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THE FREE SPIRIT:

A CRITIQUE OF THINGS IN THEMSELVES AS A NIHILISTIC MOVEMENT

A thesis presented to

the faculty of

the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

Trevor L. Hoag

June 2007

This thesis titled

THE FREE SPIRIT:

A CRITIQUE OF THINGS IN THEMSELVES AS A NIHILISTIC MOVEMENT

by

TREVOR L. HOAG

has been approved for

the Department of

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

James Petrik

Associate Professor of Philosophy

Benjamin M. Ogles

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences

Abstract

HOAG, TREVOR L., M.A., June 2007, Philosophy

THE FREE SPIRIT: A CRITIQUE OF THINGS IN THEMSELVES AS A NIHILISTIC

MOVMENT (91 pp.)

Director of Thesis: James Petrik

According to Nietzsche, the of philosophy is dominated by “,” i.e.,

the hierarchical valuation of the supersensible over and above the sensible and material.

This “nihilism,” according to Nietzsche, is particularly evident in Kant’s use of the

of things in themselves in his and moral philosophy. For example,

Nietzsche claims that Kant uses the concept of things in themselves to reinstitute the of a true world that stands “behind” and devalues the world of by contrast. Some Kant scholars, however, have argued that a “two aspect” (as opposed

to a “two world”) interpretation of Kant’s transcendental allows Kant to sidestep

the charge of practicing dogmatic as well as exhibiting the judgments

of traditional metaphysics. In my thesis, I contend that no which interpretation

one adopts concerning things in themselves, Nietzsche’s charge of nihilism holds. This is

the case because not only does Kant’s system create the conditions for the possibility of

nihilistic judgment through the positing of supersensible realms, entities, and

perspectives, but Kant himself explicitly expresses “nihilistic” value judgments in favor

of the supersensible.

Approved: ______

James Petrik

Associate Professor of Philosophy

Dedication

To Lauren and Ulysses

Acknowledgments

To my parents, siblings, grandparents, immediate family, and anyone else to whom I am genetically related (and refrained from giving me too much trouble for

choosing an academic career). To those who have inspired my of philosophy

including: Drs. Brown, Painter, Goldberg, Mickunas, Petrik, and Powell. To my

philosophical and literary colleagues at Allen County Community College, Emporia State

University, and Ohio University. To Lauren, my significant other. Thank you all for

your love and support.

“In a friend one should have one’s best enemy. You should be closest to him with

your heart when you resist him . . . There is comradeship: let there be friendship!”

– Zarathustra 6

Table of Contents

Page

ABSTRACT ...... 3 DEDICATION...... 4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... 5 INTRODUCTION...... 7 CHAPTER #1: NIETZSCHE AND NIHILISM...... 12 INTRODUCTION...... 12 JACOBI, NIHILISM, AND KANTIAN IDEALISM ...... 13 ZARATHUSTRA’S PROLOGUE AND SPEECHES ...... 15 THE PROBLEM OF SOCRATES...... 21 NIHILISM AND THE CHRISTIAN ASCETIC PRIEST...... 24 AN INTRODUCTION TO KANTIAN NIHILISM ...... 26 NIHILISM AND THE “CULMINATION” OF THE TRADITION...... 28 CONCLUSION...... 32 CHAPTER #2: KANT AND THE TWO WORLD INTERPRETATION ...... 35 INTRODUCTION...... 35 KANT AND ...... 36 NIETZSCHE AND THE THING IN ITSELF...... 42 GUYER AND THE “TWO WORLD” INTERPRETATION ...... 44 KANT AND NIETZSCHE, AND CRITIQUE...... 49 CONCLUSION...... 54 CHAPTER #3: KANT AND THE TWO ASPECT INTERPRETATION ...... 57 INTRODUCTION...... 57 ALLISON AND THE “TWO ASPECT” INTERPRETATION...... 59 NIETZSCHE AND KANT’S ...... 63 KANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE NOUMENAL SELF...... 66 NIETZSCHE AND “REMEMBERING THE EARTH” ...... 69 KANT, NIETZSCHE, AND THE BODY ...... 73 CONCLUSION...... 80 CONCLUSION...... 82 WORKS CITED...... 89 WORKS CONSULTED...... 91

7

Introduction1

“[I]n this formulation a countermovement finds expression, regarding both and task: a movement that in some future take the place of this perfect nihilism.”2 -Nietzsche, The

In Nietzsche’s earliest writings, he readily adopted Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves.3 As his thinking matured, however, he came to reject this distinction, collapsing appearances and things in themselves into a single notion of “appearance.” Nietzsche ultimately came to abhor the concept of things in themselves (or, anything in itself4), attacking it as merely one more malignant development in a 2,300 year history of that advanced the “negation of life” and thus were nihilistic.5 Though Nietzsche frequently repeats the charge that Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves leads to philosophical nihilism, he never provides a sustained analysis or detailed defense of it. It is the purpose of this thesis to supply what Nietzsche does not; viz., a careful development and defense of the charge that Kant’s transcendental idealism creates the conditions for the possibility of nihilism through the positing of supersensible realms, entities, and perspectives, and that

1 Nietzsche’s follow-up work to , book one of his Revaluation of All Values, was tentatively entitled: The Free Spirit: A Critique of Philosophy as a Nihilistic Movement. Since the second volume was never written, it is my that I can begin to bring Nietzsche’s original vision to life through the writing of this thesis. See: Walter Kaufmann. The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking Press, 1968). 657. 2 . The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967). 3. 3 For example, see Friedrich Nietzsche. “On and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 45. 4 For an excellent discussion of whether Nietzsche succeeded in “putting out of order” the category of the in itself, see Stephen Houlgate. “Kant, Nietzsche, and the ‘Thing in Itself,’” (Nietzsche-Studien Vol. 22, 1993). 115-157. 5 The figure “2,300” is the approximate between the life of Socrates and Nietzsche’s own life. 8

Kant himself exhibits “nihilism” explicitly—in the form of value judgments that favor the

supersensible.

My strategy for defending Nietzsche’s charge is as follows: In chapter one, I

begin by outlining the use of the term “nihilism” in a thinker who likely inspired

Nietzsche’s adoption and reversal of the concept, viz., Friedrich Jacobi. I do this in order to Nietzsche’s conception apart as a unique one worthy of exploration (and to show how Nietzsche reverses Jacobi’s formulation, defining nihilism as the “negation of the immanent” rather than the “negation of the transcendent”). Next, I analyze Nietzsche’s own formulation of nihilism in order to understand the charge that he levels against Kant.

In order to flesh out this charge, I discuss two of Zarathustra’s central speeches (“On the

Afterworldly” and “On the Despisers of the Body”) as well as reconstruct Nietzsche’s narrative concerning the nihilism that permeates the history of philosophy. This narrative focuses on the figures of Socrates, the Christian priest, and Kant.

Outlining Zarathustra’s speeches and reconstructing Nietzsche’s narrative ultimately leads to a formulation of nihilism as the judgment that the transcendent

(understood as that which is not given to sensibility i.e., the supersensible) is “more real” and “more valuable” than the natural, material world encountered in experience.

Moreover, Nietzsche claims that such hierarchical judgments in favor of the transcendent or the supersensible lead one to denigrate experience, , and the body (as well as to a of despair when the supersensible is no longer able to withstand critical scrutiny). I therefore conclude chapter one by explaining what Nietzsche is at 9

stake concerning nihilism and the frightening “culmination” of Western metaphysics i.e.,

I illuminate what the implications are if Kant’s philosophy is indeed nihilistic.

In chapter two, using the formulation just outlined, I explain why the traditional

“two world” interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism is susceptible to Nietzsche’s charge of nihilism. This is the case because Kant posits an ultimate “behind”

phenomena that is considered “more real” and “more valuable” than the material realm

encountered in experience.6 I then reinforce Nietzsche’s critique of Kant and the

transcendental idealism based on the work of contemporary scholar, Paul Guyer. Rather

than stop here, though, I conclude this chapter by having Kant retort that he has made no

dogmatic statements concerning transcendent entities in his Critique—claiming instead

that the Critique “den[ies] in order to make room for faith (Glaube)”7 in the transcendent. In response, I argue that Nietzsche would claim it does not matter whether one believes that “knowledge of” or “faith in” the transcendent/supersensible and its heightened value is possible, because nihilism can arise on either view. Thus, given various value judgments that Kant makes with regard to faith, I conclude that Kant’s concept of things in themselves is nihilistic.

In my third and final chapter, I explain why the “two aspect” interpretation of

Kant’s transcendental idealism is susceptible to Nietzsche’s charge of nihilism as well.

The conclusion that Kant’s system is ultimately nihilistic on this reading is especially important because many contemporary scholars believe that the negative metaphysical

6 I also explain how one can split this charge into two, related charges. By this I mean the positing of the supersensible is referred to as “creating the conditions for the possibility of nihilism,” and the valuing of the supersensible over and above the sensible/material is referred to as nihilism proper (or simply nihilism). 7 . Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). Bxxx. 10

implications of the Ding an sich are dissolved by an appeal to a “two aspect,” epistemic

interpretation.8 Indeed, contemporary scholar Kurt Mosser claims that Nietzsche’s charge of nihilism is dissolved by this reading because “Kant’s thing in itself may be metaphysically innocuous.”9 I argue that this is certainly not the case for either Kant’s

theoretical philosophy or his moral philosophy. I support this position by first putting

forward an argument that shows why the “two aspect” reading of Kant’s theoretical

philosophy still involves a hierarchical valuation of the supersensible (i.e., nihilism).

This is the case because, even on a “two aspect” reading, Kantian “noumena” are still

considered the “ground” of phenomena. I then close this section with a potential

Nietzschean criticism of concerning Kant’s theoretical philosophy. This

criticism involves arguing that things considered in themselves are tantamount to a

supersensible “” of the world and thus entail the potentially nihilistic opposition

between essence and appearance.

Beyond Kant’s theoretical philosophy are Nietzsche’s most damaging criticisms

which diagnose nihilism in Kant’s moral-practical project. Thus, the last three sections

of chapter three engage Kant’s project and various Nietzschean criticisms of it. For

example, given Kant’s understanding of the “noumenal self” in his moral , I put

forward an ecologically-based Nietzschean criticism concerning Kant’s rejection of the

earth as a source of and activity. I argue this position given that one can

8 For example, Graham Bird, Henry Allison, Gerold Prauss, Moltke Gram, and Arthur Melnick. These thinkers are primarily concerned with legitimating a “two aspect” reading, not necessarily with defending Kant against Nietzsche. 9 Kurt Mosser. “Nietzsche, Kant, and the Thing in Itself,” (International Studies in Philosophy: XXV/2). 72-73. 11

understand ecology (and ) as counter- to nihilism since the ecologist

and the naturalist laud the earth as opposed to the supersensible.

I ultimately conclude my critique of Kant’s moral philosophy (in chapter three) by

analyzing his views on the value of the body/phenomenal self in relation to the

“noumenal” self, contending that Kant’s system is problematic in two regards. First,

Kant appears to make a host of “positive” claims concerning the of a

supersensible entity (i.e., the noumenal self). Thus, if this reading legitimate, Kant

creates the conditions for the possibility of nihilistic judgment.10 Second, and more

importantly, even if one adopts a “two aspect” reading of Kant’s moral philosophy, Kant

privileges a non-naturalized description of human existence over and above a naturalized

one. Specifically, he marginalizes a description of human existence as phenomenal,

sensuous, and bodily in contrast to a description of human existence from the perspective

of a free, supersensible (or “noumenal”) . I therefore conclude, based on these

value judgments, that Kant’s system is thoroughly steeped in nihilism even on a “two aspect” interpretation.

10 Moreover, I argue that this may make a “two aspect” reading of Kant’s moral philosophy untenable. Regardless, I adopt a “two aspect” interpretation of Kant’s , and then proceed to argue that Kant’s project is still saturated with nihilism. 12

Chapter #1: Nietzsche and Nihilism

“Nihilism stands at the door: whence comes this uncanniest of all guests?”11 -Nietzsche, The Will to Power

Introduction

Before investigating Nietzsche’s claim that the Kantian thing in itself is an

expression of philosophical nihilism, I must ask and, at least tentatively answer, a

preliminary question: the question concerning the nature of Nietzschean nihilism itself.

A good way to begin explicating Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism, and thus the

charge that he levels against Kant, is to outline an early use of the word “nihilism” which

may have inspired him. Outlining this pre-Nietzschean use of the term will show how

Nietzsche reinvented (and in some ways reversed) the meaning of the word.

Although philosophers have used the term “nihilism” since at least the time of St.

Augustine,12 I wish to explore a use more contemporary to Nietzsche to determine what

may have influenced his formulation.13 One figure who stands out as Nietzsche’s

potential influence is the German philosopher Friedrich Jacobi. Jacobi applied the term

“nihilism” to Kantian transcendental idealism given that Jacobi believes Kant’s system

prevents one from making a claim to objects (or ) beyond the scope of one’s own

experience or subjectivity. Nietzsche reverses this formulation in that, for Jacobi,

nihilism involves the “negation of the transcendent,” (i.e., rejecting valuation of or claims

11 Nietzsche. The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967). 7. 12 According to Robert Solomon, Augustine used the term “nihilism” to refer to “unbelievers.” See Solomon. , (New York: , 2005). 34. 13 Although Nietzsche was steeped in classical literature that likely influenced his understanding of nihilism, Jacobi’s explicit use of the term to describe Kantian idealism seems like such an obvious source of inspiration that I selected it rather than other potential sources such as the novels of Dostoevsky and Turgenev. 13 to knowledge about beings or objects outside human experience) whereas for Nietzsche, nihilism involves the “negation of the immanent” or the “negation of life” (i.e., rejecting the value of the contents of experience including the material world and body).14

Jacobi, Nihilism, and Kantian Idealism

Friedrich Jacobi is very likely a source of Nietzsche’s employment of the term

“nihilist” against Kant because, according to Cho, “it is through Jacobi’s accusations [of

Kant] that nihilism first enters the larger philosophical discussion.”15 Moreover, Jacobi is often credited with the invention of the term “nihilist” as a philosophical pejorative.16

There are two important sources in which Jacobi indicts Kant for nihilism, his

“Circular Letter to Fichte” and “On the Attempt of Criticism to bring Reason to its

Senses and to give Philosophy in General a New Purpose.”17 Given the content of

Jacobi’s famous Letter, Cho understands him as claiming that the consequence of adopting Kant’s transcendental idealism is the view that “[a]ll objects have been reduced to merely fictional subjective constructs . . . and so their reality has been effectively

14 The phrases “negation of the transcendent/immanent” are mine. The phrase “negation of life” is Nietzsche’s. Moreover, the “negation” of the transcendent or the immanent is a question concerning values. For example, Augustine could claim that is tantamount to nihilism because the atheist “negates” the value of the transcendent God. In contrast, Nietzsche would claim that in an is nihilistic because the “believer in worlds beyond” “negates” the value of corporeal life—ultimately valuing a transcendent life instead. I should also note that by the “negation of life,” Nietzsche means rejecting not only the value of life itself, but the value of those phenomena connected to life (i.e., human experience, the world, nature, and the body). 15 Stephen Cho. “Before Nietzsche: Nihilism as a Critique of ,” (The Review of Metaphysics: XLVIII/ 2, 1994). 215. 16 . Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982). 3. Given this comment by Heidegger (as well as its reinforcement by Cho), it seems some scholars are at odds with Solomon’s claim that St. Augustine was the first to use the term “nihilism.” For my part, I was unable to find any text where Augustine uses the term. 17 See Cho. “Before Nietzsche: Nihilism as a Critique of German Idealism,” (The Review of Metaphysics: XLVIII/ 2, 1994). 14

annihilated.”18 What Cho is alluding to with this statement is that, for Kant, human

knowledge is limited to mental representations (appearances) which are formed through

the synthesis of empirical data by the conditions for objects being given to sensibility and

thought by the understanding, viz., space, time, and the categories. Kant also argues that

human beings cannot know things in themselves (i.e., objects conceived independently of the manner in which they engage human sensory and cognitive apparatuses). It seems therefore that Jacobi’s is that if human knowledge is limited to a certain

“subjective” representation of the world, then the “objective” world (independent of

human representations) falls away and one loses access to the “real world.” This is why,

in his Circular Letter, Jacobi refers to Kant’s transcendental idealism as nihilism, saying

that “idealism, which I deplore as nihilism,” amounts to “the philosophical knowledge of

nothingness.”19

Indeed, in his “Attempt of Criticism to bring Reason to its Senses,” Jacobi argues

that Kant’s transcendental idealism is an “idealism of ‘-besides-me [Nichts-

Ausser-Ich].’”20 In other words, Jacobi contends that by creating a system wherein

human knowledge is limited to mental representations (appearances), there is no

guarantee that anything (such as an extra-mental reality) exists besides the

forming the representations. Since Jacobi believes that Kant cannot make any claim to

18 See Cho 1994. 215. 19 Cho. “Before Nietzsche: Nihilism as a Critique of German Idealism,” (The Review of Metaphysics: XLVIII/ 2, 1994). 215. This statement on Jacobi’s part implies that he (wrongly) considers Kantian appearances to have merely subjective legitimacy. According to him, since representations are not real but Kant claims that this is all human beings have epistemic access to; Jacobi believes that Kant is saying human beings literally know nothing (or, in his language, nothingness). 20 Cho 1994. 215. This is a reference to Cho quoting Jacobi. 15

objects (or beings) that exist beyond oneself or one’s own mental representations, he

condemns Kant as a nihilist.

In subsequent sections of the chapter, I will show how Nietzsche’s formulation of

nihilism differs markedly from Jacobi’s. Whereas Jacobi is concerned that Kant takes

away any claim to a “true world” beyond human mental representations, and that Kant’s

system robs individuals of the ability to know anything that exists beyond the scope of

their own experience, Nietzsche reverses Jacobi, condemning Kant for nihilism on the

grounds that he is not critical enough, that his system points to the existence of a true

world “behind” appearances, and that this supersensible realm is valued over the

spatiotemporal world of human life.

Zarathustra’s Prologue and Speeches

After putting forward a possible inspiration for Nietzsche’s conception of

nihilism, I can now better investigate his own unique formulation. Nietzsche provides a

preliminary glimpse into this formulation when he states that “[a] nihilist is a man who

judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it

does not exist.”21 Nietzsche argues that this “judging of the world” characterizes the

history of philosophy; that it “begins” imperceptibly in the words of Socrates, and is

carried forward by Christian ascetics/priests of the medieval period.22 Nihilism then

progresses into the modern era, concealed within the words of each successive figure of

21 Nietzsche. The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967). 318. 22 See note attached to the section heading: “Nihilism and the Christian Ascetic Priest” for an explanation of the inclusion of the Christian ascetic priest within the reconstruction of Nietzsche’s narrative. 16 the philosophical tradition, including Kant.23 For Nietzsche, the nihilism (or “negation of life”) concealed throughout the history of philosophy is characterized by a certain attitude toward not only the world but also those phenomena that are inexorably connected to the world (i.e., life, the earth, and the body). Nietzsche also claims the values that characterize this attitude will bring about their own destruction or devaluation and leave nothing in their place.

In order to elucidate Nietzsche’s conception of nihilism (and outline his charge against Kant), I reconstruct Nietzsche’s narrative24 concerning the history of philosophy

(as nihilism). I guide this narrative using a prologue and two speeches belonging to

Zarathustra, and then elaborate it through a discussion of the “problem of Socrates,” an analysis of the Christian ascetic priest and his values, a brief outline of Kantian nihilism, and finally, the “culmination” of nihilism as the self-annihilation of traditional metaphysics.25 This investigation leads to a formulation of nihilism as a historical movement comprised of judgments meant to marginalize life, the body, and the earth in comparison to the transcendent, intelligible, or supersensible.26 I also show why

23 Interestingly, Nietzsche might claim that Spinoza is the single exception (at least in certain respects). 24 By Nietzsche’s “narrative,” I mean his interpretation of the history (genealogy) of as a history wherein the primary figures exemplify deleterious values concerning life, the earth, and the body. 25 I wish to make it clear that Nietzsche’s conception of nihilism is a “metaphysical” thesis. In other words, Nietzsche is interested in how a certain metaphysical scheme (one that posits the transcendent in contradistinction to the immanent) effects how individuals value life, the earth, and the body. Although Nietzsche is interested in metaphysics, I refrain from using this word so that it is not confused with contemporary uses of the term (i.e., studies in causation and universals). Instead, I use the terms: transcendent, supersensible, and intelligible, where these terms refer to the metaphysical (i.e., the “otherworldly” or the “other-bodily”). 26 I wish to note that, throughout the thesis, the terms supersensible, transcendent, and intelligible are used interchangeably as terms that designate the “otherworldly” or “other-bodily.” The same goes for the terms sensible, immanent, and empirical as terms that designate the “worldly,” the “natural,” or the “bodily.” Fine distinctions are not needed for making my central (Nietzschean) contentions against Kant (and would probably lead to unnecessary confusions). 17

Nietzsche thinks that these values ultimately undermine themselves and leave individuals with a feeling of absolute meaninglessness with regard to life.

An excellent place to introduce the nature of Nietzschean nihilism is Nietzsche’s

cryptic and poetic text . Though many commentators focus on

Nietzsche’s radical claim that “!”27 it is more fruitful for understanding

Nietzsche’s charge of nihilism against Kant if special attention is paid to Zarathustra’s

comments on the “believers in worlds beyond” and the “despisers of the body.”

Zarathustra’s story begins when, after leaving his mountain home and traveling to

a nearby town, he gives his first “sermon” in the that the townspeople heed his

teachings. In this sermon, Zarathustra implicitly alludes to nihilism as follows:

I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes! Poison-mixers are they, whether they know it or not. Despisers of life are they, decaying and poisoned themselves, of whom the earth is weary: so let them go.28

An understanding of the above text (by reference to the Nietzschean canon) reveals a concern with nihilism due to the passage’s allusion to “despising life” and the

“otherworldly.”29 In the passage at hand, Zarathustra implies that a nihilist is someone

who is “un-faithful” to the earth, someone who “sins” against the earth, and that this

“sinful” lack of faith is demonstrated by belief in worlds beyond the earth and the natural

world (e.g., the Platonic Forms, the Christian Heaven). Moreover, Zarathustra states that

these “worlds beyond” are not only fictional themselves, but lead one to view the world

27 Friedrich Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 124. 28 Nietzsche 1968. 125 (emphasis Nietzsche’s). 29 Even though Zarathustra does not use the term “nihilism” explicitly, this is clearly Nietzsche’s concern (given what he says in other texts). I have employed Zarathustra, though, because I think the “categories” concerning “belief in worlds beyond” and “despising the body” map perfectly onto a critique of Kant’s Ding an sich selbst. 18

of human life as a fiction as well. This is why Zarathustra laments that when he once

believed in the transcendent, “[t]he work of a and tortured god, the world then

seemed to [him]. A dream the world then seemed to [him], and the fiction of a god.”30

Given Zarathustra’s contention that the positing of the transcendent leads one to view the world as a fiction, he argues that those who posit “otherworldly,” transcendent, or supersensible entities are “poison-mixers.” Zarathustra’s language of “poison-mixing” may seem needlessly harsh, but he uses this language because he contends that within the of a sensible and a supersensible world, a hierarchical valuation takes place in favor of the supersensible (because it is considered more real or more true and ultimately more valuable than the sensible).31 This is why Zarathustra claims that when

the immanent world is opposed to a true supersensible or transcendent world, the

sensible/immanent world seems like a “fiction” by comparison. Some philosophers

claim, though, that the “mere” positing of the supersensible does not entail a value

judgment in favor of it. I account for this criticism throughout the following chapters by

slightly softening Nietzsche’s formulation of nihilism.32

Zarathustra’s other “logical slippage” from a comparative “de-valuation” (of the

sensible in comparison to the supersensible) to “despising” is also somewhat problematic,

but this does not seem to negate that a hierarchical valuation occurs in such oppositions:

true knowledge, an eternal paradise, or the absolute foundation of reality (if they are

30 Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 142. 31 This is why Deleuze writes, “[v]alues superior to life are inseparable from their effect: the deprecation of life, the negation of this world.” . Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). 147. 32 See the following note. 19 taken to exist) certainly seem worthy of more value (and are more desirable) in comparison to a world of , suffering, , and contingency. Thus, the value and importance of the immanent world is “reduced” when compared to a transcendent

“Truth” or “Good,” even if the empirical world is marginalized rather than outwardly

“despised.”33 According to Gilles Deleuze, though, it does not matter whether the empirical world is despised or the intelligible world is privileged because “[f]rom a

Nietzschean perspective these two aspects [i.e., the deprecation of life or exaltation of the intelligible] are inseparable and constitute ‘nihilism’ itself, that is to say, the way in which life is accused, judged and condemned.”34 In other words, for Nietzsche, “merely” privileging the transcendent leads one to simultaneously marginalize or neglect the immanent.35

One might argue, though, that the positing of the transcendent, rather than devaluing the immanent, actually elevates its importance (for example, by providing it with a Divine meaning). I imagine Nietzsche would likely argue, though, that even though belief in the transcendent/supersensible may lead to ascribing more meaning to

the immanent, this does not mean that the immanent is no longer marginalized with

33 When investigating Kant’s transcendental idealism in the following chapters, close attention is paid to both the issue of positing the existence of supersensible entities/perspectives and the issue of value judgments in favor of the transcendent over the immanent. Nietzsche’s claim is contentious concerning whether the “mere” positing of the transcendent is automatically tantamount to nihilism (i.e., whether a binary opposition logically entails a hierarchy), thus I will soften his formulation on this issue. Since the value judgments of nihilism require oppositions between the sensible and the supersensible, whenever a claim is made where the existence of a supersensible entity/perspective is posited, this move is referred to as “creating the conditions for the possibility of nihilism” (in contrast to nihilism proper). On the other hand, it is less contentious that when a philosopher claims that life, the earth, or the body is of little value in relation to the supersensible, this constitutes the “negation of life.” Thus, the word nihilism is reserved for any such claims on Kant’s (or any other philosopher’s) part. 34 Deleuze. Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). 33. 35 I wish to make it clear that the goal of this thesis is not to argue in favor of this contentious claim. I merely will demonstrate that Kant is an exemplar of this phenomenon. 20

regard to the transcendent. A in value between the transcendent and the

immanent still exists: it is just no longer as pronounced—the value judgment instead becomes insidious and covert.36 Moreover, requiring the transcendent to make the

immanent more meaningful implies that the immanent (on its own) is not wholly

meaningful.

Zarathustra also puts forward concerns about nihilism dealing with the body and

its relation to the (or, generally speaking, the non-corporeal component of human existence). In this vein, Zarathustra proclaims “Once the soul looked contemptuously upon the body, and then this was the highest: she wanted the body meager,

ghastly, and starved. Thus she hoped to escape it and the earth.”37 Once again, analysis

of the cited passage provides a glimpse into Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism.

Nietzsche implies that a nihilist is someone who places little or no value on the body (in

comparison to the soul, self, ego, spirit, etc), someone who sees corporeal needs,

inclinations, and as hindering a “spiritual” or “intellectual” life. The passage at

hand also implies that a nihilist is someone who wishes to escape the body through death,

or wishes that the body remain “sickly” so that death comes swiftly.

Zarathustra moves on to argue that the body itself “created” the transcendent, and that the hope of a transcendent life leads one to marginalize one’s immanent life. Along these lines, he argues, “[i]t was the body that despaired of the body and touched the ultimate walls with the fingers of a deluded spirit. Believe me, my brothers: it was the

36 Moreover, as I show later in this chapter, Nietzsche worries about what happens to the value of the immanent for those who find it valuable because the transcendent gives it value. He worries these individuals will find life meaningless once the transcendent is no longer a part of their lives. 37 Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 125. 21

body that despaired of the earth … It wanted to crash through these ultimate walls with

its head.”38 Zarathustra therefore contends that the of the body to escape pain and

“crash through the ultimate walls” of the world (into an immortal life) leads one to long for an escape from the earth (rather than embrace corporeal existence).

For Zarathustra, The hope for an intelligible existence also creates a worry about

“turning away from life” because if there is a pain-free, blissful life waiting on the “other side” of death, why should one not speed the process of death along, spend one’s life preparing for an immortal life, and ultimately place little or no value on the body? This is why Nietzsche claims that “[t]he belief in immortality deprive[s] ‘the world’ of value … with the ‘beyond’ one kills life.”39 Once again, Nietzsche’s hyperbole is evident in the

language of “killing life,” but his concerns about the relative valuation of the body in

contrast to the soul, the “proper self,” and immortal life remain legitimate.40

The Problem of Socrates

Having outlined how nihilism is constituted with respect to the body and the earth, it is now possible to flesh out the concept further by reconstructing Nietzsche’s

narrative concerning nihilism and the Western philosophical tradition. Nietzsche refers

to the “origin” of nihilism within this tradition as “the problem of Socrates.”41 By first

analyzing Socratic nihilism and working towards Nietzsche’s discussion of the

38 Nietzsche 1968. 143. 39 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Antichrist in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 650. 40 Concern with these types of valuation (with regard to the body) is central when investigating Kant’s transcendental moral philosophy and the body’s relationship to the “intelligible self.” I also employ the distinction between the “conditions for the possibility of nihilism” and nihilism proper on this issue as well. 41 Friedrich Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 473-479. 22

“destruction” of the Western tradition, I will lay the ground for a sequence of arguments

designed to show how Kant’s philosophy belongs wholly within Nietzsche’s narrative.

One way to begin analyzing the “problem” at hand is to link Socrates to the above discussion of nihilism in Zarathustra’s speeches. Thus, one should remember that nihilism (in the Nietzschean sense) takes the form of a concerning the value of life in relation to the supersensible, as well as a marginalization of the body and the earth through comparison to the supersensible. Nietzsche links this line of thought to Socrates in the following manner:

Concerning life, the wisest men of all ages have judged alike: it is no good. Always and everywhere one has heard the same sound from their mouths—a sound full of , full of melancholy, full of weariness of life, full of resistance to life. Even Socrates said, as he died: ‘To live— that means to be sick a long time’ . . . Socrates wanted to die: not Athens, but he himself chose the hemlock; he forced Athens to sentence him. ‘Socrates is no physician,’ he said softly to himself; ‘here death alone is the physician. Socrates himself has merely been sick a long time.’42

In the passage at hand, Nietzsche claims that Socrates considered embodied life a kind of

sickness, and therefore Socrates wanted to die voluntarily. Although Nietzsche does not

explicitly say so, he is likely referring to the Platonic dialogue Phaedo when forming the

above remarks concerning Socrates. A brief investigation into this dialogue is therefore

prudent.

In the Phaedo one finds Socrates preparing for his execution, but before being

executed he engages in a discussion with his students concerning the possibility of

attaining knowledge:

It really has been shown to us that, if we are ever to have pure knowledge, we must escape from the body and observe matters in themselves with the

42 Nietzsche 1968. 473-479. 23

soul by itself. It seems likely that we shall, only then, when we are dead, attain that which we desire and of which we claim to be lovers, namely, wisdom, as our argument shows, not while we live; for if it is impossible to attain any pure knowledge with the body, then one of two things is true: either we can never attain knowledge or we can do so after death.43

Reading Socrates’ words within the context of the current discussion begins to illuminate

Nietzsche’s concerning nihilism. Socrates mentions two things that are

especially worthy of note. First, Socrates explains that in order to attain pure knowledge, one must “escape from the body.” Although one might find it hyperbolic to say that

Socrates is a “despiser of the body,” it seems clear that Socrates thinks the body is a hindrance to attaining knowledge (and that the soul is ultimately more valuable than the body due to its capacity for knowing). Second, Socrates makes a recommendation for the philosophical attitude concerning death. Socrates states that only death can provide what the philosopher most longs to attain (i.e., “true knowledge”). What follows from this proposition is that it seems the philosopher should look forward to death, and later in the dialogue Socrates and his students decide that this is the case, concluding that death is something the philosopher should “gladly set out for.”44 In sum, it seems that Socrates’

remarks are nihilistic in the Nietzschean sense due to his desire to “escape” embodied life

and “gladly set out for” death.

Before proceeding to the next section, I wish to engage in a brief analysis of

Socrates’ attitude toward life because nihilism in the Nietzschean sense is bound closely

to what attitude an individual holds toward life. Nietzsche alludes to Socrates’ attitude towards life by attributing to him the following quote: “to live—that means to be sick a

43 . Phaedo in Five Dialogues, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981). 66d-66e. 44 Plato 1981. 67e. 24

long time.” Although Socrates does not say this phrase explicitly in the Phaedo,

Nietzsche is likely referring to Socrates’ final words. As Socrates’ body is growing cold,

gradually dying from ingesting the hemlock, he turns and says, “Crito, we owe a cock to

Asclepius.”45 At first this passage seems strange, and little worthy of note—that is, until

one learns the of Asclepius. According to Grube, “[a] cock was sacrificed to

Asclepius by the sick people who slept in his temple, hoping for a cure. Socrates obviously means that death is a cure for the ills of life.”46

Nietzsche, on the other hand, interprets Socrates’ dying words as claiming that the living are sick merely in of being embodied (given that Socrates was not visibly sick with any noteworthy illness, and that he chose to speak the above words at the moment of his death). Nietzsche argues that Socrates saw embodied life as a kind of sickness.47 This attitude toward life and the body, for Nietzsche, is the “essence” of nihilism, and is an attitude that characterizes the stance of the philosophical tradition for

two millennia.

Nihilism and the Christian Ascetic Priest48

Granting that Socrates is an exemplar of nihilism in the ancient world, it is now

possible to move forward into the medieval era and the nihilism contained therein.

45 Plato 1981. 118a. 46 Plato 1981. 155 (Grube’s footnote). 47 See also (Plato 1981. 67a.) where Socrates claims, “While we live, we shall be closest to knowledge if we refrain as much as possible from association with the body or join with it more than we must, if we are not infected with its nature but purify ourselves from it until the god himself frees us (emphasis mine).” 48 Although it may seem like a deviation from the current narrative reconstruction, discussion of the Christian priest is crucial to understanding Nietzsche’s narrative concerning the history of philosophy. This is because Nietzsche construes the philosophical tradition of nihilism as characterized by the Socrates/Plato--Kant lineage. Nietzsche might have made a stronger point by discussing St. Augustine or St. Aquinas (because they are canonical figures), but he does not do so. Instead, he generalizes to the larger medieval Christian community. 25

According to Nietzsche, one figure who is fruitful to investigate in this respect is the

Christian ascetic priest. According to Nietzsche, the ascetic priest not only harbors a

nihilistic attitude towards life, but is the “professional negator, slanderer, and poisoner of

life.”49 Given that the language Nietzsche uses to describe the priest is similar to the

language used by Zarathustra in his condemnation of “the afterworldly” and the

“despisers of the body,” one can predict the attitude towards life and the body that the

ascetic priest holds. In this vein, Nietzsche writes:

The at issue here is the valuation the ascetic priest places on our life: he juxtaposes it (along with what pertains to it: ‘nature,’ ‘world,’ the whole sphere of and transitoriness) with a quite different mode of existence which it opposes and excludes, unless it turn against itself, deny itself: in that case, the case of the ascetic life, life counts as a bridge to that other mode of existence. The ascetic treats life as a wrong road on which one must finally walk back to the point where it begins, or as a mistake.50

Nietzsche provides a great deal of material here for analysis, and one must exercise

caution in carefully dissecting what is most critical. To begin, one’s attention is

immediately drawn to the question of values in the first line—nihilism is a question concerning values. For example, the priest values a “mode of existence” that is opposed

to and excludes “our life.” Nietzsche thinks that this means rejecting “becoming” and

“the transitory.” There is more that one can infer with regards to “our life” as well:

“becoming” implies flux, a “subject,” and a “world” that is not fixed, one whose

character is non-substantive and impermanent. Since the priest values an opposing

“mode of existence,” it seems likely that this includes the belief in an enduring subject

49 Nietzsche. The Antichrist in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 575. 50 Friedrich Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). 117. 26

and a world of substance that underlies the transitory nature of “our life”—that “our life”

in its impermanence is a “mere appearance.” Moreover, because the priest refuses to

acknowledge the value of the world of becoming in comparison to a world of

permanence, he sees life as a mere “bridge” to another, better, world. Thus, it is clear

why Nietzsche considers the priest a “slanderer of life,” for the priest marginalizes

corporeal life, judging it to lack importance in comparison to a transcendent existence.

Discussing the priest also provides an opportunity to gain further into the term “nihilism,” given Nietzsche’s attitude concerning the transcendent. Since Nietzsche rejects all transcendent entities as “empty fictions,”51 he maintains that belief in such

entities is, in a way, belief in nothing. Nietzsche supports such a reading when he

explains that “[t]his longing to get away from all appearance, change, becoming, death,

wishing, from longing itself—all this means—let us dare to grasp it—a will to

nothingness, an aversion (Widerwillen) to life, a rebellion against the most fundamental

of life.”52

An Introduction to Kantian Nihilism

With Nietzsche’s critique of the Christian ascetic priest elaborated, it is possible

to introduce Nietzsche’s indictment of Kant’s concept of things in themselves (as

nihilism). In later chapters, I fill in this important space between the discussion of ascetic

nihilism and Nietzsche’s analysis of the “end” of the philosophical tradition with the

51 Deleuze elucidates Nietzsche’s insight as follows: “Deprecation always presupposes a fiction: it is by means of fiction that one falsifies and deprecates, it is by means of fiction that something is opposed to life.” Deleuze. Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). 147. 52 Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and RJ Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). 163. 27 central arguments concerning the Kantian thing in itself, arguments to show that Kant’s transcendental philosophy is thoroughly steeped in nihilism.53

According to a traditional (or “two-world”) interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, things in themselves (the objects that “ground” human mental representations) refer to a “true world” that stands behind the empirical world of becoming and human experience. Nietzsche contends that the positing of things in themselves (especially as a “true world”) is quite problematic. This is because Nietzsche

argues that Kant considers the “true world” of things in themselves to have more value

than the “merely apparent” world of nature and human dealings—that the “merely

53 An intriguing side argument that Nietzsche puts forward involves drawing a parallel between the ascetic priest and Kant. Historically, the ascetic priest is characterized by practices that, although considered cleansing and holy, border on self-cruelty. For example, because the ascetic priest views the body as a source of temptation and vice, the priest inflicts pain upon himself in an attempt to “cleanse” his body of desire and temptation (as well as penance for sin). In Kant’s transcendental idealism, Nietzsche sees a similar practice taking place:

Cruelty against reason—a voluptuous that reaches its height when the ascetic self-contempt and self-mockery of reason declares: ‘there is a realm of truth and being, but reason is excluded from it!’ (Incidentally, even in the Kantian concept of the ‘intelligible character of things’ something remains of this lascivious ascetic discord that to turn reason against reason: for ‘intelligible character’ signifies in Kant that things are so constituted that the intellect comprehends just enough of them to know that for the intellect they are—utterly incomprehensible) (GM 163).

Although a rather unique approach to critiquing Kant, the above analogy provides some insight into what Nietzsche’s concerns are when discussing the thing in itself. In order to understand Nietzsche’s charge, though, further exegesis of his claim is necessary. The ascetic priest is charged with nihilism, on Nietzsche’s view, for repudiating the body and violently attacking it, chiding it for its weakness. By analogy, Kant is charged with nihilism for repudiating reason and the power of the intellect. This seems like a rather strange critique coming from Nietzsche, given his penchant to celebrate the body and his suspiciousness of any deification of Reason. On the other hand, Nietzsche claims that “the soul [i.e., the intellect, the non-corporeal] is only a word for something about the body” (Z 146). Thus, by reducing the intellect and reason to the body, Nietzsche is claiming that by attacking the intellect and reason, one is also attacking the body. Indeed, Nietzsche would likely claim that Kant and others like him “subconsciously” recognize that it is the body that they are actually chiding for he says “these godlike men . . . I also know what it is in which they have most faith. Verily, it is not in afterworlds and redemptive drops of blood, but in the body, that they too have the most faith; and their body is to them their thing-in-itself” (Z 145). Thus, Kant reveals himself as a “despiser of the body” (in a covert fashion) for placing limitations on reason. Granted, this preliminary argument is likely unconvincing to some, but through it one can begin to see Nietzsche’s critique of Kant taking shape. 28

apparent” world lacks value in comparison to the supersensible. On this reading, then,

Kant is indicted by Nietzsche as a “believer in worlds beyond” (which I will refer to in

the following chapters as “creating the conditions for the possibility of nihilism”). More

importantly, Nietzsche thinks that Kant is a nihilist for judging the realm of human

experience (the world) as less valuable than the transcendent “realm” of things in

themselves.54

Nihilism and the “Culmination” of the Tradition

In previous sections, I explained why Nietzsche sees the origin of the Western

philosophical tradition (as well as those philosophical/religious positions which stemmed

from it) as nihilistic, but I have not yet discussed why Nietzsche sees this nihilistic

movement as harmful beyond its privileging of the supersensible or the transcendent over

and above the sensible and the immanent. In this final section, I explain why Nietzsche

that something horrific results from two millennia comprised of these types of

valuations (i.e., from marginalizing life, the earth, and the body).

With regard to the frightening results of traditional valuation, Nietzsche asks the

question, “What does nihilism mean?” and answers, “That the highest values devalue

themselves.”55 For Nietzsche, the values that characterize the Western philosophical

54 Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 484. I should make it clear that, for Nietzsche, the positing of transcendent/supersensible entities and the valuation of these entities are inexorably intertwined. Indeed, for Nietzsche, both the positing of and the valuation of the supersensible constitute nihilism. Although I am skeptical that these two moves are separable, I separate them in order to appease those who are skeptical of Nietzsche’s “logical slippage.” Regardless, the point that Kant is a nihilist and his philosophy creates the possibility for this nihilism remains legitimate. 55 Nietzsche. The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967). 9. 29

tradition are in the process of bringing about their own destruction. I think Nietzsche

would argue that one example of this self-destruction is found in Kant’s transcendental philosophy and its relation to truth.56 To begin, truthfulness and honesty are both values lauded by Kant’s moral philosophy. The desire to know certain about reality is also a kind of honesty (i.e., honesty about what is the case). Kantian idealism puts

forward a rigorous with regard to the possibility of making transcendent claims and thus involves honesty about (and precludes the possibility of) the accessibility

of transcendent truths. Thus, one traditional value, “truthfulness” or “honesty,” has

helped to bring about the “destruction of” (or claim to knowledge about) another set of

values: transcendent truth(s). This is why Ansell-Pearson states that “[f]or Nietzsche,

Kant’s critique reveals a much more fundamental moral-metaphysical crisis than [Kant]

himself was prepared to acknowledge or concede. Nietzsche has bequeathed to

philosophy today the term ‘nihilism’ to describe the nature of that crisis.”57

Even if one is skeptical about the self-destructive nature of traditional values, an

investigation into what Nietzsche fears concerning the disintegration of these values is

still possible. Nietzsche fears that when “the dominance of the ‘transcendent’ becomes

null and void . . . all being [or, better yet, ‘becoming’ will] lose its worth and meaning.”58

The reason why Nietzsche puts forward this supposition is based on the “” of nihilism. Nietzsche expounds upon this “logic” in the following manner:

56 Nietzsche puts forward an almost identical example with regard to the self-destruction of Christian , but I have reapplied his tactics here to fit Kant’s morality and its relationship to transcendental idealism. 57 Keith Ansell-Pearson. “Nietzsche’s Overcoming of Kant and Metaphysics: From Tragedy to Nihilism,” (Nietzsche-Studien: Vol. 16, 1987). 311. 58 Heidegger. Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1982). 4. 30

[T]he belief in the absolute immorality of nature, in aim- and meaninglessness, is the psychologically necessary effect once the belief in God and an essentially moral order becomes untenable. Nihilism appears at that point, not that the displeasure at existence has become greater than before, but because one has come to mistrust any ‘meaning’ in suffering, indeed in existence. One interpretation has collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation it now seems as if there were no meaning at all in existence, as if everything were in vain.59

It is valuable at this point to reconstruct the central line of Nietzsche’s argument.

Nietzsche claims that the “moral-metaphysical” interpretation of the world gave the world a meaning (an elaborate transcendent/Divine meaning that some believe it requires), gave suffering itself meaning.60 Once the transcendent values of traditional metaphysics expire, though, the pain and suffering of the world no longer seem meaningful (because they are no longer part of a Divine plan). Thus, the person who once believed in the transcendent is suddenly struck with a horrific and feeling of “being-not-at-home-in-the-world.” This is why Heidegger states that the nihilism

“born” at the twilight of metaphysics is “the beginning of a serious concern with that

’: ‘God is dead.’”61

Just as Nietzsche understands that the “death of God” leads to a lack of meaning

for life/suffering, he also claims that certain philosophical categories will have the same effect when they disintegrate. The “logic” of nihilism is employed once again as

59 Nietzsche. The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967). 35. 60 This line of thought seems in tension with Nietzsche’s earlier claim that belief in the transcendent leads one to marginalize (“despise”) the immanent. As stated earlier, though, I think Nietzsche would argue that just because belief in the transcendent provides the immanent (and suffering) with some higher meaning, does not mean that the immanent is no longer marginalized in comparison to the transcendent. In other words, a difference in value between the transcendent and the immanent still exists, it is just no longer as great. Moreover, this value-scheme implies that the immanent is something that requires the injection of further value than it possesses independently of the transcendent. 61 Heidegger. Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1982). 5. 31

Nietzsche states “the categories ‘aim,’ ‘unity,’ ‘being’ which we used to project some

value into the world—we pull out again; so the world looks valueless.”62 Nietzsche therefore contends that human beings used certain “categories” to inject the world with meaning, but now that those categories are gone, meaninglessness results.63

The value-creating categories that Nietzsche refers to above include: the belief

that the world has a specific telos towards which it aims and that human existence

somehow helps to achieve that end; the belief that the is an organized place that

hangs together neatly according to a logos and wherein human existence has meaningful

a role to play; and finally, belief in a “true world” comprised of static “Being” that

excludes “becoming” (i.e., that “Truth” is possible). Since each of these traditional

categories helps to make the world seem like a meaningful, organized place, Nietzsche

posits that “[t]he faith in the categories of reason [aim, unity, and being] is the cause of

nihilism. We have measured the value of the world according to categories that refer to a

purely fictitious world.”64

Thus, when traditional (meaning-creating) categories are no longer in place, the

world will seem meaningless by comparison. This is why Nietzsche would argue that by

privileging the intelligible (as a source of truth, freedom, and moral obligation) and by

creating various “philosophical categories”65 (i.e., the thing in itself as an example of

62 Nietzsche. The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967). 13. 63 This is why Deleuze states that the reactive nihilist “denies God, the good and even truth – all forms of the supersensible. Nothing is true, nothing is good, God is dead.” Deleuze. Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962). 148. 64 Nietzsche 1967. 13. 65 Scare quotes are necessary because the term “category” has a special meaning for Kant. What Nietzsche has in , though, are that refer to “fictional” (i.e., supersensible) entities. For example, one 32

“being,” and the categorical imperative as providing “aim” and “unity”), Kant is

responsible for fostering the feeling of suffocating meaninglessness that characterizes the

Western tradition’s “culmination.”66

Conclusion

At the close of the current chapter, the nature of Nietzschean nihilism is hopefully becoming clearer. In order to convey the nuances of this complex conception, I first postulated as to where Nietzsche received the inspiration for it. I did this by explaining how Jacobi was responsible for bringing the term “nihilism” into the public discourse through his critique of Kant. I contended that Nietzsche likely was inspired by Jacobi, and that Nietzsche ultimately reversed Jacobi’s formulations, charging Kant with the very

things that Jacobi believed Kant denied. Indeed, Nietzsche defines “nihilism” in a

manner quite different from Jacobi, as constituted by the belief in (and the hierarchical

valuation of) a “true world” and a “true self” beyond the world of appearances and

human experience. Nietzsche argues that this view ultimately leads to a marginalization of the experienced world and the empirical body (i.e., that life, the earth, and the body are

judged as less valuable than the transcendent/supersensible).

might interpret the thing in itself as a realm of static “being,” a place where absolute truth exists. Or, in Kant’s moral philosophy, one might interpret the categorical imperative as creating an intelligible matrix that links together all rational beings (i.e., unity) in the shared goal of creating a “kingdom of ends” (i.e., aim). 66 I hope it is clear by now that the nihilism Nietzsche diagnoses in the Western tradition and the nihilism he predicts will come about at the “end” of the tradition are closely linked, although different. Deleuze makes a useful distinction between these two types of nihilism, labeling the first negative nihilism and the second reactive nihilism. To clarify, negative nihilism is characterized by the negation of life, the earth, and the body, whereas reactive nihilism is characterized by the negation of the transcendent and all traditional values—it is a reaction to the disintegration of the tradition and the “death of God.” Deleuze. Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962). 148. 33

After investigating a possible source of Nietzsche’s inspiration for the term

“nihilism,” Nietzsche’s own understanding of nihilism (and thus the charge I bring against Kant) was put forward—first by discussing Zarathustra’s speeches and then by reconstructing Nietzsche’s narrative concerning the history of Western philosophy. For

Zarathustra, nihilism is characterized by a certain attitude toward life, the earth, and the body. Specifically, Zarathustra calls those persons “nihilists” who posit the existence of

(and value) another world instead of venerating the earth, as well as those who see the body as less valuable in contrast to the soul or “intelligible self.”

After discussing Zarathustra, Nietzsche’s narrative concerning the history of philosophy was reconstructed (in order to provide a fuller understanding of nihilism).

Understanding this movement and its history is particularly important because the arguments that I put forward in later chapters discuss why and how Kant is “guilty” of harboring analogously nihilistic attitudes. By first outlining the “problem of Socrates,” I showed how nihilism is embedded deep within the roots of philosophy, taking the form of the desire to “get wholly free” of the body (and escape life). Through an analysis of the medieval Christian priest it was shown why ascetic nihilism involves not only of the body, but seeing life as merely a bridge to another “truer” world. A preliminary overview was also given of why Nietzsche thinks that Kant is a nihilist in a manner similar to Socrates and the ascetic priest. The reason Nietzsche indicts Kant for nihilism specifically is linked to Kant’s positing and valuing of “worlds beyond” human experience. This discussion created an introduction to the central investigation of Kant’s 34

notion of things in themselves, carving out an argumentative space that I fill in later chapters.

Finally, I showed what Nietzsche fears concerning the “fulfillment” of the

Western tradition: namely, that when traditional values have dissolved, a period of utter meaninglessness and hopelessness will follow. Nietzsche’s dire predictions are important prior to a discussion of Kantian nihilism because if one can demonstrate that

Kant is a nihilist, then one can claim that his philosophy contributes to the frightening outcomes of the tradition’s dissolution. 35

Chapter #2: Kant and the Two World Interpretation

“‘Things that have a constitution in themselves —a dogmatic idea with which one must break absolutely”67 -Nietzsche, The Will to Power

“I have found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith”68 -Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

“‘Faith’ means not wanting to know what is true”69 -Nietzsche, The Antichrist

Introduction

After outlining Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism in the previous chapter, it is now possible to investigate the nature of things in themselves as well as Nietzsche’s critique of the concept. In this chapter, I first outline Kant’s theory of transcendental idealism and then discuss Nietzsche’s indictment of the system as “otherworldly,” nihilistic metaphysics. After outlining Nietzsche’s attack, I support his reading based on the work of the contemporary philosopher, Paul Guyer. Guyer adheres to a “two world” interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, contending that Kant’s system ultimately masks a dogmatic metaphysics. And in my terms, it masks a metaphysics that creates the conditions for the possibility of nihilism.70 Furthermore, Guyer aligns himself with

Nietzsche in claiming that Kant denigrates human experience, reducing the furniture of

67 Nietzsche. The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968). 302. 68 Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). Bxxx. 69 Nietzsche. The Antichrist in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 635. 70 I want to emphasize that the locution “conditions for the possibility of nihilism” is my own. Nietzsche himself argues that the “mere positing” of supersensible entities is nihilism proper. I have softened his formulation for those who think that the binary opposition of supersensible/sensible does not automatically (logically) slide into a hierarchy that favors the supersensible. 36

the empirical world to the status of “mere representations.”71 Thus, given Nietzsche’s

and Guyer’s insights, I argue that according to a “two world” interpretation, Kant’s

transcendental idealism is explicitly nihilistic in Nietzschean sense.

Rather than simply assume that Nietzsche and Guyer show that Kant is guilty of

nihilism, I foster a further exchange between Kant and Nietzsche. I contend that Kant

would posit he never claimed that one can know that things in themselves exist (behind

appearances) from the theoretical standpoint, because he holds that transcendent entities

are entities in which one can only have faith. Nietzsche would respond, though, by

arguing that faith in the transcendent leads to nihilistic judgment. I therefore conclude

the chapter by arguing that not only has the possibility for nihilism been created through

Kant’s faith in the transcendent (a faith fostered by the appearance/thing in itself

distinction), but that he expresses nihilistic values based upon this distinction.

Kant and Transcendental Idealism

In order to enter the debate concerning the nature of things in themselves as well

as Nietzsche’s critique thereof, a general overview of Kant’s theory of transcendental

idealism is required. Kant’s transcendental idealism itself is born of a reversal. Kant

refers to this reversal as “the Copernican Revolution”72 in epistemology, and summarizes

it as follows: “suppose that our representation of things, as they are given to us, does not

71 Guyer does not explicitly align himself with Nietzsche (by name). I am simply contending that they have similar worries concerning Kant’s transcendental idealism. 72 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). Bxvii. 37

conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as appearances,

conform to our mode of representation.”73

In many prior to Kant, it was assumed that mental representations

of the world had to passively conform to the structure of the “external” world.74 Put

differently, the world “outside” the mind governed the kinds of representations that one

could form “inside” the mind. Kant’s insight comes when he reverses these

traditional epistemic models. According to Kant, the “external” world must “conform” to

the conditions of human sensibility and understanding. Indeed, the world “outside” the

mind is ultimately governed and shaped in a certain way by the mind itself. This is not to

say that on Kant’s model the external world is actually created by the mind (as in

idealism proper), but that the mind must shape its experience of external objects in a

certain manner in order to make experience possible. This is why Deleuze writes “[t]he

first thing that the Copernican Revolution teaches us is that it is we who are giving the

orders . . . we are the legislators of Nature.”75

In order to flesh out and clarify the above comments on Kant’s epistemology, it is

fruitful to turn to the Critique of Pure Reason and further outline Kant’s model. For

Kant, “objects of sensible intuition must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility

which lie a priori in the mind.”76 By “a priori” formal conditions of sensibility, Kant

means those features that the mind of the experiencing subject contributes to experience.

73 Kant 1965. Bxx. 74 And moreover, on some models a pre-established harmony between external objects and internal representations is assumed as guaranteed by God (for example, see Descartes’ Meditations). 75 Gilles Deleuze. Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963). 14. 76 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B123. 38

Kant states that the features of experience that are imparted by human sensibility are

space and time.77 This means that for any to appear in experience, the viewing

subject must impart spatiotemporal conditions upon that object in order to experience it.

This leads Kant to conclude that “[s]pace [and time] do not represent any of

things in themselves, nor [do they] represent them in their relation to one another.”78

For Kant, though, sensible intuition79 is only the beginning of the epistemic

process. After objects are intuited according to the a priori conditions of space and time,

the resulting manifold is synthesized by the imagination.80 The synthesis of the intuited

manifold, though, does not provide knowledge. The manifold of intuited objects must

first be organized by what Kant refers to as the categories of the understanding. The a

priori categories of the understanding unify the manifold of intuition into a

comprehensible whole (where these categories include causation, substance, and

community). The result of this unification is organized experience. This means that

(similar to space and time) concepts like cause and effect are imposed upon experienced

objects by the cognizing subject and employed in all judgment.81

Thus far, I have explained how Kant’s model involves a subject forming

representations in the mind as “external” objects are engaged by the sensory apparatus,

and that in order to form representations, the subject must impart certain conditions (i.e.,

space, time, and causation) upon objects. This leads Kant to conclude that space and

77 See the Transcendental Aesthetic of The Critique of Pure Reason, B34 through B73. 78 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B42. 79 For Kant, sensible intuition is the first step of the epistemic process. In order to experience any object, the human mind must first “frame” it within space and time. Otherwise, it cannot be intuited at all. 80 Kant 1965. B104. 81 For a detailed exposition, see Deleuze. Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963). 15-17. 39

time, although empirically real and featured in all phenomenal experience, are

transcendentally82 ideal (i.e., imparted a priori by the subject). Kant himself summarizes

and expands upon these insights concerning sensibility in the following way:

What we have meant to say is that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being, nor their so constituted in themselves as they appear to us, and that if the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish. As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us. We know nothing but our particular mode of perceiving them.83

Kant also reaches a similar conclusion concerning the categories of the

understanding (i.e., that they are empirically real, yet transcendentally ideal). He

summarizes this insight (as well as the relationship between nature and the categories) in

the following passage:

Consequently, all possible , and therefore everything that can come to empirical consciousness, that is, all appearances of nature, must, so far as their connection is concerned, be subject to the categories. Nature, considered merely as nature in general, is dependent upon these categories as the original ground of its necessary conformity to law (natura formaliter spectata).84

Thus, for Kant, all representations formed in the mind (appearances) must conform to the

categories of the understanding. The sum of all appearances itself constitutes nature, and

thus nature is determined a priori by certain , cognitive laws.

82 When reading Kant, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between “transcendent” and “transcendental.” The term “transcendent” refers to objects or entities outside or beyond the scope of experience. On the other hand, the term “transcendental” refers to the conditions for the possibility of experience. For example, space is transcendental because it is contributed to experience by sensibility prior to experience. The noumena, by contrast, are something entirely outside experience. Thus, if they exist, they are transcendent. 83 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B59. 84 Kant 1965. B164-165. 40

Through the above two passages, Kant’s epistemic system as a whole is brought

together (and hopefully clarified), but the reader is likely beginning to anticipate some of

the central questions surrounding Kantian transcendental idealism such as: If all human

experience is composed of representations (appearances), and these representations are

composed by imparting spatiotemporal conditions upon objects in order to intuit them, is

it meaningful to talk about (or think about) objects existing independently of the human

mode of viewing them? In sum, what is the nature of a thing considered in itself, a thing

considered independently of the conditions for the possibility of experience (ein Ding an

sich selbst)?

Before moving ahead to the interpretation of things in themselves put forward by

Nietzsche, a brief glance at some of Kant’s general remarks on the concept is instructive.

Concerning things in themselves, Kant states, “though we cannot know these objects as

things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as things in

themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be

appearance without anything that appears.”85 Thus, for Kant, human knowledge is

limited to representations (appearances) and “it is impossible for . . . a to be a

positive object for our understanding.”86 This is the case because Kant contends that in

order to have knowledge, one must first have in place certain conditions for knowing. If an object is considered without the conditions for the possibility of experience, then one

cannot intuit a ready-to-hand object at all. On the other hand, Kant contends that

although things in themselves are unknowable, they are certainly thinkable. This is the

85 Kant 1965. Bxxvi-ii. 86 Deleuze. Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963). 26. 41

case because reason compels the subject to posit that an appearance is always an

appearance of something (of some object).87 Thus, all representations have an unknowable “transcendental object” corresponding to them that one can think about but not experience or know. These combined insights lead Kant to wax poetically that:

We then realise that not only are the drops of rain mere appearances, but that even their round shape, nay even the space in which they fall, are nothing in themselves, but merely modifications or fundamental forms of our sensible intuition, and that the transcendental object remains unknown to us.88

For Kant, then, the transcendental object “provides an (essentially) noncausal principle of grounding” for the objects of experience.89 This ground is “noncausal” because the categories apply only to the objects of experience. Thus, it would be contradictory for

Kant to say that something “outside” experience (things in themselves) is the cause of

something “inside” experience (the phenomena).90 The nature of this unknowable

ground “outside” experience, though, remains mysterious and worthy of further

exploration and interpretation. It is best therefore to move forward to Nietzsche’s

interpretation of the Kantian thing in itself, and to why he contends that the concept

constitutes philosophical nihilism.

87 Nietzsche contends that this is problematic based on his famous contention that, “[T]here is no ‘being’ behind doing.” In other words, he contends that just because there is an “appearance,” does not mean that there is something doing the appearing. Nietzsche’s argument is found in On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). 45. 88 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B63. 89 Nicolas Rescher. Kant and the Reach of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000). 26. 90 For more on this issue, see Critique of Pure Reason B165 through B169 where Kant explains why, “[w]e cannot think an object save through [the] categories.” Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B165. 42

Nietzsche and the Thing in Itself

In the previous chapter concerning nihilism, I explained why Nietzsche reserves one use of the term “nihilist” for individuals who posit an “otherworldly” realm, especially those who claim that this transcendent or intelligible realm is more real or more valuable than the phenomenal/empirical world of human experience.91 Through

the above discussion of Kant’s transcendental idealism, one might consider the concept

of things in themselves as involving a “true,” separate, and objective world that underlies

human experience. If I can indeed show that things in themselves are tantamount to an

“otherworldly” reality that stands behind human experience, then I can claim that Kant

has created the conditions for the possibility of nihilistic judgment. Furthermore, if Kant

claims that this intelligible world is the privileged/foundational substratum of the

phenomenal world of human experience, then I can also indict him as a nihilist in the

Nietzschean sense.

According to Nietzsche, things in themselves are nothing more than an updated version of “the old sun,” the Platonic-Christian “true world” that resides behind the world of appearances, and Kantian epistemological skepticism is simply a clever way to

“protect” transcendent metaphysical ideals from destruction.92 In The Antichrist,

Nietzsche fleshes out this critique of Kant’s system as follows:

91 One should remember that I soften Nietzsche’s formulation of nihilism as Kant’s transcendental philosophy is investigated. Specifically, the “mere” positing of a supersensible realm is referred to as “creating the conditions for the possibility of nihilism,” whereas valuing the supersensible above the empirical (or denigrating the empirical) is considered nihilism proper. 92 Stack reinforces this interpretation “Nietzsche sees the Kantian assumption of a realm of things in themselves as a reinforcement of the Platonic-Christian belief in a transcendental ‘true world’ that implies the denigration of this world as a system of appearances.” See George Stack. “Nietzsche’s Critique of Things-in-Themselves,” (Dialogos: Vol. 36, 1980). 41. 43

Why was Kant’s appearance (Erscheinnung) greeted with jubilation among German scholars . . . and whence came the German conviction, echoed even today, that a change for the better began with Kant? The theologian’s instinct in the German scholars divined what had once again been made possible. A path had been found on which one could sneak back to the old ideal. The conception of a ‘true world,’ . . . [was] once again, thanks to a wily and shrewd skepticism, if not provable, at least no longer refutable. Reason, the right of reason, does not extend that far. Reality had been reduced to mere ‘appearance,’ and a mendaciously fabricated world, the world of being, was honored as reality. Kant’s success is merely a theologian’s success.93

Nietzsche contends, therefore, that Kant dogmatically asserts the existence of a realm of

objects that underlie the world of human experience, and moreover that this world is the

“true world.” This seems like a reasonable enough conclusion given that Kant claims

“[t]he true correlate of sensibility, the thing in itself, is not known, and cannot be known,

through . . . representations.”94 According to Nietzsche’s interpretation, then, because

things in themselves are tantamount to “the true world,” and thus more real and more

foundational than the world of appearances, the value of appearances (and human

experience) is diminished significantly by contrast (i.e., reduced to “mere appearance”).

Nietzsche concludes, then, by saying that “[a]ny distinction between a ‘true’ and an

‘apparent’ world—whether in the Christian manner or in the manner of Kant (in the end,

an underhanded Christian) – is only a suggestion of , a symptom of the decline

of life.”95

93 Nietzsche. The Antichrist in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 577. 94 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St.Martin’s, 1965). B45 (emphasis mine). 95 Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 484. 44

Although Nietzsche’s generalization to “any [and all] distinction[s]” is likely problematic to some (because they contend that a dichotomy does not automatically entail a hierarchy), on Nietzsche’s reading, Kant’s system certainly appears guilty of positing a “true world” that stands in contrast with the world of . Moreover,

Kant’s system downgrades the value of human experience (referring to it as a manifold of

“mere representations”96) in contrast to an intelligible “true world,” and is thus nihilistic.

This exemplification of nihilism allows Nietzsche to place Kant within the history of the

nihilistic tradition outlined in the previous chapter. Thus, in a famous passage from

Twilight of the Idols where Nietzsche traces the history of a nihilistic “otherworld,” Kant

is included among the ranks of traditional Platonic and Christian metaphysicians:

The true world—unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it—a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. (At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian [i.e., Kantian]).97

For Nietzsche, then, the Ding an sich is an ideal that one can neither witness nor grasp,

but belief in its existence provides an “old-fashioned metaphysical comfort.”98 In

actuality, the concept is ancient—as old as Plato’s Form of the Good—only now the

philosopher has no hope of knowing its radiance or Truth.

Guyer and the “Two World” Interpretation

After outlining Nietzsche’s interpretation and criticisms of Kant’s transcendental idealism, I now turn to the work of contemporary commentator Paul Guyer to show why

96 See Critique of Pure Reason B164, B521, and B523 for a mention of “mere representations.” 97 Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 485. 98 Nietzsche. The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967). 21. 45

Nietzsche’s remarks are neither incidental nor merely polemical. According to Guyer, one reason Kant’s transcendental idealism is problematic is that it puts forward positive assertions about the nature of things in themselves. This is, of course, problematic because Kant argues that things in themselves are entirely unknowable: “[t]he non- sensible cause of . . . representations [i.e., things in themselves] is completely unknown to us, and cannot therefore be intuited by us as [an] object.”99 Thus, if Kant is positing the

existence of, and making claims about, a realm independent of human experience, he is

simply a traditional metaphysician (creating the conditions for the possibility of nihilism)

rather than a critical and skeptical philosophical revolutionary. Moreover, if Kant views the realm of things in themselves as more true, more real, or more valuable than the phenomenal realm of appearances, he is also guilty of nihilism proper.100

A good place to begin an investigation into Guyer’s interpretation of Kant is

where Guyer describes how Kant makes (unwarranted) positive assertions about the

nature of things in themselves. In this vein, Guyer writes:

What Kant sets out to demonstrate under the name of transcendental idealism is that a spatial and temporal view of things as they really are in themselves, independent of our perceptions of them, would be demonstrably false . . . it is a harshly dogmatic insistence that we can be quite sure that things as they are in themselves cannot be as we represent them to be.101

There is a great deal at stake in Guyer’s claim, thus careful analysis is required. I agree

with Guyer that Kant ultimately sets out to demonstrate the non-spatial and non-temporal

nature of things in themselves. This is the case because Kant’s entire ethical project

99 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B522. 100 This concern with nihilism is, of course, Nietzsche’s and not Guyer’s, although Guyer’s worries concerning Kant are certainly analogous to Nietzsche’s. 101 Paul Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 333. 46

hinges on his ability to demonstrate this proposition, and he bolsters this supposition in

the following passage from the Critique of : “[a]ctually, if the actions of

man, as they pertain to his determinations in time, were not merely properties of his being

as appearance but also of his being as a thing regarded as he is in himself, freedom [and

thus morality] could not be saved.”102 Indeed, I highlight Kant’s here to

underscore what motivations he might have for overzealously asserting the non-

spatiotemporal nature of things in themselves (assuming that that he is indeed

overstepping his bounds by making this claim).

Guyer contends that Kant is certainly far from cautious when it comes to making

the “non-spatiality” claim. He writes: “Kant does not use the qualified language of a true

skeptic when he writes that ‘space represents no property whatever of any things in

themselves, nor does it represent them in their relation to one another.’”103 Thus, if Kant

can provide no arguments for the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves, instead dogmatically asserting the claim, this means that Kant is merely a traditional metaphysician who makes claims about the “otherworldly,” and puts the conditions for

the possibility of nihilistic judgment in play.104

Before moving forward, I wish to say a few more words about the “non-

spatiality” claim. According to Henry Allison, Kant’s claim to “non-spatiality” is not

102 Kant. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993). Ak., III, 101. 103 Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 333. 104 According to Clark, “[i]f Guyer is correct, Kant means that we can be sure that things-in-themselves are not as we represent them to be, thus the ultimate truth about things is hidden from our knowledge. Even if Guyer’s version of Kant is wrong, it seems very close to the one under whose influence Nietzsche wrote.” See Maudmarie Clark. Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 57. 47

dogmatic at all, but is rather an “analytic truth” of transcendental idealism.105 By

“analytic truth,” Allison means that contained within the very definition of the concept

“thing considered in itself” is the feature of non-spatiality. Guyer does not agree with

Allison’s analysis, though, and claims that “Kant argues . . . exactly the opposite of this: namely, that space and time can only be mere forms of representation because they cannot be properties of things in themselves.”106 It seems one can support Guyer in

holding this position given Kant’s remark that “if we regard space and time as properties

which, if they are to be possible at all, must be found in things in themselves . . . [one

cannot avoid the] absurdities in which we are then involved.”107 Given this passage (as

well as others at B42 and B64), it seems that Kant is indeed concerned with arguing, not

that the non-spatiotemporal nature of things in themselves is based on an analytic truth,

but rather that he must posit their non-spatiotemporal nature in order to avoid various

philosophical difficulties.108

Interestingly, Guyer argues that even if one does not buy his reading that Kant

dogmatically adheres to the claim that things in themselves are non-spatiotemporal,

Kant’s thought is still problematic on other (I claim, Nietzschean) grounds. In relation to

these grounds, Guyer states:

[I]t is no help to claim that Kant does not postulate a second set of ghostlike nonspatial and nontemporal objects in addition to the ordinary referents of empirical judgments. Indeed he does not, except in the special

105 Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 342. 106 Guyer 1987. 342. 107 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B70. 108 Even if one does not concede Guyer’s point here, adhering instead to a “two aspect” interpretation, this does not damage the weight of the thesis’ total argument. I am merely considering two different lines of argumentation (“two world” and “two aspect”) in from one another to show how each reveals Kant’s thought as nihilistic. I do not wish to burden myself with the task of demonstrating which interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism is the most legitimate. 48

cases of God and the soul, which clearly are intended to be objects numerically distinct from any encountered in ordinary experience. But he does something just as unpleasant – namely, degrade ordinary objects to mere representations of themselves, or identify objects possessing spatial and temporal qualities with mere mental entities.109

One can see from the passage at hand that Guyer’s concerns are profoundly linked to

Nietzsche’s. Guyer claims that Kant “degrades” the objects of ordinary experience to the status of “mere representations” in contrast to their supersensible ground. If Guyer is warranted in making this claim, then Kant is making a nihilistic gesture. This is the case because making such a gesture implies that the world of human experience is of lesser value in comparison to some “other” world or “other” set of objects.

Guyer’s reading here is certainly defensible, especially given various slips of the pen that Kant exhibits. For example, Kant refers numerous to appearances and/or mental representations as “mere appearances” and “mere representations.”110 And although Kant is careful not to characterize appearances as “illusions” (Scheinen), he

does not seem to grant them any standing beyond that of “mere” mental entities, saying,

“all appearances, are not in themselves things; they are nothing but representations, and

cannot exist outside our mind.”111 Thus, according to Guyer’s interpretation, Kant has

devalued the world of human experience in comparison to another, more foundational,

realm. One can therefore indict him as a nihilist in the Nietzschean sense.

109 Guyer. Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 334-335. Although Guyer says that, “Indeed [Kant] does not [postulate a second set of ghostlike nonspatial and nontemporal objects],” this does not mean that Guyer does not abide by a “two world” interpretation of transcendental idealism. Reference to the rest of his text clearly shows that because he thinks Kant dogmatically asserts the non-spatiotemporality of things in themselves, this means that Kant is more or less referring to unknowable objects that underlie human experience. 110 See Bxxix, B207, and B429 for a mention of “mere appearances,” and B164, B521, and B523 for a mention of “mere representations.” 111 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B520. 49

Kant and Nietzsche, Faith and Critique

Although it is tempting to end the present discussion of the “two world” interpretation here (with Kant indicted as a nihilist), such an abrupt conclusion is peremptory. Before concluding, I wish to foster an exchange between Kant and

Nietzsche on the relationship between The Critique of Pure Reason and faith. I contend that Kant would claim he has made no dogmatic assertions about the “positive” existence of things in themselves from within the theoretical standpoint, and that faith alone can foster belief in entities beyond the scope of human experience. In response, I think

Nietzsche would argue that faith in the transcendent (as opposed to knowledge) still ultimately leads to nihilism (and that Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves promotes such faith-based nihilism).

In response to Nietzsche’s and Guyer’s indictments concerning the positive knowledge of objects beyond the power of human thought, I think Kant would maintain that he has made no such claims. In The Critique of Pure Reason Kant writes that, when making judgments from the theoretical standpoint, “we are never justified in making a leap out beyond the context (assuer dem Zusammenhange) of sensibility.”112 Thus, for

Kant, knowledge is always knowledge of appearances only and so from the standpoint of speculative reason, claims concerning the “otherworldly” are groundless. Kant makes this claim explicit, saying, “knowledge has to do only with appearances, and must leave the thing in itself (die Sache an sich selbst) as indeed real per se, but as not known by us.”113 It seems therefore that Kant does not think he is making any kind of claims about

112 Kant 1965. B591. 113 Kant 1965. Bxx. 50

the transcendent from within the theoretical standpoint, and therefore is not creating the

conditions for nihilistic value judgments.

Although in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant claims that knowledge concerning

the transcendent is impossible, Gilles Deleuze argues that Kant is actually not as skeptical

as he appears. Thus, Deleuze refers to Kant’s First Critique as a “false critique,” saying:

[T]he uncritical character of each ideal remains at the heart of like the worm in the fruit: true knowledge, true morality and true . What Kant still calls – in his own terms – a fact: the fact of morality, the fact of knowledge . . . The Kantian taste for the demarcation of domains was finally freed, allowed to play its own game, in the Critique of Judgment; we learn what we had known from the start, that the only object of Kant’s critique is justification, it begins by believing in what it criticizes.114

In other words, Deleuze claims that although (in the Critique of Pure Reason) Kant

denies that knowledge concerning the transcendent is possible, reference to the totality of

the Kantian canon115 proves otherwise. Deleuze claims that Kant believes positive

knowledge of the supersensible is possible (i.e., that the First Critique is a kind of ruse).

If this is the case, then Kant has certainly created the conditions for the possibility of

nihilism by making positive claims concerning the supersensible. Deleuze’s argument is

quite contentious, though, so it is more fruitful to simply imagine Nietzsche conceding

Kant’s claim that knowledge of the transcendent is impossible and then see what ensues.

Given Kant’s claim that positive knowledge of the transcendent is impossible, I

think Nietzsche, in turn, would raise another worry—that there is a problematic

114 Deleuze. Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). 90. 115 For example, see Critique of the Power of Judgment Second Part: Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment. Immanuel Kant. Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 231-346. 51

“loophole” in the Kantian project. In this vein, Nietzsche writes, “it was no slight

universal danger, under the semblance of full and final knowledge of the past, to

subordinate knowledge to feeling altogether and—to speak with Kant, who thus

determined his own task—‘to open the way again for faith by showing knowledge its

limits.’”116 Early in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant indeed states, “I have therefore

found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith (Glaube).”117

Therefore it seems that Kant has made his claims about the critical limitations of knowledge in order to allow, or even promote, faith in inaccessible, transcendent entities

(namely: God, the soul, and intelligible freedom118).

For Nietzsche, though, it does not matter whether one claims that knowledge of supersensible entities is possible or faith alone in such entities is possible—nihilism is not a matter of whether one believes that one can access entities through a syllogism or only

“touch them with the heart.” Nihilism is about judging the value of life, the earth, and the body as inferior in comparative relation to the supersensible. This is why Nietzsche claims that Kant’s aim in writing The Critique of Pure Reason is problematic. It is problematic because even though the Critique is successful in “destroying” the possibility of making transcendent knowledge claims, Kant has put forward his critique in order to promote faith in the transcendent—which ultimately fosters the conditions for nihilism.

Nietzsche further articulates this concern as follows:

Does one still seriously believe (as theologians imagined for a while) that Kant’s victory over the dogmatic concepts of (‘God,’ ‘soul,’

116 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Dawn in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 85. 117 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). Bxxx. 118 Kant might also mean that he is making room for values/religion in a mechanized universe. 52

‘freedom,’ ‘immortality’) damaged that ideal? —it being no concern of ours for the present whether Kant ever had any of doing such a thing. What is certain is that, since Kant, transcendentalists of every kind have once more won the day—they have been emancipated from the theologians: what ! —Kant showed them a secret path by which they may, on their own initiative and with all scientific responsibility, from now on follow their ‘heart’s desire.’119

Thus it seems that whereas Guyer’s and Deleuze’s concerns with Kant’s epistemic

system are concerns about what can be known positively concerning two different worlds

(or sets of objects) as well as the denigration of the phenomenal world, Nietzsche’s

concerns with Kant and the question of a “two world” interpretation are ultimately related

to faith and the (potentially nihilistic) values that such a faith can foster.120

With regard to Kant’s “faith-based nihilism,” it is worth showing how Kant’s faith leads him to posit the existence of supersensible entities (and that this faith is fostered by the distinction between appearances and things in themselves)—for if Kant makes claims about the positive existence of transcendent entities based upon the supposition of the

Ding an sich, then the conception clearly creates the conditions for the possibility of nihilism. Concerning God and the “positive” existence of things in themselves Kant writes:

I will that there be a God, that my existence in this world be also an existence in a pure world of the understanding [i.e., the noumena] outside

119 Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morals, trans Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). 117. 120 Interestingly, Nietzsche seems to recognize that from the theoretical standpoint, things in themselves are a limit-concept rather than a transcendent supposition, but he worries that the whole point of setting limits on reason is merely to smuggle in faith in transcendent entities. In this vein, he writes “an epistemology that ‘sets boundaries,’ means that it permits one to posit as one may see fit a beyond of reason.” Nietzsche. The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967). 60. 53

the system of natural conditions, and finally that my duration be endless. I stand by this and will not give up this belief.121

Based on the passage at hand, one can see that, by faith, it seems Kant believes that things

in themselves are indeed real (even if theoretical knowledge of them is impossible). This means that Kant has posited (or “willed”) the existence of a supersensible realm, and has put in place the conditions for the possibility of nihilism based on the appearance/thing in itself distinction.

Now that I have shown how Kant puts the possibility for nihilism into play, can I also demonstrate that he does indeed make (and even encourage) nihilistic value judgments? Yes, and I contend that Kant’s nihilistic encouragements are revealed in the following passage situated late in the Critique of Pure Reason:

[W]e can propound a transcendental , namely, that all life is, strictly speaking, intelligible only, is not subject to changes of time, and neither begins in birth nor ends in death; that this life is an appearance only, that is, a sensible representation of the purely spiritual life, and that the whole sensible world is a mere picture (ein blosses Bild) which in our present mode of knowledge hovers before us, and like a dream has in itself no objective reality; that if we could intuit ourselves and things as they are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual beings (geistiger Naturen), our sole and true community with which has not begun through birth and will not cease through bodily death—both birth and death being mere appearances. Now all of this we have not the least knowledge. We plead it only in hypothetical fashion . . . we are not actually asserting it.122

Analyzing the passage backwards, one sees here that the theoretical standpoint is always

held in mind. Nothing that Kant claims in the passage above is known, the suppositions

are only possible objects of thought, they are believed only according to faith. And it is

121 Immanuel Kant. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993). Ak., III, 143-144 (my emphasis). 122 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B807-808. 54

critical to recognize as well, that the distinction between appearances and things in

themselves creates the conditions for Kant to make the above “faith claims.” Thus,

Nietzsche’s analysis of the aims of the Kantian project is not a mere ad Hominem

concerning Kantian faith, but an indictment of the Kantian system (because the

distinction between appearances and things in themselves creates the conditions for the

possibility of nihilism).

In sum, then, it appears that Kant’s Critique creates a window for faith in

transcendent claims, but denies that such claims are affirmed from the theoretical standpoint. The “faith claims” in the long passage cited above, though, not only expound a “two world” view from the “standpoint of faith” but exemplify an explicit nihilism in

full detail. Indeed, that “our life” is “an appearance only,” that the “world is a mere

picture,” “a dream,” and that the true nature of human existence is a “spiritual” existence;

each statement leads to a traditional metaphysical picture wherein life, the world, and the

body are illusory and fleeting, wherein “true life,” the “true world” and the lasting value

that goes with them hides in a place just beyond human reach—this is the “negation of

life” par excellence.

Conclusion

At the close of the current chapter, I hope to have demonstrated that Kant’s

philosophy is nihilistic according to a “two world” interpretation (whether considering

Nietzsche’s preliminary indictments, Guyer’s concerns with knowledge, or Nietzsche’s

concerns with faith). Such an interpretation begins to situate Kant within the historical

narrative that Nietzsche weaves, and in the following chapter I show how Kant indeed 55 belongs entirely to this history due to his views on nature and the body (as well as his problematic suppositions concerning the “grounding” relation of the noumena).

The goal of this chapter was accomplished by first introducing and explicating

Kant’s transcendental idealism for the purpose of analysis. Nietzsche’s critique of Kant’s system was then outlined. According to Nietzsche, positing the existence of things in themselves leads to nihilism because such entities represent a “true world” that underlies and is held as more valuable than the world of appearances. Next, I put forward an interpretation of Kant’s system by contemporary scholar Paul Guyer in order to support

Nietzsche’s claims. Guyer’s reading is linked closely to Nietzsche’s because Guyer indicts Kant for making dogmatic claims concerning the transcendent (which constitute the conditions for the possibility of nihilism), and for denigrating the phenomenal world as well as the status of human experience (which constitutes nihilism proper).

Rather than simply rest on agreement with Nietzsche’s and Guyer’s condemnation of Kant, I fostered an exchange between Kant and Nietzsche on the relationship between faith and the Critique of Pure Reason. I argued Kant would claim that from the theoretical standpoint, he refrains from making suppositions concerning the transcendent.

I also claimed he would contend that belief in transcendent entities (such as God, the soul, and intelligible freedom) is a matter of faith. At this point, I argued Nietzsche would critique Kant given that faith in the “otherworldly” creates the conditions for the possibility of nihilism (and that such faith is fostered by what Nietzsche sees as the problematic distinction between appearances and things in themselves). I then concluded by arguing that an analysis of Kant’s Critique reveals explicitly nihilistic attitudes based 56 on faith in transcendent entities. Thus, according to a “two world” interpretation, Kant’s conception of things in themselves is ultimately nihilistic. 57

Chapter #3: Kant and the Two Aspect Interpretation

“[T]he mechanism of nature, [is] the direct opposite of freedom”123 -Kant, Critique of Practical Reason

“To sin against the earth is now the most dreadful thing”124 -Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

Introduction

In previous chapters, I explicated the central tenets of Nietzschean nihilism as

well as the “two world” interpretation of the thing in itself. Moreover, I showed that

according to a “two world” interpretation, Kant’s transcendental idealism is nihilistic. In

this chapter, I show that Kant’s transcendental idealism is susceptible to the charge of

nihilism even on a “two aspect” interpretation. The “two aspect” interpretation has been

advanced by contemporary scholar Henry Allison, who interprets the Ding an sich selbst

not as “otherworldly” metaphysics but as a recommendation for epistemic modesty.125

Kurt Mosser, in agreement with Allison’s interpretation, claims that Nietzsche’s criticisms of the thing in itself collapse under the “two aspect” reading.126 I argue that

this is not the case, contending instead that Nietzsche still has grounds for a critique

concerning both Kant’s theoretical philosophy and his moral philosophy.

With regard to Kant’s theoretical philosophy, one ground for a potential

Nietzschean critique involves analyzing the relationship between things considered in themselves and things as they appear. In this vein, I think Nietzsche could argue that

123 Kant. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993). Ak., III, 29. 124 Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 125. 125 See Henry Allison. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 126 See Mosser. “Nietzsche, Kant, and the Thing in Itself,” (International Studies in Philosophy: XXV/2). 58

viewing the noumenal perspective as the epistemic “ground” of the phenomenal perspective entails a hierarchical valuation of the supersensible perspective (i.e., nihilism). Another ground for Nietzsche’s critique comes from claiming that, even on a

“two aspect” reading, things considered in themselves create the conditions for the possibility of nihilism by being tantamount to an “essence of things.”

Turning from Kant’s theoretical philosophy to his moral philosophy, I also explain how Nietzsche’s most powerful grounds for a critique are available if he indicts

Kant’s views on the “noumenal self” as nihilistic. With regard to specific avenues of criticism concerning Kant’s moral philosophy and the noumenal self, I argue that

Nietzsche would express ecological/naturalistic concerns, claiming that Kant does not

“affirm the earth” (and therefore is a nihilist). Indeed, Nietzsche would characterize

Kant’s moral- as “anti-nature” because it is impossible to naturalize

Kant’s system, and the non-naturalized (and moreover, supersensible) component of

Kant’s system is privileged over the naturalized one.

To close out chapter three, I put forward a Nietzschean critique of Kant based upon Kant’s contrasting descriptions of human existence as phenomenal or bodily versus descriptions of human existence as intelligible or “noumenal.” I hold Nietzsche would claim that these noumenal descriptions are problematic on two counts: First, the noumenal self creates the conditions for the possibility of nihilism because positing it involves making positive assertions concerning a supersensible entity—thus, a “two aspect” view is untenable. Second, even if a “two aspect” view is provisionally adopted, a description of the self as noumenal/supersensible leads to “despising the body,” a 59

devaluation of an empirical description of human existence in contrast to an intelligible

one. Thus, even on a “two aspect” reading, Kant’s transcendental philosophy is nihilistic

in the Nietzschean sense.

Allison and the “Two Aspect” Interpretation

In contrast to traditional interpretations of Kantian transcendental idealism, a

trend in is to read the distinction between things in themselves and appearances in epistemic (“two aspect”) rather than ontological (“two world”) terms.

Some scholars contend that this interpretation makes Nietzsche’s original critique of Kant

highly problematic. Therefore, in order to indict Kant as a nihilist, I must confront this

contemporary reading. The foremost proponent of this interpretation is Henry Allison,

and in Kant’s Transcendental Idealism he lays out his reading as follows:

[An] epistemologically based understanding of transcendental idealism requires that the transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves be understood as holding between two ways of considering things (as they appear and as they are in themselves) rather than as, on the more traditional reading, between two ontologically distinct sets of entities (appearances and things in themselves). In this regard, it may be characterized as a ‘two-aspect’ reading.127

Whereas Guyer contends that Kant dogmatically made claims concerning objects

independent of the human mode of viewing them, and Nietzsche claims that Kant urges

faith in objects independent of human experience, Allison argues that no such

suppositions concerning any “second set” of objects is present in Kant’s thought.

Instead, Allison maintains that an object considered as appearance and an object

127 Allison. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 16. 60

considered as a thing in itself are one and the same object.128 This reading therefore is

supposed to dissolve the charge that Kant adheres to a dogmatic metaphysics, or is guilty of the nihilism that Nietzsche contends follows from the value judgments of traditional

metaphysics (given that on a “two aspect” reading, a transcendent realm is not posited as

existing behind appearances).129

There are several texts that one can refer to in support of Allison’s reading, most

of which consider the thing in itself to represent the limitations of human knowledge and

experience. One such instance occurs in the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant states

that:

The concept of a noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge . . . The concept of a noumena is thus a merely limiting concept (Grenzbegriff), the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment.130

On this reading then, things in themselves are “phantoms of the brain” that remind one of the bounds of sensory capacity rather than a second set of “ghostlike” objects behind

appearances. Allison further highlights Kant’s understanding of the noumena as a

boundary when he cites the following “Note to the Amphiboly of Concepts of

Reflection”:

Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, but does not thereby extend its own sphere. In the process of warning the latter that it must not

128 According to Allison, this emphasis on “considering an object as . . .” is bolstered by reference to the German text, where the locution Ding an sich selbst is almost always employed rather than the abbreviated Ding an sich. See Allison. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 52. 129 One should also take note of the point that was raised in the preceding chapter, namely, Allison contends Kant’s “non-spatiality” claim about the nature of things in themselves is an “analytic” (self-contained truth) of transcendental idealism rather than a dogmatic assertion. 130 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B310. Allison discusses this passage on page 58 of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. 61

presume to claim applicability to things-in-themselves but only to appearances, it does indeed think for itself an object in itself, but only as transcendental object, which is the cause of appearance and therefore not itself appearance, and which can be thought neither as quantity nor as reality nor as substance, etc.131

Thus, things considered in themselves are nothing but a philosophical “out of bounds”

marker, the limits of the playing field of experience. Late in his career, Kant even goes

so far as to explicitly state that “the thing in itself = x, is not itself a separate

(absonderliches) object, but is only a particular relation (respectus) in order to constitute oneself as [an] object.”132 Thus it seems that, from the theoretical standpoint, Kant does

not believe he is positing the existence of an “otherworldly” reality nor is making claims

about it (at least consciously).

Another issue that Allison would challenge Guyer (and by association, Nietzsche)

on, is the issue of privileging the noumenal realm in contrast to the empirical realm, or

ultimately “degrading” the objects of ordinary experience. In this vein, Allison writes

that the “two aspect” interpretation “makes it possible to understand how discursive

cognizers, such as ourselves, could have two radically distinct epistemic relations to

objects, neither of which is ontologically privileged.”133 Thus, it seems Allison would

likely contend that Nietzsche’s charge of nihilism is diffused by an appeal to the “two

aspect” reading, given that no numerical distinction (or distinction in ontological value)

exists between appearances and things considered in themselves. The reason that no

ontological privilege exists between appearances and things considered in themselves is

131 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B344-45. 132 Immanuel Kant. Opus Postumum, trans. Förester and Rosen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 179. 133 Allison. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 47. 62

because there is no numerical distinction between them—ontologically, they are one and

the same object. The distinction between appearances and things considered in

themselves arises because human beings live simultaneously in a world that one can

consider according to two “standpoints,” an empirical standpoint based in the senses and

an intellectual standpoint based in the understanding. One can readily employ either

standpoint when considering objects in the world, but any object considered from either

standpoint is still a single object; thus, according to Allison, neither standpoint is

privileged (at least ontologically). Nietzsche, therefore, may have difficulty claiming that

life, the earth, or the body is judged as inferior to the intelligible or the transcendent

according to Allison’s interpretation. This is why contemporary scholar Kurt Mosser

concludes:

Given that Nietzsche’s critique of Kant’s philosophy is based in large part on his reading of Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena, it seems reasonable that an alternative reading of this distinction may generate some real difficulties for this critique. For if we reject, or at least question, the two-world interpretation of the thing in itself, Kant’s distinction begins to appear in a much different light.134

Given Allison’s and Mosser’s interpretations, one may what Nietzsche

could say in order to defend his critique of the Kantian thing in itself as nihilistic.

Nietzsche did not live to see Allison’s and Mosser’s interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism put forward, but this does not mean that one cannot envision his

134 Mosser. “Nietzsche, Kant, and the Thing in Itself,” (International Studies in Philosophy: XXV/2). 68, 75-76. 63

rebuttal. I contend that Nietzsche’s “framework” readily generates arguments that

preserve his critique and thus keep Kant situated within a nihilistic narrative.135

Nietzsche and Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy

One charge that Nietzsche could level against Kant’s theoretical philosophy, even

on a “two aspect” interpretation, is in relation to how Kant conceives of things considered as they are in themselves versus those same things considered as they sensibility.

On a “two aspect” reading, Kant still posits that considering things as they are in themselves performs a “grounding-function” with respect to those things as they appear to human experience. This is why he writes “the intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world and therefore also of its laws.”136 Given Kant’s explicit statement of the “grounding function” of appearances, Allison concedes that “Kant does speak of the

transcendental object (or its equivalent) as affecting the mind, and he further seems to

equate this with its serving as a non-sensible cause or ground of appearances,”137 but

Allison attempts to diffuse the charge that Kant’s claim is problematic by adding that one must always understand this grounding-function in methodological or “antimetaphysical” terms.

Even on a “two aspect” interpretation, then, where the intelligible Ding an sich

selbst does not represent an objective realm “behind” one’s mental representations, Kant

sees the world considered as it is in itself as methodologically/conceptually grounding

135 As a preview, I argue that even if no ontological privilege exists between appearances and things considered in themselves, this does not mean that no epistemic or axiological privilege exists. 136 Immanuel Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). 121. 137 Allison. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 65. 64

that same world as it is encountered in human experience. By thus construing the

noumenal perspective as the “ground” of the phenomenal perspective, one might also

contend that this position still implies a privileging of the noumenal perspective (i.e.,

considering the noumenal perspective as more “foundational” than the phenomenal

perspective). Granted, the link between viewing something as the foundation or ground

of something else and considering that ground more valuable than what it grounds is

somewhat tenuous, but the concern is certainly worth addressing. This is the case because, even if the noumenal perspective is merely a methodological foundation for the phenomenal perspective, Kant’s scheme may still entail a hierarchical valuation of the supersensible (i.e., nihilism). In other words, it seems an epistemic privilege of the

supersensible noumenal perspective exists even if an ontological privilege ultimately

does not.

In a way, one might consider this outcome of the “two aspect” interpretation even

more problematic than the outcome of a “two world” interpretation. For on the “two

world” interpretation, at least an actually existing object is considered the ground of phenomena. On the “two aspect” interpretation, though, one must consider phenomena as grounded by a mere “thought-entity,” which is nothing other than a particular way of considering the only world that exists. Given this outcome, I think Nietzsche would find it no less problematic to subordinate an empirical perspective on the world to a noumenal

(i.e., supersensible) perspective than to subordinate an ontologically distinct phenomenal world to an ontologically distinct noumenal world. For in both cases, the outcome is a hierarchical valuation of the supersensible. 65

Another Nietzschean criticism that makes a “two aspect” interpretation of Kant’s

theoretical philosophy problematic comes from Gilles Deleuze. According to Deleuze,

appealing to a “two aspect” reading does not actually endanger Nietzsche’s original

interpretation of the Ding an sich selbst as the “true world.” Deleuze writes that,

according to Kant:

[T]he distinction between two worlds is denied in principle: the same world is both sensible and super-sensible. But while denying this distinction between worlds one merely replaces it with the distinction between interior and exterior – which is just like that between essence and appearance, that is to say like the two worlds themselves.138

Given this interpretation, it seems Deleuze is concerned with the lingering dualism of

appearances and things in themselves that remains on a “two aspect” reading. On a “two aspect” reading, the world is comprised of objects considered as appearances, and those same objects considered as having a character that one can only comprehend through the understanding. Kant also adds “knowledge has to do only with appearances, and must

leave the thing in itself (die Sache an sich selbst) as indeed real per se, but as not known

by us.”139 Therefore, according to Kant, the intelligible character of things considered in themselves (attainable only through the understanding) is real, but is the object’s unattainable “interior” (i.e., what is left of the object after being stripped of all its

phenomenal qualities).

Thus, even if one interprets things considered in themselves as merely an “aspect” of the world, this aspect is the world’s “interior,” its intellectually real but empirically

unreachable heart. Deleuze construes this “interior” as tantamount to the world’s

138 Deleuze. Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1962). 83. 139 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). Bxx. 66

essence, and for both Deleuze and Nietzsche, to speak of is to speak of true

worlds in contrast to “merely apparent” ones. According to this interpretation, then, Kant

has posited the existence of a supersensible essence of the world and has therefore

created the conditions for the possibility of nihilism. For just as one can contrast and

value things considered in themselves over and against appearances, the classic

opposition of essence and appearance is a potentially nihilistic opposition as well, for one

can privilege an essential interior over an accidental exterior.

Kant’s Moral Philosophy and the Noumenal Self

Beyond critiquing Kant’s theoretical philosophy, Nietzsche is primarily

concerned with critiquing Kant’s moral-practical project. Nietzsche’s criticisms of

Kant’s moral philosophy target the “noumenal self” or the “subject considered in

itself”140 as philosophically problematic. Therefore, in order to investigate these features of Nietzsche’s critique, I must outline the salient details of Kant’s moral and practical philosophy.141

A good place to begin an investigation into Kant’s moral philosophy and its

relation to things considered in themselves is by looking at Kant’s notion of the moral

subject, the “intelligible” or “noumenal” self. Just as one can consider objects in the

world from the standpoint of sensibility as appearance and from the standpoint of the

understanding as a thing considered in itself, one can view human beings in the same

manner. As explained in the previous chapter, an object considered from the standpoint

140 “Subject in itself” is a phrase employed by Nietzsche, not Kant. 141 Given that one could easily re-apply negative criticisms of a “two aspect” view of Kant’s moral philosophy to a “two world” view of Kant’s moral philosophy, I will only consider criticisms of the former in the following sections. 67

of a thing in itself is an object considered independently of the conditions for the possibility of experience, namely, space, time and the categories. A human being viewed as a noumenon is no different, as Kant explains:

[T]his acting subject would not, in its intelligible character, stand under any conditions of time; time is only a condition of appearances, not of things in themselves . . . In its intelligible character . . . this same subject must [also] be considered to be free from all influence of sensibility.142

Kant focuses on the intelligible viewpoint for considering human subjects because

he sees this intelligible viewpoint as closely linked to morality. Indeed, it is morality that gives Kant the ability to describe human existence as “noumenal” from the practical standpoint, and the -inspiring and innate “moral law within” is demonstrated by the

existence of a universal moral law (i.e., the categorical imperative). Moreover, for Kant,

morality simply does not make sense unless it is the case that moral beings can describe

themselves as free:

Consequently, if we wish to save [freedom and morality], no other course remains than to ascribe the existence of a thing so far as it is determinable in time, and accordingly its under the law of natural necessity, merely to appearance, and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in itself.143

Thus, Kant is led to consider or describe human moral character as “intelligible” and freed from the workings of the phenomenal world (i.e., space, time, and causation) because otherwise, for him, morality does not make sense. This is the case because Kant thinks that if human behavior is described in terms the mechanisms of nature alone, then freedom and (consequently) morality are illusions. This is why Kant concludes by

142 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B568. 143 Kant. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993). Ak., III, 95. 68

writing “the reality of the intelligible world [is] definitely established from a practical

point of view.”144

Based upon the supposition of a dynamic noumenal self, Kant determines that two

different types of causality must exist. According to this model, rational human subjects

act (or can consider themselves as acting) according to a causation different from the rest

of the natural world. This is possible, according to Kant, because “[e]verything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance

with his idea of laws.”145 In other words, for Kant, because human beings can formulate

moral principles and then freely choose to follow (or not follow) them, this demonstrates

the plausibility of human freedom (because to describe oneself as acting in accordance

with the moral law and against inclination is to hypothetically146 prove that one is free).

Kant contends that human freedom is ultimately a kind of “intelligible freedom,”

and so he is “led by reason” to consider human beings as existing in an intelligible,

“noumenal” manner. Each formulation concerning “intelligible freedom” also leads Kant

to conclude that every person can therefore “consider himself first—so far as he belongs

to the sensible world—to be under laws of nature (heteronomy); and secondly—so far as he belongs to the intelligible world—to be under laws which, being independent of nature, are not empirical but have their ground in reason alone.”147 In other words, one

144 Kant 1993. Ak., III, 105. 145 Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). 80. 146 The proof here is only hypothetical because Kant argues that positive knowledge of the noumena is impossible. Kant thinks reason leads one to posit the existence of the noumena (or describe oneself as a noumenon) because it explains human freedom, but this explanation is only hypothetical and not definitive. Definitive knowledge of the noumena would require Kant to break his own epistemic rules. 147 Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). 120. 69 can describe human existence in two significantly different ways: as natural and phenomenal or as intelligible and noumenal.

According to a “two aspect” reading, then, Kant is providing a model of human existence wherein each individual exists simultaneously in a single world as a being of appearance (who is governed by the laws of nature) and as a being considered in itself

(who is self-governed by the laws of and freedom). Concluding this section with a reminder of the “two aspect” reading is important because Mosser claims:

[G]iven the close connection between Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy, we may be able to go on and raise some difficult issues in turn for Nietzsche’s interpretation of the latter [by employing a ‘two aspect’ interpretation] . . . Certainly, Nietzsche’s critique of Kant’s practical philosophy as ‘life-denying,’ at least not life-affirming, is closely tied to his critique of the ontological status of the thing in itself.”148

In the following sections, I explain why Mosser’s claim is untenable, and that an attunement to the “two aspect” view does not help Kant in his defense against

Nietzsche’s criticisms. I thereby show that Kant’s moral-practical philosophy is ultimately nihilistic.

Nietzsche and “Remembering the Earth”

Now that I have put forward some of the most important details of Kant’s moral- practical philosophy, it is possible to move ahead to some additional Nietzschean criticisms of the “two aspect” interpretation. Based on this interpretation, it is not available for Nietzsche to claim that the noumenal self represents a Platonic-Christian

148 Mosser. “Nietzsche, Kant, and the Thing in Itself,” (International Studies in Philosophy: XXV/2). 67- 68. Worth noting, is that Mosser does not elaborate these “difficult issues” that one could raise against Nietzsche. 70

“true self” residing behind the phenomenal realm (that is ontologically distinct from the

empirical self). But, on the other hand, there are alternative avenues of critique open to

Nietzsche, and one of the most apparent is the Nietzschean “ecological project” of

translating humanity into nature, thus “remain[ing] faithful to the earth.”149

With regard to an ecological project, some of Nietzsche’s most interesting claims

appear in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I draw attention to these passages because

Zarathustra’s veneration of the earth/nature is a counter-principle to nihilism (because

affirming the earth is closely linked to that which the earth gives rise to: viz. life, the

world, and the body). In this vein Zarathustra states “[a] new my ego taught me,

and this I teach men: no longer bury one’s head in the sand of heavenly things but to bear

it freely, an earthly head, which creates a meaning for the earth.”150 On the “two aspect”

model, one could defend Kant more easily from the charge of “burying his head in the

sand of heavenly things,” but I contend that his distinction between appearances and

things considered in themselves still makes his system distant from affirming the earth.

In his moral philosophy, Kant contends that two types of causation exist: the causation of nature and the causation of freedom.151 This insistence upon two distinct

kinds of causation undermines the hopes of those philosophers eager to “naturalize

149 Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 125. This is also why Nietzsche hopes that “[u]nder the charm of the Dionysian not only is the union between man and man reaffirmed, but nature, which has become alienated, hostile, or subjugated celebrates once more her reconciliation with her lost son, man.” Friedrich Nietzsche. as quoted in Ansell-Pearson. “Nietzsche’s Overcoming of Kant and Metaphysics: From Tragedy to Nihilism,” (Nietzsche-Studien: Vol. 16, 1987). 324. 150 Nietzsche 1968. 144. 151 Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). 120. 71 epistemologies” or make Kant “metaphysically innocuous”152 by appealing to a “one world/two aspect” reading, because Kant thinks that one of these aspects (i.e., the supersensible) is not governed by natural processes. Nietzsche would contend, therefore, that Kant’s transcendental morality does not affirm the earth. This is so because Kant’s system does not consider free human action part of the natural order (although human action is causally efficacious within that order). Moreover, according to Kant, human beings cannot understand themselves as “belonging to the earth,” because they cannot describe their most valuable (free and active) actions as emanating from the earth/nature.

Kant not only argues that two types of causation exist and that one of these types of causation is “non-naturalized,” he also explicitly contends that one should privilege the intelligible causality of freedom over the natural variety. Given that this is the case, the intelligible categories of freedom lead to nihilism because the domain of nature is marginalized in contrast to that of the intelligible (even if it is only a certain description of the “world” and not a separate world). In this vein, Kant argues:

These categories of freedom—for we wish to call them this in contrast to the theoretical concepts which are categories of nature—have a manifest advantage over the latter. The latter categories are only forms of thought which, through universal concepts, designate in an indefinite manner objects in general for every intuition possible for us. The categories of freedom, on the contrary, are elementary practical concepts which concern the decisions of the free faculty of . . . the categories of freedom have as their foundation a pure practical law a priori, and this cannot be said for any of the concepts of the theoretical use of our cognitive faculty.153

152 Mosser. “Kant, Nietzsche, and the Thing in Itself,” (International Studies in Philosophy: XXV/2). 73. Mosser is misguided in thinking that Kant’s program can “be made innocuous,” but, importantly, he recognizes the value of the attempt, saying “[m]y guess is that conflict between Kant and Nietzsche arises not so much in terms of the thing in itself and its viability, but rather over . . . the very possibility of naturalizing Kant’s program.” Mosser. 75. 153 Kant. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993). Ak., III, 65 (my emphasis). 72

It seems, then, for Kant, that one should privilege the categories of freedom over and

above the categories of nature because the former are linked to “the free faculty of

choice.” Thus, the nature of “advantage” in the passage above is that the laws of freedom

are advantageous to humanity because they grant human beings the ability to

view/describe themselves as free, dignified, and moral. Nature (and its forces), on the

other hand, cannot grant humanity these “advantages.” Thus, one should value viewing

human action as supersensible/free over and above viewing human action as belonging to

the world’s sensuous, natural aspect.

Given Kant’s views on the value of nature (in relation to the supersensible), it is

easy to see why he deems it necessary to “detach ourselves from every empirical

by our Idea of freedom.”154 This prescription for , though, is quite

problematic from the standpoint of “remembering the earth.” For how is it possible to find meaning on the earth and in nature if one believes that human freedom is only understood by considering human existence independently of nature’s operations?

Furthermore, based on Kant’s model, it seems as though the ecologically engaged philosopher is hindered with regard to affirming the earth. This is because the philosopher must consider herself independently of nature and the empirical in relation to the way she views her actions. She must consider herself no longer as a being who always “acts-within-nature,” deriving the meaning of her actions from nature (as well as valuing nature as the ground of her activity). This is why, given the sum of Nietzsche’s

154 Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). 117. 73

ecological concerns, he would conclude his critique enthusiastically, saying “anti-nature

as instinct, German decadence as philosophy—that is Kant!”155

Kant, Nietzsche, and the Body

Another way in which Nietzsche could critique Kant (even on the “two-aspect”

view) involves Kant’s understanding of the body (and phenomenal description of the

self). I argue that, given Kant’s views concerning the noumenal self in relation to the

sensuous body, Nietzsche would indict Kant for nihilism. First, concerning the noumenal

self, Kant appears to make a host of positive, seemingly transcendent claims (thus he

creates the conditions for the possibility of nihilism). This is important because such

suppositions seem to make a “two aspect” reading of the transcendental morality

untenable. Setting aside this textual concern, I also argue that Kant’s moral system is still

guilty of nihilism even if a “two aspect” reading is adopted. The reason why this is the

case, is that Kant’s conception of the intelligible self involves “despising the body.”

Indeed, Kant explicitly marginalizes an empirical description of human existence in

contrast to an intelligible or supersensible description. I consider each of my two

criticisms in turn.

Concerning Kant’s “positive” claims about the noumenal self, one will recall that

in Nietzsche’s eyes, positing the existence of the supersensible is tantamount to nihilism

(or, in my formulation, creating the conditions for the possibility of nihilism). In of

this danger, one can clearly see Kant claiming that the noumenal self has certain positive

features. For example, Kant makes it explicit that the intelligible self is free from the

155 Nietzsche. The Antichrist in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 578. 74 influences of time and sensibility.156 Kant also seems to make explicit claims about the existence of an intelligible self that resides in an intelligible world: “[the moral law] begins at my invisible self, my personality, and exhibits me in a world which has true infinity but which is comprehensible only to the understanding—a world with which I recognize myself as existing in a universal and necessary [manner].”157 Kant, therefore, has let his critical guard down, and appears to make transcendent claims that create the conditions for nihilism. In addition, Ruediger Grimm agrees that Kant makes these positive assertions:

[Kant’s] argument [about the noumenal self] is initially introduced as a mere possibility, but as Kant develops it, it becomes increasingly evident that he must make positive assertions about man as a noumenon in order to justify the moral law . . . Kant is put into the awkward position of claiming to know something about noumena after having denied that anything can be known about them . . . he nevertheless does use the concept of the noumenon in a positive fashion to support his ethical views.158

Nietzsche, in turn, would claim that these positive assertions lead to nihilism because once a supersensible foil to the sensible world or body is posited, the conditions for the possibility of nihilism are enacted and a comparative decline in the value of the empirical is inevitable.

In contrast to the above criticisms that seem to make a methodological interpretation of the Ding an sich problematic, Henry Allison responds as follows:

Admittedly, Kant does speak on occasion, particularly in Groundwork III and the Critique of Practical Reason, of the idea of freedom or the

156 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B568. 157 Kant. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993). Ak., III, 162. 158 Ruediger Grimm. Nietzsche’s Theory of Knowledge, trans. R. Grimm (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1977). 58-59. 75

consciousness of the moral law as giving us an entrée to an intelligible world or higher order of things, quite distinct from the sensory world of experience. Nevertheless, it is clear from the context that the superiority of the former to the latter is to be construed in axiological rather than ontological terms.159

Allison’s point here is well-taken, and Kant’s texts may well bear Allison’s argument out.

It is not my task, though, to investigate whether or not this is the case. Instead, I assume here that Allison’s reading is the best reading of Kant, and argue that Nietzsche could still put forward multiple arguments to show the explicitly nihilistic character of the noumenal self (even according to a “two aspect” interpretation). Indeed, I show how ascribing axiological superiority to the noumenal self (and the supersensible) is just as problematic as ascribing it ontological superiority.

To begin, in response to Kant’s arguments claiming that one can describe the noumenal self as free from desire and inclination, I argue Nietzsche would contend that within these arguments resides the Socratic drive to “get free of the body.” With regard to the drives, impulses, and desires of the body, Kant writes “[i]nclinations themselves, as sources of needs, are so far from having an absolute value to make them desirable for their own sake that it must rather be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free of them.”160 Whereas one might interpret the passage at hand as Kant

chiding the destructive urges of the body in relation to morality, I argue that Nietzsche

would find a more insidious aim at work. For Nietzsche, the body is an aggregate of desires, forces, and drives. Thus, any attempt to “be wholly free” of desire (by appeal to

159 Allison. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 48 (emphasis mine). 160 Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). 95-96. 76

an intelligible description of oneself) is tantamount to the Socratic impulse to “shed one’s

skin” and escape the body.

Kant, though, disagrees with the importance of the body (as well as a phenomenal

description of the self), as well as impulses and drives, elevating instead the rational

being’s ability to view herself as “non-corporeal” intelligence, saying “a rational being

must regard himself qua intelligence (and accordingly not on the side of his lower [i.e.,

bodily or empirical] faculties) as belonging to the intelligible world, not to the sensible

one.”161 This privileging of an “intelligible” description of oneself over and above a

description of oneself as a “sensible” or sensuous being (i.e., the “lower faculties” of the

body), for Nietzsche, barely masks a “body-loathing” nihilism. Kant concludes by

making this point even stronger, claiming:

[I]t is then not to be wondered at that man, as belonging to two worlds [which here means two descriptions], must regard his own being in relation to his second and higher vocation [i.e., describing oneself as moral or noumenal] with , and the law of this vocation with the deepest respect.162

Although I contend it is clear that Kant privileges a noumenal description of the self over and above an empirical description of the self (as well as the body), and that one can easily see this based upon the above passages, I wish to make this point even stronger. To demonstrate that Kant privileges an intelligible description of the self, and

by contrast devalues an empirical description of the self (body), there are various

passages that I wish to highlight. First, Kant makes it perfectly clear that a description of

oneself as intelligible or supersensible should be understood as the “proper self,” (or the

161 Kant 1964. 120. 162 Kant. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993). Ak., III, 87. 77

description of the self worthy of most value and dignity), when he states “[i]t follows that

incitements from desires and impulses (and therefore from the whole sensible world of

nature) cannot impair the laws which govern [my] will as intelligence. Indeed [I] do not

answer for the former nor impute them to [my] proper self.”163 Thus, it seems that the

empirical description of the self (body) is marginalized in relation to a description of the

self that is supposed to be “for the theoretical use of reason, an empty concept, although a

possible and thinkable one.”164 Nietzsche would certainly characterize Kant’s stance

here as nihilistic, and Steven Weiss agrees when he writes:

[T]hat we should obey the moral law as legislated by the self under its ‘proper’ description is for Nietzsche nihilism re-visited, this time under the guise that there is some non-natural description of myself that holds priority over and obligates me under my aspect as empirical self.165

Kant not only privileges a supersensible or noumenal description of the self in

relation to a phenomenal description of the self, but also downplays the phenomenal or bodily life of rational beings. It is his contention that “the entire history of [one’s] existence as a sensuous being, is seen in the consciousness of [one’s] intelligible existence as nothing but a consequence, not as a determining ground, of [one’s] causality

as a noumenon.”166 For Kant, then, one should view a bodily or phenomenal description of oneself as nothing but the result of one’s activity described from the noumenal or

supersensible perspective. Indeed, one must view all free or dignified activity that one

163 Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). 125-126. 164 Kant. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993). Ak., III, 55. 165 Steven Weiss. “Nietzsche and the Thing in Itself: Surviving Modern Kant Scholarship,” (International Studies in Philosophy: XXV/2). 82. 166 Kant. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993). Ak., III, 97-98. 78

exhibits as a result of oneself considered from the noumenal (supersensible) perspective.

Moreover, because a phenomenal description of the self/body does not allow an

individual to see themselves as a source of free action, Weiss writes:

[On Kant’s model,] I can only think of myself as acting from the motive of duty to the extent that I do not regard myself as a sensible creature motivated by natural inclinations and desires. Again, value – and the very condition of valuing anything at all – depends upon regarding or describing ourselves from a non-natural point of view. The outcome is the same whether we read Kant’s noumena/phenomena distinction on the two- worlds or the two-aspect interpretation: we lack value insofar as we regard ourselves as natural creatures.167

Given Weiss’ account, it is easy to see why Nietzsche characterizes Kant’s moral

philosophy as nihilistic—for the system marginalizes a naturalized, sensuous description of the self (i.e., the body). For Kant, human value and dignity is found only in regarding oneself as supersensible, independently of the corporeal and all its trappings. And thus,

Nietzsche would certainly contend that this belief exemplifies a “hatred of the body.”168

Another striking example of Kantian nihilism (with regard to the body) is found in

the latter pages of the Critique of Pure Reason. In response to the supposition that the

human subject or self is nothing more than a “diverse modification of our organs,” Kant puts forward the following claims:

[O]ur body may be nothing more than a fundamental appearance which in this present state (in this life) serves as a condition of our whole faculty of sensibility, and therewith of all our thought, and that separation from the body may therefore be regarded as the end of this sensible employment of our faculty of knowledge and the beginning of its intellectual employment.

167 Weiss. “Nietzsche and the Thing in Itself: Surviving Modern Kant Scholarship,” (International Studies in Philosophy: XXV/2). 83. 168 See also Groundwork page Ak., III, vi, where Kant explains how the metaphysics of a moral philosophy must “be scrupulously cleansed of everything empirical.” The metaphor of “cleansing” seems to imply that Kant considers the empirical to be something dirty or tainted. Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). 79

Thus regarded, the body would not be the source of thought, but merely a restrictive condition of it, and therefore, while indeed furthering the sensible and animal life, [the body] would because of this very fact have to be considered a hindrance to the pure and spiritual life.169

For Nietzsche, the passage at hand would exemplify a radical nihilism. Not only does

Kant claim that the body is possibly only an appearance (closer to a Schein than an

Erscheinnung), but that it is not the source of thought or action. Moreover, the body is a

“restrictive condition” on thought, and a “hindrance to the pure and spiritual life.” These

are words that Socrates (the “despiser of the body” par excellence) himself might have

spoken in the Phaedo. Although Kant goes on to claim that these suppositions are

unknowable from the theoretical standpoint, he ultimately “urges” the of them

based on faith.

If there was any doubt that Kant holds a supersensible or noumenal description of

the self in higher regard than a phenomenal description, I simply point the reader to the

following passage: “what belongs to mere appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason to the character of the thing in itself.”170 Thus, Kant does not stop at a mere

privileging of an intelligible description of human existence over and above a

phenomenal description, he demands that one bring the body/phenomenal description of

the self under the utmost hegemony171 of the Ding an sich selbst because it is the source

of intelligible (moral) law.

169 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965). B807. 170 Kant. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). 129 (bracketing not in original). 171 Popularized by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, “hegemony” refers to the dominance of one entity (cultural, national, or otherwise) over another. The term is also strongly tied to the dominance of one over another. 80

This claim concerning subordination, for Nietzsche, entails an extreme nihilism

because to subordinate a sensuous, bodily description of oneself to a supersensible, moral

description of oneself is to reject the value of viewing oneself from a natural/phenomenal

perspective. Indeed,

[T]o suppose that the dictates in terms of which we are to govern our lives must originate from some conception of ourselves other than that as wholly natural creatures [for Nietzsche, the only viable conception] is to reject the idea that the natural perspective could serve as a source of meaning and value in our lives.172

Thus, even when considered from a “two aspect” view, the Kantian thing in itself leads to

a radical privileging of the intelligible/supersensible perspective, as well as a

corresponding marginalization of the body/phenomenal perspective. This, of course,

means that the thing in itself is ultimately a nihilistic concept.

Conclusion

After investigating the Kantian thing in itself according to a “two aspect”

interpretation, Kant was once again found guilty of nihilism. In order to show that the

Ding an sich is nihilistic in the Nietzschean sense, I first outlined the contemporary “two

aspect” interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, drawing on the formulations of

Henry Allison. I then explained how one might avoid Nietzsche’s earlier criticisms by

appealing to Allison’s reading. After that, I argued Nietzsche could employ alternative

arguments from his previous ones concerning Kant’s theoretical philosophy, for example,

by turning his attention to the “grounding-function” of things considered in themselves as

well as the Deleuzian question of essentialism.

172 Weiss. “Nietzsche and the Thing in Itself: Surviving Modern Kant Scholarship,” (International Studies in Philosophy: XXV/2). 82. 81

Another set of arguments that Nietzsche could employ focus on the intelligible or

“noumenal” subject from Kant’s moral philosophy; therefore, I outlined the salient

features of the Kantian moral-practical project before proceeding to another set of

Nietzsche’s criticisms. I then argued that Nietzsche could critique Kant for diminishing

the worth of nature and the earth even according to a “two aspect” reading.

Rather than end my critique at this point, I put forward a final set of Nietzschean arguments concerning Kant’s views on the body/phenomenal description of the self in relation to a noumenal/supersensible description of the self. First, I explained how Kant makes positive assertions about the existence of a supersensible self that stands in contrast to the body (thus he creates the conditions for the possibility of nihilism), arguing that these assertions might undermine a “two aspect” interpretation. Next, I adopted a “two aspect” interpretation (regardless) in order to give Kant, Allison, and

Mosser the benefit of the doubt as to the most sympathetic understanding of transcendental idealism/morality, and then proceeded to critique Kant’s understanding of the value of describing oneself as a sensuous body in relation to viewing oneself as an intelligible subject. Based upon these criticisms, Kant was shown once more to be guilty of nihilism, even on a “two aspect” interpretation. 82

Conclusion

“This man of the future, who will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism; this bell-stroke of noon and of the great decision that liberates the will again and restores its goal to the earth and his hope to man; this Antichrist and antinihilist; this victor over God and nothingness—he must come one day”173 -Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals

In conclusion, Kant’s conception of the thing in itself is nihilistic in the

Nietzschean sense. This is the case regardless of whether one adheres to an ontological

(“two world”) interpretation of the concept or a methodological (“two aspect”) interpretation of the concept. This thesis was demonstrated by first elucidating

Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism as the hierarchical valuation of the transcendent or the supersensible over and above the immanent or the sensible (or as exemplified simply

by the outward denigration of the immanent/sensible). The details of Nietzsche’s

conception of nihilism were outlined by investigating his reversal of Jacobi, explicating

two of Zarathustra’s speeches, and through a reconstruction of Nietzsche’s narrative

concerning the history of philosophy.

Based on an ontological (“two world”) reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism,

the concept of things in themselves creates the conditions for the possibility of nihilism

because it involves positing the existence of a “true world” that resides behind the world

of human experience (phenomena). Kantian nihilism “proper” also arises on this reading

because the world behind phenomena is ultimately privileged as “more real” or “more

valuable” than the empirical world. It was also shown how, even if Kant adheres to a

173 Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967). 96. 83

more critical conception of the Ding an sich, he still urges faith in (and a nihilistic

ascription of value to) objects beyond the scope of human experience—a faith fostered by an appeal to the appearance/thing in itself distinction.

Given an epistemic (“two aspect”) reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism,

Kant’s theoretical philosophy is revealed as nihilistic because the “two aspect” interpretation still involves a hierarchical valuation of the supersensible. This is because, even on a “two aspect” interpretation, Kantian noumena are still construed as the

“intelligible ground” of phenomena. Furthermore, even on a “two aspect” interpretation,

the critical distinction between appearances and things considered in themselves implies

the classical (and potentially nihilistic) distinction between essence and appearance.

More important, still, however, is the nihilism inherent in Kant’s moral-practical

project. One reason that Kant’s system is problematic is that it leads to a devaluation of

nature given that nature is not a source of meaningful (free) activity. Kant’s moral

philosophy is also nihilistic because his conception of the “intelligible self” privileges a

non-naturalized (supersensible) description of human existence over and above a description of human beings as immanent, embodied creatures. Beyond this “mere” privileging of the “intelligible self” over the body, I also argued that Kant’s moral philosophy involves an outright denigration of the self described as a sensuous body.

Recognizing the nihilism inherent in Kant’s statements concerning things in

themselves is quite important philosophically. It helps individuals to realize that one

should regard Kantian epistemology, morality, and “metaphysics” with caution, and

exercise wariness towards those intellectuals who wish to breathe new life into “old 84

Kant”174 in an attempt to make his thought wholly palatable to (or “innocuous for”)

contemporary audiences by focusing exclusively on selected epistemic suppositions.

There is nothing problematic about claiming certain pieces of Kant’s work as one’s own while overlooking Kant’s shortcomings (i.e., his lingering dogmatic rationalism175). On the other hand, by focusing solely on Kant’s critical epistemological suppositions, the

Kantian project with regard to faith, nature, the body, noumenalism, and the transcendent is overlooked (and a more holistic understanding of Kant’s Weltanschauung is lost). In sum, it is critical that the reader is left with the feeling that, although Kant’s thought may lead to viable contemporary epistemological and phenomenological positions, one simply cannot inoculate certain problematic features of his thought.

Given this warning, I should state that my own inquiry is, of course, only a limited one. In line with my statements in the preceding paragraph, I envision fellow philosophers telling me after reading this thesis: “I am fairly convinced that Kant’s theoretical philosophy is nihilistic on a ‘two world’ reading, and that Kant’s moral philosophy is nihilistic on both a ‘two world’ reading and a ‘two aspect’ reading, but I am not convinced that Kant’s theoretical philosophy is nihilistic according to a ‘two aspect’ reading.” I worry these individuals will claim that they adhere to a “two aspect” epistemology without all of Kant’s problematic moral-metaphysical value claims, and thus believe that they escape the charge of nihilism.

Let me begin by saying that I do not believe this worry hurts my interpretation of

Kant (or my thesis as a whole). Given Kant’s ascription of non-spatiotemporality to

174 A favorite phrase of Nietzsche’s. 175 By this, I mean his statements concerning the noumena with regard to faith, morality, etc. 85

things in themselves, his faith-claims concerning the transcendent/supersensible, and his

moral-practical claims concerning the positive features of the noumenal self, I believe it

is clear that Kant is operating with the supposition that, in certain cases, the Ding an sich is not merely a “limit-concept”—in these cases, for him, it is indeed an actuality.176

Moreover, even if the noumena merely represent one way of describing the world, I have shown why this does not exonerate Kant either, given his penchant to privilege the noumena as the “ground” of phenomena and as a supersensible axiological ideal. Thus, in all of the above cases, the thing in itself entails the trappings that Nietzsche claims that it does.

The problem remains, though, that my interlocutor claims that she does not make those kind of problematic suppositions, and that one should laud Kant for pointing her towards her own epistemic position (even if Kant does not adhere to it).177 With regard

to this objection, I am willing to grant my interlocutor the importance of Kant’s thought

concerning her position, but it is still her position and not Kant’s (or, at least not an

inclusive version of Kant’s position). As stated above, it is legitimate if a contemporary

Kant scholar wishes to pick and choose certain aspects of Kant’s work to adopt, but one

should make this “picking and choosing” explicit and free of the pretense that somehow

176 I am, of course, tipping my hand here as to what I think about the viability of both the “two world” and the “two aspect” interpretations. May the reader forgive me for making theses gestures without providing further evidence. 177 My interlocutor may even go so far as to claim that Kant’s pure epistemic (sans faith-based/moral) position on this issue is actually similar to Nietzsche’s epistemic “.” As stated above, I think at this point the debate definitely becomes less about Kant, and more about my interlocutor. I concede that Kant indeed led my interlocutor to her position, that this Neo-Kantian position is an important development in the history of philosophy, and that this position is somewhat close to Nietzsche’s own—but where I would disagree, is that epistemology or subjectivity are not problematic themselves. For in the phenomena of embodied experience, following Heidegger, I contend that there is only , and that it is no longer meaningful to talk about an epistemic “inside” and “outside.” But this, of course, is another issue altogether. 86 one might purge Kant’s thought of the metaphysical (or a privileging of the supersensible).

A final shortcoming that I wish to concede is that I likely have not satisfied those philosophers concerned with the ultimate “correctness” of Kant’s and Nietzsche’s arguments concerning the origin and value of the transcendent. For example, when

Nietzsche argues that Kant’s moral philosophy involves a marginalization of the body,

Kant would likely respond that this is clearly the case—because he does not care that he degrades the status of the body. Why? Because he believes that the transcendent/supersensible is not problematic (or a fiction). Kant instead would probably demand arguments to know why the positing of the supersensible (or describing human existence/the world under a supersensible aspect) does not raise the importance of embodied life. In turn, Nietzsche would likely contend that this misses the point, asking instead: “what does it matter if the supersensible raises the importance of the body, if the body is still marginalized by contrast to the supersensible and the supersensible is itself a fiction?” Thus, marginalizing the body in contrast to the transcendent/supersensible is not a problem for Kant (nor is elevating an intelligible description of human existence in contrast to an embodied one) because he subscribes whole-heartedly to the existence of the transcendent and to the viability of describing human beings as non-natural, supersensible entities.

Hence, whether one finds Nietzsche’s arguments convincing will likely have to do with how one regards the status of the transcendent/supersensible. This is especially apparent when considering the force of Nietzsche’s argument that the “mere” positing of 87

the transcendent/supersensible leads to nihilism or that privileging the intelligible entails

a marginalization of the body (or the earth) that is unwarranted. In actuality, I am

skeptical that anyone could ever demonstrate the cogency of Nietzsche’s arguments in

this vein to someone who adhered to an that includes the supersensible or the

transcendent. The best one might do along these lines is to raise the Nietzschean

questions stated earlier: “What if the transcendent is a fiction?” And, more importantly,

“what if by marginalizing immanent life, the earth, and the body, one

marginalizes/devalues the ontological totality (life) with regard to a fiction?”178 Phrased

this way, Nietzsche’s arguments (as well as my own) ultimately take on the status of

edification.

Turning away from the limitations of this thesis, the conclusion that Kant’s

transcendental epistemology and morality are steeped in nihilism is important for other

reasons. To begin, given this conclusion, Nietzsche’s charge of nihilism against Kant’s

philosophy is vindicated as neither tendentious nor polemical. Also, it is an implied

outcome of this conclusion that a part of Nietzsche’s narrative concerning the history of

philosophy (as nihilism) is preserved. One must not understate the importance of these

conclusions. Recognizing the legitimacy of Nietzsche’s interpretation of Kant helps put

philosophy itself on the path to coping with philosophical nihilism as a legitimate crisis.

And although I have not devoted time to defending this point, I contend that it is a good

178 I am aware that certain individuals claim to espouse the tenets of organized religion (as well as participate in its rituals), while understanding that the transcendent/supersensible suppositions of the practice are “fictional.” Moreover, these individuals claim that the fictions provide their lives with meaning. It seems quite clear to me that Nietzsche would claim these individuals are engaged in egregious self-deception as well as a refusal to come to terms with the ramifications of the “death of God.” In other words, they do not recognize that highest values are truly devalued. 88 thing when the “death of God” and the “end of metaphysics” are confronted and recognized as legitimate philosophical “problems.” The sooner that this reality is confronted, the sooner philosophers (and others) can begin to construct new, “life affirming,” values in place of the values of traditional metaphysics.

Thus, the most important reason for recognizing the legitimacy of the Nietzschean reading of Kant is with regard to what it points towards—a world in which philosophy is no longer tolerated for attempting to wage war against life, temporality, the body, the earth, and becoming—a world in which the devaluation of phenomena in relation to their supersensible counterparts is rejected. Instead, a philosophy of the future is lauded. A philosophy that is receptive to Zarathustra’s voice whispering from upon the mountaintop, reminding each person to celebrate human experience, the earth, and the body—to love only “our life,” beg for its eternal return, and dance joyously in the hope of pure affirmation

—a dance that takes place on the surface of things …

89

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