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Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 1 Introduction One of the greatest challenges facing independent post-crisis societies in Africa is that of structuring sustainable systems of political and economic governance. Many political science and international relations scholars concur that military intervention in countries experiencing economic or political crisis is common. The post-colonial political path in Africa, as noted by David Zounmenou; shows complex relations between the army and ruling civilian elites.1As such, there have been considerable military interventions in politics in some African countries. Independence in Africa was greeted with optimism and exultation. The first generation of nationalist leaders like Kwame Nkrumah, Kamuzu Banda, Mobutu Sese Seko, Modibo Keita, Gamal Abdel Nasser and many others promised their people a new beginning. The citizens of these newly independent African states looked forward to enjoying the freedoms that colonial governments had denied them, however, such enthusiasm was quickly frustrated as the new leaders became despotic and personalised the national purse to benefit the ruling clique and their cohorts. Carlson Anyangwe writes that such behaviour by politicians put into motion systemic corruption that had culminated in military coups remaining an option in Sub-Saharan Africa 2(SSA). 1 For more information on this see Francis N. Ikome’s paper; “Good and Bad Coups,” Institute of Global Dialogue (2007): 1-60. 2 Carlson Anyangwe, “Revolutionary Overthrow of Constitutional Orders in Africa” (Professorial inaugural lecture, Walter Sisulu University, South Africa, 31 August, 2010). 1 It is a paradox but the legitimacy of civilian governments (CG) especially in Africa is arguably no longer being determined by the electorate but has become a prerogative of the military. While militaries in some African countries have left barracks to dislodge incumbent incompetent and corrupt governments, some have openly supported sitting presidents. What is worries me is that the military which has guns obey civilian politicians who do not have guns when such politicians are regarded by many as a liability and hold the whole nation at ransom? It is in this context that Robin Luckham argues that the African state has become a major source of insecurity.3 One disturbing phenomenon that has developed is that some militaries in SSA are no longer confined to their barracks and intrusion in politics has become a central if not a permanent feature. Plausibly this is because political and economic decadence have manifested in crises that have led to militarisation of politics and subsequent politicisation of the military or vice versa. Literature on civil-military relations, depict that some militaries in Africa have entered into marriages of convenience or have become ‘conjoint twins that have a single heart’ with politicians in their respective countries. In doing this, the military have abrogated their constitutional mandate of being apolitical. Military intervention in politics has resulted in the formation of dynamic interdependent ‘strategic interactions’ that international relations and military theorists have become very sceptical of. These interactions are beneficial to actors but detrimental to the growth and sustenance of democracy. It has been a long-held belief among ‘traditional military scholars’ that the military rarely entangle themselves in politics because their duty is to defend their country against external threats as well as 3 Robin Luckham, “The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues,” African Studies Review 37, no. 2 (1994): 23. 2 protecting its citizens. While military interpolations and interventions during crises or outright coups in Africa have happened in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Zaire now the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and other countries; some militaries and politicians have strategically positioned themselves and cooperate with civilian politicians. It is perplexing that politicians have not allowed Zimbabweans to enjoy stable civil- military relations from the time it gained independence; a disturbing phenomenon in the Zimbabwean civil-military relations that has permitted the uncalled-for military interference in politics. Zimbabwe has therefore not been accorded the much-needed space that would have allowed democracy to grow and has thus “not been insulated from the negative effects of national competitive politics.”4 From the beginning of the 21stcentury, Zimbabwe was gripped by an eco-political crisis that has resulted in the military being very visible in the domestic political arena. Questions abound why the Zimbabwe army generals have openly disregarded the country’s constitution and have become unprofessional by intervening in politics. The Zimbabwean experience shows the development of a phenomenon that has been existent since independence and has continued to determine civil-military interactions. This may be because “Zimbabwe has never enjoyed the classic Clausewitzian separation of military and state.”5It is beyond dispute that the military leaders and some military rank 4Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “A perspective on ethnic, regional and ideological dimensions of the composition of the Zimbabwean military and their implications,” Zimbabwe’s Military: Examining its Veto Power in the Transition to Democracy, 2008-2013, ed. Martin R. (Pretoria: The African Public Policy and Research Institute, 2013), 40. 5 Paul Moorcraft, Mugabe’s War Machine (Johannesburg & Cape Town: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2012), 157. 3 and file soldiers in Zimbabwe have continued to exude a domineering presence be it when in the barracks or outside. They like their counterparts in the security sector (the Central Intelligence Organisation and Police) are omnipresent especially during or when an election is looming. According to Samuel Decalo “the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social organizational character of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of society.”6This -applied to the Zimbabwean case shows that something has gone wrong politically, thus, “the Zimbabwe of today is much like the Zimbabwe of 1979-1980 where the security-sector ‘holds’ the key to transformation,”7whereby the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), a military composed of educated military personnel is openly supportive of the ZANU-PF ruling political party. The thesis explores why an outright military coup has not occurred despite severe political and economic crisis that gripped Zimbabwe. To provide an answer to this question I analyse the underlying forces surrounding interactions between key relationships: (i) the Zimbabwean civilian government (CG) and the military leaders or military elites (MLs/MEs8) and (ii) the MEs and the military rank and file (MR&F). In chapter Five I unravel the interactions between the politicians and the political party rank and file (PPR&F). By investigating these relationships, the research seeks to improve on the understanding of the interactions between the above set of relations. The interactions 6 Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints (London: Yale University Press, 1990), 3. 7 Takawira Musavengana, “Security sector: No transition without transformation,” Academic article, [email protected]: 37. 8 I refer to Military elites as top military personnel who are still in the army or those who are now leading government parastatals or institutions having retired from the military. 4 involve four key actors ;(i) the Zimbabwean civilian government (ii) the military leaders (iii) the military rank and file and (iv); later on in the thesis, the political party rank and file. Below is the background to the study. Background When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, it was greatly admired and seen by many African leaders as a beacon of hope on the African continent. It had a strong flourishing economy that Julius Nyerere the then Tanzanian President called it the “jewel of the African continent.”9 The new Zimbabwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe became an icon especially when he called for reconciliation and an end to all past enmity between Blacks and Whites. In his inauguration speech Mugabe had said: If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself.... We must draw a line through the past to achieve reconciliation.... Oppression and racism must never find scope in our social and political system...An evil remains an evil whether practised by White against Black or Black against White10. Mugabe took advantage of the Cold War politics to have a bite at the international aid cherry and told the Black and the White communities that “we are the darling of the world.....honeymoon don’t last long, we ought to take advantage of it.”11 9 Martin Meredith, Robert Mugabe: Power, Plunder and Tyranny in Zimbabwe (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2002), 15-17 10 Ibid, 15. 11 Martin Meredith, Power, Plunder, Op. Cit., 15-17. 5 However from 2000 the Zimbabwean situation changed. Zimbabwe was ravaged by a serious economic crisis. The crisis was set in motion by war veterans’ gratuities in 1997, Zimbabwe’s costly intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998 and the Fast Track Land Reform. The situation was further worsened by economic sanctions and Donor fatigue. Donor countries refused to continue to give money to the Harare government.
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