<<

VBI DA 2k11

China DA

China DA ...... 1 China 1NC ...... 2 China 1NC ...... 3 Uniqueness—China Leads in Space ...... 4 Uniqueness—China Leads in Space ...... 5 Uniqueness—Chinese Heg Now ...... 6 Uniqueness—Chinese Heg Now ...... 7 Uniqueness—Chinese Heg Now ...... 8 Uniqueness—Multipolarity Now ...... 9 Brinks—Now Key Time ...... 10 Links— Detection ...... 11 Links—Asteroid ...... 12 Links—Civil Competition ...... 13 Links—Cooperation With China ...... 14 Links—ISS ...... 15 Links— ...... 16 Links—Mars ...... 17 Links— ...... 18 Links—New Space Stations ...... 19 Links—Private Launches/CCDev ...... 20 Links—SETI ...... 21 Links— ...... 22 Links—Space Solar ...... 23 Links—Space Solar ...... 24 Links—Technology Exports ...... 25 Links—US Space Hegemony ...... 26 Internal Links—Civil Space Key to Chinese Power ...... 27 Internal Links—Space Key to Chinese Power ...... 28 Internal Links—Space Key to Chinese Power ...... 29 Internal Links—Space Key to Chinese Power ...... 30 Internal Links—Space Key to Chinese Power ...... 31 Impacts—Space Dominance Key to Military Dominance ...... 32 Impacts—Space Dominance Key to Military Dominance ...... 33 Impacts—Avoiding Competition Prevents War ...... 34 Impacts—Avoiding Competition Prevents War ...... 35 Impacts—Competitionà Arms Race/Instability ...... 36 Impacts—Chinese Heg Good ...... 37 Impacts—Chinese Heg Good ...... 38 Impacts—Chinese Heg Good ...... 39 Consult China Solvency ...... 40 Consult China Solvency ...... 41 Consult China Solvency ...... 42 AT: Space Co-Op Now ...... 43 AT: Space Co-Op Now ...... 44 AT: Now ...... 45 AT: China Exporting Military Tech Now ...... 46 AT: China Won’t Start a Space War ...... 47 AT: US Victory Good ...... 48 AT: Plan Leads to Cooperation With China ...... 49 AT: Heg Good Impact Turns ...... 50 AT: China Bad in Africa ...... 51 AT: China War Good ...... 52 AT: China War Good ...... 53 AT: No War With China ...... 54 Aff—Non-Unique ...... 55 Aff—No Nuclear War ...... 56 Aff—Co-op Good ...... 57 Aff—Chinese Heg Bad ...... 58 Aff—No Chinese Hegemony ...... 59 Aff—Hegemonic Competition Now ...... 60 Aff—Chinese Heg Bad ...... 61 Aff—Chinese Heg Bad ...... 62 Aff—US Can Re-Establish Asian Hegemony ...... 63

Page 1 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

China 1NC

Space Diplomacy With China is Failing Now—While The Relationship Remains Cordial, American Space Power is Winding Down as China Accelerates—This Mirrors the Overall Strategic Relationship Washington Post, “Mistrust stalls U.S.-China space cooperation,” January 22nd, 2011 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104480.html)

The Obama administration views space as ripe territory for cooperation with China. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has called it one of four potential areas of "strategic dialogue," along with cybersecurity, and nuclear weapons. And President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao vowed after their White House summit last week to "deepen dialogue and exchanges" in the field. But as China ramps up its space initiatives, the diplomatic talk of cooperation has so far found little traction. The Chinese leadership has shown scant interest in opening up the most sensitive details of its program, much of which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). At the same time, Chinese scientists and space officials say that Washington's wariness of China's intentions in space, as well as U.S. bans on some high-technology exports, makes cooperation problematic. For now, the U.S.-China relationship in space appears to mirror the one on - a still- dominant but fading superpower facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion on both sides. "What you have are two major powers, both of whom use space for military, civilian and commercial purposes," said Dean Cheng, a researcher with the Washington-based Heritage Foundation and an expert on the Chinese military and space program. NASA's human program has been in flux in recent years, fueling particular concern among some U.S. observers about the challenge posed by China's initiatives in that area. There is "a lot of very wary, careful, mutual watching," Cheng said.

Increases in American Space Power are Competitive Attempts to Head-Off the Rise of China— This Increase in Tension Leads to Severe Conflict Escalation Global Times, “Washington expresses concern over China's expanding space capabilities,” May 13th, 2011 (http://world.globaltimes.cn/americas/2011-05/654637.html)

"We are worried that, particularly in crisis, a misunderstanding in space could easily lead to an inadvertent escalation that would not be in the interest of either of our countries," AFP quoted Gregory Schulte, deputy secretary of defense for , as saying Wednesday. He also said that the US seeks an understanding "over what responsible behavior might look like," Schulte told the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Ni Feng, deputy director of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that China's growth has led the West to identify three fields of likely strategic conflicts between China and the US – nuclear weapons, space operations, and the Internet. China's significant development in the space field threatens the US dominant position, which has caused the US to seek to restrict its competitors by setting rules in order to get a more advantageous position, he added. Three months ago, Schulte said the US was worried about China's development of its space capabilities, as the defense and intelligence communities released their 10-year National Security Space Strategy (NSSS). "China is at the forefront of the development of those capabilities," Schulte said, adding the money China was putting into counter-space capabilities was a matter of concern to the US, AFP reported. The concerns of the US were largely due to China's new anti- test in 2007, when China shot down one of its own weather , sparking international concern over the debris from the satellite, Ni told the Global Times. However, every country has its own standards of development in space, and the US has raised its concerns over China's growth and is trying to control other countries' development because it wants to avoid competition, he added.

Page 2 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

China 1NC

China Refuses to Be Deterred—Intensified With China Will Result in Nuclear Escalation—American Deferral to Intensify the Conflict is Key Matthew Hill, Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, “Space: The Final Frontier of Strategic Competition?” Pnyx Blog, March 2nd, 2011 (http://www.pnyxblog.com/pnyx/2011/3/2/space- the-final-frontier-of-strategic-competition.html)

Nonetheless, China’s is showing signs of embracing these and other risks. Over the past year, Beijing has attempted to promote a reputation for hard-line behaviour amidst strategic crises ranging from escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula to economic brinksmanship with over the Senkaku-Daioyutai Islands. In developing an ASAT capability to threaten US conventional and nuclear confidence - while embracing the huge potential costs - Beijing is merely extending this logic to impose uncertainty on the US’ position in Asia. By setting itself up to link the threat of uncontrollable nuclear escalation to Washington’s intervention over Taiwan, Beijing is exploiting deterrence as an instrument of its political will: forcing the US to contemplate its interest in maintaining its status quo regional influence against the potential costs of enforcing that stability.

As the US faces this possibility, it is increasingly seek ways to ameliorate its exposure to a developed Chinese ASAT capability. What little is known of recent developments in Washington’s space-based capabilities suggests a strategy of deterrence through denial – attempting to create resilience against the threats posed by Beijing through stealth, miniaturization, and rapid replacement, and by developing worst-case alternative capabilities to compensate key informational functions through an attack.

The success of such a strategy is contingent on whether or not China is willing to intensify its own ASAT program. The possibility of an escalating arms race in space, with potentially disastrous consequences for both strategic stability and the sustainability of humanity’s presence in , cannot be ruled out. While Asia analysts remain focused on the strategic competition on land and sea, they must increasingly spare a thought for the nascent contest occurring in the heavens.

US China War Terminates in Extinction The Straits Times, “No One Gains in War Over Taiwan,” June 25th, 2000 (Lexis)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full- scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine 's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full- scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major- General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to , we would see the destruction of civilisation.

Page 3 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Uniqueness—China Leads in Space

China is Focusing on Establishing Space Competition Now—They are Fighting Hard to Expand into Near Earth and Deep Space Rep Frank Wolf, US House, “Wolf Statement At U.S. - China Commission Hearing On Military and Civil Space Programs in China,” May 14th, 2011 (http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.rss.html?pid=37024)

"It should not be surprising that many countries have taken notice of the tremendous benefits that the American space program has yielded. It is clear that we are now entering an era of much greater civil, defense and commercial competition in space.

"Most countries expanding their space programs are strong U.S. allies that are primarily interested in advancing science research or building a commercial . The Chinese, however, do not fall into this category. Over the last decade, China has developed its space program at a surprising pace. In less than 10 years the Chinese have gone from launching their first manned to unveiling plans last week for an advanced Chinesespace station designed to rival the International .

"However, the Chinese are not only focusing on establishing a significant presence in . In March, the Chinese state news agency announced its plans for 'a powerful carrier for making a manned moon landing and exploring deep space.' This announcement confirms what space experts have long believed: the Chinese have their sights set on the pinnacle of American achievement - landing a man on the moon.

"According to the article, the Chinese are planning a heavy lift rocket capable of carrying up to 130 tons. This would provide the capacity to launch the critical components for a lunar landing. The announcement made clear that if the does not get serious about its own Exploration Program, the next flag planted on the moon may be a Chinese flag.

Page 4 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Uniqueness—China Leads in Space

China is Ahead and On its Own in the Competition for Furthering Space Domination— American Space Programs are Winding Down as China Ramps Up Sydney Morning Herald, “China seems to be running in space race on its own,” April 28th, 2011 (http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/china-seems-to-be-running-in-space-race-on-its-own-20110427- 1dwrj.html)

BEIJING: China has laid out plans for its future in space, unveiling details of an ambitious new space station to be built and in orbit within a decade. The project, unveiled yesterday, was described as a ''potent political symbol'' by one NASA adviser. It is the latest phase in China's rapidly developing space program, less than a decade since China put a human into orbit. The space station will weigh about 60 tonnes and consist of a core module with two laboratory units for experiments, says the state news agency, Xinhua. Officials have asked the public to suggest names and symbols for the unit and for a cargo spacecraft that will serve it. Professor Jiang Guohua, from the China Research and Training Centre, said the facility would be designed to last a decade and support three working on microgravity science, space radiation, biology and . John Logsdon, a NASA adviser, said China's plans would give it homegrown expertise in human space flight. ''China wants to say: 'We can do everything in space that other major countries can do,''' he said. ''A significant, and probably visible, orbital outpost transiting over most of the world would be a potent political symbol.'' The project heralds a shift in the balance of power among spacefaring nations. In June, NASA will mothball its fleet of space shuttles, in a move that will leave only the Russians capable of ferrying astronauts to and from the International Space Station. The outpost is due to fly until 2020, but may be granted a reprieve until 2028. Bernardo Patti, head of the space station program at the , said: ''China is a big country … They are getting richer and richer. They want to establish themselves as key players.''

Page 5 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Uniqueness—Chinese Heg Now

China is Rising Now as American Economic and Military Hegemony Crumble Washington Times, “PRELL: China: U.S. No. 1 no more,” January 19th, 2011 (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/19/usacross-out-usa-china-1/?page=1)

It was a signal. The latest and boldest signal yet that China intends to become the world's No. 1 power. President Obama took the occasion of his first visit to China to show "humility" and to assure his Shanghai audience that "we do not seek to contain China's rise." The Chinese communists are taking the occasion of their first visit to the Obama White House - not to show humility, as Mr. Obama did to them - but to openly show their clear intention to dominate the world from the Middle Kingdom. As Constantine Menges wrote in "China: The Gathering Threat," "In the traditional Chinese view, the world needs a hegemon - or dominant state - to prevent disorder. The communist Chinese regime believes China should be that hegemon." Traditionally, the Chinese communists have cloaked their hegemonic ambitions under the guidance of the late Deng Xiaoping to "keep a cool head and maintain a low profile. Never take the lead - but aim to do something big." But in early 2010, cool heads and low profiles gave way to a senior People's Liberation Army officer openly calling for "China to abandon modesty about its global goals and sprint to become world No. 1," adding that "China's big goal in the 21st century is to become world No. 1, the top power." Now we have the official state paper of the Chinese Communist Party openly discussing "China as the world's top nation" on the eve of China's state visit to the Obama White House. Why is this happening? And why now? When Mr. Obama "arrived in China ... as a fiscal supplicant, not the leader of the free world," as stated in the Times Online, and bowed down to their communist premier, the Chinese communists took the president's gestures as the signs of weakness they were, and quickly made "radical departures from late patriarch Deng Xiaoping's famous diplomatic credo of 'adopting a low profile and never taking the lead' in international affairs" by unveiling China's new "ambitious agenda" to assume a more powerful stance on the world stage and "to become world No. 1, the top power," according to the Asia Times.

Page 6 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Uniqueness—Chinese Heg Now

China Will Economically Pass the US to Dominate the World Economy Now Ian Fletcher, Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, “America’s Fate Under Chinese Hegemony: a Review of Eamonn Fingleton’s Jaws of the Dragon, Trade Review, May 2nd, 2011 (http://www.tradereform.org/2011/05/america%E2%80%99s-fate-under-chinese-hegemony-a-review-of-eamonn- fingleton%E2%80%99s-jaws-of-the-dragon/)

The news has recently hit the press that China’s economy, measured on the purchasing-power basis that adjusts for price differences between nations, may surpass the U.S. in only another five years or so. Surprisingly, China has still shown no signs of morphing into the cuddly liberal and democratic nation, devoted to American ways from Coca-Cola to democracy, whose eventual appearance has been assumed by American policy for thirty years now. Our policy during this period has, after all, enthusiastically cooperated with China’s efforts to build up its economic power—which entails, of course, every other kind of power, including the military kind. So our assumption of a benign China had better be right, or else we have been abetting the creation of a monster. A hostile China will be arguably even worse than the USSR, because it will not do us the favor of sabotaging its economy by adhering to a dysfunctional economic ideology. ...[CONTINUED]… The bottom line, after a few thousand years of history and some astonishing ideological twists and turns, is an approach to politics that is systematically opposite to liberal democracy. It is the velvet glove on the fist, and increasingly a very sophisticated one. It has tamed capitalism and mastered modern media. It is not headed for collapse or metamorphosis any time soon. If anything, it is currently more successful at imposing its will on us than we are at the reverse. To be fair to poor old Confucius, the political system of contemporary China is not a direct extrapolation of any blueprint he drew up, and its flaws should not blind humanity to the genuinely civilizing aspects of his teachings (which are real). But, as Fingleton shows in considerable detail, a Confucian mentality underlies the politics of not only China, but also, in a soft-authoritarian version that has mastered the surface rituals of democracy, the politics of neighboring nations like Japan, Korea, and Singapore. Make no mistake: East Asia is on a fundamentally different civilizational track than the U.S., and it isn’t going to get off any time soon. And why should it, when East Asians are currently watching America decline? If the U.S. had not chosen, by its unconditional embrace of economic globalization by means of (one way) free trade, to render itself vulnerable to China, the above might not matter very much. After all, for most of its long history, China has maintained a civilization upon principles very different from those of the West, and it didn’t do us much harm. Unfortunately, the U.S. has, in fact, chosen the opposite course, with the result that our own government is increasingly slipping under the control of an ethically alien and geopolitically hostile power. To take just the most obvious example: because political bribery is, by way of political action committees, essentially legal in the U.S., Beijing can manipulate the U.S. Congress and the presidency almost at will. Why? Because it can manipulate the profits of the Fortune 500 companies that do business in China, and they do its bidding as lobbyists here. Because they are still headquartered in the U.S., they find welcome on Capitol Hill, but it is Beijing that is calling the shots. Americans sometimes puzzle over why their government doesn’t “get” the Chinese threat. The answer is simple: because it has been bribed not to by China. The most important issue on which our government has been bribed is, of course, trade. China runs astronomical trade surpluses with the U.S. In fact, a majority of our trade deficit is now with China. This is no accident: it is the product of China’s aggressive embrace of predatory mercantilism plus America’s government being bribed not to take defensive measures. To find an historical parallel, one would probably have to go back to something like the suicide of the old Polish state in the 18th century, carved up by its adversaries after its domestic politics was paralyzed by foreign bribery. America’s defense against Chinese mercantilism is further sabotaged by the fact that, despite our usingsimilar policies earlier in our own history, mainstream American economists are largely blind to the fact that mercantilism even works. Trapped in the same “free” market thinking that led to the 2008 financial crisis, they don’t believe that China’s policies can possibly be a winning move for that country. An economy that has gone from peasant agriculture to superpower in 30 years doesn’t seem to persuade them. Why are China’s economic policies so effective? The aggressive pursuit of exports is a game other nations, like Germany and Japan, also play well. But these are both medium-sized high-wage nations that are already developed, not gigantic low-wage nations still on the early stage of their development path. (China is an economic superpower because it has so many workers, but their per capita output still only qualifies China as a middle-income nation globally, behind nations like Jamaica.) China is unique because it combines standard-issue (if exceptionally cynical) mercantilism with other policies, like forced savings and systematic technology acquisition, made possible by its despotic ex-Marxist political system. For example, it has, by deliberate state fiat, a savings rate close to 50%, while America’s is close to zero. This gives China a tidal wave of investment capital to put into everything from factories to freeways. (It is also enabling China to accumulate ownership of American government securities and private-sector assets.) Japan never took over the world, so some people dismiss the Chinese threat as yet another big wolf-cry. But China has ten times Japan’s population, nuclear weapons, and a hard-authoritarian rather than soft-authoritarian political system. This time, it’s different. Beijing is already extending its political tentacles everywhere from the Middle East to Latin America. Now that Uncle Sam worships democracy (at least in principle) and doesn’t cut dictators the slack he did during the Cold War so long as they were anti-communist, China is the new best friend of despots everywhere. China’s voracious demand for imports alone guarantees that this rivalry will not remain trivial forever.

Page 7 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Uniqueness—Chinese Heg Now

China Modernizing its Currency Now as it Ascends to Economic Hegemony Spiegel Online, “China Plans Path to Economic Hegemony,” January 26th, 2011 (http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,741303,00.html)

They have made it to the heart of American capitalism. As of last week, the pioneers in China's race to the top have been displayed on a giant electronic billboard in New York's Times Square. For four weeks, the images of Chinese astronauts and athletes, their stars and the super-rich will appear 300 times a day in a giant advertisement for the People's Republic. The occasion for the new superpower's confident campaign was the state visit of President Hu Jintao, 68, with US President Barack Obama. Even before he left Beijing, the visiting head of state had predicted that the dominant capitalist power could expect to see a redistribution of global power. In written interviews with theWall Street Journal and , the Chinese leader said that the world's monetary system, with the US dollar as its reserve currency, was a "product of the past." China's long-term goal is to become a country with an anchor currency. If that happens, other countries will have to maintain reserves of the yuan instead of the current reserve currencies, the dollar and the euro. China could then use its own currency to conduct transactions, gaining more favorable terms as a result, in its global shopping spree, such as in the commodities markets. Secret Lectures on Reserve Currencies Years ago, Hu and the Politburo attended secret lectures in which Chinese professors explained the history of the rise and fall of major powers. During these sessions, the Chinese leaders realized that no modern country has ever become a superpower without a reserve currency. The United States superseded the British Empire after World War II, when the dollar replaced the British pound as the dominant currency in the global financial system. This explains why Beijing has pursued the internationalization of the yuan since the outbreak of the global financial crisis, which the Chinese believe has irrevocably harmed their American rival. China has a lot on its plate. Today the renminbi -- the official name in China for the "people's money," which is adorned with a portrait of Mao -- cannot even be freely exchanged into another currency. To keep the prices of its exports artificially low, the country also essentially links the exchange rate of its currency to the dollar. Until now, Beijing has used a complicated system of foreign currency controls to effectively shield the renminbi from global capital flows. In order to have a reserve currency, China would have to give up all of this. It would have to gradually appreciate its currency, perhaps even allowing it to float freely, so that the exchange rate could be based on the real value of the currency and the strength of China's economy. This would make the country's exports substantially more expensive and would drastically curb growth. Nevertheless, hardly a week goes by in which China does not launch new pilot projects to "internationalize" the yuan in the long term. Channeling the Money Overseas As of January, private citizens in the eastern Chinese industrial city of Wenzhou have been permitted to invest up to $200 million (€148 million) abroad. Wenzhou is the traditional cradle of private entrepreneurship in the People's Republic. In the past, many Chinese business tycoons moved their money abroad illegally, but now Zhou Xiaoping, a foreign trade official in Wenzhou, is being inundated with inquiries from wealthy Chinese. He promises them entirely new freedoms, as long as they do not use their money to speculate in real estate or stocks. "It's better to channel the flow of money," says Zhou, "than just to block it." That would be a big change. The Chinese media reported this week, however, that authorities in Beijing have not yet given final approval to the Wenzhou scheme. In December, the central bank issued permits to 67,400 export firms throughout the country to do business abroad in yuan. Previously, only 365 companies had that privilege. Trading the Yuan China is also experimenting with the yuan as a form of payment abroad. In Moscow, the Chinese ambassador recently attended a ceremony to launch trading of the yuan against the rubel in Russia's interbank currency exchange. Still, that trading will be restricted to one hour daily. In January, the New York branch of the Bank of China began offering American customers monetary transactions in yuan for the first time. China has also reached agreements with South Korea and other neighbors, as well as with Iceland, Belarus and Argentina, to engage in complex financial transactions known as currency swaps. The deals are designed to allow the central banks of these countries to make the yuan available to domestic companies. However, China's real testing ground for the internationalization of the yuan appears to be Hong Kong. As of September 2009, a handful of companies in the so-called Special Administrative Region (SAR) have been permitted to conduct trading operations in renminbi. Foreign corporations, including the US fast-food restaurant chain McDonald's, have already issued bonds denominated in yuan in the SAR to fund their expansion on the mainland.

Page 8 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Uniqueness—Multipolarity Now

Multipolarity is Coming Now—The Decline of the American Economy and Rise of China Will Displace Militarist American Dominance Michael Hudson, Distinguished Professor of Economics, University of Missouri (Kansas City), “Dollar Hegemony and the Rise of China,” March 15th, 2010 (http://michael-hudson.com/2010/07/dollar-hegemony-and-the-rise-of-china/)

China, the rest of Asia and Russia have been financing the US overseas dollar spending to pay for America’s military encirclement of the Eastern Hemisphere and for US investors to buy out the crown jewels of Asian industry, financial institutions and public infrastructure. This situation is asymmetrical not only economically, but also politically. In 1823, America’s Monroe Doctrine told Europe to keep out of the Western Hemisphere, ending European colonialism and political hegemony in Latin America. The United States replaced the major European powers as investor and political and military influence. Today, many people in the United States, Canada and Europe wish to see global disarmament in a multi-polar world rather than a unipolar world. They believe that no country should get a free ride or dominate the world militarily. That would not be a free market. In the end, international economic, political and military relations tend to settle at symmetrical common rules for all parties. A generation ago, Harvard economist Albert Hirschman called for U.S. disinvestment in Latin America and third world countries, on grounds of U.S. economic interest itself. Today, the US economy is suffering from chronic domestic budget deficits that are largely military in character, and chronic payments deficits. Scaling back military spending would free resources for use in its own economy, while enabling foreign economies to wind down their own military budgets. This logic is endorsed by many US citizens and economists. It can be promoted by a system in which no national economy remains in a monetary system based on the military spending of a military nation in chronic deficit and rising debt beyond its foreseeable ability to pay. This kind of free ride characterized the empires of times past, but the present century promises a more fair, equitable and (one hopes) less militarized world.

Page 9 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Brinks—Now Key Time

Now is the Brink—The US and China are Jockeying in Intense Soft-Power Competition—China is Extremely Concerned About American Competitiveness China Defense Mashup, “Clinton says US in direct competition with China,” March 2nd 2011 (http://www.china- defense-mashup.com/clinton-says-us-in-direct-competition-with-china.html)

The U.S. risks falling behind China in the competition for global influence as Beijing woos leaders in the resource-rich Pacific, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Wednesday. Her unusually strong comments before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are certain to anger the communist power, especially in light of Chinese President Hu Jintao's recent high-profile visit to Washington, seen as boosting trust and trade between the world's two largest economies. As Clinton railed against cuts sought by Republican to the U.S. foreign aid program, she told senators, "We are a competition for influence with China. Let's put aside the humanitarian, do-good side of what we believe in. Let's just talk straight realpolitik. We are in competition with China." She noted a "huge energy find" in Papua New Guinea by U.S. company Exxon Mobil Corp., which has begun drilling for natural gas there. Clinton said China was jockeying for influence in the region and seeing how it could "come in behind us and come in under us." America's top diplomat accused China of supporting a dictatorial government in Fiji, where plans to reopen an office of the U.S. Agency for International Development would be shelved under a resolution passed last month by the Republican-led House. That measure proposes sharp cuts to foreign assistance, including a $21 million program to help Pacific islands vulnerable to rising sea levels, as part of efforts to rein in government spending. Clinton also said China had brought all the leaders of small Pacific nations to Beijing and "wined them and dined them." "We have a lot of support in the Pacific Ocean region. A lot of those small countries have voted with us in the , they are stalwart American allies, they embrace our values. And they believe, contrary to what some might think, that they are sinking," Clinton said. She said foreign assistance was important on humanitarian and moral grounds, but also strategically essential for America's global influence. "I mean, if anybody thinks that our retreating on these issues is somehow going to be irrelevant to the maintenance of our leadership in a world where we are competing with China, where we are competing with Iran, that is a mistaken notion," Clinton said. In the past year, Obama administration has invested much diplomatic effort in firming up ties, including military ones, in the Asia-Pacific. That push has won applause by some governments, particularly in East Asia, because of concerns over China's expanding clout and aggressive claims to disputed islands in the South China Sea. The administration has said it is important to get along with China because of their shared interests in global stability and their deep economic ties. China holds $1.16 trillion in U.S. Treasury securities, helping finance the vast U.S. government deficit. Before Hu's visit, Clinton said that the U.S. would pursue a "positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship," and she welcomed China as a rising power. Charles Freeman, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said the U.S. was "unquestionably" involved in a "soft power competition with China. But this isn't a hard power, Cold War exercise." "Beijing gets nervous when we talk about competition in any form," he said. "Hints of Cold War rivalry make them frantic."

Page 10 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—Asteroid Detection

China Participates and Expands Participation Now in Asteroid Detection Technology SpaceDaily, “China Builds New Observatory To Detect Near-Earth ,” August 15th, 2000 (http://www.spacedaily.com/news/asteroid-00l.html)

China began the construction of a new astronomical observatory dedicated to the detection and study of near-Earth asteroids (NEAs), Xinhua News Agency reported on August 3. According to Yang Jiexing, an astronomer who is in charge of the project at the Purple Mountain Observatory in Nanjing, the new observatory is being built in the Tieshanshi State Forest Park in Xuyi County in the eastern Jiangsu Province. The chosen location has an unobstructed view of the horizon and a very dark sky, with the number of clear nights reaching 210 in a year. The observatory will house a telescope with a mirror diameter of 1.2 metres to observe near-Earth asteroids and . The observations will be used to determine precise orbits of these objects and find out if they pose any threat of colliding with Earth in the future. Completion of the observatory is planned for 2002. The estimated cost of the project is more than 10 million yuan renminbi ($1.2 million US). Funding comes from the local government, the State science and technology department, and contributions from Hong Kong. Upon completion the new observatory will join an international network of observatories to monitor near-Earth objects. Since the mid-1990s China has been active in studying asteroids. The Xinglong Station of the Beijing Astronomical Observatory (BAO), which is about 180 km northeast of Beijing, is among a dozen observatories in the existing asteroid monitoring network. Here the Schmidt telescope, which is smaller than the telescope that will go in the new observatory, is equipped with a CCD camera to observe minor under the Schmidt CCD Asteroid Program (SCAP).

Page 11 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—

China Controls Most Terrestrial Sources of Minerals Found On Asteroids—The Plan Would Compromise A Significant Chinese Resource Naples News, “Rare earth elements are in the news,” November 27th, 2010 (http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2010/nov/27/ben-bova-nov-28-2010-rare-earth-elements-are-news/?print=1)

China produces roughly 97 percent of the world’s supply of rare earth elements. A few weeks ago China tightened its exports of these elements to the United States and Japan, two of the biggest users of them. The Chinese government says it is limiting its exports of rare because it wants to improve the environmental conditions of its mines — and, besides, it needs to keep a larger percentage of them for its own growing industries. Japan is looking into the possibilities of opening a rare earth mine in Vietnam, and in the U.S. Molycorp Minerals plans to reopen a mine in California it had closed in 2002 when radioactive waste was discovered leaking from a pipe there. But new facilities would have to be built to refine the from these mines. At present, the only operating refinery for rare earths happens to be — you guessed it — in China. Cynics believe the Chinese are merely trying to drive up the price of the rare earths. Conspiracy theorists see a plot afoot in Beijing to control a natural resource that is vital for many high-tech industries. Space enthusiasts, though, see an opportunity. The contains millions, perhaps billions, of small chunks of metals and minerals, which are called asteroids. The largest of them, , is less than 600 miles wide. Most of them are much smaller, tiny chunks of rock left over from the creation of the solar system nearly five billion years ago. Most of the asteroids circle around the between the orbits of Mars and , roughly four times farther from the Sun than our own Earth. But there are thousands that are much closer to Earth. Some of them actually cross Earth’s orbit. They are called Near Earth Asteroids: NEAs. (Astronomers are not known for poetic nomenclature.) When President Barack Obama scrapped NASA’s plans for returning to the Moon and building permanent bases there, he proposed sending astronauts to one of the NEAs, instead. Now, many of these asteroids happen to be rich in rare earth elements. In fact, most of the rare earth mines on our planet are situated at the sites of ancient asteroid impacts. If we’re going to send astronauts to an asteroid, why not include a geologist who can bring back some samples of rare earths? Why not give the mission a purpose beyond merely exploring for the sake of scientific knowledge? Why not begin to exploit the natural resources that lie among the asteroids? Such an effort could act as an incentive for private industry to move farther into space than merely providing to ferry people and cargo to the International Space Station. It could also show the world — and particularly the Chinese government — that we can move beyond our dependence on their resources (and ploys). Mining rare earths from asteroids would be enormously expensive, at first. But the effort could help to start a transition toward developing space industries. In time, we could see many industrial operations running in space, using virtually free solar energy, while our world becomes cleaner and greener: a residential zone, with industry moving off our planet. Would a move in this direction influence the Chinese government to relax its grip on rare-earth exports? There is a precedent for this sort of thing. In the 1980s, when former President Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (aka “Star Wars”) it started a chain of events that led eventually to the fall of the . We didn’t go ahead with SDI — indeed, we still do not have a credible defense against ballistic missiles. But the possibility that the U.S. might develop missile defenses helped to crack the Soviet Union apart. The possibility of mining rare earths from asteroids might help influence China, too.

Page 12 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—Civil Competition

China is Growing in its Ability to Compete in Civil Space Programs—Attempts to Advance Competition in a Cold War Mentality is Dangerous Dr. James Clay Moltz, Naval Postgraduate School, “China’s :International Dynamics and Implications for the United States,” For the hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on: “The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs” May 11, 2011 (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/11_05_11_wrt/11_05_11_moltz_testimony.pdf)

For these reasons, viewing China’s space program solely from the perspective of its military activities is misleading. While China is active in the military sector and is seeking to check current U.S. advantages in this area, China’s challenge to the United States in space may eventually be equally significant in the civil space sector, where China’s expanding infrastructure, growing cadre of space scientists and engineers, and active international outreach puts it in a favorable position for long-term competition. But China still lags behind the United States and suffers from some serious, structural weaknesses in regard to space: bureaucratic overhang, a lack of capable space allies, and tepid receptivity to its efforts at international leadership. Unfortunately, the United States has failed to exercise its advantages in some of these fields. The international is changing, yet Washington has too often fallen back into Cold War patterns, which are ineffectual in the today’s expanded space marketplace. The new National Space Policy and National Security Space Strategy have outlined important new directions, but specific steps are now needed to implement them in regard to China and, as importantly, with U.S. allies and friends in the region. Such combined policies would assist in the development of U.S. markets and increase U.S. space security.

Page 13 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—Cooperation With China

Cooperation With China on Space Won’t Lead to True Cooperation—Just Space and Technology Gains for China at US Expense Reuters, “Analysis: Space: a frontier too far for U.S.-China cooperation,” January 2nd, 2011 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/02/us-china-usa-space-idUSTRE7010E520110102)

U.S. officials say China's capabilities could threaten U.S. space assets in low orbit. The Chinese test also created a large cloud of orbital debris that may last for 100 years, boosting the risk to manned spaceflight and to hundreds of satellites belonging to more than two dozen countries. China's work on anti-satellite weapons is "destabilizing," Wallace Gregson, assistant U.S. secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, said in December, also citing its investment in anti-ship missiles, advanced submarines, surface-to-air missiles and computer warfare techniques. "It has become increasingly evident that China is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military buildup that could upend the regional security balance," Gregson told a forum hosted by the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, called on members of the incoming Congress to be wary of any space cooperation with China on the grounds it could bolster Beijing's knowledge and harm U.S. security. "Congress should reject (the Obama) administration attempts to curry favor with the international community while placing U.S. advantages in space at risk," Dean Cheng, a Heritage research fellow for Chinese political and security affairs, and two colleagues said in a December 15 memo to lawmakers.

Page 14 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—ISS

Continued Exclusion of Chinese Presence on the ISS Causes Tension and Prevents Co- Operation Dr. James Clay Moltz, Naval Postgraduate School, “China’s Space Technology:International Dynamics and Implications for the United States,” For the hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on: “The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs” May 11, 2011 (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/11_05_11_wrt/11_05_11_moltz_testimony.pdf)

Supporters of the current freeze in U.S.-Chinese space relations argue that Washington is sending a signal to Beijing about its deplorable human rights record and is also limiting China’s ability to develop advanced space systems. Unfortunately, while well-intended, current U.S. policy is ineffective sends a weak and off-target signal. Unless the United States is also willing to halt U.S. investment in Chinese manufacturing, cut off Chinese access to the U.S. export market, and find a new client for U.S. debt, holding space cooperation hostage will have no significant impact on China, except pushing it to cooperate with others. In addition, it puts the United States in the odd position of promoting “protectionism” in space and adopting a “defensive” strategy, when opening markets and reducing U.S. export barriers instead would strengthen the U.S. space industry and promote American security through greater engagement with the region. Efforts to keep China off of the International Space Station (ISS), for example, have only strengthened China’s resolve to build its own space stations. Former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin, notably, argues that failing to work with China may cause the United States to be left behind in new international missions, particularly given the fact that current NASA funding will not sustain a unilateral return mission to the Moon, much less continue shouldering of the lion’s share of the ISS budget. A step-by-step process to begin space science cooperation and (if successful) allow gradual Chinese participation on the ISS (first via joint research, then a taikonaut visit, then a possible module) would make more sense: reducing U.S. costs and increasing U.S. knowledge about Chinese space activities.

Page 15 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—Mars

China Intends to Use Mars to Demonstrate its Status as a Serious Space Power Cosmic Log, MSNBC Space Blog, “China lays out its plan for Mars,” October 25th, 2010 (http://cosmiclog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2010/10/25/5349170-china-lays-out-its-plan-for-mars)

Chinese space officials have come up with a plan that would send an orbiter toward Mars on a Chinese rocket as early as 2013, the Xinhua news agency reports. Such a mission would use technologies that were developed for the Chang'e 1 lunar orbiter and its recently launched follow-up mission, Chang'e 2. The orbiter mission also would follow up on China's joint effort with Russia to send probes toward Mars and one of its , . Launch of the Phobos-Grunt mission is scheduled for a year from now. China's Yinghuo 1 ("Firefly") orbiter would hitch a ride on a Russian-built spacecraft that's designed to put a on Phobos and return a soil sample to Earth. All this activity signals that Beijing will be taking its status as a space power seriously in the years ahead. NASA Administrator Charles Bolden has just returned from a controversial visit to China, and today he said in a written statement that the visit "increased mutual understanding on the issue of and , which can form the basis for further dialogue and cooperation in a manner that is consistent with the national interests of both of our countries."

Page 16 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—Mars

Chinese Space Program Actively Investigating Mars Now—Planetary Exploration Will Be Significant Beijing Review, “Seeing Deeper Into Space,” October 21st, 2010 (http://www.bjreview.com.cn/Cover_Story_Series_2010/2010-10/18/content_304395.htm)

Although it had a late start, China's space technologies have developed rapidly. It became the fifth country in the world to independently manufacture and launch manmade satellites, when Dongfanghong 1 went into space on April 24, 1970. In October 2003, China successfully launched and recovered the Shenzhou-5 manned spacecraft and became the third country with the technology for manned spaceflight. On October 24, 2007, China took the first step toward deep-space exploration with the successful launch of Chang'e 1. China's space scientists are outstanding and young. The average age of the designers for the country's manned spaceflight and lunar probe projects is just over 30. Through continuous learning and practice, they are becoming the mainstay for China's march toward having the world's leading space technologies. China is also actively developing Mars exploration technologies and is expected to start a joint in 2011 in cooperation with Russia. By the end of next year, the first Chinese Mars probe is scheduled to be launched. In the future, China will also explore and other planets in the solar system and their satellites.

Page 17 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—Moon

US Space Program is Ceding the Moon to China Now—It is a Critical Part of Their Future Strategy Global Post, “Dragon watch: China pulls ahead in moon race,” November 2nd, 2010 (http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/china/101027/space-race-moon)

TAIPEI, Taiwan — The next human to plant a foot on the moon's surface is most likely to be Chinese or Indian — and that "small step" could happen as soon as 2020. In late October, China's moon orbiter Chang'e 2 shifted into a lopsided orbit that brings it as close as 9.5 miles from the moon's surface. It's snapping pictures, scouting a landing site for an unmanned rover in two to three years' time in a lesser-known area of the moon known as the "Bay of Rainbows." India plans a similar rover mission around the same time, and both countries hope to follow that feat with a manned mission as soon as a decade from now. Both countries are pouring money and resources into moon programs. Japan has also floated plans for a manned lunar mission and moon base. By contrast, the recession-battered United States earlier this year scratched its — the ambitious, George W. Bush-launched plan to return Americans to the moon's surface — because it was too pricey (about $100 billion through 2020 alone). So is Asia poised to make a giant leap, past the United States, in space? Not necessarily. Experts say both China and India still lag far behind the United States in space expertise and experience. After all, American astronauts bounded over the moon's surface more than 40 years ago. President Barack Obama himself downplayed the importance of manned moon missions earlier this year, saying bluntly "we've been there." U.S. spacecraft and satellite technology is still cutting-edge; witness the high-tech American lunar orbiter that's now sharing the moon's skies with China's orbiter. And the United States is now aiming for a daring new stunt: landing an astronaut on an asteroid by 2025, a project dubbed "Plymouth Rock." But some worry that by giving up its grand lunar ambitions, the United States is ceding important political and symbolic ground to Asia — China, in particular. "I’m afraid what the president and his administration want is for the United States to no longer be pre-eminent in space flight, and that has very, very serious consequences," former astronaut Harrison Schmitt told the Madison, Wis., Capital Times. "I am very much of the mind that America can’t afford to be second-best in space.” There are commercial fears too. While extracting may still be the stuff of science fiction, in another generation or two it could become reality — and the United States might find itself on the back-foot in a race to mine the moon. Moreover, voices including former Apollo astronaut Neil Armstrong, the first man to walk the moon, argue that the moon should remain a focus of the U.S. space program because it could provide a stepping stone to Mars and the rest of the solar system. Last year's findings of extensive water on the moon (first confirmed by an Indian lunar orbiter, by the way) suggest that rocket fuel could one day be produced at a moon base, making a Mars trip more feasible, Armstrong's co-pilot Buzz Aldrin pointed out recently.

Page 18 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—New Space Stations

China Interprets its Newness in the Space Station Development as Key to its Space Power 2 Point 6 Billion, Emerging Commentary and News From Asia, “China’s First Space Station to Shift Balance of Power,” April 27th, 2011 (http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2011/04/27/chinas-first-space-station-to-shift-balance-of-power- 9185.html)

Apr. 27 – China recently unveiled its 2011 plans for manned spaceflight development, taking further steps to approach the establishment of its first space station. The strong interest China holds in its space program, together with billions worth of investment in the field, is interpreted – by a U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) advisor – as a “potent political symbol” that can impact the current space power balance among space industry-pursuing countries. China’s Manned Space Engineering Office announced in its media briefing on April 24 that the country will place its focus on the rendezvous and docking project this year, and plans to launch the first piece of its space station – the Tiangong-1 Space Module – into orbit by the end of the year. In general, China wants to push its space station program into reality during the next decade, as the country already fired its first human being into space in 2003 and saw its first spacewalk in 2008.

Page 19 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—Private Launches/CCDev

China is Suspicious of American Private Companies—Continued Success in Private Launches of American Assets Causes Competition Rick Boozer, Space Author and Educator, “United States Will Beat China in Newest Space Race,” Yahoo News, May 19th, 2011 (http://news.yahoo.com/s/ac/20110519/sc_ac/8496119_united_states_will_beat_china_in_newest_space_race)

But the Chinese are glimpsing something that disturbs them. They are worried that the American companySpaceX can launch satellites and people into space for prices so low that the Chinese can't compete with them ! SpaceX is one of the companies NASA is hiring to come up with space vehicles for sending astronauts to the ISS under its Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) program. Other CCDev companies include veteran aerospace giant Boeing and newcomers Sierra Nevada Corporation and . Competition between these companies would bring down launch prices allowing NASA to have more money for developing technology we will need to send Americans to the Moon, asteroids, and Mars. However, the money hungry super rocket (that politicians are forcing NASA to build with obsolete and expensive 1980's era shuttle technology) jeopardizes the development of technology by potentially gobbling any money freed up with CCDev. Not relying heavily on subcontractors as its competition does, SpaceX manufactures 80% of its vehicle parts, giving them greater quality control. They use the same in all of their launch vehicles. When they want more power, they add more engines to the vehicle, giving them economies of scale. Those are just a couple of the many ways they hold prices down while insuring high quality and safety. That affordability is allowing them to develop the most powerful launcher since the V moon rocket - totally on their own with no government money! The other companies participating in CCDev also use American ingenuity to bring prices down. In a few years because of their cost savings, more astronauts will be launched into orbit than have ever been before! And if politicians can be prevented from squandering the money freed up by CCDev, Americans will lead the way in exploration throughout the inner solar system with such proposed NASA projects as Nautilus-X at much lower cost than the traditional way of doing things. Nautilus would be the first true spaceship that would stay in space and never land, with astronauts brought to it from Earth by the CCDev vehicles. NASA can accomplish great things without a budget increase. If we have the national will, the U.S. will dominate , not the Chinese!

Page 20 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—SETI

China Considers their SETI Program as Part and Parcel of Space Exploration and Domination Christian Science Monitor, “Wave Of UFO Sightings Underscores China's Scientific Search For ET,” January 7th, 2000 (http://www.rense.com/politics6/wave.htm)

Long isolated by great walls of xenophobia, China is curiously entering the new century by trying to build bridges of communication with extraterrestrials.

Amid a wave of UFO sightings and the rise of a generation bred on "Star Wars" and "The X-Files," Chinese space scientists are mapping out plans to find and explore life beyond earth.

"China is planning to build a gigantic radio telescope that will search for signs of and signals from extraterrestrial intelligence," says Zhao Fuyuan, an astronomer at the prestigious Chinese Academy of Sciences. "The telescope will work like the SETI [US-based Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence] program ... by tracking radio signals" from the cosmos, says Mr Zhao.

The academy has drawn up its own SETI plan and is awaiting funding to begin construction at a time when citizens of other planets seem to have launched an invasion of the Middle Kingdom: Chinese newspapers and broadcasters, even the normally staid, state-run Chinese Central TV, are stepping up reports of close encounters here with aliens.

"As they become more market-oriented, Chinese editors, like their American counterparts, are finding that aliens and UFO sightings sell newspapers," says a Beijing-based diplomat who tracks the local press.

Astronomer Zhao says that "Chinese people are becoming better educated and have more leisure time to explore their own interests, and science is increasingly popularized in the press."

"These two trends," he adds, "are both boosting coverage of phenomena on the fringes of science like UFOs." Zhao says the Academy of Sciences recently issued a circular authorizing all its members for the first time to talk to the press about UFOs.

"The academy hopes that more media reports about and growing interest in extraterrestrial life will convince the government to invest more money in the overall space program," he says.

China's creation of a SETI operation is only one step in an ambitious 21st-century plan to explore the .

"China's recent success in launching its first unmanned is catapulting the country toward recognition as a major space power," says a Western official. "The Chinese think they can one day catch up to the US as one of the world's top space powers," he adds.

"Within the next two decades, China wants to build a reusable launcher like the US space shuttle and help colonize the moon," says a Chinese space researcher who asked not to be identified.

Page 21 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—Space Debris

China is Taking the Lead on Space Debris Control—Their Incidents are Accidental and Only Encourage Further Thinking and Operations New York Times, “Orbiting Junk, Once a Nuisance, Is Now a Threat,” February 6th, 2007 (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/science/space/06orbi.html)

Dr. Forden suggested that Chinese engineers might have understood the risks but failed to communicate them. In China, he said, “the decision process is still so opaque that maybe they didn’t know who to talk to. Maybe you have a disconnect between the engineers and the people who think about policy.” China, experts note, has 39 satellites of its own — many of them now facing a heightened risk of destruction. Politically, the situation is delicate. In recent years China has played a growing international role in fighting the proliferation of space junk. In 2002, for instance, it joined with other spacefaring nations to suggest voluntary guidelines for debris control. In April, Beijing is to play host to the annual meeting of the advocacy group, known as the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee. Donald J. Kessler, a former head of the orbital debris program at NASA and a pioneer analyst of the space threat, said Chinese officials at the forum would probably feel “some embarrassment.” Mr. Kessler said Western analysts agreed that China’s new satellite fragments would speed the chain reaction’s onset. “If the Chinese didn’t do the test, it would still happen,” he said. “It just wouldn’t happen as quickly.” Last week in Beijing, a foreign ministry spokeswoman failed to respond directly to a debris question. Asked if the satellite’s remains would threaten other spacecraft, she asserted that China’s policy was to keep space free of weapons. “We are ready to strengthen international cooperation in this regard,” the spokeswoman, Jiang Yu, told reporters.

Page 22 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—Space Solar

China is Pushing Space Solar Technology Now Aviation Week, “China Great Wall Confounded By SpaceX,” April 15th, 2011 (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/asd/2011/04/15/11.xml&headlin e=China%20Great%20Wall%20Confounded%20By%20SpaceX%20Prices)

Lei Fanpei, vice president of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CAST), told the National Space Symposium in Colorado Springs April 14 that despite the U.S. policy shift in 1999 that effectively shut down U.S.- China trade in space products, China is still open for business. “Committing to peaceful uses of outer space, CAST is willing to stress exchanges and cooperation with various countries in the world transparently and with [an] open mind,” Lei said through an interpreter. “I believe the China-U.S. space cooperation, once initiated, will certainly bring immediate results to the two countries’ space industries, providing more choices for customers from different countries all over the world.” Lei did not take questions, and declined an interview request. But colleagues from China Great Wall, the marketing arm of CAST, say they are opening a one-person office in Washington this summer to push Chinese space products, including solar arrays.

Page 23 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—Space Solar

China is Advancing Over the US on the Search for Space —US Action Would Be Infringing Their Turf Consortium News, “The Race for Solar Energy from Space,” March 23rd, 2011 (http://www.consortiumnews.com/2011/032311b.html)

Editor’s Note: The idea of solving land-based energy needs by collecting solar power in outer space may sound like an impractical futuristic dream, but it is attracting new attention today given the recent reminders about the dangers of producing energy on Earth. But the United States, which gained a crucial technological lead in the Cold War from John F. Kennedy’s Mission to the Moon, is lagging on this new frontier as China and a freshly motivated Japan take the lead, William John Cox reports in this guest essay: The failure of the General Electric nuclear reactors in Japan to safely shut down after the 9.0 Tahoku earthquake – on the heels of last year’s catastrophic Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the deadly methane gas explosion in Massey’s West Virginia coal mine – underscores the grave dangers to human society posed by current energy production methods. In Japan, the radiation plume from melting reactor cores and the smoke of burning spent fuel rods threaten the lives of the unborn; yet, they point in the direction of a logical alternative to these failed policies – the generation of an inexhaustible, safe, pollution-free supply of energy from outer space. Presently, only the top industrialized nations have the technological, industrial and economic power to compete in the race for space-solar energy, with Japan occupying the inside track in spite of, and perhaps because of, the current disaster. Japan is the only nation that has a dedicated space-solar energy program. Japan also is highly motivated to change directions. China, which has launched astronauts into an earth orbit and is rapidly become the world’s leader in the production of wind and solar generation products, will undoubtedly become a strong competitor. However, the United States, which should have every advantage in the race, is most likely to stumble out of the gate and waste the best chance it has to solve its economic, energy, political and military problems.

Page 24 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—Technology Exports

Exports of Space Technology are Crucial to Chinese Foreign Policy Goals Dr. James Clay Moltz, Naval Postgraduate School, “China’s Space Technology:International Dynamics and Implications for the United States,” For the hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on: “The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs” May 11, 2011 (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/11_05_11_wrt/11_05_11_moltz_testimony.pdf)

China has also used space to pursue its foreign policy goals. In 1992, it founded the Asia-Pacific Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP- MCSTA). This group, which included Pakistan, Thailand, and a number of other developing countries, eventually began cooperating in several areas, including in the joint development of satellites based on Chinese technology. In 2008, China led a subset of this group to establish the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO)—a formal, membership-only group modeled on ESA. The APSCO organization now includes seven dues-paying members: China, Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, and Thailand. China has high hopes for APSCO, but it has yet to attract more accomplished space powers to the group. APSCO engages in joint research and data- exchange efforts, as well as formal training courses for scientists and engineers from the Asian-Pacific region in space technology and remote sensing. Through these efforts, China has been able to portray itself as a “purveyor” of space know-how and technology to lesser-developed states in Asia and elsewhere. One target of interest has been Indonesia, which recently received satellite ground stations and communications equipment from China, as well as visit by Chinese taikonauts. In recent years, China has also begun to engage in considerable commercial space exports. It has sold satellite laser-ranging equipment to Argentina and ground stations and satellites to Venezuela, Pakistan, and Nigeria, among others. While China’s space enterprises are seeking profits abroad, China also uses space exports for political purposes. Its space deals with Nigeria and Venezuela, for example, were motivated by Chinese interests in long-term energy security. In both cases, these deals for Chinese- built and launched geostationary communications satellites were officially commercial, but on very favorable credit terms to the purchasing countries, with China providing some costs and offering low- or zero-interest rates on its loans. China also provided technical training to each country’s space scientists, as well as building ground stations on their territories. This strategy offers political benefits but imposes costs on the Chinese government and the space industry. Looking ahead, China has contracted with Laos to build and launch Laosat-1 and with Bolivia for the Tupac Katari .

Page 25 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Links—US Space Hegemony

China Will Never Accept US Space Hegemony—Acceleration of American Space Dominance Will Produce Chinese Response Bruce MacDonald, Analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, “China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security,” CFR Report, September 2008 (http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707)

The United States faces challenging choices in responding to this new space environment and must respond wisely as well as vigorously to protect the security interests of itself and its allies. Imprudent choices could create a self-fulfilling prophecy, spurring China, for reasons of security or national pride—or both—to accelerate its counterspace efforts in such a way that both the United States and China would be worse off. With so many different ways to attack space assets, it is much easier and less costly to attack spacecraft than defend them. Thus, a U.S. or Chinese doctrine of space dominance seems likely to fail. Provocative military postures can result in more adversarial efforts than nonprovocative postures. The United States would never accept Chinese hegemony in space, and as their ASAT test strongly implies, China seems unlikely to accept U.S. hegemony or dominance. Developing defensive and offensive capabilities to defend U.S. space assets from attack is a legitimate act of self-defense, though it will be best accom24 China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security plished at reasonable cost if integrated into an overall doctrine of space deterrence. Current U.S. space policy contains a potential problem when it states that the United States will “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.” This creates a possible conflict with the same policy’s statement that U.S. space capabilities are “vital to its national interests,” given that U.S. attacks on the space capabilities of others run a high risk of sparking counterattacks, and the costs of hardening U.S. systems against similar attacks are so high. This tension has remained largely unaddressed for nearly two years. Washington needs to consider the costs and benefits of such attacks and address them in policy and force doctrines. The implication of current policy is that others, not the United States, must make trade-offs in space, yet it is highly unlikely that China and other spacefaring nations will accept substantially subordinate status, or that the United States would make the substantial investments required to enforce such a dominant position. If the United States can resist the urge to overreach, it may be able to achieve a more stable, less costly military space posture and doctrine that could maintain a measure of U.S. space superiority, based on the strategic nuclear balance precedent. The United States could preserve space superiority relative to China, deriving more benefit from space than China does and retaining more offensive capability, though China would still keep its ability to deter the United States from attacking China’s growing space capability. Such a capability appears well within China’s reach, in spite of Washington’s wishes otherwise.

Page 26 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Internal Links—Civil Space Key to Chinese Power

Civil Space Engineering is Still Critical to Chinese Self-Perception and Overall Power Dr. James Clay Moltz, Naval Postgraduate School, “China’s Space Technology:International Dynamics and Implications for the United States,” For the hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on: “The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs” May 11, 2011 (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/11_05_11_wrt/11_05_11_moltz_testimony.pdf)

Understanding China’s space program and moving the U.S.-Chinese space relationship in a more favorable direction is critical to furthering U.S. interests in space. It is also essential for promoting the broader conditions of safety and stability in the orbital environment that are needed for the successful development and use of U.S. scientific, commercial, and military space assets. In the emerging post-Cold War space environment, Asian countries—among them China, India, and Japan—have played an increasingly prominent role. The motives of these countries to date have been different from than those of the superpowers, putting a greater emphasis on domestic economic goals, regional competition, and international prestige, as compared to more limited geo-strategic military aims. China’s 2006 White Paper on space listed the goal to “build up the comprehensive national strength” as one of the country’s core rationales for space activity. Thus, while China has significant military aims in space, it also has important civil space purposes that are often underappreciated. Given the waning relevance of Communist Party doctrine to Chinese reality, the government is using civil space activities to promote its legitimacy in the eyes of its people.

Page 27 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Internal Links—Space Key to Chinese Power

Chinese Interest in Emerging as a Global Power is Uniquely Dependent on Space— Development and Competition Over Space Assets Now is Crucial Andrew Kakabadse, Professor of International Management Development at Cranfield University’s School of Management, “Global Divisions and China’s Ascent to the Stars,” January 24th, 2011 (http://www.kakabadse.com/2011/01/global-divisions-and-china%E2%80%99s-ascent-to-the-stars/)

There have been a number of economists who for many years have been foretelling that China is going to emerge as the global power, not the US or Anglo-American interests. Now the question may be: why do you want to be a global power? This is especially the case when the world’s resources are diminishing and the majority of those resources are in Russia. The answer is that it is not to control oil, gas, minerals and so on, but it is to control space: to control all movement through space and control the unlimited resources in space.. What it actually means to control space is not yet clear. It could be the number of satellites and the number of manned space stations but ultimately it will be the technology that will take you to other planets so you can begin the process of excavation. This will require military technology to be put into space, allowing you to attack anyone threatening your capacity to penetrate space. What has not been mentioned in the media is that the Chinese have just quadrupled their defence and military spending, of which a large portion is going towards increasing its space exploration budgets. The American budget for space, however, is static or declining, even though their military budget is increasing. It is not quite understood why the American space budget is decreasing, considering that they can see the Chinese budget is rapidly increasing. Perhaps the reason is that controlling the world counts before controlling space, but why not take that extra step and get to space first rather than trying to outbid the other side for what is essentially territory that will be of no use to anybody, and that’s land. If you look at the time frames of governments, they look ahead in 50 year terms, or 75 year terms; businesses in 5 year terms. With 50 years not being a great deal of time to rethink your whole military strategy, why spend your money chasing something where the resource space is declining when you could be controlling space where the resource space is unlimited? So will it be the Americans or the Chinese who will become the global dominant power? The interesting point is that whoever it is, it is the control of space that counts. It’s a 50/50 question because despite the Chinese budget increasing, their technological position is radically behind the Americans. On the surface, it does seem that the Chinese are on the ascendancy and the US is on the decline, both in terms of the race for power but also in terms of the race for space.

Page 28 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Internal Links—Space Key to Chinese Power

Chinese Space Gains Put Them in Direct Competition With the US—They Will Use it To Outstrip American Power Time, “The New Space Race: China vs. US,” February 13th, 2008 (http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1712812,00.html)

China's space program lags far behind that of the U.S., of course. "They're basically recreating the Apollo missions 50 years on," says Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Studies Department at the U.S. Naval War College and an expert on China's space development. "It's a tortoise-and-hare race. They're happy plodding along slowly and creating this perception of a space race." But there may be more at stake than national honor. Some analysts say that China's attempts to access American space technology are less about boosting its space program than upgrading its military. China is already focusing on space as a potential battlefield. A recent Pentagon estimate of China's military capabilities said that China is investing heavily in anti-satellite weaponry. In January 2007, China demonstrated that it was able to destroy orbiting satellites when it brought down one of its own weather satellites with a missile. China clearly recognizes the significance of this capability. In 2005, a Chinese military officer wrote in the book Joint Space War Campaigns, put out by the National Defense University, that a "shock and awe strike" on satellites "will shake the structure of the opponent's operations system of organization and will create huge psychological impact on the opponent's policymakers." Such a strike could hypothetically allow China to counterbalance technologically superior U.S. forces, which rely heavily on satellites for battlefield data. China is still decades away from challenging the U.S. in space. But U.S. officials worry espionage may be bringing China a little closer to doing so here on Earth.

Page 29 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Internal Links—Space Key to Chinese Power

China Views Space as Crucial to Their Future Economic and Soft Power—American Investments are Competition Dr. Bruce Cordell, Dean, Natural Sciences Division, Fullerton College, “China Surges to #2 and Contemplates More Freedom: The Implications for Space,” 21st Century Waves, August 21st, 2010 (http://21stcenturywaves.com/2010/08/21/china-surges-to-2-and-contemplates-more-freedom-the-implications-for- space/)

One way or the other, China will be a major player in space and on Earth during the next 10 -15 years (i.e., the 2015 Maslow Window) (8/15/10) concurs. After three decades of spectacular growth, China passed Japan in the second quarter to become the world’s second- largest economy behind the United States. The milestone, though anticipated for some time, is the most striking evidence yet that China’s ascendance is for real and that the rest of the world will have to reckon with a new economic superpower. Will China ascend to global leadership in space during the next 10-15 years? The Times suggested that China’s surge will continue and may eventually approach the much larger capacity of the U.S. “as early as 2030.” China’s continuing growth fits well into a scenario that 21stCenturyWaves.com sketched over 2 years ago in “10 Reasons Why China is Good for Space”: China’s space program stretches back more than 35 years, suggesting that space will expand in importance because of the growing economic, technological, and scientific culture of the country … China’s very rapid economic growth hovers around 10% annually. This is very important internally to the Communist Party leaders, as well as to major export sources like Wal-Mart! It also provides the financial cornerstone for future Chinese technology and space initiatives.

Page 30 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Internal Links—Space Key to Chinese Power

Military Strategy Means Space Will be the Crucial Domain for US Chinese Competition in the Next Century Thomas P.M. Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor for Esquire magazine, “Big-War Thinking in a Small-War Era ,” China Security, 2010 (http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=475)

Does China’s current military build-up warrant such a nudge? The United States also has at its disposal significant near-term force-structure opportunities for further signaling its strategic resolve. The most salient example: if the US Navy were to move decisively toward fielding unmanned combat air vehicles on its carriers (a good idea for all sorts of reasons), our now vulnerable big decks could—at a moment’s notice—mount strike operations at suitably standoff distances to effectively diminish China’s first-strike strategy. China’s Pearl Harbor-like opening blows will be far less stirring when Doolittle’s unmanned “raiders”—with no return address required—strike back at the Chinese mainland almost immediately.

Finally, the PLA and China’s senior Communist Party leadership give no serious indication of being anywhere near immune to deterrence on the Taiwan scenario, which lies at the heart of the ASBC’s strategic rationale (with Iran a distant second). Off the record, senior Chinese officials readily indicate a complete understanding of the logic of deterrence with regard to Taiwan. They view the “assassin’s mace” as the PLA’s capacity to threaten the US Navy’s capacity to threaten the PLA Navy’s capacity to threaten Taiwan with invasion. The AirSea Battle Concept extends this chain of mutual deterrence one additional link—nothing more. But it will put the ball in China’s court, and, by prodding Beijing’s insecurities, provide unhealthy encouragement for an arms race. Building on China’s 2007 anti- satellite missile test, the next realm for this competition will likely be in space.

Page 31 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Impacts—Space Dominance Key to Military Dominance

Chinese Quest for Space Dominance is an Explicit and Obvious Attempt to Achieve Military Pre-Eminence and Challenge American Power Ted Spitzmiller, Aerospace Author and Historian, “Book Review: The New Space Race,” , February 2010 (http://www.nss.org/resources/books/non_fiction/NF_077_newspacerace.html)

The space race of the earlier era was highlighted by the ominous surprise of the Soviet Union’s miraculous technological rise from the ashes of WWII. They presented a military and ideological threat to the United States that provided an extreme motivation to embark on a crash program to beat the Russians to the Moon — at any cost. The new space race, as defined by the author, is more subtle. It involves a nation that (like the Soviets) is diametrically opposed to the ideology of the United States, yet is inextricably tied to it by an uneasy economic relationship. Although well behind the US in space technology, China has publicly embarked on an ambitious effort to close the gap, including pronouncements that it will orbit a manned laboratory and send taikonauts to the Moon. Seedhouse notes that the advances made by the Chinese are a result of an energetic “buy, copy, steal” policy. Moreover, like the former Soviet Union, the closed nature of the PRC masks much of its capabilities and intentions. Yet the author weaves together both public pronouncements and analysis of actions to portray China as a major military threat to America. Examples include the development of an anti-satellite weapon and the marketing of high tech weapons to rogue nations such as Iran. The author provides a brief historical perspective of the military potential in space. He cites Herman Oberth in the 1920s describing orbiting mirrors that could focus sunlight to destroy terrestrial targets. Wernher von Braun in the pre- Sputnik days of the 1950s wrote of orbiting nuclear weapons directed from manned space platforms. A more contemporary Donald Rumsfeld oversaw a widening of space assets (non-nuclear) under both the Ford and Bush (43) administrations. The author repeatedly characterizes China’s stated goal of using space for “peaceful purposes” as “nothing more than hot air.” He contends that China perceives the United States as a security threat—not so much for an overt massing of weapons in space, but rather its superiority in the use of space-based assets that provide for effective conduct of war. These include reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, radar mapping, GPS, and command and control — whose impact was evidenced in the two Iraqi conflicts. I was impressed with the character of the book and the quality of the ideas brought together. The author provides a good overview of U.S. space policy and its complexities, and the impact of International Trade in Arms Regulations. Key elements of this policy are much the same as the concept of “freedom of the seas” and use such phrases as “control of space” as an adjunct of U.S. intentions. According to Seedhouse, these phrases apparently alarm the Chinese. Just as the first space race was driven by possible offensive military operations, so is the Chinese version. Although the prospects of nuclear weapons in orbit are still not regarded as rational options, the use of laser weapons and ‘kinetic energy kill’ systems for ballistic missile defense and as anti-satellite weapons are described. The book highlights the technological complexity of the many and varied aspects of strategic defense in today’s aerospace environment.

Page 32 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Impacts—Space Dominance Key to Military Dominance

Chinese Space Dominance Destroys American Conventional Superiority—Makes China a Legitimate Threat Matthew Hill, Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, “Space: The Final Frontier of Strategic Competition?” Pnyx Blog, March 2nd, 2011 (http://www.pnyxblog.com/pnyx/2011/3/2/space- the-final-frontier-of-strategic-competition.html)

Washington was shocked when, in 2007, the People’s Liberation Army shot down its own with a modified ballistic missile. China has subsequently demonstrated an interest in a wider range of ASAT and counter- space capabilities, including the ability to blind or destroy an adversary’s satellites with lasers, and jam their signals and data links. Indeed, late in 2010 it emerged that China may have conducted a test of a co-orbital ‘hunter’ satellite, potentially capable of destroying other satellites in orbit.

To some extent, Washington is merely reaping the strategic consequences of its own precedents. Following the development of kinetic ASAT capabilities in the 1980s, the Pentagon promoted research into laser and electro- magnetic counter-space capabilities. Under the Bush Administration, multilateral efforts to demilitarize space were ignored for fear of constraining US strategic latitude. Furthermore, the pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) has provided an implicit ASAT system, as demonstrated in 2008 when Washington destroyed a satellite utilising its own ship-launched interceptor.

China’s pursuit of ASAT capabilities is motivated by its overwhelming military weakness relative to Washington. Over the past twenty years, the US has demonstrated its superiority in conventional warfare, leveraging space-based communications, positioning, and reconnaissance assets to project power unimpeded. At the same time, the US development of BMD is perceived by China as a threat to its limited nuclear deterrent. If it is to contest this military dominance – especially amidst a confrontation over Taiwan – it is in Beijing’s interest to develop asymmetric capabilities to complicate US access to space.

A mature ASAT system could compromise Washington’s ability to contest Chinese military action in East Asia. Degrading the Pentagon’s satellites would greatly impede the US ability to pursue in joint warfare and deep strike operations. By ‘blinding’ or destroying Washington’s missile early warning satellites, Beijing could threaten the effectiveness of BMD during an escalating military crisis. The very possibility of these capabilities is of deep concern to US defence planers.

Page 33 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Impacts—Avoiding Competition Prevents War

American Acceptance of Chinese Power and Expansion is Crucial to Avoid Conflict Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “Balancing Beijing”, The National Interest, February 24th, 2009 (http://nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20906)

Yet the question is, what balance of power? Beijing poses no threat to America’s homeland or even Pacific possessions and will not do so for decades, if ever. The United States possesses a far stronger military to start— eleven carrier groups to none, for instance—spends five or more times as much as the PRC on defense (excluding the costs of Afghanistan and Iraq) and is allied with most important industrial states in Asia and Europe. There is no Chinese threat or potential threat to America. At issue is relative influence in East Asia and the security of Washington’s friends in that region. Yet the PRC so far has been assertive rather than aggressive and those nations, particularly Japan and South Korea, could do much more individually and collectively for regional security. Washington should not hesitate to sell arms to friendly states, including Taiwan, despite Chinese protests, but should leave them with responsibility for their own defense. Of course, a policy of continued restraint by Beijing will make it far easier for the United States to back away. In any case, there is little that Washington can do, at least at acceptable cost, to maintain U.S. dominance along China’s borders, as the PRC—whose economy already ranks number two or three, depending on the measure, in the world—continues to grow. Washington would have to devote an ever larger amount of resources to the military, in the midst of economic crisis, to ensure its ability to overcome far more limited Chinese capabilities. Even then, Beijing is unlikely to forever accept U.S. hegemony. Confrontation if not conflict would be likely. The better option would be to temper America’s geopolitical pretensions and accept a more influential PRC in its own region. China will grow in power, irrespective of Washington’s wishes. America’s chief objective should be to ensure that this rise is peaceful, as Beijing has promised. U.S.-China diplomatic relations passed the thirty-year mark last fall. The relationship has survived great challenges and is likely to face even greater ones in the future. But despite inevitable differences between the two nations, much depends upon strengthening their ties. The twenty-first century will turn out far differently—and positively—if America and the PRC prove willing to accommodate each other’s economic and geopolitical ambitions.

Page 34 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Impacts—Avoiding Competition Prevents War

The US Must Accept the Rise of China to Avoid Conflict—Their Rise is Inevitable, Attempting to Shut it Will Only Cause Arms Races and War Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute “First Among Equals,” The National Interest, January 12th, 2010 (http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20570)

It’s the job of military planners to plot future contingencies, which is why the U.S. Joint Forces Command looked ahead in its newly published Joint Operating Environment 2008. Despite obvious foreign threats, America’s destiny continues to remain largely in its own hands. No other country could draft such a report with such a perspective. The Europeans, constrained by the and their memories of World War II, must cast a wary eye towards Russia and have little military means to influence events much beyond Africa. For all of its pretensions of power, Moscow is economically dependent on Europe and fearful of an expanding China; Russia’s military revival consists of the ability to beat up small neighbors on its border. Countries like Australia, South Korea and Japan are not without resources, but they are able to influence their regions, no more. Brazil is likely to become the dominant player in South America, but global clout is far away. India and China are emerging powers, but remain well behind Russia and especially the United States. Every other nation would have to start its operational analysis with America, which alone possesses the ability to intervene decisively in every region. The main challenge facing the United States will be becoming more like other nations. That is, over time other states will grow economically relative to America. That will allow them to improve and expand their militaries. Washington will long remain first among equals, the most powerful single global player. But eventually it will no longer be able to impose its will on any nation in any circumstance. That doesn’t mean the United States will be threatened. Other countries won’t be able to defeat America or force it to terms. But the outcomes of ever more international controversies will become less certain. Other governments will be more willing in more instances to say no to Washington. Especially China. Much will change in the coming years, but as the JOE 2008 observes, The Sino-American relationship represents one of the great strategic question marks of the next twenty-five years. Regardless of the outcome—cooperative or coercive, or both— China will become increasingly important in the considerations and strategic perceptions of joint force commanders. What kind of a power is Beijing likely to become? Chinese policymakers emphasize that they plan a “peaceful rise,” but their ambitions loom large. Argues JOE 2008, while the People’s Republic of China doesn’t “emphasize the future strictly in military terms,” the Chinese do calculate “that eventually their growing strength will allow them to dominate Asia and the Western Pacific.” More ominously, argues the Joint Forces Command, “The Chinese are working hard to ensure that if there is a military confrontation with the United States sometime in the future, they will be ready.” Yet this assessment is far less threatening than it sounds. The PRC is not capable (nor close to being capable) of threatening vital U.S. interests—conquering American territory, threatening our liberties and constitutional system, cutting off U.S. trade with the rest of the world, dominating Eurasia and turning that rich resource base against America. After all, the United States has the world’s most sophisticated and powerful nuclear arsenal; China’s intercontinental delivery capabilities are quite limited. America has eleven carrier groups while Beijing has none. Washington is allied with most every other industrialized state and a gaggle of the PRC’s neighbors. China is surrounded by nations with which it has been at war in recent decades: Russia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and India. Indeed, today Beijing must concentrate on defending itself. In pointing to the PRC’s investment in submarines, the JOE 2008 acknowledges: “The emphasis on nuclear submarines and an increasingly global Navy in particular, underlines worries that the U.S. Navy possesses the ability to shut down China’s energy imports of oil—80% of which go through the straits of Malacca.” The Chinese government is focused on preventing American intervention against it in its own neighborhood, not on contesting U.S. dominance elsewhere in the world, let alone in North America. Washington almost certainly will be unable to thwart Beijing, at least at acceptable cost. China needs spend only a fraction of America’s military outlays to develop a deterrent capability—nuclear sufficiency to forestall nuclear coercion, submarine and missile forces to sink U.S. carriers, and anti-satellite and cyber-warfare weapons to blind and disrupt American forces. Washington could ill afford to intervene in East Asia against the PRC so equipped. Such a military is well within China’s reach. Notes JOE 2008: “by conservative calculations it is easily possible that by the 2030s China could modernize its military to reach a level of approximately one quarter of current U.S. capabilities without any significant impact on its economy.” Thus, absent the unlikely economic and social collapse of China, in not too many years Beijing will able to enforce its “no” to America. Washington must reconsider its response. U.S. taxpayers already spend as much as everyone else on earth on the military. It’s a needless burden, since promiscuous intervention overseas does not make Americans safer. To maintain today’s overwhelming edge over progressively more powerful militaries in China, Russia, India and other states would require disproportionately larger military outlays in the United States. It’s a game Washington cannot win. A better alternative would be to more carefully delineate vital interests, while treating lesser issues as matters for diplomacy rather than military action. Equally important, the American government should inform its allies that their security is in the first instance their responsibility. Washington should act as an offshore balancer to prevent domination of Eurasia by a hostile hegemon. But the United States should not attempt to coercively micro-manage regional relations. Stepping back today would reduce pressure on Beijing to engage in a sustained arms buildup to limit U.S. intervention in the future. If the PRC nevertheless moved forward, its neighbors could take note and respond accordingly. Encouraging China to keep its rise peaceful is in everyone’s interest. Despite the many challenges facing U.S. policy, America retains an extraordinarily advantageous position in today’s global order. Eventually, the United States is likely to fall to merely first among many—the globe’s leading state, but no longer the hyper- or unipower, as America has been called. The sooner Washington begins preparing for this new role, the smoother will be the transition.

Page 35 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Impacts—Competitionà Arms Race/Instability

China Will Fight Against American Attempts to Reassert Unipolar Dominance—Such a Competitive Decline in Relations Will Cause an Arms Race that Destabilizes Asia Harold J.Gries and Ruth Newman, Chair in U.S.-China Issues and Director of the Institute for U.S.-China Issues at the University of Oklahoma. Director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue (SASD), “Harmony, Hegemony, and US – China Relations,” World Literature Today, July-August 2007 (http://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/harmony.pdf)

And this is what strikes me as new, and potentially dangerous, about Chinese Occidentalism today. The dialectic of similarity to and difference from the U.S. has swung decidedly in favor of difference. Unlike China’s earlier “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development” discourse, which clearly had a status quo orientation, focusing on China’s development within the existing world system, the new discourse of “civilization modes” and “harmonious worlds” appears more revisionist, pointing to a distinctly Chinese and different regional order. It evokes a hierarchical, China- at-the-center vision of East Asian politics. Furthermore, the new Chinese Occidentalism depicts Americans as an aggressive, militaristic, and threatening people. It certainly does not help that the current Bush administration’s embrace of military and unilateral means to resolve international disputes in Iraq and elsewhere has provided ample fodder for Chinese nationalist arguments. The danger is that heightened Chinese perceptions of U.S. threat could promote the emergence of an acute “security dilemma” in U.S.-China relations. Feeling threatened by a “hegemonic” U.S., Chinese could decide to step up their military modernization for defensive reasons. Americans would likely respond to increased Chinese arms acquisitions with heightened threat perception of their own, leading the U.S. to embrace its own defensive arms buildup. The unintended result: a possible U.S.-China arms race in East Asia. Absent feelings of mutual trust, and given the deep animosities that have led to the recent deterioration of Sino- Japanese relations and the always volatile situation in the Taiwan Strait, there is a real possibility that the United States will get drawn into yet another conflict with China in the first decades of the twenty-first century. What can be done? While American and Chinese nationalists produce Orientalist and Occidentalist discourses based on similar epistemologies of difference, other Americans and Chinese can construct discourses of similarity. At its best, American and Chinese cultural products, like the special section on contemporary Chinese literature in this issue of World Literature Today, celebrate our common humanity. Translation and cultural exchange can reveal our shared challenges: modernization, globalization—indeed, the human condition. In the end, cultural products that raise awareness of our common humanity can serve as a vital counterweight to the discourses of difference and threat that undermine U.S.-China relations.

Page 36 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Impacts—Chinese Heg Good

Chinese Leadership Deters North Korea From Provocation and Nuclear Attack Thomas Christensen, President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia,” International Security, Summer 2006 (http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.2006.31.1.81?journalCode=isec)

Rather than merely following the lead of others, China is championing some multilateral initiatives in the region and has sought to catalyze existing trends through economic diplomacy. One factor that might help secure China’s leading role in the ASEAN economies is the China-ASEAN free trade agreement (FTA), signed in 2001 and due to take effect in 2010.33 This FTA supplements agreements reached in multilateral forums such as the Asia Paciªc Economic and Cooperation forum (APEC), the Asian Development Bank, and the World Trade Organization (which China joined in 2001); and it promises to accelerate trade and investment between China and its southern neighbors. In 2003 China helped create and hosted the six-party talks on North Korean denuclearization and, in the fall of 2005, not only helped revive those talks but drafted the joint statement presented on September 19, 2005. That statement calls for the dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and weapons-related programs in exchange for security guarantees and energy assistance. In addition, it promises future U.S. consideration of both diplomatic normalization of relations with Pyongyang and the transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies to the North Koreans.34 China also has been advocating trilateral functional cooperative meetings with South Korea and Japan, including discussion of security issues.

Page 37 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Impacts—Chinese Heg Good

Chinese Leadership Stabilizes East Asia—Doesn’t Produce Militarization or Aggression Marcus Hellyer, Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies Australian Defence College, “Is the Expansion of Chinese Military Capability a Threat to the Stability of the Western Pacific,” Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies Australian Defence College, 2009 (http://www.defence.gov.au/jetwc/docs/publications%202010/Publctns_050310_IstheExpansionofChinese.pdf)

China under the Communist Party has not been a pacifist power and has been willing to use force even beyond its borders.10 Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that China is developing its military power in order to use it against its neighbours with the potential exception of Taiwan noted earlier. China has been very active in presenting a peaceful image of itself to the world. President Hu Jintao has used the term ‘harmonious world’ to describe China’s model of international relations and Zheng Bijian developed the term ‘peaceful rise’ to describe China’s development.11 The latest Chinese defence White Paper adopts this terminology stating that ‘China is unswervingly taking the road of peaceful development…endeavouring to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.12 While Chinese statements should not be taken at face value, they should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric. There is considerable incentive for China to avoid conflict that would interfere with its continued economic growth. The need to maintain the international conditions necessary for economic growth has become a central goal of Chinese foreign policy. China has shown itself quite willing to peacefully resolve – or at least manage – disputes with its maritime neighbours. Indeed, its focus on avoiding conflict to permit development predates Hu Jintao and motivated its moderate behaviour over the South China Seas territorial disputes with ASEAN members in the 1990s. China acceded to the ASEAN code of conduct for the South China Sea and has embarked on joint resource development projects there with ASEAN members.14 Similarly, while China’s territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea have not been fully resolved, the two countries have declared East China Sea a sea of ‘peace, stability and cooperation’ and reached agreement on the joint development of gas fields.15 China has taken considerable efforts to demonstrate that it is a good international citizen, for example in approving and participating in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Increasingly, China has come to realise that it needs to contribute to the maintenance of the peace and stability that serves China’s interests so well.

Page 38 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Impacts—Chinese Heg Good

American Pre-Eminence is Conclusively Coming to an End—The United States Must Avoid Attempting to Retain Unipolarity to Avoid Conflict With China and Another Global War Henry Kissinger, Former Secretary of State, “Rebalancing Relations With China,” Washington Post, August 19th, 2009 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/18/AR2009081802850.html?hpid=opinionsbox1)

For several decades, the global economic system was sustained by acceptance of American predominance. A vast tide of liquidity coupled with America's appetite for consumer goods had sent enormous amounts of dollars to China, which, in turn, China lent back to us for still more buying. Before the crisis, China sent scores of experts to the United States and invested in major American financial institutions to learn the secrets of the system that seemed to produce permanent global growth at little risk. The economic crisis has shaken that confidence. Chinese economic leaders have seen the American financial system subject a decade of their savings to potentially catastrophic fluctuations. To protect the value of its Treasury investment and to sustain its own export-driven economy, China finds itself obliged to largely retain its Treasury holdings of nearly $1 trillion. Ambivalence in both China and the United States is the inevitable consequence. On the one hand, the two economies have grown increasingly dependent on each other. China has a major interest in a stable -- and preferably growing -- U.S. economy. But China also has a growing interest in reducing its dependence on American decisions. Since American inflation as well as deflation have become for China nightmares as grave as they are for America, the two countries face the imperative of coordinating their economic policies. As America's largest creditor, China has a degree of economic leverage unprecedented in the U.S. experience. At the same time, the quest for widening the scope of independent decision exists in ambivalent combination on both sides. A number of Chinese moves reflect this tendency. Chinese officials feel freer than they did previously to offer public and private advice to the United States. China has begun to trade with India, Russia and Brazil in their own currencies. The proposal of the governor of China's central bank to gradually create an alternate reserve currency is another case in point. Many American economists make light of this idea. But it surfaces in so many forums, and China has such a consistent record of pursuing its projects with great patience, that it should be taken seriously. To avoid a gradual drift into adversarial policies, Chinese influence in global economic decision-making needs to be enhanced. According to conventional wisdom, the world economy will regain its vitality once China consumes more and America consumes less. But as both countries apply that prescription, it will inevitably alter the political framework. As Chinese exports to America decline and China shifts the emphasis of its economy to greater consumption and to increased infrastructure spending, a different economic order will emerge. China will be less dependent on the American market, while the growing dependence of neighboring countries on Chinese markets will increase China's political influence. Political cooperation, in shaping a new world order, must increasingly compensate for the shift in trade patterns. A cooperative definition of a long-range future will not be easy. Historically, China and America have been hegemonic powers able to set their own agendas essentially unilaterally. They are not accustomed to close alliances or consultative procedures restricting their freedom of action on the basis of equality. When they have been in alliances, they have tended to take for granted that the mantle of leadership belongs to them and exhibited a degree of dominance not conceivable in the emerging Sino-American partnership. To make this effort work, American leaders must resist the siren call of a containment policy drawn from the Cold War playbook. China must guard against a policy aimed at reducing alleged American hegemonic designs and the temptation to create an Asian bloc to that end. America and China should not repeat the process that, a century ago, moved Britain and Germany from friendship to a confrontation that drained both societies in a global war. The ultimate victims of such an evolution would be global issues, such as energy, the environment, nuclear proliferation and climate change, which will require a common vision of the future. At the other extreme, some argue that the United States and China should constitute themselves into a G-2. A tacit Sino-American global governing body, however, is not in the interest of either country or the world. Countries that feel excluded might drift into rigid nationalism at the precise moment that requires a universal perspective. America's great contribution in the 1950s was to take the lead in developing a set of institutions by which the Atlantic region could deal with unprecedented upheavals. A region hitherto riven by national rivalries found mechanisms to institutionalize a common destiny. Even though not all of these measures worked equally well, the end result was a far more benign world order. The 21st century requires an institutional structure appropriate for its time. The nations bordering the Pacific have a stronger sense of national identity than did the European countries emerging from the Second World War. They must not slide into a 21st-century version of classic balance-of-power politics. It would be especially pernicious if opposing blocs were to form on each side of the Pacific. While the center of gravity of international affairs shifts to Asia, and America finds a new role distinct from hegemony yet compatible with leadership, we need a vision of a Pacific structure based on close cooperation between America and China but also broad enough to enable other countries bordering the Pacific to fulfill their aspirations.

Page 39 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Consult China Solvency

Dialogue With China to Assure Stabiltiy in Space is Crucial—We Can Foster Certainty and Transparency Bruce MacDonald, Analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, “China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security,” CFR Report, September 2008 (http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707)

The strategic landscape of this new space era is largely unexplored and poorly understood. Nonetheless, certain objectives are clearly in the interest of the United States. The risks inherent in space conflict, where vital U.S. interests are at stake, suggest that preventing space conflict should be a major U.S. security objective, and that all instruments of U.S. power, not just military measures, should be drawn upon to this end. The United States needs to deter others from attacking its space capabilities and bolster an international space regime that reinforces deterrence, the absence of conflict in space, and the preservation of space as an environment open to all. Such a regime would allow the United States to continue reaping the critical information and service benefits that U.S. military space assets provide. To achieve this, the United States needs vigorous diplomatic initiatives as well as defense programs and strategy. Such a stable space regime would seek to: – focus U.S. policies on stability, deterrence, escalation control, and transparency; – create incentives that encourage nations to avoid actions that are inherently destabilizing and cannot be reversed; – construct a military on the basis of an in-depth, layered defense in order to ensure the availability of vital space services; – reduce incentives to and the ability of adversaries to target space capabilities; – foster uncertainty with respect to the consequences of such an adversarial action; – increase warning time to enable both strategic- and operational level actions; – facilitate agreements and understandings that would constrain the most destabilizing dimensions of space competition and provide ground rules for normal space operations; and – maintain ongoing dialogue among U.S., Chinese, and other military and policy experts to promote greater understanding and reduce chances for misunderstanding and miscalculation.

Page 40 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Consult China Solvency

Regular Consultation With China on Space Issues is Key to Maintaining a Stable Security Relationship Dr. James Clay Moltz, Naval Postgraduate School, “China’s Space Technology:International Dynamics and Implications for the United States,” For the hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on: “The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs” May 11, 2011 (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/11_05_11_wrt/11_05_11_moltz_testimony.pdf)

But enhanced U.S.-Chinese space cooperation cannot occur without stabilization of the security relationship with China in regard to space. In this area, it is encouraging that bilateral military-to-military talks are likely to begin soon to discuss parameters for improved space security in the context of the new strategic dialogue with Beijing. It as yet unclear what direction these talks will take, or what initiatives might be possible. Chinese military receptivity and transparency—not seen in recent years—will be necessary to move this dialogue forward. However, if China shows a willingness to respond, the United States should be ready with concrete ideas aimed at creating a framework for more responsible Chinese behavior and mutually beneficial cooperation. Actions by the Nixon administration in the early 1970s established mutually beneficial norms with the Soviet Union under far more difficult circumstances. At a minimum, measures with China should include similar mutual pledges of non-interference with “national technical means” of verification, as well as early-warning satellites. In addition, given China’s 2007 ASAT test, it would be beneficial to exchange joint statements rejecting debris-producing events involving orbital objects, particularly those above 150 miles in altitude. Finally, getting China to agree to regular (at least annual) consultations10 on space security would improve U.S. knowledge of Chinese military programs and create the mechanisms for the prevention of dangerous activities. All of these mechanisms are in U.S. national interests.

Page 41 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Consult China Solvency

US and Chinese Joint Diplomatic Efforts are Crucial to Produce a Secure Space Environment Bruce MacDonald, Analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, “China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security,” CFR Report, September 2008 (http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707)

Accordingly, the United States will soon confront a situation where its satellite fleet becomes increasingly exposed to advancing technology and ever more sophisticated attack because of the major negative military consequences such a loss would produce. Other economically and militarily advanced countries—particularly China—will face a similar, if not quite as stark, situation within the next two decades. The United States faces a serious challenge as its military and economic prowess increasingly depend upon space infrastructure that grows more vulnerable as worldwide space technology advances, especially in China. While the United States will likely remain the preeminent space power at least for the next twenty to thirty years, it will no longer enjoy the level of near monopoly on military space capability that it has enjoyed since the fall of the Soviet Union. As China becomes a credible space power with a demonstrated offensive counterspace capability, the question for U.S. policy is what kind of feasible and stable space regime best serves U.S. long-term security interests. This question should be addressed early in the new administration’s tenure, if not earlier. The fundamental U.S. security interest in the wake of China’s 2007 ASAT test should be deterring China and others from attacking U.S. assets in space, using both a combination of declaratory policy, military programs, and diplomacy, and promoting a more stable and secure space environment. At the same time, the United States and China should both pursue diplomatic options to increase clarity and minimize misunderstanding on space-related matters, and reduce the chances of accidental conflict. This comprehensive mix of military and diplomatic measures is more likely to achieve U.S. space and larger national security objectives than either by itself.

Page 42 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

AT: Space Co-Op Now

There is No Space Cooperation Now—China is Accelerating its Program in Competition With the United States Reuters, “Analysis: Space: a frontier too far for U.S.-China cooperation,” January 2nd, 2011 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/02/us-china-usa-space-idUSTRE7010E520110102)

The prospects for cooperation between the United States and China in space are fading even as proponents say working together in the heavens could help build bridges in often-testy relations on Earth. The idea of joint ventures in space, including spacewalks, explorations and symbolic "feel good" projects, have been floated from time to time by leaders on both sides. Efforts have gone nowhere over the past decade, swamped by economic, diplomatic and security tensions, despite a 2009 attempt by President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, to kick-start the bureaucracies. U.S. domestic politics make the issue unlikely to advance when Obama hosts Hu at the White House on January 19. Washington is at odds with Beijing over its currency policies and huge trade surplus but needs China's help to deter North Korea and Iran's nuclear ambitions and advance global climate and trade talks, among other matters. Hu's state visit will highlight the importance of expanding cooperation on "bilateral, regional and global issues," the White House said. But space appears to be a frontier too far for now, partly due to U.S. fears of an inadvertent technology transfer. China may no longer be much interested in any event, reckoning it does not need U.S. expertise for its space program. New obstacles to cooperation have come from the Republicans capturing control of the U.S. House of Representatives in the November 2 congressional elections from Obama's Democrats. Representative Frank Wolf, for instance, is set to take over as chairman of the appropriations subcommittee that funds the U.S. space agency in the House. A China critic and human rights firebrand, the Republican congressman has faulted NASA's chief for meeting leaders of China's Manned Space Engineering Office in October.

Page 43 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

AT: Space Co-Op Now

Shadows of US-Sino Space Cooperation are Just Hand-Shaking—There is Nothing Substantial Behind It Shanghaiist, “Three-legged space race for China and US?” October 18th, 2010 (http://shanghaiist.com/2010/10/18/post_29.php)

NASA head Charles Bolden is currently in Beijing on a six-day visit to discuss the possibility of a joint space program with China. As US space exploration hit a few speed bumps this year, now more than ever seems the right time to play nice with China whose own space program has really taken off (pun intended).

At the end of 2009, Bolden had said Washington was ready to discuss partners space projects with China. Then 2010 saw recession-hit America stall its Constellation mission to return Americans to the Moon and explore Mars because of financial difficulties. In sharp contrast to that, China has enjoyed a fair few successes lately. It smoothly launched Chang'e 2 at the beginning of this month and its space program now ranks third in the world, after the US and Russia. That being said, space analyst, Morris Jones comments that nothing too exciting is going to be happening at these meetings. "Bolden is there basically just to shake a few hands. It's the first step in a very long process to get co- operation between the US and China in space flight...[r]elations between the US and China are very bad at the moment for all sorts of political and economic reasons."

Page 44 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

AT: Space Race Now

Conditions Now Will Allow for Peaceful Space Alliances—American Resurgance Today Can Only Encourage a New Space Race Dr. Bruce Cordell, Dean, Natural Sciences Division, Fullerton College, “The Cold War-style Arms Race in Asia and the New Space Age,” February 12th, 2011 (http://21stcenturywaves.com/tag/general-dynamics/)

The current Asia-Pacific arms race is reminiscent of the 1950s Cold War U.S.-Soviet arms race that triggered the first Space Race to the Moon. The fact that it’s occurring now among China and other vibrant asian economies — one long business cycle after the original Space Race — suggests the stage is being set for a new Space Age by 2015. By then the U.S. economy should also be booming. The current asian arms race is a serious development. An Australian report notes that the “scale, pattern, and speed…” of the Chinese military buildup is “dead serious stuff” not experienced since WW II. It is potentially the most demanding security situation faced since the Second World War … (and) is altering security in the Western Pacific. In its “New Military Strategy” report released last Tuesday, the Pentagon sees connections between China’s growing military and its aspirations in space and elsewhere, We remain concerned about the extent and strategic intent of China’s military modernization, and its assertiveness in space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Although China’s impressive military buildup has triggered the current Cold War-style arms race in asia, it does not necessarily imply that we are headed for a 1960′s-style Space Race. Indeed, China’s near-term economic challenges and the possibility of liberal political reforms may lead instead to a Grand Alliance for Space.

Page 45 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

AT: China Exporting Military Tech Now

China Has Reigned in Military Space Exports Now—They are Only Providing Products on Orbit Dr. James Clay Moltz, Naval Postgraduate School, “China’s Space Technology:International Dynamics and Implications for the United States,” For the hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on: “The Implications of China’s Military and Civil Space Programs” May 11, 2011 (http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/written_testimonies/11_05_11_wrt/11_05_11_moltz_testimony.pdf)

Another potentially limiting factor is the fact that the State Council and the Military Commission of the Communist Party’s Central Committee have since 1997 implemented new export controls and a licensing system. Since 2002, the Military Products Export Control List—administered by SASTIND—has included a special Category 8 for military space items, while other regulations now govern civilian space exports. While possibly8 reducing China’s , this recent development of space-related export controls must be viewed as a positive development from a U.S. perspective, bringing China into greater compliance with international efforts to prevent the proliferation of technologies that could be used for military purposes. Indeed, most Chinese space exports today focus on delivery-on-orbit products and services, rather than direct technology transfer.

Page 46 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

AT: China Won’t Start a Space War

ASAT Capabilties Mean China Has Less to Lose in a Space War—They Will Be Willing to Fight if Necessary Bruce MacDonald, Analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations, “China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security,” CFR Report, September 2008 (http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707)

Having crossed a space Rubicon with their ASAT demonstrations, neither nation can un-invent these capabilities. As the United States approaches major security policy reviews with the advent of a new administration in early 2009, both it and China face fundamental choices about the deployment and use of such capabilities, and the development of more advanced space weapons.2 The United States and China stand at a crossroads on weapons and space: whether to control this potential competition, and if so, how. While the United States is likely well ahead of China in offensive space capability, China currently is much less dependent on space assets than the U.S. military, and thus in the near term has less to lose from space conflict if it became inevitable. China’s far smaller space dependence, which hinders its military potential, ironically appears to give it a potential relative nearterm offensive advantage: China has the ability to attack more U.S. space assets than vice versa, an asymmetry that complicates the issue of space deterrence, discussed later. This asymmetric Chinese advantage will likely diminish as China grows increasingly dependent on space over the next twenty years, and as the United States addresses this space vulnerability. Thus, the time will come when the United States will be able to inflict militarily meaningful damage on Chinese space-based assets, establishing a more symmetric deterrence potential in space. Before then, other asymmetric means are available to the United States to deter China, though at possibly greater escalatory risk. That is, the United States could threaten to attack not just Chinese space assets, but also ground-based assets, including ASAT commandand- control centers and other military capabilities. But such actions, which would involve attacking Chinese soil and likely causing substantial direct casualties, would politically weigh much heavier than the U.S. loss of space hardware, and thus might climb the escalatory ladder to a more damaging war both sides would probably want to avoid.

Page 47 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

AT: US Victory Good

The US Can’t Deter or Defeat China in the Space Race—Only Risk of Conflict Ian Easton, Project 2049 Institute Researcher, “The Asia-Pacific’s Emerging Missile Defense and Military Space Competition,” Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center, December 1st, 2010 (http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/The_Asia- Pacifics_Emerging_Missile_Defense_and_Military_Space_Competition_280111_1143.pdf)

The historic military modernization campaign being undertaken by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese development, testing and deployment of advanced anti-access, area-denial capabilities are eroding the confidence of other regional actors that they will have unimpeded access to and control of the air and space mediums in the event of a conflict. This is of crucial importance because the Asia-Pacific region is an aerospace theater by its very nature, and thus access to and control of the air and space dimensions of any future conflict will be critical to achieving political and military success on the land and the sea. The latest Quadrennial Defense Review, in an oblique reference to China, states: “Future adversaries will likely posses sophisticated capabilities designed to contest or deny command of the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains.” Recognizing that a shifting balance of relative power and capabilities is underway, the U.S. and its allies and partners in the region are seeking to develop a variety of means to counter China’s fast evolving capabilities. However, current trends suggest that the U.S. and its allies will find it increasingly difficult to deter and defeat China in any future crisis or conflict. This is due, in no small part, to China’s unprecedented buildup of conventionally armed missiles.

Page 48 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

AT: Plan Leads to Cooperation With China

Cooperation is Virtually Impossible Now—China’s Goals Conflict With American Ones, and Differing Power Status Makes Cooperation Hard Washington Post, “Mistrust stalls U.S.-China space cooperation,” January 22nd, 2011 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104480.html)

Song Xiaojun, a military expert and commentator on China's CCTV, said that substantial cooperation in the space field is impossible without mutual trust. Achieving that, he said, "depends on whether the U.S. can put away its pride and treat China as a partner to cooperate on equal terms. But I don't see that happening in the near future, since the U.S. is experiencing menopause while China is going through puberty." But while China may still be an adolescent in terms of space exploration - launching its first astronaut in 2003 - it has made some notable strides in recent months and years, and plans seem on track for some major breakthroughs. On the day Hu left for his U.S. trip, Chinese news media reported the inauguration of a new program to train astronauts - called taikonauts here - for eventual deployment to the first Chinese space station, planned for 2015. As part of the project, two launches are planned for this year, that of an unmanned space module, called Tiangong-1, or "Heavenly Palace," by summer, and later an unmanned Shenzhou spacecraft that will attempt to dock with it. On a separate track, China is also working through a three-stage process for carrying out its first manned moon landing. The first stage was completed in October with the successful launch of a Chang'e-2 lunar orbiter. In 2012 or 2013, an unmanned landing craft is scheduled to take a rover to the moon to collect rock and soil samples. By 2020, according to the plan, a taikonaut could land on the moon.

Page 49 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

AT: Heg Good Impact Turns

Attempts to Retain American Predominance Will Backfire, Destroy Relations and Cause Conflict—We Must Focus on Engagement and Tolerance of China’s Rise The Economist, “Friends, or else,” December 2nd, 2010 (http://www.economist.com/node/17601453?story_id=17601453&fsrc=rss)

That shrug is a measure of America’s difficulty in designing a China policy. America wants China to be a thriving market for its goods. It also wants China to become an active, responsible power in world affairs. Yet at the same time it feels threatened by China’s growing economic, industrial, diplomatic and military might. When America dislikes a position China has taken, it cries foul. This mix of partnership and rivalry is a recipe for confusion. One way to resolve these tensions would be to put security first. America could aim to block China now before it gets any stronger. America won the cold war by isolating the Soviet economy and stalemating its armed forces. But trying that again would be a bad idea, as Robert Art explains in a recent issue of Political Science Quarterly. For one thing, the cost would be astronomical; for another, America might suffer as much as China. The two countries’ economies are intertwined and China owns more American government debt than anyone else. In war, nations override such factors out of necessity. If an American president tried to override them in peace out of choice, he would face dissent at home and opprobrium abroad

The risks of containment In any case, a policy of containment risks backfiring, except against an unambiguously hostile China. Unless America could persuade large parts of the world to join in, China would still have access to most markets. A belligerent United States would risk losing the very alliances in Asia that it was seeking to protect. And Joseph Nye, of the Kennedy School at Harvard, has argued that the best way to make an enemy of China is to treat it like one. America may one day feel it has no choice but to focus on security alone, which is what China fears. By contrast, to focus on economics and forget security makes no sense at all. America has vital interests in Asia. It wants to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Korean peninsula and Japan. It has allies to protect and threats to police. It needs accessible sea lanes and open markets. America is the world’s pre-eminent power. It cannot surrender Asia without losing influence everywhere else. Hence for the past 15 years America has fallen back on a two-track China policy. Barack Obama articulated the first track on his visit to China in November last year. He told the students at Fudan University, in Shanghai: “The United States insists we do not seek to contain China’s rise. On the contrary, we welcome China as a strong and prosperous and successful member of the community of nations.” This means, as the president later explained in front of Hu Jintao, his Chinese opposite number, that China’s “growing economy is joined by growing responsibilities”. “Engagement” is backed by a second policy, best described as hedging. America must be able to deploy enough force to deter China. Presidents do not articulate this track quite so eagerly, but Admiral Robert Willard, head of Pacific Command, was clear enough in his remarks to Congress earlier this year: “Until…it is determined that China’s intent is indeed benign, it is critical that we maintain the readiness of our postured forces; continually reinforce our commitment to our allies and partners in the region; and meet each challenge by the PRC in a professional manner that is consistent with .” America faced some straightforward, if terrifying, calculations in its monochromatic relationship with the Soviet Union. By contrast, its technicolour dealings with China are less apocalyptic, but many times more complex—almost unmanageably so. In principle, the policy’s two tracks fit together well. Engagement is designed to reward good behaviour and hedging to deter bad. In practice, however, the hedge risks undermining the engagement. To see why, consider that the existence of two tracks acts as an excuse to leave important issues unresolved in America. China hawks and China doves can all support the policy, because both can continue to think that they will ultimately be proved right. That is politically handy in Washington, but hardly ideal as a policy. The engagement tends to be run by China specialists in the state department and the hedge tends to be run out of the Pentagon. In theory the policy’s two dimensions should be weighted according to whether or not China’s behaviour is threatening. With the best will in the world, the departments of state and defence do not always work well together. All too often, a twin-track policy can function as two separate policies.

Page 50 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

AT: China Bad in Africa

Chinese Investment in African Oil Benefits the Economy and Development of the Region— Creates Jobs and Infastructure and Western Involvement Would be Way Worse China Daily. “Chinese investment benefits Africa: Yang,” March 8, 2010 (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010npc/2010-03/08/content_9551176.htm)

Yang also said it is unreasonable for some Western countries to oppose the expansion of China's investment in Africa, holding that China is encouraging other countries to boost energy cooperation with African countries on the basis of mutual benefit. "I have noticed that some (in the international community) are unwilling to see the sound development of the Sino-African relationship and always play up our energy cooperation," said Yang at a press conference. China accounts for just a small part of global energy investment in the continent. "The United States and Europe have invested far more than us," Yang said. Africa's oil exports to China accounted for only 13 percent of its total oil exports, lower than the amounts exported to Europe and the US, which both surpassed 30 percent. China's investment in Africa's oil sector accounted for only one-sixteenth of the world's total, which is much less than the amount invested by either Europe or the US. In addition, Yang said China's relations with African countries entail more than just cooperation in the energy field. The two sides have already implemented long-lasting cooperation in improving local infrastructure by building roads, bridges, schools, hospitals and other public undertakings. Commenting on China's performance in Africa, President of the Republic of Zambia, Rupiah Banda, said: "Chinese investors are the real helping hands for us and their contribution to Africa's economic development is evident." In a recent interview, Rwandan President Paul Kagame said: "The Chinese bring what Africa needs: investment and money for governments and companies. China is investing in infrastructure and building roads." In contrast, the West's involvement "has not brought Africa forward," the president was quoted as saying. "Western firms have, to a large extent, polluted Africa and they are still doing so. Think of the dumping of nuclear waste in the Ivory Coast or the fact that Somalia is being used as a garbage can by European firms," he added.

Page 51 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

AT: China War Good

We’re All Dead Before Your Impacts—An American Debilitating Strike on China Causes Environmental Collapse and Extinction Mitsuo Takai, Retired Colonel and Former Researcher in the military science faculty of the Staff College for Japan’s Ground Self Defense Force, “U.S.-China nuclear strikes would spell doomsday”, UPI Asia, October 7th, 2009 (http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/07/us-china_nuclear_strikes_would_spell_doomsday/7213/)

What would happen if China launched its 20 Dongfeng-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with a 5-megaton warhead, at 20 major U.S. cities? Prevailing opinion in Washington D.C. until not so long ago was that the raids would cause over 40 million casualties, annihilating much of the United States. In order to avoid such a doomsday scenario, consensus was that the United States would have to eliminate this potential threat at its source with preemptive strikes on China. But cool heads at institutions such as the Federation of American Scientists and the National Resource Defense Council examined the facts and produced their own analyses in 2006, which differed from the hard-line views of their contemporaries. The FAS and NRDC developed several scenarios involving nuclear strikes over ICBM sites deep in the Luoning Mountains in China’s western province of Henan, and analyzed their implications. One of the scenarios involved direct strikes on 60 locations – including 20 main missile silos and decoy silos – hitting each with one W76-class, 100-kiloton multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle carried on a submarine-launched ballistic missile. In order to destroy the hardened silos, the strikes would aim for maximum impact by causing ground bursts near the silos' entrances. Using air bursts similar to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not be as effective, as the blasts and the heat would dissipate extensively. In this scenario, the 6 megatons of ground burst caused by the 60 attacks would create enormous mushroom clouds over 12 kilometers high, composed of radioactive dirt and debris. Within 24 hours following the explosions, deadly fallout would spread from the mushroom clouds, driven by westerly winds toward Nanjing and Shanghai. They would contaminate the cities' residents, water, foodstuff and crops, causing irreversible damage. The impact of a 6-megaton nuclear explosion would be 360 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, killing not less than 4 million people. Such massive casualties among non-combatants would far exceed the military purpose of destroying the enemy's military power. This would cause political harm and damage the United States’ ability to achieve its war aims, as it would lose international support. On the other hand, China could retaliate against U.S. troops in East Asia, employing intermediate-range ballistic missiles including its DF-3, DF-4 and DF-21 missiles, based in Liaoning and Shandong provinces, which would still be intact. If the United States wanted to destroy China's entire nuclear retaliatory capability, U.S. forces would have to employ almost all their nuclear weapons, causing catastrophic environmental hazards that could lead to the annihilation of mankind. Accordingly, the FAS and NRDC conclusively advised U.S. leaders to get out of the vicious cycle of nuclear competition, which costs staggering sums, and to promote nuclear disarmament talks with China. Such advice is worth heeding by nuclear hard-liners.

Page 52 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

AT: China War Good

Your Peeps Be Crazy—There is No Chance to Avoid Massive Retaliation and Escalation Li Bin, Professor of the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua Universit, “Paper Tiger with Whitened Teeth”, China Security, Autumn 2006 (http://www.wsichina.org/cs4_5.pdf)

Rather than exploring why China chooses to do so, Lieber and Press use this fact as evidence to support their point on U.S. nuclear primacy.3 If the authors paid more heed to China’s choice of a small and low-alert nuclear arsenal they would find their deductions faulty, including technical problems in their calculations. All the calculations in their paper, including the sensitivity analyses, focus on the hardness of the targets as well as strike capabilities, which are determined by the lethal distance, accuracy, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. However, the calculations in the paper are based on a fundamentally unrealistic assumption: that is, the United States can detect and locate all Russian and Chinese long-range nuclear weapons. The authors never state this assumption in their paper – perhaps unknowingly so, as most former calculations do not discuss the issue of target detection. In other previous studies, where the numbers of surviving nuclear weapons in a calculation are much larger than zero, it may be alright to ignore the factor of intelligence. But, if such a calculation gives a result of almost zero surviving targets in a nuclear exchange, the intelligence factor becomes highly salient and therefore cannot be ignored. The authors understand that “… one surviving mobile ICBM might destroy a U.S. city …” So their sensitivity analysis tries to prove that no single Russian longrange nuclear weapon can survive even if the U.S. nuclear weapons are not as effective as assumed. However, the real problem is that if the United States does not know where some nuclear weapons are in Russia or China, the United With near zero surviving targets in a nuclear exchange, the intelligence factor becomes highly salient. States cannot destroy them even with superior numbers and performance of nuclear weapons. It is instructive to know that once the Soviet Union (and later, Russia) felt that it had a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to survive a first U.S. nuclear strike, it chose to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I and II that entail on-site inspections to verify the numbers and locations of the Russian long-range nuclear weapons. If Russia feels that not a single one of its nuclear weapons can survive a first strike by the United States, it may consider not revealing all its nuclear weapons to the United States. In fact, unlike the START treaties, the new Moscow Treaty does not require similar on-site inspections. It is evident, even more so in China’s case, that it has never declared the number or location of its nuclear weapons. Naturally, the United States relies on its intelligence to identify and locate China’s nuclear weapons and then uses this information to decipher which objects and how many objects appear to be nuclear weapons and where they are located. The calculations in their paper do prove that the United States can destroy all the objects that have been identified by U.S. intelligence as nuclear weapons. However, the paper misses the central point of whether the entirety of Chinese long-range nuclear weapons have been identified and located by U.S. intelligence or whether all the objects that are identified in China are real nuclear weapons. The paper simply omits possible deficiencies of intelligence. Furthermore, the performance of U.S. intelligence in the first Iraq war and the Kosovo war suggests that the United States may miss more than just a few large military targets. Technically speaking, it is a relatively simple countermeasure for China to conceal a few actual ICBMs and to deploy decoy missiles – given the large size of the Chinese territory. No matter how the United States increases the number, accuracy, and reliability of its nuclear weapons, even if used in a surprise attack, it has no means of destroying those Chinese ICBMs that its intelligence has not found. Thus, there is no method or model by which Lieber and Press can determine with any certainty that the number of surviving Chinese ICBMs after a surprise U.S. strike (equal to the number of undetected Chinese ICBMs) will be zero, and it seems far more likely survivability would be greater than zero. The definitive conclusion that the surviving Chinese ICBMs must be zero is technically wrong as it omits the intelligence deficiency. The uncertainties of the calculations in the paper are much greater and much more serious than indicated by the authors, and certainly goes beyond their single scenario of an enemy target surviving because a U.S. submarine commander does not believe his launch order. However, the greatest concern is that U.S. leaders actually believe that zero retaliation from China is possible, as predicted by Lieber and Press, and behave incautiously. Zero retaliation is an illusion, and if taken seriously it would bring dire risks to the United States.

Page 53 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

AT: No War With China

Increased Competitive Tension Means War Will Emerge as an Misunderstanding, Accident or Miscalculation—Economic Ties Can’t Prevent It South China Morning Post, "Doubts about China's rise dangerous for us all,” September 29th, 2009 (Lexis)

Two decades of annual double-digit growth in defence spending have raised eyebrows within and outside China. Military expansion and modernisation are important, but so too is putting food on tables, alleviating or providing affordable health care. Nuclear weapons, missiles, submarines and talk of aircraft carriers worry neighbours and rivals. A parade will not ease such concerns. The event has been years in the planning. Troops have been training for at least five months. No matter how flawless their performance or how well equipped they are, capabilities cannot be judged by watching the event; no inkling will be given of how widely weapons are deployed. The parade is intended to foster national pride. Chinese people will be able to see where funding has been going. Deterrence will be clearly announced - against a conventional attack on sovereignty, nuclear war, Taiwanese independence and terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Leaders will contend that publicly revealing weapons is dedication to transparency in military affairs. Foreign observers are less interested in what will be in the parade than what is not. They have made much of China's expansion of missile defences, its air force and submarine fleet. Its talk of building an aircraft carrier has raised doubts about whether Beijing's military is only for defence or also to project power. Authorities are repeatedly being asked to be more open about spending, weapons development and deployments. China should not have to be completely transparent. The objective of an effective military hinges on security and surprise. Enemies are not supposed to know what they are up against. Nonetheless some governments, particularly the US, would be more comfortable if intentions were better defined. Beijing is acutely aware of the concern. Military diplomacy is increasingly taking place through joint exercises, dialogue, displays and inspections. More than 8,000 soldiers have been sent on UN peacekeeping missions - more than for any other nation. Despite these moves, fears persist; greater effort is clearly needed. China has legitimate security interests. The party's credentials have been burnished in guaranteeing territorial integrity. Some borders remain unstable. Chinese of all political persuasions are acutely aware that at times of military weakness, their nation has been subjected to brutality. Military strength has kept Taiwan from declaring independence. China's growing international interests mean it needs to protect shipping routes. Chinese quite fairly say that if other nations can have well-equipped militaries, so should they. These are strong incentives for robust defence. Yet doubts about China's rise are dangerous for the nation and the rest of the world. While they persist, there will be the possibility of conflict due to a miscalculation, accident or misunderstanding. As with all governments, Beijing is always going to put national security ahead of confidence-building measures. Hence China and its rivals and friends need to make ever greater strides towards working more closely. Open channels of communication and understanding are essential.

Page 54 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Aff—Non-Unique

China Views Cooperation as Strained and Competition Highlighted Now—US Sino Tension Remains High Now BBC, “China white paper highlights US military 'competition,” March 31st, 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- asia-pacific-12917338)

China says the United States is increasing its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, which is becoming more "volatile". It also says there has been a rise in operations directed against China. The views were made in China's National Defence white paper, issued by the government. The paper outlines the country's current views on security issues and gives an overview of its military forces. Fierce competition In the document, released on Thursday, China gives a downbeat assessment of the regional security situation. "Profound changes are taking shape in the Asia-Pacific strategic landscape. Relevant major powers are increasing their strategic investment," it says. "International military competition remains fierce." The document singles out the United States. According to China, it is reinforcing military alliances and getting more involved in regional affairs. Beijing also says foreigners are now more suspicious of China - and have increased "interference and countering moves" against it. Relations between China and the United States, particularly on military matters, have been strained over recent years. That tension eased slightly following Chinese President Hu Jintao's state visit to the United States earlier this year. But the potential for disagreement remains high.

Page 55 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Aff—No Nuclear War

US China War Can’t Go Nuclear—Even a Full Fledged Conflict Would Maintain Deterrence Thomas P.M. Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor for Esquire magazine, “Big-War Thinking in a Small-War Era ,” China Security, 2010 (http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=475)

Most incredulously, a guiding assumption of the CSBA’s war scenario analysis is that, despite the high likelihood that a Sino-US conventional conflict “would devolve into a prolonged war” (presumably with tens of thousands of casualties on China’s side at least), mutual nuclear deterrence would be preserved throughout the conflict even as China suffers humiliating defeat across the board. The historical proof offered for this stunning judgment? Neither Nazi Germany nor Saddam Hussein’s Iraq used chemical weapons as a last-ditch tool to stave off defeat. And if China took that desperate step? The CSBA then admits that, “the character of the conflict would change so drastically as to render discussion of major conventional warfare irrelevant.” As strategic “oops!” disclaimers go, that one has the benefit of understatement.

Of course, CSBA’s counter to such criticism is to argue that thinking about—and preparing for—that unthinkable is what keeps it unthinkable, much like our successful Cold War-era deterrence of World War III in Europe. Fair enough, but that suggests a multi-pronged political-military approach to reduce the overall likelihood of such catastrophic escalation.

Page 56 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Aff—Co-op Good

Cooperation With China is Crucial to Ensure Succesful Security Policy in Space—Without it We Lose Knowledge of the Chinese Programs and Encourage Dangerous Military Competition Space.com, “Washington Worries China Will Challenge U.S. Dominance in Space ,” May 12th, 2011 (http://www.space.com/11646-china-space-policy-united-states.html?)

However, other panelists cited the possible benefits to the United States of such cooperation, which range from expanding opportunities for American businesses to increasing space security. If the United States thinks China can become a "normal" spacefaring country, keen to exploit space commercially, collaboration is probably a good idea, according to Krolikowski. "As China invests in and derives greater benefit from space, it will acquire the same stake in creating a predictable, stable, safe and sustainable space environment that the U.S., Canada, Japan and European and other countries already share," Krolikowski said. Cooperation and engagement could also help reveal China's goals for space. Does China, for example, hope to dominate military space aggressively in the near future, or is it concerned more about self-defense? "While China’s capabilities in space are known to U.S. observers, its intentions are not," Krolikowski said. According to Baseley-Walker, panelists stressed the importance of getting to the bottom of those intentions. It's difficult to draw up and implement effective policy, after all, without a basic understanding of where China is coming from, and where it's going.

Page 57 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Aff—Chinese Heg Bad

Abandoning East Asia to Chinese Hegemony Will Destabilize the Region and Produce Numerous Conflicts Over Regional Issues and Taiwan Evelyn Goh, Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the Univ of Oxford, “Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 2008 (Oxford Journals Database)

. Yet, the East Asian regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that could be extremely disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly destabilizing ways. Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions. 5. Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I have suggested that the United States is the central force in constituting regional stability and order. The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However, the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a contest made more potent because of the inter-twining of regional and global security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States' global leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.

Page 58 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Aff—No Chinese Hegemony

China Can’t Translate its Power Into Leadership—It Will Never Replace American Hegemony Japan Times, “A Sino-centric Asia unlikely,” September 22nd, 2010 (http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi- bin/eo20100922rc.html)

How Asia's geopolitical landscape will evolve over the next couple of decades is not easy to foresee. But it is apparent that an increasingly assertive China is unwittingly reinforcing America's role in Asia as the implicit guarantor of security and stability. There are at least four possible Asian security scenarios. The first is the rise of a Sino-centric Asia, as desired by Beijing. China seeks a multipolar world but a unipolar Asia. By contrast, the United States desires a unipolar world but a multipolar Asia. A second scenario is of the U.S. remaining Asia's principal security anchor. A third possibility is the emergence of a constellation of Asian states with common interests working together to ensure both power equilibrium and an Asia that is not unipolar. A fourth scenario is of an Asia characterized by several resurgent powers, including Japan, India, Vietnam, Indonesia and a reunified Korea. Of the four scenarios, the least unlikely is the first one. China's neighbors increasingly are uneasy about its growing power and assertiveness. While Beijing aspires to shape a Sino-centric Asia, its actions hardly make it a credible candidate for Asian leadership. Brute power cannot buy leadership. After all, leadership can come not from untrammeled power, but from other states' consent or tacit acceptance. If leadership could be built on brute force, schoolyard bullies would be class presidents. In any event, China's power may be vast and rapidly growing, yet it lacks the power of compulsion. In other words, China does not have the capability to militarily rout or compel any rival, let alone enforce its will on Asia. As China seeks to translate its economic clout into major geopolitical advantage in Asia, a nation that once boasted of "having friends everywhere" finds that its accumulating power might inspire awe, but its actions are spurring new concerns and fears. Which states will accept China as Asia's leader? Six decades of ruthless repression has failed to win China acceptance even in Tibet and Xinjiang, as the Tibetan and Uighur revolts of 2008 and 2009 attested. Leadership involves much more than the possession of enormous economic and military power. It demands the power of ideas that can galvanize others. Such power also serves as the moral veneer to the assertiveness often involved in the pursuit of any particular cause. The Cold War, for example, was won by the U.S. and its allies not so much by military means as by spreading the ideas of political freedom and market capitalism to other regions that, in the words of strategic thinker Stanley A. Weiss, "helped suck the lifeblood out of communism's global appeal," making it incapable of meeting the widespread yearning for a better and more-open life. China has shown itself good at assertive promotion of national interests and in playing classical balance-of-power geopolitics. But to assume the mantle of leadership in Asia by displacing the U.S., it must do more than just pursue its own interests or contain potential peer rivals. The overly assertive policies and actions of a next-door rising power make Asian states look to a distant protector. With its defense spending having grown almost twice as fast as its GDP, China is now beginning to take the gloves off, confident that it has acquired the necessary muscle.

Page 59 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Aff—Hegemonic Competition Now

The US and China are Already Locked in Superpower Competition—The US is Actively Attempting to Freeze Out Chinese Economic and Military Power Mr D.S.Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India, “China: US ‘Hegemony’ Comes Under Attack of Some Military Analysts Ahead of President Hu Jintao’s Visit to Washington,” South Asia Analysis Group, January 17th, 2011 (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers43%5Cpaper4280.html)

The three experts further charged the US for establishing military bases in the Asia-Pacific region under the pretext of preventing China’s threat and harming the trade partnership ties between China and surrounding nations. Washington in particular encouraged the ASEAN nations to suspect China. Such moves which violate China’s national rights, show that the US is gradually building an anti- China United Front, so as to enhance the degree and strength of its plan to encircle and contain China. Although containing China is a broad US strategy, Washington realises that if China’s development stagnates, the same will not be in its interests. Facing the situation under which the US comparative superiority in national strength is obviously falling, the world multipolarisation process is progressing and China’s development is becoming unstoppable in reality, the US feels the objective necessity to rejuvenate itself and make its economy strong; for this it needs a strong China, but with a China well below the US in terms of national strength. The analysts then criticised the US for trying to make use of China for realising its strategic plan to lead the world. The Chinese military scholars added that in the Asia-Pacific region, Washington intends to establish ‘hegemony’ by making use of the strengths of regional countries, both traditional allies and new partners. This makes it to spread the canard of ‘China threat’ among such countries. In doing so, Washington is disregarding objective reality of 30- 50% gap between the military strengths of US and China. Such a situation is making the regional powers suspicious on China, which the US wants to exploit for its competition to secure sea rights. As Washington aims to make the nations in China’s neighbourhood to serve its strategy to contain China, a tense situation in the region has come into being. The analysts at the same time pointed out that such nations are not keen to serve the interests of US strategy as they have come to depend on China markets. In conclusion, they called upon China to firmly deal with the US, which follows a strategy to contain China. What is the meaning of the anti-US views expressed by PLA scholars? The hawkish stand against the US and the West coming from China’s experts affiliated to the military is not new. Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu, attached to the National Defence University, Col Dai Xu of China’s Air Force and Rear Admiral Yang Yi, have in the recent past adopted strong anti-US positions interalia accusing Washington of trying to encircle China. What is important is that the latest military comments critical of the US have appeared in the most authoritative party theoretical magazine, that too close to Hu Jintao’s impending visit to the US. Questions arise – is there any indirect objection to the visit within China? Is there any division between the party and government on one hand and the military on the other on how to approach the US? The answer is clearly No. In principle, the Chinese Communist Party always commands ‘the gun’ and the PLA has to obey the party line. Intriguing in this regard is the admission of the party-controlled Global Times (14 January 2011), first such instance to be noticed, that “China has so called hard-liners and pragmatic group’. The picture in any case remains opaque and no final word can be said at this moment. The PLA’s apparent increasing involvement in the country’s foreign policy making, may signal that an internal debate on balancing the diplomatic and security interests of the country, is in progress within the country albeit with official blessings; this may be meant to benefit the PRC’s fifth generation leadership slated to take over in 2012 in its policy making. In any case, one thing is certain - the PLA factor is going to keep the hands of China watchers in the world full in the coming years.

Page 60 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Aff—Chinese Heg Bad

Chinese Hegemony in East Asia Risks the Rise of Terrorism and Independent Nuclearization Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, “The Price of Power,” The Weekly Standard, January 24th, 2011 (http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html)

This “fair share” argument is at least more sober than phony “cut defense or kill the economy” sensationalism, and it has the appearance of reasonableness. But it is still based on a fallacy. Distributing cuts equally is not an intrinsically good thing. If you wanted to reduce the gas consumption of your gas-guzzling car by 10 percent, you wouldn’t remove 10 percent of your front and rear bumpers so that all parts of the car shared the pain. The same goes for the federal budget. Not all cuts have equal effect on the national well-being. Few would propose cutting spending on airport security, for instance. At a time of elevated risk of terrorist attack, we don’t need to show the American people that airport security is contributing its “fair share” to budget reduction. Today the international situation is also one of high risk. • The terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances they will succeed. • American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons.

Page 61 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Aff—Chinese Heg Bad

American Leadership is Crucial to Deter China From Escalating War Over Taiwan Robert Ross, Professor of Political Science at Boston College, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait”, International Security, Fall 2002 (Lexis)

The United States can continue to deter China from initiating war in the Taiwan Strait for many decades. In the absence of a Taiwan declaration of independence, China prefers to maintain the status quo and an international environment conducive to economic and military modernization. Moreover, Chinese analysts understand that China is vastly inferior to the United States in nearly all facets of international power and that it will remain so for a long time. One analyst estimated that Chinese military technology is fifteen to twenty years behind that of the United States. n90 More important, Chinese analyses of "comprehensive national power," which takes into account the military, technological, educational, and economic bases of national strength, estimated in 2000 that China would catch up to the United States in 2043 if Chinese comprehensive national power grew at a rate of 6 percent per year and U.S. comprehensive national power grew at 3 percent per year.n91 During the Cold War, the most pessimistic U.S. civilian and government analysts insisted that only if the United States possessed war-winning capabilities and/or escalation dominance could it deter the Soviet use of force in Europe. n92 In the twenty-first century, the United States possesses escalation dominance in the Taiwan Strait. At every level of escalation, from conventional to nuclear warfare, the United States can engage and defeat Chinese forces. Moreover, it can do so with minimal casualties and rapid deployment, undermining any Chinese confidence in the utility of asymmetric and fait accompli strategies. Chinese military and civilian leaders have acknowledged both U.S. resolve and its superior war-winning capabilities. Confidence in its deterrence capabilities enables the United States to protect Taiwan while developing cooperative relations with China. This was post-Cold War U.S. policy toward China in both the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations. Maintaining this policy is both possible and necessary. On the one hand, the United States should continue to develop its capabilities in long-range precision-guided weaponry and in its command-and-control facilities. It should also continue to develop and forward deploy not only aircraft carriers but also Trident SSGNs and UAVs, platforms that enable the United States to deliver precision-guided weaponry and carry out surveillance with minimal risk of casualties, thus further reducing PRC expectations that asymmetric capabilities or a fait accompli strategy could deter U.S. defense of Taiwan.

Page 62 of 63

VBI China DA 2k11

Aff—US Can Re-Establish Asian Hegemony

The US Retains the Ability to Challenge China in East Asia—We Still Have a Last Chance to Re-Establish Regional Leadership William Overholt, Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, “In Asia, U.S. Still Guards the Fort but Surrenders the Bank,” RAND Corporation, Spring 2008 (http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2008/disoriented.html)

Much of the current national-security establishment in Washington expresses fear of being forced out of Asia by China. China has indeed made disproportionate gains in recent years. But this is not because it has forced the United States out. It is because Washington has deliberately stepped back from Asian regional institutions that include the United States, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and created a vacuum into which China has stepped with institutions that exclude the United States, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the East Asia Summit, and others. Likewise, South Korea and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have distanced themselves from U.S. policy and cultivated a relationship with China that is much warmer than it was before. China’s disproportionate success in both Asia and Africa has come from adopting policies that had been the core U.S. strategies in winning the Cold War. The United States had a patent on those strategies but ceded the intellectual- property rights to China. There is a real risk that future historians will conclude that the most influential foreign-policy decisions of this era concerned not Iraq, not the war on terror, but rather the re-ignition and acceleration of Sino- Japanese rivalry. Washington can still reestablish the old balances between military and economic priorities and between China and Japan. Future U.S. administrations would do well to revive an Asia policy that emphasizes diplomacy with all Asian countries, promotes economic liberalization throughout the region, and abates rather than fosters hostility among regional neighbors.

Page 63 of 63