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La Mobilisation De La Violence À Des Fins Politiques: La Crise Zimbabwéenne Au Regard Du Droit International Des Droits Humains (2008-2013)

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La Mobilisation De La Violence À Des Fins Politiques: La Crise Zimbabwéenne Au Regard Du Droit International Des Droits Humains (2008-2013) La mobilisation de la violence à des fins politiques: la crise zimbabwéenne au regard du droit international des droits humains (2008-2013) Mémoire Olivier Mercier Maîtrise en études internationales - avec mémoire Maître ès arts (M.A.) Québec, Canada © Olivier Mercier, 2018 La mobilisation de la violence à des fins politiques : la crise zimbabwéenne au regard du droit international des droits humains (2008-2013) Mémoire Olivier Mercier Sous la direction de : Mme Marie Brossier, directrice de recherche Mme Julia Grignon, codirectrice RÉSUMÉ Au pouvoir de 1980 à 2017, le président zimbabwéen Robert Mugabe a non seulement repoussé les limites de la longévité politique, mais le régime politique qu’il a présidé pendant près de 38 ans a également su défié certaines idées reçues en maintenant une légitimité certaine sur le plan international en dépit de violations massives et bien documentées des droits humains lui étant attribuées. En effet, malgré un bilan catastrophique sur le plan du droit international des droits humains, le régime Mugabe a su, dès les années 2000, se positionner en rempart contre l’impérialisme sur le continent africain en se dotant d’une légitimité idéologique renouvelée. Cette légitimité idéologique renouvelée a su être habilement utilisée contre ses opposants politiques, accusés d’être à la solde de forces impérialistes extérieures afin de banaliser, voire de justifier, les violations des droits humains commises à leur encontre, en particulier des droits civils et politiques, taxés de « non-africains ». En plaçant au centre de son objet d’étude la mobilisation de la violence à des fins politiques à grande échelle lors de l’année électorale de 2008 et lors des quatre années subséquentes au Zimbabwe, ce mémoire s’intéresse au paradoxe de la légitmité certaine ayant permis au régime Mugabe de demeurer en place en dépit de violations massives très bien documentées des droits humains protégés par le droit international. Si l’ampleur des violences a été à l’origine de la mise en place d’un gouvernement d’unité nationale avec l’opposition, le résultat a plutôt bénéficié au régime Mugabe en lui permettant de demeurer au pouvoir sans trop le partager. En effet, les critiques lui étant adressées à propos de son traitement des droits civils et politiques ont accrédité son message de victime d’acharnement impérialiste auprès de certains acteurs régionaux, affaiblissant du même coup le rapport de force de l’opposition. iii ABSTRACT In power from 1980 to 2017, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe not only personally pushed the limits of political longevity, but the political regime he presided over for nearly 38 years also defied preconceived ideas about political survival by maintaining a certain level of international legitimacy, despite massive and well-documented human rights violations. Indeed, despite a catastrophic human rights record from the perspective of international human rights law, since the 2000s, the Mugabe regime was able to position itself as a bulwark against imperialism and neo-colonialism on the African continent with renewed ideological legitimacy. This renewed ideological legitimacy has been skilfully used against political opponents who were accused of serving external imperialist forces, in order to trivialize or even justify the human rights abuses committed against them; in particular abuses of civil and political rights, presented as being "non-African". By focusing on the large-scale mobilization of violence for political purposes in the 2008 election year and in the four subsequent years in Zimbabwe, this master's thesis focuses on the paradox of the legitimacy that allowed the Mugabe regime to remain in place despite massive and well-documented violations of human rights that are protected by international law. While the scale of the violence was at the origin of the establishment of a government of national unity with the opposition, the result benefited the Mugabe regime by allowing it to govern without genuinely sharing power. Indeed, criticism of his treatment of civil and political rights has accredited his stature as a victim of imperialist vilification to certain regional actors, thereby weakening the opposition's balance of power within the power- sharing deal. iv TABLE DES MATIÈRES RÉSUMÉ............................................................................................................................................ iii ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................................... iv TABLE DES FIGURES .................................................................................................................... vii LISTE DES ABRÉVIATIONS ........................................................................................................ viii REMERCIEMENTS ........................................................................................................................... x 1. INTRODUCTION ET MÉTHODOLOGIE .................................................................................... 1 1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 Méthodologie ............................................................................................................................ 5 2. MISE EN CONTEXTE ET CARACTÉRISATION DE LA VIOLENCE (CHAPITRE 1) ......... 11 2.1 Mise en contexte de la violence politique et de la crise au Zimbabwe ................................... 11 2.1.1 Facteurs internes et externes menant au référendum de février 2000 .............................. 12 2.1.2 L’alliance du pouvoir avec les vétérans de guerre ........................................................... 16 2.1.3 Récurrence et institutionnalisation de la violence depuis 2000 ........................................ 21 2.2 Catégorisation de la situation au Zimbabwe ........................................................................... 24 2.2.1 Qualification de la situation au Zimbabwe en droit ......................................................... 24 2.2.2 Catégorisation en science politique de la situation au Zimbabwe .................................... 27 2.3 Les interprétations concurrentes de la crise zimbabwéenne de Freeman ................................ 32 2.3.1 La première interprétation – la « poursuite du projet révolutionnaire » − et l’idéologie du régime Mugabe .......................................................................................................................... 32 2.3.2 La seconde interprétation − la réaction autoritaire du régime .......................................... 35 2.3.3 Les droits humains et le paradoxe de la légitimation du régime ...................................... 36 3. LA CAMPAGNE ÉLECTORALE ET LA CRISE POLITIQUE DE 2008 (CHAPITRE 2) ........ 47 3.1 Portrait des élections de 2008 .................................................................................................. 47 3.1.1 Les candidats .................................................................................................................... 50 3.1.2 Les résultats des élections « harmonisées » du 29 mars 2008 .......................................... 54 3.2 Facteurs explicatifs de la violence .......................................................................................... 60 3.2.1 Facteurs partisans ...................................................................................................... 60 3.2.2 Facteurs institutionnels .............................................................................................. 67 4. LA VIOLENCE POLITIQUE ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS HUMAINS (CHAPITRE 3) .................................................................................................................................. 76 4.1 La violence comme instrument politique et partisan ............................................................... 76 v 4.2 La violence politique au Zimbabwe en droit international des droits humains ....................... 83 4.2.1 Atteintes au droit à la vie .................................................................................................. 83 4.2.2 Atteintes au droit à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne .......................................... 100 4.2.3 Atteintes à la prohibition de la torture et des peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants ............................................................................................................................... 114 5. LA SIGNATURE DU GLOBAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT (GPA) ET LE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (GNU), 2008-2013 (CHAPITRE 4) ....................................................... 133 5.1 Le GPA : Les pressions internationales, Robert Mugabe et Morgan Tsvangirai .................. 133 5.1.1 Les réactions internationales à la « victoire » de Robert Mugabe ................................. 133 5.1.2 L’influence des pressions extérieures sur le contenu du Global Political Agreement ... 146 5.2 Le Government of National Unity et la mobilisation de la violence ..................................... 155 5.2.1 Structures de pouvoir du GNU et capacité limitée de Tsvangirai à limiter les violences ................................................................................................................................................. 155 5.2.2 Dynamiques du pouvoir au sein du gouvernement d’unité nationale (GNU)
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