Between Dualism and Immanentism Sacramental Ontology and History
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Phil. 173: Metaethics Apr. 25, 2018 Lecture 27: Is Expressivism Nihilism? Is Relativism Nihilism? I
Phil. 173: Metaethics Apr. 25, 2018 Lecture 27: Is Expressivism Nihilism? Is Relativism Nihilism? I. Lewis’ Argument That Quasi-Realism Is Fictionalism (and Hence a Form of Nihilism) Suppose Blackburn’s quasi-realist project has succeeded perfectly on its own terms. Then the quasi-realist can, and will, echo everything the moral realist says. Rosen’s question: So what, then, makes the quasi-realist not simply a realist? Lewis’ reply: We shouldn’t look for something the realist says that the quasi-realist will not echo. Rather, we should look for something the quasi-realist says that the realist will not echo. In particular, even though at the end of the day the quasi-realist apes everything the realist says, at the beginning of the day the quasi-realist starts by expressing his commitment to projectivism. According to Lewis, this statement of projectivism acts as a disowning preface that turns the quasi-realist’s later realist-sounding assertions into fictive assertions of the sort uttered by a moral fictionalist. It’s as if the quasi- realist started out by saying, “Let’s make believe that moral realism is true, though it isn’t.” More formally, Lewis argues as follows (see p. 319): 1. One aim of quasi-realism is (to earn the right) to say what the moral realist says. [premise] 2. To say what the moral realist says is either to be a moral realist or to make-believedly be a moral realist. [premise] 3. So, an aim of quasi-realism is either to be a moral realist or to make-believedly be a moral realist. -
Edition of Henri-Xavier Arquillière, L'augustinisme Politique: Essai
1 Translation by Catherine J. Bright and Courtney M. Booker, of Henri-Xavier Arquillière, L’Augustinisme politique: Essai sur la formation des théories politiques du Moyen-Age, second ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1955), 19–50. PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION The study that I present in these pages is by no means a general statement of Saint Augustine’s political doctrine. That has been done many times.1 The goal of my research is more limited. All medievalists have been struck by the profound intermingling of the Church and the State, which forms one of the characteristic traits of medieval civilization. How did this intimate relationship operate? How was the old Roman idea of the State absorbed by the increasing influence of the Christian idea, to the point that it led to the theory of the two swords in the twelfth century? That is the question. I have named this progressive, irregular movement political Augustinism, for want of a better term.2 I endeavored to define its formation and to mark some of its stages with precision. If by doing so I was able to open some avenues of research, in which I have directed several of my students, then I will have fully achieved my goal. I sought to observe the lives of certain ideas—to catch, in a way, their distortion in the minds of those that were simpler than the protagonists who inspired them, and to establish how these ideas came to transform major institutions, such as the monarchy. 1 See in particular the recent work of Gustave Combès, La doctrine politique de saint Augustin, Paris, 1927 (482 p.). -
An Interview with the Superior General of the Priestly Society of Saint Pius X on the Pontificate of Pope Francis
An interview with the Superior General of the Priestly Society of Saint Pius X on the pontificate of Pope Francis WE MUST NOT CAPITULATE BEFORE THIS WORLD, BUT RECAPITULATE ALL THINGS IN CHRIST. DICI: Reverend Father, it has been eight years since Pope Francis ascended the throne of Saint Peter, and on the occasion of this anniversary, you have kindly granted us this interview, for which we are truly grateful. For some observers of the pontificate of Pope Francis, particularly for those who are attached to Tradition, it seems that the battle of ideas is now over. According to them, it is now a praxis that dominates, namely concrete action, inspired by a wide- ranging pragmatism. What is your opinion of this? Father Pagliarani: I am not really sure that actions and ideas should be opposed in this way. Pope Francis is definitely very pragmatic. But being a man of government, he knows perfectly well where he is going. A large-scale action is always inspired by theoretical principles, by a set of ideas, often dominated by a central idea to which all praxis can and must be related. One must realise that all attempts to understand the principles of Pope Francis’ pragmatism are not without trial and error. For example, some people thought they had found his principles of action in the teologia del pueblo, an Argentinean variation of liberation theology – but which is much more moderate. However, in reality, it seems to me that Pope Francis is beyond this system, and even beyond any known system. I believe that the ideas that direct his actions cannot be analysed and interpreted in a satisfactory way, if we limit ourselves to traditional theological criteria. -
Natural Law the Unknown Jacques Leclercq
Notre Dame Law School NDLScholarship Natural Law Forum 1-1-1962 Natural Law the Unknown Jacques Leclercq Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Leclercq, Jacques, "Natural Law the Unknown" (1962). Natural Law Forum. Paper 69. http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum/69 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Law Forum by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NATURAL LAW THE UNKNOWN Jacques Leclercq THis PAPER DEALS with the questions of change and immutability of natural law, the development of knowledge of natural law, and the only way this development may be achieved. I. VARIATIONS IN NATURAL LAW OR IN KNOWLEDGE OF NATURAL LAW? RESEARCH ABOUT MAN in all domains for the past century has made us realize that the differences between men are much more important than formerly thought. When we consider primitives as they are still found in our time, or primitives as reconstructed on the basis of the findings of paleonto- logical discoveries, we have the impression of a significant gap in personal characteristics between primitives and today's civilized men. The elements of evolution in human nature are considerable. Hence many are inclined to believe that we should no longer speak of a stable human nature but of a nature in evolution. This belief is particularly strong in regard to the social nature of man, for the difference between modern society and a primitive tribe is even greater than the personal differences between the civilized and the primitive. -
Saint John Henry Newman, Development of Doctrine, and Sensus Fidelium: His Enduring Legacy in Roman Catholic Theological Discourse
Journal of Moral Theology, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2021): 60–89 Saint John Henry Newman, Development of Doctrine, and Sensus Fidelium: His Enduring Legacy in Roman Catholic Theological Discourse Kenneth Parker The whole Church, laity and hierarchy together, bears responsi- bility for and mediates in history the revelation which is contained in the holy Scriptures and in the living apostolic Tradition … [A]ll believers [play a vital role] in the articulation and development of the faith …. “Sensus fidei in the life of the Church,” 3.1, 67 International Theological Commission of the Catholic Church Rome, July 2014 N 2014, THE INTERNATIONAL THEOLOGICAL Commission pub- lished “Sensus fidei in the life of the Church,” which highlighted two critically important theological concepts: development and I sensus fidelium. Drawing inspiration directly from the works of John Henry Newman, this document not only affirmed the insights found in his Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (1845), which church authorities embraced during the first decade of New- man’s life as a Catholic, but also his provocative Rambler article, “On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine” (1859), which resulted in episcopal accusations of heresy and Newman’s delation to Rome. The tension between Newman’s theory of development and his appeal for the hierarchy to consider the experience of the “faithful” ultimately centers on the “seat” of authority, and whose voices matter. As a his- torical theologian, I recognize in the 175 year reception of Newman’s theory of development, the controversial character of this historio- graphical assumption—or “metanarrative”—which privileges the hi- erarchy’s authority to teach, but paradoxically acknowledges the ca- pacity of the “faithful” to receive—and at times reject—propositions presented to them as authoritative truth claims.1 1 Maurice Blondel, in his History and Dogma (1904), emphasized that historians always act on metaphysical assumptions when applying facts to the historical St. -
Why Determinism in Physics Has No Implications for Free Will
Why determinism in physics has no implications for free will Michael Esfeld University of Lausanne, Department of Philosophy [email protected] (draft 8 October 2017) (paper for the conference “Causality, free will, divine action”, Vienna, 12 to 15 Sept. 2017) Abstract This paper argues for the following three theses: (1) There is a clear reason to prefer physical theories with deterministic dynamical equations: such theories are both maximally simple and maximally rich in information, since given an initial configuration of matter and the dynamical equations, the whole (past and future) evolution of the configuration of matter is fixed. (2) There is a clear way how to introduce probabilities in a deterministic physical theory, namely as answer to the question of what evolution of a specific system we can reasonably expect under ignorance of its exact initial conditions. This procedure works in the same manner for both classical and quantum physics. (3) There is no cogent reason to subscribe to an ontological commitment to the parameters that enter the (deterministic) dynamical equations of physics. These parameters are defined in terms of their function for the evolution of the configuration of matter, which is defined in terms of relative particle positions and their change. Granting an ontological status to them does not lead to a gain in explanation, but only to artificial problems. Against this background, I argue that there is no conflict between determinism in physics and free will (on whatever conception of free will), and, in general, point out the limits of science when it comes to the central metaphysical issues. -
An Introduction to Relational Ontology Wesley J
An Introduction to Relational Ontology Wesley J. Wildman, Boston University, May 15, 2006 There is a lot of talk these days about relational ontology. It appears in theology, philosophy, psychology, political theory, educational theory, and even information science. The basic contention of a relational ontology is simply that the relations between entities are ontologically more fundamental than the entities themselves. This contrasts with substantivist ontology in which entities are ontologically primary and relations ontologically derivative. Unfortunately, there is persistent confusion in almost all literature about relational ontology because the key idea of relation remains unclear. Once we know what relations are, and indeed what entities are, we can responsibly decide what we must mean, or what we can meaningfully intend to mean, by the phrase “relational ontology.” Why Do Philosophers Puzzle over Relations? Relations are an everyday part of life that most people take for granted. We are related to other people and to the world around us, to our political leaders and our economic systems, to our children and to ourselves. There are logical, emotional, physical, mechanical, technological, cultural, moral, sexual, aesthetic, logical, and imaginary relations, to name a few. There is no particular problem with any of this for most people. Philosophers have been perpetually puzzled about relations, however, and they have tried to understand them theoretically and systematically. Convincing philosophical theories of relations have proved extraordinarily difficult to construct for several reasons. First, the sheer variety of relations seems to make the category of “relation” intractable. Philosophers have often tried to use simple cases as guides to more complex situations but how precisely can this method work in the case of relations? Which relations are simple or basic, and which complex or derivative? If we suppose that the simplest relations are those analyzable in physics, we come across a second problem. -
Integrating Ontological Knowledge for Iterative Causal Discovery and Vizualisation Montassar Ben Messaoud, Philippe Leray, Nahla Ben Amor
Integrating ontological knowledge for iterative causal discovery and vizualisation Montassar Ben Messaoud, Philippe Leray, Nahla Ben Amor To cite this version: Montassar Ben Messaoud, Philippe Leray, Nahla Ben Amor. Integrating ontological knowledge for iterative causal discovery and vizualisation. ECSQARU 2009, 2009, Verona, Italy. pp.168-179, 10.1007/978-3-642-02906-6_16. hal-00412286 HAL Id: hal-00412286 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00412286 Submitted on 17 Apr 2020 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Integrating Ontological Knowledge for Iterative Causal Discovery and Visualization Montassar Ben Messaoud1, Philippe Leray2, and Nahla Ben Amor1 1 LARODEC, Institut Sup´erieur de Gestion Tunis 41, Avenue de la libert´e, 2000 Le Bardo, Tunisie. [email protected], [email protected] 2 Knowledge and Decision Team Laboratoire d’Informatique de Nantes Atlantique (LINA) UMR 6241 Ecole Polytechnique de l’Universit´ede Nantes, France. [email protected] Abstract. Bayesian networks (BN) have been used for prediction or classification tasks in various domains. In the first applications, the BN structure was causally defined by expert knowledge. Then, algorithms were proposed in order to learn the BN structure from observational data. -
H-France Review Vol. 12 (March 2012), No. 41 Kathleen A. Mulhern
H-France Review Volume 12 (2012) Page 1 H-France Review Vol. 12 (March 2012), No. 41 Kathleen A. Mulhern, Beyond the Contingent. Epistemological Authority, a Pascalian Revival, and the Religious Imagination in Third Republic France. With a Foreword by Martha Hanna. Eugene, Or.: Pickwick Publications, 2011. xvii + 212 pp. Bibliography and index. $25.00 U.S. (pb). ISBN-13: 978-1-60899-370-3. Review by Stephen Schloesser, Loyola University Chicago. Kathleen Mulhern investigates a late-nineteenth-century deployment of the seventeenth-century thought of Blaise Pascal by French neo-Pascalians (“Pascalisants”). Pascal had never completely disappeared from the French literary scene. Seventy years after his death, he served Voltaire as a foil in the Remarques sur les Pensées de Pascal (1734); Condorcet’s edition of the Pensées (1776) was but one stage in his ever-shifting relationship with Pascal-Voltaire.[1] In the post-revolutionary Romantic period, Pascal re-appeared in 1835; a new critical edition proposed by Victor Cousin followed ten years later (1844). From the mid-century onward, Pascal’s nationalist function as the French literary genius enjoyed multiple new editions: Vinet (1848), Sainte-Beuve (1848), Havet (1852), Droz (1886), Michaut (1896), and Brunschvicg (1904) (p. 7). For the purposes of Mulhern’s story, there seems to be a missing link here between 1776 and 1835. That link is suggested by Darrin McMahon’s observation that (largely Catholic) opponents of the philosophes during the 1770s-1780s overlooked Pascal’s Jansenist associations (and Rousseau’s own philosophic position) in service of combating “rationalism.” Though clearly differing in world view, both Pascal and Rousseau “argued convincingly that the heart had reasons that reason knows not, that when left to themselves our rational faculties left us lifeless and cold, uncertain and unsure. -
An Argument for Moral Nihilism
Syracuse University SURFACE Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects Projects Spring 5-1-2010 An Argument for Moral Nihilism Tommy Fung Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone Part of the Other Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Fung, Tommy, "An Argument for Moral Nihilism" (2010). Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects. 335. https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone/335 This Honors Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 An Argument for Moral Nihilism What if humans were just mere animals, and that we react to certain stimuli in a certain, lawful manner, and thus change in the appropriate way. It is debatable how much free will the average person would grant to say- a dog, but the average person doesn’t doubt that humans exercise free will. What if instead it could be shown that we are no different than a robot? That we are nothing but just an input-output mechanism for our programming to determine how to react to certain stimuli? I don’t know how many people who would claim that a robot exercises free will, or could be held morally responsible for their actions. “Science is more than the mere description of events as they occur. It is an attempt to discover order, to show that certain events stand in lawful relation to other events.. -
The Philosophy of William James As Related to Charles Renouvier, Henri Bergson, Maurice Blondel and Emile Boutroux
Portland State University PDXScholar Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses 1987 The philosophy of William James as related to Charles Renouvier, Henri Bergson, Maurice Blondel and Emile Boutroux Peggy Lyne Hurtado Portland State University Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds Part of the Intellectual History Commons, and the Philosophy Commons Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Hurtado, Peggy Lyne, "The philosophy of William James as related to Charles Renouvier, Henri Bergson, Maurice Blondel and Emile Boutroux" (1987). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 3713. https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.5597 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible: [email protected]. ---- l I AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Peggy Lyne Hurtado for the Master of Arts in History presented June 10, 1987. Title: The Philosophy of William James as Related to Charles Renouvier, Henri Bergson, Maurice Blondel and Emile Boutroux. APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE: Michael F. Reard~n, Chairman Guin~ David Joh This thesis argues two issues: William James' philosophy was-to a great extent derived from his interaction with the French philosophers, Charles Renouvier, Henri Bergson, Maurice Blondel and Emile Boutroux. Correlative to the fact that these five figures have an intellectual 2 relationship with one another, I also argue that in order to understand James, he must be placed within the context of these relations. -
An Introduction to Philosophy
An Introduction to Philosophy W. Russ Payne Bellevue College Copyright (cc by nc 4.0) 2015 W. Russ Payne Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document with attribution under the terms of Creative Commons: Attribution Noncommercial 4.0 International or any later version of this license. A copy of the license is found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ 1 Contents Introduction ………………………………………………. 3 Chapter 1: What Philosophy Is ………………………….. 5 Chapter 2: How to do Philosophy ………………….……. 11 Chapter 3: Ancient Philosophy ………………….………. 23 Chapter 4: Rationalism ………….………………….……. 38 Chapter 5: Empiricism …………………………………… 50 Chapter 6: Philosophy of Science ………………….…..… 58 Chapter 7: Philosophy of Mind …………………….……. 72 Chapter 8: Love and Happiness …………………….……. 79 Chapter 9: Meta Ethics …………………………………… 94 Chapter 10: Right Action ……………………...…………. 108 Chapter 11: Social Justice …………………………...…… 120 2 Introduction The goal of this text is to present philosophy to newcomers as a living discipline with historical roots. While a few early chapters are historically organized, my goal in the historical chapters is to trace a developmental progression of thought that introduces basic philosophical methods and frames issues that remain relevant today. Later chapters are topically organized. These include philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, areas where philosophy has shown dramatic recent progress. This text concludes with four chapters on ethics, broadly construed. I cover traditional theories of right action in the third of these. Students are first invited first to think about what is good for themselves and their relationships in a chapter of love and happiness. Next a few meta-ethical issues are considered; namely, whether they are moral truths and if so what makes them so.