THE FREE SPIRIT: A CRITIQUE OF THINGS IN THEMSELVES AS A NIHILISTIC MOVEMENT A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts Trevor L. Hoag June 2007 This thesis titled THE FREE SPIRIT: A CRITIQUE OF THINGS IN THEMSELVES AS A NIHILISTIC MOVEMENT by TREVOR L. HOAG has been approved for the Department of Philosophy and the College of Arts and Sciences by James Petrik Associate Professor of Philosophy Benjamin M. Ogles Dean, College of Arts and Sciences Abstract HOAG, TREVOR L., M.A., June 2007, Philosophy THE FREE SPIRIT: A CRITIQUE OF THINGS IN THEMSELVES AS A NIHILISTIC MOVMENT (91 pp.) Director of Thesis: James Petrik According to Nietzsche, the history of philosophy is dominated by “nihilism,” i.e., the hierarchical valuation of the supersensible over and above the sensible and material. This “nihilism,” according to Nietzsche, is particularly evident in Kant’s use of the concept of things in themselves in his epistemology and moral philosophy. For example, Nietzsche claims that Kant uses the concept of things in themselves to reinstitute the notion of a true world that stands “behind” and devalues the world of human experience by contrast. Some Kant scholars, however, have argued that a “two aspect” (as opposed to a “two world”) interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism allows Kant to sidestep the charge of practicing dogmatic metaphysics as well as exhibiting the value judgments of traditional metaphysics. In my thesis, I contend that no matter which interpretation one adopts concerning things in themselves, Nietzsche’s charge of nihilism holds. This is the case because not only does Kant’s system create the conditions for the possibility of nihilistic judgment through the positing of supersensible realms, entities, and perspectives, but Kant himself explicitly expresses “nihilistic” value judgments in favor of the supersensible. Approved: _____________________________________________________________ James Petrik Associate Professor of Philosophy Dedication To Lauren and Ulysses Acknowledgments To my parents, siblings, grandparents, immediate family, and anyone else to whom I am genetically related (and refrained from giving me too much trouble for choosing an academic career). To those who have inspired my love of philosophy including: Drs. Brown, Painter, Goldberg, Mickunas, Petrik, and Powell. To my philosophical and literary colleagues at Allen County Community College, Emporia State University, and Ohio University. To Lauren, my significant other. Thank you all for your love and support. “In a friend one should have one’s best enemy. You should be closest to him with your heart when you resist him . There is comradeship: let there be friendship!” – Zarathustra 6 Table of Contents Page ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................................3 DEDICATION...............................................................................................................................................4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.............................................................................................................................5 INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................................7 CHAPTER #1: NIETZSCHE AND NIHILISM.......................................................................................12 INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................................12 JACOBI, NIHILISM, AND KANTIAN IDEALISM .............................................................................................13 ZARATHUSTRA’S PROLOGUE AND SPEECHES ............................................................................................15 THE PROBLEM OF SOCRATES.....................................................................................................................21 NIHILISM AND THE CHRISTIAN ASCETIC PRIEST........................................................................................24 AN INTRODUCTION TO KANTIAN NIHILISM ...............................................................................................26 NIHILISM AND THE “CULMINATION” OF THE TRADITION...........................................................................28 CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................................32 CHAPTER #2: KANT AND THE TWO WORLD INTERPRETATION .............................................35 INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................................35 KANT AND TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM..................................................................................................36 NIETZSCHE AND THE THING IN ITSELF.......................................................................................................42 GUYER AND THE “TWO WORLD” INTERPRETATION ..................................................................................44 KANT AND NIETZSCHE, FAITH AND CRITIQUE...........................................................................................49 CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................................54 CHAPTER #3: KANT AND THE TWO ASPECT INTERPRETATION .............................................57 INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................................57 ALLISON AND THE “TWO ASPECT” INTERPRETATION................................................................................59 NIETZSCHE AND KANT’S THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY ...............................................................................63 KANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE NOUMENAL SELF.........................................................................66 NIETZSCHE AND “REMEMBERING THE EARTH” .........................................................................................69 KANT, NIETZSCHE, AND THE BODY ...........................................................................................................73 CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................................80 CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................................82 WORKS CITED..........................................................................................................................................89 WORKS CONSULTED..............................................................................................................................91 7 1 Introduction “[I]n this formulation a countermovement finds expression, regarding both principle and task: a movement that in some future will take the place of this perfect nihilism.”2 -Nietzsche, The Will to Power In Nietzsche’s earliest writings, he readily adopted Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves.3 As his thinking matured, however, he came to reject this distinction, collapsing appearances and things in themselves into a single notion of “appearance.” Nietzsche ultimately came to abhor the concept of things in themselves (or, anything in itself4), attacking it as merely one more malignant development in a 2,300 year history of philosophies that advanced the “negation of life” and thus were nihilistic.5 Though Nietzsche frequently repeats the charge that Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves leads to philosophical nihilism, he never provides a sustained analysis or detailed defense of it. It is the purpose of this thesis to supply what Nietzsche does not; viz., a careful development and defense of the charge that Kant’s transcendental idealism creates the conditions for the possibility of nihilism through the positing of supersensible realms, entities, and perspectives, and that 1 Nietzsche’s follow-up work to The Antichrist, book one of his Revaluation of All Values, was tentatively entitled: The Free Spirit: A Critique of Philosophy as a Nihilistic Movement. Since the second volume was never written, it is my hope that I can begin to bring Nietzsche’s original vision to life through the writing of this thesis. See: Walter Kaufmann. The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking Press, 1968). 657. 2 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967). 3. 3 For example, see Friedrich Nietzsche. “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1968). 45. 4 For an excellent discussion of whether Nietzsche succeeded in “putting out of order” the category of the in itself, see Stephen Houlgate. “Kant, Nietzsche, and the ‘Thing in Itself,’” (Nietzsche-Studien Vol. 22, 1993). 115-157. 5 The figure “2,300” is the approximate time between the life of Socrates and Nietzsche’s own life. 8 Kant himself exhibits “nihilism” explicitly—in the form of value judgments that favor the supersensible. My strategy for defending Nietzsche’s charge is as follows: