Entertainment31 ST ANNUAL THE MAGAZINE OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION Law Issue

MAY 2015 / $4

EARN MCLE CREDIT PLUS Marriage of Indie Film Valli Financing page 25 page 32

New Media Publicity Rights page 10 California Tax Residency page 14 Lessons of Aereo Perk page 40 Points

Los Angeles lawyer Jill L. Smith reviews the noncompensatory provisions in the entertainment contracts of actors page 18

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May 2015 Issue Master.qxp 4/14/15 2:47 PM Page 3

Entertainment Law Issue

FEATURES

18 Perk Points BY JILL L. SMITH While agreements between studios and actors are often similar, each deal is individually negotiated and must be carefully analyzed

25 Transmutation of Law BY WILLIAM S. RYDEN Family Code Section 852’s requirement of an express, unequivocal declaration of transmutation bars enforcement of a technically insufficient writing Plus: Earn MCLE credit. MCLE Test No. 246 appears on page 27.

32 Security and Independence BY JOHN W. CONES Attorneys advising independent filmmakers need to carefully analyze financing deals in order to avoid violations of securities rules

Los Angeles Lawyer DEPARTMENTS the magazine of the Los Angeles County 8 On Direct 38 By the Book Bert Fields Clearance & Copyright Bar Association INTERVIEW BY DEBORAH KELLY REVIEWED BY PAUL S. MARKS May 2015 Volume 38, No. 3 9 Barristers Tips 40 Closing Argument Guidelines in bankruptcy procedure for Aereo shows what attorneys can do to

COVER PHOTOGRAPH: nonbankruptcy litigators advise technology entrepreneurs TOM KELLER BY CHRISTOPHER O. RIVAS BY OWEN J. SLOANE

10 Practice Tips 39 CLE Preview Right of publicity issues in emerging media BY MATTHEW SAVARE AND JOHN WINTERMUTE

LOS ANGELES LAWYER (ISSN 0162-2900) is published monthly, 14 Tax Tips except for a combined issue in July/August, by the Los Angeles County Bar Association, 1055 West 7th Street, Suite 2700, Tax residency issues for filmmakers, Los Angeles, CA 90017 (213) 896-6503. Periodicals postage paid at Los Angeles, CA and additional mailing offices. Annual sub- actors, and musicians in California scription price of $14 included in the Association membership BY BRADFORD S. COHEN, WALTER R. CALVERT, AND dues. Nonmember subscriptions: $28 annually; single copy price: $4 plus handling. Address changes must be submitted MICHAEL A. BLOOM six weeks in advance of next issue date. POSTMASTER: Address Service Requested. Send address changes to Los Angeles Lawyer, P. O. Box 55020, Los Angeles CA 90055. 05.15 VISIT US ON THE INTERNET AT WWW.LACBA.ORG/LALAWYER E-MAIL CAN BE SENT TO [email protected] EDITORIAL BOARD Chair MARY E. KELLY Articles Coordinator DONNA FORD Assistant Articles Coordinator TED M. HANDEL Secretary JOHN C. KEITH Immediate Past Chair PAUL MARKS

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4 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 LOS ANGELES LAWYER IS THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION Law Firms 4 Sale 1055 West 7th Street, Suite 2700, Los Angeles CA 90017-2553 Telephone 213.627.2727 / www.lacba.org

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he job of the entertainment deal lawyer is different from that of many other types of transactional lawyers. T Entertainment projects are often complete businesses in and of themselves, requiring lawyers to negotiate numer- ous intricate deals that are all separate from but dependent on

one another and that balance the interests of all the different stakeholders. Financiers, distributors, talent, advertisers, and exhibitors all have different needs and differ- ent financial models that need to be addressed and accounted for in order to pro- duce the project and monetize it successfully. This year’s special entertainment law issue offers a nearly complete course on the study of film and television production. In this special issue, we focus on the nonglamorous issues that entertainment lawyers face every day. For example, we cover film finance, actor deals, and clearing rights. How does the production lawyer structure the financial deals that will provide ade- quate financing to produce the project, minimize the client’s risk, and provide a way for the investors to earn a return on their investment? While the garden of visual con- tent is planted with the seeds of creative spark, those seeds will not germinate with- out sufficient financial backing. John Cones explains the nuts and bolts of financing films through equity investing through traditional means and crowdfunding. He out- lines the legal landscape and instructs readers on what points must be negotiated. Besides requiring money, producing visual content requires actors—whether in live action or giving voice to animated characters. The actor’s agent may have negotiated compensation, but the talent lawyer has numerous problems to solve that are not always exciting (approvals and indemnity and publicity, oh my!) but can make or break a deal. Jill L. Smith covers the contours of negotiating the nonfinancial terms of an actor employment agreement. Even if a project is well financed and has stellar talent committed, content still reigns. Does the client have a great idea to turn a famous brand into a movie franchise? Does he have an even better idea on how to market the franchise using celebrity endorse- ments? No entertainment property can be made (or marketed) without carefully nav- igating the troubled waters of rights clearance. We have articles that address this impor- tant topic. Matthew Savare and John Wintermute, for example, discuss the complexities of the ever-evolving right to publicity doctrine and provide advice and insights for videogame developers, advertisers, recording artists, and the companies who distribute their works. Our Closing Argument focuses on counseling tech companies—although producers and their lawyers would also be wise to heed Owen J. Sloane’s advice— on the importance of properly licensing content. Finally, we review a book—perhaps “the” book—that addresses the manifold rights issues that filmmakers, videographers, television producers, YouTubers, and anyone else who makes visual content needs to know about rights clearance from initial acquisition to distribution. We are proud to bring readers this special issue and hope it helps improve the qual- ity of their legal analysis, advice to clients, and work product. Entertainment deal makers may not be the focus of the attention on the red carpet, but they certainly are a critical component in ensuring that their clients arrive there. ■

Caroline Y. Barbee is an attorney with Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, where she focuses her practice on all forms of intellectual property enforcement, protection, counseling, and lit- igation. Gary S. Raskin is the principal of Raskin Anderson Law, LLP, where his practice involves entertainment transactions with an emphasis on motion pictures and finance. Thomas H. Vidal is an entertainment and IP litigation partner with Abrams Garfinkel Margolis Bergson, LLP. Barbee, Raskin, and Vidal are the coordinating editors of this special issue.

6 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 on direct INTERVIEW BY DEBORAH KELLY

Bert Fields Attorney

just brushed him. He said, “No, sir, he went In 2009, you were accused of hiring Anthony at this for at least 45 seconds.” I got up in Pellicano to wiretap Michael Davis Sapir of front of the jury, and I said, “Now, take out Bold magazine. How did it feel? It was very your watches.” I started to stroke the jury unpleasant. Mr. Pellicano was the best de- rail, and I stroked, and I stroked. I said, tective that I have ever hired. He did a su- “That’s four seconds.” I kept on stroking perb job. As far as I know, he didn’t wiretap and said, “What are they talking about? for me. I was never charged, but the media This guy’s an officer of the law? One stroke was all over me. made the offense.” I said, “That’s seven sec- onds.” I stroked, and I stroked. By the time What book is on your nightstand? West of we got to 20 seconds, the jury was just Sunset. It’s about F. Scott Fitzgerald’s last rolling in laughter. They acquitted the guy. years in Hollywood.

You’ve represented top performers and huge Which magazine do you pick up at the doc- entertainment companies. Do you have a tor’s office? I do not touch magazines at the preference? No. It’s the issues that make the doctor’s office because I’m a hopeless neu- case fun or not fun. rotic about picking up diseases at the doc- tor’s office. BERT FIELDS | A veteran of the Korean War, Under a pseudonym, you’ve written novels What is your favorite vacation spot? I have Bert Fields has practiced law since 1955 and and a biography. How is it different than an old mill in the French countryside that I has represented virtually every major practicing law? You are given a lot more love, and I also have a house in Zihuatanejo Hollywood studio and talent agency. He is rein for the imagination in novel writing. In overlooking the bay. I can’t weigh one also an author, a lecturer on Shakespeare, and nonfiction writing, it’s similar to the law. against the other. a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. You do a lot of research. What was your best job? Working in a stable What is your favorite hobby? Writing. when I was a teenager. What is the perfect day? When I come into You are 80-plus years old. Any retirement the office and I have a lot of exciting new What was your worst job? Setting pins in the plans? Not as of today. cases. bowling alley. In the old days, it wasn’t au- What is your favorite sport as a participant? tomatic. What is overrated about being an entertain- Tennis. When I was younger, I played foot- ment attorney? I don’t think anything is What characteristic did you most admire in ball. I loved it because that’s how you got overrated about it. It’s great fun. your mother? She was smart. girls. I was small and slow.

What is underrated? Lots of people feel that If you were handed $1 million tomorrow, what How do you get your news? Television. I’m a the clients are difficult, that they are more would you do with it? I would probably give it news junkie. I cook every night, and while I trying. I don’t find them so. My clients, over to Harvard Law School. Over the centuries, it cook, I listen to the news. the years, have been very nice people. Ac- really has helped mold American law. Which person in history would you like to take tors. I’ve been lucky. , Dustin out for a beer? Abraham Lincoln, because he Hoffman, —each of those three What scared you the most the first time you had a great sense of humor and a wonderful is just a delightful human being. stood in front of a jury? Losing. political sense during a challenging time. Do you have a favorite famous client? No. If Do you believe jurors obey the judicial offi- What are the three most deplorable condi- I did, I wouldn’t tell you. cer’s instruction to ignore the news and so- cial media during a trial? No. tions in the world? Terrorist aspects of ex- What is your wildest court story from the treme Islam and ISIS, hunger, and limited good old days? My first jury trial was a case You graduated from Harvard Law School in healthcare in great parts of the world. in which I represented a man who had been 1952 and have been practicing for decades. Who are your two favorite U.S. presidents? accused of groping an undercover vice squad Have juries changed much? Society has Lincoln and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. officer standing at the urinal of a skid row changed much in that people are much bet- ter educated than they were, and juries are movie house. In the course of the trial, I sug- What is the one adjective you would like on a part of that. gested to the cop that maybe my client had your tombstone? “He loved his life.”

8 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 barristers tips BY CHRISTOPHER O. RIVAS

Guidelines in Bankruptcy Procedure for Nonbankruptcy Litigators

BANKRUPTCY LAW IS A HIGHLY SPECIALIZED FIELD, and although pending against a bankruptcy debtor or the debtor’s assets. Parties it is possible to successfully dabble in bankruptcy law in the context who violate the automatic stay may be found liable for actual dam- of broader nonbankruptcy litigation, bankruptcy practice is riddled ages, punitive damages, and a debtor’s attorneys’ fees. If a party with traps for the unwary. However, there are a few common areas wishes to continue pursuing actions against a debtor, the party must that nonbankruptcy litigators will regularly experience. first seek relief from the automatic stay in the bankruptcy court. This The Bankruptcy Code is set forth in Title 11 of the U.S. Code and is a relatively easy process for a secured creditor seeking to foreclose is accompanied by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which its collateral, but a plaintiff seeking to assert claims against a debtor incorporate many of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but which may have greater difficulty getting relief from the stay. also deviate from them in numerous material ways. The bankruptcy Ultimately, a debtor in chapter 7 or chapter 13 is seeking to dis- court is a federal court that has been granted authority by Congress charge debts, including causes of action pending against the debtor. to adjudicate disputes arising under, arising in, or related to the Bankruptcy Code. As in the U.S. district court, filings in the bankruptcy No other aspect of the Bankruptcy Code affects nonbankruptcy court can be retrieved in PACER, and papers may be filed in the bankruptcy court via the case management/electronic case files (CM/ litigators more than the automatic stay set forth in Section 362. ECF) system. Nonbankruptcy litigators with CM/ECF privileges in the district court must obtain a new CM/ECF login from the bank- ruptcy court, which can sometimes be a time-consuming process. A plaintiff asserting fraud-type claims against a debtor should imme- The three chapters of the Bankruptcy Code that a litigator is most diately investigate whether to pursue a nondischargeability action likely to encounter are chapters 7, 11, and 13. Chapter 7 cases are typ- against the debtor in bankruptcy court pursuant to Section 523 of the ically filed by individuals seeking to discharge all of their prebankruptcy Bankruptcy Code. Such actions are not barred by the automatic stay, debts. Chapter 11 cases are typically filed by entities and wealthy indi- but a claim holder only has approximately two months to file this action viduals seeking to reorganize their debts. Chapter 13 cases are typi- or will likely lose the cause of action as part of the debtor’s discharge. cally filed by individuals seeking to retain or modify mortgaged prop- On the other hand, when a debtor is a plaintiff or potential plain- erty and to pay a portion of the debtor’s debts over a five-year period. tiff, the debtor must disclose all of the debtor’s assets, including any No other aspect of the Bankruptcy Code affects nonbankruptcy potential claims or causes of action owned by the debtor at the time litigators more than the automatic stay set forth in Section 362 of the of the bankruptcy since such claims may be of value to the debtor’s Bankruptcy Code. The automatic stay is triggered the moment a creditors. In chapter 7 cases, the bankruptcy trustee takes possession debtor files a petition for bankruptcy protection and it operates as an of the lawsuit and is solely responsible for pursuing the claims or set- automatic injunction prohibiting any party with notice of the bank- tling them. A litigator defending such claims should seek out the bank- ruptcy from taking any actions against the debtor or property of the ruptcy trustee to determine whether the trustee is willing to settle the bankruptcy estate. As set forth in Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, debtor’s claims out from underneath the debtor. generally all of a debtor’s prebankruptcy property is part of the Less scrupulous debtors may seek to hide a cause of action from bankruptcy estate, including any claims or causes of action that the bankruptcy court so that the debtor may pursue the claim for his accrued prior to the bankruptcy. In chapter 7, a debtor’s postpetition or her own benefit. In doing so, the debtor has effectively tricked the income is not part of the estate, but in chapters 11 and 13, a debtor’s bankruptcy court into granting the debtor a discharge by hiding postpetition income is part of the estate. valuable assets. If a defendant is defending claims brought by a In practice, this means any court actions pending against the debtor, bankruptcy debtor that were not properly disclosed to the bankruptcy as well as collection and foreclosure actions against the debtor, must court, the defendant has two tactical options: 1) a defendant may reach cease. Litigation in which a debtor is a defendant or cross-defendant out to a chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee to settle the debtor’s claims out should be stayed immediately. However, litigation in which a debtor from underneath the debtor, or 2) if the debtor has already obtained is a plaintiff is not ordinarily stayed—although state courts often mis- a discharge, a defendant may seek to dismiss the debtor’s claims on takenly stay the litigation anyway. A defendant may continue to defend judicial estoppel grounds. The equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel in the action by pursuing demurrers, motions for summary judgment, serves to prohibit the debtor from pursuing the cause of action in these and other similar filings without being impeded by the automatic stay. circumstances. I Lawyers should not take the automatic stay lightly. Even informal notice of the bankruptcy is enough to put a party on inquiry notice Christopher O. Rivas is a senior associate with the commercial restructuring of a bankruptcy, and the party should immediately stop any actions and bankruptcy group at Reed Smith LLP in Los Angeles.

Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 9 practice tips BY MATTHEW SAVARE AND JOHN WINTERMUTE

Right of Publicity Issues in Emerging Media

IN 1956, A COURT LIKENED the state of publicity law—the right to con- ent states. For example, some states have extended publicity rights trol the commercial use of one’s identity—in the United States to a past the subject’s death, while others have not,10 the duration of this “haystack in a hurricane.”1 Since then, courts have brought little clar- postmortem protection varies widely among the different jurisdictions, ity to the doctrine. Indeed, recent case law in the videogame space has and some, though not all, states accord the right to celebrities and non- not resolved the seemingly incongruous opinions amongst various celebrities alike.11 Moreover, as the doctrine has evolved over the years, courts and has highlighted the inherent conflict between the doctrine the identity prong has morphed from its humble beginnings of pro- and the First Amendment. tecting only a person’s name and picture to include virtually any indi- In January, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cia of a person’s identity. Statutes and courts from various states have addressed this issue in Davis v. Electronic Arts Inc.2 The videogame extended protections to, among other things, name, voice, signature, company had already lost dual landmark cases in 2013, with the Third photograph, likeness, “look-alikes,”12 “sound-alikes,”13 catchphrases,14 and Ninth Circuits’ deciding, in Hart v. Elec- tronic Arts Inc.3 and Keller v. Electronic Arts Inc.,4 respectively, that Electronic Arts was To what degree does someone’s persona need to be not entitled to First Amendment protection for its use of the virtual likenesses of college football players in its popular NCAA Football “transformed” to receive First Amendment protection? line of games. Davis extended the ruling in those previous cases to the professional foot- ball context and held that the “historic teams” feature in Electronic Arts’s Madden NFL games, which allows gamers nicknames,15 screen persona,16 performance characteristics,17 and to control avatars resembling retired players, violates those players’ biographical data.18 right of publicity because those likenesses are “central to the creation Since its inception, the right of publicity has been a controversial of an accurate virtual simulation of an NFL game.”5 doctrine, engendering criticism from academics, judges, and the pub- The implications of Davis, Hart, and Keller for videogame man- lic at large,19 particularly with respect to its interplay with the First ufacturers are materially adverse. Yet the broader takeaway is the dif- Amendment. In one of the most well-known opinions regarding the ficulty in reconciling an ever-evolving right of publicity doctrine with conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment,20 emerging technologies and new media. Judicial adaptation to new tech- Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski lamented in his dissent: nology is never painless, but innovative businesses and marketers face I can’t see how giving [Vanna] White the power to keep oth- unique uncertainty and risk in navigating these unpredictable waters. ers from evoking her image in the public’s mind can be squared As content providers, brands, advertisers, news organizations, and the with the First Amendment. Where does White get this right to public continue to blur the lines of art, commerce, entertainment, and control our thoughts? The majority’s creation goes way beyond information—particularly with respect to new technologies and the protection given a trademark or a copyrighted work, or a methods of distribution—an unclear and ever-expanding right of person’s name or likeness. All those things control one particular publicity doctrine has the capacity to chill innovation. way of expressing an idea, one way of referring to an object The present flood of right of publicity litigation, especially con- or a person. But not allowing any means of reminding people cerning entertainment properties, tracks the doctrine’s swift growth of someone? That’s a speech restriction unparalleled in First since its inception in 1953. In that year, the Second Circuit coined the Amendment law.21 term “right of publicity” to support the idea that a “prominent per- The dangers identified by Judge Kozinski stem from the perceived son” possessed “the right to grant exclusive privilege in publishing inconsistent and haphazard balancing of publicity rights and free his picture” in advertisements.6 Since that holding, this limited for- speech. Indeed, no fewer than five First Amendment tests have been mulation of the right has been expanded to include protection for non- recognized in evaluating right of publicity claims.22 The U.S. Supreme celebrities, postmortem rights, and broad categories of identification. Court, in its only case involving the right of publicity, held that free Today, 31 states recognize a right of publicity (19 by statute, 21 speech protections “do not immunize the media” from right of pub- by common law, and 9 by a combination of the two).7 Among the states licity violations. The Court declined, however, to impose any stan- that recognize the right, it is generally comprised of three components: dard or test to resolve the tension between these competing princi- 1) use of the plaintiff’s identity, 2) without the plaintiff’s consent, and ples.23 The result has been chaotic, as lower courts have created 3) for commercial purposes.8 “Commercial purposes” in California, as in many other states, includes both uses “in products, merchandise, Matthew Savare is a partner and John Wintermute is an associate at Lowenstein or goods” and “for purposes of advertising or selling.”9 Sandler LLP, where they practice intellectual property, media, entertainment, However, there are wide variations in the right across the differ- technology, and privacy law with a particular focus on new media.

10 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 their own ad hoc balancing tests borrowed “to the main purpose and subject” of creat- trict court is not bound by the holdings of the from copyright, trademark, and other areas ing “an accurate virtual simulation of an Ninth Circuit. Such a response ignores the of the law. Such a process has engendered NFL game.”31 In essence, the court held there fundamental problem—namely, that the right seemingly conflicting rulings, doctrinal incon- to be a misappropriation of the players’ pub- of publicity doctrine is convoluted and con- sistencies, and uncertainties for plaintiffs and licity rights because “[a]ccurate depictions tradictory, particularly with respect to emerg- defendants. of the players” was “central” to an accurate ing media and technologies.38 In Keller, Electronic Arts proffered First virtual experience.32 This has led to more, not fewer, lawsuits. Amendment defenses based on the following But Davis, too, arguably fails to accord In addition to the Hart, Keller, and Davis four tests: 1) the transformative use test, 2) the traditional First Amendment protections to cases against Electronic Arts, right of publicity Rogers test, 3) the public interest test, and 4) new media. This seeming incongruity is illus- lawsuits emanating from videogames have the public affairs exemption.24 The Ninth trated when Davis is read in conjunction been filed recently by Manuel Noriega,39 Circuit dismissed the latter three defenses as with Dryer v. National Football League,33 Lindsay Lohan,40 No Doubt,41 and the estate inapt and rejected Electronic Arts’s contention which was decided by a district court in Min- of General George Patton.42 Hart and Keller, that its use was transformative.25 The Court nesota only three months earlier. In that case, in fact, relied upon No Doubt v. Activision held that the “realistic” nature of the players’ former NFL players had sued the league itself, Publishing, Inc., in finding that celebrity depictions in the game rendered Electronic claiming that its use of the players’ likenesses depictions in a video game were not pro- Arts’s use of their likenesses nontransforma- and historical video footage in various NFL tected unless they somehow “transformed” tive, and hence subject to the players’ public- Films productions was unauthorized and a the subject.43 This trend shows no signs of ity rights.26 violation of their publicity rights.34 The Dryer slowing. The mutable doctrine and ad hoc Keller’s “realistic use” holding, along with court rejected the suit’s merits, finding for application of various First Amendment tests Hart’s nearly identical analysis, is troubling the NFL on all of its various arguments, in- creates an unhealthy environment for all for content creators and a potential boon for cluding that the films qualified for full First parties involved. Content creators are faced athletes and celebrities. Realism, many critics Amendment protection as noncommercial with uncertainty as to what rights need to be of these decisions argue, is an entirely accept- speech and were protected under the “news- cleared, undue threats of litigation, and a able creative aim and one that judges do not worthiness” doctrine.35 Given the similar potential chilling of arguably protectable have the authority or the artistic wherewithal fact patterns of the two cases, the contradic- speech. The persons depicted in the content to condemn.27 Given the Supreme Court’s tory dispositions of Davis and Dryer are have to invest the time, money, and risks recognition that videogames are entitled to the striking. associated with formal legal action. If the same degree of First Amendment protection In fact, the Dryer court addressed and law were clearer on this subject, the likelihood as other forms of creative works, such as accepted the same incidental use argument that there would be a meeting of the minds books and movies,28 the Ninth Circuit’s hold- that the Ninth Circuit rejected in Davis: between the parties would presumably in- ing seems inconsistent with controlling case The NFL is capitalizing not on the crease and the chances of litigation would law and begs several important questions. likenesses of individual players but on almost certainly diminish. Why are docudramas like The Social Network, the drama of the game itself, some- These problems are compounded as inno- which are based on real people and a certain thing that the NFL is certainly entitled vative companies and emerging technologies degree of verisimilitude, shielded from right of to do. Plaintiffs do not explain how the blend artistic, commercial, and informational publicity claims by the First Amendment while NFL could create a visual recounting messages in hybrid speech. Existing right of realistic videogames are not? How is a video- of a significant football game or the publicity and First Amendment jurisprudence, game, which has been held by numerous season of a particular football team which compel content to be judged as either courts to be expressive speech, considered a without the use of footage of NFL commercial or noncommercial, fails to appre- commercial use? To what degree does some- players playing in those games. While ciate that speech is not always binary and one’s persona need to be “transformed” to the NFL certainly reaps monetary ben- often cannot be placed in these neat, notional receive First Amendment protection? Can efits from the sale and broadcast of buckets. The emergence of hybrid speech, such transformation result in a different cause these productions, the use of any indi- such as advertorials and native advertising, and of action, such as a defamation claim?29 At a vidual player’s likeness—the produc- the advent of social media and its function- time when technology is enabling photoreal- tions’ display of footage of plays in- alities, such as “likes” and “retweets,” have istic renderings of individuals (both living volving an individual player—is not for further complicated matters for brands and and deceased) for entertainment content, First commercial advantage but because the content creators and increased their oppor- Amendment advocates argue that the vagaries game cannot be described visually any tunities to run afoul of right of publicity laws. and uncertainties of the transformative use test other way.36 Take, for instance, the dispute between make it ill-equipped to balance the right of Conversely, Davis viewed the necessity Katherine Heigl and Duane Reade in the publicity doctrine with the right to free speech. of the players’ likenesses for achieving a real- summer of 2014, over a tweet sent out by In Davis, Electronic Arts also argued that istic virtual simulation as inculpatory, not the drugstore chain. The disputed post cap- the First Amendment protected the use of exculpatory, evidence.37 That raises the ques- tioned a paparazzi photo of Heigl exiting a former NFL players’ likenesses because they tion as to why Electronic Arts is not entitled Duane Reade store with the message “Don’t appeared in only a single feature of the game, to exploit its license with the NFL to create you just love a quick #DuaneReade run? Even amounting to an “incidental use” of their accurate virtual simulations of games (includ- Katherine Heigl can’t resist shopping at images.30 The Ninth Circuit rejected this ing the reenactment of historical games), just #NYC’s most convenient drugstore!” Alleging defense, citing a number of factors, including as the NFL is entitled to create traditional, that those 19 words had violated her right of “the unique value” of the use “and [its] con- visual accounts of historical games? Why is publicity, Heigl sued the company for $6 mil- tribution to the commercial value of Madden Electronic Arts’s pursuit of realism any less lion.44 The parties quickly settled for an undis- NFL,” Electronic Arts’s advertising of the valid than the NFL’s? One can reconcile the closed sum, but questions abound. To what “historic teams” feature, the prominence of Davis and Dryer holdings by pointing out that extent does the First Amendment protect a the former players’ likeness, and their relation the courts are different and the Minnesota dis- company’s truthful social media statements dis-

Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 11 cussing a celebrity’s use of its product or ser- rights vigorously. mightily to differentiate between commercial and enter- vice? Does it matter that Duane Reade in- With all of the aforementioned doctrinal tainment speech. For more information, see Matthew Where Madison Avenue Meets Hollywood cluded its hashtag in the tweet and would it uncertainties and with the likes of Lindsay Savare, and Vine: The Business, Legal, and Creative have been safer to simply retweet the photo- Lohan invoking her right of publicity against Ramifications of Product Placements, 11 UCLA ENT. 48 graph without any additional messaging? everyone from E-Trade to the makers of L. REV. 331 (2004). On this set of facts, existing case law Grand Theft Auto,49 to Pitbull,50 businesses 9 CIV. CODE §3344. seems to lean in Heigl’s favor. But would and their advertising agencies must assume 10 See, e.g., CIV. CODE at §3344.1. 11 more indirect messaging be acceptable? For that simply evoking someone’s persona, even See, e.g., Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011). example, companies often provide free swag in the most tangential way, will result in a 12 See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. at celebrity functions, such as the Oscars. demand letter and ultimately litigation. N.Y. 1978); White v. Samsung Elecs. Amer., Inc., 989 Can these companies, which pay to get their Despite Supreme Court precedent to the con- F. 2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993). products freely distributed to celebrities, post trary, lower courts are simply not affording 13 See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F. 2d 1093 (9th pictures of these celebrities (with no captions certain types of entertainment speech, espe- Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F. 2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). or other verbiage) with these products with- cially videogames, the same robust First 14 See, e.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, out their permission? Here, the answer ap- Amendment protections it gives other expres- Inc., 698 F. 2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). pears less clear than in the Heigl case, and sive content. In light of this environment, 15 See, e.g., Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane, & Bernbach, likely depends, among other things such as the any commercial venture should carefully eval- Inc., 396 N.Y.S. 2d 661 (App. Div. 1977); Hirsch v. choice of law, on which definition of com- uate whether using—or simply evoking—the S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W. 2d 129 (Wis. 1979). mercial speech the applicable court employs. persona of an individual (celebrity or non- 16 See, e.g., McFarland v. Miller, 14 F. 3d 912 (3d Cir. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Cor- celebrity) without permission in any mes- 1994). poration v. Public Service Commission,45 the saging (unless unequivocally noncommer- 17 See, e.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. U.S. Supreme Court defined commercial cial) is worth the risk. Until Congress or the 1015 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1986). speech as “expression related solely to the Supreme Court acts to clarify and reconcile 18 See, e.g., Prima v. Darden Rests., Inc., 78 F. Supp. economic interests of the speaker and its audi- the various discrepancies concerning the scope 2d 337 (D.N.J. 2000). 19 See, e.g., Joshua Waller, The Right of Publicity: ence.” However, just three years later in Bolger of publicity rights, the definition of com- Preventing the Exploitation of a Celebrity’s Identity or v. Youngs Drug Products Corporation,46 the mercial speech, and the bounds of First Promoting the Exploitation of the First Amendment?, high court defined commercial speech as Amendment protection, the haystack will 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 59 (2001); Diane Leenheer “speech which does ‘no more than propose a keep blowing. I Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of commercial transaction.’” More recently in Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 35, 52 (1998); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom 1 Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F. 2d Kasky v. Nike, Inc., the California Supreme of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 481 (3d Cir. 1956). Court concluded that certain speech was 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 227 (1998); Michael Madow, Private 2 Davis v. Electronic Arts Inc., No. 12-15737 (9th “commercial” because “the messages in ques- Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Cir. Jan. 6, 2015), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 191 (1993). tion were directed by a commercial speaker to .gov/datastore/opinions/2015/01/06/12-15737.pdf. 20 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F. 2d 1512 a commercial audience, and because they 3 Hart v. Electronic Arts Inc., 717 F. 3d 141 (3d Cir. (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). The case made representations of fact about the speak- 2013). involved a Samsung advertisement for its consumer elec- 4 Keller v. Electronic Arts Inc.,724 F. 3d 1268 (9th Cir. er’s own business operations for the purpose tronics equipment, which depicted various Samsung 2013). of promoting sales of its products....”47 products with various humorous predictions. The com- 5 Davis, No. 12-15737 at 16. mercial was to illustrate that Samsung’s products Retweeting a picture of a celebrity carry- 6 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., would still be used 20 years in the future. The image ing a company’s products, without including 202 F. 2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). in question in this case involved a robot dressed to look any messaging, still seems to be commercial 7 The states with statutory sources of publicity rights like Vanna White beside a game board reminiscent of are California (CIV. CODE §3344-3344.1), Florida speech and problematic from a right of pub- that of Wheel of Fortune, with the caption “Longest (FLA. STAT. ANN. §540.08), Illinois (765 ILL. COMP. licity perspective under Central Hudson and running game show. 2012 A.D.” The U.S. Court of STAT. 1075/1), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §32-36-1-1), Kasky, but possibly not under Bolger. What Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §391.170), Mas- court’s rejection of White’s summary judgment motion if the facts are changed and the company sachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 214, §3A), for a common law right of publicity claim, stating posting the message is truthfully reporting on Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §20-201), Nevada (NEV. that it “declines Samsung and Deutch’s invitation to per- REV. STAT. ANN. §597.7700), New York (N.Y. CIV. a celebrity’s philanthropic involvement with mit the evisceration of the common law right of pub- RIGHTS LAW §§50, 51), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. a charity that the company sponsors? Al- licity through means as facile as those in this case.” §2741.01), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, though there is no definitive answer, what is 21 Id. at 1519. §839.1), Pennsylvania (42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 22 These tests include: 1) the transformative use test clear is that a 140 character message can §8316), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS §9-1-28.1), employed by the California Supreme Court in Comedy expose companies—even ones that are doing Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§47-25-1101-1108), III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387 (2001); more than simply proposing a commercial Texas (TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §26.001-15), Utah 2) the Rogers test, from Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F. 2d (UTAH CODE ANN. §45-3-1), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. transaction—to a Page Six headline and a 994 (2d Cir. 1989); 3) the standard from the RESTATE- §8.01-40), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. multimillion dollar lawsuit. MENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, which was §63.60.010), and Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. used by the Sixth Circuit in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, In light of our culture’s fascination with §895.50). The states that recognize a common law Inc., 332 F. 3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); 4) the predominant celebrities and sports figures, incorporating right of publicity are Alabama, Arizona, California, use test utilized by the Missouri Supreme Court in some elements of their personas into our Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Doe v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 110 S.W. 3d 363 (Mo. Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New messaging—be it a tweet, a Facebook post, a 2003); and 5) the knowingly false standard, a concept Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South virtual reality simulation, a videogame, or a from libel law adopted in some right of publicity cases, Carolina, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. including Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F. 60-second spot—will continue unabated. The states that recognize both a statutory and common 3d 1180 (9th 2001). Likewise, because stars often earn more law right of publicity are California, Florida, Illinois, 23 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. money licensing their name, image, voice, or Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and 562 (1977). The Zacchini case demonstrates that the Wisconsin. likeness and go to great lengths to cultivate doctrine is not confined to commercial speech. In 8 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY their image, their professional representa- Zacchini, the Supreme Court concluded that a televi- AND PRIVACY §6.1 (2d ed. 2014). Courts have struggled tives will continue to enforce their publicity sion station had to compensate a performer when it

12 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 May 2015 Issue Master.qxp 4/14/15 2:05 PM Page 13

aired his entire act without his consent during its 11 o’clock news program. Although the unauthorized use concerned a seemingly newsworthy event, the court held that the First Amendment did not immunize the station. Although commentators have construed the decision narrowly to apply only to misappropriations of a plaintiff’s entire act, its holding illustrates that even newsworthy speech is not beyond the reach of the doctrine. 24 Keller v. Electronic Arts Inc.,724 F. 3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 2013). 25 Id. at 1274-84. 26 Id. at 1283-84. 27 See, e.g., Tyler Ochoa, Rationalizing (?) the Hart and Keller v. EA Sports Publicity Rights Rulings, Guest Blog Post, Tech. & Mktg. Law Blog (Aug. 5, 2013), http://blog .ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/08/a_futile_attemp .htm. 28 Brown v. Entertainment Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 29 Matthew Savare, Falsity, Fault, and Fiction: A New Standard for Defamation in Fiction, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129 (2004). 30 Davis v. Electronic Arts Inc., Case No. 12-15737, 12 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 2015), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts .gov/datastore/opinions/2015/01/06/12-15737.pdf.12. 31 Id. at 14-16. 32 Id. at 16. 33 Civil Case No. 09-2182 (D. Minn. Oct. 10, 2014), avail- able at http://www.loeb.com/~/media/Files/Publication /2014/10/Dryer%20v%20NFL.pdf. 34 Id. at 1. 35 Id. at 39. 36 Id. at 15. 37 Davis, Case No. 12-15737 at 16. 38 Aside from the interplay between the First Amend- ment and the right of publicity, other challenges exist with respect to the right of publicity, including choice of law and forum shopping due to the wide variations in the law, the variations with respect to postmortem protection, and the different definitions and tests employed to determine whether the speech at issue is commercial. Based on these and other factors, numer- ous commentators have called for the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify the doctrine or for the passage of a fed- eral right of publicity law. 39 Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC 551747 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014). 40 Lohan v. Take-Two, Case No. 156443/2014. 41 No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc. 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011). 42 CMG Worldwide Inc. v. Maximum Family Games, LLC et al., Case No. 3:14-cv-05124 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2014) available at http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content /uploads/2014/12/pattonsuit.pdf. 43 See Keller v. Electronic Arts Inc.,724 F. 3d 1268, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 2013). (“Like the majority in Hart, we rely substantially on No Doubt, and believe we are correct to do so.”). 44 Katherine Heigl v. Duane Reade, Inc., Case No. 1:14CV02502 (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 9, 2014). 45 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 46 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S 748, 762 (1976)). 47 Kasky, v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 946 (2002). 48 Lohan v. E*Trade Secs. LLC, Case No. 10-004579, filed in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Nassau. 49 Lohan v. Take-Two, Case No. 156443/2014, filed in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York. 50 Lohan v. Perez, Case No. 2:11-CV-05413 (E.D. N.Y. Feb. 21, 2013).

Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 13 tax tips BY BRADFORD S. COHEN, WALTER R. CALVERT, AND MICHAEL A. BLOOM

Tax Residency Issues for Filmmakers, Actors, and Musicians in California

MOVIES ARE FILMED IN FOREIGN LOCATIONS; musicians go on tour; actors, writers, producers, and directors come to Los Angeles. As a result of all this moving around, people working in entertain- ment may find themselves treated as California residents for income tax purposes even if they do not intend to live here permanently. Certain tax planning techniques may be available, however, to mit- igate the impact of being treated as a California resident, particularly in connection with the sale of substantially appreciated intangible prop- erty, for example musical copyrights. Nevertheless, the consequences of being caught in a state’s tax net are significant. A person who is treated as a resident of a state is typ- ically subject to income tax on all income, even if it was earned else- where. Further, each state has its own residency test, each of which may be satisfied in multiple ways. An individual may be treated as a resident of two states at the same time. To illustrate, a New York actor coming to work on a television series in Los Angeles may be treated as a New York income tax resident under New York’s income tax laws because he or she intends to return to New in California for other than a temporary or transitory purpose. The York upon completion of the project and as a California income tax evaluation is made on a case-by-case basis. resident under California’s income tax laws if the work on the televi- California’s Franchise Tax Board Publication 1013 explains that all sion project is for an indefinite duration. In this scenario, both states relevant facts and circumstances are considered in residency determi- may seek to tax the actor’s worldwide income earned during the period nations. The goal of the facts-and-circumstances test is to determine “the of dual residency. The scenario is not completely dire because relief from place where [the taxpayer] has the closest connections.”7 In this respect, double taxation is typically granted in the form of an “other state tax the “other than a temporary or transitory purpose” test is similar to credit” or OSTC. However, this relief may not be complete.1 the “center of vital interest” test that applies under the tie-breaker res- In California, persons who are classified as residents are subject idency provisions in U.S. income tax treaties with foreign countries. to California income tax on all their income, regardless of where it Publication 1013 lists 13 nonexclusive factors commonly considered was earned.2 Consequently, if a New York actor is treated as a when making this determination. They are 1) the amount of time one California income tax resident as a result of being present in California spends in California versus the amount outside California, 2) the loca- while working on a television show in Los Angeles, he or she would tion of one’s spouse or registered domestic partner and children, 3) the become taxed in California on any income received while a California location of one’s principal residence, 4) the state that issued one’s dri- resident. This may include fixed fees, profit participations, and ver’s license, 5) the state where one’s vehicles are registered, 6) the state deferred compensation earned from earlier New York projects, as well in which one maintains one’s professional licenses, 7) the state in as passive income such as dividends, interest, rents, and royalties. In which one is registered to vote, 8) the location of the banks where one contrast, nonresidents of California are only subject to California maintains accounts, 9) the origination point of one’s financial trans- income tax on income that is derived from California sources. 3 If the actions, 10) the location of one’s medical professionals and other New York actor can avoid being treated as a California resident, he healthcare providers, accountants, and attorneys, 11) the location of or she can limit liability for California income tax to the taxes owed one’s social ties, such as one’s place of worship, professional associa- on income from the L.A. television show. tions, or social and country clubs of which one is a member, 12) the The tax statute for determining who is a California resident or non- location of one’s real property and investments, and 13) the permanence resident is Section 17014 of the California Revenue and Taxation of one’s work assignments in California.8 Code, which defines a resident as including both 1) “[e]very individual This facts-and-circumstances test offers little guidance to taxpay- who is in this state for other than a temporary or transitory purpose”4 ers seeking certainty. However, certain rules and presumptions apply and 2) “[e]very individual domiciled in this state who is outside the state for a temporary or transitory purpose.” 5 A nonresident is Bradford S. Cohen is a partner at Venable LLP in Los Angeles whose practice any person who does not meet either of these tests.6 Not all states apply focuses on business and tax matters for clients in the entertainment and sports the same residency test. In fact, California’s test is a bit of an outlier. industries. Walter R. Calvert is a Venable partner in Baltimore who focuses Many states apply a bright-line, 183-day presence test in lieu of an his practice on state and local tax planning and controversy matters. Michael “other than a temporary or transitory purpose” test. There is no bright- A. Bloom is an associate in the firm’s New York office who provides tax plan-

RICHARD EWING line test for determining when a person is considered to be present ning services to many prominent entertainers and professional athletes.

14 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 under California law to assist in its applica- ciled here. The term “domicile” has a special for income taxes paid to cities or to foreign tion. First, there is a rebuttable presumption legal definition that is not the same as “resi- countries. The credit is allowed only if the that every individual who spends in the aggre- dence.” While many states consider the terms other state does not allow a credit for Cal- gate more than nine months of the taxable to be the same, California views them as two ifornia taxes paid on the same income. This year in California is a California resident. 9 separate concepts, even though they may over- rule prevents credits from being applied in This presumption may be overcome by satis- lap. As discussed in Publication 1013, “[d]omi- both states. California, like most other states, factory evidence that the individual is in the cile is defined for tax purposes as the place limits the amount of the OSTC to the amount state for a temporary or transitory purpose. where you voluntarily establish yourself and of California tax owed on the double-taxed Note that the converse is not true—spending your family, not merely for a special or lim- income. less than nine months of the taxable year in ited purpose, but with a present intention of This tax crediting mechanism is unlikely to California does not necessarily avoid Cali- making it your true, fixed, permanent home provide complete relief for any California fornia residency. Affidavits or testimony of an and principal establishment.”14 Stated differ- income tax paid for two reasons. The first individual and of employers or business asso- ently, “it is the place where, whenever you are reason is that California currently has the ciates that the individual was in the state to absent, you intend to return.”15 highest state income tax rate in the United complete a specific business transaction will Although a taxpayer can be an income tax States (13.3 percent). Therefore, the OSTC usually be sufficient to overcome a presump- resident of several states simultaneously, a allowed in California will almost never equal tion of residency.10 taxpayer can generally only have one place of or exceed the California taxes owed on the Second, Section 17014 of the California domicile. Consequently, once a person has same income. Similarly, with respect to Cali- Code of Regulations provides that presence established California as his or her place of fornia nonresidents, the OSTC allowed in in California for other than a temporary or domicile, the only way that such person can their state of residency will be unlikely to transitory purpose includes “employment in no longer be treated as a California resident equal or exceed the California income taxes California that may last permanently or indef- is to be outside of California for “other than owed on any California source income because initely.”11 This rule may cause differing tax a temporary or transitory purpose.” Entertain- California’s income tax rate is almost certain treatment of film actors versus television ers that come to work in California on a film to be higher. actors. Film actors can probably satisfy this or television project often intend to leave The second reason that this crediting re- test because principal photography lasts for California upon completion of the project. gime may not provide complete relief is that a finite duration. However, television actors They usually do not intend to make California certain types of income do not have a state of may not be able to satisfy this test because their “true, fixed, permanent home and prin- source (e.g., passive investment income such television series run for an indefinite duration cipal establishment” and, therefore, should not as interest and dividends) and therefore may and, while being made, often represent the satisfy the domicile test for California resi- end up being double taxed in the event the actor’s primary source of employment. dency. Once a person establishes California as taxpayer is treated as a resident of two states Third, in apparent acknowledgment of a place of domicile, it is difficult to change it. simultaneously. Therefore, one cannot assume the difficulty in applying this “temporary or To do so, a person must not only leave Cal- that reliance on OSTCs is an adequate sub- transitory purpose” test, the California Legis- ifornia but also affirmatively establish a new stitute for sound tax planning. lature created a safe harbor under Revenue domicile in a different jurisdiction. and Taxation Code Section 17014(d), which California residency opinions issued by the Changing Domicile provides: California State Board of Equalization are not California domiciliaries looking to reduce For any taxable year beginning on or easily reconcilable. The only common thread their state tax burden may consider a domi- after January 1, 1994, any individual is that taxpayers seem to lose. One rationale cile shift—that is, leaving California and domiciled in this state who is absent often given in these opinions is that a taxpayer establishing a domicile in a state with a lower from the state for an uninterrupted is a resident if he or she receives the benefits and income tax rate, such as Texas or Florida. This period of at least 546 consecutive days protections of California’s laws and government is easier said than done. It requires: 1) aban- under an employment-related contract over an extended period of time. Therefore, the doning the California domicile, 2) physically shall be considered outside this state for more time a taxpayer spends in California, the moving to and residing in a new locality, and other than a temporary or transitory greater the likelihood that he or she will receive 3) demonstrating by actions an intent to purpose.12 these benefits and protections, and be deemed remain in the new locality permanently or For purposes of this safe harbor, returns a California resident. indefinitely.18 Taxpayers generally must sell or to California totaling, in the aggregate, not If a person is not a California resident, lease their current California home, take their more than 45 days during the taxable year are only income from California sources is sub- children out of California schools, move bank disregarded. However, the safe harbor does ject to California income tax. California’s accounts, and change driver’s licenses, vehi- not apply if 1) the taxpayer has income from sourcing rules are set forth under Revenue and cle registrations, and voting registrations. stocks, bonds, notes, or intangible personal Taxation Code Sections 17951 and 17952. In- Because of the difficulty in accomplishing property in excess of $200,000 in any taxable come from California sources includes, with- a domicile shift, the safe harbor alternative year in which the employment-related con- out limitation, 1) income from real or tangi- under Revenue and Taxation Code Section tract is in effect, or 2) the principal purpose ble property located within California, 2) 17014(d) can be attractive. As discussed above, of the individual’s absence from the state is compensation for services performed within this safe harbor alternative provides that any to avoid California income tax.13 This safe California, and 3) intangible income that has person domiciled in California who is absent harbor is attractive to entertainers because it a business situs in California.16 from the state for an uninterrupted period of allows them to escape the California tax net These sourcing rules are also important for at least 546 consecutive days under an employ- while retaining domicile in California. California income tax residents. This is be- ment-related contract shall be treated as a While some may qualify as residents for cause California allows its residents a credit California nonresident (subject to the $200,000 being in California for other than a tempo- against their California income liability for intangible income limitation). This safe harbor rary or transitory purpose, others may be taxes paid to another state on income that is provision, therefore, allows a California domi- treated as income tax residents by being domi- sourced to that state. 17 No credit is allowed ciliary to drop out of the California tax net

Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 15 while retaining his or her California domicile ized as service income and therefore should not the domicile change. so long as the foreign state activity occurs count toward the $200,000 intangible income Under Section 17952(c) of the California pursuant to an employment contract. Two limitation noted above. However, the $200,00 Code of Regulations, intangible personal examples of how this may be feasible are 1) an intangible income limitation would include property has a business situs in [California] actor does back-to-back movies outside of “portfolio” income, such as interest and div- if it is “employed as capital in this State or the California or 2) a musician goes on an extended idends, and may include any royalties received possession and control of the property has non-California concert tour or is conducting from film or record profits if the individual been localized in connection with a business, extended non-California recording activities. owns all or part of the underlying rights. trade or profession in this State so that its sub- If the taxpayer qualifies for this rule, it A planning opportunity may exist when a stantial use and value attach to and become may allow him or her to avoid paying Cal- California resident anticipates selling a highly an asset of the business, trade or profession ifornia income tax on his non-California source valuable intangible asset, such as a music cat- in this State.”20 This regulation also provides income, which is paid or accrued while outside alog. This type of planning is similar to the that if intangible personal property of a non- of California. This would include compensa- planning often done for individuals who antic- resident has acquired a California business tion for personal services rendered outside of ipate selling substantially appreciated closely situs, “the entire income from the property California during the period of nonresidency. held business stock. The rationale of these including gains from the sale thereof, regard- Less clear, however, is whether it would apply strategies is the same: intangible assets (whether less of where the sale is consummated, is to profit participations and other forms of closely held stock or a music catalog) are gen- income from sources within this State, taxable contingent compensation earned in connection erally sourced to the state of a taxpayer’s to the nonresident.”21 Little guidance exists with the performance of the non-California ser- domicile under the principle of mobilia sequ- on the issue of what it takes for a copyright vices because not all events may have occurred untur personam (chattels follow the person). to acquire a “business situs” in California. to generate the income during this period of Thus, by changing one’s domicile, one can In Holly Sugar Corporation v. McColgan,22 nonresidency—e.g., the determination of the often change the state of sourcing of income the California Board of Equalization held amount of the contingent compensation realized from the sale of intangible property. that “[b]usiness situs arises from the act of the payable to the taxpayer from future sales.19 Changing one’s domicile away from Cal- owner of the intangibles in employing the Stated differently, such amounts would not ifornia to reduce the state income taxes owed wealth represented thereby, as an integral have become fixed and determinable during the on the sale of the intangible property is sub- portion of the business activity of the partic- period of nonresidency. ject to two notable caveats. The first caveat ular place, so that it becomes identified with Taxpayers with significant profit partici- is that the intangible asset cannot have a the economic structure of that place….”23 pations and residuals should still be able to take business situs in California; otherwise, gain Applying the foregoing standard, the Cal- advantage of this safe harbor. Profit partici- from the sale of the intangible will continue ifornia Franchise Tax Board held in Ruling pations and residuals are properly character- to be sourced to California notwithstanding No. 145 that copyrights relating to course materials did not acquire a “business situs” in California as a result of their being licensed into the state by a California nonresident for use by an unrelated individual in California. According to the Franchise Tax Board, “there must be further ‘localization’ of the intangi- ble asset” before the intangible acquired busi- ness situs in California. Based on the forgoing guidance, it would seem that merely licensing a song catalog into California for use in television commercials and movie trailers would not give rise to “busi- ness situs” in California because it would not arise from the act of the owner thereof (the songwriter) using the musical copyright as part of an integral portion of its business activity in California. The second caveat to this type of planning is that the property sold must represent an intangible (e.g., a musical copyright) as op- posed to a form of deferred compensation. The label given to the property is not deter- minative, and the contract giving rise to such rights must be carefully analyzed in making this determination. The relevant analysis is illus- trated by California and federal income tax authorities. For example, in its Ruling Number 345, the California Franchise Tax Board ruled that amounts titled “royalties” received by an author from a New York publishing company for textbooks written in California were actu- ally compensation for services because they

16 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 were earned “under a continuing contract income relates to a “publishing” contract concerned. Therefore, it is possible for an individual with the publisher.”24 In IRS Program Man- without any specific output requirements, to be considered a nonresident for U.S. federal income tax purposes (either under U.S. law or under the rel- ager Technical Assistance Memorandum the income payable to the service provider evant foreign income tax treaty) but a resident of 2007-0007, IRS counsel advised that pay- thereunder will likely be treated as royalty California. ments made in respect of a “writer’s share” income as opposed to deferred compensa- 2 REV. & TAX. CODE §17041(a)(1). interest in a musical copyright were royalty tion. In the latter scenario, if the taxpayer 3 REV. & TAX. CODE §17014(b). income (not compensation income) because anticipates selling this income stream, the 4 REV. & TAX. CODE §17014(a)(1). 5 the music publishing contract under which the taxpayer could consider undertaking a domi- REV. & TAX. CODE §17014(a)(2). 6 REV. & TAX. CODE §17015. songs were made: 1) did not obligate the tax- cile shift to a lower tax jurisdiction to mini- 7 California Franchise Tax Board, Guidelines for De- payer to write any music and 2) granted the mize the state income taxes owed on the gain termining Resident Status—2011, at 4, available at music publisher only a limited copyright in the from the sale of this “intangible.” As dis- https://www.ftb.ca.gov. music—i.e., the right to use the songs in U.S. cussed above, accomplishing a domicile shift 8 Id. 9 markets. In Revenue Ruling 74-555, the IRS requires 1) abandoning your California domi- REV. & TAX. CODE §17016. 10 CAL. CODE REGS. §17014(d). held that amounts received by a foreign cile, 2) physically moving to and residing in 11 CAL. CODE REGS. §17014(b). author under a contract granting a U.S. com- a new locality, and 3) intending to remain in 12 REV. & TAX. CODE §17014(d). pany the U.S. serial rights in his exclusive the new locality permanently or indefinitely. 13 CAL. CODE REGS. §17014(d)(1)-(4). output of both long and short stories were In conclusion, it is worthwhile for indi- 14 California Franchise Tax Board, Guidelines for royalty income because the contract “did not viduals working in the entertainment industry Determining Resident Status—2011, at 7. 15 Id. prescribe in any manner what the taxpayer to pay attention to California’s rules regarding 16 CAL. CODE REGS. §17951-2. 25 was to write or when it was to be written.” residency and domicile. With awareness of 17 See REV. & TAX. CODE §175951(a). As these authorities illustrate, making the these rules, one can structure one’s affairs as 18 CAL. CODE REGS. §17014. determination between compensation and best as possible to avoid being treated as a 19 See REV. & TAX. CODE §17554; see also Cal. income derived from the ownership of an California resident altogether. However, even Franchise Tax Board Legal Ruling No. 132 (June 23, intangible requires a careful analysis of the if this cannot be done, steps can be taken to 1958) and Cal. Franchise Tax Board Legal Ruling No. 340 (Oct. 5, 1970). contract giving rise to such income. mitigate the negative effects of being treated 20 CAL. CODE REGS. §17952(c). In general, if the income is paid under a as a California resident (e.g., acceleration or 21 Id. contract to provide services, pursuant to deferral of income). Thus, for those who 22 Holly Sugar Corp. v. McColgan, 115 P. 2d 8 (Cal. which the service provider did not retain any enter, all is not lost. I 1941). 23 interest in the copyright produced from the Id. at 11. 24 Cal. Franchise Tax Board Legal Ruling No. 345 1 States are not bound by and generally do not follow engagement, such income should be treated (Sept. 15, 1970). U.S. tax treaties insofar as residency determinations are as deferred compensation. In contrast, if the 25 Rev. Rul. 74-555, 1974-2 C.B. 202 (1974).

Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 17 Entertainment law issue

by JILL L. SMITH

PERK POINTS

Publicity services, approval rights, exclusivity, and approvals are often key elements of a deal between actors and studios

A CONTRACT IS an “agreement, upon suf- For theatrical motion pictures or long- pany during production periods and subject to ficient consideration, to do or not to do a par- form television motion pictures, settling on the professional availability during periods not ticular thing.”1 In the entertainment field, an fee payable to the actor can often raise more consecutive to the production period. Both attorney often is brought into a contract questions. The first question is likely to be, parties must agree upon the extent to which the negotiation on behalf of an actor client after “What services are covered by the fee?” For flat fee covers these services. an agent has discussed and potentially re- day and weekly player agreements, which Actors are typically required to render solved some of the material deal points— are the standard for newcomers and unknown services for preproduction (rehearsal, cos- most likely the fee and credit. The attorney performers, the answer is usually simple. A tume fittings, etc.), production (i.e., principal is likely to handle the remaining noncom- day rate covers a day of services; a weekly rate photography), postproduction (which may pensation provisions that are essential to the covers a week. But the answer is not as obvi- include special effects work, dubbing, and deal. While actors just starting their careers ous in a “flat fee” deal, which is the norm for reshoots), and publicity for the film. It is not often have little leverage or desire to haggle talent of greater stature and for roles requir- unusual for an actor’s deal to be based on a over much beyond a standard deal, seasoned ing services longer than a few days or weeks. set amount of services, broken down into a or breakout performers may be able to nego- One issue is likely to be exclusivity, which specific number of days for consecutive exclu- tiate for better nonfinancial terms. The pro- is generally not a contentious issue in movie visions that can make or break a deal are deals. The presumption is that the actor’s ser- Jill L. Smith is an entertainment attorney at

largely dependent on the type of deal at issue. vices will be exclusive to the production com- Kleinberg Lange Cuddy & Carlo LLP in Los Angeles. MICHAEL CALLAWAY

18 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 sive preproduction services, a specified num- In addition to compensation, another Another key area of negotiation in respect ber of weeks for shooting, and a maximum deal point that is usually raised early is credit. of motion picture talent deals is the use of the number of days for postproduction services. Discussions will involve the order of the artist’s name, likeness, and voice. No one The actor may be required to render services actor’s credit in relation to other actors as disputes the studio’s ability to use the actor’s beyond those specified, for which the pro- well as other details such as size and place- recorded performance in the movie itself, but duction company pays additional sums ment. While the movie-watching public may the breadth to which that performance may known as overages. pay scant attention to the placement of cred- be used beyond the movie and publicity, pro- Parties will often agree to a “run of show” its before or after the title of the movie or in motion, and advertising for the movie can deal in which the fee is intended to cover the big bold letters in a poster, talent and pro- result in extensive conversations prior to services for the entire length of production. duction attorneys tasked with working out agreement. The request in a talent deal to a However, there can be differing interpretations these complexities are typically quite con- “one picture license” is commonly under- of what that means. A production company cerned with whether the credit to actor A or stood to mean that the results and proceeds may expect that a “run of show” deal means B will appear first, or at the same time, or of the actor’s services may only be used in the that there is no chance for overages and that with one on the upper right side and one on picture itself and in advertising, promotion, no matter how long the shoot lasts, the flat the lower left. While the usual focus is on get- and publicity for the picture. The biggest fee covers all production services. The talent, ting the biggest and best credit, there are hurdles to overcome in that regard concern on the other hand, may interpret a “run of instances in which no credit is permitted. the right to use the talent’s name, likeness, and show” deal to mean that the fee covers the For example, a high-stature actor appearing voice in connection with merchandising and period of shooting based on the scheduled in a cameo may insist on not being accorded soundtrack albums. period as of the start of the shoot. In that case, any credit. The intricacies of credit negotia- The request for a one-picture license is no the expectation might be that if the shoot tion at times will also involve discussions longer as innocuous as it was in the past. A goes overschedule, the actor will be entitled about the use of an actor’s image in adver- successful movie can lead not only to a line to overages. Notwithstanding the efforts of tising for a movie. A contract might address of board games, toys, books, and music videos both parties to negotiate each material deal not only when the likeness can, or must, be but also to mobile applications, computer term prior to papering a deal, these issues of used, but also the size of the actor’s image in wallpapers, video and computer games, theme interpretation may not become apparent until relation to other likenesses appearing in the park rides, and ice arena shows. In this both sides attempt to document their differ- same advertisement. instance, the determinative factor is less likely ing understanding of the deal. to be about the performer’s stature and more Similar discussions are required concern- Approval Rights likely to be about what studio is involved, as ing the number of days included in the flat fee Some actors have sufficient clout to be Disney and Universal have theme parks. At for preproduction and postproduction ser- accorded certain creative approval rights. times a studio will insist on the ability to use vices. In addition, there may be limitations on Typical areas of such creative input are in an actor’s name or likeness in connection the type of postproduction eligible to be respect of the selection of the director, the final with merchandising. Short of the actor’s end- included in the flat fee. For instance, are screenplay, and other principal cast mem- ing negotiations (which can happen), the reshoots to be considered postproduction ser- bers. But not all approval rights are the same. next best step is to ensure that the actor is vices covered by the flat fee or additional Most approval rights afforded talent will appropriately compensated for this use. photography services that could give rise to provide that, in the event of a disagreement, Merchandising tends to be an all-or-noth- overages? The more attention given to these the studio’s decision will prevail. An absolute ing proposition. Most pictures have little or issues during negotiation, the less likely dis- approval right, however, provides the actor no merchandising, but when a movie’s mer- agreements will arise during the documenta- with the ability to walk away from the pic- chandising campaign hits, it can hit big. It is tion phase. ture if the actor does not approve a certain ele- incumbent on the talent attorney to ensure ment. Such an approval right can put an that the royalty provisions are adequately Publicity Services and Credit entire movie in jeopardy, a potentially unten- and clearly negotiated. But even under the best The requirement to render publicity services able position from the perspective of a studio of circumstances with heavily negotiated pro- is another area for debate. Studios often con- that may have already invested millions of visions, an actor may not feel that he or she sider an actor’s promotional and publicity dollars in development and preproduction. is getting what was promised.2 services essential to the deal. Some studios will Similarly, an actor of a certain stature may The use of someone else to dub an actor’s attempt to make it a requirement that the find it wholly unacceptable to work on a voice in their native language can be embar- actor be present at certain promotional events film that he or she does not completely sup- rassing from the actor’s perspective—or nec- (e.g., the picture’s premiere). While seem- port. A typical compromise would provide for essary from the studio’s. While not at all the ingly reasonable, this requirement may affect a true approval right to convert into a con- only instance, Andie MacDowell’s entire per- the actor’s ability to take on other work, as sultation right at some point prior to the formance in 1984’s Greystoke: The Legend the new job may conflict with the deal pic- start of shooting; but even that concept will of Tarzan, Lord of the Apes was famously ture’s publicity schedule. require the parties’ agreement as to when overdubbed by Glenn Close.3 Limiting the cir- Another issue involving required promo- that conversion occurs. cumstances under which the voices of actors tional services could arise in the case of an Other common approval rights concern can be dubbed and providing actors with the actor who is taking less money to work on a the actor’s photograph, nonphotographic first opportunity to dub in their native lan- movie or is not receiving any contingent com- likeness, and biography as well as behind-the- guage are customary compromises. pensation. In that situation, actors may believe scenes materials including the actor and Consideration also needs to be given to the that they should not be obligated to render footage recorded for, but not used in, the studio’s ability to re-create an actor’s like- publicity services. A well-known actor appear- picture. It is not unusual for an actor to have ness. Use of technology to fabricate an actor’s ing in a cameo role may feel that it is not input on some or all of these areas. The image means that the use of a double is no appropriate to publicize the picture, given degree of that input will depend on the par- longer the only way to do so. An attorney rep- the small role, for example. ties involved. resenting an actor will want to give consid-

20 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 eration to these issues in order to ensure the integrity of the actor’s work.

Nudity Another area often addressed in talent deals is the extent to which an actor may appear in nude, semi-nude, and sex scenes. For most roles, this topic is a nonissue; there will be no nudity or sex scenes. For others, this issue can result in heated discussions between the production attorney and the talent attorney. The SAG-AFTRA Agreement states: “The ap- pearance of a performer in a nude or sex scene or the doubling of a performer in such a scene shall be conditioned upon his or her prior written consent.”4 Separate consent is typically contained in a nudity rider, which “must include a general description as to the extent of the nudity and the type of physical contact required in the scene.”5 Indeed, the nudity rider more typically addresses, in painstaking detail, the specific permitted and nonpermit- ted filming areas of the actor’s body as well as the use of the materials. If an actor agrees to perform in nude scenes and then reneges on the agreement, the usual recourse for the produc- tion company is that a body double will be hired. The engagement of a body double in those circumstances is permitted by SAG- AFTRA.6 However, there has been a recent counter-suit filing by the company that pro- duces Femme Fatales for Cinemax against an actress, Anne Greene, for allegedly breaching the applicable nudity rider by retracting con- sent.7 Time will tell if that reaction proves credible. compensation issues raised in talent deals for threshold issue in a series deal will be the motion pictures are the same in series deal number of options granted to the studio. It Perquisites and Options negotiations, there are significant distinctions. is typical in these instances for the studio to The final area of nonboilerplate, noncom- Deals and fees for a series regular are gen- want options totaling seven seasons (or pensation terms in respect to an actor’s motion erally structured as a per-episode payment. seven and a half if the show initially airs in picture deal concerns perks. This area, like the But even that resolved issue brings its own set the spring). The number of options results in others, comes with a wide range of possibil- of questions and negotiations. It is not unusual a long-term commitment from the actor and ities. The A-lister commanding a private jet for a series to include episodes in which a reg- impacts the inevitable renegotiation of a series and a full entourage including an on-set ular cast member does not appear. The ques- deal which occurs once a series becomes a pilates teacher, masseuse, and chef is far from tion of whether or not that actor is nonethe- success; that is, the shorter the commitment, routine. Nonetheless, negotiations between less paid for that episode depends on how his the more leverage the actor has if a series the studio and the actor’s attorney may go into deal was negotiated. becomes a hit. the finest details. The particulars concerning The gold standard in such respects is for the type and size of dressing room and the an actor to be paid his or her episodic rate Exclusivity and Relocation amenities to be included in it, the hotel, room on an “all episodes produced” basis. The A main component of a television series deal type, quality of ground transportation (for actor would then be compensated for all is exclusivity. The requirements of exclusiv- both self-drive and with a driver) and, of episodes even if he or she appears in less ity flow in two directions—what other services course, the class and number of roundtrip air than all. Even then there will be a discussion the actor is permitted to render and when transportations to be provided, are all likely as to whether there is a minimum number of those services may be rendered. Unlike feature to be discussed. episodes guaranteed per season. Particularly motion pictures, which customarily have a Although a television or internet/stream- in light of the long production schedule and straightforward beginning and end of pro- ing series may begin as a pilot (or even just a burdensome exclusivity requirements, there duction schedule requiring an actor’s exclu- test in which an actor auditions for a pilot), are strong justifications for an actor to be sive services and after which the actor is the specifics are customarily entirely negotiated guaranteed payment for a certain number of released, a television series by its nature is in before the actor says a single line on camera. episodes each season. a relatively constant state of production and Series deals differ from theatrical or MOW Although some series regular actor deals postproduction during which there will be motion picture deals primarily because they are intended for one season only, the tradi- stretches of time when an actor’s services are have the potential for continuing for so many tional series deal will grant the studio options not needed. As a result, a series actor is not years. Accordingly, while some of the non- for additional seasons. Accordingly, another usually barred from rendering outside services

Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 21 during production periods, albeit in second Another venue for an actor to render ser- approval of the director of the commercial as position to the series. The bigger issue in vices is in connection with product or service well as the storyboard prior to committing to series deals is the other aspect of exclusivity— commercials or endorsements. By nature, rendering services. While the company will the nature of permitted outside services. endorsements focus on the use of an actor’s be reluctant to give an actor approval rights As a starting point, studios want the actors name, likeness, voice, and persona. The value that could significantly affect the company’s on their shows to be relatively exclusive to the of an actor’s name and likeness in connection right to use materials already created (and show, at least in respect of television and, with supporting a particular product or ser- paid for), certain deals will nevertheless pro- more recently, internet programming. So, vice is evidenced by the number of lawsuits vide an actor with additional approval rights even when the agreement permits an actor to by an actor or actor’s estate in which a like- over the finished products. In light of the render outside services, there is a practical ness was used without consent.8 Accordingly, Federal Trade Commission’s truth-in-adver- limit to his or her ability to do so. Since the issues relating to such usage are of para- tising requirements, including that “[e]ndorse- actor may only have periods of a few con- mount importance in these deals. ments must reflect the honest opinions...or secutive days off, other than during true hia- A starting point for the question of per- experiences of the endorser,”9 approvals can tus periods (traditionally during May and mitted usage will be the type of services protect endorsers as well as sponsors. For ex- June), from the beginning of production of a required. The range of possible services in- ample, Octavia Spencer was awarded almost season to the season’s production wrap, it will cludes on-camera work, voice-over services, $1 million in damages in a default judgment be nearly impossible for an actor to schedule live appearances, still photography sessions, against Sensa, a weight loss company, for work on a feature. And, whereas it may be or any combination of these. The services wrongful termination of her endorsement more realistic to coordinate production sched- rendered pursuant to these types of deals are contract based on her appropriate social ules for an appearance on another series, the usually more limited and may result in more media postings that reflected that she was a actor’s deal may preclude that. While there flexible scheduling for the actor. paid sponsor.10 may be some exceptions to television exclu- Once the nature of the required services is One issue unique to these types of deals is sivity in episodic deals (a limited number of determined, the manner in which the services the nature of protection afforded the actor guest spots, appearance in foreign commer- can be used is the overriding issue requiring arising out of a third party’s use of the prod- cials and services in nonidentified voice-over resolution. For instance, a deal requiring one uct endorsed. An injured party will often commercials are commonly permitted), in day of on-camera services can result in a mul- seek relief against anyone affiliated with a general, an actor signed to a series role has titude of commercials in various lengths as well product causing the injury that could include made a significant commitment. as still photographs that can be used in print the actor who has been promoting the prod- Another distinction between series deals ads or the like. The details of the allowable uct. While the actor may ultimately be and movie deals concerns location services. usage will address territory, term, and media. released from the claim or otherwise deter- For a movie, the actor may need to be on loca- These negotiations can be a critical aspect of mined to be not responsible, the burden of tion for several months. For a television series, the deal for actors with existing deals (e.g., for defending himself from a frivolous claim if the show is successful, there is a possibil- a series) that impose limitations on their abil- should not fall on the actor. Accordingly, the ity that the actor will be at the production ity to appear in commercials. issues of liability insurance and indemnifi- location more than at his or her preseries An infrequently used but potent provis- cation provisions are of particular impor- residence. ion in this type of deal is a liquidated dam- tance in these types of deals. An actor may be provided with tradi- ages provision. Such a clause would obligate Notwithstanding the many similarities tional travel and expenses for pilot services. the contracting party (often the advertising among all talent deals, the differences between However, most series actor deals will provide agency rather than the product manufac- them require a talent attorney to evaluate, that if the series is produced on location the turer) to pay the actor for each individual analyze, and negotiate each deal individually actor will receive a one-time relocation fee in breach of the agreement. The amounts are and at some point make a determination about lieu of accommodations and per diem. For usually very high (six or seven figures per whether a deal is in place. When all goes some individuals, the possibility of such breach), which creates a strong incentive to smoothly, as it does more often than not, that uproot can result in the death of a deal. comply with the terms of the deal. determination will not be subject to scrutiny. Another area of significance in an endorse- But, when something goes wrong, a threshold Publicity ment-type agreement is exclusivity. The exclu- question may be whether or not there was a An actor’s publicity commitment is also sig- sivity at issue does not relate to the actor’s abil- contract. The most famous, or perhaps infa- nificant in a series deal. Like motion picture ity to do other work but rather to what mous, situation regarding that issue reached talent deals, most publicity services are sub- products the actor may be prohibited from involved the motion picture Boxing Helena ject to the actor’s professional availability. also endorsing during the term of the deal at and a lawsuit by the producers against Kim However, most studios also obligate the actor issue. Is an actor appearing in a beer com- Basinger after she backed out of portraying the to be present at certain events (e.g., the Tele- mercial to be prohibited from promoting lead role. While the producers were initially vic- vision Critics Association Press Tour occur- another beer, any other alcoholic beverage, any torious against Basinger in the 1993 jury trial,11 ring in January and July, and the annual up- refrigerated beverage, or any beverage at all? the verdict was ultimately overthrown and front presentations and related activities The actor will want the scope of exclusivity the case settled.12 occurring in May), further affecting an actor’s to be as narrowly defined as possible while the A diametrically opposite lawsuit was the ability to take outside work. company whose product the actor is endors- topic of another notable case filed in 2001 The other nonfinancial deal terms that ing may want to broaden the scope to both by Sharon Stone in which Stone alleged that may be addressed in a talent agreement for a protect the brand and to have the actor’s her deal to reprise her star-turning role from series are for the most part comparable to endorsement be that much more meaningful. Basic Instinct was in place.13 Stone’s suit those of a feature deal. Those provisions will against the producers of Basic Instinct 2 assuredly include credit as well as approvals Approvals and Liability was initiated when the production was can- and restrictions in respect of the use of the Approval rights in these types of deals may celed. That case eventually settled,14 and, actor’s name, voice, likeness and biography. also be significant. An actor may require ultimately resulted in the completion and

22 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 23 release of the sequel starring Stone. As the suits involving Basinger and Stone reveal, ROSS MEDIATION SERVICES it is not always comprehensible to both sides Integrity Commitment Success whether or not an agreement is reached. The bottom line is that the attorney tasked SPECIALTY AREAS with closing an actor’s deal needs to carefully • Real Estate • Business/Commercial consider all issues particular to, and the • Mortgage & Lending • Escrow/Title/Agency individual circumstances of, that deal. Not • Trusts & Estates • Workplace one of these issues by itself is usually in- • Construction • Multi-Party surmountable; rather, it is the totality of • Personal Injury • Professional Liability the deal (which certainly includes the com- BARRY ROSS,ESQ., MBA pensation) that gets evaluated and results in (818) 840-0950 either mutual agreement on all material www.ROSSmediation.com issues or an endnote in an article about deals gone awry. I

1 See http://thelawdictionary.org/contract. 2 See, e.g., Scott Zamost, ‘Happy Days’ actors settle law- suit with CBS, CNN (July 7, 2012), at http://www.cnn .com/2012/07/06/showbiz/happy-days-lawsuit-settled; Dominic Patten, Fox Hit With $250M ‘Simpsons’ Law- suit by ‘Goodfellas’ Actor, Deadline (Oct. 21, 2014), at http: //deadline.com/2014/10/simpsons-lawsuit-goodfellas -character-rip-off-fox-857282. 3 See, e.g., Andie Macdowell at http://www.tcm.com NotSoBIGLAW.com /tcmdb/person/118671%7C0/Andie-Macdowell; Mark Iveson, 10 actors who got dubbed out of their movies copyright • trademark (Mar. 16 2011), at http://www.shadowlocked.com /201103161613/lists/10-actors-who-got-dubbed-out -of-their-movies.html. 4 SAG-AFTRA Agreement, Art. 43.D, available at http: //www.sagaftra.org/files/sag/2005theatricalagreement NOT SO BIGLAW® is a service mark of Paul D. Supnik .pdf. 5 Id. 6 “If a performer has agreed to appear in such scenes and then withdraws his or her consent, Producer shall have the right to double, but consent may not be with- drawn as to film already photographed.” Id. 7 Eriq Gardner, Producers Allowed to Sue Actress for Refusing to Film Nude Sex Scene, The Hollywood Re- porter (Oct. 20 2014), at http://www.hollywoodreporter .com/thr-esq/producers-allowed-sue-actress-refusing -742081. 8 See, e.g., Nate Raymond, Katherine Heigl, Duane Reade end lawsuit over actress’ photo, Reuters.com (Aug. 27, 2014), at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/27 /us-people-katherineheigl-idUSKBN0GR2BD20140827. 9 Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §255.1(a). 10 See, e.g., Eriq Gardner, Octavia Spencer’s Tweets at Center of Endorsement Lawsuit (Exclusive), The Hollywood Reporter (Aug. 28 2013), at http://www .hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/octavia-spencers-tweets -at-center-616596; Daniel Taylor, Octavia Spencer Wins Wrongful Termination Lawsuit Involving Tweets, FindLaw (Dec. 24, 2014), at http://blogs.findlaw .com/celebrity_justice/2014/12/octavia-spencer-wins -wrongful-termination-lawsuit-involving-tweets.html. 11 Robert W. Welkos, Basinger Ordered to Pay $8.9 Million for Jilting Film, (Mar. 25, 1993), available at http://articles.latimes.com/1993 -03-25/news/mn-14793_1_kim-basinger. 12 Judy Brennan and Edward J. Boyer, Damages Against Kim Basinger in Film Suit Voided, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 23, 1994), available at http://articles.latimes .com/1994-09-23/local/me-42074_1_boxing-helena. 13 Stone’s Basic Instinct: Sue the producers, The Guardian (June 7 2001), at http://www.theguardian.com/film /2001/jun/07/news. 14 Robert W. Welkos, Settlement Near in Suit Over ‘Basic Instinct 2,’ LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 14, 2004), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/14 /business/fi-stone14.

24 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 MCLE ARTICLE AND SELF-ASSESSMENT TEST By reading this article and answering the accompanying test questions, you can earn one MCLE credit. To apply for credit, please follow the instructions on the test answer sheet on page 27.

by WILLIAM S. RYDEN TRANSMUTATION OF LAW

Under Marriage of Valli, third-party transactions are not exempt from transmutation rules

WHEN the California Supreme Court issues the sole beneficiary of the cash proceeds upon butted only by clear and convincing proof.” an opinion that addresses a community prop- his death. It was clear from the terms of In Valli, the supreme court held that “We erty issue, family law practitioners take note.1 the policy that Valli had divested himself need not…decide here whether Evidence In the recent In re Marriage of Valli deci- of ownership and control, apparently for Code section 662’s form of title presump- sion,2 the court held that a $3.75 million estate planning purposes. The court of appeal tion…applies.…Assuming for the sake of whole life insurance policy that singer Frankie had unanimously determined that because argument that [it] may sometimes apply, it Valli purchased from a third-party insurance ownership stood in Mrs. Valli’s name with Mr. does not apply when it conflicts with the company, naming his wife as sole owner and Valli’s knowledge and consent, the policy was transmutation statutes.”3 sole beneficiary, should be characterized as a presumed to be her separate property. The The basic facts in Valli were not in dispute. community property asset. The Valli deci- supreme court, in reaching its result, expand- During the marriage, Mr. Valli acquired the sion also involves the issues of transmuta- ed the law of transmutation to include not policy on his life and named his wife as its sole tion and the application of Evidence Code only transactions between spouses but also owner and sole beneficiary. The trial record Section 662. Although straightforward in its between a spouse and a third party. indicated that Mrs. Valli did not participate holding, Valli is a departure from prior trans- Valli also limits what role Evidence Code in the transaction. She did not suggest that she mutation cases and has possible consequences Section 662 may have on characterization be the owner nor the amount of insurance that could affect estate planning and creditor of property in a dissolution. The supreme that should be acquired. Mr. Valli had the rights. court considered whether the policy should be assistance of professionals (his business man- In Valli, the key distinction from prior characterized as community property or sep- cases holding that insurance policies pur- arate property under Section 662, which William S. Ryden is a certified family law special- chased with community funds are community states: “The owner of the legal title to prop- ist and a partner with Jaffe and Clemens in Beverly property was the fact that Valli had named his erty is presumed to be the owner of the full Hills. He was lead counsel for Mrs. Valli at trial and spouse both as legal owner of the policy and beneficial title. This presumption may be re- through the appeal.

Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 25 ager and life insurance agent) in making his is adversely affected.6 The purpose of the stitute a transmutation because the consent decision to acquire and title the policy. He transmutation legislation was to eliminate paragraphs did not expressly state that the paid the life insurance premiums with com- the ability of spouses to claim that the char- consent constituted a transfer of her commu- munity property funds. There is no question acter of property changed based on an alleged nity interest in the funds to her husband. that he relinquished all indicia of legal own- oral agreement or a party’s conduct. MacDonald fashioned two requirements. A ership, beneficial ownership, and manage- sufficient writing under Section 852 must MacDonald ment and control of the policy. Transmutation in contain 1) language of transfer and 2) an Clearly, Valli did not have any expectation Estate of MacDonald7 was the first significant express statement that characterizes the title of sharing in the economic benefits, since the case to address the transmutation issue. In this of the property after transfer. An important death benefit would be payable upon his case, the court exposed a defective attempt to point to note is that the court would not death. This is not an uncommon occurrence. create a transmutation. MacDonald was an allow extrinsic evidence to further interpret the For estate planning purposes, couples often action by the children of a decedent wife to actual writing. If the writing is ambiguous as take out life insurance policies and place title establish her community property interest in to the intention to change the character of or ownership in one spouse’s name to keep the the value of the husband’s IRA accounts. The property, the writing fails, and the transmu- proceeds out of the insured’s estate in order evidence relating to the alleged transmutation tation will be denied. Unwritten intent to cre- to avoid or reduce estate taxes. In certain was uncontroverted. Prior to her death from ate a transmutation will not be allowed to be instances couples do not consult with attor- cancer, the wife and her husband intended and shown through extrinsic evidence. It is also neys before acquiring policies, nor are they attempted to divide the community estate so worth noting that the MacDonald decision likely to discuss the possible legal and eco- that her children by a prior marriage would favors a finding in favor of the community.11 nomic consequences that will flow from their receive her share of the community property In 1995, in In re Marriage of Haines,12 the choices if there is a later divorce. and his children from a former marriage court of appeal determined that transmuta- Prior to Valli, no family law case had would receive his share. The trial court found tions can be completed by way of a quit- extended the Family Code’s transmutation that in signing a consent to certain agree- claim deed. Taking the analysis a step further, statutes to apply to transactions between a ments in connection with the husband’s IRA the court determined that interspousal trans- spouse and a third party. No family law case accounts, the wife intended to transmute her actions must comply with the rules control- prior to Valli eliminated application of community property interest in those funds ling actions of persons occupying confidential Evidence Code Section 662 to characteriza- to the husband’s separate property. relations with each other. Transmutations tion issues.4 The facts of Valli provided the The California Supreme Court reversed are subject to the fiduciary rules governing court with an opportunity to carve out an the appellate court on grounds that the doc- spouses and the spouse benefitting from the exception for situations in which the con- uments purportedly transmuting the IRA transaction has the burden of overcoming duct of a party or the writings signed by a interest did not meet the writing require- the presumption that an advantage was party demonstrate that the party intended ments of Civil Code Section 5110.730 (which gained by the exercise of undue influence. In to relinquish all ownership interest in an is now Family Code Section 852). The court Haines, one spouse obtained a quitclaim deed asset, or alternatively, to carve out an excep- expressly disregarded the intent of the parties, from the other by telling her that he would tion applicable to life insurance policies. interpreting what is now Family Code Section not cosign for her automobile loan unless Considering prior applicable decisions, 852 as an absolute bar to enforcement of a she signed the deed. The court held that the the court interpreted Family Code Sections technically insufficient writing. The court deed was not signed voluntarily and freely 850 to 852, which concern transmutations, found: “We must therefore determine whether with full knowledge of the legal conse- to apply to transactions involving third par- Margery’s actions, whether or not they were quences.13 ties if one spouse claims as separate property intended to transfer her interest in the pension The next important case to address a com- an asset acquired during marriage and paid funds, were effective under Section 5110 plicated transmutation fact pattern was In re for with community funds that is titled in that .730(a) to transmute those funds from com- Marriage of Barneson.14 In that case, the spouse’s name. The fact that Valli did not munity property to Robert’s separate property. husband provided written instructions to his expressly state in writing that he intended to We are of the opinion that they were not.”8 investment managers to “transfer” his Marina give up a community interest or change the The court also noted: “There is no question Oil stock into his wife’s name or to “journal” character of an asset meant that the require- that the Legislature intended by enacting stock in his Schwab account into her account. ments of Family Code Section 852 had not Section 5110.730(a) to invalidate all solely The appellate court rejected the wife’s argu- been met, making the life insurance policy oral transmutations.”9 “In our view,” the ment that her husband had failed to rebut the community property. In order to appreciate court continued, “[T]he Legislature cannot statutory presumption created by Evidence the context of this new rule, one must under- have intended that any signed writing what- Code Section 662 that she held full beneficial stand why transmutation rules were created. soever by the adversely affected spouse would title to the stock placed in her name. The In 1984, the legislature enacted what are suffice to meet the requirements of Section court ruled that the term “transfer” might or now Family Code Sections 850, 851, and 5110.730(a). First, to so construe that statute might not refer to a change of ownership. This 852.5 Those statutes provide the require- would render mere surplusage all the lan- demonstrated an ambiguity in the husband’s ments for how one spouse could change the guage following the words ‘unless made in written directions. In referring to the title character of an asset from community prop- writing,’ including the phrase ‘an express provisions embodied in Section 662, however, erty to separate property, or separate property declaration.’ A construction rendering some the court did not state that the title pre- to community property, or the separate prop- word surplusage is to be avoided.”10 sumption could never apply in family law erty of one spouse to separate property of the In MacDonald, the disputed writing was situations.15 other. This change of character is a trans- the written consent given by the wife to her In 2005, the court decided In re Marriage mutation, and for it to be valid, it must be husband’s designation of beneficiaries other of Starkman,16 which concerned whether an made in writing by an express declaration that than her to his IRA accounts. The court estate plan satisfied the requirements of the is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted explained that consenting to the designation transmutation statutes. In that case, the hus- by the spouse whose interest in the property of other beneficiaries was insufficient to con- band, heir to the UPS fortune, married in

26 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 MCLE Test No. 246 MCLE Answer Sheet #246 TRANSMUTATION OF LAW

The Los Angeles County Bar Association certifies that this activity has been approved for Minimum Name Continuing Legal Education credit by the State Bar of California in the amount of 1 hour. Law Firm/Organization

1. In determining whether a transmutation will be 11. The transmutation rules never apply to an acqui- Address effective, courts primarily look to the intent of the par- sition by one spouse from a third party. ties. True. City True. False. State/Zip False. 12. Execution of a quitclaim deed can be sufficient to E-mail 2. A key fact in Marriage of Valli that makes it differ- effectuate a transmutation. Phone ent from prior cases involving insurance policies pur- True. State Bar # chased with community funds is that Mr. Valli, on his False. own, named Mrs. Valli as owner and beneficiary. 13. Spouses engaging in interspousal transmutations INSTRUCTIONS FOR OBTAINING MCLE CREDITS True. are not subject to fiduciary obligations. 1. Study the MCLE article in this issue. False. True. 2. Answer the test questions opposite by marking 3. Evidence Code Section 662 provides that the owner False. the appropriate boxes below. Each question of legal title to property is presumed to be the owner has only one answer. Photocopies of this 14. If an alleged transmutation writing is ambiguous, of beneficial title. answer sheet may be submitted; however, this the spouse asserting that a transmutation of property form should not be enlarged or reduced. True. has occurred may introduce parol evidence to remove False. 3. Mail the answer sheet and the $20 testing fee the ambiguity. ($25 for non-LACBA members) to: 4. For a transmutation to be effective, it must be made True. Los Angeles Lawyer in writing by an express declaration that is made, False. MCLE Test joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse P.O. Box 55020 15. Instructions to an investment manager to “trans- whose interest in the property is adversely affected. Los Angeles, CA 90055 fer” or “journal” stock into a spouse’s name is sufficient True. Make checks payable to Los Angeles Lawyer. to cause a change in the character of the stock. False. True. 4. Within six weeks, Los Angeles Lawyer will return your test with the correct answers, a 5. In order to be sufficient to effectuate a valid trans- False. rationale for the correct answers, and a mutation, a writing need only include language of 16. It is legally permissible for spouses to enter into con- certificate verifying the MCLE credit you earned transfer. ditional transmutations that only change the charac- through this self-assessment activity. True. ter of separate property to community property in the 5. For future reference, please retain the MCLE False. event of one spouse’s death. test materials returned to you. 6. The presumption set forth in Evidence Code Section True. ANSWERS 662 can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evi- False. Mark your answers to the test by checking the dence. 17. One way to avoid application of the transmutation appropriate boxes below. Each question has only True. one answer. statutes is to provide in estate planning documents that False. the transmutation agreement is automatically termi- I I 7. While one spouse can transmute his or her separate nated upon the filing of a petition for dissolution of mar- 1. True False property to community property, a spouse cannot trans- riage. 2. I True I False mute his or her separate property to the other spouse True. 3. I True I False as separate property. False. 4. I True I False True. 18. The holding in In re Marriage of Brooks and I I False. 5. True False Robinson is no longer applicable. 6. I True I False 8. In order to be sufficient to effectuate a valid trans- True. I I mutation, a writing must include the word “transmu- False. 7. True False tation.” 8. I True I False 19. For estate planning purposes, if the intention of the True. I I parties is to keep life insurance proceeds out of the 9. True False False. estate of the insured spouse, premium payments 10. I True I False 9. Mr. Valli, in naming his wife as both owner and should be paid from a separate property source. 11. I True I False beneficiary, confirmed that he intended to relinquish True. 12. I True I False his community property interest in the policy. False. 13. I True I False True. 20. Community property is liable for a debt incurred by False. 14. I True I False either spouse before or during marriage. 15. I True I False 10. One purpose in enacting the transmutation statutes True. I I was to eliminate claims that the character of property False. 16. True False (either as community property or separate property) had 17. I True I False changed based on an alleged oral agreement between 18. I True I False the spouses. 19. I True I False True. I I False. 20. True False

Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 27 1990. In 1996, he employed an attorney to ownership, the parties might have stated that transmutation agreement, the trial court prepare an estate plan. Contemporaneously any property transferred to the trust by either found that under express terms of the agree- with execution of the trust, the husband and of them “becomes” or “is changed into” the ment, the husband had transmuted his sepa- wife executed a general assignment to convey community property of the parties. The trust’s rate property to community property. The “any asset, whether real, personal, or mixed” stated purposes could have stated (but did husband appealed. The question before the that they owned or would own to the trust. not) that one purpose was for the husband to appellate court was whether the transmuta- The general assignment did not specifically transmute the entirety of his separate estate tion agreement and the trust were sufficient identify any property as the husband’s sepa- to community property. Reasonable infer- to establish the husband’s express intent to rate property. One month after the execution ences from other trust provisions regarding transmute his separate property to commu- of the trust and general assignment, the attor- separate property supported the court’s con- nity property, as contemplated by Section ney sent the parties copies of the estate plan clusion. The court also found that a letter 852, given the fact that language in both instruments. The cover letter advised that from the husband’s attorney to be inadmis- documents indicated that they were executed the trust provided a presumption that all the sible extrinsic evidence21 and that the estate solely for estate planning purposes. The court trust assets were “your community property plan instruments and stock brokerage trans- observed: “‘In deciding whether a transmu- unless you clearly specify otherwise. There- fer forms did not establish a transmutation of tation has occurred, we interpret the written fore, it is very important that separate prop- the husband’s separate property into com- instruments independently, without resort to erty be clearly identified as such.”17 munity property.22 extrinsic evidence.’”27 The husband later executed various stock In 2008, Marriage of Holtemann was The court found that the transmutation brokerage transfer forms to convey specific decided, and another legal concept came into was valid. The agreement unambiguously assets into the trust. Each form designated the play.23 Effective transmutation agreements stated that “Husband agrees that the char- assets to be held by the husband and wife as cannot be conditional. Although executed acter of the property described in Exhibit trustees. The forms did not describe the assets for purposes of estate planning, the charac- A…is hereby transmuted from his separate as either community property or separate terization as community property is not lim- property to the community property of both property. During dissolution, the wife con- ited only for estate planning. Once a valid parties.” The trust similarly provided that it tended that the assets that her husband had transmutation occurs, it is valid and enforce- was created “in order to hold community conveyed to the trust by the stock brokerage able, regardless of the purposes for which it property of the settlors.” That community forms had been transmuted into community was done. In Holtemann, the husband and property “was created by the transmutation property. The trial court disagreed and ruled wife married in 2003 and separated in 2006. of separate property of settlor Frank G. that he did not transmute his separate prop- During marriage, the parties retained an Holtemann concurrently with the execution erty assets by conveying them to the trust. The attorney to prepare estate planning docu- of this trust instrument. As the trial court wife appealed. ments. The attorney prepared a written trans- aptly noted, ‘[a] clearer statement of a trans- The question presented to the appellate mutation agreement and trust, which the mutation is difficult to imagine.’”28 court was whether the trust, general assign- parties executed in 2005. An introductory The Holtemann court distinguished this ment, and stock brokerage forms taken provision in the transmutation agreement fact scenario from the one presented in together established an express intent on the stated that “[t]he parties are entering into Starkman. Unlike Starkman, in which the husband’s part to change the character of this agreement in order to specify the char- word “transmutation” was never mentioned, his separate property to community prop- acter of their property interests pursuant to in Holtemann the word is stated repeatedly. erty. The court reasoned that a writing signed the applicable provisions of the California There can be no doubt that, with the advice by the adversely affected spouse is not an Family Code. This agreement is not made in of counsel, the parties chose that specific “express declaration” for the purposes of contemplation of a separation or marital dis- term of art.29 Regardless of the motivations Family Code Section 852(a) unless it con- solution and is made solely for the purpose underlying the documents, the documents tains language that expressly states that the of interpreting how property shall be dis- contained the requisite express, unequivocal characterization or ownership of the property posed of on the deaths of the parties.” The declarations of a present transmutation. is being changed.18 The court also held that parties also acknowledged that their attorney Moreover, the documents reflected that the an “express declaration” does not require had explained the “legal consequences” of the husband was fully informed of the legal con- use of the terms “transmutation,” “commu- agreement, and that they had decided not to sequences of his actions.30 nity property,” “separate property,” or a par- retain separate counsel after being advised of In 2009, another transmutation scenario ticular locution. Although the court held that the advantages of doing so.24 added a new wrinkle. In In re Marriage of those terms were not required, “The express The transmutation agreement stated that Lund,31 a husband and wife executed a doc- declaration must unambiguously indicate a the husband agreed that the property des- ument titled Agreement to Establish Interest change in character or ownership of property. cribed in “Exhibit A (including any future in Property in 2002, two years before disso- A party does not “slip into a transmutation rents, issues, profits, and proceeds of that lution. The agreement was executed concur- by accident.”19 Moreover, the court held that property) is hereby transmuted from his sep- rently with other estate planning documents, “In deciding whether a transmutation has arate property to the community property including wills, which stated that all of the doc- occurred, we interpret the written instru- of both parties.”25 As noted in the decision, uments were integrated. The attorney who ments independently, without resort to extrin- the agreement’s statement of intent provided: drafted the agreement represented both par- sic evidence.”20 “‘This is a joint trust established by the set- ties. The recitals stated that at the date of The court found that neither the trust’s tlors in order to hold community property of marriage, the husband owned property of terms nor the conveyance to the trust effected the settlors, which community property was substantial value, the wife had assets of de by the general assignment was sufficient to created by the transmutation of separate minimis value, and that the husband “for establish unambiguously that the husband property of settlor Frank G. Holtemann con- estate planning purposes desires to convert said was effecting a change of ownership in the currently with the execution of this trust separate property into community property.”32 entirety of his significant separate estate. Had instrument.’”26 One section of the agreement stated: “All there been an intent to effectuate a change of At the bifurcated trial on the validity of property, real and personal, of the parties

28 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 hereto, whether title thereto is held in the that the motivations underlying the docu- deed. Application of Section 662 had not names of one or the other of the parties or ments were irrelevant. The agreement made been disapproved in prior family law cases. both of the parties as joint tenants or other- it clear that all the property previously held After Valli, a spouse’s ability to rely on Section wise, is the community property of the par- as the husband’s separate property was trans- 662 to argue that property acquired during ties hereto, each having a present, existing, muted to community property on December marriage in one spouse’s name is presump- and equal interest therein.” Another section 2002. The court stated: “It simply does not tively that person’s separate property is in stated: “All of the property, real and per- matter that the agreement, the trust, and the doubt. The third way the decision impacted sonal, held in the name of Husband having wills were all executed together as part of a family law is to confirm that Marriage of its origin in his separate property no matter single ‘estate planning’ strategy.”35 Lucas38 is no longer good law on that portion how received and/or earned, is hereby con- The court’s key holding was that the ter- of its holding in which a motorhome acquired In a dissolution, the spouse who has irrevocably relinquished interest in the insurance policy now may get a second bite at the apple if transmutation rules have not been satisfied. verted to community property of Husband mination provision in the trust, which pur- during marriage and titled in wife’s name and Wife, and shall thereafter be the com- ported to automatically retransmute the prop- was confirmed as her separate property based munity property of the parties for estate plan- erty upon the filing of a dissolution petition.36 on her husband’s failure to object. ning hereto, each having a present, existing, According to the appellate court, the hus- It is noteworthy that the transmutation and equal interest therein.” Section E of the band made an express declaration in writing statutes, the Family Code statutory commu- agreement indicated that it was executed for of his unambiguous intention to transmute nity property joint title presumptions, and “estate planning purposes.”33 all of his separate property to community statutory rights for reimbursement all arose Concurrently with execution of the agree- property as of the date he executed the 2002 out of response to Lucas. Although the court ment, a trust that had been established by agreement, notwithstanding its termination has neutralized the applicability of the Evi- the husband 12 years earlier was amended provision. dence Code title presumption, it has not nec- and restated to add the wife as an additional essarily eliminated the title presumption for Valli trustee and settlor as of the date of estab- The Effect of on Community all purposes, although the concurring opin- lishment of the trust. Three of the real prop- Property ion advocated for doing so. The supreme erties at issue had been transferred to the hus- There are three ways in which the Valli deci- court has now defined a rule that transactions band, as trustee of the trust, prior to 2002, and sion has affected community property con- between a spouse and a third party may be in 2002 one of the properties was transferred cepts. The first is that third-party transactions subject to the transmutation rules. to the husband and wife, as trustees of the are not exempt from the transmutation rules. The most obvious consequence of this trust. Although prior cases had referred to trans- rule is how it might affect estate planning. In Finally, the trust provided: “Upon the fil- mutation as interspousal transactions, no Valli, the designation by the husband naming ing of a petition for the dissolution of the mar- case had specifically stated that third-party his wife as both owner and beneficiary of a riage and/or separation by either Settlor, this transactions would be exempt. Valli addressed policy on his life could be viewed as part of Agreement is automatically terminated with- that specific issue. Third-party transactions are an estate plan to keep proceeds from being out further notice to third parties and either not exempt, at least in situations in which an treated as part of his estate for estate tax Trustee shall return to each Settlor the sepa- asset is acquired during marriage, titled in one purposes. By characterizing the property as rate property they contributed to this Agree- spouse’s name at the time of acquisition, and community property and giving no consid- ment not previously disposed of, together paid for with community property. eration to title and ownership, the intended with each Settlor’s share of the Trust Estate The second way Valli has affected family purpose for obtaining the life insurance pol- which is community property. Upon the auto- law is the application of Evidence Code icy would be nullified. matic termination, all dispositive provisions Section 662. In 2008, in In re Marriage of Even in the narrow instance in which one of this Trust Agreement shall be null and Brooks and Robinson, the court relied on spouse intentionally and irrevocably relin- void other than returning the assets to the Section 662 to find that a piece of real prop- quishes ownership to minimize taxes, trans- rightful owners.…”34 erty acquired and titled in a wife’s name was mutation may come into play if there is a dis- The trial court held that the agreement was her separate property based on the title pre- solution. In a dissolution, the spouse who ambiguous because of language in the recitals sumption contained in Section 662.37 The has irrevocably relinquished interest in the and in section E of the agreement indicating issue arose in connection with a joined third insurance policy now may get a second bite the agreement was executed for “estate plan- party who purchased the property from the at the apple if transmutation rules have not ning” purposes as well as by the simultane- wife over her husband’s objections. The dis- been satisfied. These are difficult issues be- ous execution of other “estate planning” pute was between the husband and the third- cause in many cases, individuals or spouses documents (the trust and the wills). The wife party buyer. The court, relying on prior fam- enter into an estate plan without considering appealed. The issue before the appellate court ily law cases, determined that the sale was not the consequences of divorce. Also, while one was whether the husband transmuted his an interspousal transaction, so transmuta- of the stated reasons for adopting the trans- separate real properties into community prop- tion rules did not apply. The court further mutation rules was to eliminate the ability of erty by way of the 2002 agreement, which relied on the Evidence Code Section 662 pre- individuals to fabricate stories concerning was part of his estate plan. In interpreting the sumption to support the view that the third- oral transmutation or to establish character- transmutation statutes, the court determined party purchaser was entitled to rely on the ization of property by oral testimony or con-

Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 29 duct, strict adherence to the transmutation trary. However, pursuant to Family Code insurance proceeds may be included in the rules allows one party to possibly avoid Section 2640, to the extent separate property decedent’s estate.39 expressing his or her real intentions by decid- is used to acquire or improve the property, the Given the fact that Evidence Code Section ing to remain silent and let the transmutation person whose separate property is used is 662 may have limited application, if any, in rules govern. entitled to dollar-for-dollar reimbursement the characterization of property in a family There is another aspect to the Valli case of his or her separate property without inter- law proceeding, creditors may now have that affects estate planning. It was acknowl- est or adjustment for appreciation. On the access to more property to collect community edged in Valli that the premium payments other hand, there is no comparable family law debt. Property titled in one spouse’s name were paid with community property funds. statute addressing a situation where title does not necessarily mean that said property Although not addressed by the court in Valli, stands in one spouse’s name. In such a situ- is that person’s separate property. Until the the fact that the parties used community ation, the general presumption applies as a Valli decision, property titled in one spouse’s funds to pay the premiums could have had the starting point. In future cases in which sim- name logically could be presumed to be that effect of causing, in a situation like that of ilar situations arise, one argument might be spouse’s separate property. As a general rule, Valli, a portion of the life insurance proceeds to consider a community’s right to reim- community property is liable for a debt to be included in a husband’s estate when he bursement for funds expended as a remedy in incurred by either spouse before or during dies even though he intentionally relinquished cases where property titled in one spouse’s marriage, regardless of which spouse has the ownership and control over the policy. This name during marriage is found to be separate management and control of the property and is a potential pitfall. Better practice would be property. regardless of whether the one or both spouses to ensure that if parties intend to keep a life are parties to the debt or to a judgment for insurance policy separate property, in addi- Considerations for Estate Planners the debt.40 So, it is possible that property tion to satisfying transmutation rules, the The Valli case has many implications. With that married persons believe is separate prop- parties must ensure that premium payments regard to life insurance policies, designating erty because of title will have possible cred- are made from separate sources. one spouse as an owner will not necessarily itor exposure for collection of community There now seems to be an inconsistency establish the policy as that spouse’s separate debt. The holding may have an impact in in how title to property applies in family law property. In order to confirm such property bankruptcy cases. At least one bankruptcy cases under the family law statutes. On the as separate property, a written transmuta- case has cited Valli to support a finding that one hand, if property is acquired in joint tion agreement would be required. Further, if a claim identified as an asset should be con- forms, certain family law statutory rules premium payments are being made, those sidered community property in the bank- apply. Under Family Code Section 2581, the premium payments should be paid from sep- ruptcy proceeding even if not specifically property is presumed to be community prop- arate property sources not community prop- identified as community property by the erty unless there is a signed writing to the con- erty sources. Otherwise, portions of the life debtor.41

30 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 The Valli case has extended the transmu- tation rules to more than just interspousal transactions. One difficulty in this decision is how it will affect expectations. In most situ- ations, married individuals probably do not consult with divorce attorneys before enter- ing into property transactions. In its depar- ture from prior transmutation cases, Valli could affect estate planning and creditor rights in future dissolution cases, and family law practitioners should advise clients of these implications. I

1 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Benson, 36 Cal. 4th 1096 (2005); In re Marriage of Sonne, 48 Cal. 4th 118 (2010); In re Marriage of Green, 56 Cal. 4th 1130 (2013). 2 In re Marriage of Valli, 58 Cal. 4th 1396 (2014). 3 Id. at 1406 (citing In re Marriage of Barneson, 69 Cal. App. 4th 583, 593 (1999)). 4 See In re Marriage of Weaver, 224 Cal. App. 3d 478 (1990) (Title presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.). See also In re Marriage of Brooks and Robinson, 169 Cal. App. 4th 176, 189 (2008). 5 See Recommendation Relating to Marital Property Presumptions and Transmutations, 17 CAL. LAW REVISION COM. REP., at 213 (1984). 6 FAM. CODE §852. 7 Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 267 (1990). 8 Id. 9 Id. at 269-270. 10 Id. (citing People v. Black, 32 Cal. 3d 1, 5 (1982); LA Lawyer ad one-third 2014 OUTLINES.pdf 1 4/29/2014 11:04:34 AM Watkins v. Real Estate Comm’r, 182 Cal. App. 2d 397, 400 (1960)). 11 MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262. 12 In re Marriage of Haines, 33 Cal. App. 4th 277, 293- 301 (1995). 13 Id. 14 In re Marriage of Barneson, 69 Cal. App. 4th 583 (1999). 15 Id. 16 In re Marriage of Starkman, 129 Cal. App. 4th 659, 662 (2005). 17 Id. at 662. 18 Id. at 664. 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 Id. at 665. C 22 Id. at 664. 23 In re Marriage of Holtemann, 166 Cal. App. 4thM

1166 (2008). Y 24 Id. at 1170. 25 Id. CM 26 Id. at 1170-71. MY 27 Id. at 1172 (quoting In re Marriage of Starkman, 129

Cal. App. 4th 659 (2005)). CY 28 Marriage of Holtemann, 166 Cal. App. 4th at 1173. 29 Id. CMY 30 Id. K 31 In re Marriage of Lund, 174 Cal. App. 4th 40 (2009). 32 Id. GL Howard and Company CPAs, LLP 33 Id. at 52.

34 Id. at 48. LITIGATION SUPPORT ŏTAX CONTROVERSY ŏINTERNATIONAL TAX 35 Id. at 52. ACCOUNTING SERVICES ŏTAX COMPLIANCE & PLANNING 36 Id. at 54. 37 In re Marriage of Brooks and Robinson, 169 Cal. App. 4th 176 (2008). 38 In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808 (1980). 39 See 26 C.F.R. §20.2041-1 (proceeds of life insurance). 40 FAM. CODE §910. 41 In re Lewis, 515 B.R. 591 (2014). See also 11 U.S.C.A. §363(i).

Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 31 Entertainment law issue

by JOHN W. CONES

SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE

The SEC’s Regulation D offers independent filmmakers a means to raise funds, provided antifraud and disclosure rules are observed

OFTEN, when independent filmmakers seek eign presales all rely on established industry pens. Not to say it cannot happen or that it to finance the development,1 production entities or entertainment banks to provide will not happen in a particular practice, but and/or distribution of their films, by raising financing. Investor financing generally relies it is quite rare. money from investors—sometimes referred on individuals outside the film industry to put There are also several practical problems to as equity financing—they are not aware up the financing (sometimes referred to as with a single investor, or even a small group that they may be selling a security. Attorneys alternative financing). In other words, if a film of two or three investors, that an attorney will and their indie producer clients can, however, industry entity gets involved in financing a fea- want to discuss with indie filmmaker clients. successfully negotiate this important area ture film, it does not typically do so as an First, people who put up all or most of the of the law relating to investor financing, investor. The people who do invest in inde- financing for a risky investment like a feature- specifically as it applies to independent film pendent films generally do not work in, or length independent film tend to want some- offerings. have much knowledge or experience of, the thing for their money. For example, they may First, it is important to understand that film industry. investor financing for independent films is On the other hand, it is not uncommon for John W. Cones is a securities/entertainment attor- significantly different from traditional indus- indie filmmakers to claim they know one or ney who practiced in Los Angeles for 23 years try financing. The production-financing/dis- more wealthy individuals who can invest the advising independent feature film producers and tribution deal and the various forms of the entire amount of the budget required for others on matters relating to investor financing of

negative pickup transaction including for- their film. Unfortunately, that rarely hap- feature film and other entertainment projects. HADI FARAHANI

32 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 want a relative or personal friend to star or allowing the filmmaker to sell contingent each with a different set of rules. Thus, even appear in the picture. That may or may not promissory notes avoids the necessity of com- though the filmmaker now recognizes that a be appropriate for the filmmaker, but all of plying with the securities laws. Whenever security is being sold, and that a registered the possible ramifications of such a decision repayment of the promissory note is contin- offering is not being conducted, if the film- need to be discussed. gent upon the film’s earning money (i.e., the maker does not know which exemption from Secondly, single investors may want to loan is to be repaid out of the revenue stream registration is being used, it is quite unlikely be actively involved in helping make many of of the film), that promissory note is in fact a that such a filmmaker will come anywhere the important decisions associated with pro- security, and the securities laws still need to close to complying with all of the conditions ducing and distributing the film. If these be observed.5 If not, the investor can suc- and limitations imposed on the use of that investors have little or no experience in film- cessfully demand a full refund along with, in exemption. making or film distribution, this could spell some situations, attorney fees and damages.6 Some entertainment attorneys report on disaster and may also expose active investors Filmmakers may tell their attorneys that their websites that the federal intrastate to liability as well as raise tax issues. they have never heard that raising money exemption7 should be considered for inde- Third, if both the filmmaker and the from investors involves the securities laws, pendent film offerings. The intrastate exemp- investor want the investor to be actively which may be true due to the fact that film tion, however, is really intended for offer- involved in helping to make the important schools across the country choose not to pre- ings that raise, spend, and earn most of their decisions associated with producing and dis- pare their graduates for the business side of money in the local state. Since filmmakers typ- tributing a feature film, and the investor does independent film. Nonetheless, the vast major- ically want their films to earn money all over not have knowledge and experience in the film ity of these investor-financed independent the world, the intrastate exemption is gener- industry, the investor is really relying on the films actually do involve the sale of a security, ally not appropriate for a film offering. expertise of the filmmaker and others asso- and it serves the interests of filmmakers to ciated with the filmmaking process. Thus, educate themselves. Regulation D the investor is a passive investor—not an If the filmmaker-client finally admits that Other practitioners recommend reliance on active investor—and the filmmaker has sold he or she prefers to raise money from a group Section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act,8 the a security, regardless of whether that was the of passive investors, because of not wanting original nonpublic offering exemption. intention.2 Further, if the filmmaker made to deal with the problems associated with Unfortunately, there is so little detail regard- no attempt to comply with the federal and either active investors’ telling the filmmaker ing how an issuer is supposed to comply with state securities laws (since the filmmaker did what to do or finding one or more investors this exemption that it becomes a risky en- not know he or she was selling a security), the who legally qualify as active investors, the deavor. That is precisely why the SEC came investor can, at any time along the way, next issue the attorney will want to raise up with Regulation D in 1982.9 Regulation demand a full refund of the investor’s money, with the indie filmmaker client is whether D is intended as a “safe harbor” for businesses and the filmmaker has no defense. That is, the the filmmaker wants to pursue a registered that want to safely offer securities, since it pro- filmmaker sold the investor a security, took (public) offering or an exempt (private place- vides more detailed guidance regarding how the investor’s money, and made no attempt to ment) offering. Once the client realizes he or to comply. comply with the federal and state securities she is selling a security, the first general rule Regulation D originally offered three sep- laws. If the matter ever reaches a court, all the of compliance is that the security be registered arate exemptions, but not all of these are investor has to do is prove these three ele- with the SEC and with the state securities reg- that useful. For example, the general rule in ments of the case, and the burden then shifts ulatory authority in each state in which the securities law compliance is that the issuer to the filmmaker to show that he or she did filmmaker intends to raise money from must comply with both federal and the applic- comply with the federal and state securities investors. For indie filmmakers, the general able state securities laws (dual jurisdiction). laws, which will be impossible to do after the rule of a registered offering is rarely observed The Rule 504 exemption10 under Regulation fact. This scenario also overlooks another because these offerings are too complicated, D for offerings of $1 million or less might potential inconvenience: selling an unregis- expensive, and time-consuming. Furthermore, appeal to low-budget filmmakers, but this tered security is a felony.3 registered offerings for independent films exemption is not recognized by the states, and One of the early important questions that have rarely been mounted in the United States thus the filmmaker relying on Rule 504 would an attorney must ask the indie filmmaker in the last 25 years, and in each case, the have to conduct a registered offering at the client, particularly when the client talks about offering failed to raise the financing sought. state level, which is not practical. funding their entire film budget through one So, a private placement offering is the pre- The Rule 505 exemption11 of Regulation individual or a few wealthy people, is whether ferred approach. D allows the issuer to raise up to $5 million, the filmmaker wants the investors to be active Reference to an exempt offering does not but the added burden of dual regulation is or passive. If the client says he or she wants mean that the offering is exempt from all still applicable. The issuer’s attorney will the investor(s) to be active, the attorney will rules. It is simply exempt from the registra- have to identify the specific state level exemp- need to discuss the legal requirements for an tion requirement. However, an exempt offer- tion being relied on in each state, and add cer- active investor4 along with the other practical ing must comply with a different set of rules tain legends and purchaser representations to problems. If the client wants the investors to than those of a registered offering. The film- the private placement offering memoran- be passive—a larger group of passive investors, maker must comply with all the conditions dum (PPM). typically more suited to a creative venture and limitations imposed on the use of a given Rule 50612 is the single most popular fed- like a feature film—then the attorney will exemption, or the filmmaker and the offering eral exemption under Regulation D for small need to discuss compliance with federal and will not qualify for the exemption, once again businesses generally and independent film state securities laws. leaving the filmmaker in the position of hav- offerings specifically. The Rule 506 offering ing sold an unregistered security. To make this is considered a national offering, and, pur- Promissory Notes area of the law even more difficult, there are suant to the National Securities Improvement There are still a few entertainment attorneys a number of different exemptions at both Act of 1996,13 it preempts state jurisdiction in Los Angeles who erroneously believe that the federal and state levels on which to rely, except for notice filing purposes.14 Thus, the

34 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 securities disclosure document—the PPM— specific disclosure requirements. And the min- with the antifraud rule), the less likely does not need to include the purchaser rep- imum disclosure rule21—the SEC’s antifraud investors will subsequently demand a refund resentations and legends for each state in rule—applies to all securities offerings, includ- of their money or sue the attorney and client which the securities are to be offered. ing those to accredited investors only. because the client failed to disclose certain The traditional Rule 50615 offering ex- The SEC’s antifraud rule requires that all information the investors felt was material. emption allows issuers of securities to raise material information regarding the offering The best practice is to come as close to full dis- money from an unlimited number of accred- (i.e., everything that any prospective investor closure as possible for both Rule 506(b) and ited investors16 and up to 35 nonaccredited would reasonably need to know before invest- (c) offerings. An independent film offering is investors, so long as no advertising or general ing in the deal) be put in writing—disclosed one of the riskiest of all possible investments, solicitation occurs. Practically speaking, that in a PPM—and given to each prospective thus it is important to take all necessary steps means certain persons within the issuer group investor before he or she invests. Further, the to reduce the risk of a lawsuit. Moreover, must have a preexisting relationship with antifraud rule requires that no material infor- if the investor information is not in writing, each of the prospective the task of mounting a investors.17 defense to a securities In 2012, Congress fraud charge is much helped to create an alter- more difficult. native Rule 506 offering Although there may exemption by passing be some overlap in the the Jumpstart Our Busi- contents of such docu- ness Startups Act (JOBS ments, a PPM is not the Act).18 The SEC promul- same document as a gated its final rules that business plan or a pitch eliminate the prohibition deck. The PPM is used against general solicita- to comply with the tion and general adver- securities laws in pro- tising in certain Rule 506 viding full disclosure to offerings that are made prospective passive in- to accredited investors vestors and is legally re- only, so long as the issuer quired in private place- takes specific steps to ment situations. The confirm the accredited business plan may be investor status of each in- used to provide infor- vestor.19 This new ex- mation to prospective emption is referred to as active investors (i.e., non- Rule 506(c), and the tra- securities offerings) but ditional Rule 506 offer- cannot legally be used ing is now Rule 506(b). by itself without the Thus, another early dis- PPM to actually raise cussion the attorney will investment funds from need to have with the passive investors. The indie film client is to pitch deck, on the other determine whether to hand, is merely a Power- raise money from both Point presentation that accredited and nonac- provides a quick over- credited investors with view of the film offer- whom they have a pre- ing. It may be used in existing relationship or whether to conduct a mation relating to such an offering be omit- making the presentation to prospective general solicitation to accredited investors ted (i.e., a material omission) and that every- investors but must be supported by the PPM only, taking the extra steps necessary to con- thing disclosed in the PPM be stated in a if offers are being made to passive investors. firm the accredited investor status of such manner that is not misleading. Significant Passive investors cannot legally invest in secu- investors.20 failure to comply with the antifraud rule may rities offerings until after they have had an This decision will also determine the level result in a charge of securities fraud. Again, opportunity to review the PPM. The best of disclosure that is required in the PPM that the SEC’s antifraud rule applies to all securi- practice is to complete the PPM first, and if must be given to each prospective investor ties offerings.22 a pitch deck or business plan is desired to sup- before investing. The Rule 506(b) offering (if plement the PPM, take language in the PPM made to nonaccredited investors) requires Disclosure that is already approved by the securities what may be referred to as full disclosure, sim- As a consequence, attorneys may disagree attorney and use that in the pitch deck or busi- ilar to that of a public (registered) offering. An about how much and what specific informa- ness plan, so that both documents are con- offering like that of Rule 506(c) imposes no tion needs to be disclosed in such offerings to sistent and comply with the law. specific disclosure requirements because it is prospective investors. In practical terms, this In 2013, the SEC also adopted a “bad- only being made to the more wealthy accred- level of disclosure decision comes down to actor rule,”23 which disqualifies certain felons ited investors—emphasis on the word “spe- how much risk exposure the attorney and and other “bad actors” from participating in cific.” This does not mean there are no dis- client want to assume for themselves. As a a Rule 506 offering, either (b) or (c). Thus, it closure requirements, merely that there are no general rule, the more disclosure (consistent is important that the attorney representing

Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 35 indie filmmaker clients in investor offerings Kickstarter or IndieGoGo) and the investor- investor is the essence of the definition even for the U.S. Supreme Court’s classic Howey case. See SEC v. W.J. 30 assist clients in conducting an adequate level crowdfunding as contemplated by Congress Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 31 of due diligence with respect to the back- but as yet not fulfilled by the SEC. Don- 6 CORP. CODE §25501.5. grounds of everyone involved in such offerings. ation-based crowdfunding involves gifts and 7 See §3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. From a legal standpoint, financial pro- does not involve investors; for most inde- §77c. 8 jections are not required to accompany Rule pendent filmmakers, it offers a very limited §4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77d. 506 offerings under Regulation D; however, access to funding but still may be useful for 9 17 C.F.R. §§230.500-230.508. investors tend to want to see them. So, it is startup funds. On the other hand, Congress 10 17 C.F.R. §230.504. important that the attorney make filmmaker has asked the SEC to develop final rules for 11 17 C.F.R. §230.505. clients aware the SEC has a policy regarding investor-crowdfunding, but the SEC has had 12 17 C.F.R. §230.506. financial projections and that, to the extent a difficult time doing that because of the con- 13 National Securities Market Improvement Act of that the filmmaker is offering a security, com- flicting interests of securities issuers and 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996). 14 The phrase “notice filing” refers to the requirement 24 pliance with this SEC policy is necessary. In investors, along with the significant potential that a specific form be completed and sent in a timely essence, the SEC policy requires that the for abuse. In addition, the congressional man- manner to each state securities regulator in the states assumptions25 underlying the projections be date itself has placed severe limits on the in which the security is being offered (along with the set forth in writing and that these assumptions ability of the SEC to create rules that are not appropriate fee), as well as to the SEC, thus providing be reasonable. Some of the proprietary com- overly burdensome to issuers. Investor-crowd- notice that the client intends to sell securities to citizens in those states. panies that prepare film financial projections funding at the federal level is not yet available, 15 17 C.F.R. §230.506(b). for filmmakers for a fee tend not to want to and Congress may even need to revise its 16 17 C.F.R. §230.501. fully disclose their assumptions because it legislative approach to make it possible. Some 17 See Rule 3a4-1 of the General Rules and Regulations allows others to understand how they calcu- states, meanwhile, have gone forward with promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of lated their projections. However, to fully their own versions of investor-crowdfund- 1934 (Associated Persons of an Issuer Deemed not to be Brokers, also known as the Issuer Sales Rule). comply with SEC rules for such an offering ing that may be used on an intrastate basis. 18 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. to passive investors, the policy needs to be However, film projects may experience some L. No. 112–106, §201(a), 126 Stat. 306 (2012). observed. of the same problems as they would with 19 SEC Release No. 33-9415 (Sept. 20, 2013), 17 the federal intrastate exemption, since such C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 242, Eliminating the Prohibition Section 181 and State Tax Incentives securities cannot be offered to persons who Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 Offerings. As of this writing, the federal tax incentive are not residents of the same state.32 20 Id. for certain films—Section 181 of the IRS When independent film producers seek 21 See §10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 Code26—has not been extended by Congress financing, they should always remember that C.F.R. §240.10b-5. into 2015, thus it is no longer available to the complex rules governing securities are 22 17 C.F.R. §230.500, Preliminary Note 1. serve as an incentive for investors investing most likely at play. Therefore, any prospec- 23 SEC Release No. 33-9414 (Sept. 20, 2013), 17 in film projects. A legislative extension was tive filmmaker would be advised to seek C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 239, Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offerings. introduced in June 2014 (H.R. 5771) and counsel that has the requisite expertise. Also, 24 Id. was subsequently included in an omnibus practitioners should advise producers to rec- 25 Assumptions are the circumstances that are assumed bill.27 That bill was signed into law by the ognize when a security is being offered and to be factual for purposes of projecting the hypothet- President—Public Law No. 113-295—on to comply with the appropriate federal and ical results of the investment. 26 December 16, 2014. Unfortunately, the Sec- state securities laws. I I.R.C. §181. 27 H.R. 5771, 113rd Cong., 135 Cong. Rec. S6898- tion 181 extension only lasted until Decem- 6903 (2014) (enacted). ber 31, 2014. However, 39 states and Puerto 1 The development phase of an independent film may 28 Connecticut, Idaho, and Oklahoma provide film Rico offer tax incentive programs for film pro- be financed separately from the production phase, and production incentives; however, incentives programs duction within their jurisdictions.28 These funds for development (to cover the expenses associ- in these states have been suspended, or funding has ated with writing the script, creating a budget, attach- include tax credits, exemptions, rebates, cash not been provided. The National Conference of State ing elements, or clearing the chain of title) may be Legislatures provides a chart detailing the specifics of grants, fee-free locations, or other perks.29 For raised from investors. film incentive programs in the 50 states. The state tax credits, a portion of income tax owed to 2 See Defining the Active Investor, http://www names also contain links to state film offices and the state by the production company is .filmfinanceattorney.com. commissions. For full details on eligibility and require- removed. Production companies must often 3 Under federal securities laws, specifically the ments, the state’s film office should be contacted. meet minimum spending requirements to Securities Act of 1933, the mere offer to sell a secu- Other online sources of information re state film tax rity—unless there is an effective registration statement be eligible. Of the 28 states that offer tax incentives include the Association of Film Com- on file with the SEC for the offer—can be a felony sub- missioners International, Film Production Capital, credits, 26 make them either transferable jecting the offeror to a five-year federal prison term. Cast and Crew Entertainment Services and Media or refundable. The cash rebates are paid to pro- See §5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77e. Services. duction companies directly by the state, usu- In addition, sales and deliveries after sale of unregis- 29 William Luther, Movie Production Incentives: ally as a percentage of the company’s qualified tered securities is also unlawful. See §5(a) of the Blockbuster Support for Lackluster Policy, 173 TAX Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77e. See also expenses. Grants are distributed to production FOUNDATION 4 (Jan. 2010), available at taxfoundation CORP. CODE §§25540, 25541. Most states have sim- .org. companies by three states and the District of ilar provisions. 30 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, §201(a), 126 Stat. Columbia. In some states, exemptions from 4 See “Defining the Active Investor” in the “Articles” 306 (2012). state sales taxes and lodging taxes are granted section of filmfinanceattorney.com. 31 SEC Release Nos. 33-9470; 34-70741 (Oct. 23, 5 to all guests staying more than 30 days. The John W. Cones, Hard Money—Legal Liabilities May 2013), Proposed Rules. Arise for Independent Film Producers Who Rely on 32 fee-free location incentive allows production States with intrastate crowdfunding laws include Contingent Promissory Notes, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kan- companies to use state-owned locations at no May 2010, at 26. This article also discusses and cites sas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, charge. the relevant court cases relating to the more technical Tennessee, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin; Finally, concerning the issue of crowd- securities definitions used by federal and state law, see http://crowdfundinglegalhub.com/2014/06/25 funding, it is important to distinguish between although the active/passive distinction serves this pur- /state-of-the-states-list-of-current-active-and-proposed pose quite well in most situations; after all, the passive donation-based crowdfunding (e.g., through -intrastate-exemptions/.

36 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 by the book REVIEWED BY PAUL S. MARKS

Clearance & Copyright

The target audience for Clearance & declares—would suffer without a visual component. After all, biogra- Copyright comprises the clearance phies of, say, Beethoven and Mozart are necessarily incomplete and professionals who vet scripts, adver- unsatisfying if the reader lacks immediate access to the composers’ tisements, movies, television programs, musical compositions as performed. The fourth edition of Clearance and the like—those who police the & Copyright cures this type of shortcoming by introducing dozens potential infringement of anyone else’s of internet links to movie and television clips that illustrate many of intellectual property. But the book— the reported cases discussed in the book. The links are easy to find now in its robust new fourth edition— and use, and the film clips themselves are presented purely, in their offers much more to the legal indus- original form, without taint of advertisements, pop-ups, or other extra- try. Clearance & Copyright is one of neous matter. The links increase comprehension of the complex legal those rare legal publications that com- rules governing copyright, and especially the fair use defense, while bines expert knowledge and advice at the same time helping to make sense of many seemingly contra- with fascinating real-life illustrations dictory case outcomes. and anecdotes, spun together in an The authors teach that trademarks may need to be cleared as By Michael C. Donaldson and elegant and witty writing style. If ever well, but to a lesser extent than copyrights. The chapter on trademarks Lisa Callif a legal how-to book could be called a begins with an interesting historical digression on the oldest contin- Silman-James Press, 2014 page-turner, this is it. uously used trademarks that are still in use today (a 1366 mark for $45.00, 557 pages Here, for example, is how the au- the Belgian beer Stella Artois being the winner). As with their treat- thors, veteran entertainment lawyers ment of copyrights, the authors regale the reader with example after Michael Donaldson and Lisa Callif, describe the holding in Desny v. example of trademark use in film and television, and the stories behind Wilder, a seminal case in which the California Supreme Court rec- the story. Some cases in point: the popular film Drop Dead Gorgeous, ognized implied contractual rights—regardless of the application of which was originally named Dairy Queens—until the owner of the Dairy copyright law—when an author and a producer have reached an Queen trademark sued and won an injunction, and Anheuser-Busch’s understanding that the producer will pay compensation to use the unsuccessful efforts to squelch Denzel Washington’s abuse of Bud writer’s idea: Light in the film Flight. What a mouthful! What a case! The courts recognize that writ- ers are not truffle pigs, sniffing out good stories and bringing Insurance Coverage them to the attention of others, only to have the stories snatched One example of the wide net the authors cast on the practice of clear- from them by those who would use them and grow rich. ance is the frequent reference to insurance issues. It is a legal urban There is nothing dry about the authors’ prose style; lighthearted legend that intellectual property disputes can never be subject to commentary and clever turns of phrase populate almost every page. insurance coverage, and the authors provide specific examples of the And, while the book is primarily geared toward the interests of film- actions they have taken, as practicing lawyers, to ensure that their makers and other producers, the “truffle pig” quote (and others) show clients have the best chance for insurance coverage in case of poten- that the authors have a warm place in their hearts for the rights of tial clearance disputes. They even take the reader step-by-step through authors and other content creators who deal with production com- an application for an errors and omissions policy. panies. The narrative as a whole is well-balanced, providing practi- Some hopes for a future fifth edition of Copyright & Clearance cal advice to all stakeholders in the entertainment industry. include an upgrade to the internet film clips, through the addition One useful aspect of this advice is the inclusion of detailed con- of more detailed subtitles or other references to the issues being illus- tracts, applications, and other documents that can be used as templates trated. And while the back of the book does contain a table of cases by the professionals who consult the book. These supplemental with legal citations, there are no footnotes or endnotes, so the materials cover a wide range of topics, such as work-for-hire agree- reader needs to do some hunting and pecking to be assured of get- ments, composer agreements, copyright and insurance applications, ting to the correct legal citation for the case described in the text. license agreements, and more. Many of the forms offered are down- Clearance & Copyright provides the novice with a superb, highly loadable from government websites and other sources, while more spe- readable introduction to copyright and trademark law, and the skilled cialized forms, including industry-standard contracts, are available practitioner with valuable advice on day-to-day clearance issues, free of charge by sending an e-mail a website that the authors have from two experts in the field. This book will be a welcome addition created. to the library of any intellectual property lawyer. I In addition to understanding how to keep the reader engaged with a lively writing style, the authors recognize that a book about the Paul S. Marks is a partner with the Neufeld Marks law firm in Los Angeles and visual arts—primarily film and television, as the book’s subtitle is a former chair of the Los Angeles Lawyer editorial board.

38 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 Advanced Mediation 47th Annual Family Law Symposium Skills Practicum ON SATURDAY, MAY 2, the Family Law Section and the Los Angeles Superior Court will host the 47th Annual Family Law Symposium. Many distinguished family law ON MAY 28, 30, AND JUNE 4, the Center judges and practitioners will offer a program on the important money issues that for Civic Mediation will host a program appear in cases, including current IRS civil and criminal procedures and offering extensive practice and coaching enforcement regarding unreported income and assets, how to deal with complex in advanced mediation skills. Those cash flow issues for support and postseparation accounting, how to work with who attend will receive nine hours of accounting experts, and a step-by-step approach to business valuations. The lecture and nine hours of role-playing, program will take place at the Universal City Hilton, 555 Universal Hollywood Drive observation, coaching, and feedback. in Los Angeles. Parking by hotel valet costs $16 and self parking costs $11. On-site Lecture topics include assessing the registration and breakfast will begin at 8 A.M., with the program continuing until 4:45 P.M. A reception and mixer will immediately follow in the Club Room. The conflict, consensus building, problem- registration code number is 012375. solving, managing multiparty agendas, Free—family law judicial officers in Los Angeles County legal ethics, distributive and integrative $125—CLE+ members bargaining, and using case studies from $240—Family Law Section members and other family law judicial officers a range of areas of law (e.g. personal $265—LACBA members injury, employment, contracts, real $300—all others 6.5 CLE hours, including 6.25 hours of family law legal specialization credit estate, and property). The advanced practicum aims to develop more advanced skill sets for practitioners as well as an understanding of key Introductory TAP (i-TAP) elements, principles, and strategies in BEGINNING TUESDAY, MAY 5, Trial Advocacy and the Litigation Section will host a mediation. Prior mediation training is program on the evenings of May 5, 7, 12, 14, 19, and 21 from 5:30 to 8:30 P.M. in one in a required for this course, which will take series of courses offered by LACBA’s Trial Advocacy Project (TAP). Designed specifically for place at the Los Angeles County Bar attorneys who have little or no trial experience, this course provides introductory trial Association, 1055 West 7th Street, 27th advocacy instruction, mock trial performance, and constructive feedback. Participants floor, Downtown. Parking is available at learn to mark exhibits, lay evidentiary foundation, deliver opening statements, conduct witness direct and cross examinations, and deliver closing arguments. The course 1055 West 7th and nearby lots. On-site instructors are seasoned trial attorneys. Successful completion of this course meets the registration will begin at 8:30 A.M., with prerequisites for admission to LACBA’s five-week traditional TAP course taught annually the program continuing from 9 A.M.to 4 in the fall. Completion and certification from Traditional TAP qualifies participants for a P.M. each day. The registration code pro bono practicum with a local prosecutorial agency trying criminal cases. Written number is 012602. course materials will be distributed via e-mail prior to the first class, so a correct e-mail $435—Center for Civic Mediation address at the time of registration is needed. The program will take place at the Los Angeles County Bar Association, 1055 West 7th Street, 27th Floor, Downtown. On-site associates registration and dinner will be available at 5:00 P.M.Parking is available at 1055 West 7th $465—LACBA members Street and nearby lots. The registration code number is 012418. $515—general price $995—LACBA members 18 CLE hours, including 3 hours of $1,195—all others ethics and 1 hour of elimination of bias 16.5 CLE hours, including 1 hour in ethics

The Los Angeles County Bar Association is a State Bar of California MCLE approved provider. To register for the programs listed on this page, please call the Member Service Department at (213) 896-6560 or visit the Association website at http://calendar.lacba.org, where you will find a full listing of this month’s Association programs.

Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015 39 closing argument BY OWEN J. SLOANE

Aereo Shows What Attorneys Can Do to Advise Technology Entrepreneurs

A TECH ENTREPRENEUR is often more concerned with his or her idea For example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) than the business of its development. This is understandable, given provides for a safe harbor for qualifying Internet Service Providers the excitement that a good idea and the technological challenge of (ISPs) that comply with the detailed takedown procedures provided implementing it generate, but neglecting the business aspects can be by the act. Lawyers representing ISPs need to be fully cognizant of a costly mistake. This is especially true if the idea and technology are these requirements. Accordingly, if there is a possibility that a ven- dependent upon the use of content owned by others. Owned content ture can qualify as an ISP and the safe harbor would protect it from includes music and audiovisual programming, photos, words, graph- copyright infringement liability, this should be investigated. ics, drawings, and designs. Failure to provide for the legal use of some- These safe harbors are useful when the venture is dependent one else’s content if that use is central to the success of the venture upon third-party, user-generated content. If the venture is using con- cannot only cost the venture substantial amounts of money but also tent directly, it would be unwise to rely on a technological workaround be destructive of the entire business. The recent Aereo case is an example. Aereo, a supplier of over-the-air broadcast transmis- These safe harbors are useful when the venture is dependent sions via digital devices to subscribers, was held to infringe the copyrights owned by tele- vision producers, distributors, and broadcast- upon third-party, user-generated content. ers in the programs that Aereo streamed. The court’s decision essentially put Aereo out of business unless it can qualify as a “cable sys- tem” entitled to a compulsory license under the Copyright Act. to avoid the requirement of a license between the venture and the con- Some entrepreneurs who are aware of the legal risks of not clear- tent owner. The only safe way to proceed is to secure permission from ing content have expressed a cavalier attitude to the problem. They the content owner. Many are willing to cooperate with entrepreneurs say that they would rather have a successful business in operation first at the startup stage by not burdening the venture with large licens- and deal with the legalities with content owners later. This, however, ing fees until the venture is successful. At that point, they expect to places a lawyer representing such an entrepreneur in a vulnerable posi- be paid a fair price. It may be worth giving up some equity to secure tion. In addition, while the business-first, litigation-second model may the content. be a risk that some entrepreneurs are willing to take, in many cases Another approach can be borrowed from the film industry. When the risk is too great to justify. independent filmmakers consider licensing music for their films, they For example, in the case of copyright infringement, the civil penal- do not know whether the film will be successful or even secure dis- ties can range from up to $30,000 for each infringement and up to tribution. Consequently, it is common practice to enter into synch $150,000 per infringement for willful infringement. In a case in which licenses that involve “step deals.” The initial rights granted are for the entrepreneur knows he or she is infringing but proceeds anyway, festivals, usually the first step. The license fees are minimal for this willful infringement may be relatively easy to establish. The plaintiff type of usage. However, if the film receives theatrical distribution, there may also be entitled to recover the profits of the infringer, plus attor- is an additional payment required to keep the license in effect. If the ney’s fees and costs and an injunction that effectively puts the startup film reaches agreed-upon gross box office receipt amounts, an addi- out of business. The cost of defending a copyright infringement law- tional license fee applies at each level. This model could be adapted suit can be in the high six figures or greater, and if the infringer has to new technologies. to pay the attorney’s fees of the other party plus damages as well, the In addition to clearing content for infringement purposes, there overall cost could be in the millions. In addition to civil penalties, the are other intellectual property issues that need to be dealt with, the Copyright Act provides for criminal penalties with fines and jail time. earlier in the process the better. For example, use of photos of peo- There is no assurance that a claim can be settled with a content ple may violate their rights to privacy or publicity. Statements made owner if the owner’s goal is to put the venture out of business. about people and products may constitute defamation even if they are Napster was destroyed by litigation, as were a number of other tech made by third parties and republished or broadcast by the venture. startups. Unless investors are sufficiently experienced and are advised There are ways to avoid running afoul of these legal problems with in writing, up front, of the risks of not clearing content, the entre- proper planning. Sweeping all of these legal land mines under the car- preneur may also face lawsuits from investors. Consequently, it is advis- pet is usually not a smart way to start a business, and it can subject able to seek agreements at the startup stage with content owners whose lawyers to liability. I content is essential to the success of the venture. An attorney for an entrepreneur should advise the client as to how to avoid infringing Owen J. Sloane practices entertainment and new media law at Eisner Jaffe in content by using statutory provisions that provide for safe harbors. Beverly Hills.

40 Los Angeles Lawyer May 2015