Ou La Stratégie Du Repli De Bachar Al-Assad Selon Plusieurs Experts, Le Président Syrien a Déjà Préparé La Région Côtière Pour S'en Servir De Base De Repli

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Ou La Stratégie Du Repli De Bachar Al-Assad Selon Plusieurs Experts, Le Président Syrien a Déjà Préparé La Région Côtière Pour S'en Servir De Base De Repli INSTITUT KURDE DE PARIS Information and liaison bulletin N°328 july 2012 The publication of this Bulletin enjoys a subsidy from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGCID) aqnd the Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (The Fund for action and support of integration and the struggle against discrimination) This bulletin is issued in French and English Price per issue : France: 6 € — Abroad : 7,5 € Annual subscribtion (12 issues) France : 60 € — Elsewhere : 75 € Monthly review Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 15 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tel. : 01-48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01-48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: bulletin@fikp.org Information and liaison bulletin Kurdish Institute of Paris Bulletin N° 328 July 2012 • SYRIA: THE KURDS ARE LIBERATING THEIR REGIONS. • IRAQI KURDISTAN: A TURCO-KURDISH EXPORT AGREEMENT AROUSES BAGDAD’S IRE. • TURKEY: THE START OF A MASS TRIAL OF 205 PEOPLE ACCUSED OF “TERRORISM”. • CULTURE: THE UBISOFT COMPANY DORCED TO BACKTRACK FACED WITH KURDISH ANGER. SYRIA: THE KURDS ARE LIBERATING THEIR REGIONS t the beginning of July while the United States consid- putting forward a creditable the Syrian opposition ered that it would not let Bashar political organisation capable of rejected the UN peace el-Assad play any part in Syria’s replacing the Baath in office plan proposing a “polit- political future. The Americans without plunging Syria into A ical transition” and a finally gave way faced with insurrectional chaos or civil war. provisional government so as to Russia’s stubbornness. Nabil al-Arabi stated, before the ends the acts of violence. This 250 Syrians meeting there, that plan had been put forward by For his part, Bashar al-Assad has this conference was an opportu- Kofi Annan and accepted by the constantly repeated that it was nity that should not, in any cir- United Nations some days earli- his duty to eliminate “terrorism” cumstances, be lost by factional er, during an international con- and rejects any foreign interfer- quarrels (AFP). ference at Geneva. However, ence in Syrian affairs. the revolting Syrians consider Nasser el-Kidwa, representing the that negotiating with Bashar al- Meanwhile, in Cairo, Nabil al- United Nations, also insisted on Assad or any member of his Arabi, the leader of the Arab the fact that unity of the Syrians “murderous” government would League, called on the Syrian opposed to the Baath was not “an be just a waste of time, especial- opposition, meeting in the option but a necessity”. ly as Russia insisted that any Egyptian capital, to unite “most future agreement should not urgently”, setting aside their dif- The differences and the multi- totally dismiss the present ferences of opinion that, so far, tude of political platforms are, in Syrian President from office had prevented them from fact, a reflection of the very het- • 2 • Information and liaison bulletin n° 328 • July 2012 erogeneous character of Syria, want to lay down non-nego- by the fact that, as in Iraq in which is split up into a mosaic of tiable conditions for this such as Saddam’s era, many members of ethnic, religious and political recognition of a Kurdish entity the Baath had joined more from groupings — unlike Egypt, in the future Syrian constitution. opportunism or to secure jobs Tunisia and even Libya, whose This is just the issue that proved than out of conviction and that populations are much more a stumbling block to any project the American error in 2003 of homogeneous. Moreover, the of unity in Cairo, since a driving all Iraqi “Baathists” out contacts between the insurgents Kurdish group withdrew when of any public office or the army in Syria and the dissidents in faced with the refusal of the was a powerful factor in increas- exile are very difficult and there Arab opposition to consider ing the ranks of the insurgents. is often little co-ordination such a Kurdish entity in Syria. between on the spot military Thus, one of the members of the While the general Syrian opposi- action in Syria and external ini- National Kurdish Council in tion is having difficulty in unit- tiatives. Consequently the prin- Syria, Morshid Mashouk, ing, an important step, on the cipal fighting force in the field declared that he would not contrary, was taken by the was not represented in Cairo. return to this conference and Kurds on 12 July when the two that this decision was irrevoca- principal blocks of Kurdish As for the Kurds, they also seem ble: “We are a people, we have one opponents, the PYD and the divided over certain political language, one religion and every- Kurdish National Council of choices. Thus on 4 July, Saleh thing that defines a people”. Syria, who had hitherto adopted Saleh Mohammad, leader of the antagonistic positions on the Democratic Union Party (the The final statement of the Cairo attitude to adopt regarding Syria affiliate of the PKK) con- Conference reaffirmed that the Baath, finally announced that sidered, contrary to the rest of fall of Bashar al-Assad was the they had reached an agreement. the opposition, both Kurdish necessary pre-requisite for any They decided to form a common and Arab, that Kofi Annan’s political solution to the Syrian front after final negotiations at plan of a transition government Crisis. “Civil peace and national Irbil, the capital of Iraqi supported “the people’s wishes, unity” are objectives on which Kurdistan. President Messud since this set up would include the opponents were able to agree Barzani attended the meeting. all the social circles in Syria” and (once the Kurdish parties had that his party, consequently, left!). Apart from that, the oppo- While the contents of the agree- supported the decisions taken in sition leadership seemed to ment have not been made pub- Geneva: resist any attempt at unification lic, the effects were soon appar- “We Kurds will also take part in — indeed they were hesitant ent since, as of 20 July the Syrian this government, since the Kurdish about letting any single leader- Kurds announced that they had opposition has already taken it place ship control all their forces. Thus launched an operation to “liber- within the general opposition in the proposal for a committee, ate the Kurdish regions” and Syria”. which would consolidate all the had already taken over the town actions of dissident parties, was of Kobane (in Aleppo giver- However the PYD was alone rejected by the principal political norate) stating that the govern- amongst the Kurds in wishing to body, the Syrian National ment forces had withdrawn. spare the Syrian government as Council. This was criticised by Videos quickly circulated on long as possible, without clearly others, who saw this as a refusal Internet showing that some offi- choosing between the Ba’ath and by the SNC both to give up its cial buildings were flying the the Free Syrian Army. From the leadership and to act as the co- Kurdish flag. PKK flags were start of the revolt it has tried to ordinator itself. also visible and the picture of set up more or less autonomous Ocalan was seen side by side areas in towns it controlled and The Cairo Conference expressed with that of Massud Barzani where it imposed either neutrali- the wish for a “republican, demo- (very popular in Syrian ty of a non-aggressive line cratic” Syria and for a “civil and Kurdistan) in demonstrations between the Kurds and the gov- plural system”. The dissolution that seem to confirm a common ernment’s armed forces. of the Ba’ath Party is envisaged strategy of Syrian Kurds. They but its former members would also show to what extent State Other Kurdish parties are con- not be excluded from all political borders are totally irrelevant sidering whether to ally them- participation so long as “they do when it is a matter of defining selves more clearly with the not have blood on their hands”. the various trends within the Arab opposition while others This last point can be explained Kurdish national movement. n° 328 • July 2012 Information and liaison bulletin • 3• These actions, in any case, mark autonomy and laying down its to occupy the abandoned areas, a turning point in the PYD’s pol- own conditions and, even today, virtually without firing a shot. It icy, which has hitherto tried to refusing any presence of the is only at Qamishlo that clashes discourage the other Kurdish Iraqi Army on its soil must have seem to have taken place between movements from joining the carried some weight in the the Kurdish “People’s Defence Arab revolts because of its choice of this strategy. Union” and Baath militia. Turkish sponsor. Thus the PYD leader announced the formation A rew days after the liberation of Il remains to be seen whether of “civil defence committees” Kobane, it was the turn of the Damascus was caught unawares that would administer the liber- towns of Efrin and Amude then by the Irbil agreement or ated areas, For his part Nuri of Dêrik to fall into Kurdish whether there the Alawis are Brimo, spokesman for the hands as well as certain neigh- anticipating the future collapse Kurdistan Democratic Party, bourhoods of the big city of of this agreement and hope to stated to the daily paper Rudew Qamishlo. win back both the lost Kurdish that, on the strength of the Irbil regions and its alliance with the agreement, the town of Kobane It should be noted that, so far, PYD.
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