK has also participated in joint exercises with Gulf states. Personnel from the GCC states have received training in the UK.
The UK’s engagement with the GCC has drawn criticism because of the human rights record of Gulf countries. All six states are considered amongst the least free for press and religious freedom and retain the death penalty. All, except Bahrain, criminalise same-sex relationships, and LGBT+ people commonly face discrimination.
In 2021, the APPG on Democracy and Human Rights in the Gulf argued the GSF has supported human rights violations in the region and that it lacks transparency. The APPG called for the GSF to be suspended. The UK Government has denied GSF work contributes to human rights abuses and states all programmes are subject to human rights assessments.
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Changing relations with the US The Biden Administration has sought to reset relations with the region, placing US arms exports to the UAE and Saudi Arabia under review, and releasing intelligence linking Saudi Arabia, including the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, to the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
The US has shifted its focus to the Asia-Pacific and to threats from Russia and China. However, it maintains deep defence relationships with the Gulf states. In 2021, it participated in military exercises with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
Diplomatically, the US is seeking Gulf engagement to address the economic crisis and political instability in Lebanon, the conflict in Yemen, and on the Iran nuclear deal.
Resolution to the Qatar crisis, 2017-2021 Relationships between the Gulf states have recovered since the crisis in Qatar in 2017, which had left the country isolated in the region. Gulf states had introduced a blockade against Qatar, citing its support for the Muslim Brotherhood (which some Gulf states see as a threat to stability) and maintenance of some diplomatic ties with Iran. An agreement to establish trade and other relations was reached in January.
Regional relations: Iran, Israel and Yemen Talks between the US and Iran on re-establishing the 2015 nuclear deal have currently stalled, following the inauguration of the new Iranian President. The GCC continues to oppose any nuclear deal with Iran that does not also put limits on wider Iranian activity in region, such as its support for proxy groups (like Hezbollah in Lebanon). Iran opposes any widening of the deal.
In the last year both the UAE and Bahrain have also recognised Israel, being the third and fourth Arab states, respectively, to do so.
Saudi Arabia has also called for a ceasefire in Yemen, where it backs the Hadi Government against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. Saudi Arabia has also drawn criticism for potential human rights abuses in the conflict.
Attacks on merchant vessels Iran and Iranian-backed groups have long been suspected of carrying out attacks on tankers and merchant vessels in the Gulf. In 2021, the UK, US and others accused Iran of attacking a vessel in July, leading to two deaths. An attempted hijacking of another ship occurred in August, though no party has been blamed or claimed responsibility.
The attacks are likely to increase pressure for any deal with Iran to include limits on its wider regional activity, such as backing for militia groups.
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The Football World Cup in Qatar, 2022 Qatar is due to host the World Cup in November-December 2022. Significant concerns have been raised for the treatment of migrant workers in the country, and discrimination against LGBT+ people. In 2020, an estimated 95 percent of the Qatari workforce were migrant workers, numbering around 2 million.
In 2020, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights welcomed the steps by Qatar to improve migrants’ rights, which include allowing migrants to change jobs without their employer’s permission. Amnesty International has continued to urge Fifa, the world governing body for association football, to use its leverage to end the abuse of migrant workers.
In 2020, the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association reported LGBT+ persons in Qatar continue to “face an extremely hostile context.”
Although some footballers and national clubs have called for a boycott of the 2022 competition, no country federation has formally decided to do so.
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1 Human rights
1.1 Regional overview
The six Gulf states are considered amongst the least free countries in the world. The Cato Institute’s Human Freedom Index rates all below the average country rating of 6.93, while Reporters Without Borders places all in the bottom half of the least free countries for press freedom. Pew Research rank all as having “high” or “very high” government restrictions on religion, putting all Gulf states amongst the most restrictive fifth of countries in the world.1
Human rights in the Gulf: Global rankings and scores Bahrain Kuwait Oman Saudi Arabia Qatar UAE Global Freedom Score 12 37 23 7 25 17 2020 (out of 100) Human Freedom Index 6.18 6.39 6.03 5.29 6.07 6.17 2020 (out of 10) World Press Freedom 168th 105th 133th 170th 128th 131th Index 2020 (out of 180) Pew's Government Restrictions Index 2018 6.3 5.6 5.4 7.5 5.5 5.8 (out of 10)
Note: Ratings and scores may be impacted by both state and non-state actors. See sources for breakdown of methodology Source: Freedom House, Global freedom scores 2020, Cato Institute, Human Freedom Index 2020, Reporters without Borders, 2021 World Freedom Index; Pew Research Centre, Government restrictions on religion reach highest level globally in more than a decade: Full report, pp67-8
All six states also retain the death penalty and are known to have collectively All six states retain handed down at least 62 death sentences in 2019 and 2020. Amnesty the death penalty International reports Saudi Arabia executed 184 people in 2019 and 27 in 2020. From January to July 2021, the Kingdom executed a further 40 people. Bahrain executed three people in 2019, and Qatar one in 2020.2 The UK opposes the death penalty in all circumstances, and has raised this directly with Gulf Governments, including Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.3
1 Pew Research Centre, In 2018, government restrictions on religion reach highest level […]: Methodology, 2018 2 Amnesty International, Death sentences and executions, 2019, 2020 pp11, 34; Amnesty International, Death sentences and executions 2020, 2021, pp12, 36; Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia: Authorities ramp up repression after G20 hiatus, 3 August 2021 3 PQ 73749 [Bahrain: IAF], 20 July 2020; PQ 35883 [Saudi Arabia: Capital Punishment], 27 July 2021
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All countries other than Bahrain criminalise same-sex acts. In Bahrain, they All except Bahrain have been legal since 1976 but widespread discrimination remains.4 LGBT+ criminalise same- organisations and activists struggle to organise openly.5 sex relations There are limited elections in Gulf states. Bahrain and Oman have elections for one house of their bicameral parliament, and Kuwait allows its elected parliament to block laws and question ministers. In the UAE, half the members of the Federal National Council are elected. In July 2021, Qatar set up a committee to oversee legislative elections for the first time. These are due to take place in October 2021. 30 of the 45 members of the advisory Shura Council will be elected, with the remainder appointed by the Qatari Emir.6
UK’s priority countries in the Gulf The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has identified 31 countries where it is particularly concerned about human rights, and where it considers the UK can make a “real difference.” These priority countries include Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.7
In terms of UK priorities for these two countries, in Bahrain the FCDO has engaged with women’s rights and migrant labour as part of Bahrain’s National Human Rights Action Plan.8 In Saudi Arabia, the Department intends to prioritise work on the death penalty, women’s rights, specific cases of concern and will attempt to attend the trials of political detainees.9
1.2 Country overview
This section provides only a short summary of key human rights concerns in the region—Box 1 lists further resources and reading.
Saudi Arabia In a 2021 report, Human Rights Watch (HRW) raised concerns that torture was used against political prisoners, including women’s rights activists, in 2018.10
The FCDO has previously signed UN Human Rights Council statements setting out concerns for the use of torture in the Kingdom, and called for the release of all political detainees in the country.11
4 ILGA World, State-sponsored homophobia: Global legislation overview update, 2020, p327 5 Human Rights Watch, LGBT activism in the Middle East and North Africa, April 2018 6 Al-Jazeera, Qatar sets up supervisory body for first legislative elections, 11 July 2021 7 FCDO, Human rights & democracy: The 2020 FCDO report, July 2021 8 FCDO, Human rights & democracy: The 2020 FCDO report, July 2021, p35 9 FCDO, Human rights & democracy: The 2020 FCDO report, July 2021, p58 10 HRW, Saudi Arabia: New details of alleged torture leaked, 11 July 2021 11 PQ 31326 [Saudi Arabia: Human rights], 15 July 2021; PQ 136477 [Saudi Arabia: Political prisoners], 18 January 2021
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In October 2020, the Kingdom lost a UN vote to remain on the UN Human Rights Council, where it has sat for two terms.12
Bahrain In March 2021, HRW and the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy published a report accusing Bahrain police of arresting and mistreating children aged between 11 and 17.13
The UK Government state Bahrain has taken steps to improve its juvenile justice system, which the UK is supporting.14
Concerns have also been raised for political and other prisoners in the country, particularly due to the high incidence of Covid-19 and UN concerns for the “disproportionate” force used by police against prison protests.15
In June 2021, the UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, met with the Crown Prince of Bahrain, Salman Bin Hamad al-Khalifa.16 The UK Government was criticised for the resulting press statement on the meeting not mentioning the country’s human rights record.17 Responding to questions in the Lords, the Government whip, Lord Parkinson, said the Government regularly raised human rights concerns with the Bahrain Government, including at senior levels.18
Kuwait Concerns have been raised for the rights of the Bidoon community, who are stateless individuals estimated to number around 100,000.19 Kuwaiti MPs have subsequently drafted a law providing basic rights for the group.20 There have also been calls to reform the country’s penal law to better protect women.21
Oman In January 2021, Oman completed its third periodic review before the UN Human Rights Council.22 The UK said it acknowledged the progress made by
12 CNBC, Saudi Arabia loses vote to stay on human rights council; China, Russia and Cuba win seats, 14 October 2020 13 Al-Monitor, Rights groups say Bahrain police beat, threatened children, 10 March 2021; HRW, Bahrain: Police beat, threaten children, 10 March 2021 14 HL Deb, 15 July 2021, c1948; Al-Jazeera, UN “disturbed” by Bahrain forces’ violent breakup of jail sit- in, 30 April 2021; The Guardian, Bahraini prisoners allege brutal crackdown in response to Covid protest, 22 June 2021 15 EDM-284 of 2021-22 [Hassan Mushaima and political prisoners detained in Bahrain], 5 July 2021 16 Number Ten, PM meeting with HRH the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Bahrain, 17 June 2021 17 Middle East Eye, “Sickening:” Rights groups slam Boris Johnson’s meeting with the Bahrain crown Prince, 17 June 2021; HL Deb, 15 July 2021, cc1947-50 18 HL Deb, 15 July 2021, c1947 19 Minority Rights Group international, Kuwait: Bidoon, accessed 30 July 2021 20 Middle East Eye, Kuwait: Push for rights of Bidoon community after man attempts suicide, 1 June 2021 21 Reuters, Woman’s murder by alleged harasser in Kuwait sparks protest, outrage, 22 April 2021 22 UN Human Rights Council, Oman, 21 January 2021
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Oman since its 2014 review, such as combatting human trafficking, but remained concerned on limits to freedom of expression and association.23
In 2021, economic problems have resulted in protests in Oman. Omani police have used tear gas and arrested dozens of protesters.24 The Gulf Centre for Human Rights reported there were many instances where security forces violated the rights of expression and peaceful protest.25 The UK Government has said while it works with Omani security forces, UK advice and training is always in line with respect for human rights.26
Qatar In 2021, a HRW report was published on male guardianships rules which deny women the right to make decisions about marriage, work, travel, and to access some healthcare.27
Information on migrant and LGBT+ rights in Qatar can be found in Section 6.1 on the 2022 World Cup.
UAE The UAE has come under pressure from the UN for its treatment of human rights defenders in prison, including activist Ahmed Mansoor. Many had been arrested during anti-government protests in 2011.28
Concerns continue to be raised for Mansoor. In July 2021, the Gulf Centre for Human Rights and HRW have called for his release, citing his treatment in prison and unfair nature of his trial. He has been held in isolation for four years.29 The UK has raised his case with the UAE.30
The country has also established a National Human Rights Authority.31
The UAE is due to become a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), of which the UK is shareholder.32 Many human rights organisations have opposed the move.33 Under EBRD statutes, the Bank is limited to carrying out its functions in states committed to pluralism,
23 FCDO, 37th Universal Periodic Review: UK statement on Oman, 21 January 2021 24 Al-Jazeera, “Controlling the situation:” Oman leader quickly quells protests, 3 June 2021 25 GCHR, Oman: Freedom of assembly and expression violated during recent popular protests, 2 June 2021 26 PQ 24338 [Oman: Demonstrations], 5 July 2021 27 HRW, Qatar: Male guardianship severely curtails women’s rights, 29 March 2021 28 Reuters, UN expert urges UAE to release five human rights activists, 11 June 2021; UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (UN OHCHR), UAE: Release human rights defenders serving long-term prison sentences, urges UN expert, 10 February 2021 29 HRW, UAE: Prominent jailed activist in danger, 19 July 2021 30 PQ 7935 [Ahmed Mansoor], 8 June 2021 31 Gulf News, UAE passes law setting up national human rights authority, 21 April 2021 32 EBRD, UK: Shareholder profile, accessed 2 August 2021 33 Devex, UAE membership raises human rights concerns about EBRD, 1 February 2021
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multiparty democracy and market economics, though it has worked with states such as Russia and Egypt.34
A new head of Interpol, the international criminal police organisation, is also due to be selected in 2021. A former UK Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir David Calvert-Smith, has argued the UAE is attempting to “improperly finance” Interpol and that its potential candidate for Interpol President, Major General Al-Raisi, would undermine the organisation’s commitments to human rights.35
Box 1: Further reading on human rights in the Gulf
The above provides only a summary of the human rights situation in the region. The following sources provide additional information:
• US State Department, 2020 country reports on human rights practices (2021) • FCDO, Human rights and democracy report 2020 (2021) • Human Rights Watch, World report 2021 (2021) • Amnesty International, The state of the world’s human rights, 2020/21 (2021) • US State Department, 2020 report on international religious freedom (2021) • International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), State-sponsored homophobia 2020 (2020) • International Labour Organization, World Social Protection Report 2017- 19, 2017
Many NGOs and activists struggle to organise in the region and are instead based abroad. However, in Qatar during 2020 some international NGOs were able to visit and report without interference.36 Organisations such as the Gulf Centre for Human Rights, Bahrain Centre for Human Rights and Omani Centre for Human Rights are amongst those monitoring events.
34 EBRD, Multiparty democracy and pluralism, accessed 2 August 2021; ERBD, Where we are, accessed 2 August 2021 35 HRW, Interpol: UAE official’s candidacy raises human rights alarms, 5 May 2021: Peter & Peters Extradition UK, Sir David Calvert-Smith publishes report on UAE and Interpol, 7 April 2021 36 For example, US State Department, 2020 country reports on human rights, 2021, Bahrain, Section 5; Kuwait, section 5; Oman, section 5; Qatar, section 5, Saudi Arabia, section 5; UAE, section 5
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2 The UK’s Gulf Strategy Fund
One of the significant mechanisms through which the UK interacts with the region is the Gulf Strategy Fund (GSF). The GSF is the successor to the Integrated Activity Fund (IAF), which was in place from 2016 to 2020. Both seek to strengthen commercial and security ties, support reforms in human rights and governance, and enable sustainable action on climate change.
There is only limited information on the programmes provided under GSF, a position criticised by some MPs (see section 2.2). The funds have also been criticised by the APPG on Democracy and Human Rights in the Gulf for undermining human rights (see section 2.3).
2.1 Programme objectives and funding
In April 2020, the GSF succeeded the IAF. It provides six country programmes and five regional ones. Country-specific programmes are provided by the FCDO, while other departments may bid to provide regional ones.37
Country programmes and objectives
• Bahrain: GSF funds centre on consolidating security and stability in the country, including through police reform, strengthening oversight bodies in the country (over the police, for example) and its counter-terrorism capabilities.38 • Kuwait: Funds centre on climate change and addressing corruption. This has included the development of a code of ethics for the Kuwaiti Parliament. • Oman: UK funds support Oman’s economic reforms and development, particularly in the technology sector. • Qatar: GSF provides staffing support for the country’s Football World Cup preparations. • Saudi Arabia: The UK seeks to support Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 reforms. This includes economic development, mutual security, and women’s rights. One objective includes increasing women’s participation
37 FCDO, GSF programme summary, updated 24 June 2021 38 PQ HL15129 [GSF], 29 April 2021
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• in the workforce from 22 percent to 30 percent by 2030, an objective achieved in 2020.39 • UAE: The GSF focuses on identifying threats of mutual concern such as terrorism, border protection and illicit finance.40
Regional programmes The GSF’s regional programmes include a Gulf-wide alumni network to strengthen education and commercial ties, a cyber ambassador to strengthen regional cyber-security, and a marine partnership for environmental management. The GSF also supports tax reform across the Gulf and runs a science and innovation programme designed to strengthen the UK’s role as a science partner to the region.41
Funding Expenditure on IAF/GSF From 2016/17 to 2020/21, the UK is due to spend £62.2 million via the GSF. 2016/17 £10.5m Individual country allocations for 2021/22 are under consideration. £20 million 2017/18 £13.9m was allocated for 2020/21 but it was subsequently reduced due to 2018/19 £17.1m programmes being put on hold due to the Covid-19 pandemic.42 2019/20 £12.4m 2020/21 £8.4m* Country-level breakdowns have not been published, but in 2019/20 Saudi Total £62.2m Arabia received around £500,000 from the GSF.43
Note: * 2020/21 figures are allocations. Calls for information to be released Source: PQ 103608 [GSF], 19 October 2020 During an October 2020 Westminster Hall debate on the GSF, several MPs were critical of the lack of transparency of the fund, in particular the lack of Expenditure on breakdown by beneficiary state, the projects it funds, and the safeguards it Saudi Arabia applies to prevent collaboration with those who may commit human rights 2016/17 £0.40m abuses.44 2017/18 £0.67m 2018/19 £0.65m In response to the debate, the FCDO Minister, James Cleverly, said the 2019/20 £0.50m government conducted security and justice assessments to ensure the fund Total £2.22m strengthens human rights and the rule of law. He said the FCDO would publish Source: DEP 2020-12349/is a summary of the work funded by the Gulf Strategy 2021 to enable greater [Saudi Arabia: GSF], 9 45 December 2020 scrutiny.
39 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030, p39; Brookings Institute, The spectacular surge of the Saudi female labour force, 21 April 2021 40 FCDO, GSF programme summary, updated 24 June 2021 41 FCDO, GSF programme summary, updated 24 June 2021 42 PQ 117287 [GSF], 23 November 2020 43 DEP 2020-12349/is [Saudi Arabia: GSF], 9 December 2020 44 HC Deb, 20 October 2020, cc474-5WH 45 HC Deb, 20 October 2002, c 492WH
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Annual publication of reports From 2021, the FCDO will publish an annual summary of the GSF’s work. It will provide a list of programmes and their objectives (see above). The Government will not publish further information where it presents risks to staff, programme suppliers and beneficiaries, or impact on its relations with Gulf states. It argues this would reduce the UK’s ability to influence their reform efforts.46
2.2 Calls to suspend the fund
In July 2021, the APPG on Democracy and Human Rights in the Gulf argued the IAF and GSF have failed to prevent a deterioration in human rights in the Gulf, that the funds have lacked transparency and accountability, and its beneficiaries are implicated in human rights abuses. MPs said GSF assistance should be suspended.47
The UK Government has denied that its GSF work contributes to human rights abuses. The FCDO states all its IAF/GSF work is subject to assessments to ensure it meets the UK’s human rights values, and that the Government would continue to raise any human rights concerns with states.48
It has also cited the example of its work in Bahrain where the IAF helped the country develop its independent human rights oversight bodies. To October 2020, this had investigated 5,000 complaints.49
The FCDO’s Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance sets out how its work should meet human rights obligations and UK values.50
46 PQ 32524 [Economic situation: Oman], 19 July 2021 47 APPG on Democracy and Rights in the Gulf, The cost of repression: Secret government funds and human rights abuses in the Gulf, July 2021, summary and key findings 48 PQ 35586 [IAF], 27 July 2021 49 HL Deb, 20 October 2020, c491WH 50 FCDO, Overseas security and justice assistance guidance, updated 26 January 2017
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3 UK-Gulf relations
3.1 Trading relationship
In 2020, the UK said it was conducting an investment and trade review with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The six Gulf states constitute the GCC.51
In June 2021 the UK and GCC committed to strengthening their trading relationship. Any resulting agreement would be expected to focus on services, education, healthcare, financial services, and environmental technologies.52
The Government’s Integrated Review sets out an objective to be one of the Middle East’s “primary trade and investment partners.”53 It estimates the GCC is the UK’s third-largest non-EU export market.54 In 2019, the total value of exports to the region was £26.1 billion, lower than the 2016 peak of £30.6 billion. Since 2010, annual UK imports have averaged £12.9 billion.
UK-Gulf Cooperation Council trade, 2010-2020 £ million, current price, and is non-seasonally adjusted 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 UK exports UAE 7,046 7,674 8,487 9,848 9,408 9,462 10,733 10,814 10,943 11,532 8,141 Saudi Arabia 6,492 5,894 7,876 9,305 9,982 10,594 10,281 9,688 7,521 5,988 6,605 Qatar 1,706 1,852 2,047 2,513 2,594 2,785 3,232 3,417 3,558 4,225 3,791 Kuwait 1,206 1,223 1,312 1,474 1,501 1,614 1,854 2,441 2,523 2,534 1,937 Oman 620 636 654 707 721 787 1,565 3,469 1,599 1,043 876 Bahrain 539 600 736 572 605 562 649 777 785 821 536 Total 17,609 17,879 21,112 24,419 24,811 25,804 28,314 30,606 26,929 26,143 21,886
UK Imports Bahrain 3,747 4,190 4,688 5,946 5,148 4,672 6,161 7,190 7,317 7,073 3,890 Kuwait 1,214 1,571 2,597 3,654 3,292 2,555 2,321 2,723 3,695 3,716 1,937 Oman 2,548 5,156 3,336 3,072 2,364 2,644 2,303 2,851 1,727 2,782 1,723 Qatar 1,809 2,403 2,376 2,458 2,007 988 906 1,067 760 820 378 Saudi Arabia 202 260 235 183 276 239 212 395 296 412 247 UAE 342 293 393 263 225 298 165 336 404 428 228 Total 9,862 13,873 13,625 15,576 13,312 11,396 12,068 14,562 14,199 15,231 8,403
Note: “Non-seasonally adjusted” means the data retains any seasonal effects (e.g. cultural and social events, weather patterns) Source: Office for National Statistics, UK total trade: all countries, non-seasonally adjusted, October to December 2020 edition, Tables 1, 7
51 Department for International Trade (DIT), Joint statement on UK-GCC joint trade and investment review, 5 November 2020 52 DIT, UK and GCC commit to strengthening trading relationship, 30 June 2021 53 UK Government, Global Britain in a competitive age, March 2021, p63 54 HC Deb, 10 June 2021, c1112
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In June, the UK Government said it intends for “swift progress” on the proposal for a deeper trade and investment relationship.55
Any trade agreement is likely to be subject to scrutiny on whether it defends human rights. In July, the Government said it will “export our principles and values” as an “inherent part of all trade agreements.”56
Amendments were previously proposed to the Trade Bill 2019-2021 for all future UK trade agreements to include an assessment of a state’s human rights record before and after any agreements are signed.57 When arguing against the amendment, the Government emphasised trade would not come at the expense of human rights, and it would consider enhancing the FCDO’s annual human rights and democracy report on this point.58
3.2 Defence collaboration and arms sales
Defence collaboration The UK has a long-standing security presence in the Arabian Gulf, seeking to protect the flow of oil and trade, and to conduct operations against groups such as Islamic State (IS).59
The Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary station forces in the Gulf, and have their command in Bahrain.60 In 2020, together with French and US naval forces, the UK participated in Omani training exercises.61
The RAF’s Middle East Operational Headquarters is based in Qatar. In recent years, air strikes have been used against IS in the region.62 In 2018 the RAF formed a Typhoon joint squadron with the Qatar Emiri Air Force, the first such joint squadron since World War Two. The RAF also has the use of bases in the UAE and Oman.63 In Ministry of Defence’s Defence in a Competitive Age (2020), the Government committed to further investment in Oman and increased deployments to both the country and region to “demonstrate our long-term commitment to the Gulf’s stability and prosperity.”64
55 DIT, UK and GCC commit to strengthening trading relationship, 30 June 2021 56 HC Deb, 20 July 2021, c800 57 House of Commons Library, Trade Bill 2019-21: Lords amendments, January 2021 58 HL Deb, 23 March 2021, c766 59 UK Defence Journal, The UK in the Persian Gulf- historical involvement and military presence, 26 July 2019: PQ HL17940 [Persian Gulf: Armed conflict], 7 October 2019 60 Royal Navy, Operation Kipion, accessed 26 July 2021; House of Commons Library, Operation Kipion: Royal Navy assets in the Persian Gulf, January 2020 61 Royal Navy, Mine warfare forces sharpen skills in Omani exercise, 28 February 2020 62 Royal Air Force, NO 83 expeditionary air group, accessed 26 July 2021 63 House of Commons Library, UK forces in the Middle East region, January 2020 64 Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, CP411, 22 March 2021
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As of 22 July 2021, at least 929 UK service personnel are deployed in GCC UK forces countries (not including those at sea in ships and submarines and those whose details are withheld due to operational sensitivity). In both 2019/20 deployed in the and 2020/21, the UK hosted defence personnel from all six Gulf states for Gulf on 22 July training or defence education.65 2021 Oman 235 Arms sales to the Gulf Bahrain 193 Saudi The Middle East is the largest defence export market for the UK. Aerospace is 142 the dominant sector and over the last decade the UK has signed major deals Arabia for Typhoon and Hawk aircraft and associated weapons to several Gulf UAE 141 states. These include Saudi Arabia and Qatar.66 Qatar 134 Kuwait 84 The Chair of the Defence Select Committee, Tobias Ellwood MP, and Oxfam Total 929 are amongst those who have argued the UK should restrict arms sales to Saudi Arabia in response to the killing of Jamal Khashoggi (see 3.3).67 Note: Numbers do not include those at sea or whose details are withheld due to operational The Commons Library briefing, UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia: Q&A sensitivity provides more information on UK arms sales to the Kingdom. These have previously proved controversial because of Saudi Arabia’s human rights Source: PQ 31387 [Armed forces; record and the accusation that UK-built and licenced arms have been used in Deployment], 22 July 2021 Yemen by Saudi forces.
Box 2: Library briefings on the UK’s defence relations with the Middle East
• Operation Kipion: Royal Navy assets in the Persian Gulf, CBP8628, January 2020 • UK forces in the Middle East region, CBP8794, January 2020 • UK defence industry exports, CBP8310, August 2020
3.3 Sanctions for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi
In July 2020, the UK imposed sanctions against 20 Saudis involved in the 2018 murder of the Saudi journalist and activist, Jamal Khashoggi.68
In February 2021, a US intelligence report concluded that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman approved of an operation to capture or kill
65 PQ HL14177 [Military aid], 25 March 2021 66 DIT, UK defence and security export statistics for 2019, 6 October 2020, chart 7 67 The Guardian, UK urged to end arms sales to Saudi Arabia following Khashoggi report, 26 February 2021 68 Office for Financial Sanctions Implementation HM Treasury, Consolidated list of financial sanctions targets in the UK, 16 July 2021
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Khashoggi.69 Following the report’s publication, the US State Department imposed a visa ban on 76 Saudi citizens. The US Treasury also sanctioned officials directly involved in the killing. No sanctions were imposed on the Crown Prince.70 The Biden Administration has been subsequently criticised for hosting Prince Khalid bin Salman in Washington, the Crown Prince’s brother.71
The UK Government states it continues to raise the Khashoggi killing with the Saudi Government, including during the visit of the Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, to the country in June 2020.72 No additional sanctions have been 73 applied by the UK Government beyond those issued in July 2020.
UAE, Qatar and Bahrain backed Saudi Arabia following publication of the US report.74
3.4 COP 26 and climate change
In November 2021, the UK is due to host the COP 26 Climate Change conference.
The Gulf states are some of the world’s leading oil producers. From 2001 to 2020, the six states produced an average of 22 percent of the world’s petroleum and other related liquids. Oil makes a substantial contribution to all Gulf economies except for Bahrain. Oil rents—that is, the revenues above the cost of extracting the oil—in 2019 represented 42 percent of Kuwait’s GDP and around 24-25 percent for Saudi Arabia and Oman.
69 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Assessing the Saudi Government’s role in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, 25 February 2021, p1 70 Al-Jazeera, Khashoggi ban: US to impose visa ban on 76 Saudi citizens, 26 February 2021; US Department of the Treasury, Treasury sanctions the Saudi Rapid Intervention Force […],26 February 2021 71 Al-Jazeera, No “Khashoggi ban:” Biden team criticised for hosting MBS brother, 8 July 2021 72 Reuters, UK says it still raises “terrible crime” of Khashoggi killing with Saudi government, 25 February 2021 73 PQ HL14153 [Jamal Khashoggi], 25 March 2021 74 Middle East Eye, Khashoggi murder: Gulf states show support for Saudi Arabia, 28 February 2021
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The Gulf and global petroleum Oil rents as a share of GDP production 2010 2016 2019 Average % of global production, Kuwait 49% 32% 42% 2001-2020 Oman 37% 18% 25% Saudi Arabia 12.4% Saudi 41% 19% 24% UAE 3.6% Arabia Kuwait 3.0% Qatar 28% 12% 17% Qatar 1.8% UAE 22% 11% 16% Oman 1.0% Bahrain 3% 2% 2% Bahrain 0.1% World 2% 1% 1%
Note: Includes other liquids related to petroleum. Note: “Oil rents” are the revenues above the cost of extracting the oil. “Rent” is used as they are not produced. Source: US Energy Information Administration, Data: Source: World Bank, Oil rents (% of GDP), accessed 3 Petroleum and other liquids, accessed 3 August 2021 August 2021. CC-BY-4.0
The UK’s COP 26 President-designate, Alok Sharma, has visited Saudi Arabia to discuss climate collaboration.75 Saudi Arabia, the largest producer of oil in the Middle East and second only to the US globally in 2020, has sought to implement reforms to reduce its dependence on oil.76 This includes, in March 2021, the launch of the Green Initiative. This aims to increase the contribution of green energy to its economy and improve the efficiency of oil production.77
Other states have introduced measures. For example, Qatar aims for a carbon-neutral World Cup, and has commissioned a Carbon storage plant.78 The UAE is reportedly considering committing to net-zero emissions by 2050.79
The UK Government’s Integrated Review also sets out intentions to work with Saudi Arabia and the UAE on sustainable growth and green technology.80
In 2020, a review by Institute of Development Studies reported that the Middle East and North Africa is likely to see decreased access to food and water due to climate change, increased migration, and the potential for greater conflict.81 The Brookings Institute has argued the region has not yet made significant progress on decoupling economic growth from emissions growth.82
75 Cabinet Office, Alok Sharma visits Saudi Arabia to discuss action on climate change, 29 July 2021 76 US Energy Information Administration, What countries are the top producers and consumers of oil?, accessed 3 August 2021 77 Arab News, Saudi green initiative will improve quality of life [..], 31 March 2021 78 Gulf Times, Qatar promises the first “carbon neutral” world cup in 2022, 19 December 2018; Al- Jazeera, Qatar building large CO2 storage plant, 8 October 2019 79 Al-Monitor, UAE sets new climate standard for the Gulf […], 9 August 2021 80 UK Government, Global Britain in a competitive age, March 2021, p63 81 Institute of Development Studies, Climate change risks and opportunities in the Middle East and North Africa, September 2020 82 Brookings Institute, Decoupling economic growth from emissions in the Middle East and North Africa, 22 July 2021
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4 Relations with the US
4.1 Change under Biden?
Prior to entering office, President Biden said Saudi Arabia would be treated as a “pariah” over its human rights record, criticising the “blank check” he argued President Trump awarded to the region.83 More broadly, the US is considered likely to focus on China and Russia as well as the Middle East.84
Under Biden, the US has taken four steps that suggest a hardening in approach to the Gulf, compared to the Trump Administration:
• In January 2021 it announced a pause in arms sales to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE.85 • This was followed in February by the withdrawal of support of the Saudi- led offensive in Yemen.86 • In the same month, the US released an intelligence assessment finding Saudi Crown Prince bin Salman approved the 2018 murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Additional visa restrictions were placed on some Saudi nationals (see section 3.3).87 • By June, the US had also withdrawn some troops and missile defences from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, while maintaining “substantial” forces in the wider Middle East and Gulf bases.88
4.2 Continuing collaboration
Diplomacy Despite these steps, bilateral ties have continued. The US seeks Gulf cooperation on issues including the Iranian nuclear programme, the Lebanon crisis, and the conflict in Yemen. In Lebanon, the US has sought Saudi
83 France 24, After cosy ties with Trump, Saudi Arabia faces Biden “pariah” pledge, 10 November 2020 84 Middle East Institute, The Biden Administration and the Middle East: Policy recommendations for a way forward, 10 March 2021 85 CNN, Biden administration pauses arms sales to Saudi Arabia and UAE, 27 January 2021 86 AP, Biden ending support for Saudi-led offensive in Yemen, 5 February 2021 87 US State Department, Accountability for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, 26 February 2021 88 Middle East Eye, US to pull defence systems, aircraft and hundreds of troops from Middle East, 18 June 2021
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humanitarian assistance and support for a stable Government in response to the country’s economic crisis.89 In Yemen, the US seeks a ceasefire.90
In July, the brother of Mohammad bin Salman, Prince Khalid bin Salman, who was not one of those sanctioned by the US, visited the US and met with the US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, and other defence officials. Khalid Bin Salman is the Saudi Deputy Defence Minister.91
Military facilities and deployments The US has a deep defence and security relationship with the Gulf States. Despite the announcement of the review into arms sales with the UAE and Saudi Arabia in January, the sale of arms to both is expected to continue.92 In April, it was reported that the US will sell fighter jets to the UAE.93
Like the UK, the US has several bases in the region. The US Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain, and Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar is the forward HQ of central command and Combined Air Operations Centre.94 In July 2021, the US redeployed some army personnel from Qatar to Jordan. Analysts say this is to decrease the threat of rocket attacks from Iranian-backed militias.95 US bases in Iraq have previously been subject to missile attacks.96
The US also participates in joint exercises in the region. In March 2021, it participated in UAE-organised air drills together with Bahrain, France, India, Saudi Arabia and South Korea.97 In June, Saudi and US forces conducted a joint land exercise.98
In 2020, a US carrier strike force was deployed to the Gulf.99 Washington Institute analysts argue the deployment of carriers has failed to deter Iran, writing that many Iranian attacks have taken place in periods when one or two American carriers are present in the Gulf.100
89 The New Arab, French, US envoys discuss Lebanon in Riyadh amid rumours of Hariri’s resignation, 8 July 202l; Commons Library, Lebanon: One year on from the Beirut explosion, 3 August 2021 90 Al-Jazeera, US envoy to Yemen to travel to Saudi Arabia and Oman, 25 May 2021 91 BBC News, Khashoggi murder: US softens towards Saudi leader, 14 July 2021 92 New York Times, US is expected to approve some arms sales to UAE and Saudis, 14 April 2021 93 Reuters, Analysis: Unlike Trump, Biden arms export policy strikes balance on human rights, economics, 5 May 2021 94 US State Department, US Security Cooperation with Qatar, 30 July 2021; US State Department, US relations with Bahrain, 4 December 2020 95 Stars and Stripes, US military shifts army basing from Qatar to Jordan in move that could provide leverage against Iran, 1 July 2021 96 Reuters, Series of attacks target US personnel in Iraq and Syria, 8 July 2021 97 Foreign Brief, UAE-organised six-nation military exercises to conclude, 26 March 2021 98 Saudi, US ground forces conclude “Falcon Claws 4” exercise in Saudi Arabia, 29 June 2021 99 Al-Monitor, US again sends B-52 bombers to deter Iran as tensions peak, 30 December 2020 100 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Do aircraft carriers deter Iran?, 6 August 2021
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5 Regional relations
5.1 Qatar crisis
In January 2021, Gulf states signed a “solidarity and stability” agreement, bringing to an end a three-and-a-half year blockade of Qatar.101
The blockade began in 2017, when the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Egypt severed diplomatic, trade and travel ties with the country, alleging that Qatar has supported terrorism, including aiding the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and for being too close to Iran.102
Qatar has also been closer to political Islam organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood than other Gulf states. Qatar was supportive of the Presidency of Mohammad Morsi in Egypt, a member of the Brotherhood, who was overthrown in a Saudi-backed coup in 2013.103
Demands made against Qatar included the closure of its state broadcaster, Al-Jazeera and ending contact with groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.104
The severing of ties had weakened the GCC, and also saw Qatar leaving Saudi-led oil producers organisation, OPEC, in 2019. It has yet to re-join.105
States have moved at different speeds to re-establish relations. Since January 2021, trade has resumed between Saudi Arabi and Qatar, and a new Saudi ambassador to the country has been appointed.106 The UAE and Bahrain have been slower than Saudi Arabia to re-establish relations, but talks are ongoing.107 Tensions remain in the GCC, such as over Al-Jazeera coverage of
101 Al-Jazeera, Gulf states sign “solidarity and stability” deal at GCC summit, 5 January 2021 102 Commons Library, The Qatar crisis and regional ramifications, October 2019 and Qatar Crisis, June 2017; Al-Monitor, How Qatar is working to boost its influence in Yemen, 19 November 2018; BBC News, Qatar restores diplomatic ties with Iran amid Gulf crisis, 24 August 2017 103 Brookings Institute, Saudi Arabia cheers the coup in Egypt, 7 July 2013 104 The Guardian, Qatar given 10 days to meet 13 sweeping demands by Saudi Arabia, 23 June 2017 105 CNN, Qatar to withdraw from OPEC, 14 December 2018; OPEC, Member countries, accessed 5 August 2021 106 Arab News, Trade between Saudi Arabia and Qatar to resume today, 14 February 2021; Al-Monitor, Saudi Arabia has ambassador in Qatar again, 22 June 2021 107 Al-Jazeera, Qatar’s foreign minister hails “positive” stance in UAE talks, 30 May 2021; Al-Jazeera, Bahrain says it invited Qatar twice for bilateral talks, 23 June 2021; Reuters, Bahrain ready to work with estranged Qatar on airspace sovereignty, 24 June 2021
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other Gulf states and provisions in the January agreement for increased 108 foreign policy alignment.
5.2 Yemen
Gulf states have intervened in the Yemen conflict on the side of the Hadi Government. Hadi is opposed by the Iranian-backed Houthis. The Houthis are Shia Muslims, as are most Iranians. Most Gulf states are Sunni-majority countries.109
The conflict in Yemen has its immediate origins in 2011, when protests led to the transfer of power to the then-Vice President, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Violent conflict broke out in 2014 when the Houthis seized control of Sana’a province, which includes the capital city.110
The conflict intensified in 2015, when a Saudi coalition that included Sunni- majority states such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE intervened in support of Hadi.111
The Saudi coalition has subsequently weakened. In 2017, Qatar was expelled from the coalition, and in 2019 the UAE announced most of its forces would be withdrawn from the country.112 The UAE and Saudi Arabia have not always acted as one in Yemen prior to the announcement—in the same year, the UAE conducted airstrikes against Hadi forces in support of their separatist allies, the Southern Transitional Council.113 Analysts cite several factors for the UAE’s withdrawal, in addition to attitudes towards the Southern separatists, including the UAE deeming the war unwinnable.114
In March 2021, Saudi Arabia proposed a ceasefire in Yemen.115 Both Qatar and Oman have offered to facilitate talks between the Saudis and Houthis.116
The war is currently stalemated, but if Houthi rebels capture the city of Marib, which they have threatened since February 2021, it may be hard for the Hadi Government to recover.117
108 Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Qatar’s regional relations and foreign policy after Al Ula, 14 April 2021 109 BBC News, Sunnis and Shia in the Middle East, 19 December 20113 110 Council on Foreign Relations, War in Yemen, accessed 2 August 2021 111 BBC News, Yemen crisis: Why is there a war?, 19 June 2020 112 BBC News, Qatar row: Saudi and Egypt among countries to cut Doha links, 5 June 2017; Middle East Institute, The UAE drawn down in Yemen is a welcome step […], 11 July 2019 113 Reuters, UAE carries out air strikes against Yemen government forces to support separatists, 29 August 2019 114 Al-Jazeera, Saudi-UAE: Despite turmoil geopolitical goals remain steadfast, 16 July 2021 115 AP, Saudi Arabia offers cease-fire plan to Yemen rebels, 22 March 2021 116 Middle East Monitor, Yemen’s Houthis ready for peace talks hosted by Qatar, 17 June 2021; Al- Jazeera, “Bitter pill to swallow:” Saudis grapple with Yemen peace deal, 29 June 2021 117 Fikra Forum, The battle of Marib: The challenge of ending a stalemate war, 9 July 2021
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5.3 Israel
Like many Arab states, Gulf countries have never formally recognised Israel.
However, in 2020 both the UAE and Bahrain became the third and fourth Arab states, respectively, to establish diplomatic ties with Israel. Only Jordan and Egypt previously had diplomatic relations with the country.118 The UK welcomed the steps to normalise relations with Israel.119
Israel and the UAE have subsequently signed tax treaties to encourage economic cooperation.120 While the UAE, alongside other Gulf states, expressed criticism of Israel’s plans to evict Palestinians from land claimed by Jewish settlers in May 2021,121 the Israeli Foreign Minister still visited the UAE the following month.122
Will others recognise Israel? Both Qatar and Oman have previously hosted Israeli trade missions, though these have now ended, and both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have had some security cooperation.123 In November 2020, it was reported that then Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited Saudi Arabia, suggesting a thawing of relations.124
In July 2021, Saudi Arabia challenged the UAE’s establishment of ties to Israel by amending its import rules to exclude goods from other GCC states that were made in free zones or using Israeli input. “Free zones” are areas in the UAE where foreign companies may operate with fewer regulations. However, the move should also be seen within the wider context of economic competition between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.125
Analysis by the Brookings Institute argues the establishment of Gulf-Israel relations is an indirect means of strengthening relationships with the US, which is seeking to become less dependent on Gulf oil and expected to become more critical of Saudi Arabia under the Biden Administration.126
118 BBC News, Trump announces “peace deal” between Bahrain and Israel, 11 September 2020; Al- Jazeera, Israel, UAE announce normalisation of relations with US help, 13 August 2020. Mauritania, a member of the Arab League, severed diplomatic ties with Israel in 2010 that existed since 1999— Reuters, Mauritania says cut diplomatic ties with Israel, 21 March 2010 119 Number Ten, PM meeting with HRH the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Bahrain, 17 June 2021; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Israel-UAE agreement, 13 August 2020 120 The Jerusalem Post, Israel UAE sign double taxation prevention agreement, 31 May 2021 121 Reuters, Saudi and UAE condemn Israel over Palestinian clashes at Al-Aqsa, 8 May 2021 122 AP News, New Israeli foreign Minister in the UAE on 1st state visit, 29 June 2021 123 The Times of Israel, The Gulf states: It’s complicated, 9 August 2013; Foreign Affairs, Rivals with benefits: Israel and Saudi Arabia’s secret history of cooperation, 13 March 2015 ; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel’s diplomatic missions abroad: Status of relations, accessed 29 July 2021 124 NBC News, Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu visits Saudi Arabia, official says, 23 November 2020 125 Reuters, Saudi Arabia amends import rules from Gulf in challenge to UAE, 5 July 2021 126 Brookings institute, The emergence of GCC-Israel relations in a changing Middle East, 28 July 2021
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5.4 Iran
The Gulf’s relations with Iran are influenced by existing religious differences— Iran is one of the few Shia-majority countries in the region while Gulf states are primarily Sunni Muslim. Other issues have included proxy-wars between Iranian and Saudi-backed forces in Yemen, and Iran’s nuclear programme.
Establishing diplomatic relations Diplomatic relations may soon be improved between Saudi Arabia and Iran, whose diplomatic relations were cut in 2016 following its execution of Nimr al- Nirm, a Shia critic of the Saudi Government, and the storming of the Saudi Embassy in Iran.127 Bahrain also ended diplomatic relations with Iran and the UAE downgraded its relations.128
In April 2021, talks were held between Iran and Saudi Arabia.129 The meeting reportedly focused on Yemen, where the Saudi-backed Hadi Government has been in conflict with Iranian-backed Houthi rebels since 2015.130
The UAE has moved more quickly than Saudi Arabia to re-establish relations with Iran, with talks between the two states taking place in August 2020 relating to Covid-19 and between the UAE’s Prime Minister and Iranian diplomatic representatives in July 2021.131 In August, the new Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi, said he desired “close cooperation” with the UAE, though also criticised the UAE’s recognition of Israel in 2020.132
Analysts have cited several reasons for increased diplomatic engagement between the Saudis and Iranians, including a questioning of the US commitment to the region, and Saudi Arabia’s desire for a ceasefire in Yemen.133
The Iranian nuclear deal The 2015 Iranian nuclear deal placed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for the relief of sanctions. However, in 2018 the US withdrew from the deal, arguing it had failed to curtail Iran. The following
127 BBC News, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr: Saudi Arabia executes top Shia cleric, 2 January 2016; Wilson Center, Timeline of Iran-Saudi relations, 5 January 2016 128 The Guardian, Bahrain, Sudan and UAE follow Saudis in diplomatic action against Iran, 4 January 2016 129 Reuters, Saudi and Iran held talks aimed at easing tensions, say sources, 18 April 2021 130 Asia Times, Iran, Saudi Arabia on the edge of rapprochement, 30 July 2021 131 Bloomberg, UAE, Iran discuss Covid-19 response in rare talks, 2 August 2020; Times of Israel, UAE deputy PM, Iran envoy meet, discuss “enhancing bilateral cooperation,” 7 July 2021 132 Al-Monitor, Iranian president expresses “heartfelt amity” towards UAE, 6 August 2021 133 Middle East Eye, Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement: What is driving push for diplomacy?, 5 May 2021 ; Reuters, End of Yemen quagmire? Saudi-led coalition, Houthis near peace deal, 21 June 2021; Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Saudi Arabia’s new dialogue with Iran was long in the making, 4 May 2021
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year, Iran began exceeding the agreed-upon limits on its use of uranium. Both the US administration under President Biden and the Iranians have said they are willing to return to talks.134
However, talks are were adjourned in June 2021, awaiting the inauguration of the new Iranian President, Ebrahim Raisi, in August.135 He is expected to adopt a tougher stance towards the deal than his predecessor.136
The GCC have called for the deal, if re-established, to be widened, in order to address its concerns over Iran’s support for proxy groups in the Middle East, threats to maritime traffic, and its ballistic missile program. Iran opposes any expanded agreement.137
Saudi Arabia previously opposed the 2015 Nuclear Agreement, arguing the lifting of sanctions allowed Iran to expand other activities that threaten Saudi power, such as its support for groups in Syria, Yemen and Lebanon.138
Attacks on vessels in the Gulf The Strait of Hormuz, located in the Gulf between Oman and Iran, and only 19 miles wide at its narrowest point, is one of the most important trade routes in the world—in 2018, an estimated 21 percent of global petroleum liquid consumption travelled through it.139
For several decades, attacks on oil tankers and merchant vessels have occurred in the Gulf and neighbouring Gulf of Oman.140 Both the US and Iran have also shot down drones in the Strait.141 This is one reason for the presence of UK defence personnel in the region.
In 2021, there have been two separate attacks on merchant vessels. In July, an oil tanker, Mercer Street, was attacked near the coast of Oman. This resulted in the death of two crew members, one UK national and one Romanian national. The UK and US are amongst the countries that have said it is “highly likely” Iran caried out the attack. Iran rejects the claim.142
A second incident in August saw unknown gunmen board the Asphalt Princess Tanker in the Gulf of Oman. No injuries were reported before the gunmen left
134 Council on Foreign Relations, What is the Iran nuclear deal?, updated 29 June 2021 135 International Crisis Group, Iran: The riddle of Raisi, 5 August 2021 136 Commons Library, Iran’s next President: Ebrahim Raisi and the Iran nuclear deal, 22 June 2021 137 Al-Monitor, Gulf states want Iran talks deal to address Tehran’s missile program, support for proxy groups, 16 June 2021 138 Brookings Institute, What the Iran deal has meant for Saudi Arabia and regional tensions, 13 July 2021 139 US Energy Information Administration, The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most important transit chokepoint, 20 June 2019 140 Martin Navias in History Today, The First Tanker war, August 2019 141 BBC News, Iran tanker seizure: What is the Strait of Hormuz?, 2 July 2019 142 France 24, US and UK join Israel in alleging Iran behind drone strike on tanker near Oman, 1 August 2021
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the ship after the arrival of US and Omani warships. The attack has not been attributed to any country or group.143
In January 2021, a Korean ship was also seized by Iranian forces, citing violation of pollution rules.144 The vessel was released in April.145
The incidents take place in the context of stalled talks with Iran on the 2015 nuclear deal, and Iran’s rejection of proposals from the US and Gulf states that any revived deal encompasses limits on Iran’s support for regional militias or its missile programme (see above).146
5.5 Oil production
In July 2021, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have disagreed over OPEC plans to extend a cap on oil production. Saudi Arabia has sought to continue cuts to production until the end of 2022, while the UAE has sought an increase. The Saudis fear an increase in production would produce a fall in oil prices because of lower demand due to the economic impact of Covid-19.147
The dispute over oil prices follows the strain in UAE-Saudi relations over the Yemen conflict, Israel, and economic development (see above).148
143 BBC News, MV Asphalt Princess: Suspected hijackers leave ship off UAE, 4 August 2021 144 BBC News, South Korea to send delegation after Iran seizes tanker, 5 January 2021 145 Guardian, Iran releases South Korean tanker seized in January, 9 April 2021 146 Security Council Report, Maritime incident off the coast of Oman […], 5 August 2021 147 BBC News, The growing Gulf rivalry that’s pushing up oil prices, 8 July 2021 148 Tobias Borck for RUSI, Saudi Arabia and the UAE: Normalisation not divorce, 19 July 2021; Neil Quilliam for Chatham House, Stark choice must be faced to end Saudi-Emirati stalemate, 8 July 2021
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6 Soft power and the World Cup
Qatar and other Gulf states have sought to use sport diplomacy to project soft power and influence.149
In addition to the Football World Cup, due to be held in Qatar in November- December 2022, the country previously hosted the Asian Games in 2006.150 Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have subsequently bid to host the Asian Games, with Qatar winning the role for 2030, and Saudi Arabia, 2034.151 Formula 1 races have also been held in Bahrain (from 2004), UAE (from 2009) and Saudi Arabia (from 2021).152
6.1 Progress since awarding Qatar the World Cup tournament
The awarding of the Football World Cup to Qatar for 2022 drew criticism because of its poor record on worker rights, especially for migrants, and the country’s history of discrimination against LGBT+ people.153 Qatar has also denied US Department for Justice claims that three officials from fifa, the world governing body of association football, were bribed to vote in favour of the country hosting the tournament.154
Worker rights In 2020, an estimated 95 percent of the Qatari workforce were migrant workers, numbering around 2 million.155 Qatar has the fifth highest proportion of its population consisting of international migrants in the world (77
149 Al-Monitor, Can World Cup soccer help heal Gulf wounds?, 12 January 2021 150 BBC News, Asian Games, 30 November 2006 151 Gulf Times, Qatar wins bid to host Asian Games 2030, 16 December 2030 152 Formula 1, 2004 Gulf Air Bahrain Grand Prix; Formula 1, F1 adds Saudi Arabian Gran Prix night to 2021 calendar, 5 November 2020. Both accessed 29 July 2021; Gulf News, Abu Dhabi to host F1 Gran Prix in 2009, 3 February 2007 153 HRW, Building a better World Cup, 12 June 2012; The Guardian, Fifa boss tells gay fans: “Don’t have sex at the Qatar World Cup,” 14 December 2010; CNN, Blatter apologies for Qatar World Cup gay remarks, 17 December 2010 154 CNN, Qatar and Russia deny allegations of bribery surround world cup bids, 9 April 2020 155 HRW, Qatar: little progress on protecting migrant workers, 24 August 2020
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percent). Migrants also represent significant proportions in the UAE (88 International percent) and Kuwait (73 percent). migrants in Gulf states, 2020 Since being awarded the World Cup, the UK Government says Qatar has taken % “concrete steps” to improve the situation for its workers, including the Number Popn abolition of exit permits and a non-discriminatory minimum wage.156 In 2018, UAE 8.7m 88% the International Labour Organisation (ILO) also withdrew its complaint Qatar 2.2m 77% against Qatar for maintaining an insufficient legal framework for migrant Kuwait 3.1m 73% workers. This followed commitments from the Qatari Government that it Bahrain 0.9m 55% would strengthen protections.157 Oman 2.4m 46% Saudi 13.5m 39% Arabia In 2020, Qatar announced two significant reforms. The first was the abolition Global of the Kafala (“sponsorship”) system. All other Gulf states continue to operate - 4% average a form of the Kafala.158 The system had required migrant workers to obtain
Source: UN Population Division, their employer’s permission before changing jobs, which had reduced their 159 International Migrant stock mobility and increased their risk of exploitation. 2020, Tables 1 and 3 The country also adopted a non-discriminatory monthly minimum wage, applying to all workers. It is the first country in the region to adopt this.160
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has welcomed the steps by Qatar to improve migrants’ rights, in particular the dismantling of the Kafala scheme.161 The International Trade Union Confederation also welcomed the decision, calling on other countries to follow Qatar’s example.162
However, Amnesty International has continued to urge Fifa to use its leverage over Qatar to end the abuse of migrant workers. It has argued that Qatar’s reforms, although welcome, are often not properly implemented.163 Amnesty cites a lack of inspection systems and challenges in lodging complaints against employers.164
In March 2021, Amnesty criticised proposals from Qatar’s Shura Council (a body advising the Qatari ruler) to remove the rights of migrant workers to change jobs frequently and increase the proportion of workers requiring exit
156 HC Deb, 10 December 2020, c493WH 157 ILO, ILO Governing body welcomes Qatar’s commitment to bolster migrant worker rights, 8 November 2017 158 Al-Jazeera, Minimum wage, no NOC: Qatar announces changes to labour law, 30 August 2020 159 Council on Foreign Relations, What is the Kafala system?, updated 23 March 2021 160 Reuters, Qatar raises minimum wage, lifts curbs on changing jobs, 30 August 2020; ILO, Changes in the labour market in Qatar, 30 August 2020 161 UNOHCR, UN human rights experts welcome Qatar’s improvement of migrant rights, 3 September 2020 162 ILO, Changes in the labour market in Qatar, 30 August 2020 163 Amnesty International, Qatar: Fifa must act on labour abuses as World Cup qualifiers kick off, 22 March 2021 164 Amnesty International, Qatar: Reality check 2020: Countdown to the 2022 World Cup, 18 November 2020
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permits to leave Qatar from 5 to 10 percent.165 Al-Jazeera has also reported some workers refrain from lodging complaints due to fears of reprisals.166
LGBT+ people The FCDO has raised the issue of LGBT+ fans directly with Qatar’s World Cup Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, who it reports “want to demonstrate to the world the progress they are making.”167
In 2020, Qatar said it would allow Pride flags to be flown during the competition, in line with Fifa rules. LGBT+ organisations have urged Qatar to repeal its wider laws that criminalise same-sex sexual relations.168
While Qatari legislation allows for the death penalty to be used against those participating in consensual same-sex relations, there are no reports it has been applied recently. However, in 2020 the ILGA reported LGBT+ persons in Qatar continue to “face an extremely hostile context.”169 HRW report in 2018 several articles relating to LGBT+ rights have been self-censored in the country.170
Protests and potential boycotts Although some footballers and national clubs have called for a boycott of the 2022 competition, no country federation has formally decided to do so. In 2021, both Denmark and Norway have rejected proposals to boycott the competition.171
In March 2021, German, Dutch and Norwegian players protested against human rights in the country during World Cup qualifiers, following reports in the Guardian that at least 6,500 migrant workers have died in Qatar since it won the right to hold the competition in December 2010.172 The Qatari Government rejects the 6,500 figure as “totally false,” stating there have been only 3 deaths related to work on World Cup construction sites since 2014.173
165 Amnesty International, Is Qatar planning a U-turn on reforms?, 31 March 2021 166 Al-Jazeera, Labour law changes: Are Qatar’s migrant workers better off?, 15 March 2021 167 HC Deb, 10 December 2020, c495WH 168 AP, Qatar to allow rainbow flags at 2022 World Cup, 8 December 2020 169 ILGA World, State-sponsored homophobia report, 2020, p68 170 HRW, Qatar: Censorship ignores rights, Fifa rules, 3 August 2018 171 Al-Jazeera, Qatar 2022: Norway rules out boycotting Football World Cup, 21 June 2021; The Independent, Danish national football team loses sponsor amid Qatar human rights row, 9 April 2021 172 Euronews, Football: Netherlands joins Germany, Norway in Qatar world cup protest, 28 March 2021; The Guardian, Revealed: 6,500 migrant workers have died in Qatar since World Cup awarded, 23 February 2021 173 State of Qatar Government Communications Office, Deputy Director of the GCO Sheikh Thamer bin Hamad Al Thani’s op-ed in Le Monde, 11 July 2021
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