Aristotle on

Between Dialectic, Logic and Epistemology

Luca Castagnoli, Durharn University

Abstract The article examines Aristotle's seminal discussion of the faIlacy of begging the question (petitio principii), reconstructing its complex articulation within a variety of different, but related, contexts (the "dialectic" of the Topics and the Sophistical Refu• tations, the "Iogic" of the Aristotelian theory of syllogism, and the "epistemology" of the inquiry into "scientific" syllogisms). I suggest that cIose analysis of Aristotle's understanding of the should prompt critical reconsideration of the scope and articulation of the faIlacy in modern discussions and usages, suggesting how beg• ging the question should be distinguished from a number of only partially related argumentative faults.

1. To beg or not to beg

Begging the question (hereafter, BTQ) is a popular fallacy in philosophical dis• course. It is popular in three ways: philosophers often commit the fallacy, they waste no occasion to level BTQ charges at others, and they typically theorise about BTQ in their taxonomies of . 1 One would expect to find a well• defined account of BTQ underlying this abundance of practices and theories; an inspection of the ways in which the BTQ jargon is currently used will disappoint this expectation. I am not primarily worried here by the "deviant" usage of the expression which thrives in 21 si century English: nowadays ''to beg the ques• tion" is very often found used with the same meaning as ''to raise the question", typically a pressing, follow-up question, or one which needs be addressed (e.g. "Warm Weather Begs the Question: To Water or Not to Water Yard Plants?").2

• Earlier versions of this paper were presented to responsive audiences in Durharn, Berlin (Humboldt Universität), Paris (Centre Uon Robin, Paris IV Sorbonne) and London (Institute of Classical Stud• ies). I wish to thank here all those who have contributed to the discussion of my views on those occasions, and especially George Boys-Stones, Valentina Di Lascio, Paolo Fait, Pieter Sjoerd Hasper, Lise Kapembwa and an anonymous referee for extremely helpful comments on the content and form of earlier drafts of this article. I Cf. e.g. Hamblin 1970, Walton 1989, 1991, 2006, Hansen-Pinto 1995, Tindale 2007. Cf. Sinnott• Armstrong 1999, 174: "No topic in informallogic is more important than begging the question". For a useful status quaestionis on the revival of studies on BTQ starting from 1970 cf. Walton 1994. 2 There is no official recognition of this use of the idiom prior to the first edition of The Oxford Guide to English Usage (1983), and this sense is not yet recorded by most English dictionaries. There is another deviant use of "to beg the question", with the meaning of "10 evade the question", "to duck the issue" (e.g. "Let's beg the question of just who was in love with whom."). This use has a longer history, Aristotle on Begging the Question 91

There is an ongoing debate between "descriptivists" and "prescriptivists" on the acceptability of this usage, which has become increasingly widespread in the last couple of decades; while the latter party accuses the former with inadmissible barbarism, the former charges the supporters of the correct philosophical usage with pedantic purism. 3 I will side, of course, with the pedantic. But this leaves us with a more interest• ing preliminary question: what is this "correct" "philosophical" use of "begging the question" which we all should stick to, after all? A cursory inspection is suf• ficient to reveal that the BTQ jargon is used in a variety of ways even within the enlightened community of those who steer clear of recent deviations. Let us consider a limited, but I believe sufficiently representative, anthology of supposed definitions and examples of BTQ. Begging the question is: (D 1) ''the taking of something for granted which is just as uncertain or unproved as the proposition it is used to establish. (b) In a controversy, using as a premise what your opponent will not admit, or has not been forced to admit" (Robinson 1936, 195); (D2) ''to take for granted the matter in dispute, to assume without proof" (Oxford English Dictionary 19892);

(D3) "an informal fallacy [ .. . ], also known as arguing in a circle 4 [ ... ] and peti• tio principii. An exhibits when, explicitly or implicitly, it assurnes its conclusion, or a claim tantamount to the conclu• sion, among its premises" (Routledge Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy); (D4) ''the blunder of illicitly assuming what is to be proved"; "according to the DEPENDENCY CONCEPTION, an argument is circular [sc. begs the question] if some premiss actually depends on the conclusion as part of the evidential backing of that premiss"; "according to the EQUIVALENCE CONCEPTION, an argument is circular where the conclusion is tacitly or explicitly assumed as one of the premisses" (Woods-Walton 1982, 78-79). And here are some examples of BTQ used in modern discussions of the fallacy:

(E1) God exists; the bible says SO. 5

(E2) All humans are mortal; therefore all humans will die. 6

as it is attested since 1860 (Websters Dictionary 0/ English Usage), but does not appear to be nearly as common as "to raise the question". It is possible to see how it might have sprung up from the "correct" philosophical use of the phrase: if you are asked to defend a certain position, but you just assurne the point at issue or something ultimately equivalent to it or dependent on it, you are in fact evading the question, ducking the issue of justifying it. 3 For a luminous example of this debate cf. www.begthequestion.info. with its campaign against the deviant use, including merchandise such as BTQ t-shirts and BTQ cards to hand on to offenders. 4 The idea that BTQ and circular reasoning are one and the same thing is widespread in the literature (cf. e.g. Walton 1991 and Sanford's entry "Circular Reasoning" in Audi 1995).1 will contest this idea below. 5 Engel-Soldan-Durand 2008, 219. 6 Martinich 2005, 35.