Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
Migration Radar Summary T2 JanuaryDevelopment - andApril expectation 2020 of asylum-related migration May - August 2020
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
Publisher's information Title Migration Radar Summary. Development and expectation of asylum- related migration May - August 2020.
Contents The Migration Radar Summary is an analysis product, centring on the monitoring of asylum-related migration to the Netherlands. The data from the relevant triannual period have been supplemented by data from previous months and from the same period a year ago. In addition, information is provided on developments in countries of origin in the relevant triannual period and policy developments in the Netherlands and Europe. The Migration Radar provides the organisations cooperating in migration with an analysis to support policy and implementation.
Reporting period The Migration Radar Summary is based on data from various databases (IND, IOM, UNHCR), media reports, public Frontex data, and public country information from IND/TOELT. The Migration Radar Summary is published once per triannual period.
Cooperation The Migration Radar is an analysis product of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), (Strategy and Implementation Advice (SUA)/Research and Analysis (O&A) and the IND service centre DV/Country and Language Research and Expertise Team (TOELT)), and has been written through cooperation with the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar), the Ministry of Justice and Security (J&V/Directorate General for Migration (DGM)), the Repatriation and Departure Service (DT&V), Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA), Police and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (BZ).
IND Strategy and Implementation Advice (SUA) Research & Analysis (O&A) Ministry of Justice and Security Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) Rijnstraat 8 | 2515 XP | The Hague Postbus 16275 | 2500 BG | The Hague
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
Contents
1 ASYLUM APPLICATIONS ...... 4
1.1 FIRST APPLICATIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS ...... 4 1.1.1 Asylum applications by persons coming from “safe countries of origin” ...... 5 1.1.2 Asylum applications by persons coming from visa-free countries ...... 6 1.1.3 Asylum applications by unaccompanied minors (UAMs) ...... 7 2 SELECTED NATIONALITIES ...... 7
2.1 SYRIA ...... 8 2.1.1 Figures...... 8 2.1.2 Developments ...... 8 2.2 TUNISIA ...... 10 2.2.1 Figures...... 10 2.2.2 Developments ...... 10 2.3 TURKEY ...... 11 2.3.1 Figures...... 11 2.3.2 Developments ...... 11 3 OVERVIEW OF ROUTES AND DEVELOPMENTS ...... 14
3.1 ROUTES ...... 14 3.2 IMPORTANT SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGIONS ...... 14 3.1.1 Middle East ...... 14 3.1.2 Africa ...... 16 3.1.3 Asia – Afghanistan ...... 19 4 POLICY AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS ...... 21
4.1 EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS ...... 21 4.1.1 Emergency measures relating to Covid-19 ...... 21 4.1.2 General policy developments ...... 22 4.2 POLICY AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS ...... 24 4.2.1 Emergency measures relating to Covid-19 ...... 24 4.2.2 General policy developments ...... 24
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
1 Asylum applications 1.1 First asylum applications in the Netherlands In the second triannual period of 2020, 3,612 first asylum applications were submitted in the Netherlands. The number of applications has decreased in comparison with both the preceding triannual period (-1,133, - 24%) and last year in the same period (-3,554, -50%). Figure 1.1 shows that the influx sharply decreased from March 2020 and increased again from June. It is clear that the number of first asylum applications in T2 still remained below the pre-corona level.
Figure 1.1 Course of the number of first asylum applications in the Netherlands 2.500
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Most asylum applications in triannual period 2 were submitted by Syrians (1,120). This is comparable to the preceding triannual period (-43, -4%) and last year in the same period (-3, 0%). Unlike other nationalities, the number of asylum applications by Turks in the second triannual period (358) rose compared to the preceding triannual period (+99, +38%). There was however a decrease in comparison with last year in the same period (-89, -20%).
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
Figure 1.2 Top 20 nationalities who made asylum applications in the Netherlands in T2
Figure 1.3 Development of the number of first asylum applications by the top 5 nationalities 2.000 1.800 1.600 1.400 1.200 T2 2019 1.000 T3 2019 800 T1 2020 600 T2 2020 400 200 0 Syria Turkey Algeria Morocco Nigeria
1.1.1 Asylum applications by persons coming from “safe countries of origin” In the second triannual period of 2020, two out of the five largest groups of asylum seekers came from countries placed on the list of safe countries (hereinafter safe-country nationals), namely Algerians and Moroccans. In total, 17% of the first applications by asylum seekers came from safe-country nationals. This is comparable to previous triannual periods. The relative share of safe-country nationals remained the same in T2, but the absolute number of first asylum applications by safe-country nationals (627) decreased sharply in comparison with the
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
preceding triannual period (-310, -33%) and in comparison with last year in the same period (- 725, -54%). This has to do with a fall in the number of first asylum applications by (almost) all safe-country nationals.
Figure 1.4 Development of the number of first asylum applications from the top 5 nationalities from safe countries of origin 600
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0 Algeria Morocco Georgia Tunisia Serbia
1.1.2 Asylum applications by persons coming from visa-free countries In the second triannual period, no visa-free country was among the top ten nationalities of asylum seekers. The number of first asylum applications by citizens from visa-free countries (158) sharply decreased, compared to both the preceding triannual period (-283, -64%) and last year in the same period (-652, -80%). About a third of the applications from visa-free countries were submitted by Georgians. The number of applications by Georgians in the second triannual period (60) is comparable to the preceding triannual period, but did decrease in comparison with a year ago in the same period (- 90, -60%). Only the number of applications by Brazilians (11) shows an increase compared to previous periods. The number of applications by Brazilians is, however, limited.
Figure 1.5 Development of the number of asylum applications from the top 5 nationalities from visa-free countries 160
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
1.1.3 Asylum applications by unaccompanied minors (UAMs) In the second triannual period of 2020, a total of 248 first asylum applications were submitted by UAMs. This is comparable to the preceding triannual period (+4, +2%), but it is a slight decrease in comparison with last year in the same period (-42, -14%). In total, 7% of the first asylum applicants said they were UAMs. This is somewhat higher than in previous triannual periods. Figure 1.6 shows the course of the number of first asylum applications by UAMs. In April and May, the number of applications by UAMs fell compared to previous months. From June, the number of first asylum applications by UAMs increased again considerably to the level of the months before.
Figure 1.6 Course of the number of asylum applications by UAMs 140
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Almost half (41%) of the UAM applications came from Syrians. The number of applications by Syrian UAMs increased in the second triannual period (102) compared to last year in the same period (+12, +13%) and in comparison with the preceding triannual period (-7, -6%). Compared to the preceding triannual period, all nationalities from the top five, except the Syrians, showed an increase. Compared to last year in the same period, Algerians and Afghans also show an increase.
Figure 1.7 Development of the number of first asylum applications by UAMs, the top 5 nationalities 180
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120 T2 2019 100 T3 2019 80 T1 2020 60 T2 2020 40
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0 Syria Morocco Eritrea Algeria Afghanistan
2 Selected nationalities
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
In this section, some nationalities are selected in order to provide insight into the background characteristics of certain groups of asylum seekers. The reasons for singling out a certain nationality have to do with an increased influx, developments in the country of origin or the increased importance of the country as a transition country. Subsequently, the Migration Radar Team, in consultation with the focus group, made a selection of the nationalities mentioned in the survey. The information on developments in countries of origin is based on public sources.
2.1 Syria
2.1.1 Figures The number of first asylum applications by Syrians remained stable in the second triannual period (1,120) and is comparable to the preceding triannual period a year ago in the same period. A fifth of the applicants (22%) are female and four fifths (78%) are male. One fifth of the applicants (21%) are underage, and almost half of them (43%) stated that they were UAMs. In the EU+ the applications by Syrians in May/June fell compared to the months before and last year in the same period. The top 3 host countries in May and June of 2020 were Germany, Greece and Austria. The Netherlands was the fourth host country in this period.
In the second triannual period almost 1,600 applications were handled. The majority (87%) were granted. The applications that were rejected were rejected mainly because the applicant already received protection in the EU/a safe third country or had previously resided in a safe country (Dublin).
2.1.2 Developments In the parliamentary elections in July, the Baath Party (of President Assad), won 177 of the 250 seats. The turnout was 33%. Voting was possible in 70% of the country.1 The conflict in Syria continued in the meantime. The joint Turkish-Russian military patrols started in March in northwest Syria were ended in mid-August. This could be an indication of an oncoming Syrian offensive in the area. According to reports, the Syrian ally Hezbollah has moved troops to the area.2 Russian planes started bombarding again June after a break since March, and in August also in the northwest of Syria controlled by the opposition.3
The Islamic State has lost its territory in Syria, but remains active there with bombings, rocket attacks and attacks by fighters (‘armed clashes’). The focus is on the areas they had recently controlled, but their fighters are also active in the west of Syria.4
The Syrian economy has completely collapsed. The currency has lost 80% of its value, war damage amounts to tens of billions of dollars, agriculture and industry have been hit hard, and eight out of ten Syrians live under the poverty level.5 Residents of the city of Sweida protested in June against the high prices of food, the bad living conditions and against corruption, and demanded the resignation of President Assad and departure of the Baath Party. The demonstrations immediately led to arrests and assaults by the security forces.6
1 Al Jazeera, 22-07-2020, Syria: Assad's Baath party wins majority in parliamentary polls, 20-08-2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/syria-assad-baath-party-wins-majority-parliamentary-polls-200722065257820.html 2 Arab News, 17-08-2020, Fears of new bloodbath in Idlib as Assad troops go on the offensive, 20-08-2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1720506/middle-east 3 Reuters, 18-08-2010, Russian jets bomb opposition-held Idlib: witnesses, 20-08-2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis- russia-idlib/russian-jets-bomb-opposition-held-idlib-witnesses-idUSKCN25E254 4 The Syrian Observer, 12-08-2020, Islamic State Resurfaces in Syria, 21-08-2020, https://syrianobserver.com/EN/commentary/59784/islamic-state-resurfaces-in-syria.html and Danish Immigration Service, June 2020, Islamic State in Syria, 21-08-2020, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2032499/COI_brief_report_Islamic_State_in_Syria_June_2020.pdf 5 Reuters, 13-08-2020, Special report: A collapsing economy and a family feud pile pressure on Syria's Assad, 20-08-2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-syria-tycoon-special-report/special-report-a-collapsing-economy-and-a-family-feud-pile- pressure-on-syrias-assad-idUSKCN2591C3 6 Human Rights Watch, 28-06-2020, Syria: Protesters Describe Beatings, Arrests, 20-08-2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/28/syria-protesters-describe-beatings-arrests and The Guardian, 12-06-2020, Syrian protesters call
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
Reception of Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon On 4 August 2020, almost 660,000 Syrian refugees were registered in Jordan, more than a fifth of whom lived in camps and the rest outside camps. These numbers have been fairly constant for years.7 Until the beginning of July, Jordan issued more than 190,000 work permits to Syrians. According to the Minister of Foreign and Expatriates Affairs, the best solution for Syrians is to return voluntarily to Syria.8 The economic prospects for Jordan, and with that for the Syrian refugees are not good.9 Because of the strict Corona measures, many Syrians have lost their jobs.10 Jordan treats everyone within its borders equally, according to the King.11 Human Rights Watch, however, stated in a report in June that it is becoming increasingly more difficult for Syrian children to undergo secondary education in Jordan, which undermines their possibilities on the future labour market.12
On 31 July 2020, about 880,000 Syrian refugees were registered in Lebanon, divided among about 200,000 households. Since mid-2015 there has been a gradual decrease in the number of registered Syrian refugees.13 Lebanese President Aoun called upon the Syrian refugees again in mid-July to return to the areas in Syria where there was no fighting, partly because the Syrian authorities welcomed their return and have promised to provide them with the necessary support and care. There was said to be a plan for their return, aimed at preventing the politicisation of this humanitarian act.14 The economic crisis in Lebanon had already caused problems for the Syrian refugees, and the corona crisis aggravated them further. More than half of the Syrians allegedly lost their jobs, 92% of the Syrians were faced with uncertainty of food and 66% of them live in ‘poor standard conditions’.15 Access to Lebanese healthcare is still more problematic for Syria refugees.16 The explosion in the port of Beirut in the beginning of August is expected to aggravate the political and economic crisis in Lebanon further. There were at least 43 Syrians among the more than 200 deaths, and may Syrians lost their shelter.17
for Assad's downfall as economic crisis deepens, 20-08-2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/12/syrian-protesters-call- for-assads-downfall-as-economic-crisis-deepens 7 UNHCR, 04-08-2020, Syria Regional Refugee Response Jordan, 19-08-2020, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36 8 Middle East Monitor, 01-07-2020, Jordan issued over 190,000 work permits to Syria refugees, 19-08-2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200701-jordan-issued-over-190000-work-permits-to-syria-refugees/ 9 Atlantic Council, 14-07-2020, What lies ahead as Jordan faces the fallout of COVID-19, 19-08-2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/what-lies-ahead-as-jordan-faces-the-fallout-of-covid-19/ 10 The New Humanitarian, 14-05-2020, ‘Like a ship about to sink’: Refugees in Jordan voice pandemic despair, 19-08-2020, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2020/05/14/Jordan-coronavirus-refugees and Reuters, 10-05-2020, Lockdowns pile job losses and hunger onto Syrian refugees' plight, 19-08-2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-mideast- refugees/lockdowns-pile-job-losses-and-hunger-onto-syrian-refugees-plight-idUSKBN22M04X 11 Al-Arabiya, 29-06-2020, Jordan's response to coronavirus: Leave no one behind, 19-08-2020, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2020/06/29/Jordan-s-response-to-coronavirus-Leave-no-one-behind 12 Human Rights Watch, 26-06-2020, “I Want to Continue to Study”, 22-08-2020, https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/06/26/i-want- continue-study/barriers-secondary-education-syrian-refugee-children-jordan 13 UNHCR, 31-07-2020, Syria Regional Refugee Response Lebanon, 19-08-2020, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71 14 Arab News, 18-07-2020, Lebanon pushes for Syrian refugees to leave, 19-08-2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1706306/middle- east 15 The Tahrir Institute for ME Policy, 23-07-2020, No Funding and No Policy: Lebanon’s Refugee Population amid COVID-19 and an Economic Crisis, 19-08-2020, https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/no-funding-and-no-policy-lebanons-refugee-population-amid-covid- 19-and-an-economic-crisis/ and DW, 06-05-2020, Syrian refugees in Lebanon more scared of starvation than COVID-19, 20-08-2020, https://www.dw.com/en/syrian- refugees-in-lebanon-more-scared-of-starvation-than-covid-19/a-53355378 16 Syria Direct, 14-07-2020, Syrian refugees’ growing struggle to access healthcare in Lebanon, 19-08-2020, https://syriadirect.org/news/syrian-refugees%E2%80%99-growing-struggle-to-access-healthcare-in-lebanon/ 17 Foreign Policy, 11-08-2020, Beirut Explosion Imperils Lebanon’s Refugee Population—and Aid Routes to Syria, 20-08-2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/11/lebanon-syria-refugee-population-beirut-explosion/ and Middle East Institute, 19-08-2020, Lebanon’s invisible: Refugees, COVID-19, and the Beirut port explosion, 20-08-2020, https://www.May.edu/publications/lebanons- invisible-refugees-covid-19-and-beirut-port-explosion and Arab News, 18-08-2020, Beirut blast brings fresh misery to displaced Syrians in Lebanon, 20-08-2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1719916/middle-east
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
2.2 Tunisia
2.2.1 Figures
Because of its increased importance as a transit country, Tunisia has also been selected. The first asylum applications by Tunisians in the second triannual period (43) decreased compared to the preceding triannual period (-17, -28%) and compared to last year in the same period (-58, -57%). Almost all applications (90%) were made by men. Most of the men were between 20 and 29 years old. The only minors who submitted applications were UAMs. In the EU+ there were considerably fewer applications by Tunisians from March than in previous years. The top three host countries in May-June 2020 were Germany, France and Spain. The Netherlands was the fourth host country in this period.
In the second triannual period 42 applications were handled. The vast majority (96%) were rejected. Half of them (55%) were rejected because of Dublin, a fifth (21%) were not handled (including destination unknown (MOB)), another fifth (19%) were declared manifestly unfounded (safe country of origin). Fewer than five applications were withdrawn by the applicant or granted by the IND.
2.2.2 Developments
Political crisis On 15 July 2020 Prime Minister Elyes Fakhfakh offered his resignation after he had been accused of corruption. On 25 July, the Tunisian President Kais Said appointed the Minister of Home Affairs, Hichem Mechichi, as Prime Minister.18 On 2 September, Mechichi received a vote of confidence from the Tunisian parliament to start governing with a government composed of technocrats.19 Besides the political crisis, Tunisia is suffering from the economic consequences of the corona pandemic, which has destroyed thousands of jobs, e.g. in tourism. The unemployment rate is now said to be 18%.20 In June, demonstrators in the southern city of Tataouine blockaded an oil pumping station in Kamour and called for more to be done about creating jobs in the oil and gas sectors. The initially peaceful protests became violent after the leader of the protests, Tarek Haddad, was arrested on 21 June 2020. The police fired tear gas to disperse the crowd.21
Illegal Tunisian migration to Italy is increasing To date, about 4,500 Tunisians have arrived in Italy. They are not only young people, but also whole middle class families. This appears to be a consequence of the unemployment caused by the coronavirus.22 From 10 August, Tunisian migrants have been deported from Italy by plane. The Italian government concluded an agreement with the Tunisian government to this effect.23
Blogger sentenced to six months' imprisonment On 14 July 2020, the blogger Emna Chargui was sentenced by a court in Tunis to a term of imprisonment of six months and a fine of EUR 610 for a post on social media in which a warning
18 France 24, Tunisie : le ministre de l'Intérieur Hichem Mechichi désigné chef du gouvernement, 25-7-2020 https://www.france24.com/fr/20200725-tunisie-le-ministre-de-l-int%C3%A9rieur-hichem-mechichi-d%C3%A9sign%C3%A9-chef-du- gouvernement 19 Al Jazeera, Tunisian Parliament approves third government in less than a year, 2-9-2020 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/09/tunisian-parliament-approves-government-year-200902064321246.html 20 France24, en Tunisie, le Premier ministre désigné opte pour un gouvernement de technocrates, 25-8-2020 https://www.france24.com/fr/20200825-la-tunisie-se-pr%C3%A9pare-%C3%A0-un-gouvernement-de-technocrates 21 Al Arabiya, Renewed clashes in Tunisia’s deprived southern Tataouine region, 22-6-2020, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/north- africa/2020/06/22/Renewed-clashes-in-Tunisia-s-deprived-southern-Tataouine-region 22 NOS, Many more migrants to Italy; major concerns about coronavirus, 1-8-2020 https://nos.nl/collectie/13841/artikel/2342511-veel- meer-migranten-naar-italie-grote-zorgen-om-coronavirus 23 Infomigrants, Italy-Tunisia migrant repatriation flights to resume on August 10, 6-8-2020 https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/26477/italy-tunisia-migrant-repatriation-flights-to-resume-on-august-10
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
was given for the coronavirus in the form of a Koran verse. According to the court, the blogger had “insulted Islam” and she called for “hatred between religions”.24
Tunisia as a transit country On 9 June, a migrant boat sank on the coast of Tunisia, whereby certainly 53 migrants died. The migrants came from Central Africa. According to the UNHCR, the number of illegal crossings from Tunisia to Italy increased between January and April by 150% compared to the same period last year. 25 A shift is therefore taking place from departures from Libya to departures from Tunisia. The UNHCR reports that on 31 July 2020, there were 5,032 refugees registered by the UNHCR residing in Tunisia. Of them, 1,829 persons came from Syria. The others came mainly from Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia.26
2.3 Turkey
2.3.1 Figures
The number of first asylum applications by Turks in the Netherlands in the second triannual period (360) rose compared to the preceding triannual period (+99, +38%) and compared to the triannual period before. It is notable that in July and particularly in August the number of asylum applications by this nationality rose enormously and is higher than in the months of January and February. This can possibly be explained by the lifting of travel restrictions for Gülenists. Two thirds (68%) of the applicants are men, and one third (32%) are women. More than half of the applicants are between the ages of 20 and 39. There were no applications by UAMs; all applications by minor children were therefore made as a family unit.
In the EU+ the applications by Turks in May/June sharply decreased compared to the months before and compared to previous years in the same period. The top three host countries in May and June were France, Germany and the UK. The Netherlands is the fifth host country.
In the second triannual period almost 400 applications were handled. The majority (89%) of the applications were granted. The applications that were rejected (9%), were mainly declared manifestly unfounded.
2.3.2 Developments
Political developments Former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan and former AKP Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu have each started their newly formed parties – respectively DEVA and Future. Both parties are preparing to win over the electorate who have become disappointed in the governing AKP. To date, the AKP has been able to maintain its voters, because the DEVA and the Future Party have not yet succeeded in attracting voters and the existing opposition parties were also strongly polarised. Shifts are nevertheless in progress. Because of the economic crisis, the policy towards Syria, the increasing influx of refugees and internal social tensions in the country, Erdoğan's popularity is declining. Moreover, as former AKP Minister of Economic Affairs, Ali Babacan has the advantage that he is known as the one who provided for great economic progress, unlike his
24 Amnesty International, Tunisia: Blogger Emna Chargui sentenced to six months in prison for social media post, 15-7-2020 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/tunisia-blogger-emna-chargui-sentenced-to-six-months-in-prison-for-social-media- post/ 25 Deutsche Welle, At least 53 dead in migrant shipwreck off Tunisia, 12-6-2020 https://www.dw.com/en/at-least-53-dead-in-migrant- shipwreck-off-tunisia/a-53785022 26 UNHCR, Tunisia registration factsheet, 31-7-2020, https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Tunisia%20Registration%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20July%202020.pdf
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
former party colleague Davutoğlu, who is held responsible for the failing policy with respect to Syria.27
Arrests and convictions During various waves of arrests all across Turkey, persons have been arrested who are suspected of having ties with the Gülen movement or the PKK. In the beginning of June, for instance, more than 200 arrest warrants were issued for people accused of having ties with the Gülen movement. Of the 191 people being sought in Izmir, 181 were active members of the Turkish Air Force and police. To date, 145 people have been arrested in 22 provinces. The ground on which the persons were arrested was use of the Bylock app (application to encrypt messages frequently used by members of the Gülen movement).28
The dismissal of thousands of judges who have been replaced by government loyalist and inexperienced newcomers has put the judicial system under heavy pressure. According to a report by Human Rights Watch in July 2020, in the past two months there has been an increase in force used by the police and so-called night neighbourhood watch members who allegedly arrested persons and assaulted and tortured them in detention. According to Human Rights Watch, at least fourteen persons are concerned in various Turkish cities.29According to Sezgin Tanrıkulu, prominent CHP Member of Parliament, in July 2020, about 170 persons, of whom four minors and 43 prisoners, were faced with assault and torture by police.30
Recently adopted laws On 11 June a law was adopted to give neighbourhood watches more powers. The vagueness of their comprehensive mandate, including "crime prevention" and "prevention of public gatherings that are considered to disturb public order" and the "localisation of persons sought by the police", has alarmed the opposition.31
The Turkish Parliament adopted a controversial law on 9 July by which several bar associations were allowed per province. The existing bar associations view the law as a threat to the impartiality of the rule of law, because bar associations can arise in the larger provinces that favour the government.32
On 29 July a law was introduced on the restriction of social media in Turkey as a result of online messages ridiculing the family of Erdoğan.33
Covid-19 The number of Covid-19 infections in Turkish prisons is increasing rapidly. According to the Mezopotamya News Agency, by order of the Turkish Ministry of Public Health, the corona testing of prisoners has been stopped. Prisoners with Covid-19 symptoms are put together with prisoners without symptoms in order to obtain ‘so-called group immunity’. The infected prisoners are denied
27 Çevik, Salim, New Political Parties and Reconfiguration of Turkey’s Political Landscape, in: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) – German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Center for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS), SWP Comment No 22 May 2020, p 1-3, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2020C22_PartiesTurkey.pdf 28 Al-Monitor, Turkey rounds up scores of citizens with alleged Gulen links, 9-6-2020 https://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/06/turkey-arrests-warrants-gulen-coup-erdogan-crackdown-feto.html ; Anadolu Agency, Turkey arrests 26 suspects for FETO, PKK terror links, 17-8-2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-arrests-26-suspects-for-feto-pkk- terror-links/1944652 29 Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Police, Watchmen Involved in Torture, Ill-Treatment, 29 July 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/29/turkey-police-watchmen-involved-torture-ill-treatment 30 Stockholm Center for Freedom, Opposition deputy announces July human rights toll in Turkey, 15 August 2020, https://stockholmcf.org/opposition-deputy-announces-july-human-rights-toll-in-turkey/ 31 Aljazeera, Turkey grants increased power to neighbourhood watchmen, 11-6-2020 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/turkey- grants-increased-power-neighbourhood-watchmen-200611070930909.html 32 Turkish lawyers protest as parliament debates bar association bill, 9-7-2020, https://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/07/turkey-lawyers-bar-association-bill-parliament.html 33 Human Rights Watch, Turkey, Social Media Law Will Increase Censorship, 27-7-2020 https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/27/turkey- social-media-law-will-increase-censorship ; Hurriyet, Turkey’s new social media law put into effect, 31-7-2020 https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-new-social-media-law-put-into-effect-157029
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
treatment. On 14 April 2020 an amnesty law was adopted in order to relieve the overpopulated prisons so that the Covid virus could be curtailed. This amnesty law, however, does not apply to politicians, human rights activists, journalists, lawyers and academics who are imprisoned under the counterterrorism legislation.34
Turkey as a reception and transit country About 4.1 million refugees are staying in Turkey at present, 3.7 million of whom have come from Syria.35 There have been reports in recent months that Turkey, in an indirect way (via third countries) is repatriating Uighurs to China.36 On 1 June the prohibition on interprovincial travel in Turkey was lifted. This enabled irregular migrants to travel on more easily to the country and sea border with Greece. The number of border crossings at the Turkish-Iranian border is rising. Turkey aims to finish the construction of a wall along the border with Iran this year.37
The number of Syrians on direct flights from Turkey fluctuates, but is considerably lower than the number that first travels to Greece in order to travel on subsequently to the Netherlands. The diversity of nationalities that normally fly via Turkey to the Netherlands and apply for asylum at the airports is great. This shows that Istanbul serves as a hub from areas including Asia, the Middle East and Africa38. We also see this in T2 of 2020, although the number of third-country nationals on direct routes from Turkey was limited due to COVID-19 restrictions.
3434 Stockholm Center for Freedom, Turkey stops testing prisoners for COVID-19 in notorious Silivri Prison, 20 May 2020, https://stockholmcf.org/turkey-stops-testing-prisoners-for-covid-19-in-notorious-silivri-prison/ 35 UNHCR, Global Focus Turkey, 2020, https://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2544?y=2020#year 36 Middle East Eye, Turkey accused of deporting Uighurs back to China via third countries, 27 July 2020, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uighurs-china-turkey-accused-deporting-third-countries 37 Migration Bulletin, 30 July 2020, ‘Turkey: migration trends after reopening of the borders’ 38 Flights for this purpose are direct from Turkey but it can also be seen e.g. that flights go from Africa to Turkey, after which the foreign national continues travelling via Greece to the Netherlands.
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3 Overview of routes and developments
3.1 Routes
On three of the five main routes to the EU a rise can be seen in the number of irregular border crossings due to termination of the Covid-19 measures in countries of origin, transit and destination. Only the two eastern routes showed a decrease. There was a decrease in the number on the East Mediterranean route compared to both the preceding triannual period and the same period last year. The same trends are visible on the eastern land route. It should be noted however that August shows a rise. On the West Balkan route, a slight increase can be seen in the second triannual period compared to the three months before. In comparison with the same period last year, there has also been a rise. A sharp rise could be seen for the West Mediterranean route compared to the months before. This is a substantial decrease compared to the same period last year. The Central Mediterranean route showed a similar picture, with a rise compared to the preceding triannual period and a slight decrease compared to last year.
3.2 Main socio-political developments in the regions
3.1.1 Middle East
3.1.1.1 Iran In the second triannual period, a number of (attempted) demonstrations in various regions in Iran were quelled by the riot police and the security forces. The demonstrations were directed against the poor economic situation and anti-regime slogans were shouted.39
The Iranian economy declined further in the past few months as a result of US sanctions and the corona measures, the exchange rate of the Rial dropped further and oil production decreased further. For 2021 a small economic growth of a few percentage points is nevertheless expected.40
The coronavirus is not under control in Iran. It appears from a data breach that the actual numbers of deaths and infections might be higher than the official figures.
Afghans in Iran Despite the economic crisis and the increasing number of corona infections, Afghans attempt to enter Iran in order to work. Iranian border guards however firmly obstruct this.41
39 VOA News, 17-07-2020, Iranians Angered by Faltering Economy Stage Rare Protest, 21-08-2020, https://www.voanews.com/middle- east/voa-news-iran/iranians-angered-faltering-economy-stage-rare-protest and RFE/RL, 17-07-2020, Police Chief In Iran Threatens Protesters With 'Forceful' Crackdown, 21-08-2020, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/police-chief-in-iran-threatens-protesters-with-forceful- crackdown/30733437.html 40 FocusEconomics, 07-07-2020, Iran Economic Outlook, 21-08-2020, https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/iran and Tasnim News Agency, 10-06-2020, World Banks Forecasts Positive Growth for Iran's Economy in 2021, 21-08-2020, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2020/06/10/2283279/world-banks-forecasts-positive-growth-for-iran-s-economy-in-2021 41 The New York Times, 02-05-2020, Afghanistan Investigating Claims Migrants Were Killed by Iranian Guards, 22-08-2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/02/world/asia/afghanistan-iran-migrants-drown.html and Human Rights watch, 28-05-2020, Victims of Iran-Afghan Border Drowning Deserve Justice, 22-08-2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/28/victims-iran-afghan-border- drowning-deserve-justice
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3.1.1.2 Iraq Remaining ISIS elements The provinces of Diyala, Nineveh, Kirkuk and Salahaddin have been hit particularly hard by ISIS cells. ISIS killed various members of the security forces in Iraq and civilians in various provinces and sabotaged various high voltage pylons in Ninewa and Salahaddin. On 3 May interim premier Adil Abdul-Mahdi ordered the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to start military operations in areas hit by ISIS as a reaction to a wave of ISIS attacks. ISIS also poses a threat to an increasing extent in disputed ares in Iraq, where the relations between the Federal and Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) troops are tense. The attacks in these areas are said to be increasing.42 On 26 May, the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS) stated that a high-ranking ISIS commander had been killed in an air attack by the International Coalition in eastern Syria. The CTS said that the person in question was the ISIS Wali, or commander, for Iraq.43 On 28 July the Iraqi army said that it had concluded a new series of operations as part of the fourth stage of operation "Heroes of Iraq" in the Province of Diyala in order to create a safe environment for the return of displaced residents.44
New government sworn in Mustafa al-Kahdhimi has succeeded in forming a government since the previous Prime Minister Adil Abdalmahdi resigned in November 2019. Both the United States and Iran have expressed their support of the new government.45
Demonstrations resumed and announcement of elections In the beginning of May, demonstrations started again in various provinces that had stopped for several weeks because of the coronavirus. During the first cabinet meeting, the new government of Iraq promised to release arrested demonstrators and pay compensation to the families of people who had been shot to death by the police during the disturbances. Iraqi government troops used excessive force against demonstrators, causing deaths and injuries, such as on 20 June 46 and 27 July.47 On 31 July, Prime Minister Kadhimi announced new elections on 6 June 2021. By doing so, he met an important demand of anti-government demonstrators that the political system would be dismantled and that endemic corruption and what many view as the malevolent influence of sectarian interests would be combated.48
Murder of a known terrorism expert On 6 July, the known terrorism expert Hisham al-Hashimi was murdered. He was a government security advisor and openly expressed criticism of the different militias in Iraq. Before his death, al-Hashimi stated that he was being threatened by Shiite militias. In a recent interview, al-Hashimi criticised PMU leaders and their political allies for protecting militants who are supposed to be prosecuted. Al-Hashimi was also an advocate of the protests against corrupt Iraqi political parties. The murder was committed in the midst of a deterioration of the security in Baghdad, as anti- American militias carried out increasingly more rocket attacks on the Green Zone in Baghdad. It seems that the militias have gone on the offensive against the Iraqi Prime Minister in order to block his reform plans in the security area. Prime Minister Kadhimi has replaced many security officers in order to take firmer action against the militias.49
42 Various EPIC reports ISHM: APRIL 30 – MAY 7, 2020 to ISHM: JULY 23 – JULY 30, 2020 43 EPIC, ISHM, ISHM: MAY 21 – MAY 28, 2020 44 EPIC, ISHM: JULY 23 – JULY 30, 2020 45 EPIC, ISHM: APRIL 30 – MAY 7, 2020, https://enablingpeace.org/ishm253/#Headline2 46 Various EPIC reports; Al Monitor, Iraqi protests resume as new government builds support for reform, 21-5-2020, https://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/iraq-kadimi-protests.html 47 EPIC, ISHM, ISHM: JULY 23 – JULY 30, 2020 https://enablingpeace.org/ishm265/ 48 Al Jazeera, Iraq prime minister calls early elections for June 2021, 30-7-2020 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/iraq-prime- minister-calls-early-elections-june-2021-200731191846324.html 49 Al Jazeera, Iraq armed groups expert Hisham al-Hashemi shot dead in Baghdad, 6-7-2020 ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/iraq-armed-groups-expert-hisham-al-hashemi-shot-dead-baghdad-200706194213891.html ; Al Monitor, Iraqi prime minister vows to bring expert's killers to justice, 7-7-2020, https://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/07/iraq-isis-terrorism-pmu-husham-hashimi.html ; EPIC, ISHM: JULY 2 – JULY 9, 2020 https://enablingpeace.org/ishm262/
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Turkish bombardments in northern Iraq intensified The Turkish military operation against the Kurdish Labour Party (PKK) in North Iraq was intensified in mid-June by operations ″Claw-Eagle“ and ″Claw Tiger″.5051
Iraq as a transit and reception country Since the end of July, the Kurdish Autonomous Region (KAR) has accommodated 244,000 Syrian refugees. At present, 99 per cent of the Syrian refugees live in the KAR, 41 per cent of whom live in camps and the rest outside them in the cities or in rural areas. The main risks to protection with which the people of the UNHCR are confronted include more challenges to gaining access to camps and reach refugees outside the camps, lack of possibilities for maintenance and the resulting socio-economic consequences, rise in prices of basic food products, increased risk of deportation, more domestic violence and discontinuation of educational activities. Most of the refugees and internally displaced persons in Iraq live on a daily wage. Their inability to gain access to jobs as a result of the current health crisis has greatly influenced their ability to provide for their most basic needs.52
3.1.1.3 Yemen The Special UN envoy for Yemen is working together with the warring parties to continue the cease-fire and resume the political process that is supposed to put an end to the conflict in Yemen. Various measures have to be taken to this effect. The situation in South Yemen has deteriorated because of fighting between the Southern Transitional Council and the government troops.
Al-Qaida/AQAP executed six persons in August 2020 who were allied with the Houthi. AQAP also claimed responsibility for the assassination of a dentist in the region. On 28 August the Saudi-led coalition supposedly intercepted a Houthi explosive under way to Saudi Arabia. The day before, the Saudi coalition allegedly intercepted a Houthi ballistic missile aimed at the Saudi city Najran. 53
The UN views the humanitarian situation in Yemen as very concerning.54 The number of COVID infections is rising as well, with fatal victims as a consequence. 55
3.1.2 Africa
3.1.2.1 Algeria
Convictions of journalists and Hirak activists In the last few months, the Algerian judiciary have intensified the prosecution and conviction of journalists, Hirak activists, political opponents and bloggers. For instance, on 11 August an Algerian journalist was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for reporting a demonstration by the Hirak movement, two Hirak activists were sentenced to a jail term of 2 years and a correspondent of a media group was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment.56 On 2 July a Hirak activist was released under a presidential pardon because of Independence Day.57
50 EPIC, ISHM ISHM: JULY 23 – JULY 30, 2020 https://enablingpeace.org/ishm265/ ; Political Geography Now Saturday, August 22, 2020Iraq Control Map & Timeline: Turkey Expands Control in North - August 2020 https://members.polgeonow.com/2020/08/map-of-turkish- control-in-iraq-2020.html?zx=7599a436cd8e6700 51 Middle East Eye, Fear and fury as Turkish air strikes devastate farmland in Iraq's Kurdish region, 15-8-2020 https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-airstrikes-pkk-devastate-farmland-iraq-sulaymaniyah 52 UNHCR, Iraq: Syrian Refugees Statistics, 11-8-2020 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/78239.pdf ; UNHCR, Iraq factsheet July 2020, https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Iraq%20Factsheet%20-%20July%202020.pdf 53 Critical threats, Gulf of Aden Security Review – August 2020, https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/gulf-of-aden-security-review 54 UN News, Yemen: Crisis reaches new low, top UN officials tell Security Council, 28 July 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/07/1069161 55 Security Council Report, June 2020 Monthly Forecast, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2020-06/yemen-19.php 56 France24, Algerian journalist Khaled Drareni handed three-year jail term, 10-8-2020, https://www.france24.com/en/20200810-algerian- journalist-khaled-drareni-handed-three-year-jail-term 57 France24, Algerian court grants release of anti-government protest leader Karim Tabbou, 2-7-2020, https://www.france24.com/en/20200702-algerian-court-grants-release-of-anti-government-protest-leader-karim-tabbou
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Referendum on a new constitution In a referendum on 1 November, Algerians will be able to express their views on a new constitution that is intended to give the parliament a larger role.58
Protests against the government Since the end of May, anti-government demonstrations have been taking place again, despite an evening curfew and the prohibition of large gatherings because of the coronavirus. 59 Critics accuse the government of abusing the state of emergency in order to weaken the protest movement and prevent new protests.60 The repression against activists and journalists has increased strongly since the corona restrictions from the beginning of March 2020. On 28 April new amendments to the penal code were adopted, that enable persons to be prosecuted who “publish false information that undermines public order and state security”. These broad terms make it easy to prosecute critics of the regime.61
Algeria as a transit country The borders of Algeria have been closed as a precaution against corona. By way of an agreement on temporary lifting of the border closing with Mali, the IOM enabled the voluntary return of stranded migrants in mid-July from Algiers to Bamako. 62 The UNHCR has registered 1,172 asylum applications in total since January 2020, compared to 1,468 for the same period in 2019, mainly from Guinea, Cameroon, Niger and Syria. The UNCHR has started conducting asylum interviews remotely.63
3.1.2.2 Morocco From 14 July the air and sea borders of Morocco were gradually opened for necessary traffic.64 At the end of July a partial lockdown was established for a number of cities. Permission could be given if travel to these cities was considered necessary.65 On the occasion of the Sugar Feast, the 21st anniversary of the Moroccan King, the Feast of Sacrifice and Youth Day, the Moroccan King pardoned about 3,000 convicted persons.66
Morocco as a transit country In the past few months there were mainly reports of migrants who wanted to go to the Canary Islands via Morocco. This is a longer and more dangerous route that seems to have replaced the
58 Reuters, Algeria to hold referendum on constitution on Nov. 1, 24-8-2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-constitution- referendum-idUSKBN25K26Q 59 Le Figaro, Algérie: nouvelle manifestation contre la répression du «Hirak», 13-5-2020, https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/algerie- nouvelle-manifestation-contre-la-repression-du-hirak-20200513 60 Algérie Eco, 70eme vendredi: reprise tendue du Hirak dans plusieurs villes, 19-6-2020, https://www.algerie- eco.com/2020/06/19/70eme-vendredi-reprise-tendue-du-hirak-dans-plusieurs-villes/ 61Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme, Noureddine Benissad:Ces dispositions pénales qui répriment les libertés doivent être abrogées, 23-6-2020, http://www.droits-laddh.org/me-noureddine-benissad-ces-dispositions-penales-qui-repriment-les- libertes.html 62 IOM, Amid COVID-19 Pandemic, IOM Facilitates Return of 84 Migrants from Algeria to Mali, 17-7-2020 https://www.iom.int/news/amid- covid-19-pandemic-iom-facilitates-return-84-migrants-algeria-mali 63 UNHCR, Algeria Operational update May 2020, 15-5-2020 https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Algeria%20Operational%20Update%2015%20May%202020.pdf 64 VOA News, Morocco to Start Reopening Borders After Strict Lockdown, dd. 9 July 2020, found on: https://www.voanews.com/covid-19- pandemic/morocco-start-reopening-borders-after-strict-lockdown, 65 Al Jazeera, Morocco bans travel to and from major cities to curb coronavirus, dd. 27 July 2020, found on: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/morocco-bans-travel-major-cities-curb-coronavirus-200727110734625.html 66 Maroc.ma, Eid Al Fitr: Royal Pardon for 483 People, dd. 23 May 2020, found on: http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-activities/eid-al-fitr- royal-pardon-483-people, Maroc.ma, Throne Day: HM the King Pardons 1,446 Convicts, dd. 29 July 2020, found on: http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-activities/throne-day-hm-king-pardons-1446-convicts, Morocco World News, Throne Day: Royal Pardon Includes Some Hirak Rif Activists, dd. 29 July 2020, found on: https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2020/07/312973/throne-day-royal- pardon-includes-some-hirak-rif-activists/, Maroc.ma, HM the King Pardons 752 People on Eid Al Adha, dd. 30 July 2020, found on: http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-activities/hm-king-pardons-752-people-eid-al-adha, Morocco World News, King Mohammed VI Pardons 673 Convicts to Honor Morocco’s Youth Day, dd. 20 August 2020, found on: https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2020/08/316117/king- mohammed-vi-pardons-673-convicts-to-honor-moroccos-youth-day/
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
route via the Straits of Gibraltar.67 The Spanish authorities say that the number of migrants (3,446) without papers on the islands increased sixfold between January and mid-August 2020.68
3.1.2.3 Libya
Battle for Tripoli decided On 27 April, Haftar declared that he had a “mandate from the people” to govern Libya. He also announced that East Libya had withdrawn from a UN supported agreement from 2015 between the rival eastern and western governments of Libya. The GNA (Government of National Accord) rejected Haftar's declaration.69
On 9 May the only airport of Libya that was still functioning was showered with rockets by troops of the Libyan National Army (LNA).70 Several rockets landed in residential districts, killing at least five civilians and injuring dozens more.71 In the last weeks of May 2020, the GNA retook the southern parts of the Tripoli area from the LNA, and the LNA withdrew increasingly further. 72 The GNA continued this in June, retaking the international airport of Tripoli, Tripoli itself73 and Tarhuna. Egypt announced a new plan for the cease-fire, that was supposed to enter into effect on 8 June. The same day, the GNA called for taking over all of Libya, and rejected the proposed cease-fire. In the meantime, a large Egyptian military convoy was set up at the Libyan-Egyptian border.74
In Tarhuna on 11 June, hundreds of bodies were found in mass graves. 75 To date, 158 bodies have been found in the hospital of Tarhuna showing signs of torture. The International Criminal Court stated that this is proof of crimes against humanity. On 20 June, the Egyptian President warned for “direct intervention” in Libya to protect the border if a “red line” were crossed with respect to the city of Sirte and the Jufra airbase. The UAE and Saudi Arabia support Egypt in this regard. 76 The troops of the GNA and the LNA have ended up in a standoff near the city of Sirte, without any decisive military action since June. On 21 August the GNA called for a cease-fire, but Haftar rejected this. 77
The number of civilian victims has risen sharply According to a report by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, there has been a 65% increase in the number of civilian deaths compared to the first three months of the year. Between 1 April and 30 June, according to the report, there were 106 civilian deaths and 252 injured persons.78
67Info Migrants, Migrants return to dangerous Canary Islands route, dd. 26 August 2020, found on: https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/26861/migrants-return-to-dangerous-canary-islands-route 68 Morocco World News, Irregular Migration Route to Spain Redirects Through Morocco to Canary Islands, dd. 26 August 2020, found on: https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2020/08/316641/irregular-migration-route-to-spain-redirects-through-morocco-to-canary-islands/ 69 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Khalifa Haftar declares himself ruler of Libya, 30-4-2020, https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1499476733&Country=Libya&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=Political+sta bility ; Deutsche Welle, Libya: Khalifa Haftar declares 'popular mandate,' end to 2015 UN agreement, 27-4-2020, https://www.dw.com/en/libya-khalifa-haftar-declares-popular-mandate-end-to-2015-un-agreement/a-53264892 70 Reuters, Tripoli airport shelling hits fuel tanks, passenger plane-ministry, 9-5-2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security- oil-airport/tripoli-airport-shelling-hits-fuel-tanks-passenger-plane-ministry-idUSKBN22L0GT 71 Al Jazeera, Libya: Three killed in Tripoli shelling blamed on Haftar's forces, 8-5-2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/05/libya- killed-tripoli-shelling-blamed-haftar-forces-200508060216549.html 72 Political Geography Now, Libyan Civil War Map & Timeline - May 2020, https://members.polgeonow.com/2020/05/libya-control-map- 2020-haftar-turkey-russia.html 73 Reuters, Eastern forces quit Libyan capital after year-long assault, 4-6-2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security- idUSKBN23B1PN 74 Political Geography Now, Libyan Civil War Map & Timeline – June 2020 https://members.polgeonow.com/2020/06/libyan-war-control- map-lna-pushed-out-of-tripoli.html 75 Al Jazeera, Libya: Haftar's forces 'slow down' GNA advance on Sirte, 11-6-2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/libya-haftar- forces-slow-gna-advance-sirte-200611061626411.html 76 Political Geography Now, Libyan Civil War Map & Timeline – June 2020 https://members.polgeonow.com/2020/06/libyan-war-control- map-lna-pushed-out-of-tripoli.html 77 Al Jazeera, Haftar rejects GNA's call for Libya ceasefire, 23-8-2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/haftar-rejects-gna-call- libya-ceasefire-200823173428282.html 78 UNSMIL, CIVILIAN CASUALTIES REPORT - 1 APRIL- 30 JUNE 2020 , 29-7-2020 https://unsmil.unmissions.org/civilian-casualties-report-1- april-30-june-2020
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
Demonstrations against corruption Since 23 August, in various cities in Libya, people have taken to the streets to demonstrate against corruption and they called for the arrangement of essential services. The also demanded a return to a civilian state where there was no place for a military regime.79
Libya as a transit and reception country On 28 July, Libyan security forces shot three migrants dead and injured two others in al-Khums. 80 According to the UN, on 18 August at least 45 migrants died in front of the coast of Libya when the engine of their vessel exploded.81
On 21 August, 46,823 refugees registered by the UNHCR were located in Libya, In the week of 14 August, the UNHCR registered 193 refugees who mainly came from Sudan, Syria, Eritrea, Somalia, Yemen and Ethiopia. At present at least 2,267 refugees are being detained in prisons in Libya. The UNHCR has access to these prisons in order to monitor the conditions in which the refugees are being detained.82
3.1.2.4 Nigeria In a report by the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, it is stated that in the second quarter of 2020, the Nigerian economy declined by 6.1 per cent, the largest decline in the past decade.83 In 2020, Nigeria is expected to have the worst economic recession since 1983 because of the coronavirus and the low oil price and a resulting devaluation of the local currency.84
The security situation, particularly in the northern federal states, remains alarming. The NGO Nigeria Mourn reported that in July, 415 people in total were murdered as a result of violent attacks. In June and May, respectively 731 and 356 victims were registered.85
3.1.3 Asia – Afghanistan In February 2020, the US and the Taliban, without the Afghan government, concluded an agreement in which it was agreed that, in phases, the US would withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan within fourteen months. The Taliban promised not to allow any activities on Afghan territory that would affect the security of the US. The Afghan government would also release about 5,000 imprisoned Taliban, after which from March 2020, negotiations were to start between the Taliban and the Afghan government in order to reach a peace agreement. Since the beginning of August, all 5,000 imprisoned Taliban have been released.86 The peace talks between the Afghan
79 Libya Observer, Demonstrations continue for the third day in Tripoli, 26-8-2020, https://www.libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/demonstrations- continue-third-day-tripoli 80 Aljazeera, Libyan authorities shot dead three Sudanese migrants: UN, 28-7-2020 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/libyan- authorities-shot-dead-sudanese-migrants-200728132723944.html 81 Al Jazeera, Children among 45 dead in 2020's worst Mediterranean boat tragedy, 19-8-2020 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/children-45-dead-2020-worst-mediterranean-boat-tragedy-200819182944962.html 82 UNHCR, update Libya 21-8-2020 https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Libya%20Update%2021%20August%202020.pdf 83 Premium Times, Nigeria’s economy sees biggest decline in 10 years, 24 August 2020, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/410467-nigerias-economy-sees-biggest-decline-in-10-years.html, consulted on 26 August 2020 84 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Nigeria, 12 August 2020, https://store.eiu.com/product/country-report/nigeria, consulted on 27 August 2020, p. 2 85 Premium Times, Insecurity: 415 people killed across Nigeria in July – Report, https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/410277-insecurity-415-people-killed-across-nigeria-in-july-report.html, consulted on 27 August 2020 86 Al Jazeera, 19 June 2020. US has hit agreed troop-cut target of 8,600 in Afghanistan. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/hit- agreed-troop-cut-target-8600-afghanistan-200618214125668.html; The DefensePost, 11 August 2020. Pentagon Aims for Fewer Than 5,000 Troops in Afghanistan by November. https://www.thedefensepost.com/2020/08/11/us-troops-afghanistan/; NYT, 9 August 2020. Afghanistan to Release Last Taliban Prisoners, Removing Final Hurdle to Talks. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-prisoners-peace-talks.html
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Migration Radar Summary May-August 2020
government and the Taliban started in September.87 Attacks by the Taliban against the Afghan security forces are continuing in the meantime.
The UNAMA reported 3,458 civilian victims (2,176 injured and 1,282 dead) in 2020 as a result of the conflict, a decrease by 13% compared to the same period in 2019.88
According to the UNCHR, in the period from 2 January to 30 July 2020, almost 500 registered Afghan refugees in total returned from abroad, mainly from Iran, a decrease compared to the same period in 2019.89 The IOM reports that in 2020 up to and including August, about 400,000 undocumented Afghans have returned, mainly from Iran and to a lesser extent from Pakistan.90
In June the crossing points Spin Boldak and Torkam on the border with Pakistan were reopened for commercial purposes after being closed temporarily because of the corona crisis. On Saturdays, the border crossing points are open to Afghan and Pakistani pedestrians who want to return to their country,91 if they possess official identity papers.92 According to UNOCHA, in the period from April to August 2020, about 35,000 in the country became displaced. That is considerably fewer than in the preceding period (about 87,000).93
87 NOS, 12 September 2020, https://nos.nl/artikel/2347887-vredesonderhandelingen-tussen-taliban-en-afghaanse-regering-begonnen-in- doha.html 88 UNAMA, July 2020. Afghanistan Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict Midyear Report: 1 January—30 June 2020, pp. 3 and 4. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_midyear_report_2020_-_27_july-revised_10_august.pdf 89 UNHCR, 21 August 2020. Afghanistan: Voluntary Repatriation Response Snapshot (02 January - 31 July 2020). https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/unhcr-afghanistan-voluntary-repatriation-response-snapshot-02-january-31-july 90 IOM, 13 August 2020. Return of undocumented Afghans, Weekly situation report (02-08 August 2020). https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/return-undocumented-afghans-weekly-situation-report-02-08-aug-2020 91 UNHCR, 11 August 2020. Afghanistan: Border Monitoring update - COVID-19 Response (26 July – 08 August 2020). https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-border-monitoring-update-covid-19-response-26-july-08-august-2020 92 IOM, 13 August 2020. Return of undocumented Afghans, Weekly situation report (02-08 August 2020). https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/return-undocumented-afghans-weekly-situation-report-02-08-aug-2020 93 UNOCHA, 23 August 2020. Afghanistan: Conflict induced Displacements (as of 23 August 2020) Actual displacement. https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/idps 20
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4 Policy and other developments In this section national and international policy and other developments in the second triannual period of 2020 are descried that could have influence on the asylum flow to Europe and the Netherlands.
4.1 European and international policy and other developments
4.1.1 Emergency measures relating to Covid-19 Entry bans All non-essential trips of persons from third countries were not allowed until 1 July. On 30 June, the EU Member States reached agreement on a list of countries for which the entry ban could be lifted.94 On 1 July the travel restrictions were lifted for travellers who have their permanent residence in: Australia, Canada, Georgia, Japan, New Zeeland, Rwanda, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia and Uruguay. The ban on entering China will be lifted as soon as China itself also admits EU citizens.95 The lifting also applied to the following countries, but went into force again on 8 July for Serbia and Montenegro,96 5 August for Algeria97 and 13 August for Morocco98 because of a worsened corona situation in those countries.
Delayed return, resettlement and the Pact on Migration and Asylum as a result of COVID-19 The guidelines of the European Commission have led to problems with implementing return and delay in the resettlement of vulnerable refugees, such as unaccompanied minors, to EU Member States. 99 The reforms of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) have incurred delay as well because of COVID-19 and the pressure to make post-Brexit agreements with the United Kingdom. The same holds for the proposal for a new Pact on Migration and Asylum, which has been postponed until after the summer recess.100
Migrants stranded outside territorial waters Owing to the closure of the ports in Malta and Italy, persons who were rescued at sea were not allowed on land, but were held on ships at sea outside the territorial waters.101 On 4 June 2020, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe called for urgent action to allow migrants held on stranded ships to disembark.102 Malta reopened the port on 1 July, but the Maltese government continues to pursue a policy that prohibits NGO vessels from allowing rescued migrants to disembark in Malta.103 The vast majority of the rescued migrants however were allowed to disembark in Italy at the beginning of September. At present, because of the corona
94 Letter to the Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer), 30 June 2020, Partial lifting of the entry ban on 1 July 2020, reference 2960537 95 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/coronavirus-covid-19/nieuws/2020/06/30/nederland-heft-inreisverbod-op-voor-selecte- groep-landen 96 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/coronavirus-covid-19/nieuws/2020/07/08/nederland-stelt-inreisverbod-voor-servie-en- montenegro-weer-in 97 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2020/08/03/het-inreisverbod-voor-nederland-per-5-August-2020 98 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2020/08/12/nederland-stelt-inreisverbod-voor-Morocco-weer-in 99 Letter to the Dutch House of Representatives, 8 May 2020, Letter from the Ministers of Justice and Security and for Legal Protection and the State Secretary for Justice and Security, Session Year 2019-2020, 32 317, no. 618 100 ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 26 June 2020, ‘EU Agenda: Asylum Reform Falls behind Corona and Brexit’, https://us1.campaign- archive.com/?u=8e3ebd297b1510becc6d6d690&id=54f5dd86a6 101 ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 8 May 2020, ‘Med: Hundreds Remain Stranded at Sea as Ports are Still Closed, Solidarity Remains Lacking and Interceptions Continue’, https://mailchi.mp/ecre/ecre-weekly-bulletin-08052020?e=989a4aebdd 102 Council of Europe, 4 June 2020, ‘Immediate action needed to disembark migrants held on ships off Malta’s coast’, https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/news-2020/-/asset_publisher/Arb4fRK3o8Cf/content/ immediate-action-needed-to-disembark-migrants-held-on-ships-off-malta-s coast?inheritRedirect=false &redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.coe.int%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fcommissioner%2Fnews-2020%3Fp_p_id% 3D101_INSTANCE_Arb4fRK3o8Cf%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3D view%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-1%26p_p_col_count%3D1 103 ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 28 August 2020, ‘Med: Series of Deadly Shipwrecks While Civilian Search and Rescue Fleet is Blocked’, https://mailchi.mp/ecre/ecre-weekly-bulletin-28082020?e=989a4aebdd
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measures, Sea Watch 4 is the only rescue vessel that is active on the Mediterranean Sea. They urgently request assistance from search and rescue vessels that are presently blocked by the European Member States.104
No extension of time limits for Dublin Regulations A large number of Member States, including the Netherlands, have argued for the possibility to apply longer time limits for the transfer of persons claiming protection under the Dublin Regulation on the basis of force majeure. The risk was pointed out of an increase in secondary migration flows and the consequences for the continuation of internal border controls. Commissioner Johansson is of the opinion that there is no opportunity in the Dublin Regulation to derogate from the time limits set in the Regulation because of the COVID-19 outbreak. The notion of force majeure will be included in the coming proposals for reform.105
4.1.2 General policy developments New law pertaining to asylum procedures in Hungary On 14 May the EU Court of Justice gave judgment in a case of asylum seekers on the border between Serbia and Hungary.106 The migrant had become stuck in the transit zone. Hungary rejected the applications because the migrants came by way of Serbia and they labelled this country as a safe transit country. Serbia refused to take them back, as they stated that they had no agreement with Hungary on the transfer of people who have entered the EU illegally. The Court of Justice classified the stay of the asylum seekers there as detention, because they were unable to leave the zone legally and voluntarily. The Court of Justice of the European Union declared this detention unlawful.107 In response to this, the Hungarian government closed the transit zone and transferred the migrants to open centres. In addition, a new law was adopted on the asylum procedures.108 Persons present on Hungarian territory or at the border crossing points cannot submit asylum applications in Hungary, but are escorted to the nearest Hungarian embassy outside the country to make a declaration of intent. If this succeeds, the applicants receive authorization to travel to Hungary to submit an asylum application there.109 The legislative proposal will be in force until the end of 2020 and can be extended afterwards.110
Signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Malta and Libya The Maltese Prime Minister went to Tripoli for a migration meeting with the Libyan Prime Minister, the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Interior. The meeting was about intensifying the control of human smuggling networks. Abela's visit came after Malta’s decision to withdraw from Operation Irini and enter into closer ties with Turkey.111 On 3 June, the Maltese Parliament was informed of the fact that during the visit to Tripoli, an agreement was reached between the Malta and the Libyan government on better coordination of SAR operations. The agreement provided for coordination centres in Valletta and Tripoli, where officials of both
104 ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 28 August 2020, ‘Med: Series of Deadly Shipwrecks While Civilian Search and Rescue Fleet is Blocked’, https://mailchi.mp/ecre/ecre-weekly-bulletin-28082020?e=989a4aebdd 105 Letter to the Dutch House of Representatives, 8 May 2020, Letter from the Ministers of Justice and Security and for Legal Protection and the State Secretary for Justice and Security, Session Year 2019-2020, 32 317, no. 618 106 ECHR, ‘Judgment in Joined Cases C-924/19 PPU and C-925/19 PPU, FMS and Others v Országos Idegenrendeszeti Főigazgatóság Dél- alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Idegenrendeszeti Főigazgatóság’, 14 May 2020 https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-05/cp200060en.pdf. 107 ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 22 May 2020, ‘Hungary: Abolishment of Transit Zone Following CJEU Ruling’, https://mailchi.mp/ecre/ecre- weekly-bulletin-22052020#Hungary: Abolishment of Transit Zone Following CJEU Ruling 108 ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 4 September 2020, ‘Hungary: Closing in On Itself’, https://mailchi.mp/ecre/ecre-weekly-bulletin- 04092020?e=989a4aebdd 109 Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 12 August 2020, ‘Hungary De Facto Removes Itself From the Common European Asylum System’, https://www.helsinki.hu/en/hungary-removes-itself-from-ceas/ 110 ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 19 June 2020, ‘Hungary: New Law on the Lodging of Asylum Applications at Embassies’, https://mailchi.mp/ecre/ecre-weekly-bulletin-19062020?e=989a4aebdd#EU Parliament Adopts Proposal on the Reform of the Migration Statistics Regulation 111 Malta Today, ‘Malta vetoes Irini spending after withdrawing from EU naval mission’ https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/europe/102202/malta_withdraw_eu_naval_mission_irini_veto_spending#.XyQmjDgUlRw
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countries will be stationed. The agreement also required Malta to lobby in the EU, so that more funds would be made available to Libya.112
Developments in Greece On 8 May 2020, the Parliament adopted the bill ‘Improvement of Asylum Legislation’, which was supposed to expedite the asylum procedure and by doing so unburden the islands more quickly. Priority will be given to appeal proceedings of asylum seekers on the islands. A legal framework will also be created for ‘secured centres’ that will replace the hot spots.113 From May asylum seekers came in again by boat114 and via the land border with Turkey.115 From June the country started the phased compulsory departure of asylum seekers from hot spots, reception centres and apartments116 and from July also from hotels where migrants were staying. The government stated as well that it will also close the other facilities before the end of 2020.117 In June a special office was set up for the issue of travel documents to recognised refugees. Approximately 200-250 travel documents are issued per day with which refugees can travel on to other Member States to stay there for 3 months at most.118
At the end of July the Greek authorities decided to close the COVID-19 centre of Doctors without Borders on the island, because there was allegedly no permit to build it. According to Doctors Without Borders, this considerably reduces the response capacity on the island.119
The lockdown of all reception of asylum seekers will be extended until 15 September.120 The Greek authorities declared further that they wanted to extend the barbwire fence on the Turkish border from 12.5 to 40 kilometres.121
In the beginning of September, Camp Moria was largely destroyed by a fire, that was presumably set by migrants. As a result of the fire, about 12,000 people lost their shelter. A temporary emergency camp was built on Lesbos, but many migrants did not want to go there because they feared that their chance of asylum would be reduced if they were locked in there.122 All migrants who arrive at the new camp are tested for corona. On 17 September a total of 135 migrants tested positive.123 Ten European countries have promised to accommodate 400 unaccompanied minors. Germany will accommodate 1,500. The Netherlands decided last week to receive 100 vulnerable migrants.124 It is possible that intentional arson will be repeated at other locations. Shortly after the arson on Lesbos, fire was also set in a refugee camp in Samos.125
Developments in Denmark The Danish Minister of Immigration and Integration, Tesfaye, wants to have the temporary protection status of about 900 persons from the Province of Damascus reviewed by the Danish Aliens Directorate to assess whether or not the residence permits can be revoked. In May and June
112 ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 29 May 2020, ‘Med: Continued Violations Topped with Dodgy Deals’, https://mailchi.mp/ecre/ecre-weekly- bulletin-29052020#Med: Continued Violations Topped with Dodgy Deals 113 https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece/asylum-procedure/general/short-overview-asylum-procedure#_ftnref9 114 Press Review Greece, 7 May 2020, ‘Migration: First arrival on the islands since a month and a half ago’ 115 Migration Bulletin (Migratiebulletin), 11 June 2020, ‘Greece: more migrants attempt to cross the national border’ 116 Migration Bulletin, 5 June 2020, ‘Greece: mandatory departure of asylum seekers from reception centre causes concern’ 117 The National Herald, 9 September 2020, ‘Greece Closing Eight Hotels Holding Migrants, Will Later Shut Rest’, https://www.thenationalherald.com/archive_general_news_greece/arthro/greece_closing_eight_hotels_holding_migrants_will_later_shu t_rest-726161/ 118 Press Review Greece, 18 June 2020, ‘Migration Ministry issues ‘‘200 travel documents a day ’’ to refugees 119 Migration Bulletin, 3 September 2020, ‘Greece’ 120 ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 4 September 2020, ‘Greece: 10.000 People Prevented Access, Lockdown Extended’, Recognition Rate Increases, https://mailchi.mp/ecre/ecre-weekly-bulletin-04092020?e=989a4aebdd 121 ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 28 August 2020, ‘Greece: Border Fence Extension, Denial of Push-backs, Anti-migrant Violence, Continued Destitution, Drop in Protection rate’, https://mailchi.mp/ecre/ecre-weekly-bulletin-28082020?e=989a4aebdd 122 NOS, 15 August 2020, https://nos.nl/artikel/2348385-aanhoudingen-voor-brandstichting-kamp-moria-op-lesbos.html 123 De Volkskrant, 17 August 2020, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/operatie-lesbos-agenten-in-witte-pakken-begeleiden- vluchtelingen-met-zachte-hand-naar-nieuw-kamp~b3233431/ 124 NOS, 16 August, 2020, https://nos.nl/artikel/2348500-migranten-lesbos-wilden-na-brand-in-moria-weg-maar-die-kans-lijkt-klein.html 125 NOS, 16 September 2020, https://nos.nl/artikel/2348511-arrestaties-voor-brand-bij-migrantenkamp-op-samos.html
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2020 the aliens court gave five decisions on Syrians from Damascus who no longer receive protection in Denmark and must leave the country.126
Developments in Italy President Musumeci of Sicily has issued an ordinance to prohibit the entry, transit and stay of all irregular migrants on Sicily. Under the ordinance, all disembarked migrants who are staying in hot spots and reception centres at present must be transferred to other locations.127 The number of migrants arriving at Lampedusa has risen. On 29 and 30 August more than 900 people arrived. There are now 1,160 migrants present on the island, six times more than the maximum capacity. The authorities on the island are requesting Italy to assist them with this.128
4.2 Policy and other developments in the Netherlands
4.2.1 Emergency measures relating to Covid-19 Procedure for asylum applications and Covid-19 For the most part, the border procedure for asylum seekers will remain the same, notwithstanding the corona measures. Travellers from an orange or red area will be urgently advised to go into voluntary quarantine. This applies only to persons who had been in such an area in the last ten days. If a person states that he/she wants to apply for asylum, the person will be checked for corona symptoms. Afterwards, the person can be registered and travel to a location of the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA).129 If symptoms arise during the stay, they will be tested. In anticipation of the results, they and their immediate co-residents had to be placed in quarantine.
Resumption of Dublin transfers In view of the revocation of travel restrictions, which were introduced as a result of COVID-19, from 1 July, the Netherlands has started transferring asylum seekers again to the responsible European country according to the Dublin Regulation. Account is taken in this context of whether it is possible to transfer someone to a country in view of the corona situation in that country.130
4.2.2 General policy developments Eliminating the backlog of files In the period from 1 April to 1 September 2020, approximately 4,000 cases were dealt with by the Special Task force.131 The aim is that the Task Force will have eliminated about 15,000 overdue files by the end of 2020 at the latest. Within the frameworks of carefulness, national security and the restrictions entailed by COVID-19, everything is aimed at implementing this approach. There is a risk that some of the complex cases will take more time.132
Partnership with Greece for reception and guardianship formally sealed On 18 June 2020, the Netherlands and Greece signed and formally recorded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the purpose of structurally improving the guardianship system and reception of unaccompanied minors in Greece.133 In the context of the partnership, on 13 and 14 July 2020 a delegation travelled to Greece. During this visit, further agreements were made on the
126 Migration Bulletin, 2 July 2020, ‘Denmark: revision of temporary protection status of Syrians from Damascus’ 127 Migration Bulletin, 27 August 2020, ‘Italy’ 128 ECRE Weekly Bulletin, 4 September, ‘353 People Disembarked in Italy, 27 Remain Stranded off Malta, Increase of Arrivals in Lampedusa ’, https://mailchi.mp/ecre/ecre-weekly-bulletin-04092020?e=989a4aebdd 129 https://ind.nl/Paginas/Coronavirus.aspx 130 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2020/07/01/nederland-hervat-geleidelijk-dublinoverdrachten 131 Letter to the Dutch House of Representatives, 7 September 2020, Progress of the Task Force for eliminating the backlogs of the IND, reference 3018434 132 Idem and Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), ‘First thousand backlogged IND files eliminated’, https://ind.nl/nieuws/paginas/eerste-duizend-dossiers-achterstand-ind-weggewerkt.aspx 133 Letter to the Dutch House of Representatives 18 June 2020, Signing of the MoU with Greece, reference 2947725.
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activities pertaining to improvement of the Greek guardianship system, and an initial proposal was discussed for setting up an intended 48 reception places in three locations that will be funded by the Netherlands.134 The first location is expected to be opened at the end of September. The Greek authorities will remain responsible for transfer to the locations and for the guardianship of the UAMs.135 Because of the fire in Camp Moria, 400 UAMs have already been transferred to the mainland and the use of the reception places will be fast-tracked.
Revision of the country policy for Syria, Guinea and Libya By way of several letters to parliament, the Dutch House of Representatives was informed on 30 June 2020 of the conclusions regarding the revision of the country policy for Syria, Guinea and Libya. The conclusion regarding Syria, further to the reports on the security situation in the country, was that the entire security situation and violations of human rights committed by the Syrian regime and other parties as well, are fully alarming. Consequently, there is no reason either to modify the protection policy for asylum seekers from Syria. This means that in assessing an application for a permanent or temporary asylum residence permit, the general starting point is that on returning, he/she will run a realistic risk of serious harm.136
The conclusion regarding Guinea, further to the reports on the security situation in the country, was that minors and women who fear sexual and other acts of violence and/or genital mutilation are considered a high-risk group and there is no domestic alternative protection, unless it is evident from the individual file that the third-country national can settle elsewhere. Lastly, it was concluded that there are adequate reception facilities in Guinea for UAMs. This policy change makes it possible for the Repatriation and Departure Service (DT&V), if return to family proves not to be possible, to see whether reception in la Maison du Bonheur is indeed possible.137
The conclusion regarding Libya, further to reports on the security situation in the country, was that the official report gave reason to change the current policy with respect to asylum seekers coming from Libya. In the current policy, protection is provided to certain high-risk groups. The new country policy adds a number of high-risk groups: (alleged) opponents of the actual ruler, including armed groups and militias; human rights advocates; women who are socially or politically active; Gaddafi loyalists who had their normal residence in GNA controlled territory prior to their arrival in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, according to the State Secretary, there is no 15-c situation in Libya.138
Country policy for Venezuela further to the official report On 11 June 2020, the Ministry of Foreign affairs issued an official report on Venezuela. This report gave reason to determine a country-related asylum policy for Venezuela. Despite the unsafe and repressive situation that the report outlines, the State Secretary for Justice and Security concluded that no 15-c situation exists in Venezuela. The official report gives further reason to indicate the following groups as high-risk groups. First of all, these are persons who express significant criticism of the Venezuelan authorities, such as opposition leaders, political activities, dissidents (including military personnel) or persons who are active in journalism or in the field of human rights and who express significant criticism of the authorities. The high-risk group does not apply to demonstrators or persons who only make critical statements. Transgenders are also faced with discrimination and violent incidents, owing to which they are also considered a high-risk group.139
Court decision on asylum for Palestinians from Gaza
134 Letter from the State Secretary for Justice and Security, 7 May 2020, Session Year 2019-2020, 27062, no. 111 135 Letter to the Dutch House of Representatives 2 September 2020, Partnership of the Netherlands and Greece, reference 3003687 136 Letter to the Dutch House of Representatives 30 June 2020, Country Policy Syria, reference 2914405 137 Letter to the Dutch House of Representatives 30 June 2020, Country Policy Guinea, reference 2916511 138 Letter to the Dutch House of Representatives 30 June 2020, Country Policy Libya, reference 2915885 139 Letter to the Dutch House of Representatives, 25 August 2020, Country Policy Venezuela, reference 294219
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The Amsterdam District Court ruled on 24 August 2020 that there is a humanitarian emergency situation in Gaza. The UNRWA is unable to provide for living conditions. The entire situation in Gaza was assessed as so bad that persons are forced to leave and that return cannot reasonably be expected, according to the District Court.140 The State Secretary for Justice and Security will appeal against the judgment.141
140 Amsterdam District Court, 24 August 2020, case number NL20.6600 141 https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/rechter-palestijnen-uit-gaza-hebben-recht-op-asiel~b5a4bdac/
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