UNCLASSIFIED USCENTCOM COMBINED STRATEGIC ANALYSIS GROUP (CSAG) Strategic Estimate 2021 May 2021 Combined Strategic Analysis Group – CCJ5-G – USCENTCOM UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 0 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED FOREWORD The Coalition Strategic Analysis Group (CSAG) is a unique organization. Charged with providing 'unvarnished advice' to the Commander and Staff, it leverages its vastly experienced and diverse international membership to provide different perspectives, challenge perceptions, and provide a counter-view for planners and commanders within United States Central Command. The Annual Strategic Estimate is one of the principal mechanisms for doing so. By reviewing the last year, the CSAG draws on open source (and, therefore, unclassified) reporting to generate conclusions and recommendations for the coming period. I do not intend to rehearse the significant events of the period here as they were numerous and complex; suffice it to say that the situation in the Central Region continued to evolve at a high tempo. But there are certainly themes and patterns of behavior that have endured, that bear consideration as we plan for the future and which CSAG officers have analyzed within this document. We do not expect that many will read what follows from cover to cover, but anticipate more selective reading of those sections and chapters that are of particular interest. Either way, we would welcome comment and feedback through the administrative team or direct to the authors, whose details are included at the end of each section. Finally, we encourage you to engage CSAG members in your work, to provide a different perspective and to challenge your thinking. Brigadier (O7) James C. Coote, British Army Deputy Director CCJ5 (CSAG) USCENTCOM (813) 529-5005 SVOIP (302) 529-5005 [email protected] 12 May 2021 1 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 2 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED INTRODUCTION USCENTCOM CCJ5 Combined Strategic Analysis Group (CSAG) produces a yearly, forward looking AOR Strategic Estimate for Commander USCENTCOM and staff. This Estimate is the 48th since 2003. The previous Estimate was released on 4 May 2020. The May 2021 Estimate is current as of 27 April 2021. The Estimate draws together the perspectives of the nineteen international officers currently supporting the CSAG and includes insights for how other countries might interpret US actions in the AOR. These assessments may differ from those produced elsewhere in the headquarters and are not necessarily unanimous perspectives. The assessments capture the diverse views of the CSAG in accordance with the CSAG charter of providing “unvarnished advice from an international perspective.” Readers may note different styles and tones, reflective of different nationalities and languages. The aim of the Estimate is to present a current assessment of the AOR and provide USCENTCOM with relevant implications and opportunities to pre-empt and/or address developing issues. It supports the USCENTCOM Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign plan. The Estimate is not exhaustive on the issues across the AOR but intends to inform about the most significant factors in the twenty AOR countries. This assessment will describe the influence from external actors through political, economic, security/military, societal, environmental, and non-state domains. Where applicable, analysis within this Estimate was conducted in the context of USCENTCOM priorities: Strategic Functional 1. Deterring Iran 5. Developing Counter-UAS Capabilities 2. Resolving Conflict in Afghanistan 6. ISIS Detainees & Radicalization of IDPs 3. Maintain D-ISIS Campaign Continuity 4. Competition with China and Russia The Estimate contains two sections: 1. The Middle East and Central Asia South Asia Branch Chiefs highlight the most significant developments in the AOR since the last Estimate. 2. Main body: an assessment of each AOR Country and internal/external influences. CSAG uses the SWOT model (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) to analyze the countries in the AOR. This model allows for a structured method for assessing the four elements of stability from the perspective of the country/entity government, and/or its people. The current situation is described in the “strengths and weaknesses,” while “opportunities and threats” project current trends into the future. Each section closes with recommendations for the US and CENTCOM. The data in the national statistics chart was sourced from the International Monetary Fund website, World Population Review, and Global Firepower as a standardized sourcing method. Referenced CSAG ‘Strategy Papers’ and ‘Snapshots’ are available on the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies website at https://nesa- center.org/category/centcom-csag-papers/ and via CENTCOM CCJ5 CSAG SIPR and NIPR SharePoint sites at: http://rel.centcom.smil.mil/sites/ccj5/G_DIV http://pcent.centcom.mil/sites/ccj5/ccj5-g/pages/home.asp Colonel (O6) Andrew S. DeJesse US ARMY Division Chief CCJ5/CSAG USCENTCOM (813) 529-5055 SVOIP (302) 529-5055 [email protected] 12 May 2021 3 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Disclaimer The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the international officers within the Combined Strategic Analysis Group (CSAG) and do not necessarily reflect the views of United States Central Command, nor of the nations represented within the CSAG, nor any other government agency. 4 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION ONE SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AOR SINCE THE PREVIOUS ESTIMATE 7 SECTION TWO ASSESSMENT OF INFLUENCES FROM THE AOI AND OF THE COUNTRIES IN USCENTCOM AOR 15 2.1 DAESH AND VEOs WITHIN USCENTCOM AOR 16 2.2 THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 25 2.3 RUSSIA’S INFLUENCE IN THE AOR 30 2.4 TURKEY’S INFLUENCE IN THE AOR 37 2.5 CHINA’S INFLUENCE IN THE AOR 47 2.6 AFGHANISTAN 54 2.7 BAHRAIN 62 2.8 EGYPT 66 2.9 IRAN 75 2.10 IRAQ 83 2.11 ISRAEL 93 2.12 JORDAN 99 2.13 KAZAKHSTAN 104 2.14 KUWAIT 108 2.15 KYRGYZSTAN 115 2.16 LEBANON 120 2.17 OMAN 128 2.18 PAKISTAN 132 2.19 QATAR 138 2.20 SAUDI ARABIA 143 2.21 SYRIA 149 2.22 TAJIKISTAN 157 2.23 TURKMENISTAN 161 2.24 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 166 2.25 UZBEKISTAN 171 2.26 YEMEN 177 5 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 6 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CSAG STRATEGIC ESTIMATE 2021 SECTION ONE Significant Developments in the AOR since the Previous Estimate 7 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST Political, diplomatic, economic, and military developments in the Middle East over the past 12 months are contrasted with regard to CENTCOM’s strategic and functional priorities. Noting the recent elevation of “Competition with Russia and China” as a strategic priority, it reflects CSAG’s long standing perspective on Great Power Competition (GPC). GPC is an overarching paradigm that transcends through all of the priorities. The CENTCOM Area Of responsibility (AOR) is definitely one of the most recognizable and prominent battlespaces and arenas of GPC with the US with Russia and China being the primary external competitors. Deterring Iran It is undeniable that the Trump administration can be credited with the normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, with the tacit agreement of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the first two. Thus, this initiative contributes to making the region more stable and implicitly seems to support the idea of constituting a front against the main threat represented by Iran and its remote-controlled militias such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, the PMF, and the Muslim Brotherhood. How effective the determining role of the US was in the discussions of these normalization agreements during 2020 remains to be confirmed in the future with the new Biden administration (See Section 2.2). Continuing brokering with potential new candidate Arab countries in the region (such as Oman) but also contributing to the practical implementation of the Abraham agreements already signed: recognition of Western Sahara by the US for Morocco, cancellation of the financial debt for Sudan, and the acquisition of fifth generation fighters, drones, and surface-to-air defense systems for the others. In contrast, it should be noted that this “Realpolitik” does not reflect the aspirations of the governed peoples. Numerous protests in the region and in countries that have normalized their relations with Israel have shown that the people's support for the Palestinian cause and for a two-state solution appears unwavering. Late January, the Biden administration announced a review of Foreign Military Sales to UAE and KSA in addition to stop supporting the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen (See Sections 2.20, 2.24, and 2.25). The last announcements are likely to slow normalization dynamics at the political level. The Pentagon’s decision to modify the Unified Command Plan by moving Israel from the area of responsibility of USEUCOM to that of USCENTCOM is likely to contribute positively to CENTCOM’s top priority (See Section 2.11). If the tangible consequences of this new situation for CENTCOM, its allies and its partners in the region will surely not be visible before the second half of 2021, in terms of perception, Iran must see this strategic movement as a harbinger of increased military coordination among countries designating it as the major destabilizing threat in the region. The recent developments listed above seem to positively affect CENTCOM's top strategic priority. Nevertheless, over the past 12 months, other events observed in the region seem to contrast the picture. First, the campaign of maximum pressure accentuated with the establishment of unilateral sanctions against Iran after the lifting of some by the international community in October 2020 does not seem to have obtained the desired results (See Section 2.9). In addition, the change in foreign policy of the new US administration in the Middle East with the stated desire for a return to multilateralism, while respecting the principles of Rules-Based Order, should adjust the level of pressure and lower it, especially if the US are returning to the JCPOA.