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DOI: 10.15201/hungeobull.68.1.4Dobysh, M. HungarianHungarian Geographical Geographical Bulletin Bulletin 68 (2019) 68 2019(1) 51–64. (1) 51–64.51

Euromaidan and conflict in Eastern in social networking sites: Territorial differences of pro-Russian subscriptions in Ukraine

Mykola DOBYSH1

Abstract

Securitization of cyberspace is of great geopolitical concern. Behaviour on the Internet is not diminishing the influence of existing borders but can polarize society along territorial divisions. The paper explores territo- rial differences in the subscription to public pages and open groups in social networking sites (SNS), which emerged as a reaction to events in Ukraine (known as or of Dignity) in 2013–2014 and -backed armed conflict in the East of the country. The findings show differences in subscription to such pages in Vkontakte (the most popular SNS in Ukraine before a ban in 2017) among citizens of Ukraine and Russia, regional centres in Ukraine, cities in uncontrolled by Ukrainian government territories, reclaimed by Ukrainian army territories, territories of Lugansk and regions which were not under substantial control of Russia-backed separatists, and peripherial cities of the neighbouring , Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhya oblasts. The paper also analyzes the geopolitical narratives of pro-Russian public pages in Vkontakte and shows how SNS could be used as a geopolitical tool.

Keywords: securitization of cyberspace, Euromaidan, conflict in , social networking sites

Introduction Maidan in during the Revolution and later Russia-backed armed conflict in Don- Social networking sites (SNS) are new battle- bas, were producing not only news reports. fields of different political beliefs and prefer- They started to propose a broader vision of ences, geopolitical narratives and imagina- the conflict, geopolitical narratives about en- tions, attitudes towards conflicts and politi- emies and friends (the US and NATO, Eu- cal and social contradictions. In Ukraine, the ropean Union, Russia), new division lines revolutionary events of 2013–2014 (known as between “Us” and “Them”, legitimating Euromaidan or Revolution of Dignity) and and delegitimating narratives about political armed conflict in resulted in many centres (Kyiv and Moscow) and relations to new public pages and groups in Vkontakte, them, and geopolitical picture of the world. , Odnoklasniki, and Twitter. Despite Moreover, Russian Federation involvement the opportunity to get a variety of informa- in the conflict was also supported by active tion sources and directly communicate with information campaigns in SNS discrediting opposing side of the conflict, which might Ukraine as an independent state, de-legiti- have mediation and democratization effects, mating new Ukrainian government, and the practices of using SNS resulted in polar- promoting separatist movements within the ization of the society and formation of more country. It resulted in a ban of Russian SNS profound cleavages. Public pages and open (Vkontakte and Odnoklasniki) in Ukraine as groups, which were covering events on the well as many other Russian websites in 2017.

1 Department of Geography, National University of Kyiv, Glushkova Avenue 2A, Kyiv, Ukraine. E-mail: [email protected] 52 Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.

The use of SNS as a geopolitical tool of- impose control over the information space ten results in polarization of the society and of the country. The paper argues for the ex- raises a question about securitization of cy- amination of these “emergent arenas of se- berspace. Such polarization has its territo- curitization” (Bernazzoli, R.M. and Flint, rial dimension. The intensity of the conflict C. 2009). Moreover, SNS are increasing their in Ukraine strengthened not a nation-wide role in “popular production of geopolitical network of connections in SNS but regional knowledge” (Pinkerton, A. and Benwell, M. (Duvanova, D. et al. 2016). The paper focuses 2014), which should be reflected in political on the manifestation of Ukrainian Revolution geography studies. of 2014 and armed conflict in Donbass in SNS On the one hand, SNS open access for the and aims to reveal territorial differences in broader population to the same sources of the spreading of Russian geopolitical narra- geopolitical narratives (passing existing ter- tives and pro-Russian position in the conflict ritorial borders) and contribute to bottom-up as well as differences between social net- participation in their shaping. On the other works in the representation of the events. hand, geopolitical actors receive a power- In the first part, it shows the current state of ful instrument to spread their geopolitical research on political behaviour in SNS. The imaginations and frame social and political second part presents the methodology and issues in their interest. In such a case, politi- data of the study. The third and fourth parts cal beliefs and geopolitical imaginations of analyze territorial differences of choosing in- particular places can be shaped by the poli- formation sources in SNS in Ukraine, and the tics of interested geopolitical actors – still, the fifth part is dedicated to the content analy- question what territories are more vulnerable sis of geopolitical narratives by pro-Russian to such influences and whyremains open. public pages in Vkontakte. Current research on political issues in SNS is focused on active use of them in electoral campaigns in different countries of the world Political behaviour in social networking sites (Kasmani, M.F. et al. 2014; Kruikemeier, S. 2014; Steenkamp, M. and Hyde-Clarke, N. The use of the Internet brings new challenges 2014; Frame, A. and Brachotte, G. 2015), to political geography research. Friedman, political mobilization of population for the Th.L. (2005) states that in such conditions action and participation in politics (Nam, space is concerning place, which could be T. 2012; Park, Ch.S. 2013), and correlation understood as making places obsolete and between online membership and offline en- erasing territorial differences in political and gagement (Conroy, M. et al. 2012). However, social phenomena. However, Goldenberg, it is essential that not only SNS change po- J. and Levy, M. (2009) empirical study sug- litical behaviour but also places shape peo- gests that new technologies are not under- ple’s behaviour on the Internet and the use mining the uniqueness of places and influ- of social networking sites (Wang, D.M. et al. ence of distance but even could emphasize 2016). For instance, existing empirical stud- them. Moreover, seemingly uncontrolled ies reveal that Twitter networks are depend- communications on the Internet are of geo- ent on the geographical distance between political concern (Pinkerton, A. et al. 2011). users (Takhteyev, Yu. et al. 2012) and SNS One of the cases of this absence of control is users cluster themselves in politically homo- the inability of nation-states to control the geneous networks (Borondo, J. et al. 2014). flow of information within their borders Jackson, L. and Valentine, G. (2014) assume (especially in conflict situations). However, that such computer-mediated communica- the ban of Russian websites and Vkontakte tion is a new way of doing politics through and Odnoklasniki SNS in Ukraine in 2017 is its absence and presence at the same time. an example of how state government could Therefore, SNS are a new political and geo- Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64. 53

political instrument of influence, and, at the in political preferences and voting behaviour same time, their use is framed by the existing in Ukraine (Liber, G.O. 1998; Birch, S. 2000; territorial differences. O’Loughlin, J. 2001; Barrington, L.W. and We suggest that SNS not only work as reg- Herron, E.S. 2004; Clem, R.S. and Craumer, istration of reality but also produce it and are P.R. 2008; Osipian, Ar.L. and Osipian, Al.L. a form of symbolical violence as Bourdieu, P. 2012; Peisakhin, L. 2013; O’Loughlin, J. (1998) stated about television. Lippmann, W. et al. 2016), but also external involvement and (2017) suggests that social media influence mobilization of the population of Ukraine to on public opinion has two crucial aspects: (1) reach geopolitical goals. Therefore, the paper filtration of reality, and (2) focus of attention is mainly focused on Russian SNS, subscrip- on prepared facts, which are understood as tion to pro-Russian public pages, and geopo- worked out by political actors, media, opin- litical narratives produced by them to exam- ion leaders and other subjects engaged in ine territorial differences of the consumption and interested to influence public opinion. In of that content. case of public pages and open groups in SNS that emerged as a reaction to revolutionary events in Ukraine in 2013–2014, they were Data and methodology not only focused on prepared facts but also produced and manipulated infor- Data was collected using publicly available mation for the sake of one side of the conflict. information in Vkontakte, Facebook, Od- Consequently, SNS did not bridge political noklasniki, and Twitter SNS. Using search divides in Ukrainian society but polarize option for these SNS we found the number them further during the conflict (Duvanova, of public pages and groups, which have used D. et al. 2015). such words as “Euromaidan”, “Antimaidan”, Social media and social networking sites “Ukrainian Revolution”, “”, also became part of soft power and public and “ATO” (Anti-terrorist operation) in democracy strategies by geopolitical pow- their names, which shows their dedication ers (Simons, G. 2015). As a seemingly uncon- to the revolution in Ukraine in 2013–2014 trolled channel of information, SNS became and armed conflict in Donbass.A number of essential tools in the formation of alternative subscribers/members was also received from geopolitical narratives of conflicts, geograph- publicly available information in search en- ical imaginations about particular places and gines. Vkontakte was chosen as a case study regions and their relations to political cen- for territorial differences in choosing informa- tres, a geopolitical picture of the world and tion sources because it was the most popular relations between countries. Social media SNS among in 2015 (11.8 million operations are an essential part of Russian of individual user profiles in 2015 according propaganda in Eastern Europe (Helmus, T.C. to Gemius) and most politicized and polar- et al. 2018). Russia was using social network- ized according to our preliminary study. ing sites in Ukraine to frame its geopoliti- Vkontakte has a built-in instrument of cal messages (Gaufman, E. 2015). Historical filters, which gives the opportunity to filter myths, regional identity, and images of subscribers of chosen public page or group the enemy were exploited by the Russian by location, age, education, gender, image Federation in spring 2014 in the Donbas re- status, and other parameters filled in per- gion to escalate conflict Osipian( , Al.L. 2015). sonal account settings. Some of the param- Therefore, territorial differences of the use eters are filled in the process of registration of SNS in Ukraine during 2013–2014 revo- (hometown, age, and gender); therefore, all lutionary events and later during the armed profiles have that information. It isimportant conflict in Donbas are not only caused by in- that location in Vkontakte is not presented ternal factors and known regional differences as the user’s current place of living but as a 54 Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.

hometown, which is a matter of choice by the in Donbass. Due to personal security settings, user itself. Vkontakte has security settings, not all information was publicly accessible. where the user can make information una- Subscription to public page information was vailable for the public. However, hometown available for all the profiles, while informa- and gender are open for filter instrument.For tion about membership in groups and posts the purposes of this paper, information about and repost was limited only to those profiles, the number of subscribers to top-5 ideologi- which did not make that information private. cally opposite public pages and groups was Our study revealed that in 30.4 per cent of collected for Ukraine and Russia in general, cases (134 out of 450) people make the list administrative centres of Ukrainian oblasts of the groups they are members unavailable (regions), and for the case study cities in the for the public. conflict territories andneighbouring regions The third part of the research was based on in Eastern Ukraine. the data from two of the five most popular Vkontakte search instrument also allows Antimaidan, pro-Russian, and pro-separatist filtering profiles by hometown. This feature public pages and groups: “Antimaidan” and was used for the second part of the study, “Russkie online – Novorossiya”. The first one which focuses on the conflict territories and appeared as opposition to the revolutionary neighbouring regions in Eastern Ukraine. events in Ukraine in 2013–2014 and the second For the research purposes we identified four one as a promotion and support for the sepa- different areas in the Eastern Ukraine: (1) ratist movement in South-Eastern Ukraine. uncontrolled by Ukrainian government, (2) 1053 news posts from “Antimaidan” and 756 reclaimed by military actions after occupa- posts from “Russkie online – Novorossiya” tion, (3) territories of Donetsk and Lugansk were chosen for the content analysis. These oblasts, which were not under substantial posts include all, which were made on control of Russia-backed separatists, (4) pe- these pages in Vkontakte from March 10 to riphery of the conflict zone in the neighbour- March 25, 2015, following a military escala- ing regions. For each of these areas we chose tion in January, Second Minsk Agreements two (in case of neighbouring regions three be- in February, and the start of the positional cause three oblasts are neighbouring Donetsk armed confrontation. The content of all and Lugansk oblasts) comparable cities. For posts was coded into four groups: (1) about each of them, we used systematic sampling Ukraine, (2) in relation to Russia, (3) about with gender quota. In the search window the US and EU, and (4) Other. It was also de- filtered by location, each randomly defined cided to include armed conflict news posts as n-profile from general sample k was chosen a category in the group “in relation to Russia” to reach the quota of 25 male and 25 female because they were done from the Russian profiles. Data about gender composition of perspective and often addressed the Russian the Internet audience of the chosen cities was government. Within these four groups, mes- unavailable; as a result, the equal number of sages and framing of political events was cod- males and females was chosen, which we ed into subgroups, which are presented and should admit slightly differs from the actual discussed in the last part of the paper. composition of the population of the cities. We are aware of the limitations of the Consequently, in nine cities sample of 450 paper. It is focused only on the sources of profiles was selected for the analysis of the the information people chose in Vkontakte behaviour in SNS: posts and reposts of politi- during Euromaidan and conflict in the East cal content, subscription to public pages with of the country, which in some cases might political content, membership in groups ded- not represent that people share geopoliti- icated to political issues. Political issues were cal narratives and political beliefs of those narrowed down to the Euromaidan revolu- public pages and open groups. However, the tion, the annexation of , and conflict share of subscription to ideologically oppo- Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64. 55

site public pages in the total subscription to The manifestation of the “Euromaidan” revolu- sources of information about Euromaidan tion and war in Donbass in SNS and conflict reveals biased predominance or overweight of subscription to one of the As the Euromaidan and Antimaidan move- sides of the conflict in particular areas. The ments started in 2013, they were actively paper has no examination of public pages, discussed in social networking sites. Figure which had balanced position covering con- 1 shows that thousands of public pages and flict events because it was one of the effects groups emerged to report news and opin- of SNS – emerged public pages and groups ions on the ongoing conflict. Public opinion were emphasizing differences and not build- was divided into two camps: (1) supporters ing bridges. Moreover, the data was collected of the Euromaidan, and (2) opponents. SNS after the period of the escalation of the con- also followed that line of divide and pages flict in February 2015, which should be taken where information was presented only from into consideration interpreting the results of one of the points of view were created and the study. The focus of the paper is on pro- actively promoted. Russian propaganda was Russian public pages and their geopolitical also actively engaged in the process. For in- narratives because Russia is increasing its ge- stance, two Russian social networking sites, opolitical presence in the world using SNS as Vkontakte and Odnoklasniki, were platforms geopolitical tools. The paper uses a concept were most of the pages criticizing Ukrainian of territorial differences,and we are cautious pursuit for European integration and later that obtained data is for particular cities. supporting separatist movements and annex- ation of Crimea emerged. At the same time, only Odnoklasniki is dramatically one-sided Territorial differences in support of the in the number of pages and subscribers for Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine in SNS Antimaidan and pages supporting separa- tism and unity with Russia. In November 2013, , Vik- Facebook is in the opposite pole, with most tor Yanukovych, refused to sign the Associa- of the popular pages and their subscribers tion Agreement with the EU during Eastern being pro-Ukrainian and pro-European in Partnership Summit in despite public the coverage of the conflict. Twitter is less pressure in Ukraine. It caused and popular in Ukraine and had a balanced polarization of society. Subsequent events number of pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian show the fundamental foreign policy cleav- pages. Numbers show that despite many age in Ukraine, which supports Lijphart, A. channels of information created to spread (see Johnston, R.J. et al. 1990) complementa- the pro-Russian view of the conflict; they tion of the classical Lipset, S.M. and Rokkan, were not so popular. Vkontakte is the most S. (1967) model. Two main social movements polarized SNS among analyzed. Top-5 emerged as a reaction to the events in Vilnius public pages with pro-European and pro- and Kyiv: Ukrainian revolution (Euromaidan Ukrainian stances have near two million or Revolution of Dignity) and Antimaidan. subscribers and members, while top-5 pro- In the course of events, the annexation of Russian pages have one million and a half. Crimea and Russia-backed armed conflict Vkontakte also was the most popular SNS in in Donbass resulted in the additional line of Ukraine and the most representative of the confrontation in society: pro-Ukrainian sup- the Ukrainian internet audience in 2013-2017. port of sovereignty versus the pro-Russian In 2017, Vkontakte, as well as Odnoklasniki support of separatists, Novorossiya concept, and many other Russian media, were banned and unity with Russia. However, in Ukraine, in Ukraine as a part of the measures to coun- foreign policy cleavage is complicated by ac- teract Russian aggression and propaganda tive Russian involvement. (Figure 1. and 2). 56 Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.

Fig. 1. Number of groups and public pages in popular social networking sites dedicated to the Ukrainian revolution of 2013–2014 and war in Donbass by keywords used in the name.

Moreover, the politicization of the citizens Territorial differences of subscription to ideolo- of the Russian Federation and their engage- gically opposite public pages and groups in ment in an online confrontation over the Vkontakte Euromaidan, lately annexation of Crimea and war in Eastern Ukraine are vivid. All the top-5 Until Vkontakte was banned in Ukraine in pro-Russian, Antimaidan, and pro-separatist 2017, it was the most popular SNS. It is the pages and groups have the majority of sub- most representative of the polarization of po- scribers from Russia, not from Ukraine (Figure litical views among Internet users in Ukraine. 3). At the same time, top-5 pro-Ukrainian In Donetsk, Lugansk, and sub- sources of information in Vkontakte have 99 scribers to pro-Russian, pro-separatist, and per cent and more subscribers from Ukraine. Antimaidan pages dominated pro-Ukrainian Therefore, the conflict manifestation in (more than 83 to 17). Only in Kharkiv and Vkontakte shows that it was not only within in South-Eastern Ukraine they had a Ukraine but had a clear Russian involvement. substantial share in the total subscription to top-10 ideologically opposite public pages and groups (38% and 33% correspondingly). In , , Zaporizhya, and , regional centres of South-Eastern Ukraine, the shares of subscribers to pro-Russian sources of information were only from 15 per cent to 24 per cent. 8 per cent of pro-Russian subscriptions in Kyiv stands out of . While in Central and North-Eastern Ukraine pro-Russian sources of information in Vkontakte had only 2–6 per cent share. In , pro-Ukrainian sources of information in Vkontakte totally dominated (98–99% of subscriptions) (Figure 4). Consequently, easy access to different Fig. 2. Number of subscribers and members of top-5 viewpoints and sources of information on the ideologically opposite public pages in popular social Internet does not erase territorial differences networking sites in Ukraine, 19 February 2015. in political beliefs. Moreover, it creates pre- Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64. 57

Fig. 3. Number of subscribers and members of top-5 ideologically opposite public pages/groups in Vkontakte by country of origin, 19 February 2015. conditions for polarization and territorially people in foreign countries. Primarily this is framed preferences for information sources. the case in the neighbouring countries where For such powerful geopolitical actors as there is no language barrier, and a shared Russia, it opens the door for the information- history could be used as an instrument for al involvement in the creation of symboli- unification under one centre position and cal reality and geopolitical imaginations of disunion with the other.

Fig. 4. Territorial differences of subscription to top-10 ideologically opposite public pages/groups in Vkontakte, 19 February 2015. 58 Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.

Conflict in Eastern Ukraine and territorial and not only subscription to top-5 ideologi- differences of political behaviour in SNS cally opposite public pages from each side of the conflict, but also other groups and After the annexation of Crimea and the start pages and reposts of the information on of the war in Eastern Ukraine, the Internet us- personal pages feed. As shown in Figure 5, ers and Vkontakte members faced the ques- the numbers of people who used polarized tion of reliable sources of information about sources of information about the conflict were the events. However, it turns out that the even higher, but patterns of the information question was rather about suitable sources of sources in four studied territories of Ukraine information or those that arise due to social- were the same. In profiles from uncontrolled ization in particular geographic places. Our territories, the use of pro-Russian sources of study of Vkontakte shows that assumption information was predominant; in reclaimed that space is conquering a place in the era of territories, they were substantially lower; in new technologies (Friedman, Th.L. 2005) is the areas where there was no armed conflict, not the case in choosing sources of informa- pro-Ukrainian sources of information were tion about conflicts. Four studied areas in more widespread; and, in the periphery of Ukraine show differences in sources of in- the neighbouring regions, they already domi- formation about Euromaidan revolution and nated the pro-Russian sources of information. conflict in Eastern Ukraine. In uncontrolled by As a result, Internet users in those territo- Ukrainian government territories subscription ries received a very different message about to top-5 pro-Russian public pages and groups the understanding of the causes and conse- prevailed. Subscription to top-5 pro-Russian quences of the conflict as well as attitudes public pages is 26.9 per cent in Yenakiieve and towards Kyiv or Moscow as centres or even 16.3 per cent in Kadiivka (Stakhanov), while broader geopolitical imaginations of interna- a subscription to pro-Ukrainian pages is only tional relations and Russia’s role in the world 0.70 and 0.85 per cent, respectively (Table 1). It politics. was predominant in the reclaimed territories of Bakhmut (Artemivsk) in Donetsk oblast and Lysychansk in Lugansk oblast but with Geopolitical narratives of pro-Russian lower numbers of subscription (12.0% and public pages and groups in Vkontakte 9.7% respectively). In territories of Donetsk and Lugansk Despite Pinkerton, A. et al. (2011) assump- oblasts, which stayed under Ukrainian tion that the Internet is of geopolitical con- government control during the conflict, the cern due to uncontrolled and uncontrollable numbers of subscription to top-5 pro-Russian communication, Russian-Ukrainian conflict public pages and groups was even lower and representation of the events in Vkon- (9.7% in Pokrovsk [Krasnoarmiysk] and 8.0% takte show that SNS are of geopolitical con- in Starobilsk), while the use of pro-Ukrainian cern also because of possible manipulations sources of information was higher (2.5% and and controlled messages. Our study shows 2.7% respectively). In the periphery of the that in Russian SNS public pages and open neighbouring regions, subscription to top-5 groups there are no platforms for communi- pro-Ukrainian public pages and groups was cation and exchange of ideas, but these are already higher than to top-5 pro-Russian (ex- places of passive communication, where the cept Izium city in Kharkiv oblast were it was source of information is just spreading mes- almost equal). sages to receiving subjects. On the one hand, The second part of the study of the con- they have no geographical barriers, but on flict territories of Eastern Ukraine sources the other, they are territorially bounded in- of information about the conflict included formation spaces. For instance, pro-Russian a sample of 450 profiles from studied cities pages and groups bound together people in Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64. 59

Russia and Donbass, while gradu- ally separating Donbass from other % 0.70 0.85 2.04 1.97 2.46 2.68 4.01 7.12 5.90

Share, South-Eastern, Central and Western Ukraine. Bourdieu’s understanding of television (1998) as symbolical vi- 166 155 326 406 424 190 471 Total

2,426 2,478 olence could also be used for public pages and groups in SNS as engaged in symbolical violence. 98 82 97

181 210 225 276 Antimaidan, pro-Russian, and pro- Male 1,312 1,336 separatists as a group of information sources for Russian speaking people of

68 73 93 Ukraine were imposing specific geopo- 145 196 199 195 ro-Ukrainian public pages and groups 1,114 1,142 Female p litical visions of the world and conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Content analysis of two of the five most popular pro-Rus- % 9.70 9.65 8.04 4.22 2.13 2.43

26.92 16.34 12.01 sian pages in Vkontakte posts in 2015 Share, shows that they were creating image of Ukraine as the Other, of South-Eastern Number of subscriptions to top-5 571 495 724 Ukraine as a part of greater Russia, of Total 6,345 2,981 1,920 2,000 1,663 1,022 the US and NATO as the main villains, and contradicting image of Europe: (1) negative, as “morally degrading” 954 347 287 394 581 Male 3,291 1,722 1,083 1,096 (in case when it was about Ukrainian inspirations of European integra- tion), and (2) positive, as supporting 837 904 709 224 208 330 441 pro-Russian public pages and groups

3,054 1,259 annexation of Crimea and separatist Female inspirations in Donbass (mainly about particular positions of right, far-right and sometimes far-left political lead- of 7,102 23,566 18,240 15,992 20,624 17,231 11,740 34,069 42,018

profiles ers) (Figure 6). Number Vkontakte Narratives of Ukraine were orient- ed to discredit it as a state (notions of failed-state, oligarchs’ domination, 90,133 75,348 17,153 49,744

Total and weak and illegitimate govern- 107,817 102,594 115,916 109,566 117,509 in 2015

population ment) and to accentuate its status as the Other for territories of the armed conflict (“karateli” [chasteners] image and notions of human rights viola- tions). Use of “karateli” as a descrip- tion of Ukrainian forces and almost Sudied cities

Yenakiieve Kadiivka (Stakhanov) Bahmut (Artemivsk) Lysychansk Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiyks) Starobilsk Izium Pavlovgrad Berdiansk everything connected to state appara- tus was a crucial element of Russian

- propaganda in SNS. Important is an appeal to World War 2 memories be-

Table 1. Subscription to top-5 ideologically opposite public pages/groups in Vkontakte among users of studied cities, February 2015 Table cause it is of high symbolical value for Russian and Ukrainian people. “Karateli” is a word that was used to describe Nazis and their Ukrainian col- Studied territories Uncontrolled territories Reclaimed territories of Donetsk and Parts Lugansk oblasts* of neigh Periphery bouring regions under state control. stayed *Territories laborators who were killing local peo- 60 Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.

Fig. 5. Sources of information in social networking sites of Internet users from conflict territories and neigh- bouring regions.

Fig. 6. Content analysis of “Antimaidan” and “Russkie online | Novorossiya” public pages in Vkontakte, 10–25 March 2015. Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64. 61

ple in times of World War 2. Therefore, it was was constructed using the same narrative. a strong emotional discrediting of Ukraine and Notions of NATO and the US were used in- the creation of Russia’s image as a stronghold terchangeably, while the image of Europe in in a war with the enemy in the eyes of sub- pro-Russian public pages in Vkontakte was scribers of Antimaidan and pro-separatist pag- constructed ambiguously. On the one hand, es. Moreover, continuous appeal to Kyiv au- a number of messages in the analyzed con- thorities (“Kievskie vlasti”) as illegitimate and tent were criticizing Ukrainian inspirations oppressing local populations in South-Eastern for integration with the EU by portraying Ukraine was developing the image of Kyiv as European states as “morally degrading”, the Other, while Moscow was portrayed as a which in the narrative of pro-Russian pub- centre, which can protect local populations lic pages in Vkontakte means domination of from the violence of Kyiv authorities. liberal values which are contradicting tradi- Narratives about Russia were complicated. tional values of and more broadly First, armed conflict newswere given not from Slavic people. At the same time, they were neutral or only pro-separatist perspectives. developing a positive narrative of Europe us- They were following lines of official Russian ing statements of European far-right, far-left, Federation positions in the conflict. Second, and pro-Russian politicians and activists. the legitimization of Russian involvement in the conflict was often supported by the nar- rative of Slavic unity and Russian greatness. Conclusions and discussion It supports conclusions of Kasamara, V. and Sorokina, A. (2012) about imperial ambi- Public pages in Vkontakte, which emerged tions of the Russian population of different as a reaction to the Euromaidan revolution social statuses. The studied public pages in in Ukraine and later armed conflict in Don- Vkontakte were creating particular geopoliti- bas, were producing broader geopolitical cal imaginations of Ukrainian territories in narratives and imaginations of different ter- their connection to Moscow as a centre. For ritories. For example, the image of Crimea instance, Crimea annexation legitimization as historically Russian land, South-Eastern practices were built on notions of “reunifica- Ukraine as “Novorossiya” culturally closer tion” and historical justice as well as stories connected to Moscow than Kyiv, which was of social and economic success after the an- undermining the sovereignty of Ukrainian nexation. South-Eastern Ukraine territories state and legitimation of Kyiv as a political were described using the concept of historical centre for these territories. Second, these “Novorossiya”, which was undermining the public pages were not just informing people role of Kyiv as a legitimate political centre for about the conflict, but also suggesting ageo - the region and accentuating its historical and political vision of international relations. The cultural connections to Moscow. and NATO were presented as Moreover, these narrative lines were sup- main villains who caused armed conflict by ported by messages about Russian great- interfering in Ukrainian politics, and Russia ness, which included notions of a mighty image was developed around its greatness army, reach natural resources, reach cultur- as a prerequisite to oppose these enemies. al heritage, influence on geopolitical scene, Ukrainian government was discredited using and ability to resist such world powers as “karateli” concept with the emotional appeal the US, which was portrayed as the biggest to World War 2. enemy of Slavic people and “Russkiy mir”, The consumption of above described geo- undermining post-Soviet space unity, and political imaginations and narratives in SNS its economic and political capacities, pro- had clear territorial differences in Ukraine. voking conflicts in Russia and its “sphere Subscription to top-5 ideologically pro-Rus- of interests”. Geopolitical image of NATO sian public pages and groups in Vkontakte 62 Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64.

was predominant to the subscription to top- users cluster themselves in homogeneous 5 pro-Ukrainian only in Donetsk, Lugansk, groups. However, homogeneity could be and Simferopol regional centers in Ukraine. In based on conformity to a similar vision of Odesa and Kharkiv, for each one subscription the region or place regarding centre-periph- to pro-Russian pages were three subscriptions ery relations, causes of conflict, and a geo- to pro-Ukrainian. Internet users in such cities political picture of the region and the world. of South-Eastern Ukraine as Dnipropetrovsk, Takhteyev, Yu. et al. (2012) findings that so- Mykolaiv, Zaporizhya, and Kherson (whose cial ties in Twitter networks depend on the voting behaviour in years of independence of geographical distance between users and are Ukraine was mainly shifted to the pro-Rus- stronger in similar metropolitan areas could sian side) in times of armed conflict in Donbas have external validity for other SNS and cov- were predominantly using pro-Ukrainian erage of conflicts in SNS. sources of information in Vkontakte. It fol- The paper’s findings show that people lows electoral behaviour patterns in 2014 living in the same administrative regions of presidential and parliamentary and within newly emerged conflict Ukraine, which support the thesis that exist- zone boundaries use different sources of in- ing territorial differences in political beliefs formation about the conflict. Moreover, those are preconditions for the homogenization of sources of information are not only about subscription to information sources in SNS. agenda setting and coverage of the events The study of the conflict zone Internet us- but also spread broader geopolitical narra- ers information sources preferences reveals tives about actors involved, centre-periphery the influence of the emerged borders and ad- relation, legitimation of the authorities, and ministrative divisions. Cities in the occupied a geopolitical picture of the world. However, area and reclaimed by the Ukrainian army we should admit that it does not suggest that were using pro-Russian sources of informa- all places within administrative borders are tion in Vkontakte more often than other cit- homogeneous. Intraregional variability is ies in Donetsk and Lugansk regions where also of great interest to study in the context was no armed conflict and where Russia- of the sources of information preferences in backed separatists were not controlling ter- SNS, but it was not in the focus of this paper. ritory for substantial time. At the same time, In the case of the post-Soviet space, where administrative borders between Lugansk the is understood or even and Donetsk oblasts on the one side, and native for populations in the countries neigh- Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhya bouring to Russia, information distributed on the other are vividly visible in the number on the Internet is a powerful tool to promote of subscribers to pro-Ukrainian public pages pro-Russian geopolitical orientations among and groups in Vkontakte. the local population. Territorial differences of On the one hand, existing territorial differ- such information consumption depend on ences in political views frame behaviour of existing territorial divisions. However, the the users on the Internet. On the other hand, reasons why some territories are more vul- SNS as geopolitical tools could be used to nerable to specific geopolitical narratives is polarize society along existing or imagined still under question. These questions in the borders, mobilize people in conflict areas, time of the increased importance of the secu- and spread specific geopolitical narratives. ritization of cyberspace are of great interest Existing administrative divisions, phantom for further geographical research. borders revealed by electoral campaigns, emerged borders of conflict zones frame Internet users’ decisions about informa- tion sources on SNS. It corresponds with Borondo, J. et al. (2014) findings that Internet Dobysh, M. Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 68 (2019) (1) 51–64. 63

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