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Soviet perceptions of global ecological problems: An analysis based on simulated interviewing

Hall, Barbara Welling, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1987

Copyright ©1987 by Hall, Barbara Welling. All rights reserved.

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UMI

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS:

AN ANALYSIS BASED ON SIMULATED INTERVIEWING

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of the Ohio State University

By

Barbara Welling Hall, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1987

Dissertation Committee: Approved by

Chadwick F. Alger

James E. Harf

Richard K. Herrmann Adviser ^ Philip S. Stewart Department of Political Science FRONTISPIECE

— y c A o a u tt a 6 ft nee ft coidaA nauCoAec 6AU3sufk ecmecmaeHHtiM,

PucynoK C.T hjhumo.

From Priroda [Nature] Volume 11, 1972: inside back cover. The caption reads, "I have created more natural conditions for h e r ." (^Copyright by- Barbara Welling Hall 1987 To My Family

ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is customary for authors to thank their spouses last. In breaking with tradition as he has done, I give my first and foremost thanks to my husband, Joe Ventresca.

His constant faith and support made this dissertation possible.

Dr. Chadwick F. Alger inspired my intellectual develop­ ment and introduced me literally and figuratively to

international social science as a teacher, adviser, and

friend. Dr. Philip S. Stewart encouraged me to pursue

Soviet studies and appreciate nontraditional forms of diplomacy in East-West relations. I studied global problems

for the first time with Dr. James E. Harf, who also taught me the value of the scientific method in studying politics.

Dr. Richard K. Herrmann provided voluminous and valuable comments on this work and its predecessors, as well as encouragement in the transition from graduate student to assistant professor.

Beyond my committee, other scholars were generous in

their assistance. Dr. Lester Milbrath invited me to a pivotal panel at the 1985 conference of the International

Society of Political Psychology. Dr. Harold Guetzkow opened his files to me at a critical stage in data collec­ tion. Dr. Lynton Keith Caldwell, Dr. Craig Davis, and Dr.

Dennis Meadows answered numerous requests for information from a novice in their respective fields of environmental policy.

Thanks go also to those responsible for supporting my studies in tangible ways: Dean Koenigsknecht of the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University for providing a Graduate

School Alumni Research Award; the Department of Political

Science; the Fellowship Committee for the Center for Slavic and East European Studies; and the Ford Foundation Fellow­ ship Program in Combined Soviet/East European and Interna­ tional Security Studies. Thanks go also to Dr. Charles F.

Hermann, Director of the Mershon Center at The Ohio State

University for providing an atmosphere conducive to reflec­ tion and debate and for inviting me to participate actively in the work of the Center. My colleagues and friends at

Earlham College graciously rearranged their schedules to provide me with a vital term in which to write.

I am grateful to Wendy Coons, Ella Young, Sandy Wood,

Beth Tabriz and the secretaries in the Department of

Political Science for easing the burden in many incon­ spicuous and tremendously important ways. Thanks finally to

Mark Denham, Valerie Martinez and Tom Holloway for their assistance as fellow graduate students. VITA

September 27, 1957. .... Born - East Orange, New Jersey

1979...... B.A., Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio

1983-1984 ...... Ford Foundation Fellow in Combined Soviet/East European and International Security Studies

1983-1986...... National Resource Fellow

1984 ...... M.A. , The Ohio State University

1985-1986...... Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of Political Science The Ohio State University

1987-present ...... Assistant Professor, Political Science and Peace and Global Studies, Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana

PUBLICATIONS

The Church and the Independent Peace Movement in Eastern Europe. 1986. Journal of Peace Research. 23(2): 193-208.

Should the United States Agree to A Nuclear Freeze? 1985. In Don L. Mansfield and Gary J. Buckley, eds., Conflict in American Foreign Policy; the Issues Debated. Englewood: Prentice Hall.

The Anti-nuclear Peace Movement: Toward an Evaluation of Effectiveness. 1984. Alternatives. 9(4): 475-517.

v FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: International Relations

Transnational Relations. Professors Chadwick F. Alger and James E. Harf

International Security. Professors James E. Harf and Philip S. Stewart

Minor Field: Comparative Politics

Soviet Politics. Professors Philip S. Stewart and Richard K. Herrmann TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... iii

VITA ...... v

LIST OF T A B L E S ...... x

LIST OF FIGURES ...... xi

CHAPTER PAGE

I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM ...... 1

l.A: Cooperation and International Relations .. . 4 l.B: International Relations and the Environment . 14 l.C: The Environment, Global Problems, and the Soviet Union ...... 18 l.D: Soviet Perceptions of Global Ecological P r o b l e m s ...... 23 1.E: Preview of Succeeding Chapters ...... 26

II. FOUNDATIONS OF THE THREE PERSPECTIVES ...... 29

2.A: The Polemical Perspective ...... 31 2.B: The Ecological Perspective ...... 36 2.C: The Technocratic Perspective ...... 42

III. DATA COLLECTION WITH SIMULATED INTERVIEWING . . . 46

3.A Research Involving Soviet Actors ...... 46 3.B Simulated Interviewing ...... 48 3.C Constructing the Interview Survey ...... 55 3.C.1: The Nature of the Problem ..... 60 3.C.2: The Solution to the Problem ... 69 3.C.3: The Value of International Cooperation 75 3.D: The Interview "Respondents" ...... 79 3.E: Collecting and Analyzing the Da t a ...... 83

vii IV. ANALYSIS BASED ON DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 88

4.A: I n t r o d u c t i o n ...... 88 4.B: Can the Third World be concerned with Environmental Protection? ...... 93 4 >: la Nuclear Energy Safe? Is it Necessary? . . 102 4.D: Do Industrialized Countries face Limits to G r o w t h ? ...... 112 4.E: "Summing U p " ...... 125

V. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ...... 127

5.A: The Polemical Perspective ...... 128 5.A.1: The Problem ...... 131 5.A.2: The So l u t i o n ...... 137 5.A.3: International Cooperation ...... 140 5.B: The Ecological Perspective ...... 145 5.B.1: The Problem ...... 151 5.B.2: The Solution ...... 166 5.B.3: International Cooperation ...... 174 5.C: The Technocratic Perspective ...... 182 5.C.1: The Pr o b l e m ...... 186 5.C.2: The Solution ...... 193 5.C.3 International Cooperation ...... 201 5.D: C o n c l u s i o n ...... 204

VI. THE VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ...... 208

6.A: I n t r o d u c t i o n ...... 208 6.B: Propositions Concerning Epiphenomenal I n t e r e s t s ...... 209 6.C: Chichavarin and the Environment in International Relations ...... 212 6.D: Key Themes in Answering the Questions .... 215 6.D.1: What is the Rationale for Engaging in International Cooperation? ...... 218 6.D.2: What is the relationship between environmental problems and peaceful coexistence? ...... 224 6.D.3: What are the benefits of international collaboration? ...... 232 6.D.4: What are the best forums for interna­ tional cooperation? ...... 242 6.E: Conclusion ...... 248

viii VII. COMPARATIVE SUMMARY 251

7.A: I n t r o d u c t i o n ...... 251 7.B: Prevalence of The Polemical Perspective .... 254 7.C: The Prevalence of The Ecological Perspective . 259 7.D: Prevalence of the Technocratic Perspective . . 262 7.E: Comparison with Western Survey Data ...... 267 7.F: Conclusion ...... 273

VIII. SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR UNDER GORBACHEV, WESTERN RESPONSE, AND THE FU T U R E ...... 276

8.A: Expert Opinion Under G o r b a c h e v ...... 277 8.B: Chernobyl ...... 284 8.C: Environmental Impact and Controversy: The River Diversion Project ...... 288 8.D: Proposed Solutions ...... 292 8.E: International Response to Soviet Environmental Behavior...... 300 8.E.1: International Response to the Chernobyl Disaster...... 300 8.E.2: East-West Joint Ventures and Exchanges 303

IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...... 312

9.A: S u m m a r y ...... 312 9.B: Conclusions ...... 315 9.C: The Last W o r d s ...... 323

APPENDICES

A. THE SIMULATED INTERVIEW S U R V E Y ...... 325

B. POLEMICAL RESPONDENTS AND CITATIONS ...... 337

C. ECOLOGICAL RESPONDENTS AND CITATIONS .... 338

D. TECHNOCRATIC RESPONDENTS AND CITATIONS .. 340

E. DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO SURVEY ITEMS .... 342

LIST OF INTERVIEW REFERENCES ...... 356

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 364

ix LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

1. Three Soviet perspectives on global ecological p r o b l e m s ...... 30

2. Distribution of responses to Item No. 13: Third World 94

3. Distribution of responses to Item No. 28: Nuclear Energy ...... 103

4. Distribution of responses to Item No. 12: Limits to G r o w t h ...... 112

5. Distribution of responses to Item No. 12 across j o u r n a l ...... 121

6. The Polemical Perspective: responses to survey i t e m s ...... 130

7. The Ecological Perspective: responses to survey i t e m s ...... 150

8. The Technocratic Perspective: responses to survey i t e m s ...... 185

9. Key themes related to international cooperation . 216

10. Three Soviet perspectives on global ecological problems (revised) ...... 253

11. Distribution of polemical quotient within interview p o o l ...... 254

12. Prevalence of Polemical responses in total pool 257

13. Prevalence of Ecological responses in total pool 261

14. Prevalence of Technocratic responses in total p o o l ...... 265

x LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE

1. Locating this research in the "Big Picture" . . . 3

2. A description of the processes of global development ...... 195 CHAPTER I

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

One of the aims that a dissertation writer can have is to address, in however limited a fashion, the type of provocative statement that public figures typically make at the end of a book or keynote address.

Recently George Kennan, the author of containment in

East-West relations, wrote:

This weapons race...is tragic because it creates the illusion of a total conflict between the two societies; and it does this at a time when their problems are in large measure really common ones. It tends to conceal the fact that both of these societies are today confronted with new internal problems which were never envisaged in either of the ideologies that originally divided them, problems that supersede the essentially nine­ teenth-century conditions to which both of these ideologies, and Marxism in particular, were addressed.

. . . I n part, I am referring to the environmental problems with which we are all now familiar: the question whether great industrial societies can learn to exist without polluting, and thus destroying the natural resources essential to their very existence. These are not only problems common to the two ideological worlds; they are ones for the solution of which they require each other’s collaboration, not each other’s enmity (Kennan 1983: 144f).1

1 George F. Kennan, "Politics and the East West Rela­ tionship" in The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations

1 2

Kennan’s statements are normative and prescriptive. As social scientists, our modes of analysis must also include description and explanation. In tackling just one aspect of his remarks, this dissertation asks "What evidence is there that environmental problems are seriously considered by

Soviet elites or that interdependence is part of the Soviet world view?" This question is inherently interdisciplinary.

At the very least, it demands intradiscjplinary discourse, drawing upon different strands of research within political science that have not been tied together in the past.

However, as Galtung (1982: 15) points out in a related context, a call to involve everybody and everything in every matter and every process can be more than unproductive; it can be paralyzing. This dissertation deals directly with only a part of the big picture illustrated in Figure 1.

While the illustration describes interaction between both

Soviet and non-Soviet perceptions of global ecological problems, between perceptions and policy making, between policy making and behavior, and between domestic and international activities, the goal of this research is an improved understanding of Soviet perceptions, one of the less accessible pieces of this puzzle. A finding of potential compatibility with non-Soviet [Western] views of

1(...continued) in the Atomic Age (Pantheon New York: 1983) pp 134 - 147. Kennan emphasized this theme in his keynote address to a conference at the National Defense University on "The Future of Containment", November 1985. 3

SOVIBT PERCEPTIONS i ! Soviet International ! ... ! Non-Soviet ! OF GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL PBOBLEHS \ ...... | Behavior I ! ! Policy Making ! 1 1 1I 1 1t ------1, 1 1 1I 1I _ 1 1 I I 1 t 1 ..... Soviet Policy Making ! ! IGO Behavior | I Non-Soviet ! ! ! ! ! |— 1 Policy Making ! ! 1 1 I1 1 1 1 1 1 1 * 1 1 1 1 ...... ,1 I __ __ 1 ! Soviet Doiestic Behavior ! ! j | Non-Soviet ! I 1 t1 .... ! Policy Making ! 1 ...... (1 1 1 1I 1 1 1 1 1 1 : INGO Behavior !.... ! ! ...... ' 1 1 t1 1 1 1

Non-Soviet Perceptions | ! of Global Ecological Probleis I

FIGURE 1 LOCATING THIS RESEARCH IN THE "BIG PICTURE" 4 environmental problems will suggest that one of the prere­ quisites for serious and sustained collaboration is present.

This introductory chapter outlines work in three different areas that bear on the question: cooperation and international relations, international relations and ecological problems, and the Soviet Union and ecological problems. The final section of this chapter previews succeeding chapters.

l.A: Cooperation and International Relations

In concluding an edited volume on cooperation in U.S.-

Soviet relations, Nish Jamgotch asks:

Given extensive American and European studies on interdependency and globalism, is it not reason­ able that thoughtful citizens of the Soviet Union have become aware of the many serious threats to security? If so, what are they writing and saying? Is there evidence of changed values? Or clusters of new perceptions? (Jamgotch, 1985: 168)

The American and European studies that Jamgotch refers to have their intellectual roots in David Mitrany’s treatise on functionalism, A Working Peace System. In place of ill- fated constitutional fixes to global problems, functional­ ists seek to make international government coextensive with international activity (Mitrany, 1966: 53). Not one central authority, but a multitude of task-specific organizations and agencies are required to transcend political 5 jurisdictions, creating multiple loyalties in the process of literally "working" for peace.

Although scholars who have used Mitrany’s ideas to both describe and prescribe manners and methods of expanding international collaboration have been characterized (pejora­ tively, in some cases) as idealists, Hans Morgenthau, the

"father" of realism, wrote a laudatory preface to the 1966 edition of Mitrany's book. In these pages, Morgenthau states that functional cooperation, i.e. international cooperation between skilled professionals working in their areas of expertise on problems of mutual interest to the citizens of their respective homelands, is the only reliable antidote to rampant nationalism in the twentieth century.

Arguing that, "the future of the civilized world is intimately tied to the future of the functional approach to international organization," Morgenthau supports Mitrany's emphasis on active, positive peace strategies (Mitrany,

1966: 11). In this respect, if not in others, Morgenthau’s emphasis on cooperation in international relations does not differ dramatically from Johan Galtung’s prescription for associative peace strategies (bringing enemies together rather than keeping them apart) to counter both direct and structural violence (cf. Galtung, 1980: 101).

As in Kennan*s remarks, there is a strong normative or prescriptive element in international relation’s functional­ ist theory. Starting with the premise that preoccupation 6 with sovereignty prevents nation-states from dealing effectively with twentieth-century problems that are not territorially bound, functionalists argue in favor of establishing international organizations, institutions, and/or processes that are based on function rather than on territory to solve common problems (Groom and Taylor, 1975:

1). Functionalists advocate attempting cooperation first in areas that are relatively non-controversial with the expectation that this experience will build confidence, will highlight the value of cooperation in other areas, and will

"spill-over" into them (Mitrany, 1966: 97).2 As Alger

(1977: 77) points out, the conception of non-controversial issues in international politics has been controversial in and of itself. In fact, disagreement over this point has given rise to a related theory of "neofunctionalism," in which the final goal is the creation of a new sovereign state. Neofunctionalists like Ernst Haas assert that cooperation expands when an issue previously considered technical becomes politicized, thus requiring new forms of political action.3

2 "Spill-over" (Haas: 1964: 48) is Ernst Haas’ more user-friendly term for what Mitrany called the "doctrine of ramification."

3 Ernst B. Haas and Philippe Schmitter. 1964. Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projec­ tions about Unity in Latin America. International Organiza­ tion. XVIII(Autumn) p. 707. Quoted in Dougherty, J.E. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, ed. 1981. Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. Second Edition. New York: Harper and Row. p.431. 7

Those problems that are considered noncontroversial by- functionalists (or technical areas that neofunctionalists think are likely to be politicized) are those in which there is an internationally agreed upon body of expert opinion.

Thus, "experts" may have special roles to play in the conduct of new international, democratic processes (Taylor and Groom, 1975: 5). My focus on experts, i.e. Jamgotch’s

"thoughtful students in the Soviet Union," is designed to test the applicability of environmental issues to the functionalist assumption that there are areas of expertise that can transcend political jurisdictions. In other words, given the definition of knowledge as "the professionally mediated body of thought and information that transcends prevailing lines of ideological cleavage" (Haas, 1980: 368) and the importance of shared knowledge or expertise for the conduct of international, functional cooperation, to what extent are expert Soviet views of global ecological problems compatible with the views of non-Soviet counterparts?

Scholars who are interested in the roles of experts in international relations have studied international govern­ mental organizations (IGOs), especially the specialized agencies of the United Nations, and international nongov­ ernmental organizations (INGOs). By 1972, it was noted that two relatively new breeds of international organizations — transnational corporations (TNCs) and international scien­ tific and professional associations (ISPAs) — were worthy 8 of analysis.4 With the rebirth of international political economy in the 1970s and the "discovery" of global inter­ dependence, transnational corporations became important actors in at least one paradigm of international relations

(Keohane and Nye 1972; Mansbach, Ferguson, and Lambert,

1976; Maghroori and Ramberg, 1982).

ISPAs have not been as extensively studied as other international organizations, although in the late 1980s it is difficult to read through a newspaper of record on a given weeknight without coming across references to the international activity of organizations like the

International Atomic Energy Agency, GreenPeace, Union

Carbide, or the International Bone Marrow Transplant

Registry. Several existing studies focus on the role that organizations like these play in the conference diplomacy of global problem-solving (Feraru, 1985; Soroos, 1986; Evan,

1981; Haas, 1980). As Soroos (1986: 307) puts it, emphasiz­ ing the issue area of concern to this dissertation, politi­ cal scientists are inclined to study these actors because,

"an extensive body of scientific information on the global environment is a prerequisite for making appropriate international policies."

4 In his 1972 article, Evan actually used the term International Professional Association (IPA). He later revised this term (1981) to International Scientific and Professional Association (ISPA); since the latter term is more descriptive I use it here. 9

There is an established need for information-sharing in global problem-solving and it is possible to cite thousands of scientific conferences and symposia held each year.5 Yet as neofunctionalists have noted, scientific consensus is not a sufficient precondition for international cooperation in global problem-solving. According to Haas (1980:369), knowledge must be consensual among the policy-making elite, as well as among practitioners, in order for it to be a

reliable basis for international collaboration. Haas’ point

is well-taken, but it does not negate the priority of expert consensus as a necessary, if not sufficient condition, for

some forms of cooperation.

A few scholars have conducted research into areas and

processes in which international consensus is likely to develop. In her work on "invisible colleges," Diana Crane

(1971: 238) has determined that:

Disciplines characterized by a low degree of consensus about research problems tend to have distinctive national research traditions and to show few signs of international cooperation. Disciplines characterized by a high level of consensus contain research areas whose members are drawn from many different countries.

According to Crane, a traditional research area with a high degree of consensus has been high energy physics, a research

5 The Yearbook of International Organizations lists thousands of international scientific and professional organizations. In order to be included in the yearbook, these organizations must have regular (i.e. annual, bien­ nial, or triennial) membership meetings; and a duly speci­ fied election process. INGOs must be autonomous of govern­ ments . 10 area with a low degree of consensus has been biology. While

Crane considers biology a low-consensus issue, Kriesberg

(1968) notes that citizens of the United States and the

Soviet Union are likely to participate jointly in ISPAs that deal with high-consensus issues "like health." Kriesberg*s most intriguing finding related to this dissertation is that there is a proliferation of committees in those INGOs to which Americans and Soviets belong because "committees tend to transform problems from issues to be decided by political bargaining and negotiation to technical matters to be decided by consensus among experts."

At least two authors have noted that it is not par­ ticularly easy to study international scientific and professional cooperation because physical scientists in particular are loathe to have their professional attitudes and/or activity come under the scrutiny of social scien­ tists. Kay and Jacobson (1983:317) conclude their multi­ case study of international environmental protection with the following note:

Assessing attitudes is always an expensive process, particularly in regard to international programs. In addition to this basic limitation, some of the authors met unexpected "cultural" resistance to their attempts to assess formally the attitudes of relevant scientific elites on questions of effectiveness of organizations. In one of the cases, there was particularly strong resistance to this "nonscience" concern. It was feared that a social science evaluation might prejudice future collaboration in the physical science field that was involved. 11

The Secretary of the International Coordinating Council of the UNESCO Programme on Man and Biosphere, Francesco di

Castri (1976), has made a related argument concerning the difficulty of coordinating international, interdisciplinary work due to distrust between the physical and the social sciences, with physical scientists in particular concerned about the possibility of governmental interference through social science participation.

No doubt international cooperation is even more difficult to achieve than it is to study. Today's urgency does not guarantee that cooperation will be accomplished under stress. As Ophuls (1977: 215) states, there is not sufficient evidence in human history to suggest that cooperation will occur simply because it has to occur. This is true of relations even among "friendly" states. Why then does Jamgotch propose (and why do I accept?) the task of examining "unfriendly" East-West relations within a func­ tionalist framework?

The first reason for taking functionalism seriously as a framework for examining East-West cooperation in environ­ mental protection is that it is a prescription that has been made -- allegedly by the authors of detente in the 1970s, in the preamble of the Helsinki Final Act, and as the raison d'etre of some nongovernmental organizations.

In some retrospective analyses the purpose of detente was to redirect East-West relations towards cooperation 12 along functionalist lines by creating a "network of mutually advantageous relationships between adversaries" (Neal

1985: xv). For example, the signers of the Helsinki Final

Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:

convinced that their efforts to develop co­ operation in the fields of trade, industry, science and technology, the environment and other areas of economic activity contribute to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Final Act. Helsinki 1975 paragraph 140) embraced the functionalist assumption that cooperation in matters of "low politics" builds confidence for further peace-building. Yet, the history of superpower detente indicates that functionalism, reinterpreted as linkage, could be manipulated as a means of forcing one’s adversaries to adapt their behavior rather than as a method of encourag­ ing broader fields of cooperation. Henry Kissinger described detente as a net for pulling the Soviet Union into a web of interdependence. "Spill-back," or the retreat from already existing areas of cooperation, rather than "spill­ over" was a consequence of this detente which, according to

Shulman (1982: 81), was inherently flawed by contradictory

American and Soviet understandings of its meaning for both political and military aspects of the East-West relation­ ship.

Given this poor record in East-West relations, a second reason for taking a look at functionalism in East-West relations ia that the scholar interested in studying 13 cooperation doesn't have a large menu from which to make selections. That international relations scholarship is overwhelmingly preoccupied with the causes of conflict rather than the causes of peace is news to no one, although disconcerting to many (Boulding 1978; Russett 1981; Stephen­ son 1982). A developing area of research and action in mediation for international problems is related in some of its aspects to functionalism. Research into mediation is based on the assumption that strong, centrally administered systems can create as many problems as they can solve

(Dryzek and Hunter, 1987: 88). It is difficult to conceive of successful international mediation in a case involving superpowers because of the obstacles involved in locating a neutral, competent, and mutually respected intermediary.

Nonetheless, the specification of other preconditions for successful mediation suggests prerequisites for other styles of East-West conflict resolution. For example, "most important is the existence of a contract zone: a set of outcomes which all parties will prefer to the absence of an agreement" (Dryzek and Hunter, 1987: 95). This dissertation addresses the question of whether or not there is a "con­ tract zone" for global ecological problems. 14 l.B: International Relations and the Environment

Karl Deutsch, who is well-known for his significant contributions to the study of the development of political communities and cooperation through transactions and communications, primarily in the North Atlantic area (1957;

1967), has more recently turned his attention to the role of the physical environment in international affairs. Environ­ mental issues, he states, are moving from the periphery to the center of concern; people are becoming increasingly aware that they live in ecological as well as social systems

(1977). As a result, the environment is politicized and politics is environmentalized (1977: 14).

Many Western authors have commented on the contradic­ tion between the unity of the biosphere and the arbitrary fragmentation of the political world (Falk, 1970; Ophuls,

1977; Pirages, 1978, 1983; Sprout and Sprout, 1971; Peccei and Ikeda, 1984). Satellite pictures of the blue planet that captured public consciousness along with the first blush of detente dramatized this theme in the early 1970s.

In the language of activists, people became afraid that the world could end with a whimper, if not with a bang.

This does not mean that the pervasiveness of global ecological problems and the necessity of international col­ laboration to resolve them was not written about earlier, notably by natural rather than social scientists. As early 15 as 1954, the late Harrison Brown, one-time member of the

Manhattan Project in the area of plutonium chemistry and past editor-in-chief of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. wrote a prescient book entitled The Challenge of Man’s

Future. His work is all the more remarkable for suggesting at the height of the Cold War that there are ecological risks to human civilization that are greater than the threat of Soviet imperialism. Brown devoted most of this book to laying out food, energy, nature conservation, and population problems, addressing the issue of some new forms of interna­ tional government to resolve these problems only briefly:

. . . In the world of my imagination there is an organization, but it is as decentralized as possible, compatible with the requirements for survival. There is a world government, but it exists solely for the purpose of preventing war and stabilizing population, and its powers are irrevocably restricted. The government exists for man rather than man for the government. . . All people have a voice in the government. . .It is a world where man's creativity is blended with the creativity of nature, and where a moderate degree of organization is blended with a moderate degree of anarchy (Brown, 1954: 257f.).

As one of the first social scientists to take on these topics, Richard Falk (1970: 3) called for "detente between man and nature." In discussing the design of an appropriate world order to deal with global problems in a cooperative fashion, he asserts that debate about the pros and cons of functionalism is "pre-ecological." Fundamentally new ways of thinking about politics are necessary in order for humanity to survive. Falk lays the blame for an 16 ecologically endangered planet squarely on an international state system whose members are more preoccupied with retaining sovereignty than in insuring long-term planetary existence. Dissatisfaction with the state system does not lead Falk (1970: 352) to conclude that the units of govern­ ment are too large, in fact "the interrelatedness of modern life requires larger, not smaller, units of policy-planning and execution; larger function units would, of course, be consistent with smaller political units [emphasis in the original]."

Similarly, in his most recent book, Person/Planet

(1978), Theodore Roszak attributes the problems that the planet faces to "bigness." In large units, both the needs of the person and the needs of the planet are ignored: scales that are "humanizing" are also conducive to the health of the earth. Roszak has made further contributions to the subject matter of this dissertation in his assertion that it makes sense to look at the environment as a "conver­ gence" or "end of ideology" issue.

Andrei Sakharov wrote very briefly of the environmental problems shared by the United States and the Soviet Union in his 1968 essay, Progress. Coexistence, and Intellectual

Freedom. The extent of convergence was spelled out by

Marshall Goldman (1970) in an article in Science which has been cited widely by Soviets as well as Westerners.

Goldman’s article, which was expanded into a book, 17

investigated the proposition that socialism provides the solution to environmental deterioration. In providing numerous examples of fish kills, air pollution in resort cities, soil erosion, and the degradation of natural beauty

(among other problems) in the USSR, Goldman argues that the prime cause of ecological problems is not private enter­

prise, nor for that matter socialist government — although he does state that public greed is no more conserving of the

environment than private greed (1970: 42). While both phenomena have their disadvantages in creating and coping

with ecological difficulties, the primary cause of environ­ mental disturbances is industrialization (Goldman, 1970:

42). Similarly, Bush (1972) and Powell (1971) suggest that

the very process of modernization has caused grave ecologi­ cal disruption in the USSR.

There is a logical relationship between convergence and

functionalism. Simply put, convergence (Oxford American

Dictionary = "to come to or toward the same point") as used by Goldman and others (Kramer, 1973; Kelley, 1973; Roszak,

1973) alludes to the concept that similar problems have

similar causes independent of political system or sovereign­

ty.0 Functionalism, in an analogous fashion, suggests that

6 Some authors suggest that the existence of similar problems in the United States and the Soviet Union is evidence that the political systems themselves are converg­ ing, i.e. becoming more alike (cf. Enloe, 1975: 192f.). 18 shared problems will be resolved by shared solutions discovered or disseminated through a shared process

The oneness of the planet and the idea of non-ter­ ritorial cooperation make environmental concerns and functionalism appear to be logical partners even in East-

West relations. In fact, Clemens (1978: 26) suggests that

"one of the most important arenas for functional collabora­ tion between East and West lies in the preservation and enhancement of our common oikos. . ." In confirmation of

Clemen’s analysis, Kelley reports that it is in the area of environmental protection that functionalism as a prescrip­ tion for broadening East-West cooperation has had the most success. An agreement to protect migratory birds concluded in 1978 was a genuine case of spillover, "the first instance in which initial projects gave rise to continuing programs beyond the purview of the original mandate [i.e. the 1972

U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Environmental Protection]" (Kelley,

1985: 112).

l.C: The Environment, Global Problems, and the Soviet Union

With the exception of Kelley’s (1985) contribution to the volume edited by Jamgotch, virtually all existing research on the environment and environmental politics in the Soviet Union have been approached as a subject of comparative politics rather than international relations. 19

There are brief, passing references to implications for international relations in Bush (1972: 29-30), Pryde (1972: chap. 1), Goldman (1972: 284, 290), Costle (1979), and

DeBardeleben (1985: 124-125). These references are limited in scope, including statements to the effect that it is impossible to ignore the ecological impact of a country as large as the Soviet Union on the biosphere and the Soviet boycott of the Stockholm conference is evidence of a lack of serious interest in environmental problems. Furthermore, authors writing about environmental problems affecting the

Soviet Union seem to be unaware of international actors in this issue area.

Some of this work has addressed questions that provide useful background for the research at hand. For example,

Bailes (1986) and Wiener (1982) demonstrate that ecology in the Soviet Union has long-standing roots which enabled nature conservationists and environmentalists to weather the storms of Stalinism. Today, Soviet (and Western) environ­ mentalists liberally cite the work of Vladimir Ivanovich

Vernadsky, who developed the concept of the biosphere as the domain of life and elaborated on Pierre Teilhard de Char­ din’s concept of the noosphere (literally, "mind-sphere") as

"a psychological state of knowing and communicating envelop­ ing the biosphere," in which man is transformed into a geologic force (Caldwell, 1984:22). Bailes concludes on the basis of examining Vernadsky’s letters, manuscripts, and 20 personal papers in the Soviet Academy of Sciences that despite being a liberal critic of Marxism, Vernadsky was virtually unscathed by Stalinism. He attributes this to

Vernadsky’s :

1) practical contributions to Soviet science in the areas of radium research and biogeochemistry

2) enormous prestige among the scientific intel­ ligentsia both in the USSR and in the West

3) well-known Russian patriotism, and

4) care to avoid publicly embarrassing the political regime (Bailes, 1986:23).

Conversely, Weiner’s research indicates that Soviet environ­ mentalists did suffer under Stalinism psychically as well as politically: conservationists were forced to observe established sanctuaries (zapovedniki) opened up for "practi­ cal use" by state farms and lumbering operations (Weiner,

1982:53).

Several authors have focused on the issue of environ­ mental deterioration in order to examine propositions about interest group influence on policy-making in the Soviet

Union. Literature on Soviet interest groups (Schwartz and

Keech, 1968; Stewart, 1969; Skilling and Griffiths, 1971;

Hough, 1972) surfaced more or less simultaneously with literature on environmental deterioration in the USSR

(Goldman 1970, 1972; Powell, 1971; Pryde, 1972). The two areas of research were bound to come together with the question, "Can environmentalists in the USSR function as an 21

interest group?" In their case studies of Soviet environ­ mental politics, Kramer (1973), ZumBrunnen (1974) and

Lowenhardt (1981) conclude that in a contest between

economic councils and conservationist opposition made up of

public health officials, academicians, writers, and jour­

nalists the opposition has been unable to prevent the

pollution of Siberia’s Lake Baikal, the oldest and deepest

lake in the world with unparalleled pristine waters and

unique flora and fauna. Nonetheless, Lowenhardt (1981: 77)

concludes that:

The results of the campaign were two: First, without the campaign the pollution of the lake would probably have been much worse than it is now. Second, the campaign resulted in legislative measures that may in the very long run turn out to be useful instruments for curtailing and repelling the harm done to this unique body of water.

Thus, while environmental problems in the USSR may be

attributed to:

1) the lack of coordination between ministries (Pryde, 1972; Bush, 1972; Kramer, 1973)

2) the prevailing belief that there is a tech­ nological "fix" for every environmental problems (Pryde, 1972; DeBardeleben, 1984)

3) the failure to assign a high priority to environmental problems (Bush, 1972; Kramer, 1973; Zeigler, 1980)

the contention that environmental interest groups in the

Soviet Union have no influence is debatable. They have had

enough influence to prompt voluminous, if poorly defined

legislation. More significantly, as discussed in Chapter

VII, environmental interests have deterred some potentially 22 disastrous projects such as the proposed diversion of

Siberian rivers to Central Asia. The recent accident at

Chernobyl may provide a test of the official Soviet response to environmental interests and yet, given the crucial dependence of industrialized societies on energy supply and the relationship of the nuclear power industry to military concerns, it may well be the last rather than the first test that the Soviet government should reasonably be expected to pass.

The most intensive and rewarding research on environ­ mental interests in the Soviet Union has been conducted by

DeBardeleben (1984, 1985). In attempting to answer the question of how Marxism-Leninism is being adapted to meet the threat of environmental degradation, she notes that there is a theoretical lacuna in Soviet doctrine. There are both environmental optimists and pessimists in the USSR who base their arguments on references to the writings of Marx,

Engels, and Lenin. It is, she notes, easier for physical than for social scientists to be pessimistic (1984: 128).

Despite constraints, the range of publicly expressed opinion on environmental issues is quite broad, including those who attribute environmental degradation to the rapaciousness of capitalism and those who want to place limits on the anthropocentric transformation of nature in the Soviet

Union. Given this range, it is difficult to accept either of the two polar arguments that Marxism is the implacable 23

foe of ecology (Fry, 1976) or that socialist government and environmental protection are two aides of the same coin

(McIntyre and Thornton, 1978).

l.D: Soviet Perceptions of Global Ecological Problems

If there is a theoretical lacuna in Soviet doctrine, there is a practical lacuna in Western research. Excellent as it is, DeBardeleben’s analysis does not extend to the

implications for international relations, except to state that, "... Soviet scholars express enthusiastic support

for international research in the environmental field. . .

[they] strongly identify themselves as part of an interna­

tional scientific community and show more than scienti­

fically indifferent support for increased contact with the

West" (1985: 124f). This enthusiasm requires explanation, or at least further description. How widespread is it?

What are the ramifications of this enthusiasm for Soviet collaboration in resolving global ecological problems? Does

this enthusiasm indicate the existence of a "contract zone"

in which collaboration might take place? If as Falk (1970),

Kelley (1976), Pirages (1978), Soroos (1986) and others suggest, the nation-state system is pre-ecological, a more detailed study of Soviet perceptions of environmental problems in relation to international cooperation will 24 provide a useful contribution to international relations literature.

This discussion need not be "academic" in the less

flattering sense of the word. Apparently, one of the

important factors contributing to the failure of detente in

the 1970s was a fundamental Western failure in understanding or recognizing the Soviet conception of peaceful coexis­ tence. Western observers tended to believe that "peaceful coexistence" was synonymous with a new era of noncompetitive

East-West relations, while Soviet spokespersons were clearly

speaking of a relationship in which competition continued in all aspects short of nuclear war. There is evidence in

Section l.B that some Western discussions of environment and

international relations are premised on the assumption that global cooperation will occur because it must. Yet, if the environment has been politicized, it may just as easily be a source of competition. It is worthwhile knowing whether global ecological problems, as discussed by Soviets, imply cooperative or competitive relations with the West.

Luckily, global problems have been written about fairly widely in the Soviet Union since the early 1970s. During

this decade, a new area of academic inquiry called globalis-

tika evolved. Summarizing major works in the field,

Shakhnazarov (1982: 144)7 describes as global problems:

7 Shakhnazarov, who has chaired the Soviet Political Science Association was appointed under Gorbachev as First 25

1. Those that touch upon and will later affect the interests of the entire human race.

2. Those that influence societal development in all the main regions of the world.

3. Those that threaten the future of society.

4. Those which can only be solved through the con­ certed, united efforts of all mankind.

Shakhnazarov’s categorization is similar to Harf and

Trout’s (1986: 12-28) framework, according to which global problems are persistent and transcend national boundaries, actors cannot act autonomously, solutions are time-urgent, and policy action is required for an effective solution.

What kinds of problems meet these criteria? Soviet authors have outlined several different frameworks for cataloguing global problems, including one which categorizes them as either economic problems or political problems (Gvishiani:

1979) and a more complicated scheme that describes global problems as the social consequences of the scientific and technological revolution, the social aspects of the man- environment bond, and problems of the economic progress of socialist and developing countries (Timofeyev: 1976). The most elegant framework, however, is that promoted by Ivan T.

Frolov, recently appointed editor-in-chief of Kommunist and former editor-in-chief of Voprosy filosofii [Problems of

7 (...continued) Deputy Chief of the Central Committee’s Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. 26

Philosophy] when global problems were entered into Soviet discourse.

According to Frolov (1982: 26ff.), Marxism-Leninism makes it possible to "identify groups of global problems whose nature and forms of resolution will largely determine the condition of the world at the threshold of the third millenium." These problems may be labelled "intersocial"

(problems of peace and disarmament, social development, and economic growth); "man-society" (individualized and humanis­ tic consequences of the scientific and technological revolution, and problems of population growth); and

"man-nature" (problems of natural resources, energy sup­ plies, the environment, food supplies, and the biological adaptation of humans to their environment). Sometimes it is asserted that man-nature problems fall into third position within the hierarchy of global problems. Elsewhere it is suggested that all three categories "taken together, form an organically-integrated system of dialectically interrelated and interacting problems."

l.E: Preview of Succeeding Chapters

There is clearly no single Soviet view of global ecological problems, just as there is no single Western view. On the other hand, to jump to the other extreme and say that there are as many views as individuals defies the 27 rationale underlying social science that there are patterns in human behavior. Chapter II outlines three ideal type

Soviet perspectives of global ecological problems. As described in that chapter, these are derived in part from

Western studies of environmental perceptions. It is not the task here to ascertain whether Soviet and Western scientists are referring to the same chemical compounds when they discuss acid rain or the greenhouse effect. If this were the most important question, then there really would be little reason for a political scientist to undertake this task, even if he or she were competent to do so.

Instead, the emphasis in this dissertation is placed on examining whether or not Soviet discussions of global ecological problems imply competitive or cooperative relations with the West by focusing on the following three aspects of Soviet perceptions:

1. The Nature of Global Ecological Problems

2. The Solution to Global Ecological Problems

3. The Value of International Cooperation

These items are discussed further in Chapter III which discusses the simulated interviewing technique that was used to collect data about Soviet perceptions.

Chapters IV and V outline the variation that exists in

Soviet views and describe how closely the polemical, ecological, and technocratic perspectives approach the ideal types presented in Chapter III. In Chapter VI, these 28 perspectives are related more directly to the role of international cooperation in resolving global ecological problems. Chapter VII compares the prevalence of the various Soviet views discussed in the previous chapters to

Western environmental attitudes. Chapter VIII relates the data that have been presented throughout to the kinds of environmental activities that are happening in the Soviet

Union under Gorbachev. The dissertation concludes in

Chapter IX with a summary of important findings and a general statement about the Soviet Union, the biosphere, and the future of East-West relations. CHAPTER II

FOUNDATIONS OF THE THREE PERSPECTIVES

The area of inquiry explored in this study is largely terra incognita. Therefore, the work is largely descriptive and the description itself is primarily inductive. As a mode of analysis, description can be particularly useful when it is enhanced by the use of an explicit organizing framework. As summarized in Table 1: Three Soviet Perspec­ tives on Global Ecological Problems, the organizing frame­ work developed in this chapter involves three different aspects of global ecological problems — the nature of the problem, solutions to the problem, and the value of interna­

tional cooperation. A pilot study, described in Chapter

III, identified these aspects as useful in distinguishing between three different ideal type perspectives (polemical, ecological, or technocratic) defining the ways in which a

Soviet observer might evaluate global ecological problems.

29 30

TABLE 1 THREE SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Nature Solution International of Problem to Problem Cooperation

Polemical Capitalism, Existing Result of Imperialism Socialism Soviet initiative

Ecological Limits to Basic Multilateral growth changes scientific ventures

Technocratic Diminishing Technology, Acquisitive, resources management systems analysis

These three perspectives, which are described in detail below, were based on existing studies of environmental attitudes (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978; Cotgrove, 1982;

Milbrath, 1984) and on deductive and intuitive hunches about what an observer in a given situation or condition might be expected to see. However, the nature of discovery is such that the perspectives evolved over the course of collecting and analyzing data. Although my simulated inter­ views, as described in Chapter III, did not involve face-to- face contact with "respondents," this was interactive research. The remainder of this chapter describes the perspectives and issues that serve as the organizing framework for this analysis of Soviet perceptions. 31

2.A: The Polemical Perspective

While global issues may need to be "politicized" in order for agendas to be created and cooperation to be coordinated, "polemicization" is not a useful adjunct to

"politicization." The polemical perspective is largely- derived from a response set labelled "cornucopian" by

Cotgrove (1982: 25ff.) and "rearguard" by Milbrath (1984:

55). These are individuals who strongly support what

Pirages (1978: 7f.) calls the Dominant Social Paradigm as opposed to the New Environmental Paradigm (Dunlap and Van

Liere, 1978: 10). According to the dominant social para­ digm, there is no real environmental problem; any problem that might potentially exist can be resolved through newer and more powerful technology; and the idea of limits to growth is ludicrous, if not immoral. Cotgrove identifies the cornucopians as industrialists selected from the

Business Who*s Who and Who *s Who of British Engineers. In his demographic analysis, Milbrath indicates that nearly half of the U.S. business leaders surveyed fell into the

"rearguard." For these authors, defense of the dominant social paradigm also involves defense of market control of the economy and economic individualism (Cotgrove, 1982: 92;

Milbrath, 1984: 21). The major adaptation that is made in the development of the polemical perspective for this study of Soviet perceptions is that it is fitted to a world-view 32 based on Marxism-Leninism rather than on capitalism and free enterprise.

The polemical perspective is built on the premise that

the discussion of global ecological problems by Soviet spokespersons is simply a new, souped up late twentieth century weapon in the social, class struggle between

Marxism-Leninism and imperialism. It is anticipated that adherents to a polemical perspective would argue publicly that there are no environmental problems inherent in socialism (as per McIntyre and Thornton, 1978); that existing socialism provides the solutions to all global problems (including ecological problems); and in an inver­ sion of Fry (1976), that capitalism is the implacable foe of ecology. Any suggestion that the causes of global ecologi­ cal problems were similar under socialism and capitalism would be vigorously denied. Therefore, statements on these

issues are thick with polemical attacks on the Western world.

To the extent that this perspective is based on an

ideologically bipolar vision of contemporary international relations, the Third World is seen as an arena for competi­

tion. Given Karl Marx* vigorous antipathy for the writings of Thomas Malthus, concern with a rapidly growing Third

World population would be anti-scientific at best, evidence of malicious Malthusian at worst. Adherents to the polemi­

cal perspective would not consider ecological imperialism to 33 be an unconscious phenomenon of past centuries in which

European organisms displaced indigenous species throughout the temperate zones of the world (Crosby, 1986), but a deliberate policy of current capitalist leaders. The real danger of resource shortages in developed countries is that capitalists will attempt to seize resources from the developing world. For the Third World the choice is clear: if the socialist path is followed, environmental protection will follow. In the event of capitalist development, environmental protection in the Third World will not happen.

Given the centrality of conflict in the bipolar world of the polemical perspective, the most pressing (and possibly the only) global problem is avoiding nuclear war.

The West is maligned to such an extent that it is imperative for adherents to disassociate themselves from the per­ petrators of such evil by establishing the uniqueness of their own society. This will be done by frequent reference to the two great revolutions of the twentieth century: the

October Revolution and the revolution in science and techno­ logy (STR), both of which testify to Soviet greatness.

The biosphere may be threatened by the technological excesses of capitalism, but on its own socialism does not face limits to growth. Science and technology lead to pollution in capitalist countries due to existence of private ownership, profit aspirations, spontaneous develop­ ment, and the decline of capitalism with its unique "limits to growth." To the extent that there are man-nature problems in the USSR, these are primarily the legacy of capitalism and World War II. Environmental problems may also be described as the result of dialectical contra­ dictions in the man-nature relationship that have arisen as a result of the scientific and technological revolution.1

In the polemical perspective, Marxism-Leninism is the key to properly understanding these problems and existing socialism the proven cure. Given proper social conditions

(including the diversion of funds from military spending), existing Soviet science and scientific disciplines are adequate to resolve environmental problems. Intensive development of science and technology will resolve problems so that there need be no trade-off between economic growth, economic goals, and environmental protection. Science and technology are also valuable for resolving these problems globally, but only when accompanied by socialist revolution.

The faith in technological fixes like nuclear energy follows from the belief that it is human destiny to possess and master the natural environment. The natural environment is worth mastering because the Soviet Union is rich in resources; socialist planning and technology will insure rational use. Conservation, if required, is to preserve

1 An example of such a contradiction would be urban air pollution. While factories provide the economic basis for scientific and technological society, they also discharge gas, smoke, dust, and other pollutants into the atmosphere. 35 these raw material reserves for economic growth. Converse­ ly, talk of preserving nature for its own sake is antihuman romanticism. This cornucopian morality is illustrated by

Cotgrove (1982: 86) in a different political context, quoting one of the nobles of the House of Lords:

In my own simple way I am asking whether I should decide between flowers on the one hand, and people on the other — people and their prosperity . . . I come down solidly against flowers.

International cooperation in resolving global ecologi­ cal problems is discussed only as an element of peaceful coexistence, with no detailed discussion of what goals etc. could be accomplished because there will be little or no sophisticated understanding of the ways in which interna­ tional organizations work. In keeping with this relatively unsophisticated understanding, it is anticipated that adherents to the polemical perspective will attempt to demonstrate Soviet success and commitment to environmental problem-solving with static indicators: i.e. rubles spent, decrees passed. The possibility of Soviet failure will not be acknowledged. In keeping with the necessity of defining

Soviet behavior as unique, international success, if indicated, will be wholly the result of Soviet initiative.

There could be no other sources of environmental success.

Since the discussion of global ecological problems is a tool % in ideological struggle, references to Western research will be made primarily in order to refute bourgeois misconcep­ tions. Any mention of the value of international 36 cooperation will be matched by a discussion of Soviet success and qualified by the need not to abridge sovereignty in any way.

2.B: The Ecological Perspective

The ecological perspective is based on the response type labelled the "vanguard" by Milbrath (1984: 59) and

"catastrophists" by Cotgrove (1982: 25f.). These indivi­ duals who support a New Environmental Paradigm are highly educated* are actively involved in environmental groups* and include large numbers of female respondents.2 In contrast to adherents to a polemical perspective, it is anticipated that adherents to the ecological perspective will consider environmental problems to be quite serious, involving unavoidable limits to growth, and requiring basic societal change in order to avert catastrophe. Like DeBardeleben’s

(1984: 138) "pessimists", these respondents are likely to believe that time is short and ecological caution is in order.

This perspective is here labelled "ecological" as a more neutral term than "vanguard" or "catastrophic", although it does carry the implied bias that the prevalence

2 Given the completely underwhelming proportion of women identified in the pilot study, gender has not been associated with any of the three perspectives. There is only one woman in the entire interview pool — M.P. Nes­ terova, an oceanographer. 37 of this perspective would be most conducive to resolving global ecological problems. It borrows from those elements in the history of ecological thought, which have as a guiding principle the concept that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" (Worster, 1977). It is an­ ticipated that interrelatedness will be a pervasive theme to the extent that references to international cooperation will be an integrated part of the author’s argument.

Given the centrality of interrelatedness and coopera­ tion, "ecological" articles or books will not be highly polemical. If, in the Soviet context, polemical statements are unavoidable, they will be disjointed from the rest of the work, i.e. a final paragraph that doesn’t flow from the body of the article. Convergence will not be mentioned (to do so would be to risk Sakharov’s fate), but it will be implicit in attention to the theme that the biosphere, and by extension, humanity, is a single whole. Vernadsky’s work on the biosphere and the noosphere as described in Chapter I is important to this perspective both because of the content of his scientific ideas and because of the political legitimization that his work provides. Soviet ecologists can legitimately point to their Russian kin as founders of the field of ecology.

Although Milbrath links environmental concern to sympathy with peace movements, it is anticipated that because adherents to the ecological perspective consider 38 environmental problems real and urgent, they will not automatically rank the prevention of nuclear war as the

Number One global problem. Less polemically, however, detente and peaceful coexistence will be considered con­ ducive to the resolution of global ecological problems because they free up resources and because the arms race itself is harmful to the environment.

Adherents to the ecological perspective will believe that global ecological problems are increasingly serious issues that affect all countries more or less equally. In contrast to the view inherent in the polemical perspective, environmental degradation will not be attributed to the antagonism of man and nature under capitalism, but to an­ thropogenic influence related to the intensification of the scientific and technological revolution. There are limits to the extent that any society can push nature. The alterations that man makes in nature will be reflected back and these changes may or may not be conducive to life on the planet. Thinking about nature’s limits and the self- sustaining capabilities of the biosphere are incumbent on humanity in order to preserve both home and self.

Given the concern with limits, adherents to this perspective will consider the "untapped" resources of

Siberia a naive delusion. The Soviet Union, let alone the world is, in fact, running out of precious resources. At the same time, it is necessary to expand the list of 39

valuable and finite resources. This must include not only minerals and energy, but air, water, and soil as well. In

order to avert catastrophe, both conservation and a new

attitude toward nature are essential. The use of resources

and accompanying environmental degradation puts constraints

on industrialized growth and economic development as it is

currently conceptualized. This is especially true for the

Third World which faces a serious dilemma of either con­

tinued underdevelopment or ecological ruin. Overpopulation

will be a real issue of concern rather than an ideological

litmus test. In order to develop both economically and

environmentally the Third World needs assistance from the

developed world. Without such assistance, the two goals are

incompatible.

Not only are there limits to the man-nature relation­

ship as described above, but an additional complicating

factor with global ecological problems is that humanity’s

knowledge of them is truly incomplete. While adherents to

the polemical perspective will assert that Marxism-Leninism

has provided the tools necessary for resolving global

ecological problems, Soviet ecologists challenging the

dominant paradigm will suggest that solutions to these

problems are not obvious: contemporary science is unprepared

to resolve these problems. In order to effectively recog­

nize the complexity of solutions, new heights of inter­

departmental and interdisciplinary work are necessary. 40

Technology is not a panacea that can overcome all trade­ offs. Even nuclear technology, for example, will contribute to thermal pollution and global warming trends. Science and technology may help to address environmental problems, but only when accompanied by a new respect for nature, both economic and "spiritual" fdukhovny].

Such a new economic respect for nature may be a c ­ complished by a new emphasis in economic planning that puts the concerns of the environment front and center. Planning, control, the knowledge of effects, and countereffects are important to the prevention of environmental problems.

Moreover, such planning is not foolproof in socialist countries. The cause of environmental problems isn’t so much due to lawbreakers as to a system that encourages degradation of the environment in favor of plan indicators.

Moreover, there are some environmental goals that cannot be measured at all in economic terms. In contrast to the cornucopian morality illustrated in Section 2.1, the adherents to the ecological perspective will advocate a new environmental ethic promoting conservation for a multi­ plicity of reasons, including the preservation of nature for its own sake. The resolution of contemporary global ecological problems cannot be based on more of the same, solutions will depend on some basic changes.

Respondents adhering to the ecological perspective are assumed in this study to have an in-depth knowledge of at least some environmental problems. Therefore, in their responses dedication to environmental protection will not be tapped simply by reference to static indicators. These individuals should be able to cite examples of Soviet success and failure, as well as international success and failure in dealing with global ecological problems. Given their presumed preoccupation with interrelatedness, the adherents to the ecological perspective should not limit international success to ventures established by Soviet initiative. They will believe that Western scientists and authors have made significant contributions to the under­ standing of these problems. Because scientists understand each other and the problems, world science will play an indispensable role in resolving global environmental problems.

It is also anticipated that these authors should know enough about international cooperation to be able to state what kind of activities are useful: monitoring, information exchange, coordination, rule-making, etc. Moreover, they should be able to state what kinds of international forums they prefer for such collaborative activities. 42

2.C: The Technocratic Perspective

A third type established by Milbrath (1984: 57) is "the nature conservationist establishment follower". Respondents of this type believe that there are large environmental pro­ blems , these can be solved by better technology, and there are not inflexible limits to growth. Milbrath is "reluctant to take this group very seriously" because they represent less than 5 percent of the U.S., German, and English publics and they have what he perceives to be an incongruous set of attitudes. Given Soviet interpretations of the dialectical impact of the scientific and technological revolution, this combination of perceptions may not be so incongruous in the

Soviet case. In fact, the assertion of a prevailing Soviet belief that there is a technological fix for every environ­ mental problem (Pryde, 1972; DeBardeleben, 1984) makes this type seem quite plausible. This perspective is here labelled "technocratic" in reference to a world-view in which technology "rules" as well as to the presumption that this would be a plausible world-view for political and managerial elites since it acknowledges the existence of a problem while denying any trade-offs in solutions.3

3 In a similar vein, Parrott (1985: 3) argues that technological progress is always important to the political elite. This observation is in keeping with Cotgrove (1982) and Milbrath (1984) who list faith in technology as a central element in the dominant social paradigm. 43

This perspective is also partly derived from the work of Parrott (1985) on the interplay between politics and technology in the Soviet Union. Respondents falling into the technocratic type are likely to be what Parrott calls

"non-traditionalists". According to Parrott the "tradi­ tional" Soviet siege mentality regarding technology is dominated by concerns of imperialist aggressiveness; the belief that military technology must be given top priority; and preference for economic autarky as an imperative for survival. Conversely, adherents to the technocratic perspective are likely to have shared characteristics with

Parrott’s "non-traditionalists." That is, they are likely to believe that placing undue stress on military technology hampers other spheres of economic and technological develop­ ment; they are less certain that the Soviet Union can surpass the West; and they attach "considerable value to technological ties with the West as a means of meeting

Soviet economic shortcomings" (Parrott, 1985: 5f.).

Although Parrott does not discuss global ecological pro­ blems, each of these beliefs would be consistent with recognizing environmental difficulties (particularly domestically) and valuing technological exchange with the

West as a key to their solution.

Given the emphasis within this perspective on overcom­ ing economic shortcomings, the most serious environmental problems are likely to be the conservation and the rational 44 utilization of natural resources which allow continued economic growth. Adherents to the technocratic perspective are likely to believe that the solution to any problems wrought by the scientific and technological revolution (i.e water pollution, the greenhouse effect) will be solved by more of the same, therefore the industrialized world (let alone the Soviet Union) does not face limits to growth.

Despite acknowledging the existence of pressing environmental problems in the USSR, these respondents like the ecologists (but for different reasons), will not claim that these are evidence of convergence. The "nature conser­ vationist establishment follower (emphasis added)" in the

USSR must keep in line with official Marxist-Leninist thought by emphasizing the role of social factors in the contemporary world, even if capitalism is not unique in its environmental problems.

In fact, because the socialist world has some problems in common with the capitalist world, environmental problem­ solving may well represent fruitful ground for technology transfer. The adherents to the technocratic perspective discuss international cooperation both in the context of peaceful coexistence and combining efforts to solve sophis­ ticated problems that cannot be resolved by any country working alone. These are respondents who are strong supporters of systems analysis and global modeling, both of 45 which are economic forecasting tools that have been deve­

loped in part with access to Western computer technology.

The primary difference between this perspective and the polemical perspective is the extent to which problems are considered genuine. The "rearguard" sees only small problems where the "nature conservationist establishment

follower" sees large ones. At the same time, the technocrat places even more emphasis on the role of science and

technology than does the polemical respondent who has even more faith in existing socialism. The differences between

the technocratic and the ecological perspectives lie also in the nature of solutions: the ecologist will advocate basic changes in some aspects of society (including the use of technology) and will be greatly concerned by limits to growth, which do not greatly disturb the technocrat.

Thus, this chapter has outlined anticipated lines of cleavage in three ideal type perspectives. Chapter III explains the development of the simulated interview tech­ nique that was used to explore the prevalence of these perspectives in contemporary Soviet writings. CHAPTER III

DATA COLLECTION WITH SIMULATED INTERVIEWING

3.A Research Involving Soviet Actors

Students of Soviet politics and foreign policy fre­

quently talk about the special difficulties of data collec­ tion and analysis that befall them in their pursuit of knowledge (Breslauer 1982; Sloan 1982; Kramer 1973). Some of these special obstacles stem from the general impractica­ bility of applying methods, or more precisely, methodologi­ cal assumptions (such as random sampling), useful for

studying American political behavior to international relations research. For other reasons, research methods used in international relations research are not applicable to this study: for example, events data which have been used

successfully by international relations researchers inter­

ested in conflict has proven to be less useful when the

"events" of interest to the researcher, i.e. cooperation, are not considered noteworthy to initial recorders (Bur- rowes, 1974). Furthermore, events data banks are not useful sources for inferring the attitudes and perceptions of

individuals.

46 47

In the case of international relations research involving the Soviet Union, there are unglamorous problems of data collection which are nonetheless hard to ignore when the time comes to plunge into the cold waters of empirical research. Some of these are clearly related to the Soviet penchant for secrecy. The existence of Glavlit suggests systematic differences in retained and rejected primary sources.1 However, it is not only censorship that makes collection of Soviet data difficult. There are numerous mundane problems like the inconsistent and sparing use of footnotes, indexes, and bibliographies in even scholarly works that hinder double-checking and the snow-balling accumulation of data that enriches scholarly research in other areas. When bibliographies do appear, as in the 1972 article in Voprosy Filosofii [Problems of Philosophy] that introduced the Club of Rome and The Limits to Growth to

Soviet readers (Shilin, 1972), they are noteworthy. This deficiency could conceivably be explained as yet another manifestation of information control, yet at least one

Soviet social scientist privately explains the poverty of these research amenities as laziness on the part of authors who do not want to take the time to document their work and are not, in fact, required to do so since publication does

1 See Webb et a l . ’s (1966) discussion of content analysis for the problems of selective deposit and retention of archives. 48

not depend on it.* Another explanation is that extensive

footnotes, bibliographies, and indexes can consume many

pages and frequent paper shortages in the Soviet Union have

encouraged publishers to cut corners wherever possible.

Censorship, lack of pressure from publishers, and paper

shortages thus combine to frustrate the expectations of the

researcher using Soviet primary sources.

3.B Simulated Interviewing

The data collection technique used in this dissertation

marries the advantages of content analysis as an unobtrusive measure with the issue-specific focus of survey research in

a method called simulated interviewing. The term "simulated

interviewing" is from Krippendorff (1980), who provides a

single example of a study conducted of the history of the

views of child-rearing over a 300 year period, using this

technique of data collection. In this case, simulated

interviews were used because the majority of authors whose

views were sought were deceased. My efforts to locate other

instances in which simulated interviewing has been used were

not successful.

Other content analysis techniques are widely used in

international relations research. One of these used

2 Conversation with a section chief of a Soviet research institute at an international conference at the Inter-University Consortium in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia. 49 frequently in the study of Soviet perceptions is based on the operational code construct first developed by Leites in his Operational Code of the Politburo (1949) and refined by

George (1969, 1979). The operational code construct as it is now established, is made up of two basic categories of beliefs, philosophical and instrumental, which were derived from Leites* analysis of Bolshevism. The relationship of the philosophical beliefs in particular to Marxism-Leninism is evident. For example, the third question in the opera­ tional code:

Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? is neatly framed to elicit responses about historical materialism and inevitable progress toward Communism. The ease with which the operational code construct has been used in analyses of individuals actively engaged in East-West conflict is not surprising given its roots. Yet while the operational code may be most effective for illuminating orientations to East-West conflict, it is not readily adaptable to issue-area analysis.

In order to focus my research on Soviet perceptions of global ecological problems in particular, I have had to develop my own "operational code," which is a compendium of attitudes about different aspects of the problem, recorded via a method that resembles traditional survey or interview research, in that a survey questionnaire was constructed and responses were coded for individuals.. However, as suggested 50 above, simulated interviewing differs substantially from traditional survey research because "respondents’" answers are inferred from work that was not written with the questionnaire in mind. Like operational coding, simulated interviewing is an unobtrusive research method. Normally, interviewers must always be wary that their presence or the way in which a particular question is phrased may distort responses that are given to their questions.3 This is not a problem that affects this research.

The raw data for the "interviews" are derived from journal articles, books, and chapters written by Soviet scholars and selected because they dealt with:

1) the present and/or future state of the natural environment,

2) the social interaction of humanity and nature, and

3) global problems.

Ideal primary sources touch on all three of these aspects.

In practice, several of the articles from which simulated interviews are drawn deal with only two. This has happened because sometimes it is not possible to tell from the title alone if a given source will address the international aspects of environmental problems. For example, there are articles written under the auspices of the UNESCO Man and

Biosphere program that address specific Soviet problems,

3 For an excellent discussion of these problems, other related difficulties, and means of overcoming them, see Don A. Dillman. 1978. Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method. New York: Wiley-Interscience. 51 which are nonetheless good sources for Soviet thinking about social aspects of environmental problems.

The total population of works that should be sampled

(if the study were in keeping with the requirements of traditional survey research) is extremely difficult to identify. Because the selected works cannot be considered a scientific, random sample, I refer throughout to the articles and books included in the survey as a "pool" rather than a "sample". Western scholars have obtained searches of

Soviet bibliographic holdings from INION, but these include book titles rather than journal contributions, rather more

Western than Soviet titles, and, in any case, are not available to the researcher who is not in Moscow with the necessary connections. Given these and other difficulties described above, the researcher is often dependent on other

Western secondary sources to identify valuable Soviet primary sources, thus incorporating the biases of previous w o r k s .

It must be noted that such biases would be more likely to distort the research of the scholar who does not read

Russian. In searching through indices of Soviet publica­ tions compiled by the Joint Publications Research Service

(JPRS) of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), articles in the Soviet press that fit my decision rules for incorporation into the study were likely to be among those indexed, but not translated. Similarly, when working in the 52 private Foreign Science Library of the Battelle Memorial

Institute in Columbus, which regularly produces partial in- house translations of Priroda [Nature] and other natural science publications, those articles incorporated in my interview pool according to my decision rule were given the notation "Omit."4

It was my intention to become familiar with several different categories of sources: those published primarily for a Soviet domestic elite audience, for Soviet domestic mass audiences, and for foreign audiences. The primary sources of raw data for the simulated interviews were the following:

1. Roundtables and related articles in Voprosy Filoso- fii [Problems of Philosophy] which disseminated the concept of person-nature interdependencies as a global problem within the Soviet scholarly community. Voprosy Filosofii [Problems of Philosophy] is published by the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences and has a circulation of approximately 10,000. Twenty out of 87 simulated interviews were drawn from this source.

2. Priroda [Nature], the Soviet analogue to Scientific American. a "popular" science journal with articles written by scientists for highly-educated readers outside of their own discipline.* In addition to scientific articles of current interest, Priroda [Nature], like other Soviet publications contains Party obituaries and addresses around

4 In fairness to Battelle, these articles were among the less technical; this does mean, however, that according to the perspectives described below and in Chapter Five, non-Russian readers are probably missing a substantial portion of the Soviet ecological perspective.

s A readers’ survey conducted by the editors of Priroda in November 1983 indicates the editors' assumption that the majority of readers have either a candidate’s or a doctor’s degree (see Anketa chitatelya [Readers’ survey] 1983. Priroda. 11:127-128). 53 the time of Congresses. Frequently, the last pages and back cover of the journal are devoted to some whimsy or scienti­ fic satire, such as Piet Hein’s Grooks translated into Russian or a cartoon such as the one reproduced in the frontispiece. Priroda [Nature]*s circulation grew con­ tinuously during the period under review. Nineteen out of 87 simulated interviews were drawn from this source.

3. Books and articles translated for foreign consump­ tion. These are usually exported by Progress Publishers, suggesting a moderate to high polemical content. More technical works are translated by Nauka [Science] Publishers or by state agencies such as the State Committee on Hydro­ meteorology and Environmental Control. Seventeen out of 87 simulated interviews were drawn from these sources.

4. Kommunist. the theoretical journal of the CPSU. Compared to other issues discussed in this journal, rela­ tively little is said about global ecological problems. This is, however, a topic of occasional concern, and given the standing of this particular journal these articles must be included. Seven out of 87 simulated interviews were based on articles that appeared in this journal.

5. Specialized academic journals, which have limited circulations; including the global modeling monographs of VNIISI (the All-Union Institute for Systems Research), Soviet geography journals including Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta: seria geograficheskaya [Moscow University Geography Bulletin] and Izvestia Akademii Nauk: seria geograficheskaya [Geography News of the USSR Academy of Sciences], and the journals of international research institutes: Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhunarodnaya Otnoshenia [World Economy and International Relations] and SShA: Ekonomika. Politika. Ideologia [USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology]. Eleven of the simulated interviews are based on research that appeared in these journals.

6. Miscellaneous books and articles addressed to a mass Soviet domestic audience. These sources account for nine of the simulated interviews.

The authors and titles of individual sources for all simulated interviews are provided in the List of Interview

References preceding the Bibliography.

The time period of the analysis is 1972 through the 54

27th Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1986. I have selected 1972 as the starting point for several reasons:

1. In 1972 global ecological problems came of'age as an issue in international politics with the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm.

2. The first report to the Club of Rome, The Limits to Growth, was published in 1972. (There had actually been a meeting to discuss the report’s preliminary findings in Moscow in the summer of 1971, but the discussion in the Soviet press began in earnest in 1972.)

3. At their June 1972 summit, President Richard M. Nixon and General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev signed an "Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social­ ist Republics".

4. In September of that same year the Supreme Soviet devoted, for the first time, an entire session to the problems of the environment.

Selecting an endpoint was not as easy. It was impor­ tant to have a time span long enough to embrace the period of detente and disappointment. If international cooperation in the environmental arena is simply epiphenomenal, dis­ cussion of these issues would presumably be tied in some way to the current status of U.S.- Soviet relations. If discus­ sions of the need for environmental cooperation have a life of their own, independent of contemporary U.S.-Soviet relations, then the argument of epiphenomenon is not as easy to make. This particular argument is addressed in'Chapter

VI.

It has also seemed important to include the period of leadership succession within the analysis; and February 1986 55 represented Gorbachev’s first party congress as General

Secretary. A decision was made against including interviews based on articles published after April 1986. While the

Chernobyl accident can be expected to prompt new directions in Soviet discussions of environmental problems and the value of international cooperation (already detectable in official statements in summer 1986), including these responses in the interview pool would have prolonged data collection for many months. Soviet writing on global ecological problems since the accident is included in the sections on Soviet environmental behavior in Chapter VIII.

3.C Constructing the Interview Survey

The purpose of the simulated interview survey is to find answers to the following questions in the works of

Soviets who write about global ecological problems:

1. The nature of global ecological problems:

a) How extensive are these problems?

b) What are the causes of these environmental problems? Are there limits to growth?

c) Does human survival hinge on solving these problems?

2. The solution to global ecological problems:

a) How is the scientific study of environmental problems best conducted?

b) How effective are technological solutions? Does the solution depend on ideological considera­ tions? 56

c) Is man's and society's proper relationship with nature one of domination or dependence?

3. The value of international cooperation:

a) How important is international cooperation to the resolution of environmental problems? What, if anything, is to be learned from non-Soviet counterparts?

b) What is the relationship of detente to environ­ mental problem-solving?

c) What are useful forums for international cooperation in environmental problem-solving?

These sections have been developed because in a "pilot study"® they were useful in identifying different Soviet

"schools" of thought about environmental problems. While I do not expect that published opinion in the Soviet Union will match the range of published opinion in the West, I have been guided in my selection of questions by the work of other authors who have identified important variables in environmental thought. For example, Milbrath (1984: 43f.) has stated that the key questions in identifying groups on environmental issues are:

1. Awareness of the extent of the problem.

2. A belief in basic political or economic change vs. technology as the primary solution to environ­ mental problems.

3. A belief in "limits to growth".

® The "pilot study" was based on interviews recorded on a draft survey from Gvishiani (1979), Komarov (1980), Inozemtsev (1984), Sakharov (1968), Timofeyev (1976), and Zagladin and Frolov (1979). Results were used to refine the perspectives described in Chapter II and to construct the survey. 57

For these reasons, a large percentage of the questions in the survey deal with these issues.

The actual wording of about 50 percent of the questions in the simulated interview survey has been adapted from surveys of environmental attitudes conducted by Cotgrove

(1982), and Milbrath (1984) in order to enhance the poten­ tial of comparability. These researchers in turn have borrowed heavily from Dunlap and V an Liere’s (1978) pioneer­

ing work in the development of a New Environmental Paradigm

(NEP) scale.7 According to authors who have used the NEP scale as well as those who have criticized it (Geller and

Lasley, 1985), this scale is both reliable and valid.8

Milbrath (1984) and Cotgrove (1982) expanded on the NEP scale to analyze environmental beliefs and values in the

United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the

United Kingdom. They have independently reported on the

results of a three-nation longitudinal study conducted in two waves, one in 1980 and the second in 1982, by the

Environmental Studies Center at the State University of New

York at Buffalo, the International Institute for Environment

7 NEP as used here has nothing whatsoever to do with the Soviet New Economic Policy of the 1920s. Intradiscipli- nary discourse does have its pitfalls!

8 Dunlap and Van Liere (1978: 15ff.) provide evidence that the NEP scale has predictive validity in distinguishing individuals who belong to environmental organizations; content validity in that items have been drawn from the work of leading environmentalists; and construct validity in that responses on the scale are correlated with age, education, and political ideology. 58 and Society in Berlin, and the Science Studies Centre at the

University of Bath. The findings of these mail surveys are

discussed in Chapter VII in comparision with the results of

the simulated interviewing.

As discussed below, the simulated interview survey had

to be adapted to the Soviet case. Significant modifications were required for several reasons:

1) The simulated interview survey had to include new items to collect data about global problems and the value of international cooperation.

2) There are some questions, discussed below, which can probably not be profitably asked of Soviet citizens.

3) In completing the simulated interview surveys myself, I could only work with information that individuals have made available in public. In­ dividuals answering a mail questionnaire for themselves can no doubt make finer distinctions about their own beliefs than a researcher trying to think for them.

Thus adaptation, in some cases, has been fairly

drastic. For example, one of the items in the NEP scale is:

There are limits to growth beyond which our industrialized societies cannot expand.

To ask that question, in that form, to Soviet academics

would not be productive. In anticipation of potential

Soviet answers, I have divided this item in two:

Item No. 11: There are limits to growth beyond which capitalist societies cannot expand.

Item No. 12: There are limits to growth beyond which industrialized societies-cannot expand.

This specification allows for the identification of authors

who argue that there are limits to growth, but only in the 59 capitalist world and those who believe that limits are a more generalizable phenomenon. Given this reasoning, the second question needs further explication. Why not simply state, "There are limits to growth beyond which socialist societies cannot expand" in order to parallel the first question? This phrasing was purposefully avoided because, although it seems parallel, asking a Soviet to agree with a statement specifically identifying inadequacies in socialist systems comes perilously close to demanding overt disagree­ ment with The Soviet Dream. For this reason, I have matched the first question about the potential failings of capital­ ist societies with an unqualified statement that could include socialist societies, but not as explicitly as

Dunlap and Van Liere (1978: 13) do with the use of the word

"our."

In addition to those questions that have been drasti­ cally adapted, others in the Milbrath and Cotgrove surveys have been simply discarded. It would not be meaningful, for example, to ask Soviet elites if they believe that govern­ ment regulation is needed to protect the environment, let alone if they would be influenced in their choice of party at the next election by its policy on environmental ques­ tions. Some items from the NEP scale have been modified only slightly, e.g. I supplement a question on overpopulation:

We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support. with an additional qualifying statement: 60

There are negative consequences of population growth.

The following discussion provides the rationale for the inclusion of each item in the final version of the survey, reproduced in Appendix A, as it was employed in data collection.®

3.C.1: The Nature of the Problem

How extensive are these problems?

Awareness of the extent of environmental problems is tapped by several items. Two introductory questions which attempted to categorize respondents according to their conceptualization of global problems turned out to be non­ starters :

Item No. 1: Does the author have a classification scheme for categories of global problems?

9 Lester Milbrath provided early encouragement in proceeding along these lines. Other individuals who reviewed the survey, provided suggestions, and commented favorably upon it included: Dr. Lynton Keith Caldwell, member of the president's Environmental Advisory Board, 1970 to present and author of the National Environmental Policy Act, which created the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; Dr. Craig Davis, Secretary-General of the World Council for the Biosphere; Dr. Harold Guetzkow, who has been engaged in a five continent study of the uses and status of global modeling; Dr. Yuri Medvedkov, Founder and Director- of the now "disestablished" Institute for Human Ecology in Moscow; Dr. Robert Munn, Leader of the Environment Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; and Dr. Russell Peterson, former governor of Delaware, former president of the International Council for Bird Preserva­ tion, and current President of the Better World Society. 61

Item No. 2: Does the author use one of the following "established" Soviet schemes?

The most ambitious question in the attempt to record both awareness of the breadth of environmental problems

(including related global problems) and the depth of concern was the following:

Item No. 3: Which of the following global problems is of interest to the author? Is it a high priority, a conditional priority, not a priority at all, i.e. a bourgeois misconception, or not mentioned?

Air and/or water pollution Deforestation Depletion of raw materials Desertification Destruction of 'natural beauty* Economic development of LDCs Elimination of disease Energy shortages Extinction of species Feeding the world "Greenhouse" effect Nuclear power accidents Overpopulation Rational use of the global commons Toxic wastes Other:______

The list of problems posed in Item No. 3 were based on the results of the "pilot study" and on hunches concerning the types of problems likely to be acknowledged by Soviet authors. This question was based on a similar item in the

Milbrath survey. Milbrath includes noise, solid waste disposal, and nuclear wastes, but does not include defores­ tation, desertification, the economic development of LDCs, disease, the extinction of species, feeding the world, the 62

"greenhouse" effect, nuclear power accidents, the rational use of the global commons, or an Other category.

Most of the differences are accounted for by the fact that the emphasis on global problems in the present survey merits including some problems, such as feeding the world, the "greenhouse" effect, and rational use of global commons, which are not-as appropriate to a domestic context. Some adjustments were mistaken. For example, noise pollution was omitted from the simulated interview survey because there was no mention of it in the "pilot study." However, it ended up being the most frequently mentioned issue in the

Other category.

"Economic development of LDCs" is included in the list primarily as a check. Since the evolving Soviet conception of global problems includes the economic status of the Third

World (in common Soviet parlance this is "overcoming the backwardness of the Third World"), it was deemed useful to include this item to determine the extent to which Soviet authors isolate global ecological problems from other global problems.

A similar check is present in the reference to nuclear war in Item No. 6:

Preventing nuclear war is the most pressing global problem.

It was originally anticipated that the most polemical respondents would use a discussion of environmental problems as yet another vehicle to simply denounce preparations for 63 nuclear war without considering the independent and serious existence of the problems listed above.

Several other items are literally more down to earth, focusing on issues of natural resource use. Item No. 15 is taken directly from Milbrath:

There are likely to be serious and disruptive shortages of essential raw materials if things go on as they are.

This item challenges the traditions of Soviet practice according to which natural resources are free and unlimited

(Pryde, 1972: passim; DeBardeleben, 1985: 241). The following puts these potential shortages in a more "posi­ tive" light by stating that:

Item No. 14: The earth is a warehouse of resour­ ces; the major environmental problem today is effective management of our natural resources.

Item No. 5, which addresses the use of the concept

"noosphere," has been included in the simulated interview survey because of the concept’s importance in the history of

Soviet environmental awareness as indicated in Chapters I and II. According to DeBardeleben (1984: 136), the concept of the "biotechnosphere," or "a symbiosis of technology and nature" is more or less synonymous with that of the noo­

sphere. Item No. 5, which seeks to identify respondents who use either concept or who allude to Vernadsky, was iden­

tified by a knowledgable Soviet emigre as a "flag" for

respondents having serious environmental concerns. 64

What are the causes of these environmental problems? Are there limits to growth?

This question is an essential follow-up to the preced­ ing items gauging the extent of environmental awareness.

Whereas the previous series of questions targets respon­ dents' descriptions of the current state of environmental affairs, the following series attempts to identify the respondents’ basic explanations for the existence of global ecological problems.

The first of these, Item No. 4, tackles the respon­ dents’ use of the concept of convergence as described in

Chapter I. In the West, this theme of convergence is sometimes combined with a related discussion of the emer­ gence of a post-industrial society (Roszak, 1973 and 1978;

Bell, 1974; Cotgrove, 1982; Porritt, 1986).10 "Post-in­ dustrialism" as conceptualized by these authors refers, among other things, to a new societal paradigm in which a communal ethic valuing non-economic goods and services comes gradually, as the result of an evolutionary process, to supersede the old, industrial, materialist paradigm.

When Soviet authors discuss "convergence" or "post-in- dustrialism" it is anticipated that the validity of these concepts will be vociferously denied because they challenge the unique status of the Soviet Union. This has been

10 See also the British journal, The Ecologist, which is sub-titled "Journal of the Post Industrial Age" (Cot­ grove, 1984; 105). 65 notably true in the years following the appearance of

Sakharov's 1968 essay, Progress. Coexistence, and Intel­ lectual Freedom, in which he wrote very briefly of the environmental problems shared by the United States and the

Soviet Union. Prior to Sakharov’s release from internal exile in 1987, Item No. 4 was described by a recent Soviet emigre as "a flag" that would identify persons according to their true environmental sympathies.

While Item No. 4 challenges the significance of the

Great October Revolution, Item No. 9 challenges the conse­ quences of the second great revolution of the twentieth century, the Scientific and Technological Revolution (STR):

The scientific and technological revolution has led to serious disruption in ecological processes.

This item was adapted to the Soviet preoccupation with the

STR from two Milbrath items:

The good effects of technology outweigh the bad effects. and

We are in danger of letting technology run away with us.

In contrast to Items No. 4 and 9, which challenge the uniqueness of the Soviet state, Item No. 8 states:

Pollution of the environment is primarily a conse­ quence of the profit motive in capitalist coun­ tries .

This item is based primarily on DeBardeleben's assertion

(1985: 47) that Soviet and East German authorities consider that "the primacy of the profit motive in capitalist 66 industry results in crude indifference to resource needs and to maintenance of a healthy environment for present and future generations." This premise is also contained in a

Milbrath item suggesting that a market system encourages the exploitation of natural resources for profit. In retro­ spect, the weakness of Item No. 8 is that it places the blame solely on the profit motive. There are, in fact, other potential weaknesses in market systems, namely a lack of emphasis on foresight and planning for the public good.

Several Western scholars have suggested that a lack of planning and coordination between various elements of the governmental bureaucracy plagues environmental problem­ solving in the Soviet Union as well as in the United States

(Pryde, 1972; Bush, 1972; Kramer, 1973). A probe after Item

No. 10 asks repondents to indicate where in the world such a lack of planning is a problem:

Ecological problems are intensified by the lack of needed systems of centralized planning.

Probe: in the capitalist world? in the USSR? or globally?

While the items discussed so far would potentially place the blame for contemporary global ecological problems on ideology, system of government, or existing technology, another group of questions attributes problems to the finiteness of the natural environment. The most important items here are Nos. 11 and 12:

Item No. 11: There are limits to growth beyond which capitalist society cannot expand. 67

Item No. 12: There are limits to growth beyond which industrialized society cannot expand.

The construction of these items is discussed above at the beginning of this section.

Two other items approach the limits to growth question more obliquely. Since Malthus, population size has been argumentatively considered a key limiting factor on the natural environment. Therefore, concern with population growth, listed in Item No. 3, is repeated as an independent

question taken from the NEP scale in Item No. 7:

We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support; there are negative consequences of population growth.

Finally, Item No. 13 addresses the limits to growth question by asking the impact of growth in the Third World:

Environmental protection and the economic develop­ ment of the Third World are incompatible goals.

It was anticipated that respondents who may be reluctant to be so bold as to state that industrialized societies face

potential limits to growth might nonetheless be willing to

acknowledge these limits in more neutral territory. This

item may also capture concern about the economic backward­

ness of LDCs as addressed in Item No. 3. The range of

variation in response to Items No. 11, 12, and 13 is

discussed at length in Chapter IV.

Does human survival hinge on solving these problems?

An awareness of the extent to which human survival is 68 connected to environmental problems is presumably based on an awareness of the extent of interrelatedness in the natural world. Interrelatedness turns out to be a seductive concept. The seductiveness of interrelatedness is partly due to the deceiving simplicity with which the concept can be expressed as in Barry Commoner’s (1972) Second Law:

Everything is related to everything else.

This ecological truth is reflected in the by now well-known reports of DDT being discovered in high concentrations in the livers of Antarctic penguins far from commercial agriculture and unexpected consequences of deforestation on hydrologic cycles.

Nonetheless, Item No. 16:

Ultimately, everything in nature is related to everything else. turned out to be a non-starter, i.e. it did not serve to differentiate anybody or anything. In this case, the question was not deceivingly simple; it was simply too simplistic.

In an attempt to link "detente between man and nature" with the general survival of the human race, Item No. 17 is only slightly more specific and more successful in gaining some variation in response:

Human survival depends on the protection of the biosphere, our home — the planet earth.

This item is drawn from Dunlap and Van Liere (1978: 13):

Humans must live in harmony with nature in order to survive. 69

3.C.2: The Solution to the Problem

How ia the scientific study of environmental problems best conducted?

An emphasis on interdependence is frequently stated in conjunction with the desire for more interdisciplinary work.

One of the world's most prominent ecologists, Eugene P.

Odum, has written that, "the major role of ecologists in the near future is to promote the holistic approach to go along with the reductionist approach now so well entrenched in scientific methodology" (Odum, 1975:6). Acting on this theme, Odum subtitled the second edition of his layperson’s ecology text, The Link Between the Natural and the Social

Sciences. A growing belief in the necessity of complex understandings in fathoming the physical world and the interaction of the social world with it, has pushed ecology and interest in environmental issues beyond the limits of biological science. Ecology is now regularly called an interdisciplinary discipline. The need for "'holistic' instruction emphasizing the interconnections among global population, resource, environmental, security, and economic concerns" has been stated in U.S. government reports to the

President (Council on Environmental Quality, 1981). The

World Order Models Project which unites the efforts of social scientists from all continents and most disciplines in an attempt to design preferred world orders, lists 70

"ecological balance" as a criteria for evaluating sustain­ able political systems.

Because some Soviets have been actively involved in multilateral environmental programs that are also interdis­ ciplinary (and because many Western ecologists make the argument that the study of the environment is, by nature, interdisciplinary), two items designed to tap "interdisci- plinariness," or the absence thereof, have been included:

Item No. 18: Global ecological problems are ‘bounded’ problems that can be successfully resolved within the context of a single, existing scientific discipline. and

Item No. 19: Global ecological questions are 'un­ bounded* problems that transcend interdisciplinary boundaries and inherently demand many forms of intellectual cross-breeding to resolve.

An even more rigorous statement against reductionism in ecology is made by Western Marxists who argue that when complex approaches fail, new approaches should be more

rather than less complex. A dialectical approach which permits analyses of both one-to-many and many-to-one

relationships is declared to be most fruitful in ecological studies (Levins and Lewontin, 1985). This analysis serves as the basis for Item No. 20:

Marxist dialectics prevent the kind of reduction­ ism that hampers solutions to global ecological problems.

The relative complexity of ecological interactions with extensive feed-back features has led another group of 71 researchers to the wide adoption of systems analysis by ecologists around the world (Jeffers, 1978). In fact, one of the newest aspects of East-West environmental cooperation

(based on long-standing exchanges) is a project co-directed by Dennis Meadows in which senior Soviet industrial and governmental officials will be trained in the application of systems analysis to environmental and resource management.11

This is the basis for Item No 21:

The large-scale, comprehensive and multi-discipli­ nary nature of global problems necessitates a wide application of systems analysis, including global modeling.12

How effective are technological solutions? Does the solution depend on ideological considerations?

Pryde (1972) and DeBardeleben (1984) both describe a prevailing Soviet belief that there is a technological "fix" for every environmental problem. In their surveys, Milbrath

(1984) and Cotgrove (1982) ask respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement that:

Science and technology are our best hope for the future.

The emphasis on the "technological fix" is to be contrasted with the need for a new society. In fact, the title of

Milbrath’s book, Environmentalists: Vanguard for a New

11 Communication with Dennis Meadows, September 1986.

12 Intriguingly, Levins and Lewontin (1985: 135) reject systems analysis on the grounds that it is not holistic at all, but rather reductionism on a larger scale. 72

Society, is indicative of the extent to which he interprets

the preoccupation with societal transformation as the

distinguishing characteristic of environmentalists.

Similarly, in her study of ontological beliefs, Hunter

(1984: 105) found the following to be a distinguishing belief of deep ecologists:

The solution to the environmental problem is a lifestyle change and a basic change in society.

The importance of this belief is reasserted by Milbrath*s

discussion in which he discounts the importance of a group

of respondents labelled "nature conservationist establish­ ment followers". While it may be "anomalous. . . for

technology enthusiasts who deny limits to growth also to believe there is a large environmental problem" (Milbrath,

1984: 58), prior work on Soviet environmental attitudes

suggests that this would be a plausible response pattern.

Items No. 22 through 25 as a group explore the extent

to which technology is considered a panacea for environmen­

tal problems. Nos. 22 and 24 are a pair with^different

geographical emphases:

Item No. 22: The solution to man-nature problems in the USSR will be found in greater scientific and technological achievement.

Item No. 24: The solution to global ecological problems will be found in greater scientific and technological development.

These are contrasted with alternative solutions in Nos. 23

and 25: 73

Item No. 23: The solution to man-nature problems in the USSR will involve some changes in the economic structure of society.

Item No. 25: The solution to global ecological problems will be found in basic changes in the nature of society.

Because faith in technology is assumed to be such an important point and because nuclear power is easily viewed as the epitome in "hard technology," a separate item on the safety and utility of nuclear power is included:

Item No. 28: The peaceful development of nuclear power is a safe and/or indispensable response to the global energy problem.

Two items were included to try to elicit more informa­ tion about the kinds of changes in society that were being recommended:

Item No. 29: A society in which economic growth is more important than environmental protection.

Item No. 32: A society willing to pay necessary costs to implement and enforce legislation on environmental protection.

Both of these items turned out to be non-starters. That is, virtually all respondents could be interpreted as giving balanced weight to economic growth and environmental protection. In terms of legislation, it was exceedingly rare to find a response that went beyond simply naming individual decrees.

Is man*s and society’s proper relationship with nature one of domination or dependence? 74

One of the most noted or notorious articles in the history of environmentalism (White, 1967)-attributed environmental deterioration in the twentieth century to the anthropocentrism of the Judeo-Christian tradition in which man is believed to hold dominion over nature. Given

DeBardeleben’s (1984: 135) description of "the official commitment to an interventionist approach to nature" and the roots of a Soviet commitment to the mastery of nature in the historical materialism of Marxism-Leninism, Item No. 26 reads:

It is human destiny to plan the rebuilding and transformation of nature.

This item collapses two NEP scale items:

Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs. and:

Humans need not adapt to the natural environment because they can make it to suit their needs.

These contrast with Item No. 27, which suggests that inter­ ventionist activities may come up against biological limits:

Humans need to consider the regenerative capabili­ ties of the biosphere when planning their produc­ tion activities.

Items No. 29 through 33 attempt to code whether or not respondents favor or disfavor societies which encourage more or less harmonious relationships with nature. As described above, neither Item No. .29 nor Item No. 32 was particularly revealing. Item No. 30: 75

A society that emphasizes utilizing and/or transforming nature to meet human needs. was not particularly helpful (no respondent disfavored that kind of society). More variation was apparent in Item No.

31, which asked for respondents preferences concerning nature conservation (for scientific research or for pro­ longed exploitation).

The last item in the section gets at the issue of mastery over nature, anthropocentrism and the justifications for interventionism by asking whether respondents favor or disfavor:

Item No. 33: A society that emphasizes preserving nature for its own sake (aesthetic and/or moral reasons).

Unlike some of the other items in this section, this item yielded responses that make sense in terms of the three perspectives outlined in Chapter Two.

3.C.3: The Value of International Cooperation

The largest group of questions that are not based on existing surveys of environmental attitudes are those dealing with international cooperation. Authors writing about environmental problems affecting the Soviet Union seem to be unaware of international actors in this issue area, as suggested by their lack of familiarity with the names of 76

prominent INGOs.13 Most works, even those acknowledging

their "pre-ecological" concern with sovereignty and the

nation-state system (Kelley, 1976:7ff), focus on the domestic context of environmental policy.

How important is international cooperation to the resolution of environmental problems? What, if anything, is to be learned from non-Soviet counterparts?

This group of questions tries to contrast orientations

to the value of international cooperation and the value of

national autonomy in resolving serious environmental

problems. This is clearly the case with Item No. 39:

According to the author, how important is national self-reliance to the successful resolution of ecological problems?

and Item No. 38:

According to the author, how important is interna­ tional cooperation to the successful resolution of global ecological problems?

Bush (1972), Kramer (1973), and Zeigler (1980) suggest

that environmental problems within the Soviet Union are due

to the failure to assign a high priority to environmental

problems. Whether or not they are given a high priority,

environmental successes and failures in the Soviet Union are

not fully described in accessible literature. Soviet authors

are prone to write in vague (frequently self-congratulatory)

13 For example, Ruble (1980: 4) states that in 1956 the USSR joined the International Union for the Protection of Nature and Natural Resources [sic], suggesting that he is familiar with this organization only through Soviet sources. 77 generalities and the identification of specific events or processes is a refreshing and notable change from the norm.

Items No. 34 and 35 seek to identify the extent to which

Soviet authors interested in resolving global ecological problems can or will identify areas of success or failure.

Similarly, Items No. 36 and 37 seek specificity about international efforts:

Does the author provide examples of international success in dealing with any global ecological problem? and

Does the author provide examples of international failure in dealing with any global ecological problem?

Item No. 38 also seeks specificity about what is to gained from international cooperation by asking what functions international cooperation should perform. Do the scientists involved anticipate cooperation in monitoring, information exchange, coordination, rule-making, or some other aspect of environmental activity?

Item No. 41 takes a more.general, shot gun approach in simply asking the respondents if there is anything of value in Western contributions to the study of global ecological problems:

Does the author state that non-Soviet, Western, or bourgeois authors have contributed to understand­ ing global ecological problems? 78

What ia the relationship of detente to environmental problem-solving?

This question is tapped by Item No. 40:

Does the author see a connection between detente and the successful resolution of global ecological problems? and its probe:

Must arms control agreements precede the success­ ful resolution of other global problems? or vice versa? Why?

The probe is trying to get at the potential direction of influence. Where must cooperation occur first?

Many Soviet scientists who engage in exchange with the

West are "primitive functionalists," i.e. they believe that scientists around the world speak a common language and science therefore represents the last, best hope of mankind.

For these reasons, I have included Item No. 42 to gauge the pervasiveness of this belief:

Does the author discuss "functionalism" or cite functionalist authors?

If so, how is the concept treated?

What are useful forums for international cooperation in environmental problem-solving?

If one of the purposes of this dissertation is to make predictions concerning the feasibility and/or utility of

East-West collaborative efforts at environmental protection, it certainly makes sense to get a reading on Soviet evalua­ tions of past efforts. This question is approached with two separate items. A probe to Item No. 36, which seeks 79 specific examples of international success, asks which countries were involved in the case of bilateral successes and which agencies were involved in the case of multilateral successes.

In another attempt to guage respondents’ views of the efficacy of international efforts, the last item in the survey asks the following question:

Does the author believe that the organizations, institutions, or processes that are needed to resolve global ecological problems already exist?

What are the desirable/undesirable features of such organizations, institutions, processes?

3.D: The Interview "Respondents"

While it may be accepted that simulated interviewing is a useful method for gauging Soviet attitudes and perceptions relevant to international environmental cooperation, the question remains as to whose attitudes and perceptions are being gauged. As noted in Chapter I, functionalist theory suggests that it is or will be individuals with common expertise in a given field who will collaborate and even­ tually come to represent a network of international problem solvers. The theory does not predict that politicians will first become converts to an expert’s cause and then an expert in the field. Haas (1980:369) does state, however, that in order for there to be a basis for international collaboration, knowledge must be consensual, i.e. it must 80

"seep into the consciousness of policy makers and other influential groups and individuals." This quote suggests the necessity of learning what Soviet Politburo members believe about international cooperation and global ecologi­ cal problems. The difficulty in the Soviet context when it comes to studying the relevant beliefs of political elites is that their statements on global problems are so noncom­ mittal that it is hard to infer much if anything from them.

For example, Brezhnev’s statement below can be appealed to by individuals who may have an ecological, technocratic, or polemical perspective:

Global problems such as primary materials and energy, the eradication of the most dangerous and widespread diseases, environmental protection, space exploration and the utilization of the resources of the World Ocean are already suffi­ ciently important and urgent. In the future they will exercise an increasingly perceptible influ­ ence on the life of each nation and the entire system of international relations. The Soviet Union, like other socialist countries, cannot hold aloof from the solution of these problems which affect the interest of all mankind (Brezh­ nev 1976: 98).

Some of the individuals whose writings are surveyed are policy and/or opinion makers. Ivan Frolov was identified in

Chapter I as current editor-in-chief of Kommunist and former editor-in-chief of Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philoso­ phy] . Dzhermen Gvishiani, one of the more important

14 L.I. Brezhnev, "Report of the Central Committee on the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy." 25th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow 1976, p.98. Quoted by Timofeyev, The Working Class and Social Progress p. 170. 81 respondents, is Alexei Kosygin’s son-in-law and recently moved from his position as Director of the State Committee on Science and Technology (GKNT) to become a Deputy Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN). Gvishiani, who has also been Council Chairman of the International In­ stitute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg

Austria, was involved in the establishment of the Club of

Rome and has been engaged at the forefront of international efforts to resolve global problems through global modeling.

Other commentators on global ecological problems — Vadim

Zagladin, Pyotr Fedoseyev, the late Yevgeny Fyodorov and

Nikolai Inozemtsev — are, or were, members of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Many respondents are members of the elite USSR Academy of

Sciences and most are directors or deputy directors of research institutes. More specific biographical information about key respondents will be provided in Chapter V.

Western scholars differ on the extent to which academi­ cians engaged in cooperative international efforts, as the representatives of interest groups, have access to policy­ makers (Stewart 1984). The most relevant work on this topic

is the literature on Soviet research institutes (Cobb 1981;

Eran 1981; Valkenier 1983; Hough 1985). Those who argue that

the research institutes do have influence on policy point to

the personal relationships that institute directors, like

Arbatov and Inozemtsev, have with Politburo members. 82

Others, specifically challenging interest group theory, argue that the ideas and concepts discussed by academics and intellectuals remain wholly external to policy discussions.

More cogently, Valkenier (1983: 149) argues:

The fact that new interpretations appear most prominently in academic publications does not mean that these opinions do not inform or reflect the policy-making process. Key academic experts supply information and recommendations to people directly responsible for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

Brezhnev’s all-embracing statement cited above, in tandem with directions to the academic community to pay more attention to global problems, support Valkenier’s statement that the Soviet political leadership looks to the academic community for direction. Here, then are two good reasons for analyzing the writings of academics and intellectuals on international environmental problems:

1. Their ideas may represent a possible foundation for functional cooperation in resolving mutually perceived problems.

2. Their ideas represent the background of expert opinion upon which political elites may base policy decisions.

It will not be possible to generalize from the simu­ lated interviews to what is perceived or valued by Politburo members concerning global ecological problems or which bila­ teral or multilateral arrangements will be approved by governments. I should be able to identify the perceptions and possibly the goals of likely Soviet participants in international cooperative environmental protection efforts. 83

If prevailing perceptions can be identified, I may be able to suggest likely directions of international efforts if and when they should be initiated.

3.E: Collecting and Analyzing the Data

The survey instrument was originally designed so that data could be analyzed quantitatively. Numerical response categories were established (i.e. 1 = Strongly Agree,

5 = Strongly Disagree, 9 = No Comment, etc.) in order to enable analysis with descriptive statistics which may be appropriately used with ordinal data. However, the extent of missing data in some categories and the rich responses to other items quickly changed my emphasis in favor of more qualitative analysis of Soviet perceptions. As indicated in tables in the next several chapters, this change also involved collapsing six ordinal categories listed in the survey into four nominal categories: Agree, Balanced,

Disagree, and Other.

This change was prompted largely due to the extent of missing data. I originally planned on completing 75 interviews; if each of 75 "respondents" had answered 43 questions there would have been 3225 data points. Given more interviews than anticipated and the extent of missing data, there were actually 1740 data points for 87 inter­ views. More qualitative analysis also seemed justified 84 because the verbal responses to individual survey items turned out to be both richer and more diverse than origin­ ally anticipated. When completed, my surveys were covered with the scribblings of long, descriptive quotes to supple­ ment the sometimes hesitant circling of "Strongly Agree" or

"Strongly Disagree." In effect, given the attention to the respondents’ individual statements, the content analysis aspects of the simulated interviewing technique became much more important than the survey aspects.

In practice, as described in Chapters VI and VII, the content analysis was enhanced by the supplemental coding of the interviews according to key themes mentioned by the

interviewees in response to a given item or question. The key themes recorded were derived from the perspectives described in Chapter II, but in some cases, key themes were introduced by the interviewees themselves. Filing and recalling interviews according to the appearance of key themes was assisted by a commercial software program that

facilitated Boolean searching of all of the interviews simultaneously.1 5

According to Krippendorff (1980), George (1969) and

Holsti (1969) the researcher using qualitative analysis may be more sensitive to the context of messages and to the use

15 The software program used is SquarenoteTM, a product of UnionSquareware. With this program, I could search the interviews for simultaneous mentions of up to nine key themes at once (with the possibility of expanding each search ad infinitum). 85 of nuanced words or phrases. That a word occurs at all, e.g. "interdependence" rvzaimozavisimostl. or that it does not occur in certain places within a document, e.g. the authors of The Limits to Growth are not described as bourgeois, may be more telling than a frequency count. The careful reading and re-reading that qualitative content analysis entails can lead to serendipitous discoveries of conjunctions or disjunctions in texts that frequency counts may not pick up. An excellent example of the latter is N.N.

Moiseyev’s explicit use of the word "divergence" fdivergen- tsial in the conclusion of an article that can be read as an affirmation of the convergence of environmental problems affecting all countries (Moiseyev, 1984: 67).

A further advantage of qualitative content analysis is that it is feasible. Quantitative content analysis is an arduous task that involves a voluminous amount of data (in order to properly apply statistical analyses) and multiple coders.10 In the description of his Soviet elite perceptions project, Stewart provides the dimensions of the task:

Sources utilized include all full reports of Politburo speeches and signed articles appearing during the period of the study (1972-1979) or during the tenure on the Politburo of the indivi­ dual concerned. This amounts to over 2400 individual sources, and nearly 15,000 pages of material (Stewart 1982: 11).

10 Krippendorff provides these samples of the numbers of units of analysis that have been typically involved in quantitative analysis: 4022 advertising slogans; 19,533 editorials; 15,000 characters in 1000 hours of television fiction. 86

The fact that qualitative content analysis is an accessible technique can, however, also pose questions about its reliability and suggest a potential loss of rigor. In this context it is important to note that systematization and precision are not synonymous with quantification. In fact, precision may be sacrificed for quantification when numeri­ cal techniques are inappropriately applied to data.

There are two aspects of my data analysis that do involve quantification. The use of the variation ratio to identify particularly controversial items is described at length in Chapter IV. Another measure -- a polemical quotient — was designed and calculated to serve as an indicator of the extent of ideological hostility directed toward the West in a given source. The denominator in the quotient is the total number of paragraphs in the article

(or pertinent chapter of a book). The numerator is the number of paragraphs containing one of the following themes:

1. Global ecological problems are best understood within the framework of class struggle.

2. Socialists are inherently better at resolving these problems than capitalists.

3. Bourgeois ideology is bankrupt; bourgeois scholars cannot properly understand environmental problems.

An examination of the frequency distribution of the percentage of polemical themes in the interview pool revealed distinct breaks at 10 percent, 20 percent, and 40 percent. Therefore, qualitatively speaking, those ranked at 87 less than 10 percent are said to have a low polemical quotient, those between 10 and 19 — a moderate polemical quotient, between 20 and 39 — a high polemical quotient, and above 40 an extremely high polemical quotient.

One of the primary reasons for engaging in quantitative analysis is to insure systematic inquiry. The simulated interview procedure itself is one method of guaranteeing systemization. The survey questions provide insurance that each article, chapter, or monograph is read to answer the same questions. Each interviewed article was read and re­ read so that the sense of the article as a whole, rather than a single phrase was recorded in the interview. If there is no comment relevant to the specific question, that is so recorded. Questions are asked that probe at the same concept

(e.g. interrelatedness) from several different angles, so that important data do not hinge on a single question.

Reports of Soviet perceptions and confirming/discon- firming statements in surveys are all footnoted so that anyone who wants to "see for themselves" can easily find their way to the appropriate citation, provided they can read Russian. The extent to which my research is drawn from several different types of sources and describes variation in Soviet perceptions is one indication that the work does not suffer unduly from systematic bias: systematic distor­ tion would have been more likely to thrust findings in one general direction than in several competing directions. CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS BASED ON DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

4.A: Introduction

This chapter begins the analysis of the results of the simulated interviewing described in Chapter III. There are very few readily discernible patterns in the numerically coded responses to the survey. In fact, there is very little quantifiable variation. This may be attributable to the fact that there is so much missing data.1 The total pool, as described in the previous chapter, contains 87 interviews.2 Yet, only two of the 43 items had responses in as many as 60 interviews (approximately two-thirds of the total number of coded cases). The average (mean) number of

1 The missing data, in turn, may be attributable to shortcomings in the actual survey. Improvements for the purposes of future research will be recommended in Chapter VII.

2 Curiously, there are 87 individuals who have coded responses and 87 "interviews" were coded. There is not, however, a one to one correspondence between individuals and interviews. Some interviews are coded from articles or books that have multiple authors (e.g. Babayev, Demin, Kuzmin and Stepanchikov; Astanin and Blagosklonov; Vonrosy filosofii and Priroda roundtables etc.); some individuals are represented more than once (e.g. Fedorenko and Reimers, Ye.K. Fyodorov, Frolov, Gvishiani, Zagladin et a l . ) .

88 89 responses to an item is only 38 or 43% percent of the total pool. As a rule, I avoided coding articles that appeared to address fewer than 21 items (50% of all items in the survey), but it is not uncommon for a given interview to have missing data on as many as 18 or 19 items.3

The responses to the items were not easy to code (for this reason the coding on several was done twice). As stated in Chapter III, the survey asked for responses to be coded on a scale that allowed for Strongly Agree, Agree,

Balanced, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, or No Comment.

"Balanced" was chosen as a scale category in place of

"Neutral" since neutrality sometimes implies either lack of knowledge or lack of concern. A "Balanced" opinion implies that the respondent sees pros and cons of answering both in the affirmative and in the negative.

This scale forced too fine a differentiation on my coding. The difficulty was all the more obvious in the case of Items No. 38 - 40, which asked for differentiation between Vital, Important, Somewhat Important, and Not

Important. This difficulty will be apparent to scholars familiar with Soviet texts, which abound with set phrases like "life itself demonstrates" fzhizn sama demonstriruyet 1 .

It may be possible for Ivan Ivanovich himself to distinguish

3 Some articles that were not included in the inter­ view sample because they were too narrowly focused are nonetheless cited when they contain valuable illustrative material. 90 between his strong agreements and his simple agreements, but it is difficult for me to do so for him. The distinction between agreement and disagreement is much easier for me to make (the easiest items to code were those that allowed only three choices — Yes, No, and No Comment; or Favor, Dis­ favor, a nd No Comment). Therefore, the most frequently used scale was collapsed to Agree, Balanced, Disagree, and No

Comment. I was also forced to add a new category of Other to handle the unexpected richness of some of the data.4

Finally, given all of these adaptations and the pervasive­ ness of missing data, I concluded that coded responses should not be interpreted as ordinal, but simply as nominal data.

There are not many statistics that are appropriately applied to nominal data. Information about the raw numbers responding to Items Nos. 4 - 43 in the survey, and the percentage of respondents answering in each category has been provided in Appendix E. In the appendix, each item is

identified with a short, one word name. The full wording of each item is given both in Appendix A, which reproduces the survey verbatim, and in Chapter III. Items Nos. 1 and 2 are

4 Responses coded as "Other" do not directly address the item. However, something related has been stated that seems worthy of note. For example, Novik (1975: 114) rejects "bourgeois" interest in the advantages of Eastern (pretechnological) culture as essentially ignoring the real ecological plight of less developed countries. This concern was coded as "Other" in response to Item No. 13 on the tension between environmental protection and economic growth in the Third World. 91 not included in this summary appendix because fewer than 12 percent of the respondents could be counted as using explicit categories in their conceptualization of global problems. While at least 70 percent of the respondents listed particular global ecological problems that concerned them in response to Item No. 3, this item is not included in

Appendix E because there are so many potential combinations of issues that response patterns are difficult to represent concisely in a table. The kinds of problems that concern different categories of respondents are discussed in Chapter

V and Chapter VI. Chapter VII compares these concerns with those of respondents to Western surveys.

The only statistic included with the summary data in

Appendix E is the variation ratio for responses to Items No.

4-43. The following description of the variation ratio, which is appropriately used with nominal data, comes from

Blalock (1979: 76f.):

Basically, [the variation ratio] is a measure of the degree to which cases are concentrated in the modal category, rather than being distributed more evenly throughout all categories. It is defined as follows:

V.R. — 1 — fboda i /N

where faodai refers to the number of cases in the modal category and N to the total number of cases. Obviously, the measure is insensitive to the distribution of cases in the nonmodal categories and is of course dependent on the categorization process. Its advantage lies in its extreme simplicity and intuitive appeal, as well as the fact that in the case of nominal scales one cannot make use of the ordering of categories to con­ struct more refined measures. 92

One might also add that used in an analysis of Soviet perceptions, the measure has an added intuitive appeal: the lower the variation ratio (i.e. the closer to -1.0), the greater the evidence of a rigorously defended standard

"line;" the higher the variation ratio (i.e. the closer to

0.0), the greater the evidence of some leeway in permitted discussion.

The computed variation ratios for the 40 items in

Appendix E do tend to be quite low. The average (mean) variation ratio is -0.67 with almost one-third above -0.80.

This simultaneously suggests that those questions for which there is an unusually high variation ratio may be worthy of examination in some detail and that the survey items, as they were worded, may not have tapped the most differentiat­ ing aspects of Soviet perceptions of global ecological problems.

This is where the advantages of the technique of simu­ lated interviewing come into play. It is possible to examine the recorded qualitative responses to given ques­ tions and, in some cases, make sense of the order or disorder in very large "Other" categories when the variation ratio suggests virtual unanimity. Qualitative analysis is similarly required when an item simply asks, as does Item

No. 4:

Does the author make reference to 'convergence' or 'post-industrial society’? 93

In this case, qualitative analysis is necessary to determine the context in which the reference has been made and whether or not the terms were discussed with favor or disfavor.

This kind of analysis is conducted in Chapters V and VI, which discuss the actual occurrence and shape of the three perspectives outlined in Chapter II.

In a word, Chapters II, V, and VI outline a tripartite consensus providing the parameters of Soviet discussion of global ecological problems. The current chapter discusses some of the "fracture points" in that consensus, identified as those items with an unusually high variation ratio.

There were three below -0.40, including questions tapping issues of the environment and the Third World, nuclear energy, and limits to growth. Perhaps because of the controversy inherent in these items no more than half, and closer to a third of the "respondents" addressed these items.

4.B: Can the Third World be concerned with Environmental Protection?

The distribution of responses for Item No. 13: "Envi­ ronmental protection and the economic development of the

Third World are incompatible goals," as shown in Table 2 below indicates that there is more variation on this item than on any other. This is a particularly rewarding finding since this item was included in the survey partly as a 94

"surrogate," anticipating the possibility that respondents might be more willing to acknowledge limits to growth in neutral territory (see Section 3.C.I.).

TABLE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO ITEM NO. 13: THIRD WORLD

Agree Disagree Balanced Other Total V.R.

7 12 5 9 33 22% 34% 15% 28% 99% -0.30

Total does not equal 100% due to rounding. Respondents (n = 33); 38 percent of Total Pool

It is noteworthy that Soviet scholars do use the term

"Third World" [trety mirl (as well as the term "developing countries" frazvivayushchiesya stranl) in their writings.

This is interesting because the usage does not seem to be correlated with an image of the rest of the world rigidly divided into two camps. In fact, Elizabeth Valkenier suggests that in keeping with the directives of the 26th

CPSU Congress, "the former rigid bifurcation or trifurcation of international economic life into geopolitical categories has been jettisoned" (Valkenier, 1983: 66).

Still, the issue of the environment and the Third World continues to be treated polemically by some authors. 95

The social ecology article in The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, repeats the frequent critique that concern about ecological problems in the Third World has resurrected Malthusianism or is evidence of reactionary alarmism (Ogurtsov and Yudin,

1978: 1786; see also Mitryushkin and Shaposhnikov, 1977:

48) .

The respondents in the Agree category are those who suggest that environmental protection and economic growth are not compatible in the Third World. They are categorized here either on the basis of their explicit arguments or because they have excluded the environment from their discussion of the Third World and global economic develop­ ment. My inference here is that for these respondents, the environment is a non-issue, or at least irrelevant, in terms of Third World economic growth. Those in the Disagree category have all made explicit statements that environmen­ tal protection is a precondition for economic growth in the

Third World.

The argument that Third World countries cannot afford to consider environmental problems in their quest for economic development is made most forcefully by Ye.K.

Fyodorov and I.P. Laptev. Significantly, Fyodorov in

Kommunist (1972: 81) interprets the authors of The Limits to

Growth as recommending that the developing countries of the world in particular should cease economic development.

Fyodorov’s views do not appear to have changed on this issue 96 over the course of a decade. In Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy] (1981: 81) he again argued that political leaders in developing countries should not halt their economic development to meet bourgeois demands when there is still great inequality in the world. In another Kommunist article, Laptev (1975: 70) states that Third World countries can justifiably ignore problems of environmental protection while they deal with the more important problems of "hunger, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and scientific and technical backwardness." Similar orientations to the incompatibility of environmental protection and the economic development of the Third World are implied by those who discuss only the latter in their review of global problems manifest in developing countries (Frolov, 1982; Tsukanov and

Miroshnichenko, 1982).9

There is a definite category of respondents who argue that there is an incompatibility between environmental protection and economic growth only if the Third World follows the capitalist model of development. Following the roundtable organized by the World Marxist Review at the suggestion of the Italian Communist Party, the journal's

9 While Sakharov’s views are not usually considered to be compatible with those of dogmatic Marxist-Leninists, in regard to this particular question his views are similar to the developmentalist position taken by some of the most polemical respondents in the sample. Sakharov (1968: 47) argues that the Third World needs to experience economic growth before its leaders can worry about environmental problems. 97 editor-in-chief reported participants' statements that

Africa can end its economic backwardness without disrupting ecological balance, but only if "powerful social forces are brought into play to prevent spontaneous growth of the capitalist type" (Zarodov, 1972: 38).

The next year, the editors of Voprosy filosofii [Pro­ blems of Philosophy] (1973: 164) concluded that the only incompatibility between environmental protection and economic growth in the Third World lay in the minds of bourgeois scientists and Third World advocates of nonalign­ ment :

A truly scientific social analysis of ecological problems is very important to Third World coun­ tries. The spreading of incomplete and distorted notions of the real social forces and effects causing ecological contradictions can produce serious aberrations in the social mind of the developing countries and push them away from the modern technical and economic means of development which they so acutely need. Furthermore, such an orientation of the public mind serves as a nutritive medium for ideas, already quite widely held in many of the liberated countries about the uniqueness and the exceptional character of the historical road for the "third world" [sic]. Yet development of the "third world" countries along the capitalist road under conditions of the ignorance of the social causes of the ecological danger with which they are pregnant can further complicate the ecological situation of humanity today.

This statement is accompanied by the assertion of socialist aid to developing countries in managing the tension between economic growth and environmental protection. Despite this claim, evidence of such aid is not readily available.

Neither CIA nor Soviet reports of Soviet aid to LDCs 98 includes environmental assistance as a category. Develop­ ment aid is overwhelmingly dedicated to heavy industry (65% to 74.5% depending on the estimate); if agricultural aid is primarily in the form of machinery and equipment, then assistance in environmental protection probably falls into a remaining "Other" category including science, culture, care of public health and other sectors at only 5X to 6% of

Soviet economic and technical assistance to developing countries.6

In an highly polemical article in SShA on the interna­ tional impact of U.S. environmental policy, V.Yu. Katasonov

(1982) ties the Third World’s environmental problems strictly to imperialism, which is damned no matter which direction politicians turn. The leaders of developing countries would like to receive reparations for the ecologi­ cal damages caused by foreign monopolies; at the same time, capitalists attempt to doom economic development in the

Third World by protectionist measures banning "dirty im­ ports," i.e. products that are not produced on an environ­ mentally sound basis. In this analysis, the ecological problems exported to developing countries by the West are serious, including soil erosion, tropical deforestation, and

8 Figures on Soviet aid distribution are taken from two piecharts, one derived from the Central Intelligence Agency. 1979. Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1979 and 1954-1979. and a second from the June 1982 translation of Vneshniaya torgovlia [Foreign Trade], both of which appear in Valkenier (1983: 156). 99

"organogenic" pollution; in fact, the ecological situation is worse in the Third World than in developed capitalist states. Nonetheless, Eatasonov appears to link economic growth in those countries to the ability to export goods to the West free from ecological considerations. A similar point is made in a moderately polemical article by Los

(1982: 92) in which he claims that ecological considerations play a "not unimportant role in the struggle for the New

International Economic Order."

If the issue of environmental problems in developing countries is the subject of highly polemical treatises, it is also discussed dispassionately in international relations as well as popular science journals. One of the most detailed of these appeared in MEMO. Karagodin (1982: 142) reports that at the beginning of the 1970s and at the

Stockholm conference, many Third World leaders relegated their concern about environmental problems to the slogan,

"Our pollution is our poverty."7 Even today, when leaders in developing countries are becoming aware of the danger, they are willing to accept pollution from other countries if this increases their opportunities for industrialization.

In opposition to this relaxed concern, Karagodin (1982: 136)

7 Some Soviet scholars who attribute Third World environmental problems to poverty do not thereby mean to imply that the problems are not serious or unique: "Ecologi­ cal danger in the Third World is manifest in the set of phenomena of undevelopment, which are unusually exacerbated by "the demographic explosion” (Vyunitsky in VFR 1974, 10: 59). 100 argues that the degradation of the environment will in and of itself hamper the economic and social development of the

Third World. This same argument is stated even more boldly in Priroda [Nature] by Fedorenko, Lemeshev, and Reimers

(1980: 5) who use examples from the Sahel to describe the plight of developing countries with unbalanced ecological systems: "without the preservation of ecological balance, the ecodevelopment of humanity is impossible, only economic ruin iB probable. "

Given that the Stockholm conference or United Nations agencies are mentioned in the pool by 48% of all respon­ dents, it is surprising that UNEP is mentioned in conjunc­ tion with the Third World by only two (Ananichev, 1976;

Shokin, 1981). According to Ananichev, in UNEP meetings it is becoming clear that the leaders of developing countries want industrialization, but not at the price of ecological ruin. Thus Ananichev, who must know the technological limits of Soviet development assistance (see Section 4.C), states that developing countries should not accept the transfer of obsolete or second-hand technologies (1976:

32) .s

8 In his review of Ananichev*s book, Vyunitsky (1974) reports that the resolution of global ecological problems depends on speeding up economic growth in the Third World without mentioning special technical requirements. Unfor­ tunately, the Russian original of Ananichev*s book is not accessible and it is not possible to say whether this is a distortion on Vyunitsky*s part or a change made for the English translation. 101

Since Stockholm, the Soviets have been engaged in UNEP activities and for a while, the director of the information department in Nairobi was a Soviet. L.I. Shokin (1981: 17), reporting on UNEP’s activities to Priroda [Nature]'s readers, recalls that the organization was located in the

Third World specifically to attract the interest of develop­ ing countries to environmental problems. Those authors who state that there has been a shift in Third World concern about the environment since Stockholm (Karagodin, 1982;

Novikov, 1984) imply that this policy has succeeded.

A few authors have balanced responses that do not emphasize either compatibility or incompatibility. Some simply state that the ecological situation in developing countries is not yet properly understood (Fedoseyev, 1981:

16) . Others argue that economic growth and ecological balance in the South depend on ecological balance in the

North (Fedorenko and Reimers, 1981: 11). This particular remark is interesting because it is not entirely clear from the context whether the authors are talking about North-

South concerns in a domestic or in a global context.

Finally, Frolov (1982: 143) turns his attention to the Third

World’s environmental problems in a book written for foreign audiences and states that the developed and the developing world should meet different criteria: "for developing countries this is an ecologically justified development. 102 while for industrial countries it is an ecologically

.justified development" (emphasis in original).

The Other category for Item No. 13 is rather large. A number of commentators discuss the environment and the Third

World raising issues that are not easily codeable as the statement is phrased. The general tenor of these comments is that while environmental problems in developing countries can be overcome, they are serious and depend on appropriate technology and assistance for resolution. Fedorenko and

Reimers (1974: 7) discuss the Green Revolution and conclude that it was unsuccessful because the agricultural conditions in Third World countries were different than anticipated.

The concern about the development and transfer of technology ecologically appropriate to tropical ecosystems is also made at length in Karagodin’s MEMO article (1982: 140); and by

Miroshnichenko (1979: 119) in Kommunist.

4.C: Is Nuclear Energy Safe? Is it Necessary?

The item on which there is the second greatest reported variation in perception is Item No. 28 which states:

The peaceful development of nuclear power is a safe and/or indispensable response to the global energy problem.

The amount of missing data on this item is considerable, only 28% of the surveyed sources addressed this issue.

Nonetheless, the variation ratio computed for those who did 103 respond, is -0.35 (see Table 3 for details). As''Blalock states, the variation ratio "is insensitive to the distribu­ tion of cases in the nonmodal categories" and therefore will not summarize polarization. Intriguingly, and in contrast to the responses to Item No. 13, no comments that made reference to nuclear energy could be coded as "balanced."

TABLE 3 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO ITEM NO. 28: NUCLEAR ENERGY

Agree Balanced Disagree Other Total V.R.

9 0 11 8 28 32X OX 39X 29X 100X -0.35

Respondents (n = 28); 32 percent of Total Pool

This degree of variation, and especially the high percentage reporting concern about nuclear energy’s safety, is surprisingly high given conventional wisdom in the West.

According to Pryde (1972: 99) the achievement of status as a nuclear power remains a source of pride to Russians who are enthralled by the capabilities promised by the scientific and technical revolution. Goldman (1972: 143-144) states that concerns about nuclear power safety are kept from the average Soviet citizen and DeBardeleben (1985b) calls debate about nuclear energy in the Soviet Union "esoteric." While there is no antinuclear protest movement in the Soviet 104

Union, there are certainly a number of scientists who do not agree with the current Chairman of the USSR State Committee on Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control or the immediate past President of the Academy of Sciences that the full-scale development of nuclear energy holds great promise for humanity (Alexandrov, 1979: 18-19).® Moreover, this concern is not limited to the most technical, small circulation journals. Items about radioactive waste disposal and the effects of nuclear energy on the thermal pollution of the biosphere are raised in the popular science journal Priroda [Nature], in books translated by Progress

Publishers and, at least once, in New Times, the mass propaganda weekly distributed outside of the USSR (see below). In fact, scientific disagreement about the nature of nuclear energy is apparent in the discrepancy between the traditional lack of official concern with the safety of nuclear power plants and the tertiary environmental jus­ tifications given for the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.10

9 Yuri Izrael's pro-nuclear stance is given in "Problems of Radioecology at the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy," in The Soviet Journal of Ecology. 3(2):191-193.

10 The third paragraph of the preamble to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water reads, "Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances. . ." 105

I.T. Frolov (1980:35; 1982:114-116; Zagladin and Frolov,

1981:) is one of the most avid supporters of nuclear energy among those surveyed.11 Quoting extensively from then

Academy President Alexandrov, he argues that the development of nuclear energy promises the circumvention of any serious energy shortage. However, since world supplies of uranium are finite, in order to fully exploit the potential of this energy source, the development of fast breeder reactors and the production of large quantities of plutonium is essen­ tial. In contrast to other Soviet scientists, Frolov argues that more extensive use of nuclear energy would reduce rather than enhance the greenhouse effect. If there are any problems associated with nuclear energy, they do not exist under socialism, but:

. . . under capitalism, as a result of a striving for profits and towards an imperialist domination, the safety measures that are needed at nuclear power stations and other energy-producing facilities, are often disregarded and a dangerous pollution of the environment takes place (1982: 116).

Similar optimism about nuclear energy under socialism is expressed by Fyodorov (1972: 49; 1977: 54) and is the theme of several articles appearing in Priroda [Nature]. Of the sources surveyed that strongly favor this energy source, the most detailed was written by a collective of physicists and chemists from the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy

11 Frolov, more so than many other writers, is extra­ ordinarily repetitive. The sources cited are identical to each other for a number of paragraphs. 106

(Babayev, Demin, Kuzmin, and Stepanchikov, 1978). In fact, while enthusiastic about nuclear energy’s potential in the

Soviet Union, these authors do not argue that there are unique safety problems unresolved by capitalists. This same

collective of authors did publish another article in Priroda

[Nature] after the accident at Three Mile Island in which

they did critique the capitalist causes of the accident;

significantly, the former and not the latter was translated

and reprinted in Man and Biosphere (Sokolov, 1984), an

anthology of Priroda [Nature] articles for English readers.

The authors’ stated objective in their 1978 article is to

demonstrate that nuclear energy is supportable on the

ecological score. Whether or not atomic energy "is worth

it" fvystoitl depends on its ecological safety in comparison

with other forms [1978: 4]. In order to support their

contention that the negative influences of atomic energy,

and in particular the danger of radiation on the biosphere,

are no more serious than the negative influences associated

with other forms of energy production, Babayev et al. take

numerous examples from the Rasmussen report (1974). Quoting

this report commissioned at MIT by the Atomic Energy Commis­

sion (and widely cited by nuclear power advocates in the

West), the Priroda [Nature] authors tell their Soviet

readers that nuclear energy is cleaner than coal; that the

possibility of an accident is considerably less than being

struck by lightening or being killed in an industrial or 107 automobile accident; and that it is possible to be optimis­ tic about nuclear safety, not because scientists underesti­ mate the danger, but because these problems have only recently been elevated to "the first level of concern"

(Babayev et al., 1978: 16). The Soviet authors also support their arguments with data from the International Atomic

Energy Agency Bulletin and English-language nuclear power engineering manuals. While foreign data are used to il­ lustrate the safety of nuclear power, at least one of the

"safety features" described by Babayev et al. indicates that concerns about the safety of distant neighbors are literally blown to the wind: readers should rest assured that radio­ active wastes do not contaminate the soil close to power stations (emphasis added) because, after passing through treatment phases, radioactive krypton and xenon are dis­ charged into the environment through extremely high smoke­ stacks (1978 : 8).

Some who are optimistic about nuclear energy contrast the potential of fusion, fueled by an unlimited supply of deuterium in the World Ocean, to uranium- or plutonium- fueled fission (Kapitsa, 1977; Mitryushkin and Shaposhnikov,

1977: 60). An expectation that fusion may eventually replace fission may be behind the argument that nuclear energy will eventually (in 150 years!) become humanity’s primary energy source (Shmelev, 1983: 97). Zagladin (1986:

15) explicitly states the belief implied by the use of data 108

in Babayev, et al. (1978) that the contemporary mastery of

fission depends on international cooperation.

Most of those who are coded as disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement that "the peaceful develop­ ment of nuclear power is a safe and/or indispensable

response to the global energy problem," make only brief comments alluding either to radioactivity or thermal pollution as serious environmental hazards (Ananichev 1972;

Parshenkov, 1972; Girusev, 1974; Kamshilov, 1976; Astafyev,

1983). Kokin’s (1983: 22) comment that "concern is also

caused by the pollution of the seas with . . . the waste of atomic power stations," is typical of these peripheral comments, distinguished by the fact that this criticism of nuclear energy in general (not specifically under capital­

ism) appeared in New Times, a journal targeted to foreign audiences.

Some criticism of nuclear energy seems rather bizarre to

the American reader. Soviet interest in outer space is

long-standing and the belief in life on other celestial

bodies is sufficiently mainstream that the respected

philosopher I.B. Novik could argue in Priroda [Nature]

(1973: 1983) that it is not right to "throw radioactive

pollution onto our brothers on other planets."

Yet other criticism of radioactive wastes is expressed so

vaguely that it is difficult to pin down precisely. For

example, Pegov (1980: 34) warns of dangers associated with 109

the dispersion of "heavy metal salts" into the biosphere.

While "heavy metal salts" is not a term used by nuclear

engineers in this country, Pegov is probably referring to

the residues associated with nuclear fuel reprocessing.12

Not all criticism of nuclear energy is vague or. periphe­

ral. K.P. Ananichev, the Director of the International

Organizations Department of the USSR State Committee of

Science and Technology, and a chief Soviet negotiator of

the Soviet-American agreement on environmental protection has criticized nuclear energy both in a MEMO article (1972) and in a book published "in too few copies" in the Soviet

Union (Vyunitsky, 1974:183), that was eventually published

for consumption abroad.

In his book, Ananichev (1976: 143) states that "every

schoolboy knows" that radioactive contamination is the most dangerous type of environmental pollution. Acknowledging

broad international efforts to safeguard peaceful nuclear

energy production, Ananichev who has participated in IIASA

symposia on energy, lists the following disadvantages of

nuclear power:

12 I am indebted to Walter E. Carey, Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the Ohio State University for this interpretation. According to Dr. Carey, the greatest part of these residues both in the United States and in the Soviet Union may be attributed to the reprocessing necessary to make weapons grade fuel. 110

1. The high costs of construction and fuel.

2. The need for costly protection against radioac­ tivity.

3. The difficulties of radioactive waste disposal.

4. The practical impossibility of using nuclear energy to fuel transportation.

5. The potentially disruptive climate changes brought about by thermal pollution of the atmosphere induced by the extensive use of nuclear energy.

Some criticism of nuclear power is directed specifically against its exploitation in the Third World. Coinci­ dentally, in his famous essay, Sakharov (1968: 83) argues that gigantic atomic power stations represent hope to "the poorer half of the world." In contrast to Sakharov, and more significantly to Frolov, who sees no problem in the full- scale production of plutonium to meet the world’s energy needs, the economist Shpirt (1977: 126) argues that atomic electric plants in the Third World represent a serious threat both to the environment and to world peace.

The development of atomic energy, testifying to the further association with and the use of the achievements of the STR by developing countries, evokes the concern of a broad community both in those countries and beyond their borders. Along with the worry provoked by the possibility of radioactive pollution, fatal for man and his environment, the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and an increasing number of states possessing them provokes concern.

Likewise, the mezhdunarodnik (international relations scholar) V.Yu. Katasonov (1982: 63) expresses the IAEA's concern that nuclear plants will be built in developing countries without necessary security measures. Ill

Soviet critics of the peaceful development of nuclear energy production also comment without qualification on the correctness of antinuclear protest movements in the West.

For example, Los (1978: 134) reports that the lack of any effective means of neutralizing radioactive wastes has sparked antinuclear propaganda in Sweden. Goredetskaya

(1985: 97) tells Soviet readers that the fact that ecolog­ ists in Great Britain are opposed to nuclear energy should not be taken as evidence that the activists are antitechno­ logy, but rather as evidence of their concern that more attention needs to be paid to the technologies of renewable sources of energy.

Interest in renewable energy accounts for the placement of the remainder of the respondents to this item in the

Other category. While Soviet nuclear energy advocates base their claims at least in part on the argument that this form of energy production is not disruptive to the environment, there are scholars who exclude nuclear energy from their lists of nondisruptive forms of energy (Novik, 1975;

Kamshilov, 1980). Finally, at least one group of economists

(Fedorenko and Reimers, 1981), argues that nuclear energy can only be sustained for a brief transition period because only solar energy will not negatively affect the planet’s thermal balance. 112

4.D: Do Industrialized Countries face Limits to Growth?

As both Kelley (1976) and DeBardeleben (1984: 176-181) note, the publication of The Limits to Growth (Meadows,

1972) inspired strong debate in the Soviet Union. This finding is supported by the high variation ratio in re­ sponses to Item No. 12: "There are limits to growth beyond which industrialized society cannot expand." Table 4 provides the summary breakdown in response to this item.

TABLE 4 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO ITEM NO. 12: LIMITS TO GROWTH

Agree Disagree Balanced Total V.R.

18 18 10 46 39% 39% 22% 100% -0.37

Respondents (n = 46); 53 percent of Total Pool

Not only is the question of limits to growth discussed by a substantial number of respondents in the survey (more than 50 percent), but the variation ratio is quite high, with respondents about equally agreeing or disagreeing with the statement in Item No. 12 that industrialized countries face limits to growth. Here it should be noted that responses to the question of limits to growth faced by capitalist countries in Item No. 11 have a very different 113 distribution: while there are fewer responses to the latter item (28 percent of the total pool rather than 53 percent), fully 87 percent of those responding agreed that capitalist countries face special limits to growth.

What those respondents who address both Items No. 11 and No. 12 have to say about capitalist limits appears to be somewhat related to their comments about limits in general.

It is common (and logical) for Soviet individuals who sharply reject the idea of generalized limits to growth to simultaneously endorse the concept of the decline of capitalism manifest in unique capitalist limits (Zarodov,

1972; editors of Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy],

1973; Vyunitsky, 1975; Timofeyev, 1976; and Timofeyev,

1978). It is understandably rare for a respondent who asserts the existence of generalized limits to growth to claim that capitalist countries are in unique danger. The individual who does this (Astafyev, 1977: 79) qualifies his remarks so extensively that it is difficult to tell exactly where he stands. While he explicitly rejects the "pessimism of the Club of Rome," Astafyev does state that the biosphere as a whole has definite limits. At the same time, he argues that ". . .in conditions of capitalism, where an extreme degree of pollution of the environment is observed, it is impossible to exclude the possibility and the necessity of a certain reduction in the rates of production." 114

Previous Western analysts focus on the significance of the debate in identifying economic and environmental optimists and pessimists in the Soviet Union without exploring the extent of Soviet involvement in the Club of

Rome or its projects. This is understandable because Soviet publications turn out to be a poor source of information about Soviet involvement in international efforts to model global problems. Yet this information, which is not readily available from Soviet sources, may be a powerful factor in explaining sustained Soviet interest in the Club of Rome and global modeling. It is difficult to describe Soviet interest in questions regarding limits to growth without also looking at responses to the role of systems analysis in understanding contemporary global problems.

Soviet participation in the Club of Rome effectively preceded not only the Club’s first publication but also the actual "formation" of the Club. One of the Club’s founders,

Alexander King, reports that he first met Aurelio Peccei in

1967 as the result of a request for information from

Dzhermen Gvishiani which traveled to the OECD via MIT.13

13 Because this historical anecdote is both significant and, apparently, little known, King’s (1981: 207) full account follows:

"Toward the end of 1967, a letter arrived from Carroll Wilson of MIT, who enclosed a copy of a speech on long-term prospects for Latin America, seen in a geopolitical context, signed Aurelio Peccei, the Military Academy, Buenos Aires, and dated November 1967. Apparently, a copy of this lecture had fallen into the hands of one Jermen [sic] Gvishiani in 115

Not only has the Club held seminars in the Soviet Union,14 but VNIISI researchers have spent months at MIT studying with Jay Forrester. Dennis Meadows has traveled extensively in the Soviet Union and in 1986 he was involved in planning a joint project to train Soviet managers in environmental modeling.

The Soviet science of globalistics fglobalistikal is not only heavily influenced by the work of the Club of Rome, but as students of global modeling, Soviets have contributed to the wider efforts it has spawned. According to Harold

Guetzkow, while there may not be convergence in social systems, there is certainly convergence in the mapping of global problems through systems modeling and econometrics.1*

13(...continued) New York. Gvishiani is professor of management at the University of Moscow, vice-chairman of the Ministerial Council of Technology, and, incidentally, son-in-law of Kosygin. He was extremely impressed by the lecture and wanted to contact Peccei, but had no idea who or where he was. He had therefore written to Wilson, his American colleague on the UN Committee for Science and Technology for Development, and Wilson, likewise not knowing Peccei, passed it on to me. I found out who Peccei was, wrote to him with the contact for Gvishiani, and suggested that we might meet when he was next in Paris. We had frequent meetings during the next couple of months, found we had common concerns, and felt that we had to do something about them."

14 Samizdat author Boris Komarov rejects these meetings as meaningless: "the meetings of the Club of Rome change nothing and will continue to change nothing" (1980: 108).

15 Conversation with the author at Northwestern University, June 1986. This observation is further sup­ ported by Zagladin (1986: 6) in an article appearing in Voprosy filosofii on the eve of the 27th Party Congress: 116

In fact, Guetzkow (1985) notes that considerable resources have been devoted in the USSR to global modeling both in

Novosibirsk and at the Institute for Systems Studies in

Moscow. The attention that Soviet cyberneticians devoted to environmental problems in their modeling during the 1970s and 1980s is almost predicted by Graham’s (1972: 354) passing remark that:

In their devotion to scientific optimism and on their emphasis on man’s ability to transform nature, Soviet writers have not yet demonstrated a sufficient awareness of the fact that man’s very effort to transform nature may lead to increasing disorders. In their lack of attention to the values of undisturbed nature, they seem rather similar to the capitalist countries of the West, although the different economic systems result in somewhat different patterns of disruption. But Soviet writers, like their colleagues in other countries, are now beginning to awake to such pro­ blems, and new discussions of ecology — which with its emphasis on the interconnectedness of the world has close ties to both cybernetics and dialectical materialism — are beginning to appear.

Soviet authors describe globalistics as an interdisci­ plinary science that represents the interconnectedness of philosophy, political economy, law, political and interna­ tional relations theory, history, geography, mathematics, pedagogy, medicine, and many other social, natural, and technical sciences. "It is, if you will allow, the clearest

13(...continued) "It is understood that the character of global problems is different in different countries. . . Nonetheless, in any country the approach to global problems and their resolution should be systematic, foresee interconnections, and coordi­ nated solutions which have an influence on the system as a whole." 117 example of the growing integration of scientific knowledge"

(Shakhnazarov, 1982). Soviet scholars have commented

favorably on the valuable observations made by non-Marxist researchers on the character and the magnitude of the problems facing mankind. However, the new-found "global solidarity" of those researchers does not compensate for other shortcomings. The Limits to Growth and other Club of

Rome reports are criticized for an overly broad definition of global problems that inaccurately subsumes problems that are inherent in capitalism; the pessimistic overtone that catastrophe is inevitable; and a general lack of attention to the role of social factors in international relations and global problem solving. Soviet students of global problems also argue that bourgeois interest in the analysis of global

issues and trends arose primarily out of a perceived need to challenge the Marxist interpretation that only through socialism would global problems, including ecological problems, be successfully resolved. This may account for the fact that the articles addressing Item No. 12 include the most polemical articles in the entire pool, including all of those with an extremely high polemical quotient

(Laptev, 1975; Timofeyev, 1976; Fyodorov, 1977; Timofeyev,

1978; and Zagladin and Frolov, 1979).

The argument that "bourgeois futurology" (a polemical

code name for global modeling) was developed to wrest the

ideological banner from socialism is made with special 118

vehemence in an uncoded article by Bestushev-Lada (1972),

who states that the Western science was developed by

politicians, economists, and the public in response to a

number of factors: the contest between two world systems;

the emergence of new states in a search to overcome back­

wardness; the appearance of nuclear weapons; the technologi­

cal revolution with its many contradictory influences on

economic and social relations; state-monopoly regulation of

the economy; the population explosion [!] and food-supply

problems; and an accelerated pace of social development.

Bestushev-Lada’s polemical critique is similar to those

included in the interview pool in that, with the exception

of Zagladin and Frolov (1979), environmental issues are mentioned only peripherally in the enumeration and discus­

sion of global problems.

The general tenor of the argument against Western

researchers, retained in even some of the least polemical

articles, is that while socialist states have to deal with a

number of problems, they will be successful in resolving

difficulties that are hold-overs from capitalism. Capital­

ist states will only become more weighted down by their own

internal contradictions that give rise to such avoidable

(under socialism) miseries and absurdities as thermonuclear

war, economic backwardness, environmental degradation, and

the deprivation of spiritual values. The limits to growth

that are faced by capitalist societies are said to be the 119 result of contradictions foreseen b y Marx, the first scientific prognostician (Timofeyev, 1976: 44).

Guarded optimism pervades polemical discussions of global ecological problems. The Limits to Growth is criti­ cized precisely because of the Malthusian finality with which inevitable catastrophe is predicted, or on the other hand, the blind hope in the survival of capitalism.

Marxist-Leninists, as the participants in the World Marxist

Review discussion seminar (Zarodov, 1972: 18) recalled, are optimists:

There has been a wave of pessimistic forecasts, numerous prophecies of mankind’s early doom, preachment of the ’need’ to halt industrial growth. . . Marxist-Leninists consider it their duty to rebuff these views.

Catastrophe is not inevitable, but only because socialism has shown a way out (Fyodorov, 1972: 70; VF editors, 1973:

173-175; Astafyev, 1974: 17; Laptev, 1975: 66; Timofeyev,

1978: 163). Environmental alarmists ignore the dictum that humanity does not set problems for itself that it cannot resolve; the limits to growth are constantly revised because humanity keeps discovering ingenious methods of overcoming the old ones (Fyodorov, 1981: 81).

While DeBardeleben (1984: 178f. ) and Kelley (1976) note that some Soviet analysts acknowledge "positive contribu­ tions" made by the Club of Rome or the techniques of global modeling pioneered by Jay Forrester and Dennis Meadows, the distance between those who condemn and those who praise is 120 considerably greater than they suggest. These differences are not confined to any time period (the debate is not definitively resolved); there are, however, differences in source. The criticism described above is more common to

Kommunist. Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy], mass circulation publications, and translated for foreign audiences; support for the modeling efforts is strongest in

Priroda [Nature]. No statistical correlations can be performed on this data since the number of cases is far to small to allow this to be meaningful. However, the raw numbers are provided in Table 5 in order to provide an overview of the distribution of responses.

The natural scientists writing in Priroda [Nature], thick (specialized) journals, and occasionally in Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy], are more likely to say that there are limits to growth than the philosophers writing in Kommunist or Voprosy filosofii [Problems of

Philosophy]. The former authors are more likely to be natural scientists who understand the methods that the authors of The Limits to Growth used. 121

TABLE 5 DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO ITEM NO. 12 ACROSS JOURNALS

Agree Disagree Balanced Subtotal

Kommunist 0 3 0 3

Vocrosy filosofii 5 8 4 17 translations 4 6 2 12

Priroda 7 0 1 8 thick journals 2 1 2 5 mass publications 1 0 0 1

TOTAL 18 18 10 39“

a Raw numbers

This does not mean that the debate is entirely eso­ teric, since Priroda [Nature], a popular science journal, has a wide circulation for a Soviet periodical (DeBar- deleben, 1984: 48-49). It is significant that The Limits to

Growth. described by Soviet reviewers as an ecological bestseller fekologicheskii bestseller!, has not been translated into Russian while Forrester’s more technical

World Dynamics has. Yet the Soviet reviewer of the Russian translation, Mirovaya dinamika. dwells on the point that many similar points are made in The Limits to Growth and a careful reader may be able to reconstruct the most salient points of both. This review in Priroda [Nature] ("Za 122

sleduyushchim gorizontom chelovechestva. . ["At humani­ ty’s next horizon. . ."]) is unusually positive in its evaluation of Western research. Not only does the author praise Forrester’s "brilliance" [blesk] in "entering a new era of human daring," but he commends his writing style, claiming that World Dynamics reads like povest (Terentyev,

1979: 118-123). Povest is the Russian word for a literary narrative or short story such as those written by Anton

Chekhov or Leo Tolstoy. The title of the book review is

taken from a paragraph at the end of Mirovaya dinamika

(retranslated from the Russian):

We are located at the theshold of a new era in human daring. In the past were epochs of geogra­ phical discovery. In other periods attention was paid to the creation of great literature. Most recently science and technology lay beyond the horizon of the unfamiliar. Now science and technology are part of everyday life. Science is no longer something mysterious. . . I believe that beyond the next horizon lies a deeper understand­ ing of our social systems. The means are clear . . . (1979: 139)i«

io For comparative purposes, see the original (Forres­ ter, 1971: 127) and note that the Russian translation omits Forrester’s reference to the period of the formation of national governments:

"We are on the threshold of a great new era in human pioneering. In the past there have been periods character­ ized by geographical exploration. Other periods have witnessed the formation of national governments. At other times the focus was on the creation of great literature. Most recently we have been through the pioneering frontier of science and technology. But science and technology are now a routine part of life. Science is no longer a fron­ tier. The process of scientific discovery is orderly and organized." 123

The "means" are systems models and it is evidently correct to state that the most positive, reviews are given for the modeling techniques rather than for any conclusions.

In fact, respondents tend to say that they like the global modeling techniques used by non-Soviet researchers, or else remain mum on the topic. Seventy-three percent of those responding agree with the statement in Item No. 21: "The large-scale, comprehensive and multi-disciplinary nature of global problems necessitates a wide application of systems analysis, including global modeling." Among those who agree that there are ecological limits to growth rpredely rostal and that the earth has a finite carrying capacity fpropusk- naya sposobnostl , the most detailed answers are given by authors who also pay considerable attention to systems analysis or global modeling (Medvedkov, 1973; Fedorenko and

Reimers, 1974; Girusov and Lappo, 1974; Moiseyev, 1978; Gvi­ shiani, 1979b; Pegov, 1980; Fedorenko and Reimers, 1981; and

Moiseyev, 1984).17

18 ( . . .continued)

"I suggest that the next frontier for human endeavor will be to pioneer a better understanding of the nature of our social systems. The means are visible."

17 One of the most challenging of these, (Moiseyev, 1984), appearing in Priroda, is entitled "Koevolyutsia cheloveka i biosfery: kiberneticheskie aspekty" [The coevolution of man and biosphere: cybernetic aspects]. This article is discussed at length below in the section on implications for international relations. Despite the title, there are no equations in the article, as there are frequently in Priroda. and cybernetics is referred to in the 124

Even these authors reject the idea of zero growth out of hand and state that there are optimal rates of growth, which, however, are not yet known. This is because there used to be no limits; they first appeared locally, then regionally, and are currently becoming global (Fedorenko and

Reimers, 1981: 3). Although it is difficult to establish what the limits of growth are, it is necessary to do so in order to maintain a homeostatic balance since "crossing over these boundaries may lead to irreversible processes, so rapidly changing external conditions that humanity will be

incapable of adapting to them" (Moiseyev, 1978: 179). The existence of these limits suggests the necessity of reorien­ ting cost-benefit economics to take environmental concerns into account:

It may be proposed a priori that too often factors that are allegedly economically beneficial in regions that cross the ecological limits of growth, turn out to be less significant than the general expenses to restore or improve the ecological potential of a territory (Fedorenko and Reimers, 1974: 10).

This comment supports calls made for increased efficiency in the use of the natural environment with the goal of

17(...continued) following statement alone:

"I am convinced that the only path [for coordinating all the numerous, multi-influential factors which determine the substance of the process of evolution], is without alterna­ tive the path of mathematical imitation. This is the only way to see the problem as a whole, to obtain not only qualitative, but also quantitative evaluations (Moiseyev, 1984: 63)." 125

essentially obtaining "more for less." Advocacy of "bioeco­ nomics" or "ecoactivity" or "ecodevelopment" is discussed in more detail in Chapter V.

4.E: "Summing Up"

Simple statistical measures can serve as guideposts for

ferreting out revealing information; calculating the variation ratios for the items described above inspired

investigations that had some unanticipated results. Intri- guingly, the three items with the highest variation ratios

either suggest implications for potential international behavior or indicate the extent of Soviet involvement in

efforts to'understand, if not correct, ecological problems

that are increasingly global.

Two items in particular, those dealing with the Third

World and with limits to growth, turn out to be useful in

separating out the respondents with the most polemical views

of global ecological problems. As mentioned above, the

debate about the Third World and environmental problems may

in fact be a surrogate for debate about domestic limits.

The response to the item about nuclear energy was the

least anticipated. At the same time, the variation in

response to Item No. 28 is consistent with Milbrath’s

observation (1984: 52) that "beliefs about the wisdom of 126 developing nuclear power have been very divisive between the rearguard and the vanguard."

Despite regular polemics, each of these items had respondents who made unexpected statements that would not seem surprising on the pages of Scientific American.

Chapter VI explores these statements in more depth, out­ lining the extent to which publicly expressed Soviet views are consistent with the perspectives outlined in Chapter II. CHAPTER V

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

The teacher was taking her pupils for a nature walk when a small animal sat down on their path. "Wonderful!" she said, "Now, can anybody tell me what this is?" The class was silent. "Come now," said the teacher, "think of the example he provides to us. So industrious, hard-working, planning for the future. What is it?" Again, nobody answered. "Children, think!" the teacher demanded. "You see it every day. You talk about it every day. What is its name?" "Well," said one of the pupils at long last, "if my mother asked me I’d say it was a squirrel, but since you asked it’s probably Lenin."

Contemporary Soviet Anecdote

The purpose of this chapter is to qualitatively analyze the simulated interview data and supporting material in order to answer the following questions: What are the various perspectives from which different respondents view global ecological problems? Who is associated with the various perspectives? This information, in combination with

Chapter VI, which focuses specifically on international relations, will contribute to making conclusions about policy implications in Chapter VII. The polemical, ecologi­ cal, and technocratic responses discussed below are

127 128 categorized in accordance with the three perspectives developed in Chapter II.

5.A: The Polemical Perspective

As a first step in examining Soviet perspectives on global ecological problems, I selected those "respondents" who were the most polemical in their writings. This included all interviews with an extremely high polemical quotient (as defined in Section 3.E) and those with a high polemical quotient in combination with assertions that capitalism faces unique limits to growth. This group of eight interviews is intuitively coherent since it includes at least two Marxist-Leninist philosophers (I.T. Frolov and

I.P. Laptev) in addition to the unnamed editors of Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy]; the editor-in-chief of the World Marxist Review (K.I. Zarodov); the director of the

Academy’s Institute of the International Working Class

Movement (T.T. Timofeyev); and V.V. Zagladin (deputy director of the CC CPSU’s international section). These interviews were drawn from Voprosy filosofii [Problems of

Philosophy], Kommunist. MEMO [World Economy and Interna­ tional Relations], Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta seria geographicheskava [Moscow University Geography Bulletin], and articles translated by Soviets for English readers; none appeared in Priroda [Nature]. Individual respondents in the 129

VooroBy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy] roundtables of

1973 and 1974 also appear to have a polemical perspective on the environment and international relations. Evidently, these perspectives may change over time in the case of some individuals: Frolov’s later works are not included in this category. The full list of cited works illustrating the polemical perspective is provided in Appendix B.

The interview responses of those classified as having a polemical perspective are summarized in Table 6. Each interview is identified in the table by the first three letters of the (first) author’s name and the last two digits of the year in which the article or book was published.

After giving the polemical quotient calculated as described in Chapter III, the table indicates responses to individual items: Agree (A); Balanced (B); Disagree (D); Y (Yes); or N

(No). The Other category is identified by R (Related

Comment) in the table since the letter "O" could be mistaken for the numeral "0". A blank simply indicates missing data.

For example, the numbers and letters following ZAR 72 in

Table 6 indicate that Zarodov (1972) had a polemical quotient of 31. He listed 8 environmental problems of concern; made a comment related to convergence or post­ industrialism; had nothing to say about the noosphere; disagreed that population growth represented a problem, etc. TABLE 6 THE POLEMICAL PERSPECTIVE: RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTIONS

Section I Section II Section III Nature of Problem______Solution Intenwt'wwl rvvippraHrm

FQ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 ZAR72 31 • 8*R D A A A A D D A A A A Y A D AAAA RYYYY A AA AAAN Y KS73 38 5 Y Y B B Y B Y AD D ABAAYYBA A DRYYN RYA73 34 8 R A D A A D A A A Y A D AA DRYY N A R B B Y 1AP75 92 2 R D A D A ADAAABYYYAYYNA A AAY TIH76 SO 3Y DADAAD DR B Y YN AAANYR N AA B Y FTO77 50 2R DADAAD NA Y Y TDf78 60 4 DADADAY A AA A BNA A A ZAB79 52 9 A A A B A DA R Y Y YB B RAAAAB A

Code: A = Agree; B = Balanced; D = Disagree; R = Related Comment (Other); Y = Yes; N = No

■ A blank indicates Biasing data; i.e., the respondent has Bade no relevant ccsment. * Numbers in this oolun refer to the lumber of problems listed by the respondent as serious ecological issues. 131

As seen in this Table 6, there are only a few items on which there are consistent responses throughout the group.

By definition, all interviews have a rather high polemical quotient. They all agree that capitalist countries face limits to growth (Item No. 11) and disagree that industrial­ ized countries in general do (Item No. 12). They tend to reject opinions that science and technology have caused these problems (Item No. 9). It also happens that most of them express the opinion that socialist revolution will solve all global ecological problems (Item No. 25).

Sections 5.A.1 through 5.A.3 elaborate on these and other dimensions of this perspective.

5.A.1: The Problem

It is easiest to trace the polemical perspective because it is the most inflexible and therefore predictable.

The description of this perspective in Chapter II suggests that its adherents do not take the environment seriously — it is a peripheral global problem in the overall interna­ tional struggle between socialism and capitalism. Environ­ mental problems do not represent an independent or a unique threat. In contrast to other authors who dwell on the implications of environmental problems for long-term human survival, authors with a polemical perspective are inter­ ested in the environment only to the extent that its 132 disruption threatens the evolution and eventual blossoming of communist society (Zarodov, 1972: 23; Laptev, 1975: 73).

Turning to specific ecological issues, several of the polemicists call not only "overpopulation," but also the forecasted depletion of raw materials and the energy shortage "bourgeois myths" and apologies for imperialism

(Laptev, 1975; Timofeyev, 1976 and 1978).

Others are not quite so glib. Given the history of the antipathy between Marxists and Malthusians it is not surprising that these authors vigorously deny the validity of concerns about population growth raised by "pundits of the reactionary bourgeoisie" (Zarodov, 1972: 17f).* Even so, the seriousness of population growth is not wholly denied: the editors of Voprosy filosofii [Problems of

Philosophy] (Society and Nature, 1973: 162) state that "the

'demographic explosion’ represents contradictions and is a topic of fierce debate." In contrast to expectations raised in Chapter II, most of these authors simply ignore the question of nuclear war as a global ecological problem, but those who acknowledge it claim that it is uppermost or

1 According to Marx, Malthus fraudulently attributed all of the economic faults of capitalism to population growth. Overpopulation was simply a synonym for unemploy­ ment, a cruel ruse employed by capitalists to exploit the proletariat. In fact, Marx and Engels used their choicest polemical language in denouncing the claims of Malthus, calling his work "a sin against science," "revolting blasphemy," "a very model of intellectual imbecility winding its way casuistically through its own inner confusion" (Besmeres, 1980: 9). 133

requires international collaboration to resolve (Society and

Nature, 1973; Zagladin and Frolov, 1979).2 While some

take the finding of DDT in penguin livers as a jumping off point to argue that "everyone in the world suffers because

of pollution in capitalist countries," (Ryabchikov and

Saushkin, 1973: 5), others list air, water, and noise

pollution, depletion of raw materials, desertification,

energy shortages, species extinction, and the greenhouse

effect as environmental problems without qualification as to

their location (Zarodov, 1972; Zagladin and Frolov, 1979).

The subject of convergence (Item No. 5) is mentioned

frequently by this group of authors. As anticipated, it is

rebuffed by repeated statements that environmental problems are emphatically not the same in socialist and capitalist

countries. The editors of Voprosy filosofii [Problems of

Philosophy] are most insistent that the analysis of global

ecological problems is especially immune to convergence:

"the idea of an 'ecological orientation’ is a last-ditch

effort on the part of bourgeois theoreticians of industrial­

ism/post-industrialism to assign a superclass character to

problems that really are a reflection of class contradic­

tions. . ." (Society and Nature, 1973: 172).

2 Nuclear war is mentioned as a global problem by 32 percent of the respondents. The percentage of those in the polemical category who describe it as the number one global problem (two out of eight) is thus even smaller than the percentage for the total sample. 134

Marshall Goldman comes in for special criticism for his explicit statement of convergence in Soviet and American environmental problems and for his refusal to acknowledge successes in Soviet environmental policy. A biting critique of Goldman’s book, The Spoils of Progress: Environmental

Pollution in the Soviet Union, appeared in the same issue of

SShA that welcomed the new bilateral environmental coopera­ tion between the United States and the Soviet Union (Khozin,

1972). G.S. Khozin was interviewed by Goldman and this raises the possibility that he was motivated in his review by a perceived need to protect himself against guilt by association. In a review entitled "Ecology from Sovieto­ logy" [Ekologia ot sovyetologii] (translated by the Soviet editor as "Ecological Anti-Sovieteering"), Khozin argues both that Goldman’s book provides an excuse for those capitalists who do not want to engage in bilateral environ­ mental protection and that, since Goldman is not convinced of the advantages of socialism in preventing environmental degradation, he is trying to frighten readers with an alleged special threat to the environment borne by social­ ism. In these respects, Khozin’s review inaccurately attributes to Goldman essentially the reverse of the polemical perspective on ecological issues held by some

Soviets.

As stated in Chapter IV, the respondents who do not believe that there are environmental limits to socialist 135 growth include all of those who have an extremely high polemical quotient in their interviews. The simultaneous assertion of no limits for socialist societies and unavoid­ able limits for capitalist societies is a constant feature in this group of interviews. In accordance with the polemi­ cal perspective, no holds are barred in the attack against capitalism: the profit lust of out-of-control capitalists who care not a whit for the future saps the earth of its natural wealth. However, the problem is not due primarily to a preoccupation with profit (as the responses to Item No

8 indicate) but to the absence of planning both in the production and consumption of resources, and to the creation of false demands and false needs (Maklyarsky in Krugly stol:

Nauka i globalnie problemy sovremennosti (Roundtable: science and contemporary global problems] 1974 (hereafter

KS 1974), 9: 68). The real danger of raw material shortages is that they will inspire imperialists to engage in the rapacious plundering of other countries to make up for their own profligate use of natural resources. Not content to spoil their own lands, capitalists "export pollution" to the rest of world (the environmental degradation that has occurred in the Soviet Union and the Third World is the legacy of capitalism). One international relations analyst has gone so far as to state that "within 10 to 15 years, environmental aggression will become the root source of political conflict between states" (Khozin in KS 1974: 136

109). If capitalists pay attention to the environmental protection issue, it is simply to garner greater profits.

In short, no matter what capitalists do, it is evidence of malicious behavior affecting the global environment.

The majority of the authors in the total pool (61 percent) agree that the scientific and technological revolution has had deleterious effects on the global environment (Item No. 9). None of the respondents in the polemical perspective category would agree to this statement without qualifications. At the same time, none of those with a polemical perspective (as opposed to 26 percent of the total pool) have avoided this issue. They have either disagreed with Item No. 9 or else they have given "yes, but" answers that are coded as being balanced.

Supplementing their critique of bourgeois environmen­ talism, the most polemical argue that the emphasis on technology as the cause of environmental evils is part of a

"campaign of obscurantism" and that "technicism, whatever its garb, acts as the refined ideological protection of modern capitalism" (Laptev, 1975: 65f). The "yes, but" answers focus on the dialectical, contradictory nature of the scientific and technological revolution that has had both a progressive and a regressive impact on humanity’s relationship with nature.3

3 Despite acknowledging the existence of some negative technogenic influences, these authors are optimistic that: 137

5.A.2: The Solution

According to the discussion in Chapter II, the Soviet respondent with a polemical perspective is an ideological optimist who believes that Marxism-Leninism is fully equipped to diagnose and prescribe solutions to any environ­ mental problem. In keeping with the historic Soviet emphasis on rapid industrialization, Nature is viewed as an exploitable source of raw material and man’s proper rela­ tionship with the earth is to transform it to meet his needs.

There are varying levels of sophistication in the claim that Marxism-Leninism is the perfect scientific tool for understanding environmental problems. Timofeyev’s state­ ments are the coarsest (1976: 50); he simply asserts that given its attention to the social aspects of man-nature problems, the science of Marxism-Leninism enables under­ standing of the true roots of ecological crisis. Other authors go into some detail to describe how it is that

3 ( ...continued)

the general direction of the scientific and technological revolution make it possible to sharply diminish the destruction and pollution of the environment, at first stopping the accumula­ tion of those unfavorable phenomena which may lead to "ecological crisis" and later even improving the natural environment (Ryabchikov and Saushkin, 1973: 4). 138 socialist science differs in philosophy and method from bourgeois natural science. The primary critique is that bourgeois science is reductionist and dialectical material­

ism is perfectly poised to correct this shortcoming.

Moreover, several of the polemical respondents, in common with the large number who answered Item No. 19 ("Global

ecological problems are 'unbounded* problems that transcend

interdisciplinary boundaries and inherently demand many

forms of intellectually cross-breeding to resolve") agree that understanding ecological problems hinges on new forms

of intellectual integration. It is asserted that Marxist-

Leninist philosophy:

. . . facilitates overcoming the limitations of specialized scientific positions, the one-sided­ ness of the intellectual and practical orienta­ tions of man and his attitudes toward nature, and the diversity of opinions. That new approach by man to nature which is an objective necessity of our times and a goal of socialist society presumes dialectical materialist philosophy as its neces­ sary foundation in methodology and general world­ view, and demands the strengthening of the interaction of the natural, technological, and social science (Society and Nature, 1973: 178).

An emphasis on the need for interdisciplinary integration in

order to resolve ecological problems pervades the total pool. In fact, Brezhnev commented on this issue at the

25th Party Congress, stating that:

new opportunities for fruitful general-theoreti- cal, basic, and applied research are opening up in the fringe areas of various sciences, particularly where the natural sciences adjoin the social sciences. These opportunities should be used to the full. 139

. . . Soviet scientists should not lose sight of problems of the environment. . ., which have become exacerbated recently. The improvement of the socialist use of nature. . .is an important task for a whole complex of natural and social sciences.4

The respondents in this category do not believe that science alone will solve the problems at hand. It is explicitly stated that genuine resolution depends upon the abolition of capitalism and the successful (if not instanta­ neous) transition to socialism and the eventual victory of communism (Item No. 25). Without this revolution in human affairs, ecological balance is hopelessly out of reach

(Zarodov, 1972: 49; Ryabchikov, 1973: 4; Society and Nature,

1973: 163f; Laptev, 1975: 64; Timofeyev, 1976: 46; Zagladin and Frolov, 1979: 37).

This group of authors puts so much faith in the potential achievements of socialist revolution that they pay less than expected attention to technology as a panacea for environmental ills. Visions of artificially created technospheres are not advocated by this core group; in fact, the editors of Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy] challenge the "noisy self-promotion" by certain (unnamed) scientists of costly and utopian offenses against nature

(Society and Nature, 1973: 179). The belief in the positive

4 Brezhnev in the Report of the Central Committee to the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The quotation is taken from Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union VII (1976: 26). 140 aspects of science and technology is expressed more keenly in the unwillingness to attribute environmental problems to technogenic causes in the first place. Anger at the sugges­ tion that technological progress should be halted just as society is on the verge of transition to communism is expressed in the strong denunciation of any "back to nature"

[nazad k prirode] movement or Rousseauist romanticism. As

Ryabchikov and Saushkin (1973: 8) put it:

. . . not back to nature, but forward to nature, leaning on social and scientific and technical progress — such is the path of resolving the problem of the "ecological crisis."

The concern with the protection of nature and natural beauty for its own sake is criticized in response to Item No. 33 as another part of the campaign for obscurantism; totally inimical to the true needs of workers (Timofeyev, 1976: 41;

Laptev, 1975: 65; Society and Nature, 1973: 169).8

5.A .3: International Cooperation

Virtually all of the respondents who talk about international cooperation say that it is important (88 percent), and this group is not an exception. However,

5 Within this group Zarodov (1972: 21) offers the single exception to this denunciation of romanticism. He reports that participants in the Marxist discussion seminar saw nature as "an inexhaustible source of health, joy, love of life and spiritual riches," while simultaneously sugges­ ting that concern about the destruction of natural beauty was not a good argument to make to workers. 141 unlike those with an ecological perspective, most of the polemical authors quote Brezhnev directly to support this claim rather than using their own arguments.0 An interpre­ tation that these authors are not particularly in favor of international cooperation, but publicly support what Parrott

(1985) calls Brezhnev’s "non-traditional" stance in the interests of political livelihood would be consistent with this finding.

Turning to actual benefits of international cooperation in environmental problem solving, this group of respondents has little to say. As suggested above, in the polemical perspective these are assumed to be either the legacy of capitalism or of reconstruction after World War II. In common with the majority of other respondents, this group of authors does not focus on the need for self-reliance to

0 One of the more frequently cited quotes is the following from the Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Party’s Immediate Tasks in the Fields of Domestic and Foreign Policy (in the section of the report devoted to foreign economic relations):

"Such global problems as the raw-materials or energy problems, the eradication of the most dangerous and wide­ spread diseases, environmental protection, space exploration and the use of ocean resources are already quite important and urgent. In the long-run, they will have an increasingly palpable influence of the life of every people and on the entire system of international relations. Our country, as well as the other socialist countries, cannot stand aside from the solution of these problems, which affect the interests of all mankind."

The translation is taken from Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union VII (1976: 26). 142 solve environmental problems, but they do point to Soviet successes in dealing with these issues domestically.

Lenin’s early decrees on forestry, fishing, hunting, and nature sanctuaries are cited as well as more current Supreme

Soviet actions such as the September 1972 decree "On

Measures for Further Improvement of the Protection of Nature and Rational Utilization of Natural Resources."

Arms control analysts use the term "bean-counting" pejoratively to describe the common practice of assessing military strength on the basis of static indicators such as the raw numbers of weapons possessed b y one side or the other. "Bean-counting" in a different guise is prevalent in assessments of Soviet success in dealing with environmental problems. As evidence of "success," the polemical respon­ dents point to the number of decrees that have been passed or the number of rubles that have been allotted in the plan for environmental protection.7 Questions about how effectively new legislation has been implemented or how efficiently rubles have been spent and whether they have been spent as they were intended are simply ignored. Only

7 Ryabchikov and Saushkin (1973: 4f) provide a fairly extensive example of "bean-counting:" in that year, Soviet expenses for environmental protection exceeded 2.5 percent of the national budget or about 8 billion rubles, out of which half was spent on land improvement. These authors note that 25, and in some cases, 40 percent of the basic cost of enterprises is devoted to environmental protection measures as in the controversial plants at Baikal and Shchekino-on-Tula. Finally they point to the size of nature protection societies in the USSR (with about 35 million members in the early 1970s). 143

the editors of Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy]

suggest that decrees and rubles alone are not enough: new

environmental values must be instilled and the CC CPSU and

the Council of Ministers allegedly want to increase popular

knowledge of environmental problems (Society and Nature,

1973: 160,180).

Significantly, the international agreements that are

mentioned tend to be within the Council on Mutual Economic

Assistance (CMEA). While the Stockholm conference is

frequently mentioned in the total pool, in this group only

Zarodov (writing in 1972) refers to this major international

event. His comments are more wishful than polemical: the conference might have contributed to the solution of global

environmental problems if only it had universal partici­

pation; the biosphere is indivisible as is peace and in

order to secure each of them the participation of both

Germanies is essential (Zarodov, 1972: 31, 49).

Despite some attention to international organizations

and a tendency to link environmental protection to economic

problems, very few of the respondents in the total pool

mention concepts that might be related to functionalism. An

important exception is the polemical mezhdunarodnik Yu.

Fyodorov who discusses these ideas in some detail. In a

blistering critique of Western theories of interdependence,

Fyodorov states that all of the Club of Rome reports are

ideologically flawed by an interest in establishing supra­ 144 national mechanisms to regulate international relations and the desire to transform national sovereignty so that it has a functional rather than a territorial character (1977: 61).

Fyodorov also sharply attacks the idea that states should give over their sovereignty in economic affairs to interna­ tional organizations as an imperialist rationale for multinational corporations to penetrate developing coun­ tries.

These critiques are consistent with the vigorous denial of convergence. In fact, the polemical authors argue that environmental problems represent a new ideological battle­ ground (Society and Nature, 1973: 162; Zagladin and Frolov,

1979: 33f). Yet this apparently does not contradict the sense that scientists working together will play a decisive role in resolving global environmental problems (Zarodov,

1972: 41) or that the valuable works of Western ecologists should not be ignored even if they are sometimes misguided b y bourgeois ideology (Society and Nature, 1973: 175;

Laptev,• 1975: 74; Zagladin and Frolov, 1979: 33).

The polemical quarrel with the Club of Rome has been reviewed in Chapter IV’s discussion of limits to growth. As indicated above, Marshall Goldman’s work is not appreciated by this group of respondents. On the other hand, Barry

Commoner is cited with approval. An "ecological bestseller" in the United States, The Closing Circle was translated into

Russian in 1975 rZamykayushchysya krugl with a foreword by 145 the geophysicist Ye.K. Fyodorov. While the ecologists and technocrats cite Commoner’s work for his clarity in explain­

ing the need for closed-cycle technology, the polemical respondents quote liberally from Commoner to demonstrate that the ecological crisis is a crisis of private technology and the political system that gave rise to it (Ryabchikov and Saushkin, 1973: 5; Dve storony "krizisa okruzhayushchei sredy," 1975: 122). Commoner’s views may be especially welcome because, as Katsura (1983: 93fn. ) states, his Second

Law: "’Everything is connected to everything else’ [vsye

svyazano so svyeml, duplicates the dialectical-materialist principle of general ties."

With the exception of very peripheral comments, these are not respondents who talk about established mechanisms of

international cooperation. Although they tend to agree that

"the organizations, institutions, or processes that are needed to resolve global ecological problems" already exist

(Item No. 43), these are primarily those of existing socialism.

5.B: The Ecological Perspective

Establishing a clearly defined group of respondents who express an ecological perspective was slightly more diffi­ cult to do. Intuitively this makes sense: the further one moves from hard-line positions, the more variation is 146 likely. Because none of the interviews yielding a polemical perspective appeared in Priroda [Nature], and because the

"catastrophists" and the "vanguard" are, demographically, highly educated, one of the selection criteria for the core group of interviews representing the ecological perspective was that they be written by natural scientists. Moreover, these had to be natural scientists who agreed that industri­ alized societies face limits to growth (Item No. 12) and/or who believed that the solution to global ecological problems would have to involve general awareness of the biosphere, environmentally appropriate technology, or the development of ecological literacy (Items No. 27, 25, 19).

The resulting group representing the ecological perspective, as summarized in Table 7, contains 13 inter­ views and 17 individuals (Fedorenko and Reimers, 1974 and

1981; Fedorenko, Lemeshev, and Reimers, 1981; Gilyarov and

Naumov, 1978; Girusov and Lappo, 1974; Kamshilov, 1976;

Kapitsa, 1973; Kunen, 1978; Moiseyev, 1978 and 1984; Neronov and Goncharov, 1979; Parshenkov, 1972; Piruzyan, Malenkov, and Barenboim, 1980). The majority of these articles do appear in Priroda [Nature]; one is a translated speech given by then president of the International Union for the

Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Kunen, 1978).

Others appear in Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy]

(Kapitsa, 1973; Moiseyev, 1978), in the Great Soviet

Encyclopedia (Gilyarov and Naumov, 1978), and as a book 147 translated for foreign audiences (Xamshilov, 1976). This group also includes contributors to both Voprosy filosofii

[Problems of Philosophy] and Priroda [Nature] roundtables.

The full list of cited works illustrating the ecological perspective is provided in Appendix C.

While Soviet publications are far from exhaustive in providing biographical information about their authors, enough information is available to suggest that these

respondents are not peripheral scientists. At least five are members or corresponding members of the prestigious

Academy of Sciences: Fedorenko, Gilyarov, Kapitsa, Moiseyev, and Piruzyan. Pyotr Kapitsa, late Director of the Vavilov

Institute of Physical Problems, who died in 1984, was a member of the presidium of the Academy as well as a Nobel

Prize winner in Physics. Including Kapitsa, six or more of these respondents are (or were) directors or deputy direc­

tors of research institutes: Nikolai Prokofyev Fedorenko, who is also chairman of the Scientific Council on the

Optimal Planning and Management of the National Academy and

editor of the journal Economics and Mathematical Methods,

was Director of the Central Economics and Mathematical

Institute (TsEMI); Mikhail M. Kamshilov, Director of the

Institute of Biology of Inland Waters; Sergei Sergeyevich

Lappo, Deputy Director of the Sakhalin Research Institute;

Nikita Nikolayevich Moiseyev, Deputy Director of the Academy

of Science’s Computing Center; Lev Abramovich Piruzyan, 148

Director of the Interagency Center for the Biological

Testing of Chemical Substances.

Numerous specialties are represented by the individuals in this group. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia lists all the disciplines that need to be involved in studying ecological problems, including genetics, physiology, ethology, biogeo­ graphy, taxonomy, geography, landscape science, biogeo­ chemistry, soil science, hydrology, hydrochemistry, clima­ tology, mathematics, statistics, modeling, sociology, political economy, jurisprudence and ethics (Gilyarov and

Naumov, 1978: 1781). In this pool, the ecologists include biologists, biophysicists, and zoologists (Gilyarov,

Kamshilov, Kunen, Malenkov, Naumov, Piruzyan, and Reimers), physicists and mathematicians (Kapitsa, Barenboim, and

Moiseyev), economists (Fedorenko and Lemeshev),8 as well as one geographer (Neronov), one oceanographer (Lappo), and one philosopher of the natural sciences (Girusov). The heavy representation of biology and related disciplines is not surprising given ecology’s historical roots as a subfield of biology. It is more surprising that there is not strong disciplinary identification among these respondents. The biologists do not aspire to make biology the "king of disciplines" in ecological research as some geographers with

8 Economists were not identified as natural scientists in the interviews. Fedorenko and Lemeshev are drawn into the group of ecologists as the result of co-authoring articles with Reimers, a biologist. 149 a technocratic perspective do. The interdisciplinary orientation of the economists might be explained by the fact that historically ecology and economics have been at cross purposes to each other (Oldak, 1973: 33). Thus, for an economist to address environmental issues seriously requires some substantial reevaluation of his or her own discipline.

Table 7 summarizes the responses of the ecologists.

In addition to perceiving limits to growth and seeing the solutions to global ecological problems lying beyond simple technological innovation, these authors share responses on other items. The ecologists believe that the scientific and technological revolution has contributed to environmental deterioration (Item No. 9); that centralized planning and coordination is necessary to resolve these problems (Item

No. 10); they see interrelatedness between man and nature

(Item No. 17) and between disciplines (Item No. 19); they believe some kind of new economic thinking is required to resolve environmental problems in the Soviet Union (Item No.

24); four out of five distrust nuclear energy (Item No. 28); they consider "environmental protection" and "economic growth" synonymous rather than antonymous (Item No. 29); they are advocates of conservation (Item No. 31) and of preserving nature for its own sake (Item No. 33); they provide examples of Soviet failure in resolving environmen­ tal problems (Item No. 35); finally, they are eager suppor­ ters of international exchanges (Items No. 36 and 38) and TABLE 7 THE ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTIONS

Section I Section II Section III Mature of Problem Solution______International Cooperation

K) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

PAR72 00 « 15"R A ANY DBAR AAAR KAP73 02 5 A A A A AA A ARRY ADAAAAA Y NA AAA Y Y FED74 00 7 AAA ARBB AA NYY BAB D AR YY Y YR

GIR74 03 7 R D D A A AB AAA YRY ADAA AA DRN Y Y A Y KAM76 01 13 Y B A B A A AB BAAA NY AAAAADRYY Y AA R AYY GIL78 00 10 AA B DRABAAN Y Y AAAA B ARYYN R AAAAYY

IUC78 00 6 BA A AA Y DBADY Y YAA A YY HDI78 06 5 Y BA AAA A NYYY AA AA AA AY Y NBR79 00 7 B B R D A A N YY BARY Y AA AA AY Y

FED60 04 7 AA BDA AA YY AA BA DYYYRAABAY

PIR80 00 7 YAAA A AA NYR AAAA AA DANYY AA AR Y FEDB1 05 11 YABBA B BAAABRY AAB A BADDY YY YAAAAY

MDI84 00 9 R Y B A B R B ARA NYY RAAAAAAYRY

Code: A = Agree; B = Balanced; D = Disagree; R = Related Ccooent (Other); Y = Yes; N = No

* A blank indicates missing data; i.e., the respondent has made no relevant cement. k Nmbers in this colian refer to the timber of problems listed by the respondent as serious ecological issues. 151 believe that they can learn from their Western counterparts

(Item No. 41). Sections 5.B.1 through 5.B.3 elaborate on these and other dimensions of the ecological perspective.

5 . B.1: The Problem

The ecological perspective and the polemical perspec­ tive are intended to stand at polar ends of a perceptual spectrum. Accordingly, the views of this group of respon­ dents concerning the nature of environmental problems is quite different from that of those with a polemical perspec­ tive. The respondent with an ecological perspective is supposed to see environmental problems as being both numerous and serious, involving the biological survival of humanity as a species. Convergence in problems affecting the Soviet Union and the rest of the world is assumed implicitly if not stated explicitly. Lack of administra­ tive coordination parallel to the interrelatedness of the natural world is seen as a problem in resolving ecological problems in the Soviet Union as well as elsewhere.

The polemical quotient in these respondents' interviews is virtually nil, ranging between 0.00 and 0.05 (compared with 0.31 and 0.92 for the group attributed as having a polemical perspective). This group of respondents does differ from the majority of those with a polemical perspec­ tive in the attention they devote to diverse ecological 152 problems. Their lists of the "burning" rzhivotrepeshchu- shchie. lit. life-trembling] environmental problems facing humanity are long, including all of the problems listed in

Item No. 3 of the survey, in addition to soil degradation and noise pollution, with the notable exception of the economic development of Third World countries. None of these problems, neither population growth nor the destruc­ tion of natural beauty, is categorized as a bourgeois myth or obscurantism. In terms reminiscent of Paul Ehrlich,

Kapitsa (1973: 45) graphically describes the exponential properties of demographic processes, likening them to "the explosion of an atom bomb." Other authors turn the tradi­ tional Marxist critique of bourgeois population concerns on its head, stating that some bourgeois economists (Julian

Simon?) believe reducing population size will lead to economic deterioration and this, of course, is not true

(Fedorenko and Reimers, 1981: 11). Still others state that there are vast numbers of underfed people in the world, that population growth is related to the world’s sharpest ecological problems,9 and openly advocate birth control

[regulirovanie rozhdaemosti1 as an important task of

9 This argument of Moiseyev’s is most interesting because it stands in contrast to the traditional Marxist response to Malthus that the only limiting factor on population size is the distribution of food. For a detailed discussion of this point, see DiMaio, Alfred J. Jr. 1981. Evolution of Soviet Population Thought: From Marxism- Leninism to the Literaturnaya Gazeta Debate. In Helen Desfosses, ed., Soviet Population Policy; Conflict and Constraints. New York: Pergamon. 153 humanity (Kamshilov, 1976; Moiseyev, 1984: 67; Piruzyan,

1980: 10).

Ecological respondents believe that the raw material and natural resource shortages facing humanity are far more imminent than the average Soviet understands and they do not explain these limits as a consequence of rapacious plun­ dering (Item No. 15). As a Soviet member of the IUCN

Commission on Rare and Disappearing Species, Professor V.G.

Geptner, stated at the 1973 Priroda [Nature] roundtable:

"Our naivete regarding natural resources is sometimes absolutely staggering. . . people think that the earth is a limitless warehouse of trees, land, etc. . ." (Za okhranu prirody. . . 1973: 80; see also Fedorenko and Reimers, 1974:

2). The predictions that this group of respondents give concerning the extent of reserves are grim. Kapitsa (1973:

47) warns that the exhaustion of raw materials on a global scale will occur within the lifetime of the current genera­ tion; Kamshilov (1976: 231) states that the world’s mineral resources will be exhausted in 80 to 140 years; Astanin and

Blagosklonov (1983: 67) list the following years remaining for non-renewable resource reserves: iron — 250; chromium -

- 85; copper — 30; coal — 500; oil and gas — 70.

While the bulk of attention is paid to the need for rationally using and conserving the raw materials that are needed for production, this group of authors counters polemical "anti-Rousseauism" by stating in response to 154

Item No. 33 that natural landscapes are worth preserving for their spiritual rdukhovnyl. aesthetic, and recreational and patriotic value (Kamshilov, 1976: 250; Girusov and Lappo,

1974: 6; Astanin and Blagosklonov, 1983: 133). In a similar spirit the economists Fedorenko and Lemeshev point out that not all worth can be rendered in economic terms. Trees, they note, have a value other than for wood. In fact, people in wooded areas live longer and those who argue that all trees should be logged should die at the age of 32 because without the symbiotic benefit of sharing life with forests, they don’t deserve to live any longer (Fedorenko,

Lemeshev, and Reimers, 1980: 11).

The absence (or inversion) of common attacks on

"bourgeois" positions is in keeping with these respondents’ views that the problems faced by socialist and capitalist societies in man-nature relations are, or will soon be, similar. The use of the word "convergence" is assiduously avoided however, except in purely natural science usage.10

In an intriguing article emphasizing the community of humanity in the evolution of the biosphere, Moiseyev (1984) expands the metaphor of "spaceship earth" with references to

10 For example (Astanin and Blagosklonov, 1983: 17) write:

"Biocenoses of similar appearance arise on different conti­ nents under similar environmental conditions; this adaptive convergence on the level of biocenoses is one of the most important conclusions of biogeography." 155

"the ship of Planet earth," "Columbus’ ship," and "Noah’s ark." His last paragraph reads like a decoy for the censors:

The evolution of life on our planet results in divergence — new species, new branches of irreversible fortunes, etc. are always arising, and we must examine the contemporary global ecological process from exactly this position [emphasis added] (Moiseyev, 1984: 67).

In contrast to expectations established in Chapter III, these respondents pay more attention to nuclear war in relation to man-nature problems than respondents with a polemical perspective. Several respondents mention the

Partial Test Ban Treaty as an environmentally important agreement (Bannikov in Za okhranu prirody. . .; Kamshilov,

1976). According to Kapitsa (1973:44), it was the recogni­ tion of the planetary nature of nuclear war that first drew attention to the fact that ecological problems are truly global; such a war would be the most monstrous environmental disaster, creating "a global ecological anomaly" (Fedorenko and Reimers, 1981: 12) in which fallout shelters could not protect humanity since "man can only live in conditions of equilibrium with nature . . . and it is obvious that no such equilibrium can exist under conditions in which man lives but the natural environment is destroyed by radioactive poisoning" (Kapitsa, 1973: 45); nuclear cataclysm is not the goal toward which humanity, ripe for noogenesis, should be pushing (Kamshilov, 1976: 250). Furthermore, the prepara­ tion for nuclear war involves devoting resources to 156

"prestigious military studies" rather than to the rational use of the environment (Oldak in KS 1974, 8: 113); and finally, if a nuclear cataclysm does not occur, global ecological processes will become one of the basic directions of research activity (Moiseyev, 1984: 63).

Because of their focus on problems with potentially devastating consequences, DeBardeleben (1984) labels many of the individuals who are here identified as having ecological perspectives as "pessimists." In fact, many of the respon­ dents with an ecological perspective are also optimists, but their optimism is not drawn from Marx.11 An alternative name for this group of respondents would be "Vernadsky’s ecologists" because of the attention they pay in Item No. 5 to the late Soviet scholar’s concept of the noosphere

(literally, "mind"sphere) as a qualitatively new stage in the evolution of the biosphere. In contrast to previous evolutionary stages, the development of the noosphere is not led by blind forces but by scientists taking responsibility for the consequences of their activities and by human reason

11 A skilled definition of optimism as exemplified by the ecologists is provided by Urlanis (VFR 74, 8:73) in the roundtable on Science and Contemporary Global Problems:

"If we have a 'round table,* this does not mean that we should avoid sharp corners. We need to look the facts in the face. We don’t need black glasses, but we don’t need rose-colored ones either. Pessimism and panic always lead only to harm. The French poet of the nineteenth century Banville said well that 'optimism is the religion of revolution.’ But optimism should not be transformed into carelessness. We need to be healthy optimists, rational optimists, nonprocrastinating optimists." 157 encompassing the globe (Parshenkov, 1972: 49; Kamshilov,

1976; Gilyarov, 1978: 1785; Moiseyev, 1978: 181 and 1984:

63; Piruzyan, Malenkov, and Barenboim, 1980: 2; Fedorenko and Reimers, 1981: 7). In a book aimed at the general Soviet reader, positively reviewed in the specialized journal

Ekologia. and translated for English readers, Kamshilov

(1976: 242) proposes the development of a new science of noogenics to guide the rational evolution of the biosphere by "plan[ning] the present activity for the sake of a better future. Its chief task is to make good the disturbances in the relations between man and nature and inside man that have been caused by technological progress."

As implied by the above comments, technological progress is viewed by this group of respondents as one of the primary causes of contemporary environmental problems.

The authors who point to the shady side of the scientific and technological revolution include the authors of the

Ecology article in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia; although the most damning critiques of technology ruining the environment appear elsewhere. "In the future," writes

Parshenkov (1972: 51), "our technology will be looked at as if we intended to burn down the house in order to roast the pig." Dissatisfaction with the ecological appropriateness of contemporary technology extends to proposed visions of a technosphere to replace the biosphere. "How can one believe," asks Kamshilov (1976: 236), "that people who prove 158

Incapable of existing on their own planet will really adapt to life on another [artificially created] one?" The creation of a viable technosphere is rejected as being too expensive, costing more than it can actually provide, and being too complex to manage (Fedorenko and Reimers, 1974:

7) .

The emphasis on technology as a primary cause of contemporary environmental problems is consistent with less finger-pointing at capitalism. This is in no way equivalent to saying that capitalism escapes unscathed, although some authors do point to particular ecologically beneficial measures that capitalists have put in place. Others refer to the death of Lake Erie in the 1970s, neglecting (!) to mention that the lake is located in the capitalist United

States (Girusov and Lappo, 1974: 4) or to the concentration of pollutants in U.S. cities (Kamshilov, 1976) without claiming the superiority of Soviet air quality. Here too is evidence that an emphasis on global ecological problems inevitably taps into a debate with domestic consequences.

This is the only group of respondents that engages in substantial self-criticism about the extent of Soviet failure in dealing with domestic environmental problems.

The Great Soviet Encyclopedia informs its readers that during its early years, the Soviet state was not able to pay adequate attention to the problems of the environment. This standard defensive line is explicitly rejected by Fedorenko, 159

Lemeshev, and Reimers (1980: 3) who state that the Soviet

Union has severe and contemporary environmental problems

that cannot be attributed solely to the trials and tribula­

tions of the Civil War and World War II. In fact, they

state, the successes that the Soviet Union has achieved in the areas of industrial and agricultural growth have occurred at the expense of the environment.

While the polemical respondents argue that any problem

with technology is attributable to the spontaneous growth

that occurs under capitalism, those with an ecological perspective point out that Soviet planning is not all that

it is cracked up to be. For example, Moiseyev (1978: 177)

argues that Forrester’s work in World Dynamics is object­

ively directed against the spontaneity of capitalist

development, but both he and other ecological respondents

come down hard against the apparently prevalent assumption

that the Soviet style of management is equipped to plan an

environmental crisis out of existence.12 Journalists in

particular are criticized for encouraging a nonchalant

attitude toward environmental problems by dwelling on the

superiority of socialist planning.

Advocacy for centralized planning and coordination to

address these problems in the USSR is an important theme in

12 This is not unanimous. Some of those who fall into the ecological perspective category (Kapitsa, 1973: 52; Girusov and Lappo, 1974: 5, Moiseyev, 1978: 181) express confidence that socialist economics are more than satisfac­ tory. 160 the interviews drawn from this group. As discussed in

Chapter II, Western analysts consider the absence of coordination to be an important factor in Soviet environ­ mental problems. While the polemical respondents state that lack of planning is a problem in the capitalist world, in their responses to Item No. 10 this group of respondents argues that environmental planning is not occurring in the

Soviet Union and that "departmentalism" [vedomstvennost1 is a primary organizational obstacle to successfully resolving environmental problems (Piruzyan, Malenkov, and Barenboim,

1980: 7). There are calls in Soviet publications for

"cabinet-level" committees to direct and coordinate not only scientific research, but also to implement "practical measures" (Sidorenko in Krugly stol: chelovek i sreda evo obitania. [Roundtable: Man and His Environment.] 1973

(hereafter KS 1973), 3: 89). On the one hand there are "too many masters" and too many administrative barriers to effective communication (Fedorenko and Reimers 1974: lOf. and 1980: 13), on the other hand, environmental protection concerns are ignored until the final draft stage of project plans and by then it is "too expensive" and "too late" to think about implementing the necessary measures (Parshenkov,

1972). When such measures are implemented, the ministries given oversight for them are those whose primary responsibi­ lity is the exploitation of natural resources (Fedorenko,

Lemeshev, and Reimers, 1980: 12). 161

Respondents with an ecological perspective argue that the natural environment is abused because there are no economic stimuli or moral levers in the USSR to encourage environmental carefulness (Parshenkov, 1972). One of the chief culprits in this respect is stated to be the offi­ cially sanctioned conception of natural resources as "free goods." The seriousness of considering natural resources both limitless and free is discussed at length by Komarov

(1980), but this concern is not at all limited to the pages of samizdat. The official Soviet evaluation of the effects of "free goods" began with the Gosplan economist and statis­ tician S.G. Strumilin who died in 1974 (Gilyarov and Naumov,

1978: 1786; DeBardeleben, 1984: 254-255). According to

Aksenok (KS 1974, 9: 1974) and Lemeshev (1975: 44f), the general conception that because land is free it can be used carelessly means that the most dangerous environmental violators are not "poachers," but factory managers. Factory managers destroy the environment because the development of ecologically efficient technology is unprofitable when natural resources cost nothing, because ecological inven­ tiveness is not rewarded,13 and because an environmental

13 Piruzyan, Malenkov, and Barenboim (1980: 7) are among those who would like to see the "activity" faktivnost1 of inventors encouraged so that ecological technology and nature conservation develop as a new field of human civiliz­ ation. This they suggest, might be done by granting certificates of authorship more quickly to inventors and guaranteeing that they will be paid for their creative inventiveness, since it is not always possible to predict in 162 inspector’s job is not respected or prestigious (Piruzyan,

Malenkov, and Barenboim, 1980: 8).

These respondents reject the argument that the cost of environmental protection measures may be prohibitive. While acknowledging that the measures will be costly, the only alternative is a short-term illusion of economic gain.

Economics must be transformed into a "new" economics, i.e

"bioeconomics."14 In this reformulation, there is no trade­ off between economic growth and environmental protection — both condition each other, as indicated in the responses of these ecologists to Item No. 29 and 31. Philosophically, this advocacy is supported with references to En g e l ’s admonition that "we must not flatter ourselves too much over our victories over nature, for nature avenges herself for each such victory" (Oldak, 1973: 34; Za okhranu prirody . .

., 1973; Novik in KS 1973, 83; Kamshilov, 1976: 67).

Others revise attacks on the bourgeoisie to build doctrinal justifications for the reorientation they endorse: it is capitalists who believe that environmental goals are not economically productive; environmental protection lies at the very heart of socialist economics because a person, after all, lives by virtue of nature rchelovek zhivvet

13(...continued) advance whether or not a measure will be truly effective.

14 As described by Fedorenko and Reimers (1974: 3), the term "bioeconomics" rbioekonomikal is used because "ecoeco- nomics" rekoekonomikal sounds redundant. 163 prirodoil (Fedorenko and Reimers, 1980); moreover, the feasibility of social production hinges on the health of the environment (Oldak in KS 1973, 2: 68). If this group would like to be able to cite broad public support in the Soviet

Union for these goals, they are unable to do so, either because they lack data or because the support is not present. In an attempt to overcome this gap, Piruzyan,

Malenkov, and Barenboim (1980: 7) resort to U.S. data from the General Social Survey to illustrate public support for expensive environmental protection measures.

While promoting the development of closed-cycle technology with frequent references to Barry Commoner

(Fedorenko and Reimers, 1974: 3; Kapitsa, 1973: 47; Girusov and Lappo, 1974 6f.; Kamshilov, 1976: 255; Gilyarov and

Naumov, 1978: 1786; Fedorenko, Lemeshev, and Reimers, 1980;

Piruzyan, Malenkov, and Barenboim, 1980: 6-7; Fedorenko and

Reimers, 1981: 9; Astanin and Blagosklonov, 1983: 64), technology is not accepted as a panacea for environmental problems. In fact, it might be said that the most distin­ guishing characteristic of this group of respondents is that for them there is no single panacea.19

19 The only exception: might be the nuclear physicist Kapitsa who -suggests that technology can stimulate.life and recommends aerating Lake Baikal for precisely this purpose. While he is in favor of implementing closed-cycle techno­ logy, he states that this is really only feasible in the case of unlimited energy expenditure and therefore the wide- scale use of civilian nuclear power is a precondition for truly closed-cycle technology. Not surprisingly, this is 164

The absence of faith in easy solutions follows from the ecological vision of the interrelatedness of the natural world. The extent to which the respondents in this group use (and coin?) words with the prefix meaning "inter" or

"mutual" fvzaimo] is striking: while "reciprocity" [vzaim- nost 1 , "reciprocal" rvzaimnyl, "interaction" fvzaimodeist- vovat1. "to interact; to cooperate" fvzaimodeistvovat1.

"interrelation" [vzaimootnosheniel. "mutual aid" fvzaimo- pomoshchl "interdependence" fvzaimozavisimost1. "inter­ communications" fvzaimosvyazi1, and "mutually conditioning"

rvzaimoobuslovlenny1 all appear in Russian-English diction­ aries; "interpenetration" [vzaimoproniknoveniel . "to mutually interweave" rvzaimopereplesti 1 , and

"interwovenness" fperepletnost1 do not.18 Vernadsky is frequently invoked to remind Soviet readers of the extent to which the man-environment system is so multifaceted and tangled that activities on a local level may lead to unexpected results elsewhere.

These respondents employ analogies vivid to a Russian reader and diagrams of ecosystem events to reinforce their

18(...continued) not a favored argument among this group of respondents, who are among the critics of nuclear power described in Chapter F our.

18 Dictionaries consulted include Smirnitsky, A.I. 1959. Russko-Anglysky Slovar [Russian-English Dictionary] New York: Dutton, and Wheeler, Marcus. 1980. The Oxford Russian-English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 165 vision of the world as a single whole. Fedorenko and

Reimers (1981: 3) are the masters of analogy, equating the biosphere to a chess game in which it is necessary to consider not only one’s own move, but countermoves long into the future, all the time remembering that "even a pawn will lose the game." In another example, probably designed to appeal to an unhealthy and aging leadership, these authors explain the interrelatedness of the natural environment by an incident in which pesticides used to increase rice production leached into medicinal mud making a restorative, recreational resort dysfunctional for individuals who need to recuperate there (Fedorenko, Lemeshev and Reimers, 1980:

4f).

This group of respondents uses these and other examples to encourage readers to be conscious of man’s place in the biosphere, to remember that "we are the human equivalent of living nature" and that failing to comprehend the laws of the biosphere, humanity must prepare for extinction (Kam­ shilov, 1975: 236f). Yet instead of being grim, most of these respondents use the disquieting state of environmental affairs to be optimistic about the future direction of human society. Moiseyev (1984: 65) is the most eloquent:

I cannot help agreeing with those who say that the future of human civilization is being determined above all by the fact that people are learning to experience themselves as passengers on one carriage of that cosmic ship, by name planet Earth. And in conformity with this, are beginning to overcome their egoism, to coordinate their goals with common goals, to succeed in halting the 166

suicidal expenditure of those limited means which Nature alloted to us for Life.

These hopes and fears inspire some explicit prescriptions for resolving serious ecological problems, both within the

Soviet Union and on the global level.

5.B.2: The Solution

The references made to politics by the ecological respondents are quite different from those of their compa­ triots with a polemical perspective. While the latter group take ecology out of the natural sciences to blame capita­ lists for environmental ills, the former link the natural and social sciences in order to set their issues before political decision makers as problems that demand serious attention within the Soviet Union. In a lead article in

Priroda [Nature] under the rubric "Towards the XXVI Congress of the CPSU," Fedorenko, Lemeshev, and Reimers (1980: 3,7) state:

The preservation of forests (and this is only one example from a chain that could continue) has acquired a new, political [politichesky1 signifi­ cance. This is not yet understood by everyone, but in the very near future forests will come to be seen as a most important regulating resource, above all as an air purifier for the earth’s atmosphere, a supplier of oxygen and a consumer of excess carbon dioxide. . . 167

The conservation of nature needs to be turned into a goal of state policy [emphasis in original].17

State policy in this area needs to be scientifically informed and the ecological respondents are emphatic that science as it is currently organized and practiced is not prepared to deal with an imminent crisis in man-nature relations. They call for ecological innovations in techno­ logy, but some technical scientists have little faith in their colleagues. A senior scientific associate of the

Bardin Central Scientific Research Institute of Ferrous

Metallurgy, S.A. Parshenkov (1973: 49), states that the majority of technical scientists (he offers metallurgists as being particularly "ecologically blind") believe that other

industries pollute more than their own; that it is the business of other specialists to be concerned with pollut­

ion; that technicians merely perfect already existing

technology and therefore do not bear responsibility for pollution; that if the state spent large sums of money on

purification equipment the problem would be solved; and that

it is unrealistic to assume that technicians should be at

the forefront of the struggle against production pollutants.

Being aware of the shortcomings of technicians as well as

17 Talking about conservation as a state policy is not inconsequential. Weiner’s research indicates that Soviet environmentalists did suffer under Stalinism psychically as well as politically: conservationists were forced to observe established sanctuaries (zapovedniki) opened up for "prac­ tical use" by state farms and lumbering operations (Weiner, 1982:53). 168 technology, the ecologists are keen advocates of a reorien­ tation of values to coincide with ecological realities through environmental education.

In their emphasis on ecological literacy, this group of respondents expands upon the theme pervading the entire pool that solving environmental problems depends upon a greater integration of natural, social, and technical sciences (Fedorenko and Reimers, 1974: 12; Kapitsa, 1973:

50; Neronov and Goncharov, 1979: 24; Urlanis in VFR, 1974,

9: 73; Volkenshtein in KS 1974, 9: 80). While some respon­ dents talk about the "Tower of Babylon [sic]" that scien­ tists have created and the need to "build bridges" between disciplines (Parshenkov, 1972: 48f; Oldak, 1973: 33;

Urlanis in KS 1974, 9: 73; Fedorenko and Reimers, 1974:

12), others lament a problem that is intradisciplinary as well as interdisciplinary: specialists within the same discipline no longer understand each other (Moiseyev, 1978:

171; Anuchin in KS 1974, 8: 121). Both Francis Bacon and

Lenin are quoted to challenge the practice of attempting narrow solutions to specific problems before the general state of affairs is fully grasped.18 The failures of

19 Francis Bacon is quoted by M.M. Kamshilov (1976: 238):

"For no one successfully investigates the nature of a thing in the thing itself; the inquiry must be enlarged to become more general."

In this same vein, Gusev appeals to Lenin (VFR 1973, 3: 94): 169 specialization are not only academic — in the "real world" they hamper effective planning and coordination. A well- known geographer participating a Voprosy filosofii round­ table (Anuchin in KS 1974, 8: 123) quotes an anonymous

Gosplan official:

On any particular very petty question we can get the advice of a major specialist. But on any major question we often cannot find even an intelligent'dilettante. Where have all the people with well-rounded educations gone?

The economist P.G. Oldak, who misses inclusion in the ecological perspective group because of his concentrated focus on planning, is especially forceful on the issue of how research might be best coordinated so that the scien­ tific community, if not individual researchers, is well- rounded and capable of addressing the major questions. His interview is noteworthy because he goes to some length to describe how it is that this coordination should be ac­ complished. The first step in research is establishing a

"tree of goals" — ecological, technological, and economic.

18(...continued)

"Despite the generally recognized need to protect nature, there is perhaps no other area of human activity in which there are differences as profound as this. This may be explained by the fact that we lack an overall theory of the interrelations between society and the biosphere, a clear formulation of the tasks and the ultimate objective of humankind in its efforts to solve the problem of the relation between nature and society. We are compelled on every hand to solve specific problems while having no solution for the universal ones. In this connection one may recall Lenin's statement that in dealing with particular problems in the absence of solutions for general ones we will constantly stumble." 170

By establishing strictly defined goals, it will be possible to guarantee against overlooking an important link between issues, to define what is needed for coordination, to identify what work can be done by existing institutes, and what work requires new institutes to be established (1973:

39) .

In addressing the linkage between issues and the need for new coordinating institutes, the ecologists have been steady supporters of systems analysis and global modeling efforts. While some of the technocrats, notably Gvishiani, are avid global modelers, they are more restrained in their enthusiasm for Western efforts and more likely to indicate bourgeois weaknesses in most global models. If ecology is a

"subversive science," the same might be said of cybernetics in the USSR. Nonetheless, the status and importance of ecocybernetics seems to be increasing in the Soviet Union.

In an article published shortly before the 27th Party

Congress, Zagladin (1986: 5, 11) states that Gvishiani and

Moiseyev have made a persuasive case that a systems approach is necessary both to understand and resolve global ecologi­ cal problems.

The ecologists’ interest in increasing understanding of environmental issues is not limited to advanced training and research on the part of specialists. Many advocate environ­ mental education in the schools and a drive for ecological literacy along the lines of the broadly successful drive to 171 teach adults to read and write in the years following the

Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War. Journalists are encouraged to write ecological propaganda, and apparently some scientists have advocated establishing new general courses in conservation.19 As participants in the 1973

Priroda [Nature] roundtable argued, the writings of journal­ ists are especially important because the average citizen receives more impressions from newspapers and magazines than from good books.20

Existing efforts to teach children about the environ­ ment are denounced as both inadequate and counterproductive.

Children are taught that nature is filthy and disgusting at an early age (K.N. Blagosklonov in Za okhranu prirody. . . ,

1973: 85); moreover in school they acquire a "consumerist"

19 The philosopher I.B. Novik is especially critical:

"Soviet citizens can’t see the forest for the trees when there are stories that, on the one hand, factories throw wastes into the river and the value of factory products is not equal to the fish destroyed while, on the other hand, journalists are saying that 'Our planned economy will overcome this. There is no problem.’" (Za okhranu prirody . . ., 1973: 83).

20 The co-author of the Ecology article in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia recommends a more integrated approach:

"Propaganda is assuredly necessary, but it would be better achieved by introducing into all subjects, particularly literature, chemistry, physics, and geography, materials shedding light on [environmental] questions from various standpoints. . . In my opinion, it is necessary to incorpo­ rate appropriate sections into all courses in higher education that touch in any way on the exploitation of natural resources, so that all professionals have basic knowledge of these matters (Naumov in VFR 1973, 3: 83)." 172

attitude toward their environment by walking on the grass,

picking numerous flowers for monuments rather than leaving

fields of blossoming flowers as a more meaningful and

permanent memorial; and using multiple frogs for senselessly

repetitive biology experiments. Other failures, such as

inadvertently killing oak trees during construction projects

because workers neglect to make any provision for the trees

to obtain water, are attributed to a "trivial" lack of

understanding: the kind of understanding, presumably that

would be enhanced by ecological literacy.

The environmental education that is advocated is in

large part a moral and ethical education designed to instill

a love of life and consciousness of humanity's relationship

to the earth as a unique ecosystem in addition to meeting

the more utilitarian goal of teaching the principles of the

rational use of natural resources (Girusov and Lappo, 1974:

6; Kamshilov, 1976: 250). In the Great Soviet Encyclopedia,

the environmental ethics of Albert Schweitzer and Aldo

Leopold are alluded to as providing a good model of the type of ethics that needs to be taught to the next generation of

Soviet citizens (Gilyarov and Naumov, 1978: 1786).21

21 The Soviet encyclopedia article does not describe in detail the environmental ethics of either Schweitzer or Leopold. Leopold, who began his career as a game manager, eventually came to a revised understanding of economics, compatible with that of the most vigorous Soviet proponents of an ecological perspective: 173

The ecologists suggest that because this is a traumatic

time in human history, it is necessary to basically change

prevailing thinking about the biosphere not only in the

Soviet Union, but around the world (Fedorenko and Reimers,

1981: 12; Rychkov in KS 1973, 4: 142). It is asserted that people need to develop a new "world perception" [mirovospri- yatiel not only of the environment, but of each other.

Acknowledging that "global ecology" differs from traditional ecology in having social aspects, Moiseyev (1984: 67) and others of the ecological respondents turn the polemical interpretation of social factors and ecology on its head by promoting integration rather than the polarization of humanity:

Humanity was more than once witness to the fact that goal-directed agitation has created mental and ideological moods which turned civilized nations into hordes, ready to destroy everything that did not suit their own stereotypes. But after all, this force of human influence on the masses may be directed along another path. I think that society is capable of perceiving the idea of the coexistence of man and biosphere and as a necessary condition, the coexistence of people with each other.

This theme is continued in ecological interpretations of the role of international cooperation in resolving global ecological problems.

21(...continued) "We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to use. When we see land as a commodity to which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect."

The quote is from the preface to Leopold’s Sand County Almanac, quoted in Worster (1977: 287). 174

5.B.3: International Cooperation

The responses to the survey items on international cooperation, which are fewer and farther between than responses to other items, suggest that the ecological respondent carries a perception of necessary and irrevocable interrelatedness in the biosphere’s ecosystems over into the world’s political and social systems much as the Chicago school of organicists did in the 1920s and 1930s.

Worster (1977: 328f.) reports that during these decades, the Ecology Group at the University of Chicago promoted the philosophy of "organicism," or the idea that:

The individual metazoan, the infusorian popula­ tion, the ant colony, the flock of fowl, the tribei and the world-economy [sic] are all exemplifications of nature’s grand strategy. . . The ultimate future of human society, however dark it may look to the contemporary sociologist or even the historian, appears in the eyes of the biologist, citing down the long perspective of organic evolution, as bright with hope. . . [Therefore,]. . . isolationism is a biological ana­ chronism.

Organicism and the fascination with ant colonies as representing an ideal to be achieved in human community faded from ecology textbooks in the West with the coming of

World War II and the reckoning with fascism and totalitari­ anism as social systems that were based on "appeals to self- sacrifice for the sake of the whole" (Worster, 1977: 329).

While organicism faded in Chicago, it appears to have made a comeback in the 1970s on the pages of Priroda 175

[Nature]. Soviet political culture with its emphasis on the collective at the expense of the individual may well be a more fruitful breeding ground for organicism than American political culture.22 In keeping with this interest in collectives and bearing in mind Soviet ecologists’ commit­ ment to centralization (Item No. 10), they may very well accept Ophul’s (1977) recommendation in favor of Leviathan and Hardin's (1968) "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon", which have been rejected by Western social scientists who favor new, decentralized forms of political participation and international coordination (Orr and Hill, 1979; Dryzek,

1986; Caldwell, 1984: 281) in order to resolve today’s global ecological problems.

As suggested by the metaphors of spaceship Earth and the need for a new "world perception," this group of respondents makes several strong references to the artifi­ cial division of the single anthroposystem of humanity into

22 About Soviet methods of political socialization, Bronfenbrenner (1970: 72) writes: "rewards and punishments are frequently given on a group basis; that is to say, the entire group benefits or suffers as a consequence of the conduct of individual members." Anecdotes supporting Bronfenbrenner’s assertion appear in Shipler (1983).

Of course, the fact that students are thus trained in school does not mean that these values are adopted or internalized by all Soviet adults. It is certainly not the case (as this survey demonstrates) that all Soviet adults are organic ecologists. The point is simply that Soviet ecologists can rest some of their arguments on a somewhat supportive political culture while their American counter­ parts must justify their arguments on a different basis. 176 tribes, civilizations, states, nations, and peoples with their separate interests, goals, and values that must be integrated in order to engage in the constructive resolu­ tions of environmental problems and to establish local, regional, and global ecological balance (Bannikov in Za okhranu prirody. . ., 1973: 78; Fedorenko and Reimers, 1981:

12; Moiseyev, 1984: 65f.)23

Soviet discussions about fragmentation and the need for integration are both poetically eloquent and appealing to the international relations scholar interested in coopera­ tion, but the themes are inadequately developed and there­ fore far from implementable. Kapitsa (1973: 51f), for example, states that as of yet there are no effective means for resolving global ecological problems, but he also apparently believes that an objective need to resolve such problems will encourage cooperation and scientific respon­ sibility on the international level. Overall, the

23 Again, Moiseyev (1984, 65f.) is the most vivid:

"Today it is necessary to study humanity as something integrated, the separate parts of which are connected by deep internal knots. But being an integrity, humanity is by no means united. It is divided, dispersed among a huge quantity of homeostatic integrities, which have their own interests, goals, certain possibilities of their achieve­ ments, and their own image of these goals, if you will, their own value scales. National and state [citizenship], class, and religious self-consciousness, race and property conflicts and much, much else divides people. .

"[Yet] I think that the world is now located right on the threshold of a crest when a new image of humanity, and its community is ready to appear among people, this has happened more than once in history." 177 respondents with an ecological perspective do not simply lament fragmentation and argue that things will become better because they must. Rather, they point to numerous examples of efforts to coordinate environmental knowledge and policy-making on the international level. The over­ whelming majority of these references are to multilateral rather than to bilateral endeavors.24

In addition to being personally familiar with the work of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), these respondents have participated in the environmental protec­ tion activities of UNESCO’s Man and Biosphere Programme, the

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health

Organization (WHO), the World Meteorological Organization

(WMO) , the United Nations Development Program, and the

International Biological Program. They have also engaged in the work of the International Union for the Conservation of

Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), the Scientific Commit­ tee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) of the Interna­ tional Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), the

24 In the total sample, there are 16 references to bilateral cooperation, 38 references to United Nations specialized agencies, 14 references to UNESCO’s Man and Biosphere program, 17 references to the Club of Rome, 4 references to the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), 12 references to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), and 21 references of miscellaneous international scientific and professional associations. Given their participation in these activities, the proportion of references to ISPAs and multilateral cooperation is higher for respondents with an ecological perspective. 178

International Council for the Protection of Birds, the World

Congress of Geographers, the Conference of European Statis­ ticians, and the International Association of Ecologists, to name a few of the organizations whose activities and conferences have been reported primarily on the pages of

Priroda [Nature].

Beginning in 1979, the editors of Priroda [Nature] began to feature articles written by scientists participat­ ing in the work of the Man and Biosphere Programme, indicat­ ing these contributions with the special international MAB logo.23 The pool of potential authors was quite large since more than 500 Soviet scientists associated with 170 research institutes, "nature sanctuaries" fzapovednikil. and other institutions have participated in MAB projects, overwhelm­ ingly in Project No. 8 on the conservation of natural regions and the preservation of genetic material (Neronov and Goncharov, 1979: 31). The international efforts of MAB are particularly praised because although "international in its structure, the MAB programme is directed toward the resolution of the concrete problems of managing the natural resources in the countries that participate in it." At least one author (Parshenkov, 1972: 49) comments that one of the values of international cooperation, giving MAB as an

25 An anthology of these articles for English readers, Man and Biosphere (1984) has been edited by the USSR Academy of Sciences Soviet Committee of the UNESCO Man and Biosphere Programme and published by Nauka Publishers. 179 example, is that it is through participation in such international programs that Soviets have been inspired to do interdisciplinary work.

Others point optimistically to the work of interna­ tional organizations in standardizing the study of ecosys­ tems (Gilyarov and Naumov, 1978: 1786), statistical analysis of environmental problems (Strumilin and Pisarenko, 1977:

104), and implementing a global system of environmental monitoring (Piruzyan, Malenkov, and Barenboim, 1980). In addition to reporting on the activities of organizations

they either belong to or whose conferences they have attended, this group of respondents allude to their member­ ship in the world community of environmental scientists with frequent references to Western data, Western journals, and

Western authors. These include classics (Kamshilov states that his book is derived from a conjunction of Darwin and

Vernadsky) as well as contemporary scientists, including

Jean Dorst, Kenneth Watt, Barry Commoner, Barbara Ward and

Rene Dubos, Anne and Paul Ehrlich, Eugene Odum, Julian

Simon, Lynn White, Jay Forrester, and Donella and Dennis

Meadows.

Some authors carefully separate their concerns about global ecology from foreign policy, international trade, or

social development. However, Fedorenko, Lemeshev, and

Reimers (1980: 7) deliberately draw politics into their discussion of international cooperation and environmental 180 problem solving. In this respect, the authors suggest that it is necessary to rethink the meaning of "policy" rpoliti- kal in world affairs. They suggest that whereas politika is usually used to refer to questions that are purely domestic, in environmental matters, politika must be international as well. To bolster this argument, they state that "many nature conserving measures undertaken today turn out to be socio-political acts of not only national, but also of world significance (Fedorenko, Lemeshev, and Reimers, 1980: 8f.)."

Expanding on themes mentioned by Brezhnev in his report to the 25th Party Congress and in anticipation of the 26th

Party Congress a few months away, they argue that "the victory of the Soviet Union in socio-economic world affairs depends on its handling of ecological issues."

Despite a vividly expressed interest in international cooperation to resolve ecological problems that are increas­ ingly global, the respondents with an ecological perspective tend to avoid discussion of detente or peaceful coexistence.

This raises an interesting question. Why do the respondents with an ecological perspective, who are the most committed objectively to international cooperation, the least emphatic on the need for peaceful coexistence per se?

It may well be that references to peaceful coexistence, more so than appeals for extended international scientific collaboration, raise "complicated" political questions.

Coexistence is one of key words and themes in Sakharov's 181 famous essay of 1968. Writing in detail about their own specific fields of expertise and experience, some Soviet ecologists (Fedorenko, Kapitsa, Lemeshev, Moiseyev, Parshen­ kov, Reimers) go further than Sakharov did in 1968 to stress the imperative of cooperative efforts to redress shared problems. Their choice of language, both in omission and in commission, is probably quite deliberate (see

Moiseyev above on divergence). To the extent that these individuals not only continue their campaign for official

Soviet attention to serious environmental problems both domestically and internationally, but also participate in multilateral endeavors, they may be considered effective both in their efforts to protect themselves and to retain and expand a Soviet presence in the world scientific community.

Another plausible interpretation of the ecologists’ restraint in the use of the terminology of "peaceful coexistence" is their assessment that peaceful coexistence as defined and practiced by Soviet political elites has more to do with East-West competition than cooperation. There is ample evidence that during the 1970s prevailing Soviet opinion understood peaceful coexistence to be perfectly compatible with competition for global influence. The ecologists do not frame their arguments in terms amenable to balance of power analysis. Finally, the ecologists may 182 avoid discussion of peaceful coexistence or detente because they do not think about international relations primarily in bilateral East-West terms. This explanation is supported by the intensive attention these authors devote to multilateral forms of cooperation (and to a far lesser extent, to the troubles of the Third World) not only in word, but especial­ ly in deed.

5.C: The Technocratic Perspective

This group of respondents is based on the nature conservationist establishment follower. They believe that the rational use of natural resources is the primary environmental issue (Item No. 14 or Item No. 15) and that other environmental problems (which are not rooted primarily in technogenic causes) will find their solution in the scientific and technological revolution (Item No. 22 or 24).

The respondents classified as having technocratic perspectives are: Academician Pyotr Nikolayevich Fedoseyev, member of the CC-CPSU Central Committee, elected vice- president of the USSR Academy of Sciences in November 1975, previously director of the Central Committee’s Institute of

Marxism-Leninism, earlier Director of the USSR Academy of

Sciences’ Philosophy Institute; the late Academician Yevgeny

Konstantinovich Fyodorov, a climatologist, former director of the Chief Hydrometeorological Service’s Institute of 183

Applied Geophysicsi chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and candidate member of the CC CPSU; Dzhermen Gvishiani, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, former deputy director of the State Committee for Science and

Technology (GKNT), former director of the All-Union In­ stitute for the Study of Systems Analysis (VNIISI), trans­ ferred in 1986 to a position in Gosplan; Yuri Izrael,

Director of the State Committee on Hydrometerology and

Control of the Environment (formerly the Hydrometeorological

Service); the late Academician Innokenty Petrovich Gerasi­ mov, director of the Academy of Science’s Institute of

Geography; Mikhail Ivanovich Budyko, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, of the Voyeikov Main Geophysical

Observatory in Leningrad; and V.A. Los, candidate in philosophy and scientific secretary of the section on global problems of the Scientific Council of the Presidium of the

Academy of Sciences on philosophical and social problems of science and technology. The full list of cited works illustrating the technocratic perspective is provided in

Appendix D.

Unlike the ecologists who were selected to be natural scientists, no attempt was made to classify this group of respondents according to their party or professional affiliations. It is thus striking that this group includes most, but not all of the leading Communist Party figures who 184 were surveyed. The remaining individuals with high-ranking positions in the Communist Party are Vadim Zagladin, member of the Central Committee and Deputy Director of the CC-

CPSU’s International Relations Section* who defies classifi­ cation (except for a 1979 article co-authored with Ivan

Frolov); and the late Nikolai Nikolayevich Inozemtsev, also a member of the Central Committee and director of the USSR

Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economics and

International Relations (from 1966 until his death in 1985) and, prior to that, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Pravda.

Inozemtsev defies classification entirely; his views on the environment and international relations are examined in

Chapter VI.20

Table 8 summarizes responses that lie within the technocratic perspective. In addition to the concerns mentioned at the beginning of this section, these authors tend to believe that preventing nuclear war is the most serious global problem (Item No. 7); they believe that overpopulation has serious consequences (Item No. 8), perhaps because they believe so strongly in transforming

20 In his discussion of technology and politics, Parrott (1985: 246f.) identifies both Gvishiani and Inozem­ tsev as key "nontraditionalists". Gvishiani is the proto­ typical "technocrat," but Inozemtsev misses being a tech­ nocrat because in regard to global ecological problems, he apparently does not consider technology a cure-all. He misses the polemical category because his writings are not polemical enough. TABLE 8 THE TECHNOCRATIC PERSPECTIVE: RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTIONS

Section I Section II Section III Nature of Problem______Solution______International f/mfpration

PH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

FYD72 12 • 3* A D A B A D A AD R A D A AAA YN A AAA Y

FYN72 07 8 Y B B A D AD A A 0 Y A AA Y N A A

GBB74 14 B 8 A D A AD A A B B R A DAAAR Y Y AAA Y

BLD77 02 6 ABAABB R A A N Y Y A AABABR Y YY R A A Y

GVI78 09 4 R A B A B B Y Y YA A B YA A YY ICS78 12 7 A A A A R B A DA A Y Y YA A A DYAAA A A Y Y

GVI79 08 Y B 3 Y B B A AB YYYAAAA A A Y

GVF79 03 9 A A A B A Y AA A A AYAA A A A

1ZR79 08 5 A A D A D A AY A AA A YY A Y FES81 13 2 Y A A B A DB B AYYY R ADAAA AYRAAANR FY061 08 11 B B A A A D A A BA BY Y A A A AA R RYYYAAAA A A Y N UQS82 17 12 Y B A A A D D A B YYR A AR A BR R Y Y R A

GER83 03 14 Y ABA A D A ABRYY Y A A A AA NY YY Y A A A A A Y

Code: A = Agree; B = Balanced; D = Disagree; R = Related Coament (Other); Y = Yes; N = No

• A blank indicates miBsing data; i.e., the respondent has made no relevant caoment. k Nimfaers in this colism refer to the lumber of problems listed by the respondent as serious ecological issues. 186 nature to meet human needs (Item No. 30) ; while they do not believe in generalized limits to growth (Item No. 12), they have a fairly solid respect for the methodology that first predicted those limits (Item No. 21); finally, they are vocal supporters of both peaceful coexistence (Item No. 40) and learning from the W est (Item No. 41) . It happens that this group may also be identified as those respondents who are moderately polemical, including seven out of the eight interviews that have a moderate polemical quotient (i.e. between .10 and .20). The articles from which these interviews were drawn were published in all the literature categories surveyed, with, again, the exception of Priroda

[Nature]. The one book in this group, V.A. Los (1978) was issued in the relatively large number of 75,000 copies.

Sections 5.C.1 through 5.C.3 complete the description of these responses.

5.C.1: The Problem

As suggested above, these respondents are less con­ vinced than the ecological respondents are of the severity of the environmental problems facing humanity and, in fact, like the polemicists, some doubt the extent to which they do face humanity. Fedoseyev (1981: 16) makes the harshest statement (so harsh as to be atypical) that "the adherents of 'the quality of life’ theory grossly exaggerate the 187 importance of ecological components in the structure of social development." These authors are inclined to state that some ecological problems are simply bourgeois myths, but there is not a firm consensus on this argument. Indivi­ dual respondents express concern about water pollution, open pit mining, eutrophication, urbanization, the greenhouse effect, species extinction, the mastery of space as a global commons, and desertification. While some of these respon­ dents consider concern with quantitative population growth to be a symptom of neo-Malthusianism (Fyodorov and Novik,

1972: 46f) others state that the demographic boom is at least a "complicating factor" in the man-nature relationship

(Los, 1978: 113).

As a rule, these are authors who do not believe that limits to growth A la Forrester and Meadows affect socialist societies. They do, however, like those with a polemical perspective (although less vigorously and consistently as indicated by the responses of the two groups to Items No. 10 and 11), believe that capitalist societies face terrible crises. The technocrats are quick to attribute what environmental limits may exist to the spontaneity of capitalist development and the general crisis of capitalism

(Gerasimov and Budyko, 1974: 120; Budyko, 1977: 255;

Gvishiani, 1978: 7; Fedoseyev, 1981: 16; Los, 1982: 132).27

27 In his works destined for foreign audiences, Gvishiani (1979b: 7) is less polemical; he avoids the terms (continued...) 188

The sharp distinction made between socialist and capitalist societies is evident in the "mirror image" expressed by

Gerasimov (1983) according to which capitalists act posi­ tively when they are forced to and socialists perform badly due only to external factors. When pressured by public opinion and economic constraints the governments of capital­

ist countries do take some conservation measures, but. these efforts are minimal and generally ineffective. On the other hand, agricultural problems, deforestation, and water

shortages in the Soviet Union are due to "insufficient

knowledge of the fundamentals of socialist exploitation of nature" (Gerasimov, 1983: 27).

Linking environmental problems to socio-economic causes

enables these respondents to view science and technology as

a neutral, if not beneficent, element in human society. The bourgeois authors of The Limits to Growth are criticized

precisely for their underestimation of the potential of

technology. While Gvishiani is balanced in his evaluation

of the positive and negative effects of technology in the

intensification of global problems when speaking to an

international audience (1979c), writing for a domestic

audience, he asserts that there is no antagonism between

scientific and technological progress under socialism and

27(...continued) "bourgeois" and "capitalist" to state that "at a certain stage big profits were made only be ignoring environmental standards by the enterprises, and for that 'negligence’ some countries are paying a high price today. 189 human development; in fact the two are mutually reinforcing

(1979b: 8).

Unlike the polemical respondents, the technocratic

respondents do link war and nuclear war to specifically environmental concerns. Los (1978: 1) begins his book, Man and Nature: Social and Philosophical Aspects of Ecological

Problems rPriroda i chelovek: sotsialno-filosofskie asoekty

ekologicheskikh probleml, with the statement that preventing nuclear war is the first global environmental problem. He

also states that the very concept of "global problems" arose

as a result of ecological concerns (see Kapitsa in Section

5.B.1).28 Budyko, a geophysicist, who does not mention nuclear war in his interview coded from a book for foreign

readers, has been a member of the Soviet team involved in

researching the climatic effects of nuclear war. The

geophysicist Ye.K. Fyodorov (1972: 70), who probably played a significant role in drafting the accepted Soviet proposal

to the United Nations General Assembly to outlaw environmen­

tal warfare, linked capitalism to the destruction of the

Vietnamese jungle.

28 Elsewhere, Los (1978: 132) argues that the ecologi­ cal crisis is primarily of capitalist origin, but this statement seems incompatible with several previous pages of writing in which he states that ecological crises are not new and occurred both during the time of the Roman empire (the desertification of Africa) and during the Middle Ages (the deforestation of Europe). Compare also Budyko*s argument (1973 and 1977) that man induced ecological crises during paleolithic times (the extinction of mammoths and other large game animals). 190

The consensus among these respondents that the rational use of natural resources is an important issue is supported with references to Brezhnev’s speeches at several Party

Congresses, Supreme Soviet resolutions, the 1977 Constitu­ tion, and mass slogans29 rather than by individual assess­ ments of the nature of the problem to be resolved. Relying on unoriginal arguments, these authors ignore the tension between the need for rational use based on the opinion that

"contemporary man is compelled to reject the traditional notion in which natural resources in the broadest sense were considered infinite" (Los, 1982: 133) and their optimism that there is no need to worry about the depletion of raw materials since "the earth’s substance as a whole, and eventually that of the cosmos lending itself to exploitation will gradually become the sole and universal measure of natural resources, as men learn to obtain ’anything from anything’" (Fyodorov and Novik, 1977: 54).30 Thus, in

29 Among the 73 party slogans printed on page 1 of Pravda and Izvestia (October 16, 1977) for use on the occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, two dealt with the rational use of natural resources (the only environmental issue addressed in the slogans) as in No. 33 "Citizens of the Soviet Union! Make thrifty use of our homeland’s natural resources, struggle for their preservation and augmentation!" in Current Digest of the Soviet Press. 29(42): 14f.

30 In another article, Fyodorov (1972: 75 fn.) writes:

"The only limit on resources is the earth’s mass. Every twenty four hours the planet receives several thousand tons of substances in the form of meteorites and loses several hundred tons of substances on account of gases dispersed from the upper levels of the atmosphere." 191 opposition to a term that has become widely used, these respondents suggest that conservation is not always "ration­ al." Rational use, when it is warranted, is alleged to follow organically from the essence of the Soviet system

(Fyodorov, 1972: 78; Gerasimov and Budyko, 1974: 124), although there are allusions to weaknesses in the system and a need to combine centralized control over use with the economic independence and initiative of enterprises (Fedose- yev, 1981: 19).

As a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,

Fyodorov is in a good position to comment on its priorities concerning rational use (as he interprets them); he does so simply by quoting Brezhnev:

We should preserve and adorn our Earth for current and future generations of Soviet people. The more rationally we use the riches of nature, the greater will be the successes gotten by nature.31

This quote and repeated references to Article III of the

1977 Constitution that makes the rational use of natural resources the responsible duty of each Soviet citizen, as well as to the 1978 Council of Ministers’ resolution "On

Additional Measures to Strengthen Environmental Protection and to Improve the Utilization of Natural Resources" suggest that rational use is conceived of first and foremost as a domestic problem rather than a global issue. Yet, in other

31 Brezhnev, Leonid I. 1973. Leninskim kursom [On Lenin’s Pathl Volume II: 103-104 quoted by Fyodorov (1981: 88). 192 cited speeches, Brezhnev states that the concern for rational use has international implications:

Such global problems as the raw-materials or energy problems, the eradication of the most dangerous and wide-spread diseases, environmental protection, space exploration and the use of ocean resources are already quite important and urgent. In the long run, they will have an increasingly palpable influence on the life of every people and on the entire system of international relations. Our country, as well as the other socialist countries, cannot stand aside from the solution of these problems, which affect the interests of all mankind (Brezhnev, 1976: 21).

"The interests of all mankind" are heavily qualified by respondents who see environmental problems springing primarily from social and economic, rather than technical, or converging causes. The imperative to deal with problems on an international level is compromised by the belief that the survival of humanity is not at stake. These respondents express concern about both the natural world and the social world, but they are separate worlds. Philosophically, this group rejects the organicism of the ecological perspective.

As Gvishiani (1978: 19) puts it, social laws are qualita­ tively different than the laws of nature. This theoretical

limitation on the extent of interrelatedness has practical

implications for the kinds of solutions to environmental problems that are proposed by these authors. 193

5.C.2: The Solution

Unlike the ecologists and despite references to the

25th Party Congress’ identification of rational nature use as a complex task involving natural, technical, and social sciences, this group is not dissatisfied with the results of knowledge purposefully differentiated by discipline. While repeating the idea that ecological ideas represent an integrating element in scientific knowledge, Gerasimov

(1983) and Los (1978: 160-161) both identify geography as the single discipline in the best position to synthesize knowledge about the man-nature relationship. Fedoseyev

(1981: 20), a philosopher of science, makes the only statement in the entire pool strongly in favor of the differentiation of knowledge. He does this in a discussion of the dialectics of knowledge about man and nature arguing that "the differentiation of knowledge is not only important as a condition for integration, but it is also valuable in itself, since it is accompanied by the elucidation of the subject-matter of science, its sovereignty among other areas of scientific cognition."

For this group of respondents the integration of knowledge is synonymous with systems analysis. The ecologi­ cal modeling advocated by Gerasimov (1983: 22f.) is not clearly global modeling, although Forrester’s symbols for indicating levels and rates have been clearly used by 194

Soviet scientists publishing in Gerasimov’s journal,

Izvestia Akademii Nauk SSSR. seria geographicheskaya

[Geography News of the USSR Academy of Sciences]. The bulk of Soviet "ecocybernetics" research has been conducted at

VNIISI from approximately 1979 through the first half of the 1980s.32 Figure 2, which is translated from Gelovani and Dubovsky (1984: 14) names the different "scenarios" that

Soviet researchers model in order to understand global processes. This figure appears to confirm Los’ assertion

(1985: 10) that ecological modeling is one of the most important elements in the system of modeling processes of global development at VNIISI.

It is initially surprising that Fyodorov, an early and vocal critic of the Club of Rome is grouped with Gvishiani who, as described above, played some role in establishing the Club. Yet it appears on closer analysis that Fyodorov came to appreciate some aspects of global modeling and that

Gvishiani has advocated a Soviet version of systems analysis that does not parallel the work of the Club of Rome in all respects. For example, while rejecting the straight line extrapolations of Meadows et al. since "real human society is not a linear system (Fyodorov and Novik, 1972:

47)," a decade later Fyodorov (1981: 85) applauded the

3* Since Gvishiani’s move to Gosplan it has not been immediately obvious to American observers under whose auspices global ecological modeling efforts are being conducted. 195

ECONOMICS k SOCIAL POPULATION k INTER­ NATURAL PROCESSES ENVIRONMENT REGIONAL RESOURCES INTERDEPEN' DENCE

Regional Age-sex Ecological Inter­ macromodel structure macromodel regional interdepen­ dence macromodel Economic Social Climate management regulation macromodel World mechanism mechanism multiproduc- tive markets Scientific- Labor Soil model mechanical activity Energy progress markets

Economic Educational structure structure Industrial markets Industrial Professional productivity structure Technology markets Heat-energy Time Budget complex Population migration Natural Income resources Differentia- World tion currency and finance mechanisms Urbanization

FIGURE 2 A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESSES OF GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT Translated from Gelovani and Dubovsky (1984: 14) 196 systems approach of Mesarovic and Pestel and stated that

"science needs to move forward from description to projec­ tion." It is perhaps in response to the earlier criticisms of Fyodorov, Gerasimov, Budyko, and doubtless others who are even more influential that Gvishiani, more so than Moiseyev, has identified and defended a peculiarly Soviet approach to global modeling.

Gvishiani, who has also served as a responsible officer of the International Institute for Applied Systems

Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria, takes pains in his writings for domestic audiences to explain what it is that is unique about Soviet efforts to model global problems

(Gvishiani, 1978; 1979a; 1979b; 1984). In an extensive review of Western global modeling efforts, Ashley (1983:

500) argues that most global modelers, the majority of whom are not political scientists and are not trained in interna­ tional relations, are only superficially aware of the political role and implications of their work. Soviet modelers, who again and again stress the role of social factors in the global processes they analyze similarly critique "bourgeois" models. Gvishiani, in particular, has a stated commitment to models of global development that are based on Marxist-Leninist sociological theory. Although a few of the ecological respondents mention dialectics in passing as a philosophical justification for systems analysis, affirmative answers to Item No. 20 on 197

Marxism-Leninism is a consistent feature in the technocratic

respondents’ interviews. Gvishiani (1978, 1979a, 1979b,

1983), Fedoseyev (1981), Fyodorov (1981), Los (1982), and

Gerasimov (1983) all devote considerable attention to the

roots of systems analysis in historical materialism.34

If systems analysis as understood and practiced by the

respondents with an ecological perspective comes close to

"extending the universalizing, objectively necessary, and

hence value-neutral logic of a post-industrial, post-ideolo­

gical, and ’scientized’ society" (Ashley, 1983: 499), global

modeling as discussed and structured within the technocratic

perspective is a useful instrument for studying the basic

contradictions between capitalism and socialism. According

to Gvishiani (1979b: 1) social processes are investigated

and modeled in two ways at VNIISI: first, they are included

in the models as an internal aspect of all processes

(technological, economic, scientific, and ecological) that permeate society; second, traditional social institutions

and cultural standards such as "the subjugation of nature by

technology," are evaluated by global models.

Despite differences in philosophical orientation

suggested by a close reading of systems analysis

34 For example, the following Soviet-translated English-language title of an article by Gvishiani appearing in the Voprosy filosofii. No. 5 1983 is suggestive of the connections posited by the group of authors: Dialectics, the System Character, and the Global Modeling [Dialektika, sistemnost, globalnoe modelirovanie]. 198 commentaries written by individuals like Moiseyev and

Gvishiani^ it would be dangerous to conclude that the

technocrats are less interested in taking advantage of systems analysis techniques to aid in the resolution of

ecological problems. It is under the auspices of

Gvishiani at GKNT that Dennis Meadows has traveled to the

Soviet Union to train ecological managers and groups of

VNIISI researchers have traveled to IIASA as well as to the

United States to study with Jay Forrester. It should be noted that VNIISI is not held in particularly high esteem by

all Soviet academics.33 Surprisingly, Soviet scholars at

IIASA are not highly impressed by the research activities of

the institute.

Given the association of these respondents with GKNT,

their emphasis on the ameliorating role of technology is not

surprising. As described above, respondents with an

ecological perspective also have hopes for technology, but

for them it is explicitly an ecologically appropriate

technology. Fedoseyev (1981: 13) and Los (1982: 132) seem

to share some of this orientation with the statement that a

new, ecological scientific and technological revolution is needed. However, in arguing that "we can’t get away from

evils of technology by rejecting it," the latter’s emphasis

is on a new, ecological scientific and technological

35 This assertion is based on discussions with IIASA researchers and with Soviet emigres. 199 revolution rather than on a new, ecological scientific and technological revolution. In some respects the techno­ crats’ arguments seem to invert ecological concerns, suggesting that ecological crises inspire valuable techno­ logical innovation: the extinction of mammoths during the

Paleolithic era led to the development of agriculture and the deforestation of Europe led to the discovery and use of more efficient forms of energy.38

The coding record does not indicate a dramatic differ­ ence in the responses of the technocrats and the ecologists to Item No. 26 on the rebuilding and transformation of the environment. Yet there are notable differences in the verbal responses to the probe as to whether environmental transformation should be symbiotic or should force nature to adapt to man. Ecologists do talk about "ecological engi­ neering" as in helping plants and animals adapt to stress

(Piruzyan, Malenkov, and Barenboim, 1980: 11); these discus­ sions are always combined with explicit statements of the need to reduce human pressure on nature and the risks to human survival posed by ecological crises. As Fedorenko and

Reimers (1981: 6) suggest, ecological transformation is needed to undo the mistakes of the past:

38 Curiously, Budyko (1973, 1977) who devotes consider­ able attention to the positive effects of mammoths' extinc­ tion on Paleolithic social development, writes that ". . . of all types of harm caused by man to the environment, the destruction of the genetic fund of currently existing organisms is the only irreparable one." 200

We need a reverse process of "retransformation," if it is possible to use such a term, — of re­ storing thoughtlessly transformed nature to its former status. This is completely obvious: no one can begin to argue with the fact that anthropo­ genic deserts demand "retransformation" into productive communities. But when it is a question of projects of the global construction of a living natural environment for all humanity, such theoretical constructs cannot be accepted for the foreseeable future.

Some of the proposals for regulating the man-nature relationship made by the technocrats are along lines that ecologists would likely point to as examples of nature- hating or life-endangering technologies. Gerasimov (1983:

44), the founder of the Soviet discipline of constructive geography is explicit that "modern geography is a science concerned with transformation (emphasis in original)." In addition to proposing large-scale irrigation projects, constructive geographers endorsed the now abandoned massive project to redirect the flow of Siberian rivers to Central

Asia as well as plans for large-scale influences on climatic processes. It is not surprising that Fyodorov, who appar­ ently invented a method for controlling hail formation

(Fyodorov, 1981: 85), reminds readers that "humanity has mastered the earth, its resources, and outer space for its own use" (1972: 70) and makes various suggestions for artificially regulating the planet's cloud cover (which would, as he acknowledges, require the cooperation of a number of states). Ironically, Fyodorov rejects some attempts at environmental protection as being "too 201 expensive," when it is obvious that implementing the massive transformation projects he has in mind would be enormously costly.

5.C.3 International Cooperation

As a whole, this group of respondents has considerable international experience: Gvishiani is well-traveled in the

West under both UNESCO and IIASA auspices; Fyodorov has also traveled abroad as the chairman of the Soviet Peace Commit­ tee and as a participant in the Dartmouth conferences; and

Gerasimov had connections for many years with the World

Congress of Geographers and with the global monitoring work of ICSU and SCOPE.

These travel privileges are in keeping with positions of responsibility (or at least prestige) within the Commu­ nist Party and this status in turn is reflected in these respondents’ interpretation of the manifestation of and the solution to global problems as a transition point on the pathway to Communism. On foreign as well as on domestic environmental policy Brezhnev and party documents are widely quoted; one of the few differences between the following excerpt from the draft party program of the CPSU quoted by

Los (1985: 1), anticipating Gorbachev's report to the 27th

Party Congress, and an almost identical statement in

Brezhnev’s report ten years earlier is that in the 202 intervening years, environmental protection has moved up to first place:

The Party and the Soviet state will cooperate with other countries in the resolution of global problems which have been especially intensified in the second half of the 20th century and are vitally important for all humanity: environmental protection, power engineering, raw material, food, and demographic problems, the peaceful mastery of space and the wealth of the World Ocean, overcom­ ing the economic backwardness of many liberated countries, eliminating dangerous diseases and others. Their resolution demands the combined forces of all states. It will be substantially easier if the squandering of forces and means on the arms race is ceased.37

37 Thus also Gorbachev (1986: 18f.) in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress in February 1986:

"Analysis of yet another group of contradictions — those on a global scale, affecting the very foundations of the existence of civilization — leads to serious conclusions (emphasis in original). This refers first of all to pollution of the environment, the air and oceans, and to the depletion of natural resources. The problems are aggravated not just by the excessive loads on the natural systems as a consequence of the scientific and technological revolution and the increasing extent of man's activity. Engels, in his time, foresaw the ill effects of subordinating the use of natural resources to the blind play of market forces. The need for effective international procedures and mechanisms, which would make for the rational use of the world’s resources as an asset belonging to all humanity, is becoming increasingly apparent."

"The global problems, affecting all humanity, cannot be resolved by one state or a group of states. This calls for cooperation on a worldwide scale, for close and constructive joint action by the majority of countries. This cooperation must be based on completely equal rights and a respect for the sovereignty of each state. It must be based on con­ scientious compliance with accepted commitments and with the standards of international law. Such is the main demand of the times we live in." 203

In discussing international joint efforts for environ­ mental protection, these respondents are attuned to both bilateral and multilateral endeavors. Again, primary attention is paid to multilateral contacts. They combine the ecological interest in the cooperation of scientists, mentioning IIASA, ICSU, UNESCO, and UN conferences on the biosphere and desertification with a polemical emphasis on socialist cooperation in the CMEA and peaceful coexistence demonstrated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Helsinki Final Act is cited as evidence of international agreement that "states in cooperation with the principles of international law, should in the spirit of cooperation adopt measures so that activity conducted on their territory is not a cause of environmental deteriora­ tion in another state and region lying beyond national jurisdiction." Although this group does not treat the

Partial Test Ban Treaty as an environmental agreement,

United Nations General Assembly resolutions prohibiting environmental warfare are noted by Ye.K. Fyodorov (1981:

80f).38

38 In this same article, written a few years before his death, Fyodorov puns on international cooperation. He writes (1981: 94):

"It is absolutely imperative to propose the beginning of an era of unprecedented cooperation and self-abnegation (razryadka mine — E .F . ) . "

Razryadka is a typographical term for emphasis indicated by extra spacing between letters. It is also the Russian word for detente. 204

While identifying a few instances of international success in environmental protection, the technocrats also recognize international failure. In one case, erosion and chemical pollution caused by the Green Revolution is attributed to the inability of Third World countries to assimilate advanced science and technology (Los, 1978: 119).

Other sources of failure are attributed to the insidiousness of bourgeois ideology. While the Global 2000 report was favorably received by Soviet reviewers, Fyodorov (1981: 95) notes that within the space of three years, the Carter presidency moved from a concern with interdependence motivating collaborative attempts at global problem solving to using "interdependence" as a cover for commissioning new military forces.

5.D: Conclusion

My original label for the polemical respondents was

"concrete Marxists." One of the reasons that this label was discarded was its implication that this group was unique in its appeal to the founders of Marxism-Leninism for doctrinal justification. Now it appears that each of these groups could choose (and in some individual cases has chosen) its own motto from the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. In the denunciation of capitalism’s rapaciousness and reckless lack of planning, the polemical respondents remind readers 205 that "culture, when it progresses spontaneously and is not consciously controlled . . . leaves deserts behind it." The ecologists, stressing the interrelatedness of man and nature recall Engel’s admonition not to "flatter overselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory it is true, in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel out the first." Finally, the technocrats, confident that science and technology will undo whatever crises science and technology have wrought, base their optimism on the fact that "mankind. . . inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is.able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation."39

To a large extent the differences between these groups of respondents lie in diverse connotations attributed to shared words. For example, interrelatedness is a key word that bridges all three perspectives. As demonstrated in

39 The desert quote is from Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. 1965. Selected Correspondence. Moscow: Progress Publishers, p.202. The victory quote is from Frederick Engels. 1974. The Dialectics of Nature. Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 180. The solutions quote is from Karl Marx. 1977. A Contri­ bution to the Critique of Political Economy. Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 21. 206 previous sections of this chapter, the polemicists point to oneness of the biosphere in combination with the capitalist threat to provoke fear that ecological crises induced by the

West endanger the rest of innocent humanity. Alternatively, the ecologists refer to the interrelatedness of global ecosystems as a reason to overcome the artifical fragmentation of humanity. Finally, in a more technical usage, the technocrats focus on ecological interrelatedness as one of the primary philosophical rationales for develop­ ing systems analysis for the study of global problems.

Soviet views on the role of international cooperation in resolving environmental problems will be explored in more detail in the following chapter. However, the review of three perspectives in this chapter indicates that, with the possible exception of the polemical respondents, interest in international cooperation is not an afterthought, but an integral part of the respondents’ thinking about environmen­ tal issues. This is most obvious in the case of the ecologists who have been regular participants in interna­ tional scientific and professional association (ISPA) activities — Priroda [Nature] would be a different journal without its regular reports on international conferences and the activities of Soviet scientists engaged in international projects like MAB. While the technocrats have also engaged in international programs and projects such as IIASA and UN conferences in the Soviet Union on global problems and 207 environmental education, there is more of an acquisitive emphasis within this perspective on acquiring what is good that comes out of the West. CHAPTER VI

THE VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

6.A: Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to expand on Soviet material on the environment and international relations introduced in previous chapters. Individuals who cannot be classified as ecologists, polemicists, or technocrats have some of the most important and relevant things to say on these issues. Furthermore, preceding discussions of the environment and international cooperation have been related to the three perspectives more or less in isolation from each other and from a broader context.

This chapter addresses several different kinds of questions. The data in Table 9 (described below) are presented in order to shed some light on whether or not

Soviet interests in international environmental cooperation is epiphenomenal. Section 6.C provides some grounding in the history of Soviet conceptions of the environment in international relations. In Section 6.D the following questions are addressed to organize and interpret responses to survey items concerning international cooperation:

208 209

1. How important is international cooperation in resolving environmental problems?

2. What is the relationship between detente or peaceful coexistence and international environ­ mental problem-solving?

3. What is to be learned or obtained from Western counterparts?

4. What are the best forums for international cooperation?

6.B: Propositions Concerning Epiphenomenal Interests

In Chapter III, I commented that if the discussion of global ecological problems is epiphenomenal, i.e. secondary

to "real politics," then these discussions may be correlated with East-West relations in one of several variations. It should be noted that these alternatives are hardly mutually exclusive, particularly since the analysis in Chapters IV and V indicates that Soviet views of global ecological problems are far from monolithic. It might even be pos­ sible to attach different perspectives to these different propositions. For example:

A. Technocratic: Expressed interest in global ecological problems is positively correlated with good East-West relations. This may suggest Soviet interest in obtaining the benefits of technolo­ gical innovations related to environmental protection when there is a political climate conducive to doing so.

B. Polemical: Expressed interest in global ecological problems is negatively correlated with good East-West relations. This may suggest that Soviet interest in global problems is primarily 210

polemical -- the environment is, in effect, another "weapon" in ideological struggle.

C. Ecological: Expressed interest in global ecological problems is negatively correlated with good East-West relations. This may suggest that interest in these problems is heightened when the consequences of noncooperation seem all the more imminent.

The naming of the last proposition as "ecological" seems somewhat problematic. The more likely ecological proposi­ tion, given the discussion in Chapters IV and V, is that there is not a correlation between the status of East-West relations and expressed interest in global ecological problems, which are important in their own right.

A review of speeches to the Party Congress indicates that if there has been any substantive change among the political elite, rather than following the ebb and flow of detente, it lies in the direction of the ecological threat being given increasingly more attention between 1972 and

1986, with a possible lapse in 1981. However, this was also the year that two widely-reviewed books (Zagladin and

Frolov, 1981; Inozemtsev, ed., 1981) were published indicat­ ing that the globalistika had come of age. Within the survey pool, there is a lull in simulated interviews dealing with the environment and international cooperation during 1975. Brezhnev disappeared from public view for seven weeks at the beginning of 1975 and it is possible that this lull in the interviews coincides with the waning of detente and public distancing from Brezhnev’s 211

"non-traditional" approach to the West. This finding coincides with Clemens' (1978: 25) finding that globalism received little support from mezhdunarodniki between late

1973 and late 1976. However, since interview references to international cooperation in environmental affairs appear to pick up in 1976 and 1977 without noticeable differences (and since the environment received a dutiful share of attention at the 1976 Party Congress), it is just as likely that this gap is an artifact of a small and limited interview pool.

The detailed interview responses to items in the final section of the survey concerning the role of international cooperation in resolving global ecological problems reveal considerable persistence in response over the years, lending doubt to propositions that expressed interest in environ­ mental issues and international cooperation is dependent in some fashion on the political winds of East-West relations.

At any rate, this is true of individual respondents, the majority of whom are not domestic political elites, although some are important actors in international organizations.

The consistency over time of annually aggregated responses does not mean that responses are unanimous or predictable from one year to the next. It does mean that patterns in the variation that does exist are elusive. 212

6.C: Chichvarin and the Environment in International Rela­ tions

According to L.K. Shaposhnikov, chairman of the IUCN’s commission on environmental education, Vladimir A. Chich­ varin *s book, Nature Conservation and International Rela­ tions [Okhrana prirody i mezhdunarodnie otnoshenial (1970) was the first [Soviet] work to examine the implications of the interrelationship of humanity and nature on interstate affairs.1 The monograph is addressed to jurists, interna­ tional specialists, biologists, geographers, economists, philosophers, and nature conservation scientists. Aside from frequent polemical thrusts against capitalists for perverting nature conservation which is a basic element of peaceful coexistence and for exploiting nature in'tite interest of obtaining the highest possible profits, the book is largely a chronology of relevant conventions passed and conferences called between 1911 and 1970.

Still, Chichvarin raises points and makes arguments that provide useful background for the variety of questions and issues that come up in survey responses, in effect

1 Shaposhnikov makes this comment in his preface to Chichvarin (1970: 5). He continues, "practically all problems of the conservation of nature of our planet which are at all significant are elucidated in the monograph, beginning with the creation of international zapovedniki [nature sanctuaries] and concluding with the struggle against the radioactive pollution of our environment." 213 combining elements of the ecological, polemical, and technocratic perspectives. The author is a lawyer and his most interesting comment is that the natural and the political worlds are not always compatible:

Nature as a vital phenomenon independent from man (res naturae) and states and generally administra­ tive boundaries (res humanae) are incompatible, lying in different conceptual planes. . . It is natural that in the interests of humanity nature conservation demands the very broadest interna­ tional cooperation: nature does not know and does not recognize state and administrative boundaries. In the biosphere everything is interdependent. . .The truthfulness of the given statement no longer needs proof, it is accepted as an axiom in international science. (Chichvarin, 1970: 21)

Unfortunately, as Haas reminds us, the truthfulness of scientific axioms is not sufficient to prompt or maintain international cooperation. The most serious limitation of

Chichvarin's work, a weakness that is common to many of the sources analyzed in the simulated survey is that hardly any attention is paid to the specific conditions that are conducive to international cooperation, or even more specifically, the ways in which international organizations should function.

Chichvarin does devote a chapter to (failed) interna­ tional efforts to create a single conservation organization.

Like others of his compatriots, he stresses that all such attempts must be international rather than supranational rmezhdunarodnie rather than sverkhnatsionalnie). Elsewhere, he denies the validity of the concept of the "common heritage" of humanity as a bourgeois front for the 214 imperialist exploitation of nature. In the same vein

Chichvarin (1970: 34) argues that environmental problems can and should be resolved with treaties rather than by "supras- tate" rnadgosudarstvennie1 organizations that violate national sovereignty.

The tension between these latter comments and the incompatibility between res humanae and res naturae is not resolved, let alone acknowledged. Although polemical in both tone and content, the author returns frequently to the theme that those whose primary interest is res naturae have an important role to play in inducing states to act appro­ priately: scientists make agreements that monopolies won’t;2 the work of international organizations enables the introduction of nature conservation into international relations; and international science is a force that states are compelled to consider.

2 Assigning even impressionistic weights to these different arguments is not easy. For example, Chichvarin devotes several pages to a description of useful regional collaboration on environmental protection in the West, but he precedes this narrative with the following statement:

In international agreements on nature conservation and the regulation of the use of its riches between capitalist countries, the state only sanctions, "rubber stamps," relationships shaped by monopolies in the course of their competitive struggle for the undivided possession of interna­ tional natural resources and the natural resource property of peoples dependent on imperialism (Chichvarin, 1970: 61). 215

6.D: Key Themes in Answering the Questions

The conflicting themes raised by Chichvarin are important, but not exclusive issues in the Soviet publica­ tions that make up the interview pool. In practice, the identification of key themes within interviews was made possible by a supplemental coding of the interviews. The key themes recorded were derived from the three perspec­ tives, but in some cases, themes were introduced by the interviews themselves (this is another example of serendi­ pitous discoveries made possible by qualitative analysis).

As indicated in Chapter III, the process of analyzing the use of themes within interviews was made possible by a commercial software program that catalogs and conducts

Boolean searches within research notes.

Table 9 summarizes the use of themes in response to items in Section Three of the survey. The one word title of the columns refer to the questions asked at the beginning of this chapter. For example, "1. Rationale" abbreviates the first question, "How important is international cooperation in resolving environmental problems?" The rows provide information about the themes that appeared in the survey data during given years. The numbers in parentheses in the table refer to the number of times this theme appears in

Section III of all interviews. Multiple references within a single interview are counted only once. Thus, the need to 216

TABLE 9 KEY THEMES RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

1. Rationale 2. Coexistence 3. Benefits 4. Poruas

1972 biosphere (28)*; functionalisa (13); interdisciplinary (1); bilateral (17); sovereignty (9); nilitary expenses (17); info exchange (9); CHEA (17); ISPA (21); costs (4) poleaical (10) regional (21)

1973 global (31); functionalist; info exchange; IUCN (12); CHEA; biosphere; ■ilitary expenses; coordination (15); regional costs poleaical aonitoring (15)

1974 global; functionalist; info exchange; UN agencies (38); biosphere; nilitary expenses coordination; IIASA (4); regional; sovereignty aodeling (23) ISPA; IUCN

1976 global; functionalist; aonitoring; bilateral; regional; biosphere tilitary expenses; aodeling UN agencies; CHBA; poleaical IIASA

1977 global; tilitary expenses; info exchange; IUCN; ISPA; biosphere; poleaical regional sovereignty

1978 global; tilitary expenses aodeling regional; CHEA; ISPA; biosphere CSCE (9); IUCN; IIASA

1979 global; costs; functionalist; info exchange; regional; CHEA; CSCE; biosphere; nilitary expenses; aonitoring IUCN; sovereignty poleaical

1980 global; ailitary expenses; aodeling; aonitoring; UN agencies; IUCN; biosphere poleaical coordination regional; CHBA; CSCE

1 Nuabers in parentheses refer to the nuaber of tiaes this theae appears in Section III for all years. 217

TABLE 9 (continued)

1. Rationale 2. Coexistence 3. Benefits 4. Forms

1981 global; lilitary expenses coordination; bilateral; IUCN; biosphere aonitoring ISPA; CHBA;

1982 global; nilitary expenses info exchange UN agencies; IUCN; sovereignty aonitoring regional; CHBA

1983 biosphere; nilitary expenses info exchange; UN agencies; IUCN; sovereignty aonitoring regional; CHEA; CSCB

1984 global; aodeling bilateral; IUCN; biosphere regional; CHBA

1985 global functionalisn; aonitoring; bilateral; regional; nilitary expenses; aodeling UN agencies; IIASA; poleaical CHEA; IUCN;

1986 global; nilitary expenses info exchange agencies; regional biosphere

protect the biosphere was provided as a specific rationale for engaging in international cooperation in 28 interviews, based on articles written between 1972 and 1986. The use of themes is not broken down by year since there are so few c a s e s .

There is clearly a discrepancy between the number of times that these themes appear in the interviews and the number of "respondents" who agree that international cooperation is necessary in response to items in Section 218

Three. Much of this discrepancy is the result of responses along such vague lines as "life itself demands international cooperation." This in turn may be explained as a greater willingness on the part of respondents to describe the problem than to prescribe solutions.

6.D.1: What is the Rationale for Engaging in International Cooperation?

Several rationales are given for engaging in interna­ tional efforts to resolve environmental problems. The first rationale, applicable to global problems in general and identified by the key theme global in Table 9, is that the social world in the latter decades of the twentieth century is undergoing unprecedented internationalization in all aspects. The second reason, specific to environmental problems and identified by the key theme biosphere, is that the biosphere is indivisible and individual countries do not have jurisdiction over ecosystems that transcend political and administrative boundaries.

The "factors underlying the emergence and intensifica­ tion of global problems" are of major interest to a number of authors in the pool, including those who may be suspected to have (or to have had) the greatest access to political elites* including Frolov, Inozemtsev, and Zagladin.

Inozemtsev’s discussion of the causes of global problems in his noted edited volume (1984: 1-40), while critical of the 219 theories of "bourgeois reformists," has more in common with them than he acknowledges. In this analysis, problems now have global causes and effects because more and more actors are now involved in world politics, transportation and communications technology have shrunk the globe to the extent that there has been "nothing comparable in the past history of the human race" (Inozemtsev, 1984: 36), the volume of exchanged goods and services is steadily growing, and science is now truly international.3

Inozemtsev does state that global problems do not arise in a political vacuum and social factors of the competition between capitalism and socialism must be covered in analyses of the global crises. This argument is pursued more vigorously'by Frolov (1982, 21f.) who is particularly critical of the tendency of bourgeois globalists to state that the very existence of a global problem is proof in and of itself of convergence and adequate justification for describing organizations involved in the solution of these problems as "supraclass," "suprasocial," or "supranational."

3 This last is a particularly important point for Inozemtsev (1984: 36):

Such a revolution [i.e. the revolution in science and technology] would not have been possible without a rapid dissemination of scientific knowledge and without wide international communication among scientists and exchange of scientific achievements and discoveries. Today there is no country in the world, not even the most industrially advanced, that could effectively carry out its own scienti­ fic research in all fields of knowledge without relations, cooperation and mutual exchange with other states. 220

Yet, even Frolov who has written one of the more polemical articles in the pool states that in the field of environmental protection, uncoordinated strategies will not work and the division of humanity by class, ideology, and country hampers effective solutions. While Frolov (1982:

25) uses the fragmentation of the biosphere as an argument that global ecological problems can only be resolved under conditions of world-wide communism, he is not always adamant on this point. He has co-authored articles on global problems with Moiseyev, who is noteworthy in his own right for asserting that the solution of global ecological problems on a shared planet rests on compromise (Moiseyev,

1978: 180 f).*

As suggested by the review of the ecological perspec­ tive in the previous chapter, the assertion that the biosphere is indivisible is made most forcefully by natural scientists, although Chichvarin’s work indicates that at least some Soviet international lawyers were using this phrase by the late 1960s. Statements that ecosystems are not coterminous with political jurisdictions are not for foreign consumption only; they have been repeated in specialized journals devoted to global modeling (Pegov,

1980: 36) as well as in a mass circulation paperback for use

in adult night schools (Mitryushkin and Shaposhnikov, 1977:

* Frolov and Moiseyev (1984) appears in Voprosy filosofii and deals with issues of cybernetics and biotech­ nology in the relationship between society and nature. 221

35). Such assertions are frequently accompanied by the

remark that the environment is a fundamentally new factor in

international relations (KS 1973 passim; KS 1974 passim;

Ananichev, 1976: 10; Miroshnichenko, 1979: 114; Novikov,

1984: 227; Moiseyev, 1984: 64f.; Kazakov, 1985: 42). Yet

far from newness being an excuse to bide time, many of the

respondents in the pool express profound urgency. Then

President of the International Society of Soil Scientists,

Viktor Kovda (1974: 12) leaves no room for imagination:

The time for superfluous noise, agitational publicity, and dangerous passivity is over. It is time to act.

Some authors who are government officials are clearly

mindful of this imperative. For example, Ananichev (1976:

10, 161) states that "the environment is a new phenomenon in

international relations, which makes specific demands on the

rules of conducts of states;" the "rules of conduct" must

reflect interdependence based upon, among other things, the

"realization of the fact that none of Europe’s countries

has, in effect, its ’own’ water."

Ananichev is the only author in the pool who even indi­

rectly acknowledges the tension raised by Chichvarin and

interview respondents between an indisputable need for

international collaboration to protect an indivisible

biosphere and the impermissibility of violating national

sovereignty on the pretext of conservation. He writes that

various authors have gone to one extreme or another in 222 arguing that either the global implications of environmental problems or domestic "home-made" remedies should take

precedence over the other (Ananichev, 1976: 10). As a middle ground, he recommends a "micro-macro" approach that

recognizes the need for both national and international action. International cooperation will only be effective

"if vigorous national efforts are made to solve these problems inside each country, not so much to level out these efforts, but to contribute to an identical understanding by all countries of the need for urgent measures in the field of environmental protection" (Ananichev, 1976: 116). The attention that Ananichev pays to national efforts is especially intriguing given that he was then an official of

GKNT, engaged in specifically international exchanges. His deliberate and unnecessary inclusion of the argument that national action and awareness (the USSR seems implicated by the lack of explicit omission) is essential for the achieve­ ment of environmental protection suggests that here again the discussion of global ecological problems taps into a debate that has domestic ramifications.

One of the few arguments that fades from view after

1972 and 1973 is that environmental protection is so costly

that regional international cooperation presents a viable and valuable avenue for alleviating an enormous financial burden (Ananichev, 1972: 4; Khozin in KS 1973, 3: 111).

Unlike many respondents in the interview pool, Ananichev and 223

Khozin are students of international relations (Ananichev was a negotiator of the U.S. - Soviet bilateral agreement on environmental protection) and their common argument may be an attempt at justifying detente.5 As Kelley (1985: 118) reports, the Soviets had initially hoped to purchase environmental pollution equipment from the United States, but sales and expectations dwindled in 1974 with the passage of. the Jackson-Vanik amendment and the American refusal to grant most favored nation status (MFN) to the USSR. The cost of environmental protection does appear again as a justification for environmental protection later in the decade (Miroshnichenko, 1979: 32). Whereas costs had earlier been used to support bilateral U.S.-Soviet coopera­ tion, Miroshnichenko writes in favor of Soviet participation in multilateral endeavors, primarily active involvement in

UNEP. The question of the costs of environmental protection after 1974 is most frequently used not to justify interna­ tional cooperation, but to argue that environmental protec­ tion, no matter what its cost, is a precondition for economic growth (Fedorenko and Reimers, 1974; Lemeshev,

1975; Fedorenko, Lemeshev, and Reimers, 1980; Fedorenko and

Reimers, 1981; Piruzyan, Malenkov, and Barenboim, 1980;

Shmelev, 1983; Zagladin, 1986).

5 Such an attempt would be based on the very question­ able assumption that the opponents of detente placed a high priority on the resolution of environmental problems. 224

6.D.2: What is the relationship between environmental problems and peaceful coexistence?

When environmental problems are ranked in a hierarchy of global problems, as in Zagladin and Frolov’s classifica­ tion of intersocial, man-society, and man-nature, they are in third place (Zagladin and Frolov 1979, 1981; Arab-Ogly,

1982; Shakhnazarov, 1982; Los, 1985).6 In this context, guaranteeing peace and security is given highest priority, both because it is stated to be the "highest human value," and because secure peaceful coexistence is supposed to free up resources that will facilitate attention to the remaining global problems. For example, Zagladin (1986: 5) quotes

Gorbachev’s speech to the 4th Session at the 11th Supreme

Soviet of the USSR:

As recently as several decades ago people did not, for all intents and purposes, recognize serious ecological problems, yet already our generation is witness to the massive death of forests, the extinction of animals, the poisoning of rivers and water bodies, the expansion of desert zones. What kind of world will the next generation see? Will they be able to live in it if the rapacious destruction of nature does not cease, if the economic, technical, and scientific achievements of our age are devoted not to securing needed conditions for the existence and development of man and his environment, but to perfecting weapons of annihilation? (Gorbachev, Pravda. November 28, 1985)

The concern that military expenses complicate the resolution of environmental problems shows up in Table 9 as

a This contrasts with the idea promulgated by some Soviets that global problems are all ecological (Tsukanov, 1982). 225 being a constant consideration during the entire period covered by the survey. Given this preoccupation it is not

surprising that the Soviet delegation proposed a special

UNEP project on the arms race and the environment (Kokin,

1983: 24) which was accepted by the UNESCO General Confe­

rence as a program for 1984-1989 (Khozin, 1985: 36).

The expense of the arms race is the primary item in

Soviet discussions of the relationship between environmental

problems and peaceful coexistence, but it is not the only

one. The use of environmental phenomena to achieve military

goals is a constant concern of Fyodorov’s, beginning with

criticism of American activities in defoliating the forests

of Vietnam. Recently, more exotic forms of environmental

warfare have been predicted and denounced: stimulating

earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, manipulating the

ionosphere with electric particles in order to expose enemy

populations to ultraviolet radiation (Gavrilov and Patru­

shev, 1984: 103). These latter authors also believe that

continued testing of nuclear weapons leads to the pollution

of the earth with threatening quantities of radioactive

isotopes. Questioning the expense and safety of civilian

nuclear power in connection with both the environment and

world peace, Gavrilov and Patrushev (1984: 105) go on to

argue that the mass adaptation of nuclear energy creates the

possibility of the proliferation of uranium and plutonium, 226 which is in turn conducive to the globalization of the nuclear arms race.

As indicated in Column 2 of Table 9, statements to the

effect that cooperation in environmental protection is

related to improvements in the international political

climate are about as common in this pool as more polemical

statements to the effect that environmental problems

represent a new battleground and will remain contentious

issues of ideological struggle between capitalists and

socialists. In fact, it is not unusual for an author to make both arguments in the course of a single article

(Ananichev, 1976; Inozemtsev, 1984; Kazakov, 1985).

Fyodorov’s claims that without capitalism there would

be no ecological crisis vie for being the most polemical in

the interview pool. A review of additional Soviet sources

indicates that this position is particularly evident in

Hydromet’s popular and colorful publication Priroda i

Chelovek [Nature and Man] which began publication in 1981

with a circulation of over 100,000. Priroda i Chelovek

contains articles with reviews for laypersons describing

scientific research (agricultural, cosmic, oceanographic,

biological), exhortations to preserve living resources,

favorable reviews of the multilateral activities of UNEP,

and crossword puzzles on environmental and ecological

themes, as well as polemical articles under the rubric

"Ecology and Politics" rEkologiya i Politikal that focused 227 during 1985 and the first quarter of 1986 on such themes as the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, acid rain controver­ sies between the United States and Canada, and the French attack against the Rainbow Warrior.

Concerning cooperation, there is no elaboration on the mechanism whereby international scientific and professional activities will be accompanied by positive changes in social and political relations other than in overcoming the pessimism of ecological doomsayers (Khozin in KS 1974, 8:

109; Ananichev, 1976: 133). Those responses that are filed under the key theme functionalism are quite cursory. The most elaborate, but still rudimentary, is made in an article by then president of the IUCN, Dutch zoologist Donald

Kunen, who is included in the interview pool because a speech he delivered was translated into Russian and printed in Priroda.7 Kunen (1978: 8) echoes Chichvarin in stating that scientific collaboration in the IUCN excludes difficul­ ties of a political character that are frequently inherent in governmental institutions.

The bulk of these few statements simply suggest that scientists and technicians have a special role to play in the resolution of global ecological problems. For example,

Kapitsa (1976: 58) writes that only scientists have

7 Here I am assuming that given existing Soviet controls over what is and is not published, non-Soviet articles are not translated for publication in Russian unless the views expressed in them meet the approval of the necessary authorities. 228

sufficient authority to speak on environmental issues that

lie outside of "states’ egotistical interests." In a

similar vein, Khozin (KS 1973, 3: 115) informs his readers of a new trend in "technological diplomacy" in which

international society has engaged in order to examine and

settle conflicts and in which new international organiza­

tions are established in the process of creating a new ecological ideology.

The absence of statements that elaborate on allusions to functionalism may be based on the difficulties that

Soviets have (and the polemics used) in discussing nongov­ ernmental organizations in international relations. Soviet research in this area is quite limited,8 yet some mezhduna- rodniki do write specifically about "nongovernmental"

fnepravitelstvenniyel organizations (NGOs). The research problem, according to Soviet scholars is that not everything

is covered by international law and there are "unofficial"

[nepravovyel forms of international activity that need to be examined (Kravchenko, 1969: 4).9

8 "The so-called science of international associations constitutes a specific direction in research on multilateral nongovernmental relations. Works have not yet been esta­ blished in Marxist literature that shed light on problems of this direction of foreign political literature (Kovalenko, 1972: 131)." There is little or no evidence that this corpus has grown since 1972.

9 The terminology here has not been conducive to discussions with Soviet colleagues at international confe­ rences. Questions about "nongovernmental" rnepravitelst- venniye] organizations have elicited the response that the 229

In the Soviet Union as in other countries of the world, there is a lack of agreement as to whether ISPAs and other environmental organizations lead to cooperation and improved relations or vice versa. This disagreement follows in part from the fact that the theorists, the practitioners, and the politicians are usually not the same individuals. The people who are involved in this activity don’t write extensively about it, perhaps out of concern that exposure runs the risk of destroying the value, as suggested by Kay and Jacobson (1983:317) and di Castri (1976) in Chapter I.

It is easy to imagine that given their familiarity with governmental interference with basic research, Soviet natural scientists would be especially concerned by outside analyses of their endeavors. In turn, most Soviet discus­ sions of the role of NGOs in international relations are written by social scientists who ignore ISPAs and con­ centrate on the issue of how to increase the authority of these organizations within the United-Nations family,

including direct participation of NGO representatives in the deliberations of the General Assembly. Notably, however, in their discussions of bourgeois research, Soviet authors use the Soviet term for NGO "MNPO" fMezhdunarodnaya

9 (...continued) term is ambiguous (it can also be translated as "illegal") and therefore it is better not to discuss the phenomenon. This is not a phenomenon unique to Russian. In authorita­ tive bibliography, Judge and Skjelsbaek (1973) state that this tension is present in a number of languages (including French and a number of African languages). 230 nepravitelatvennaya organizatsial to refer both to multina­ tional corporations and to those organizations which have consultative status in the United Nations (Kovalenko, 1972;

Kravchenko, 1969; Morozov, 1974).

Rather than attempting to cover up the great asym­ metries in the origins and behavior of capitalist and socialist NGOs, Soviet scholars describe the asymmetries explicitly (if not exhaustively). The discussion of these actors is introduced by assertions that the importance of

"public" (obshchestvennive 1 and nongovernmental organi­ zations in international affairs is primarily derived from the existence of the world’s first socialist state: prior to the October Revolution they did not exist on a significant scale.10 The standard critique of bourgeois studies of NGOs and public organizations which follows this statement is based primarily on the tendency of Western scholars (as interpreted by Soviets) to equate bourgeois and socialist organizations. Since there are allegedly no conflicts of interest between society and government in socialist countries, there is no reason for socialist NGOs to take stands in opposition to their governments. Furthermore, the bourgeois tendency to view NGOs as channels of cooperation

10 Research on the growth of international organiza­ tions indicates that in fact there has been exponential growth in the numbers of international nongovernmental organizations since World War I. In making the claim that the Bolshevik revolution caused this growth, Soviet authors are confusing correlation and causation. 231

ignores the fact that there are reactionary NGOs (see Yu.

Fyodorov in Section 5.A.3).

The argument countering functionalism that peaceful coexistence is a prerequisite to rather than a consequence of international environmental collaboration has been made by both Brezhnev and Gorbachev and is supported by Soviet mezhdunarodniki. Novikov (1984: 243), writing in the IMEMO volume on global problems edited by Inozemtsev, places this view in historical perspective:

The policy of detente made it possible to achieve major results in developing radically new systems of cooperation in the sphere of interstate relations in studying, protecting, and utilizing the environment. During a very brief historical period a ramified global network of cooperation systems developed at all levels — multilateral and bilateral.

To demonstrate that international environmental protection cannot take place when the countries involved have tense political relations, Shmelev (1983: 104) points out that collaborative work in protecting the Baltic did not begin until the political situation in Central Europe became

relatively normalized. On the other hand, he argues, protection of the Mediterranean has been hampered by

political tensions in surrounding states.

While Shmelev is accurate in recognizing that the

Baltic Marine Environment Protection, or Helsinki, Commis­

sion (HELCOM) became active in 1980 after the 1976 Confe­

rence on Security and Cooperation in Europe legitimized the

political status quo of the Eastern and Western European 232 states bordering on the Baltic, his dismissal of regional collaboration in the Mediterranean deserves some explana­ tion. Caldwell (1984: 126-134) as well as Kay and Jacobson

(1983: 268-276) both give relatively lengthy descriptions of the many actors and endeavors involved in UNEP’s Mediterra­ nean Action Plan (MAP). Notably, the Soviets have expressed interest in participating in MAP because of concerns about the extent to which the Black Sea is polluted by

Mediterranean waters (Kay and Jacobson, 1983: 273). States bordering on the Mediterranean have so far rejected Soviet attempts to develop a research presence in the area to the point of refusing a 1978 offer of a joint UNEP-Soviet oceanographic research cruise funded with blocked-currency and staffed with scientists from Mediterranean countries.

Thus, Shmelev’s discussion of failure in the Mediterranean may be more attributable to his interpretation of the exclusion of the USSR rather than to the fruits of extant activities.11

6.D.3: What are the benefits of international collaboration?

DeBardeleben’s statement that Soviet scholars express more than a scientifically neutral enthusiasm for

11 The only other indication of (implicit) displeasure with UNEP in this sample is in Astanin and Blagosklonov (1983). In their lengthy review of the ISPAs and UN agencies involved in environmental protection, UNEP is not even mentioned. 233

international scientific collaboration (1985: 125) was

reported in Chapter I. This comment is an understatement; at the same time, it leaves unanswered the question of what

scientists hope to achieve through increased contact with

the West. This question is also complicated by the fact

that Soviet practice at international conferences often

appears less than cooperative because Soviet delegates may or may not be qualified and interested participants. Party control over who goes abroad and for what purposes is well- documented and illustrated authoritatively in Khrushchev’s memoirs, which contain a telling comment on Soviet technical experts sent abroad for the purpose of international

scientific cooperation:

There had been cases when our people were picked up by foreign intelligence services while they were abroad. Therefore, for the sake of caution, we usually tried to dissuade our scientists from traveling. In the case of international conferen­ ces, we often send the second- and third-level experts rather than the people in key positions. Thus any kidnappers would be unable to get their hands on those few scientists who had concrete, first-hand knowledge of our top-secret projects (Talbot, 1974: 59).

There can be little doubt about the asymmetry of Soviet

and Western approaches to participation in ISPAs when the

Soviet leadership has veto power over who goes abroad while

the citizens of Western democracies are relatively free to

travel. This process may have become more sophisticated in

recent years, or complicated by other bureaucratic inte­

rests. For example, IIASA researchers indicate that there 234

is a tendency for Soviet IIASA participants to be af­

filiated with GKNT rather than with the Academy of Sciences

to the detriment of their ability to make the most valuable

scientific contributions.

In the interview pool, which almost by definition is made up of individuals who are both interested and quali­

fied, Soviet respondents name three main tangible benefits

of international collaboration: information exchange

(including the shared experiences in global modeling dis­ cussed in previous chapters); the coordination of environ­ mental protection efforts; and support of a global environ­ mental monitoring system. This finding overlaps with

Povzner’s (KS 1974, 11: 1972) classification of three

categories of valuable international cooperation: informa­

tion exchange (congresses and symposia, literature exchange,

etc.); coordination (synchronization of scientific methods,

etc.); and technical-economic (distribution of research

outputs for fulfilling concrete tasks).

As suggested elsewhere, Soviet data on environmental

problems (as well as unflattering statistics on most

sensitive issues) have not been available in the USSR for a

number of years.12 This pervasiveness of the lack of "eco-

information" is listed by Komarov (1980: 110) as an

12 The New York Times (October 28, 1986) reports that under Gorbachev’s policy of "openness" fglasnost1. un­ favorable statistics such as those on infant mortality and size of grain harvests are being published again. 235 obstacle, hampering the resolution of environmental pro­ blems. In this respect Komarov’s samizdat publication states only more boldly the advocacy of environmental literacy that has been a regular feature in the pages of

Priroda since at least 1972.

Within the interview pool, interest in environmental education is expressed most vividly by respondents who can be classified as having an ecological perspective (Fedorenko and Reimers, Moiseyev, Blagosklonov, Gilyarov and Naumov,

Girusev and Lappo). The record of the Intergovernmental

Conference on Environmental Education organized by UNESCO in cooperation with UNEP and held in Tblisi (USSR) during

October 1977 indicates, however, that in international arenas, the Soviet interest in environmental education is as likely to be represented by individuals who express a technocratic or even a polemical perspective. The Tblisi conference was chaired by Gvishiani and members of the

Soviet delegation included Ananichev, Mitryushkin, Vinogra­ dov, Bannikov, Laptev, and Ryabchikov. This mixed repre­ sentation is in keeping with Khozin’s (1985: 36) comment

that environmental education is inseparable from moral and ethical norms and thus from ideological considerations.

Soviet interpretations of the ideological purposes of environmental education have been perpetuated by publica­

tions designed for foreign consumption that dwell on the

theme of unspecified Soviet successes in environmental 236 education since the Bolshevik revolution (Fedoseyev and

Timofeyev, 1981).

Nonetheless, it would be hasty to jump to the conclu­

sion that Soviet interests in the International Environ­ mental Education Program are not sincere. UNEP’s environ­

mental education newsletter, Connect (published in Russian

as Kontakt) , which focuses on such themes as simulation and

gaming in environmental education; the development of an

environmental ethic stressing interdependence, respect for

nature, holism, intergenerational equity, and ecologically

sustainable development; and the training of industrial managers in environmental protection receives very positive

reviews in the USSR.

On another level, information "exchange" is probably a direct "knowledge grant" from Western scientists and editors

to Soviet counterparts. Zagladin (1986: 14) reports, "it

would be a good idea" to take advantage of the knowledge and

results that capitalists have obtained in their research and

practice." In the interests of participating in IIASA and

gaining technological expertise, Gvishiani (KS 1974, 10:

51), states that the Soviet Union is decisively opposed to

the ideology of autarky. This is obvious in the case of

natural and technical science research in which references

to international or foreign sources for empirical data are a

common feature of Soviet scholarly work on environmental

issues. Within the surveyed articles and books, footnotes 237 are as likely to be printed in Roman as in Cyrillic charac­ ters. Frequently, these cited sources are publications of

IGOs or ISPAs: IAEA, UNESCO, UNEP, F AO, WMO, WHO, IUCN,

SCOPE, and the Club of Rome. "According to UN data" [po dannym O ON1 is an especially frequent set phrase in the

Mitryushkin and Shaposhnikov (1977) adult school text, preceding numerous examples of international environmental deterioration. Not all references to non-Soviet data are to the publications of multilateral organizations. Occasionally foreign data is insinuated into a passage to provide empirical support for a generalization that an author has made about Soviet phenomena. For example, writing about the terrible destructiveness of forest fires and reminding

Soviet readers that starting a forest fire is a criminal offense, Astanin and Blagosklonov (1983: 96f) cite American data on how much land has been destroyed in the United

States by forest fires and at what cost.

Although such scientific data is frequently adapted to particular uses without comment, it is common for Soviet respondents to comment on the ideological faults of the

Western work that they cite. This is particularly common when research, especially research on global problems, has social implications. Dispassionate statements like the following that attribute the limitations of Western publica­ tions to empirical rather than ideological problems are noteworthy: 238

To identify the causes underlying the present ecological situation is not as simple as may at first appear. The methodological inconsistency of many prescriptions, models, and strategies that various groups of Western researchers have proposed is partly explained by the inherent difficulties of a scientific assessment of the phenomenon discussed (Novikov, 1984: 228).

It should be noted that Soviet writers incorporate not only Western empirical data in their work, but also, to a more limited extent, Western metaphors. Moiseyev’s use of

Spaceship Earth is outlined in Chapter Five. Others have adopted Buckminster Fuller’s concept to their own perspec­ tives on the environment and international relations. For example, Khozin (KS 1974, 8: 108) states that there are really three separate cabins on the spaceship (one for capitalists who put selfishness first, one for socialists who want to share their accomplishments, and one for developing countries who are still trying to figure out what to do). Gvishiani (KS 1974, 10: 50) writes that there is no exhaust pipe on spaceship earth, but this is a character­ istic of capitalism.13

The third expressed interest is in global monitoring, which is essentially another mechanism for obtaining information about the global environment. The Soviet interest in information exchange in this arena is not unique. One of the particularly troubling features of

13 In this article, Gvishiani identifies the metaphor as being coined by Adlai Stevenson in a speech to the United Nations. 239 global environmental issues is that there is insufficient data, both current and historical, to accurately evaluate critical parameters and trends. Echoing Soviet ecologists’ claims that contemporary science is unprepared to deal with these problems, recent U.S. writers on global ecological issues and international environmental policy are staunch advocates of mending these gaps in knowledge through UNEP’s

Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS) (Global

Future: Time to Act. 1981: 183-185; Caldwell, 1984: 64-65;

Dahlberg, 1985: 112; Soroos, 1986: 306). The key themes listed in Table 9 indicate that monitoring has been a fairly constant interest of Soviet respondents. This interest is not limited to specialized journals or to Priroda. Support for global monitoring activities is also promoted in

Kommunist (Miroshnichenko, 1979: 118); Hydromet’s "glossy" magazine Priroda i Chelovek (Kazakov, 1985: 43); and in New

Times (Kokin, 1983: 23).

A global environmental monitoring system was first proposed by the Scientific Committee on the Problems of the

Environment (SCOPE) in 1971 when Viktor Kovda was its head.

Monitoring activities were taken up by UNEP’s Earthwatch project after 1974, which has since evolved into two distinct program activity centers (PACs): GEMS (the global environmental monitoring system) and INFOTERRA, an environ­ mental information referral and retrieval system. Soviet scientists have, since the origins of GEMS, been involved in 240 plans for implementing such a system in cooperation with the

World Meteorological Organization, the Intergovernmental

Oceanographic Commission, and UNESCO’s Man and Biosphere

Program (Ryabchikov and Milyanova, 1976; Ananichev, 1976:

167-187).

One reason that monitoring has such broad support within the scientific community and has branched out in so many directions is that very different activities enhancing the work of so many different disciplines are encompassed by

"monitoring" (the Russian term is a straight transliteration from English). There are three types of monitoring activi­ ties that Soviet (and non-Soviet) scientists have interests in and that are currently loosely coordinated by GEMS: physical monitoring of characteristics of the physical state of the biosphere (climate conditions, soil conditions, deforestation, desertification); chemical monitoring of the extent of chemical pollution; and biological monitoring of changes in the biological productivity and stability of natural ecological systems as a result of human interfer­ ence .

Ananichev’s book, The Environment: International

Aspects (1976) differs dramatically from Chichvarin’s monograph not only in the degree of attention paid to the methods and problems of natural science, but even more dramatically in the kinds of mechanisms that are proposed for promoting or conducting collaborative efforts. If 241

Chichvarin makes any concrete proposals, they are the ratification of conventions and the noninterference in the internal affairs of countries party to a treaty. Con­ versely, Ananichev notes that effective, i.e. uniform, monitoring of natural phenomena requires the cooperation of all countries, which is very difficult to secure. He recommends pooling existing independent national monitoring efforts in order to develop concepts that will be acceptable to all parties, but recalls Chichvarin’s reluctance to voluntarily diminish any aspect of Soviet sovereignty by noting that:

many principles of global monitoring may encroach upon the national interests and sovereignty of individual countries. A global system with its machinery for observation, collection, and processing of data may resemble a supra-national institution, which in the present situation of mistrust among states might be unacceptable to many of them (Ananichev, 1976: 185).

Significantly, Western scientists believe that Soviets have extremely valuable contributions to make in the area of global monitoring. Viktor Kovda was coopted onto the

Council of WCB-ISEE in 1985 and it has been stated that "the

Soviets are the best in the world when it comes to designing optimal monitoring systems."14

14 Conversation with R.E. Munn, Program Leader of the IIASA Environment Program, December 6, 1986. An optimal monitoring system is composed of a group of monitoring stations designed to collect data on some aspect of environ­ mental quality efficiently and unambiguously. The placement of stations is critical in terms of being able to correctly evaluate the duplication of collected data in both time and location. 242

6.D.4: What are the best forums for international coopera­ tion?

Kramer (1973: 191) is among those authors who suggest, on the basis of the Soviet decision to boycott the Stockholm

UN Conference on the Human Environment, that in the USSR the environment as an international issue is regarded as a bone for political contention rather than as an urgent problem.

Curiously, these authors do not consider the decision to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and not to invite the

German Democratic Republic a "politicized" decision in its own right. In June 1972 neither the FRG nor the GDR was a member of the United Nations. The FRG was invited to participate in the Stockholm conference because it had status as a member of some UN specialized agencies. In

1971, the GDR had been specially invited to participate in the ECE Symposium on Problems Relating to the Environment in

Prague. This invitation may have been considered a prece­ dent according to which the GDR should also have been invited to the Stockholm conference.

While there are undoubtedly political elites in the

Soviet Union who care as little about the environment as they do about multilateral collaboration in general,

Kramer’s analysis does not jibe with the attention paid to the Stockholm conference in the years since 1972. Nor is it consistent with the presence of an "invisible" Soviet 243 delegation that stayed aboard ship during the conference, watching the proceedings on closed-circuit television.

In 1973 a translated article written by the Secretary

General of the Stockholm conference, Maurice Strong,

appeared in Priroda and discussed the conference and the

imperative of international environmental collaboration. In

addition to this reference, the Stockholm conference is cited in 11 or one in eight of the interviews. Only once

(Ananichev, 1976: 146) is the Soviet boycott mentioned (and

explained as the unfortunate result of the GDR not being

invited to participate on an equal basis with the FRG).

Even in this instance, the conference is described as being

"the first trial run on the way toward world-wide coopera­

tion." Similar comments are made by individuals as diverse

in their perspectives as Frolov (1982: 152) and Kovda (1979:

4). At least one author (Los 1978: 14) tries to slip the

Stockholm conference inconspicuously into a list of success­

ful international events in environmental protection along

with the World Congress of Peaceloving Forces (Moscow 1973)

and the World Philosophical Congress (Varna 1973). The

conference is simultaneously cited as a catalyst in expand­

ing concern about environmental problems beyond a narrow

circle of specialists (Vinogradov, 1979: 23f.) and as

developing support for the highly specialized task of

environmental monitoring (Gerasimov, 1983: 77). 244

The discussion of the ecological perspective in Chapter

IV indicated as does Table 9 that Soviet respondents are overwhelmingly interested in multilateral avenues of cooperation in environmental protection. Soviet scientists have participated regularly in multilateral nature conserva­ tion efforts, since the mid-1950s. In addition to active participation in the IUCN15 with representatives in several responsible positions as heads of various commissions,

Soviet scientists have served as officials of other interna­ tional scientific and professional organizations as well as projects of United Nations specialized agencies (FAO, IAEA,

IMCO, UNEP, UNESCO, UNITAR, WMO, WHO). Leading Soviet

functionaries in international environmental organizations

include or have included, but most assuredly are not limited

to: A.G. Bannikov,, vice-president of the IUCN, member of

USSR Committee on the International Biological Program,

(chairman of the USSR Society for the Protection of Nature);

the late Academic Innokenty Gerasimov, vice-president of the

International Geography Union and chairman of its Commission on the Environment, scientific director of a joint UNEP-GKNT

anti-desertification project; Academic Dzhermen Gvishiani, chairman of the IIASA Council; Academic Viktor Kovda,

director of the Department of Precise and Natural Sciences

11 The IUCN is one of several international organiza­ tions that has been given a Russian acronym. It is known in the Soviet Press as the Mezhdunarodnoi soyuz okhrany prirody (MSOP). 245 of UNESCO (1958 - 1965), President of the International

Society of Soil Scientists and the Scientific Committee for

the Protection of the Environment (SCOPE) of the Interna­

tional Council of Scientific Unions, now serving on the

World Council for the Biosphere; Academic A.V. Sidorenko,

President of the Pacific Ocean Scientific Association.

Taking other ISPAs as a guide, any organization that has meetings in a country has officials of that nationality on board for several years preceding that conference. Since

the Soviet Union belongs to numerous ISPAs that deal with

environmental issues, it is reasonable to infer that Soviet

scientists have positions of responsibility in many organi­

zations in addition to those listed above. It should be

noted that these individuals are not necessarily familiar

with the Soviet theoretical work on the role of nongovern­

mental organizations in international relations, which may

be yet another reason why the natural scientists (respon­

dents with an ecological perspective) are most enthusiastic

about international scientific collaboration.

Those respondents who answer Item No. 43 and do

believe that the organizations, institutions, or processes

needed to resolve global ecological problems are already in

place point to UNEP and other multilateral organizations

both governmental and nongovernmental (if not to existing

socialism). There are some references to bilateral coopera­

tion in responses to Item No. 36, but there is not any time 246 period in which it is preferred. While the U.S. is men­ tioned most frequently in connection with bilateral efforts, other partners mentioned include Sweden (pollution of the

Baltic sea); France (calculation of pollution levels);

Finland (pollution of the Gulf of Finland); and Iran

(ecology of the Caspian sea).

In the environmental arena, Soviet participation in multilateral endeavors predates bilateral contacts. There would have been no U.S. - Soviet cooperative agreement signed at the 1972 summit if there had not been a small cadre of Soviet officials and scientists interested and experienced in the benefits of international cooperation to protect the environment. The extent of this participation is all the more intriguing since in 1944, then Soviet Ambas­ sador Andrei Gromyko only grudgingly agreed to include such

"non-political" functions in the budding United Nations

(Jacobson: 265). As noted in Column 4 of Table 9, these organizations and agencies receive twice as much attention as the environmental activities of the CMEA. Furthermore, those ventures that Soviet respondents describe as being regional involve both socialist and capitalist national members including HELCOM activities to protect the Baltic and UN Economic Commission for Europe conventions on transboundary air pollution and closed-cycle technology.

This should not be understood to mean that all multila­ teral ventures are considered equal (a misconception 247 dispelled by Soviet evaluations of bourgeois functionalism).

The favored means are those that take advantage of national strengths as suggested by Ananichev in his prescriptions for equalizing inputs to environmental protection. One of the favorite multilateral projects, as suggested in the review of the ecological perspective, is UNESCO’s Man and Biosphere

Programme. In introducing MAB to Priroda readers, Neronov and Goncharov (1979: 28) state that MAB differs from previous international efforts at environmental protection because although "•intergovernmental’ [mezhpravitelstven- nayal in its structure, MAB is directed toward the resolu­ tion of concrete problems of managing natural resources in countries participating in it." Similarly, Khozin (1985:

35) points to participation in MAB as having resulted in enhanced agricultural productivity, an improved climate in

Leningrad, and the successful designation of new zapoved- niki. The multilateral efforts (and presumably bilateral) efforts that have the most appeal are those that have the greatest pay-offs domestically.

This preference for international activities, like MAB, which have a flexible, issue-related structure supports

Kriesberg’s (1968) finding that there is a proliferation of committees in those INGOs to which Americans and Soviets both belong because "committees tend to transform problems from issues to be decided by political bargaining and 248 negotiation to technical matters to be decided by consensus among experts. "

6.E: Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter provides little evidence that Soviet interests in international environmental cooperation are correlated with the status of East-West relations. In fact, the concerns and issues raised by respondents — including references to the indivisibility of the biosphere, the need to divert resources from the arms race to resolve environmental problems, the necessity of information exchange, and the value of multilateral exchan­ ges — are fairly constant between 1972 and 1986.

The first decade, of course, was the Brezhnev era.

According to Parrott, during these years a "nontraditional­ ist" approach to the West was prevalent. The approach of seeking technological parity with the West in areas of environmental protection and analysis are certainly apparent in the writings of Gvishiani, Inozemtsev, and others. This finding is more or less consistent with the technocratic proposition that expressed concern about global ecological problems is based on Soviet interest in obtaining the benefits of technological innovations related to environmen­ tal protection. However, with one possibly minor exception in the 1970s, this proposition is not supported by the 249 timing of publications. More importantly, it is not supported by data culled from the interviews with in­ dividuals to whom this proposition has been "tailored."

While Inozemtsev is not classified as a technocrat, he approaches this position. His book on global problems, which stresses the need for international cooperation was printed in 1981 — not a stellar year in East-West rela­ tions .

At the same time, this pool of interviews does not support the polemical proposition that deterioration in

East-West relations leads to increased concern with global ecological problems. While concern has been notably present during the 1980s, discussion of these issues was initiated when detente was fresh. Again, this is true of the respon­ ses of key individuals. While Frolov certainly wrote polemically about global ecological problems when East-West relations have been at a low ebb, he also served as Editor-

in-Chief of Voprosy filosofii [Problems of Philosophy] when global problems were introduced as an issue during the early years of detente.

The urgency with which Soviet scientists studying global ecological problems stress the value of international cooperation is a reminder that they have not yet been successful in "transplanting" their consensual knowledge to political elites. Nonetheless, the scientific and profes­ sional exchanges continue — sometimes multilaterally, 250 sometimes both bilaterally and multilaterally. Given the occasional fruits of these endeavors and the positive evaluations provided by both Soviet and non-Soviet par­ ticipants, advocates of improved relations between man and nature and East and West should take heart that there are some scientific and professional activities that occur in more or less deliberate and effective isolation from the meddling of government and international relations special­ ists, although this does make the job of an outside observer considerably more difficult. CHAPTER VII

COMPARATIVE SUMMARY

7.A: Introduction

Functionalism was discussed briefly in the previous chapter. However, it must be noted that respondents’ mention of this theme is not a decisive indicator of the extent of functional cooperation. Chapter VI provided evidence of the kinds of arenas in which Soviet scientists participate with their non-Soviet counterparts. In conjunc­ tion with questions posed in Chapter I, this chapter explores the extent of overlap in prevalent Soviet and

Western views of global ecological problems. International contacts will have less utility if they are founded on incompatible understandings and purposes.

This exploration will be based on a comparison of the simulated interview results with data about Western views on similar (if not identical) issues. As indicated in earlier chapters, the data used for comparative purposes is drawn from the tri-national study conducted by Cotgrove (1982),

Milbrath (1984) and others. The careful reader will be aware that there are inherent difficulties present in such a

251 252 comparison. Most importantly, while Cotgrove and Milbrath have studied the attitudes of a representative sample of

Western societies, I cannot make the same claim about my research and Soviet society.1 In fact, for reasons outlined in Chapter III, I have assiduously avoided the use of the word "sample." Nonetheless, the present study was con­ sciously modeled after these earlier surveys and therefore some comparisons, while remaining conscious of limitations, are in order.

This process of cross-national comparison begins with some comments about the prevalence of the various perspec­ tives within the Soviet Union as indicated by the interview pool, first by recalling a slightly revised version of the table used to introduce the perspectives in Chapter II.

There are several modifications that have been made in Table

10, a revised version of Table 1, in light of the simulated interviews. Technology has been added as a solution to global ecological problems in the case of the polemical perspective. The "basic changes" originally given as the solution in the ecological perspective have been more explicitly identified as better coordination between ministries, the dissemination of basic ecological literacy,

1 See Andrew Duff. Questionnaire Design and Data Analysis, in Cotgrove (1982) and Appendix E and Annex to Appendix E in Milbrath (1984) for a discussion of the reliability and validity of these surveys. 253

TABLE 10 THREE SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS (REVISED)

Nature Solution International of Problem to Problem Cooperation

Polemical Capitalism, Existing Result Imperialism Socialism, of Soviet technology initiative

Ecological Limits to Coordination, Information growth ecoliteracy, exchange, bioeconomics coordination

Technocratic Diminishing Technology, Peaceful resources rational use coexistence, Acquisitive

and the reconceptualization of economics so that environmen­ tal concerns are foremost. These are notably changes primarily in the domestic arena; the value of international cooperation in the ecological perspective is that it is a fruitful avenue for information exchange and makes coordina­ tion possible when necessary on both regional and global levels. Finally, the allegiance of the technocrats to the concept of peaceful coexistence has been noted.

The next step in comparison is to discuss the preva­ lence of these perspectives within the interview pool based on responses to characteristic items. Because of diffi­ culties that became apparent in the wording of individual 254 itemsi this process, like the analysis in the previous chapter, is supplemented by references to key themes.

7.B: Prevalence of The Polemical Perspective

Since the polemical perspective was illustrated by respondents who were chosen on the basis of the polemical quotient of their interviews (and it played an unexpected role in characterizing other groups of respondents), it makes sense to look at the distribution of the polemical quotient within the pool as a whole.

TABLE 11 DISTRIBUTION OF POLEMICAL QUOTIENT WITHIN INTERVIEW POOL

Rank Raw Numbers Percent

Low 51 58.6 Moderate 14 16 High 15 17.2 Extremely High 7 8

TOTAL 87 99.8

Total does not equal 100 due to rounding

Within this pool, highly charged polemical responses that gloat about the superiority of the socialist system as compared to the weaknesses of capitalism are not the norm.

As indicated in Table 11, even if the two most polemical 255 ranks were combined, the number of interviews encompassed would be 22 or less than half as large as the number that are not polemical at all in their discussion of global ecological problems.2

Still, as outlined in Chapter V, there are other characteristics of a polemical perspective above and beyond a high polemical quotient. It may well be that some of these characteristics are independent of language hostile to the West. For example the thumbnail sketch of this perspec­ tive indicated that all polemical respondents agree that capitalist countries face limits to growth (Item No. 11) and disagree that industrialized countries in general do (Item

No. 12). They tend to reject opinions that science and technology have caused these problems (Item No. 9). It also happens that most of the polemicists express the opinion that socialist revolution will solve all global ecological problems (Item No. 25). In discussions of international cooperation, they are very chauvinistic patriots.

Table 12 provides summary information concerning the prevalence of key themes characteristic of a polemical

2 In fact, the relative low level of polemical quo­ tients throughout the pool is even more striking. It so happens that two of the interviews included in the most polemical category, Timofeyev (1976) and Zagladin and Frolov (1979), were two of the very first Soviet articles I read concerning global problems. At that time, and in comparison with Soviet articles on the nuclear arms race and arms control, these two articles seemed remarkably refreshing. 256 perspective within the total interview pool. Raw numbers and percentages are both rather small, in part because of the extent of missing data in the pool, and in part because this perspective is not as prevalent as others. The issue of prevalence is also addressed by providing information about the variation ratio for each of the included items and whether or not responses consistent with the polemical perspective are in the modal category or not. Each inter­ view is counted only once per item or theme. Given the nature of the task at hand, inclusion in this table refers to the explicit appearance of this theme within the inter­ views. At this point, I hazard no guesses as to who might agree but has chosen to remain silent.

As indicated in Table 12, approximately one-quarter of the respondents argue explicitly that global ecological problems present special limits to capitalist societies and one-fifth believe that industrialized societies are not generally threatened. However, the table does not demon­ strate that while respondents tend to agree that capitalist societies face special limits, these themes appear together only in the interviews that served to illustrate the polemical perspective. Similarly, explicit statements that the scientific and technological revolution cannot be blamed as a cause of global ecological problems are rare. Again, all but one of the six statements to this effect appear in the already identified group. 257

TABLE 12 PREVALENCE OF POLEMICAL RESPONSES IN TOTAL POOL

Item Raw Numbers Percentage V.R. Moda! (Key Themes) Item No. 7 (Malthusianism) 9 10 -0.52 No Item No. 8 (Profit Motive) 32 36 -0.66 Yes Item No. 9 i tn 00 (STR Not Cause) 6 7 o No Item No. 11 1 (Limits to Capitalism) 21 24 o 00 00 Yes Item No. 12 (No Limits to Growth) 18 20 -0.37 No* Item No. 13 (Imperialism)b 17 20 -0.31 No Item No. 20 (Marxism-Leninism) 22 25 -0.75 Yes Item No. 22 (Soviet Technology) 31 43 -0.75 Yes Item No. 23 (No Change Required) 11 13 -0.42 No Item No. 25 (Socialist Revolution) 17 20 -0.81 No Item No. 33 (Nature’s Own Sake) 10 11 -0.54 No Item No. 35 1 -3 (Soviet Failure) 63 72 o Yes Item No. 41 (Western Contributions) 35 40 -0.52 No

a The distribution of responses for this item is Agree (39); Disagree (39): and Neutral (10) with Neutral respondents leaning more toward Agree than Disagree. b These themes appear most frequently in these items, but are not entirely synonymous with the response categories. 258

While assertions that the answers to resolving global ecological problems lie within the competence of Marxism-

Leninism are expected within the polemical perspective, only one quarter of the respondents in the total pool make this deliberate assertion, a number only slightly higher than the twenty percent who argue that global problems will be resolved by socialist revolution. More respondents are willing to make the uninformative claim that under socialism all will be solved than to state specifically why no change is required in the USSR. An exception is in Novikov (1982:

31) who argues in response to Item No. 23:

With its public ownership of productive capital and planned economic management system, socialism [in the USSR] ensures the necessary interaction between society and nature and makes it possible promptly to develop and practically to implement scientifically substantiated environmental protection measures.

It should be noted that the argument that no change is necessary in the USSR is not a modal response.

There are other themes associated with the polemical perspective that are more common in the total pool. These include assertions that a primary cause of global ecological problems in the profit motive within capitalism (24 per­ cent); that global ecological problems represent the highest stage of imperialism (20 percent); faith that Soviet techno­ logy is adequate to resolve ecological problems (45 per­ cent) ; and the absence of any acknowledgment of Western contributions to resolving global ecological problems (40 259 percent). Of these, only concern with the profit motive and faith in technology are modal responses.

Charges that concern with population growth are indicative of Malthusianism are far less common than expected, appearing in only ten percent of the interviews.

Moreover, this is not the modal response to Item No. 7.

Statements that concern with nature for its own sake is antihuman are also fairly rare, but the polemical group picked up only half of these. The most common of all these themes, but only arguably polemical, is the absence of any mention of any aspect of Soviet failure in resolving ecological problems in 72 percent of the interviews.

The discussion in Chapter V indicated that there are some very hostile interviews in the pool; there are also some highly charged statements within individual interviews, some of which appear in the interviews illustrating the ecological perspective. Nonetheless, this summary does not support the claim that a polemical perspective generally colors Soviet views of global ecological problems.

7.C: The Prevalence of The Ecological Perspective

As indicated in Table 13, some of the key themes that are central to the ecological perspective show up relatively frequently in the total pool of responses. The most frequent of these have to do with the role of science and 260 technology in resolving global ecological problems. Most common is the theme that world science is an essential (if somewhat loosely defined) actor in resolving global ecologi­ cal problems. This is, in fact, the modal response to Item

No. 38. Consistent with this, the importance of Western contributions to the understanding of these problems is mentioned in 40 percent of the interviews.

The belief that the scientific and technological

revolution has been responsible for a great number of ecological woes is a modal response, and consistent with this future technology must be designed with environmental constraints in mind. As mentioned in Chapter IV, nuclear power although controversial is not widely discussed; only

12 percent reject it as a sound alternative for meeting energy requirements.

In keeping with this suspicion of technology, about one-fifth of the respondents state that industrialized societies do face limits to growth. Only half as many state that the Third World must also observe environmental constraints in the process of economic development, but this

is a modal response. Concern that population growth contributes to ecological deterioration (not necessarily in

Third World) is mentioned by 27 percent. This too is a modal response.

In terms of solutions, the ecological interest in replacing departmentalism with centralized environmental 261

TABLE 13 PREVALENCE OF ECOLOGICAL RESPONSES IN TOTAL POOL

Item Raw Numbers Percentage V.R. Moda! (Key Themes) Item No. 7 (Population Growth) 24 27 -0.52 Yes Item No. 9 (STR Cause) 39 45 -0.58 Yes Item No. 10 (Departmentalism)b 16 18.3 -0.77 No Item No. 12 (Limits to Growth) 18 20.6 -0.37 No3 Item No. 13 (LDC Ecodevelopment) 11 12.6 -0.31 Yes Item No. 23 (Bioeconomics)b 31 35.6 -0.42 Yes Item No. 24 (Ecotech)b 40 45.9 -0.56 Yes Item No. 25 (Ecoliteracy)b 24 27.5 -0.81 Yes Item No. 28 (Nuclear Power) 11 12.6 -0.35 Yes Item No. 33 (Nature’s Own Sake) 20 22.9 -0.54 Yes Item No. 35 (Soviet Failure) 24 18 -0.71 No Item No. 38 (World Science)b 52 59 . 7 -0.85 Yes Item No. 41 (Western Contributions) 35 40 -0.52 Yes Item No. 42 (Functionalism) 13 15 -0.81 No

3 The distribution of responses for this item is Agree (39); Disagree (39); and Neutral (10) with Neutral respondents leaning more toward Agree than Disagree. b These themes appear most frequently in these items, but are not entirely synonymous with the response categories. 262 coordination in the Soviet Union is mentioned by less than one-fifth of the respondents. On the other hand, the development of a new economics that recognizes ecological limitations is mentioned by 35.6 percent. Not quite as many advocate crash programs in ecological literacy (27.6 percent), but both of these solutions are mentioned more frequently than socialist revolution as a cure for global ecological problems. As a whole, the interview respondents make clear that meeting human needs is the most important consideration — only about one-fifth explicitly value conserving nature for aesthetic or spiritual reasons.

One of the distinctive features of the interviews illustrating the ecological perspective were acknowledgments of Soviet failure in ecological problem-solving. This theme is present in less than 20 percent of the interviews.

Although the respondents as a whole are enthusiastic about world science, related themes concerning international cooperation,as described in Chapter VI, are far less commonly mentioned.

7.D: Prevalence of the Technocratic Perspective

The technocratic perspective is illustrated in Chapter

V by respondents who believe that the rational use of natural resources is the primary environmental issue (Item

No. 14 or Item No. 15) and that other environmental problems 263

(which are not rooted primarily in technogenic causes) will find their solution in the scientific and technological revolution (Item No. 22 or 24). These authors also tend to believe that preventing nuclear war is the most serious global problem (Item No. 7); they believe that overpopula­ tion has serious consequences (Item No. 8), perhaps because they believe so strongly in transforming nature to meet human needs (Item No. 30). While they do not believe in generalized limits to growth (Item No. 12), they have a fairly solid respect for the methodology that first pre­ dicted those limits (Item No. 21). Finally, they are vocal supporters of both peaceful coexistence (Item No. 40) and learning from the West (Item No. 41).

Key themes that can be associated with the technocratic perspective, as illustrated in Chapter V. are more prevalent than the key themes associated with either the ecological or the polemical perspective. Nine out of 13 typically technocratic responses are modal responses as compared with

5 out of 13 polemical responses. Ecological responses also tend to be modal responses, but on average they are given in a slightly smaller percentage of interviews in the pool.

Table 14 indiates that faith in technology as a solution, which contributes to the name of this perspective, is demonstrated as a modal response in half of the inter­ views. This fascination with technology is also present in the admiration of "high tech academia," i.e. systems 264 analysis and/or global modeling by close to half of all respondents. Although vituperative denials of limits to growth are most clearly associated with the polemical perspective, technocrats also do not acknowledge limits, therefore responses to Item No. 12 are also calculated in this Table.

The technocratic denial of limits appears, incongru- ently, with the prevalence of an equally technocratic advocacy for the implementation of rational use mechanisms and the description of shortages present in almost 45 percent of the interviews. Here it should be noted that preoccupation with the conservation of raw materials as an ecological problem is not a uniquely Soviet concern.

British and American respondents have also identified shortages of essential raw materials as a primary concern

(Cotgrove, 1982: 125; Milbrath, 1984: 119). This concern with the continued availability of raw materials as the basis of economic society is consistent with the modal, technocratic response in 34.4 percent of the interviews that nature is to be exploited for human needs. It is not at all surprising that Soviet political elites view nature as a resource for meeting consumer demands. It would have been quite surprising if post-materialist, non-economic values were given a higher priority. This does not mean that all environmental concerns in the pool are consumerist.

Most respondents who are concerned by raw material shortages 265

TABLE 14 PREVALENCE OF TECHNOCRATIC RESPONSES IN TOTAL POOL

Item Raw Numbers Percentage V.R. Modal (Key Themes) Item No. 6 (Nuclear War) 16 18.3 -0. 54 Yes Item No. 7 (Population Growth) 11 12.6 -0.52 No Item No. 8 (Profit Motive) 8 9 -0.66 No Item No. 9 (STR Cause) 18 20.6 -0. 58 No Item No. 12 (No Limits to Growth) 18 20 -0.37 Noa Item No. 14 (Rational Use) 39 44.8 -0.69 Yes Item No. 15 (Shortages) 38 43.6 -0.64 Yes Item No. 21 (Systems Analysis) 30 34.4 -0.71 Yes Item No. 22 (Soviet Technology) 31 43 -0.75 Yes Item N o . 24 (Global Technology) 45 51.7 -0.56 Yes Item No. 30 (Consumerism)1* 30 34.4 -0.81 Yes Item No. 40 (Coexistence) 16 18. 3 -0.94 Yes Item No. 41 (Global Modeling )b 40 45.9 -0.52 Yes

a The distribution of responses for this item is Agree (39); Disagree (39): and Neutral (10) with Neutral respondents leaning more toward Agree than Disagree. b These themes appear most frequently in these items, but are not entirely synonymous with the response categories. 266 are also concerned about maintaining ecological balance in production activities so that the biosphere can regenerate itself and are worried by the appearance of global warming trends. These latter themes are not clearly associated with any perspective; they are mentioned by Ananichev,

Frolov, Gvishiani, Kapitsa, Kovda, Inozemtsev, Los, and

Zagladin, among others.3

The technocrats include most of the political elites in the pool and their interests in international cooperation are not clearly stated aside from their interests in the joint development of low-waste technology and engaging in modeling. These exchanges are tied to peaceful coexistence by slightly under one-fifth of respondents. This is a modal response that closely overlaps with responses that prevent­ ing nuclear war is the most important global problem. Such

Soviet-style linkage suggest that global ecological problems may not be easily separable from other East-West issues. It is significant in this regard that Parrott (1985: 256) found an upswing in the prevalence of the "non-traditionalist" approach to technological progress during the 1970s:

3 Thirty-eight or 43.6 percent of the total sample mention the need to retain ecological balance. Thirty-six respondents or 41.3 percent are concerned with global warming trends. According to an interpretation provided by Yuri Medvedkov this widespread concern is an artifact attributable to the circumstance that global warming trends do not have a point specific source; it is therefore "safe" to talk about. 267

Brezhnev wanted to rely on cooperation with West to guaran­ tee technological innovation in the USSR.

7.E: Comparison with Western Survey Data

Whereas data from the United States, the Federal

Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom indicates that

"[m]ost business leaders and substantial portions of labor leaders, public officials, and media gatekeepers are adherents of the rearguard (Milbrath 1984: 62)," the Soviet interviews suggest that most opinion makers in the USSR pool are technocrats. In fact, while Milbrath finds the nature conservationist establishment follower anomalous, Soviet views corresponding to the perspective based on this type are more prevalent than those of any other. These findings suggest that while political elites in the West perceive a small environmental problem that can be resolved with better technology because there are no limits to growth, Soviet leaders perceive a large problem. They agree with their

Western counterparts that better technology will help and they also frequently deny limits, but this denial conflicts with their fear of shortages.

The polemical perspective, which was modeled after the rearguard, has fewer cases illustrating it than either of the other two perspectives. The rearguard in the West is

"dominated by people active in the production section of the 268 economy that is oriented toward using market mechanisms for choosing societal direction" (Milbrath, 1984: 62). The

Soviet equivalent of the rearguard may also be identified as individuals who are responsible for "choosing societal direction," but Zarodov, Laptev, Timofeyev, Zagladin and

Frolov are not producers — they are propagandists and their expressed interests can and do change.

The vanguard, on the opposite side of the environmen­ talism spectrum, has been identified demographically as a group that "has less economic stake [than the rearguard] in the preservation of the old Dominant Social Paradigm"

(Milbrath 1984: 62). The Soviet group labeled "ecologists" were deliberately chosen as natural scientists so they are, by definition, not actively involved in the productive sector of the economy. They do have views very similar to

Milbrath’s vanguard and Cotgrove’s catastrophists: they see a large problem, and believe that basic change rather than technology alone is needed to effect a cure. Some of their concerns such as preventing soil loss and dealing with the pollution problems of urbanization may be considered domestic rather than global problems, however, Soviet scientists who work on these problems professionally have been among the strongest advocates of international coopera­ tion for the purposes of monitoring and information ex­ change. In terms of explicitly global change, this pool of respondents envision maintaining ecological balance (43.6 269 percent) in a biosphere that does not observe jurisdictional boundaries (32 percent); overcoming global warming trends

(41.3 percent); preventing both tropical deforestation and species extinction (35.6 percent); and somehow countering the negative consequences of population growth (27 percent).

It is difficult to imagine achieving this preferred future without engaging, in well-funded and well-staffed interna­ tional efforts. When Soviet ecologists and Western catas- trophists meet in Nairobi, Geneva, or Paris they undoubt­ edly have quite a lot that is mutually understandable to say to each other. Unfortunately, as these individuals have noted themselves, the tasks and solutions that are worked out in committee depend in large measure on political will for implementation.

What can we say about the ecological interests of political figures on the basis of survey data? As indicated above, guaranteeing raw material reserves is a primary concern of those members of the Soviet political elite represented within the pool as illustrating the technocratic perspective. Similarly, Cotgrove (1982: 125) reports that

62.5 percent of British public officials are concerned about the depletion of natural resources.4 It can be very easily argued that this shared interest could be a new source of international competition rather than cooperation. As noted

4 By way of comparison only 29 percent are worried by overpopulation. Other global issues are not covered in either the Cotgrove or the Milbrath surveys. 270 above, however, the Soviet technocrats also express interest in maintaining the regenerative capabilities of the bio­ sphere and overcoming global warming trends.

Unfortunately, surveys of environmental concern in the

West have focused on domestic and local rather than on global problems. It is clear, however, that in the West official support for global ecological problems is a sometime thing. While President Carter commissioned the

Global 2000 report to catalog nonmilitary, ecological threats to global security, President Reagan has chosen to ignore the catastrophists. It is important to note that the current official U.S. disregard for global ecological problems is consistent with a generalized neglect of all multilateral commitments. Ironically, U.S. government support for global ecological concerns is diminishing at a time when they are gaining increasing attention in IGOs.5

Milbrath has found, surprisingly, that among those U.S. elected and appointed officials who are concerned about the environmental future, there is slightly more support for change in the basic nature of society than for technological

5 For example, under the new directorship of Barber Conable, the World Bank has established a new department to assess environmental threats to 30 of the world’s most vulnerable developing countries. This new direction comes in the wake of severe criticism of fiascos like the Polono- reste project in Brazil, which resulted in the needless destruction of millions of hectares of tropical rain forest. According to Conable, "sound ecology is good economics." The Soviet Union is not a member of the World Bank. 271 development as a cure.6 "Media gatekeepers" in the United

States, as well as German business leaders and members of parliament, display much more faith in technology. In

England, business leaders and public officials tend to be more balanced in their respective valuations of the role of social change and technology.

What is meant by "change in the basic nature of society" with respect to global ecological problems? Some

Soviet respondents explicitly equate socialist revolution with the necessary social change, but this is not a modal response. More frequently noted aspects of change are: centralizing environmental decision-making and enhancing coordination between ministries, the development of bioeco­ nomics, and the teaching of ecological literacy. While bioeconomics and ecological literacy definitely fit the New

Environmental Paradigm in the West, political centraliza­ tion, the antithesis of non-hierarchical, participatory decision-making, probably does not. Differences in deci­ sion-making styles in international endeavors may be bones of contention as much as issues of substance.7

6 It must be noted that only 60 percent of appointed officials contacted and 30 percent of elected officials returned usable questionnaires. Thus, the surprising finding that public officials favor change in the basic nature of society is probably due to the self-selected nature of the sample.

7 In fact, the long discussion on voting procedures and the use of the veto that accompanied the formation of the United Nations attests to this reality. 272

One of the few international issues that was included in the Milbrath survey concerned support of the peace movement rather than specifically ecological issues. U.S. business, labor, and political elites are reported as opposing fairly strongly "those who openly oppose weapons buildup." On a 7 point scale from strongly oppose to strongly favor, the mean response for the rearguard is 2.52.

Conversely, the mean response for the vanguard is 5.41. The prevailing Soviet technocratic perception of nuclear war and peaceful coexistence as key issues even in discussions of global ecological problems is not entirely equivalent, but it is comparable. This trend was confirmed in June 1987 when the Soviet Peace Committee established an ecological commission, tentatively entitled "Green Peace," chaired by the writer Sergei Zalygin, who is noted for his leadership of crusades to protect Lake Baikal and cancel plans to divert the flow of Siberian rivers.8

8 Although the Chairperson of Greenpeace was in Moscow to consult with Zalygin about the creation of this commis­ sion, Greenpeace has stated officially that it has no association with Soviet Green Peace and that the name "Greenpeace" may not be used without the permission of its international council. 273

7.F: Conclusion

The simulated interviews reflect concern about global ecological problems within the Soviet pool, but it must be remembered that some evidence of interest was present in the title of a given article or book — otherwise it would not have been read. By the same token, the respondents to the

Milbrath and Cotgrove mail surveys have to be considered self-selected in at least one respect. After all, they returned the questionnaire.

It seems clear, on the basis of the review in this chapter, that the Soviet interest in global ecological problems is not primarily polemical, although it is equally apparent both in the interviews and in the founding of

Soviet Green Peace that Soviet opinion makers are not above using these issues for propaganda purposes. While the environment has clearly been politicized it has not been completely polemicized. The data presented in Table 11 demonstrate that more than half of the interviews barely mention the themes that determined the polemical quotient:

1. Global ecological problems are best understood within the framework of class struggle.

2. Socialists are inherently better at resolving these problems than capitalists. 3. Bourgeois ideology is bankrupt; bourgeois scholars cannot properly understand environmental problems.

The perceived need for cooperation with the West in resolv­ ing global ecological problems is expressed more often 274

(even within the polemical perspective) than the assertion that capitalism or "the West" is the primary cause of these problems. As indicated in Table 12, 36 percent of respon­ dents in the total pool state that capitalist profit is a primary factor contributing to environmental pollution (Item

No. 8); 24 percent state that capitalism faces special limits to growth; 20 percent state that natural resources in the Third World represent a new arena for imperialism (Item

No. 13); and 25 percent state that socialist revolution is the cure for global ecological problems (Item No. 25). In contrast, as noted in Table 13, 45 percent state that the scientific and technological revolution is a primary cause of global ecological problems (Item No. 9); 59.7 percent suggest that international scientific community will jointly resolve these problems (Item No. 38); and 40 percent name specific Western contribution to the resolution of global ecological problems (Item No. 40).

An assessment of these statements must be moderated by the familiar pronouncements of social scientists that attitude does not always correlate well with behavior

(Dunlap and Van Liere, 1979: 17). As demonstrated by numerous authors (Goldman, 1972; Pryde, 1972; DeBardeleben,

1985), a poor Soviet record on environmental protection was obvious even prior to the accident at Chernobyl. At the same time, it is not unreasonable to suppose, as Ananichev seems to have argued, that successful Soviet participation 275 in efforts to resolve global ecological problems should be predicated on serious efforts at the domestic level. The next and final chapter turns to a discussion of Soviet environmental behavior as it is taking shape during Gor­ bachev’s era of "restructuring" \perestroika]. CHAPTER VIII

SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR UNDER GORBACHEV,

WESTERN RESPONSE, AND THE FUTURE

The US President said once that if our planet were threatened by a landing from another planet, the USSR and the USA would quickly find a common language. But isn’t a nuclear disaster a more tangible danger than a landing by extra-ter­ restrials? Isn’t the ecological threat big enough? Don’t all countries have a common stake in finding a sensible and fair approach to the problems of developing states and peoples?

Mikhail Gorbachev

Gorbachev’s (1986: 20) comment in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress may be dismissed on the grounds that it is simply an artifact of a verbal sparring match between two great communicators. However, given the recent history of such comments in the USSR such a dismissal may be premature.

Given current transitions in the Soviet Union, it may be profitable to examine the relationship of global ecological problems to "new political thinking" fnovoye politicheskoe myshleniel in word and deed. In Chapter III, I stated that it is worthwhile to examine the work of Soviet academics and intellectuals for two reasons:

276 277

1. Their ideas may represent a possible foundation for functional cooperation in resolving mutually perceived problems.

2. Their ideas represent the background of expert opinion upon which political elites may base policy decisions.

The first proposition was explored in the previous chapter.

This chapter begins with an exploration of the second proposition before turning to a discussion of actual behavior regarding specific environmental problems. The final sections briefly address Western responses to current

Soviet behavior.

8.A: Expert Opinion Under {Gorbachev

As stated by Gorbachev (1986: 33) and elaborated by

Soviet international relations specialists, the basic message of "new political thinking" is that security cannot be built on the fear of retribution; the politics of confrontation will not work in the nuclear age. According to IMEMO's director Primakov (1986: 15f.), international security must now be based on discovering "fields of concurrence of interest" to create "a strong and broad foundation of international security capable of bearing the load of the contradictions and unsolved problems which have accumulated over many years."

In the eighteen months following the 27th Party

Congress and the accident at Chernobyl, the journal Korn- 278 munist published five articles on environmental problems as compared to seven in the preceding fifteen years.1 Perusing these articles, three of which take the form of internation­ al round tables, sheds some light on who the "new" experts on global ecological problems are and what issues are con­ sidered particularly important. Individuals participating in the roundtables included scientists from Poland, Bul­ garia, India, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great

Britain, Netherlands, New Zealand, USA, Japan, and represen­ tatives from "eleven international organizations (UNESCO,

UNEP, Pugwash and others)" (Smirnov, 1986: 115). The participating Soviets included Academics Fedoseyev and

Moiseyev, as well as Associate Academics Kovda and Frolov, thus encompassing polemicists, ecologists, and tech­ nocrats.2 It is noteworthy that Moiseyev, one of leading proponents of the ecological perspective, wrote one of the

1 Three of these articles appeared in different issues under the rubric "The Contemporary World: Trends and Contradictions" fSovremenny mir: tendentsii i protivo- rechial. One appeared under the rubric "Science and Education" fNauka i obrazovaniel. Another appeared under the rubric "All in Man — All for Man" fVse v cheloveke — vsa dlya chelovekal.

2 The Soviets participating in these roundtables who were not included in the interview pool include: Academics Yanshin, Laskorin, Obukhov (an arms negotiator and member of the Soviet committee studying nuclear winter) and Petryanov- Sokolov, as well as Associate Academics Bolshakov, Galazy (a leader since the 1960s of the campaign to protect Baikal), Zabarzin, and Yablokov. Participants also included at least one Soviet scientist/bureaucrat who has worked at UNEP (Yevteyev) and one professor of international relations (Arab-Ogly). 279 feature articles and he is quoted in all three roundtables.

Another article is -written by Valery Alekseyevich Legasov, who was not a respondent in the interview pool. Legasov, who headed the Soviet delegation to the emergency IAEA meeting in Vienna where he "made some unexpectedly candid off-the-cuff remarks" (Cruikshank, 1986), is a member of the

Presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and First Deputy

Director of the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute.

The editor-in-chief responsible for publishing each of these articles in Kommunist is Ivan Frolov. As Chairman of the Scientific Council of the Presidium of the Academy of

Sciences of the USSR for philosophical and social problems,

Frolov clearly remains committed to the idea that Marxism-

Leninism is the best interpreter of ecological problems.

And yet, in providing a forum for other authors, he is promoting "new ecological concepts" that are premised on conditions of international compromise (Chelovek— tekhnika— priroda, 1987: 83).

These "new ecological concepts" and ecologization as an element in new political thinking are widely explored in the three roundtables: one summarizes discussions at an "Eco- forum for Peace" held in Bulgaria (Smirnov, 1986); one reports on a joint meeting of the Soviet and Polish acade­ mies of science (Chelovek— tekhnika— priroda, 1987); and the third is drawn from a seminar on global ecological problems held at the 1987 Moscow Forum "For a Nuclear-Free World, for 280 the Survival of Humanity” (Smirnov, 1987). The purposes of these discussions held in the months following Chernobyl may be questionable. Much of this increased concern is undoubtedly attributable to the attempt to regain both domestic and international public confidence. Nonetheless, there are several prevalent themes that are all the more interesting to the extent that they are related to ideas that emerged within the interview pool. Furthermore, the polemical quotient of these roundtables (if they had been coded as part of the interview pool), would have been virtually nil — an unexpected finding in articles serving a propaganda function.

The references to Vernadsky within the roundtables are numerous and extensive. The general tenor of these remarks is that humanity has indeed become a "geologic force" in influencing nature, that this phenomenon contributes to the evolution of the biosphere into a noosphere, but, unfor­ tunately, humanity's transformative activities are not based on reason, but on folly (Smirnov, 1987: 111). Since, according to Vernadsky, "The future is in our hands"

(Moiseyev, 1987: 116), humanity needs to accept full responsibility for the further development of the bio­ sphere, and has no right to destroy nature under any circumstances (Chelovek— tekhnika— priroda). In notable contrast, Legasov writes about the technosphere rather than biosphere. Nonetheless, he continues the theme of humanity 281 having evolved into a geologic force. The dangers of

technoaphere are now as threatening as those of the natural world (Legasov, 1987: 94). In a general introduction enumerating these dangers, Legasov refers to acid rain,

toxic chemicals, water pollution, improper factory placement

(in reference to the controversy surrounding Lake Baikal?), and accidents. The examples provided of accidents include

specific catastrophic events at Seveso (dioxin emissions in

Italy), Bhopal (toxic emissions from a Union Carbide plant

in India), Swiss chemicals spills into the Rhine, and the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl.

One of the primary recommendations that emerges from

the roundtables for redirecting "foolish" activities toward

reason, discipline, and responsibility is enhancing "tech­

nological democracy" (Smirnov, 1987: 115; Chelovek— tekh­ nika— priroda, 1987: 88). "Technological democracy" is

apparently a state in which there is not a monopoly on

scientific information and in which scientific consultations

with political elites are "open" or "public" fglasny] (since

scientists can be wrong). According to participants, tech­

nological democracy hinges on scientific consultations

which may be improved by giving ecological expertise a pure

and honest legal status, as well as guaranteed resources. In

preventing a situation in which humanity becomes the slave

of technology, a professional ethic is required in which 282

"nothing is more important than scientific truthfulness and civic duty fgrazhdansky d olgl" (Moiseyev, 1986: 117).

Other elements of this professional ethic include the ecologization of thought in accordance with new political, thinking as outlined by Frolov (quoted in Smirnov, 1987:

116):

1. Ecologization rests on "a conception of the contemporary world as a contradictory . . . but simultaneously interdependent, whole. In this sense it is possible to speak about a single world civilization."

2. Ecologization also rests on "the priority of the value of peace, which is common to all humanity, in relation to all others. When this priority is resolved, humanity will or will not exist. This does not mean that we reject our ideals, our ideology, our class positions. On the other hand, we emphasize the deep, dialectical interconnections between them and values common to humanity."

Elsewhere (Smirnov, 1986: 119), the ecologization of new political thinking is described more concisely as referring to 1) the unity of man and his unity with nature, and 2) the consciousness that war in the contemporary world is nothing other than suicide.

As indicated in the title "Ecoforum for Peace" and in the formation of Soviet Green Peace discussed in the previous chapter, the importance of nuclear war in discus­ sions of global ecological problems has become absolutely irrefutable. According to the Kommunist roundtables, the defense of nature and the preservation of world peace are now synonymous. While the defoliation of Vietnam is given 283 as an example as it was in the interview pool, new examples provided in the roundtables to support this assertion include non-nuclear examples from World War II and models of nuclear winter (presented as the result of international collaboration in SCOPE during 1984). This fusing of ecology and peace was also suggested by Gorbachev in his May 15,

1986 television statement that:

it should not be forgotten that in our world, where everything is interdependent, there exist, alongside problems of atoms for peace, problems of atoms for war.

Several roundtable participants acknowledge that problems of ecology and peace are inherently controversial.

According to several, it is therefore most important to con­ centrate on what can be agreed upon. Although specific problems are not mentioned in this connection, specific international organizations are; including UNESCO, MAB,

IUCN, WWF, UNEP, SCOPE, and IAEA. According to Smirnov

(1986: 115) there is an International Red Cross, therefore there should also be an International Green Cross. While some ask if such cooperation and compromise is really possible in a politically divided world, others answer in the affirmative by presenting the results of Soviet game theory research on non-zero-sum games.3

3 The rationale for modeling games of compromise is described in some detail in one of the roundtables (Chelo- vek— tekhnika--priroda, 1987: 83):

At the base of the model lies the proposition that at the end of the 20th century all people on Earth, all countries 284

8.B : Chernobyl

It has already been suggested that the issues described

above were made immediately salient by the nuclear disaster

at Chernobyl. And yet, as stated earlier, Soviet evalua­

tions of nuclear power may be the most difficult test of

their conceptions of global ecological problems. Chapter IV

established that there has been debate about nuclear energy

safety in the Soviet Union for the decade prior to the

accident. Recent events indicate, however, that those who

are committed to the full scale development of nuclear power

have won.

The graphite fire at the fourth unit of the Chernobyl

nuclear power station that killed 31 individuals immediately

and exposed several hundred thousand persons to dangerous

levels of radiation provided a vivid example of why Soviet environmental behavior is at minimum a regional, if not a

of the world have one common goal -- to preserve life on our planet. The presence of a common goal in the whole spectrum of other conflicting goals qualitatively changes the character of a conflict situation. It ceases to be an­ tagonistic (in the mathematical sense antagonism means that the values of the two sides are strictly contradictory: what is good for one is bad for the other). In such a situation there may exist mutually profitable compromises, when for each side, after concluding a compromise agreement, it is unprofitable to violate the obligations which it has taken on itself. To track down such a compromise in the com­ plexity of interwoven goals and interests is an extraor­ dinarily complex task. Science, equipped with special models and methods helps to resolve it. 285 global, issue. The accident thrust issues of interest to a relatively small group of individuals in the Soviet Union and abroad to a new height of popular discourse. Widespread discussion does not, however, imply widespread knowledge. A freshly tapped fear of nuclear destructive capability and long-standing Western distrust of the USSR, combined with the traditional Soviet penchant for secrecy reinforced in a crisis situation, led to the rapid establishment of rumor mills around the world and Western claims of 2000 immediate

Soviet deaths in the vicinity of the disabled reactor. Not until May 9, 1986 did the Soviet press publish any recommen­ dations on how individuals should protect themselves from radiation. At the same time, there was a serious reaction to a grave disaster. The Soviet government, which seriously delayed providing detailed information about the accident to its own citizens as well as to the international community, did eventually evacuate 40,000 people from the village of

Pripyat. Soviet spokespersons stated in the West that the accident was the worst involving nuclear power in history

(perhaps because the explosion at a nuclear waste dump site near Sverdlovsk in 1957 has still officially not happened).

A major difference between the accidents at Sverdlovsk and Chernobyl is that the effects of the earlier incident were presumably contained within Soviet borders. In 1986,

Swedish scientists detected heightened levels of radioac­ tivity in the atmosphere before Soviet officials had 286 informed anyone in the international community about the accident. In a number of countries there was an instant concern about health effects. The Polish government banned milk sales in fear of strontium 90 contamination. The Ital­ ians, who held the world’s record for strontium 90 in milk during the 1950s (Commoner, 1972: 50), banned all imports of fresh produce from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

In addition to monitoring radioactive fallout from the accident, observers also commented on "political fallout," specifically on the impact of an international communica­ tions fiasco on Mikhail Gorbachev’s cultivated image of new

"openness" [glasnost] in the Soviet Union (Schmidt-Hauer,

1986; Jones and Woodbury, 1987). In the Soviet press, "in accord with Soviet tradition, the incompetence, indif­ ference, and cowardice of the few were juxtaposed to the talents, dedication, and bravery of the vast majority"

(Hoffman, 1986: 35). While denouncing Western criticism of

Soviet behavior in wake of the accident as "a pretext for distracting the attention of the world public from all those problems that make them uncomfortable. . .how to stop the arms race, how to rid the world of the nuclear threat,"

Gorbachev called in his May 15, 1986 television speech for greater international cooperation within the framework of the IAEA to prevent similar disasters in the future.

Specifically, he proposed: 287

1. An international regime for early warning and information supply in the event of accidents or malfunctions at nuclear power stations, combined with bilateral and multilateral arrangements for assistance.

2. A special International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference to discuss these matters.

3. Enhancing the role and capabilities of the IAEA.

4. More active involvement of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Environ­ mental Programme (UNEP) in the safe development of nuclear power.

The initial condemnation of Soviet behavior immediately following the accident has been moderated after forthcoming presentations to international agencies. Still, there are few signs that the accident at Chernobyl has dissuaded

Soviet elites from their commitment to the development of nuclear power. Legasov’s article on the safe development of the technosphere in Kommunist and an article by the Chairman of the State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy in the International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin (Petro- syants, 1986) state explicitly that there is no feasible alternative to nuclear energy. According to the USSR State

Committee Report on the Chernobyl accident, following arguments presented in favor of nuclear power in Chapter IV

"to fall back on burning fossil fuels would result in 288 pollution of the environment, loss of water and forests, and increased risk of human disease."4

These statements are combined with calls to improve nuclear safety as discussed below in Section 8.D. At the same time, it appears that the concern stirred by the accident has manifested itself in unexpected quarters.

Following the Chernobyl disaster, statements in the Soviet press about environmental problems turned less frequently to issues of rational use and more often to issues of environ­ mental impact or the health of the biosphere.

8.C: Environmental Impact and Controversy: The River

Diversion Project

The Soviet plan to divert the flow of Northern and

Siberian rivers to Central Asia through a series of dams and canals has attracted controversy for years. Advocates have considered this major transformation project a means of overcoming water shortages in the southern USSR through ingenious engineering. Opponents have considered it an alarming, half-baked mechanism for flooding oil fields, farm lands, and promised deposits of raw materials; saliniz- ing the soil of Central Asia; disrupting underground water flow; and depriving the Arctic Ocean of one-third to one-

4 The USSR State Committee Report is reviewed by H.W. Lewis. 1987. The Accident at the Chernobyl’ Nuclear Power Plant and Its Consequences. Environment. 28(9):25-27. 289 half of its freshwater supply with unknown consequences

(Goldman, 1972: 247-267).

In 1986, citing public opinion as well as ecological and economic consequences, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "deemed it advisable to discontinue design and preparatory work on diverting part of the flow of northern rivers into the Volga River and the further implementation of design studies related to the diversion of part of the flow of Siberian rivers to Central

Asia and Kazakhstan." Instead of working on the river diversion project, the USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee, the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources and the Russian Republic Council of Ministers were to work on reclaiming land in Non-Black Earth zones and on irrigat­ ing the Volga River basin (Pravda. August 20, 1986).

The Central Committee and Council of Ministers direc­ tive has not closed debate about the project. Words between opponents and supporters have become quite vitriolic. It is not clear at this point that there is even complete agree­ ment between opponents. Some, like Sergei Zalygin, the recently appointed chair of Soviet Green Peace, argue that

"public opinion" led to the cancellation, others including some scientists and academicians argue that the cancellation was based solely on "expert opinion" (Rich, 1987; Voronit-

syn, 1987). Several months after the directive was promul­

gated, Zalygin, also editor of Novy Mir and a leading 290

Soviet writer of the "villager" \derevenahchiki1 school credited by Gorbachev as defending nature,5 attacked the project’s supporters in print. According to Zalygin, the river-diversion specialists at the USSR Academy of Sciences’

Institute of Water Problems have tried to salvage the project by continuing research and building canals (Zalygin,

1987) .

Staff members of the Institute for Water Problems have responded bitterly to the criticism of Zalygin and others, arguing that their research was conducted "in accordance with the decisions of Party Congresses, government resolu­ tions and plans drawn up by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology."

Furthermore, they suggest that the alleged "crude disparage­ ment of entire collectives and scientific trends" published by Zalygin and academic opponents of the project "is in complete accord with the notorious ethical norms of the school of T.D. Lysenko and needs no commentary."®

It is difficult for the Western observer to equate the cancellation of the river diversion project and the

5 In his report to the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev (1986: 55) stated that "the public, notably our writers, are quite right in calling for a more careful treatment of land and its riches, of lakes, rivers, and the plant and animal world."

® The critique of Zalygin et al. was published as a letter to Izvestia (April 20, 1987), which published a response from Zalygin and Academician G. Petrov on the same day. 291 attendant controversy with the period of Lysenkoism.

Scientists around the world have seriously questioned the costs and benefits of diverting the flow of the Siberian rivers. The decision to redirect research efforts and material resources toward alternative means of dealing with water shortages in Central Asia has involved, to one degree or another, leading Soviet scientists, writers, and politi­ cal elites. In contrast, T.D. Lysenko was widely perceived as a charlatan in the world scientific community. Concur­ rently, Stalin used Lysenko to purge the Soviet science of those individuals who might pollute the Soviet Union with

"foreign doctrines" of genetics.

The directors and staff of the Institute of Water

Problems may, however, be justly afraid of losing their jobs. Numerous individuals with responsibilities for nuclear safety were dismissed and some banished from the

Communist Party in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster. More significantly, other individuals have been ousted for less spectacular "environmental" reasons in the normal course of events since Gorbachev came to power. In May 1987, the

Deputy Minister of the Timber, Pulp and Paper, and Wood

Processing Industry, Gennady Pronin, was fired for failing to implement numerous measures designed to protect Lake

Baikal from pollution. The Minister of Forestry of the

Turkmen SSR has also been dismissed for failing to protect 292 the nature reserves and national parks under his jurisdic­ tion.

There is increasing evidence that ecological concerns are political issues in the Soviet Union. The staff of the

Institute for Water Problems are apparently feeling first hand that there are, in the words of the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Commission on Environmental

Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources, "no grounds for complacency" in keeping industries and mini­ stries accountable to nature (Poletayev, 1987).

8.D: Proposed Solutions

In many areas of the country, environmental problems are so obviously out of hand that drastic action is neces­ sary immediately (Gorbachev, 1986: 55; Poletayev, 1987). In

Leningrad, during the summer of 1986, the construction of dikes created stagnant waters and beaches had to be closed.

Nearby Lake Ladoga is badly polluted by toxic chemicals, effluents from a pulp and paper mill, and mineral fer­ tilizers. The Priorzh pulp mill has now been closed and will allegedly be converted to the "ecologically clean" production of furniture. While citizen groups are being established to monitor water pollution in the Leningrad area

(Talbot, 1987), the observable health and aesthetic dif­ ficulties there are relatively minor compared to those which 293 have been affecting less metropolitan areas for a number of years.

Responding to carcinogenic toxic emissions from chemical plants that have also been related to birth defects, and a repeatedly malfunctioning nuclear power plant near Yerevan, Armenian authorities announced a number of meliorative measures in April 1987. These include halting a number of production processes at the Yerevan Aluminum Plant and the Kirovakan Chemical Plant, installing antipollution technology at the Alaverdi Metallurgical Combine, increasing reliance on natural gas and hydroelectricity, and halting construction of a new nuclear power plant. Fuller (1987) speculates that these changes came about as the result of a letter written by 350 Armenian intellectuals to Gorbachev complaining about high cancer rates and birth defects.

Serious health problems related to the use of a highly toxic defoliant and pesticide have also led to a series of articles in Literaturnaya gazeta and the recent banning of the chemical Butifos (Sheehy, 1987).

A number of different suggestions for overcoming complacency with respect to generalized environmental problems have recently appeared in print in the Soviet

Union. Gorbachev (1986: 55) refers to the necessity of introducing scientific and technical achievements in nature protection into production more rapidly, and "more resolute economic, legal, and educational measures." According to 294 articles in Kommunist these measures include making environ­ mental protection profitable; improving the training of individuals who work with potentially dangerous technology; and centralizing the coordination of environmental manage­ ment activities.

As demonstrated in Chapter V, the concern with proper profit motives for environmental protection is not new

(Oldak, 1973; Fedorenko, Lemeshev, and Reimers, 1980;

Piruzyan, Malenkov, and Barenboim, 1980). In the bioecono­ mics formulation of the ecologists there is no trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection — both condition each other. These respondents indicated that factory managers wittingly and unwittingly destroy the environment because it costs nothing for them to do so.

Recently, some Soviet economists have been careful to stress that in a time of "restructuring" fperestroika! and intensification of the economy, environmental protection must be given top priority (Khachaturov, 1987; Kolosov,

1987). This concern has also been echoed by Gorbachev

(1986a: 239) in a speech to party and. managerial activists in Western Siberia in which he joined concern with the rational use of Siberian resources in stimulating economic growth with "the necessity of showing a true concern for nature. In Siberia we must act as good proprietors and must not only pursue immediate benefits but also work for 295 preserving the riches and beauty of Siberia for the coining generations."

Khachaturov (1987: 13) reaffirms the ecologists’ concern that "under the existing system of economic accoun­ tability, enterprises have no incentive to carry out environmental protection measures." Part of the problem is inherent in the fact that the methods used to assess environmental damage have been crude and unworkable. In order to "make pollution unprofitable," Khachaturov (1987:

14) who heads a USSR Academy of Sciences committee to work out a standard methodology for assessing damage, recommends that fines exceed the cost of environmental protection measures (pollution-abatement facilities, low-waste and waste-free technologies, and monitoring and administration).

More importantly, fines "should be paid out of profits — more precisely, out of the portion of profit that remains at the disposition of the enterprise and its employees." The fines thus collected should in turn be used to provide bonuses to workers who perform tasks designated by environ­ mental monitoring services. The argument that the Soviet polluter should pay for environmental damages (within the

Soviet Union) is also made by P. Poletayev (1987), Deputy

Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Commission on

Environmental Protection and Rational Use of Natural

Resources, in Pravda. 296

While the issues of cost-effectiveness described above deal most directly with the implementation and use of environmental protection technologies, Legasov (1987) is most adamant that problems with environmental health and safety are attributable to human error. His position is somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, Legasov (1987: 95) states that carelessness and negligence are the cause of accidents, on the other hand he argues that accidents are more likely to occur because there is more technology. The problem seems to be that of the money that is spent on safety, more is spent on technology than on people while accidents are attributable to human beings. "The saturation of the national economy with potentially damaging factories demands a qualitatively new approach to the problems of guaranteeing safety" (Legasov, 1987: 99). This qualitative­ ly new approach should entail the rigorous retraining of employees who deal with potentially hazardous technologies.

It is not clear that this training of engineering and technicians is synonymous with the "ecologization" that was advocated by Parshenkov (1972) or in the roundtables discussed in Section 7.A. Certainly, many environmentalists who urge a "caring and thrifty attitude toward our native land" (Poletayev, 1987) would believe that nuclear power plant operation and ecological thinking are inherently incompatible. On the other hand, as reported in Connect

[Kontakt1: 297

The methodological basis of environmental educa­ tion in the USSR implies that solving the problem of environmental quality and the exhaustibility of natural resources consists of further progress in science and technology* and not in a limitation of the use of nature. The task is to shift from exploitation of nature to artistry in its manage­ ment .7

In training new "artists," special courses on nature preservation had been introduced into the curriculum of pedagogical institutes responsible for training engineering and vocational school teachers by 1986. In addition, given a standard curriculum in secondary schools throughout the

Soviet Union, all students study a special section on "Man and Biosphere" in their general biology course.

While promoting retraining with attention to environ­ mental safety, Legasov (1987: 100) argues that:

The absence of a single, integrated approach to guaranteeing the safety of any region, and the division of responsibility between departments and public groups leads to nonoptimal decision-making and lengthy discussions without unified criteria which would allow the comparison of different approaches [to environmental health and safety] from positions of minimal risk for people and nature.

This position is very similar to the ecologists* argument that centralized coordination is necessary to compel observance of environmental standards.

7 USSR environmental education methodology was dis­ cussed at an International Environmental Education Programme meeting in Singapore on the incorporation of environmental education into technical and vocational education. The conference proceedings are reported in Connect. 11(2). 298

Yet centralized coordination is unlikely to help unless there is also commitment at the "center" to those ends. The current commitment of political elites to resolving environ­ mental problems at the domestic level is not easily as­ sessed. On the one hand, nuclear power has lost little steam in the USSR since the disaster at Chernobyl and Yuri

Izrael, the Chairman of the USSR State Committee for

Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control, chooses to focus publicly on improved air quality in Moscow rather than on the pollutant-clogged atmosphere of Kemerovo, Yerevan, and other cities. On the other hand, there is increasing evidence of progress in rejecting environmentally damaging endeavors like the river diversion project and in holding administrators responsible for environmental protection activities under their jurisdiction. Recently, the CPSU

Central Committee criticized the State Committee for

Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control itself for taking

"a passive and conciliatory position toward violators of environmental protection measures" (In the CPSU Central

Committee. 1987). In July 1987, the CPSU Central Committee cited gross violations of all environmental legislation and called for a change of attitude regarding ecological deterioration at all levels and branches of government

(Pravda Carries CPSU Resolution on Ecology. 1987). A directive was sent from the Central Committee meeting instructing Gosplan, ministries, and departments to 299 concentrate capital investments on ecologically sound construction projects. Air and water pollutors are to be prosecuted more vigorously by law enforcement agencies.

Finally, along the lines recommended by the Priroda round­

table of 1972, the USSR State Committee for Television and

Radio Broadcasting as well as newspaper editorial offices have been instructed to inform Soviet citizens of environ­ mental shortcomings and publish stories on directions for

improvement.

There is another proposed means for dealing with man- nature problems; namely, the old stand-by — more scientific

research! Much of this research is to take place in the

Soviet Union for Soviet purposes. These research activities

range from agro-industrial studies on land reclamation and

the prevention of soil erosion; perfecting closed-cycle production and pollution abatement technologies; to the modeling of positive-sum games to generate alternative

scenarios under which factory managers might cooperate in

the implementation of these technologies.

While scientific activities continue apace domestical­

ly, there is no less concern for international cooperation.

While this dissertation has focused on Soviet interests in

such cooperative activities with the West, they obviously

cannot occur without the simultaneous interest and will of

Western participants. 300

8.E: International Response to Soviet Environmental Behavior

8.E.1: International Response to the Chernobyl Disaster

The aftermath of Chernobyl provides partial testimony to the commitment of Western governments to engaging in cooperative environmental protection activities with the

Soviets. As Erik Hoffman (1986: 35) states, Gorbachev’s

"proposals for international regulation of nuclear energy may be the first positive outcome of the Chernobyl tragedy and warrant the most expeditious Western elaboration and implementation."

The West first became constructively involved in assisting the recovery to the Chernobyl disaster when Hans

Blix, Director General of IAEA was informed of the accident on April 28. On May 4 Blix was invited to the Soviet Union to witness conditions at the site. While meeting in Moscow with L. Konstantinov, IAEA Deputy Director General of

Nuclear Energy and Safety, and Yuri Izrael, Blix and his colleagues developed the idea of a multilateral convention committing states to reporting releases with transboundary effects (Response to Chernobyl. 1986).

Following Gorbachev’s television address on May 15,

1986, in which he asked for the special assistance of the

IAEA in coping with nuclear accidents, and a West German request for a special conference, a special session was 301 convened of the international organization's board of governors. At-their May meeting, the board of governors voted to expand the IAEA’s safety program by 35 to 40 percent. This action was notably overdue — the Soviet government had requested an IAEA inspection of the plant prior to the disaster, but due to scarce resources the inspection had never taken place (Fischer, 1986: 47).

By August 15, 1986 a drafting committee of experts had prepared a Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear

Accident and a Convention on Assistance in the Case of a

Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency; the American and

Soviet delegations both insisted that reporting radiation leaks from nuclear weapons tests be voluntary. Both conventions were presented at the IAEA general conference in

September 1986 and signed by sixty-two out of one hundred and thirteen IAEA Member States. U.S. Energy Secretary John

Herrington declared that the conventions represented the beginning of "a cooperative framework in which all nations may participate" (Lewis, 1986). As of March 1987, only ten states, including Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Finland, and the Soviet Union had ratified the Convention on Early

Notification. Only six, including Norway, the Soviet

Union, the Ukrainian SSR, and the Byelorussian SSR had ratified the Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear

Accident (Patterson, 1987). On March 23, 1987 President

Reagan sent both treaties to Congress for advice and 302 consent, but as of August 1987, no action had been taken by the Senate. According to the Congressional Research

Service, primary considerations for the U.S. in ratifying the conventions include inadvertent transfer of technology, the kind of information the U.S. would be expected to supply in event of an accident, and raising funds for emergency use. As hesitant as Member States have been to ratify these conventions it is easy to imagine that the interna­ tional response to Chernobyl would have been still weaker if international organizations were not in place with at least minimal action and assistance capabilities. The sponsors of proposed conventions on early notification and assistance in the event of toxic chemical accidents admit that their task is complicated since there is no international agency for toxic chemical safety that plays a role comparable to that of the IAEA (Briefly Noted. 1987).

While the IAEA was clearly the main international actor in response to Chernobyl, others have also been involved.

Shortly after the accident, the World Health Organization convened an expert group in Copenhagen to recommend im­ mediate health and safety precautions. As of August 1986, the IAEA and WHO, in collaboration with the World Meteoro­ logical Organization was "studying a system for continuous worldwide reporting of radiation levels and for authorita­ tive international evaluation of their effects" (Fischer,

1986: 48). 303

Nongovernmental individuals and organizations also responded to the disaster. Although the U.S. State Depart­ ment volunteered doctors and technical assistance the offer was rejected. According to the Department’s Soviet desk, the rejection "was somewhat understandable — there was chaos there, and Russia didn’t want to appear prostrate and at the mercy of the West" (Weinberg, 1986: 50). Shortly thereafter, the Soviets did accept about $600,000 in aid from Armand Hammer, industrialist, philanthropist, chairman of President Reagan’s cancer advisory panel and medical doctor, who paid for medical equipment and bone marrow specialists to be sent to the Ukraine. One of the American doctors who traveled to Moscow to treat individuals dying of acute radiation sickness, Dr. Robert Gale, is president of the International Bone Marrow Transplant Registry. Other members of Dr. Gale’s team included American and Israeli colleagues.

Finally, in the wake of the accident, the Soviet Union signed new bilateral agreements with both Sweden and Finland giving these countries unprecedented access to technical safety information about nuclear plants.

8.E.2: East-West Joint Ventures and Exchanges

Soviet involvement in IIASA has been described in

Chapter VI. There are a number of Western circles from 304 which IIASA receives extensive support. These include the

Western European governments which continue to fund the international interdisciplinary research agency; also included are nongovernmental organizations and individuals.

US participation in IIASA is currently funded by the

American Academy of Arts and Letters and the current

Chairman of the IIASA Advisory Council is Donald Kendall,

CEO of PepsiCo.8

When IIASA was founded, American participation was coordinated through the National Academy of Sciences. The first U.S. representative to IIASA’s governing council was

Harrison Brown, whose vision of international cooperation in resolving global ecological problems was briefly discussed in Chapter I. In 1981, IIASA was the victim of a Reagan

Administration budget cut. After the original "nonpoliti­ cal" cut, the US government found security reasons for denying dues payments. The primary justification, apart from an brief scandal in 1982 when a known KGB operative was dismissed from IIASA and returned to the Soviet Union, has to do with technology transfer. A VAX computer was pur­ chased with approval from the US government in the 1970s; in the 1980s, this technology was considered too sensitive by

8 As a member of the American Committee for US-Soviet Relations, Kendall is also committed to the belief that trade is the key to improved East-West relations. There are Pepsi kiosks in metropolitan areas of the Soviet Union and there are reports that Pizza Hut, which is a subsidiary of PepsiCo will be the first fast-f.ood franchise in the USSR. 305 the Department of Defense. In 1987, the State Department approved the reinstatement of NSF funding of IIASA, but this approval was blocked by the National Security Council

(Dickman, 1987). Despite this rebuff, and in hopes of retaining both American and Soviet presence, the IIASA

Council recently appointed a new American director and a new

Soviet chairman. Vladimir Sergeyevich Mikhalevich, a member of the Supreme Soviet and director of the 7000-member

Glushkov Institute of Cybernetics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, replaces Gvishiani in the position.

President Reagan signed a new bilateral environmental cooperation agreement with Secretary General Gorbachev at the November 1985 summit. Existing bilateral projects now include joint experiments to monitor atmospheric ozone and the effects of acid rain in the Soviet Union. Although US scientific teams have been working on Soviet research vessels, the Reagan Administration has blocked passive support for multilateral ocean exploration projects involv­ ing the USSR. In the spring of 1987, the White House canceled an official invitation for Soviet oceanographers to participate in a project of the Joint Ocean Institutions for

Deep Earth Sampling (JOIDES). Soviet scientists first joined in the work of JOIDES in 1974. While the Department of Defense Security Administration objected in 1987 to having Soviet scientists on board a research vessel, the

Commerce Department had already approved Soviet access to 306 sophisticated technologies on board, including a sonic posi­ tioning system, a heave compensator, underwater television cameras, and computers. The Soviets already have access to the drilling technology on board in ships they have built in

Finland. According to American and European oceanographers, the White House cancellation seriously disrupts the research program because the Soviets were to have contributed an ice tender to protect the research vessel at high latitudes.

Soviet participation was also expected to clear political obstacles for research drilling off countries such as Angola

(Joyce, 1987).

In light of wavering official American interests in furthering scientific exchange involving Soviet scientists, it is not surprising that there are recent signs of regional exchanges with Western Europeans. Consistent with calls at the Ecoforum for Peace for open world labs for the resolu­ tion of human problems, the Soviet and Italian governments recently established a joint institute for global problems research in informatics, biology, and physics (Smirnov,

1987: 117). The importance of the lab in political terms is suggested by the stature of the individuals who attended the opening ceremonies. Soviet participants included Foreign

Minister Shevardnadze, USSR Academy of Sciences’ President

Marchuk, Academy of Sciences’ Vice President Velikhov, as well as leading Soviet scientists. Italy was represented at the opening ceremonies by the Italian Minister of Foreign 307

Affairs and Italian scientists. Also in the spring of 1987, a new environmental accord involving scientific exchange was signed with West Germany.

Exchanges also continue with international organiza­ tions. In the summer of 1987, the State Committee for

Science and Technology (GKNT) was planning to host the Tenth

Anniversary of the UNESCO-UNEP Intergovernmental Conference on Environmental Education in Moscow. States that are not currently members of UNESCO, including the United States and the United Kingdom, do not have official delegations that will attend. Nongovernmental organizations with representa­ tives from non-member states will attend, including the

IUCN, the World Wildlife Fund, the World Council for the

Biosphere-International Society for Environmental Education

(WCB-ISEE), and the North American Association for Environ­ mental Education. Given the deep commitment of these NGOs to expanding ecological literacy, their readiness to hold yet another conference on the same topic in the USSR is indicative of the belief that cooperation with Soviet colleagues is mutually beneficial.9

It may be that the International Environmental Educa­ tion Programme has been able to fly where others have not because it is not involved in technology transfer. Although it is not a member of UNESCO, the U.S. government is

9 Conversation with Dr. Craig Davis, Secretary General of WCB-ISEE, September 6, 1986. 308 participating in an environmental education project with the Soviets by sponsoring Dennis Meadows’ training of Soviet environmental protection managers. A related NGO exchange of seven U.S. conservation organizations and Soviet counter­ parts is working on a proposal to save the tropical rain­ forests. This exchange, intriguing because it involves

U.S.-Soviet cooperation in a third country, has been approved by the State Department and the EPA, and has been favorably reviewed by the World Bank for the funding of a pilot project in Madagascar.10

There are areas of shared East-West research involving highly sophisticated technology. At the 1985 Geneva summit,

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to pursue cooperative research into nuclear fusion to solve mutual problems of energy supply. In April 1987 the U.S. government appropriated $16 million for research involving the Tokamak fusion reactor at Princeton University, which is derived from a basic concept in nuclear physics formulated by the Soviet Nobel laureates Andrei Sakharov and Igor Tamm

(US Aid Expected on Fusion Research. 1987). So far, this

10 Norland (1987) reports another new and important instance of East-West exchange in the Third World facili­ tated by NGOs. At the International Conference on Ecology in Vietnam sponsored by the Indochina Project of the Center for International Policy and the Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies and the Department of Forestry and Resource Management of the University of California, "polemics and confrontation were notably absent." The Vietnamese participants invited foreign colleagues from ASEAN countries to help set up a program in environmental studies at the University of Hanoi. 309 research is complementary, but not jointly conducted.

Although the Department of Energy has held six meetings with

Soviet counterparts, it is anticipated that actual joint work on nuclear fusion will not begin until the next generation of reactors is on line around the year 2000.

It may be argued by individuals adhering to the New

Environmental Paradigm that joint superpower research involving sophisticated nuclear technology has little to do with mutual commitment to resolving global ecological problems. Nonetheless, given the evidence in Chapter VII that political elites who express concern about the environ­ ment tend to support technological solutions, the controver­ sy surrounding technology transfer threatens to seriously handicap both bilateral and multilateral research into global ecological problems. Nuclear technology is not the only sophisticated technology. As mentioned in Chapter VI, globalobal monitoring of environmental phenomena has broad support within the scientific community because so many different activities enhancing the work of so many different disciplines depend on precise and accurate observations.

GEMS operates from stations on land and sea largely because the transfer of satellite technology is heavily restricted for predictable reasons of national security. Satellite technologies could play a significant role, not only in monitoring weather and pollution conditions, but also in the 310 analysis of soil types, mineral deposits, and vegetation analysis in remote areas.

This last point raises an important normative and prescriptive question. If Soviet technocrats want technical assistance from the West in resolving domestic environmental problems or Soviet ecologists participate in international programs for understanding global ecological problems, is it better to withhold technological assistance (either due to linkage with other foreign policy concerns or on the grounds that in the absence of assistance Soviet resources will need to be diverted from military use to environmental protec­ tion), or is it better to internationalize all environmental protection measures since the biosphere and its inhabitants may suffer as a result of ecological disaster anywhere?

This is a question that will not and cannot be resolved by a review of Soviet perceptions. Ultimately it depends on the priority that a broader range of international actors gives to global ecological problems as a genuine security threat. Even though it has been found that individuals

"find a common language" in the face of looming ecological disaster, the record demonstrates that their joint work will be hamstrung whenever there are powerful actors who believe that cooperation poses more of a security threat than the problems it aims to resolve. Thus, Haas’ (1980:369) neo­ functionalist assertion that knowledge must be consensual among the policy-making elite, as well as among 311 practitioners, in order for it to be a reliable basis for international collaboration is apt only as far as it goes.

Not only knowledge, but priorities as well must be consen­ sual. Unfortunately, some scientific and technological conditions that would be conducive to ecological security

(such as international sharing of satellite technology) would also appear to severely threaten "pre-ecological" national security. CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

9.A: Summary

This dissertation has explored Soviet perceptions of global ecological problems by collecting data in simulated interviews and interpreting those data in both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The simulated interview survey turned out to be a very useful tool, in effect an issue- specific operational coding scheme. However, my initial hopes that the interviews could be analyzed extensively with quantitative techniques comparable to those used by Milbrath

(1984) and Cotgrove (1982) in their surveys were not met.

Extensive quantitative analysis would have foundered on the shoals of missing data, not to mention the necessarily subjective process of inferring responses to questions that can be posed and answered in numerous ways. While the simulated interviewing technique can and should be used again in content analysis, the researcher would be best off to acknowledge up front that the data thus collected will be nominal. Moreover, a 43-item survey was much too long.

Given the researcher’s ability to reread the "interviews" it

312 313 may not be necessary to ask redundant items. In any case, pilot studies probably need to have more than six cases in them in order to effectively whittle away unproductive questions. For these and other reasons outlined in Chapter

III and demonstrated in the remaining chapters qualitative analysis was essential.

Notable results of multiple, quantitative and qualita­ tive analyses are:

1) There is evidence supporting the existence of at least three distinct Soviet perspectives regarding environmental problems: polemical, ecological, and technocratic (Chapters II, IV, and V).

2) The "permitted" controversy about global ecological problems taps debate on critical domestic issues such as whether or not the Soviet Union faces ecological limits to growth (Chapters IV and V ) .

3) Respondents in each perspective are able to selectively quote from the canons of Marxism- Leninism in order to support their point of view (Chapter V).

4) Soviet interests in international environmental cooperation are not correlated with the status of East-West relations (Chapter V).

5) Soviet respondents are more likely to describe the necessity of engaging in international cooperation than to prescribe the actual forms that such cooperation should take (Chapter VI).

6) While the "nature conservationist establishment follower" is a rara avis in the West, its counter­ part type "the technocrat" is most prevalent in the USSR (Chapter VII).

7) While Soviet ecologists have most in common with Western scientific counterparts, actual Soviet participants in East-West exchanges are frequently technocrats (Chapter VI). 314

8) Iu the entire interview pool, polemical statements are far less prevalent than either technocratic or ecological responses, including the ecological commitment to international cooperation (Chapter VII).

9) Since Gorbachev’s accession and the Chernobyl disaster, increasing official Soviet attention to domestic environmental problems, including both rational use of natural resources and pollution control, has been matched by considerable interna­ tional environmental activity in both bilateral and multilateral arenas (Chapter VIII).

The relevance of these findings to the functionalist theory and the concept of "contract zone" that initially guided

this research are discussed below in Section 9.B.

Given the wealth of information provided by the

simulated interviews it is logical to suppose that this

technique could be used profitably to better understand

Soviet perceptions regarding other issues of potential East-

West cooperation. These might include issues such as collaboration in the exploration of outer space, or in the

prevention and control of substance abuse (alcoholism and drug addiction), as well as more traditional political

science concerns such as conflict in the Middle East or arms

control in Europe. It is possible that a similar structured analysis could be conducted to pursue further the parameters

of issues that may lie within a "contract zone" as described b e lo w . 315

9.B: Conclusions

This dissertation research was prompted by my belief that planetary survival depends on a transformation whereby constructive assertiveness replaces violent conflict in international relations. As described in Chapter I, the emphasis on functionalism and on global ecological problems emerged because extant but disparate literature on interna­ tional relations, the environment, and the Soviet Union suggested that the protection of the biosphere by indivi­ duals with specialized expertise appeared to be the issue that most naturally transcends the competing interests of sovereign states. It is not unreasonable to suppose that as individual regions of the world assert their rights to ecological health and well-being that the interests of all will be better served.

The actual findings with regard to functionalism and the related concept of a "contract zone" are few and mixed.

The most prominent of these is that East-West ecological collaboration is possible because it exists. While this appears to be a truism, it is not a trivial finding given the prevailing notion that East-West relations are hostile and non-constructively conflictual by definition. This lack of awareness in and of itself poses a problem relative to the functionalist concepts of confidence-building and spill­ over. The expansion of cooperation must inevitably be 316 hobbled to the extent that public, not to mention official, knowledge of existing cooperative activities is virtually nil. Data collection in the United States indicated a distressing consistency with which Soviet writings about the benefits of collaborative activities in environmental protection are simply not translated. By the same token,

Soviet statements extolling these benefits have appeared most vigorously, at least in the pre-Gorbachev era, in specialized journals that are limited to a more or less privileged audience. There is evidence, however, as indicated in Chapter VIII, that in the months since Cher­ nobyl, the Soviet leadership may be publicizing these benefits more widely.

Chapter VIII ends with the assertion that East-West cooperation in resolving global ecological problems may be hampered by Western concerns about technology transfer. One reason for reluctance in sharing technology either directly or indirectly with Soviets would be the belief that Soviet interest in global ecological problems is not sincere. Or in other words, as posed in Chapter I, that Soviet discus­ sions of global ecological problems imply competitive rather than cooperative relations with the West. In the short run, the concept of interdependence, and the related Soviet emphasis on positive-sum international relations are probably even more important to the development of a

"contract zone" in global ecological problem-solving than 317 the long-promoted goal of transferring funds from the arms race to environmental protection activities.

It is clear from recent articles in Kommunist. oc­ casional remarks of Gorbachev and his predecessors, and the interview pool that the environment has been politicized in the Soviet Union. Socialist revolution and Marxist-Leninist dialectics are part of the vocabulary used to describe global ecological problems. Although man-nature problems have traditionally been subordinated to issues of war and peace, discussions of global ecological problems have been even more explicitly linked to the prevention of nuclear war since Chernobyl. At the same time, as indicated in Chapter

VII, discussions of these problems are remarkable for the lack of polemics. The participants in the 1986 and 1987

Kommunist roundtables state more explicitly than the participants in Voprosy filosofii roundtables fifteen years earlier that in the contemporary world it is necessary to think of solutions to environmental problems in positive-sum terms.

Gorbachev’s focus on interdependence discussed in

Chapter VIII may be read as an admission that environmental

issues cannot be resolved domestically. This is noteworthy since the speeches of political elites do not tend to dwell on the inability of states to solve their own problems. As the discussion in previous chapters demonstrates, his references to the security threats posed by environmental 318 problems are not unprecedented in Soviet literature. With

Frolov’s recent appointment as editor of Kommunist and

Zagladin’s continued tenure in the Central Committee’s

International Department, those analysts who have classified global ecological problems as another arena for class struggle remain close to the political elite in the Soviet

Union. Yet at the same time, it appears that the ecologist

Moiseyev, who writes extensively of the need for compromise in international relations, has replaced Kosygin’s son-in- law Gvishiani as the premier global modeler with Frolov’s support.

Similarly, the conduct and tenor of the eventual Soviet report to the IAEA in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster was closer to functional cooperation or what Soviet "respon­ dents" have called technological diplomacy than to polemical assertions that problems associated with nuclear energy do not exist under socialism. In response to the questions posed by Jamgotch in Chapter I, if there is not yet evidence of changed Soviet perceptions and values, there is. evidence that values and perceptions present in the Soviet Union since the early 1970s have been politicized and have been given a more significant imprimatur.

Officially-sanctioned writings in the Soviet Union differ substantially from Western government commissioned works like Global 2000 in many respects. While Western discussions of global ecological problems tend to wallow in 319 despair, comparable Soviet discussions almost always end optimistically, recalling the technocratic motto cited earlier:

Humanity sets before itself only such problems as may be resolved, since under close examination it always turns out that the problem arises only when the material conditions for its resolution are already present or at least in the process of creation (Marx and Engels, Collected Works quoted in Chelovek— tekhnika— priroda: 87).

Or, more pragmatically, as Legasov (1987: 100) quoting

Hemingway’s For Whom the Bell Tolls:

Security is when you know how to avoid danger.

Optimism is a useful device for sustaining morale; policy-makers may be more likely to pay attention to analysts who are not catastrophists. Nonetheless, the discussions in Chapters IV, V, and VI indicate that many

Soviets are not convinced that they do know how to avoid the worst consequences of global ecological problems. More often than not, the proposed solutions have been more research, more exchange of both basic and sophisticated information, more training.

This dissertation began with Kennan’s prescription for

U.S.-Soviet collaboration in environmental problem-solving.

It is a prescription that was echoed numerous times in the interview pool. The scholars and scientists have their joint work cut out for them. Although some Soviet academics have made a plea to focus on areas of agreement rather than disagreement, most have implicitly denied the validity of 320 functionalism. Soviet scientists as well as their Western counterparts were explicit in the Brezhnev era that their sustained collaboration is predicated on East-West political cooperation. Thus, Primakov’s attention, as noted in

Chapter VII, to the need for searching out "fields of concurrence" is noteworthy for its shift in political em­ phasis. Morozov (1986: 8) as opposed to Morozov (1974) now argues that joint participation in resolving problems of common concern will lead countries of different social systems to creative interaction and will reveal more and more the interdependence of members of the world community.

USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky (1986: 15) is even more explicit:

The creation of secure peace is unthinkable without broad and constructive interaction of states and without coordination of their positions and actions for the purpose of achieving their common goals. All international organizations and negotiating mechanisms must be enlisted for accomplishing this task, taking into account, of course, the specific nature of their activities. The creation of comprehensive security requires the maximal utilization and — wherever and whenever necessary — the creation of new interna­ tional mechanisms and institutions that would make it possible to find the optimal correlation between national and state interests and the general interests of mankind (emphasis added).

These statements by both Primakov and Petrovsky

indicate that Gorbachev’s foreign policy advisors are now explicitly advocating the identification and pursuit of

"contract zones". Although a definitive answer about what 321 these zones are with regard to global ecological problems would require a comparable survey of Western perceptions, the following areas may be identified on the basis of Soviet interests identified in the simulated survey:

1. Climatological problems, particularly dealing with the greenhouse effect. Soviet participation in the completion of an international treaty to limit chlorofluorocarbon production to protect the stratospheric ozone layer in September 1987 confirms this priority suggested by interview "respondents".

2. Nuclear safety, again confirmed by Soviet participation in the IAEA after Chernobyl.

3. Rational use of natural resources through low- waste technologies.

4. Soil conservation and the prevention of deser­ tification.

5. Pollution control.

Significantly, and in keeping with functionalist theory, these are all areas in which there will be con­ siderable domestic pay-off in the USSR when and if interna­ tional solutions are developed and implemented. It is considerably less likely that functional collaboration could take place in the development of bioeconomics given vastly different Soviet and Western styles of economic management.

By the same token, functional collaboration in developing environmental education is probably inhibited to the extent that environmental education is a social rather than a natural science.

Chapter VII presented some indications that Soviet officials are somewhat more likely than current U.S. 322 officials to state that global ecological problems are very serious. The discussion in Chapter VIII indicates that the

Reagan Administration has not vigorously pursued oppor­ tunities to test official Soviet commitment to the resolu­ tion of these problems. This need not be a long-lived phenomenon. As multilateral institutions continue to pay increasing attention to ecological concerns, they may potentially encourage Soviet spokespersons to practice what they preach and U.S. officials to keep up with the Joneses in environmentally responsible behavior. Chernobyl has already demonstrated the capacity of participation in at least one multilateral agency (the IAEA) to moderate some aspects of Soviet environmental behavior. As one Congres­ sional Research Service specialist (Donnelly, 1987) wrote, the "accident in April 1986 and the positive attitude of the

Soviet Union thereafter led to renewed interest in and popular support for international cooperation." Hopefully, this positive Soviet attitude will be quickly matched and the ante upped by a corresponding attitude in the United

States and elsewhere around the world. The existence of new collaborative ventures, such as the non-governmental joint project to preserve the tropical rain forests which has received EPA endorsement, suggests that such cooperation need not be an impossible dream.

Specific political actions that U.S. actors could take to test Soviet commitment to environmental concerns, and in 323 order to encourage ecologically responsible Soviet behavior in the global arena and the development of East-West cooperation, include the following:

1. The Senate could immediately ratify outstanding environmental protection conventions or treaties, including an acknowledgment of acid rain as a serious issue in U.S.- Canadian relations.

2. The United States could make a "matching fund" contribution to UNEP that would require Mediter­ ranean member-countries to take advantage of Soviet blocked-currency funds that have been previously offered and rejected.

3. The United States could simultaneously support the current Soviet interest in acquiring observer- status in GATT and could support initiatives for ecologically responsible trades and tariffs in that organization.

4. The federal government could initiate a joint agreement on extending the visibility of environ­ mental protection activities. State governments could sponsor Soviet participants in joint working groups on water pollution, pest manage­ ment, and acid deposition on vegetation as temporary residents at land-grant universities or as visiting cooperative extension agents.

9.C: The Last Words

The interview response that Soviet politicians were then starting to recognize the unity of the biosphere and necessity of overcoming political fragmentation (Medunin in

KS 1973, 4: 136) should be read in the late 1980s with the emphasis still on "starting." Gorbachev’s appeals to the

IAEA and other international organizations following Cher­ nobyl are not an explicit abdication of sovereignty, in fact 324

they are coupled with reminders of principles of non­

interference in domestic affairs. Yet, subtly and sig­

nificantly, the conventions described in Chapter VIII and

the monitoring and information exchanges described in

Chapter VI, involve exchanges of information that has been

jealously guarded in the past. The potential "contract

zones" and U.S. initiatives posed above suggest additional directions in which the barriers of sovereignty may be breached. If the tension between the enforced political

impermeability of national borders and the irresistible movement of natural phenomena has not yet been satisfactor­

ily resolved in favor of the biosphere, this research

suggests that the knowledge that such tension exists is percolating in official Soviet circles. Knowledge of that

tension should be promoted vigorously in both the Soviet

Union and the United States, along with frequent recitations

of the extent and promise of East-West ecological coopera­

tion. APPENDIX A

THE SIMULATED INTERVIEW SURVEY

Date: ______

Call Number:______

Library: ______

GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS SURVEY: SCHEDULE FOR "SIMULATED INTERVIEWING"

Name:

Occupation (discipline):

Affiliation (institution/location):

Citation:

Page Numbers:

Year:

Assumed Audience:

Polemical Quotient: Number of paragraphs with polemical themes/Number of paragraphs in document

325 326

SECTION ONE: THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

1. Does the author have a classification scheme for categories of global problems?

1. Yes 2. No

2. Does the author use one of the following "established" Soviet schemes?

1. international economic problems/international political problems 2. war-peace/man-nature/man-society 3. social consequences of NTR/social aspects of man-environment bond/economic progress of socialist and developing countries 8. other scheme 9. no scheme

3. Which of the following global problems is of interest to the author? Is it a high priority (1), a conditional priority (2), not a priority at all, i.e. a bourgeois misconception (3), or (9) not mentioned?

Air and/or water pollution 2 3 9 Deforestation 2 3 9 Depletion of raw materials 2 3 9 Desertif ication 2 3 9 Destruction of "natural beauty" 2 3 9 Economic development LDCs 2 3 9 Elimination of disease 2 3 9 Energy shortages 2 3 9 Extinction of species 2 3 9 Feeding the world 2 3 9 "Greenhouse" effect 2 3 9 Nuclear power accidents 2 3 9 Overpopulation 2 3 9 Rational use of the global commons 2 3 9 Toxic wastes 2 3 9 Other: ____ 2 3 9

4. Does the author make reference to "convergence" or "post-industrial society"?

1. Yes 2, No

If yes, how is the concept treated? 327

5. Does the author make reference to the "noosphere" or the "biotechnosphere?"

1. Yes 2. No

Probe: If yes,, how is the concept treated?

For the following questions, code the author^ inferred response.

6. Preventing nuclear war is the most pressing globed problem.

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Balanced 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree 9. No Comment

Please Comment:

7. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support; there are negative consequences of population growth.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Comment:

8. Pollution of the environment is primarily a consequence of the profit motive in capitalist countries.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Conment: 328

9. Die scientific and technological revolution has led to serious disruption in ecological processes*

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Comment:

10. Ecological problems are intensified by the lack of needed systems of centralized planning.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Probe: In the capitalist world? In the USSR? or globally?

11. There are limits to growth beyond which capitalist society cannot expand.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Comment:

12. There are no limits to growth beyond which industrialized society cannot expand.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Comment: 329

13. Environmental protection and the economic development of the Third World are incompatible goals.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Comment:

14. The earth is a warehouse of resources; the major environmental problem today is effective management of our natural resources.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Comment:

15. There are likely to be serious and disruptive shortages of essential raw materials if things go on as they are; the resource base of modern society is inadequate to sustain its future.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Probe: In the USSR or world-wide? In the short-term or long-term?

16. Ultimately, everything in nature is related to everything else.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Probe: In the sense of a mechanistic ecosystem or an organismic community? 330

17. Human survival depends on the protection of the biosphere, our home — the planet earth.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Conment: t

SECTION TWO: THE SOLUTION TO TOE PROBLEM

18. Global ecological problems are "bounded" problems that can be successfully resolved within the context of a single, existing scientific discipline.

1. Agree 2. Disagree 9. Not Applicable

If agree, what is the discipline?

19. Global ecological problems are "unbounded" problems that transcend interdisciplinary boundaries and inherently demand many forms of intellectual cross-breeding to resolve.

1. Agree 2. Disagree 9. Not Applicable

Please Conment:

20. Marxist dialectics prevent the kind of reductionism that hampers solutions to global ecological problems.

1. Agree 2. Disagree 9. Not Applicable

Please Conment: 331

21. Hie large-scale, comprehensive and multi-disciplinary nature of global problems necessitates a wide application of systems analysis, including global modeling.

1. Agree 2. Disagree 9. Not Applicable

Please Conment:

22. The solution to man-nature problems in the USSR will be found in greater scientific and technological development.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Conment:

23. The solution to man-nature problems in the USSR will involve some changes in the economic structure of society.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Conment:

24. The solution to global ecological problems will be found in greater scientific and technological development.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Comment: 332

25. The solution to global ecological problems will be found in basic changes in the nature of society.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Comment:

26. It is human destiny to plan the rebuilding and transformation of nature.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Probe: By forcing nature to adapt to man? or symbiotically?

27. Humans need to consider the regenerative capabilities of the biosphere when planning their production activities.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Comment:

28. The peaceful development of nuclear power is a safe and/or indispensable response to the global energy problem.

1. SA 2. A 3. B 4. D 5. SD 9. NC

Please Comment: 333

For the following statements, does the author favor or disfavor the societies described?

29. A society in which economic growth is more important than environmental protection.

1. Favor 2. Disfavor 9. Not Applicable

Please Comment:

30. A society that emphasizes utilizing and/or transforming nature to meet human needs.

1. Favor 2. Disfavor 9. Not Applicable

Please Comment:

31. A society in which conservation of natural resources is actively encouraged.

1. Favor 2. Disfavor 9. Not Applicable

Probe: For purposes of scientific research (Zapavodniki) or to prolong use of reserves?

32. A society willing to pay necessary costs to implement and enforce legislation on environmental protection.

1. Favor 2. Disfavor 9. Not Applicable

Please Comment:

33. A society that emphasizes preserving nature for its own sake, (aesthetic and/or moral reasons).

1. Favor 2. Disfavor 9. Not Applicable

Please Comment: 334

SECTION THREE: THE VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

34. Does the author provide examples of Soviet success in dealing with ecological problems?

1. Yes, listed 2. Yes, not specified 3. No

35. Does the author provide examples of Soviet failure in dealing with ecological problems?

1. Yes, listed 2. Yes, not specified 3. No

36. Does the author provide examples of international success in dealing with any global ecological problems?

1. Yes, listed 2. Yes, not specified 3. No

Probe: If cited, are specified examples bilateral or multilateral? If bilateral, which countries; if multilateral, which agencies?

37. Does the author provide examples of international failure in dealing with any global ecological problems?

1. Yes, listed 2. Yes, not specified 3. No

Probe: What was the cause of failure, factors contributing to failure? 335

38. According to the author, how important is international cooperation to the successful resolution of global ecological problems?

1. Vital 2. Important 3. Somewhat Important 4. Not Important 9. No Comment

Probe: What functions should international cooperation perform? (monitoring, information exchange, coordination, rule-making, etc.)

39. According to the author, how important is national self-reliance/ autonomy to the successful resolution of ecological problems?

1. Vital 2. Important 3. Somewhat Important 4. Not Important 9. No Comment

Please Comment:

40. Does the author see a connection between detente and the successful resolution of global ecological problems?

1. Vital 2. Important 3. Somewhat Important 4. Not Important 9. No Comment

Probe: Must arms control agreements proceed the successful resolution of other global problems? or vice versa? Why?

41. Does the author state that non-Soviet, Western, or bourgeois authors have contributed to understanding global ecological problems?

1. Yes 2. No 3. NC

Probe: Any proposals for improving scientific collaboration? 336

42. Does the author discuss "functionalism" or cite functionalist authors?

1. Yes 2. No

If so, how is the concept treated?

43. Does the author believe that the organizations, institutions, or processes that are needed to resolve global ecological problems already exist?

1. Yes 2. No 3. NC

Probe: What are the desirable/undesirable features of such organizations, institutions, processes? APPENDIX B

POLEMICAL RESPONDENTS AND CITATIONS

ZAR72 Zarodov, K.I., e d . , 1972. Marxist Discussion Seminar: Protecting the Environment. World Marxist Review. 15(1) : 16- 49.

KS 73 Krugly stol: chelovek i sreda evo obitania. [Roundtable: Man and His Environment.] 1973. Voprosy filosofii. 1:48-60; 2:36-52; 3:51-73; 4:57-79. Trans, in Soviet Studies in Philosophy. 13(2 & 3).

RYA73 Ryabchikov, A.M. and Yu.G. Saushkin. 1973. Sovremennie problemy isaledovania okruzhayushchei sredy. Vestnik Moskovskovo Universiteta. 3:3-11.

LAP75 Laptev, I. 1975. Ideological Aspects of Ecological Problems. Kommunist., 17. Trans, in JPRS 66497:63-74.

TIM76 Timofeyev, T.T. 1976. O nekotorie sotsialnykh aspektakh vzaimosvyazi cheloveka i okruzhayushchei sredy. [On several social aspects of the interconnections of man and environment.] Voprosy filosofii. 12:40-51.

FY077 Fyodorov, Yu. 1977. Rimsky klub: poiski burzhuaz- novo reformizma. [The Club of Rome: the Quest of Bourgeois Reformism.] MEMO, 12:52-65.

TIM78 Timofeyev, T.T. 1978. The Working Class and Social Progress. Series: Problems of the Contemporary World (67). Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, Social Sciences Today.

ZAG79 Zagladin, V.V. and I.T. Frolov. 1979. The World on the Threshold of the Third Millenium: Myth and Reality. World Marxist Review. 32-38.

337 APPENDIX C

ECOLOGICAL RESPONDENTS AND CITATIONS

PAR72 Parshenkov, S.A. 1972. Tekhnologia i okrana sredy. [Technology and Protection of the Environment.] Priroda. 2:46-51.

KAP73 Kapitsa, P.L. 1973. Three Aspects of the Global Problem of the Relation Between Man and Nature. Voprosy filosofii. 2. Trans, in Soviet Studies in Philosophy. 13(2 & 3):44-53.

FED74 Fedorenko, N.P. and N.F. Reimers. 1974. Priroda, ekonomika, nauka. Priroda. 3:2-13.

GIR74 Girusov, E.V. and S.S. Lappo. 1974. Predely vozmozhnostei biosfery. [The limits of the biosphere’s potential.] Priroda. 12:2-8.

KAM76 Kamshilov, M.M. 1974. Evolyutsia biosfery. [Evolution of the Biosphere.] Moscow: Nauka. Trans, by Mir Publishers, 1976.

GIL78 Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], 3rd ed., Gilyarov, A.M., N.P. Naumov, A.P. Ogurtsov, B.G. Yudin. Ekologia. [Ecology.] 1978:597-600.

IUC78 Kunen. Donald. 1978. Tridtsat let Mezhdunarodnovo soyuza okhrany prirody. [Thirty years of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature.] Priroda. 8:7-11.

MOI78 Moiseyev, N.N. 1978. Aktualniye voprosy ekologi- cheskie evolyutsii i "mirovaya dinamika" Dzheya Forrestera. [Topical problems of ecological evolution and Jay For­ rester’s "world dynamics."] Voprosy filosofii. 7:171-181.

338 339

NER79 Neronov, V.M. and V.A. Goncharov. 1979. Mezhduna- rodnaya programma YUNESKO "Chelovek i biosfera." [UNESCO's "Man and Biosphere" international program.] Priroda. 1:28-31.

FED80 Fedorenko, N.P., M.Ya. Lemeshev, and N.F. Reimers. 1980. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskaya effektivnost okhrany prirody. [The socio-economic efficiency of environmental protection.] Priroda. 10:2-13.

PIR80 Piruzyan, L.A., A.G. Malenkov, G.M. Barenboim. 1980. Khimichekie aspecty deyatelnosti chelovechestva i okhrana prirody. [Chemical aspects of human activity and environmental protection.] Priroda. 3:2-12.

FED81 Fedorenko, N.P. and N.F. Reimers. 1981. Sblizhenie ekonomicheskikh i ekologicheskikh tselei v okhrane prirody. [The rapprochement of economic and ecological goals in environmental protection.] Priroda. 9:3-12

M0I84 Moiseyev, N.N. 1984. Koevolyutsia cheloveka i biosfery: kiberneticheskie aspekty. [The coevolution of man and biosphere: cybernetic aspects.] Priroda. 1:60-67. APPENDIX D

TECHNOCRATIC RESPONDENTS AND CITATIONS

FY072 Fyodorov, Ye.K. 1972. Aktualnie problemy vzaimo- deistvia obshchestva i prirodnoi sredy. [Topical problems of the interaction of society and the natural environment.] Kommunist. 14:70-81.

FYN72 Fyodorov, Ye.K. and I.B. Novik. 1972. Problemy vzaimodeistvia cheloveka s prirodnoi sredoi. [Problems of m a n ’s

GER74 Gerasimov, I.P. and M.I. Budyko. 1974. Topical Problems of the Interaction between Man and Nature. Kom­ munist. 10:79-91. Trans, in JPRS 62754:109-126.

BUD77 Budyko, M.I. 1977. Global Ecology. Moscow: Progress. Trans, from 1977. Globalnaya Ekologia. Moscow: M y s l .

GVI78 Gvishiani, D.M. 1978. Metodologicheskie problemy modelirovania globalnovo razvitia. [Methodological problems in modeling global development.] Voprosy filosofii. 2: Trans. in Soviet Studies in Philosophy.

GVI79 Gvishiani, D.M. 1979. Global Problems and Global Modeling. MEMO. 3:83-86. Trans, in JPRS 73783:49-54.

GVF79 Gvishiani, Jermen, ed. 1979. Science.Technology. and Global Problems: Trends and Perspectives in the Develop­ ment ofScience and Technology and Their Impact on the Solutions of Contemporary GlobalProblems. New York: Pergamon

340 341

IZR79 Izrael, Yu. A. 1979. Approaches to the Solution of the Problems of Environmental Protection and Rational Utilization of Nature in the Soviet Union. In Jermen Gvishiani^ ed. Science. Technology, and Global Problems. New York: Pergamon.

FES81 Fedoseyev, P. 1981. Man and Nature Under the Conditions of the Scientific and Technological Revolution. In Social Problems of Man's Environment: Where We Live and Work. Moscow: Progress.

FY081 Fyodorov, Ye.K. 1981. Mir kak uslovie optimazat- sii otnosheny cheloveka i priroda. [Peace as a condition of the optimization of man-nature relations.] Voprosy filoso- fii. 3:80-96.

LOS82 Los, V.A. 1982. Vzaimootnoshenia mezhdu chelovekom i prirodoi kak globalnaya problema. [The interrelationship of man and nature as a global problem.] Voprosy filosofii. 5:128-135.

GER83 Gerasimov, I.P. 1983. Geography and Ecology: A Collection of Articles 1971-1981. Moscow: Progress. APPENDIX E

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO SURVEY ITEMS:

TABLE EM ITEM NO. 4 — CONVERGENCE Respondents = 87; 100 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

13 59 15 15% 68% 17% -0.66

TABLE E.2 ITEM NO. 5 — NOOSPHERE Respondents = 87; 100 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

16 69 2 18% 79% 2% -0.78

342 343

TABLE E.3 ITEM NO. 6 — NUCLEAR WAR Respondents =28; 32 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

16 6 0 6 57% 21% 0% 21% -0.54

TABLE E.4 ITEM NO. 7 — POPULATION GROWTH Respondents =44; 51 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

24 11 9 0 54% 25% 20% 0% -0.52

TABLE E.5 ITEM NO. 8 — PROFIT MOTIVE Respondents =47; 54 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

32 8 2 5 68% 17% 4% 11% -0.66 344

TABLE E.6 ITEM NO. 9 — TECHNOGENIC Respondents =64; 74 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

39 18 6 1 61% 28% 9% 2% -0.58

TABLE E .7 ITEM NO. 10 — CENTRALIZATION Respondents = 53; 61 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

42 7 1 3 79% 13% 2% 6% -0.77

TABLE E.8 ITEM NO. 11 — LIMITS CAPITALISM Respondents =24; 28 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

21 1 1 1 87% 4% 4% 4% -0.83 345

TABLE E.9 ITEM NO. 12 — YES LIMITS Respondents =46; 53 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

18 10 18 0 39% 22% 39% 0% -0.37

TABLE E.10 ITEM NO. 13 — THIRD WORLD Respondents =32; 37 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

7 5 11 9 22% 15% 34% 28% -0.31

TABLE E.ll ITEM NO. 14 — RATIONAL USE Respondents =55; 63 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

39 11 4 1 71% 20% 7% 2% -0.69 346

TABLE E.12 ITEM NO. 15 — SHORTAGES Respondents = 47; 54 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

31 8 13 2 66% 17% 6% 4% -0.64

TABLE E.13 ITEM NO. 16 — INTERRELATEDNESS Respondents = 41; 47 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

33 5 0 3 80% 12% 0% 7% -0.78

TABLE E.14 ITEM NO. 17 — SURVIVAL Respondents = 50; 57 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

43 0 0 7 86% 0% 0% 14% -0.84 347

TABLE E.15 ITEM NO. 18 — BOUNDED Respondents =31; 36 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

7 16 8 22% 52% 25% -0.41

TABLE E .16 ITEM NO. 19 — UNBOUNDED Respondents = 55; 63 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

52 3 0 94% 6% 0% -0.93

TABLE E . 17 ITEM NO. 20 — MARXISM-LENINISM Respondents = 28; 32 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

22 0 6 78% 0% 21% -0.75 348

TABLE E.18 ITEM NO. 21 — SYSTEMS ANALYSIS Respondents = 41; 47 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

30 3 8 73% 7% 19% -0.71

TABLE E.18 ITEM NO. 22 — SOVIET TECHNOLOGY Respondents =40; 46 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

31 4 2 3 77% 10% 5% 7% -0.75

TABLE E.20 ITEM NO. 23 — SOVIET ECONOMY Respondents = 35; 40 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

16 7 11 1 46% 20% 31% 3% -0.42 349

TABLE E.21 ITEM NO. 24 — GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY Respondents = 58; 67 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

45 10 2 1 78% 17% 5% 3% -0.56

TABLE E.22 ITEM NO. 25 — NATURE OF SOCIETY Respondents = 53; 61 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

48 4 1 0 90% 8% 2% 0% -0.81

TABLE E.23 ITEM NO. 26 — TRANSFORMATION Respondents = 44; 51 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

23 11 8 2 52% 25% 18% 4% -0.50 350

TABLE E. 24 ITEM NO. 27 — REGENERATION Respondents = 53; 61 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

48 3 2 0 90% 6%. 4% 0% -0.88

TABLE E.25 ITEM NO. 28 — NUCLEAR POWER Respondents = 28; 32 percent of Total Sample

Agree Balanced Disagree Other V.R.

9 5 11 8 30% 13% 41% 16% -0.35

TABLE E.26 ITEM NO. 29 — PROTECTION VS. GROWTH Respondents = 38; 43 percent of Total Sample

Favor Balanced Disfavor Other V.R.

3 0 9 26 8% 0% 24% 68% -0.65 351

TABLE E.27 ITEM NO. 30 — CONSUMERISM Respondents = 36; 41 percent of Total Sample

Favor Balanced Disfavor Other V.R.

30 0 4 2 83% 0% 11% 6% -0.81

TABLE E.28 ITEM NO. 31 — CONSERVATION Respondents = 44; 51 percent of Total Sample

Favor Balanced Disfavor Other V.R.

41 0 1 2 93% 0% 2% 5% -0.90

TABLE E.29 ITEM NO. 32 — LEGISLATION Respondents = 31; 36 percent of Total Sample

Favor Balanced Disfavor Other V.R.

27 0 2 2 87% 0% 6% 6% -0.84 352

TABLE E.30 ITEM NO. 33 — NATURE’S OWN SAKE Respondents = 35; 40 percent of Total Sample

Favor Balanced Disfavor Other V.R.

20 0 10 5 57% 0% 29% 14% -0.54

TABLE E.31 ITEM NO. 34 — SOVIET SUCCESS Respondents = 87; 100 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

47 39 1 54% 45% 1% -0.53

TABLE E.32 ITEM NO. 35 — SOVIET FAILURE Respondents =87; 100 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

24 63 0 18% 72% 0% -0.71 353

TABLE E.33 ITEM NO. 36 — INTERNATIONAL SUCCESS Respondents = 87; 100 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

40 45 2 46* 52% 2% -0.51

TABLE E.34 ITEM NO. 37 — INTERNATIONAL FAILURE Respondents = 87; 100 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

17 68 2 20% 78% 2% -0.77

TABLE E.35 ITEM NO. 38 — IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATION Respondents = 57; 65 percent of Total Sample

Vital Important Not Important Other V.R.

50 3 1 3 88% 5% t 2% 5% -0.85 354

TABLE E.36 ITEM NO. 39 — IMPORTANCE OF SELF-RELIANCE Respondents = 25; 28 percent of Total Sample

Vital Important Not Important Other V.R.

19 1 3 2 76% 4% 12% 5% -0.72

TABLE E.37 ITEM NO. 40 -- DETENTE Respondents = 33; 38 percent of Total Sample

Vital Important Not Important Other V.R.

32 1 0 0 96% 4% 0% 0% -0.94

TABLE E.38 ITEM NO. 41 — WESTERN CONTRIBUTIONS Respondents = 87; 100 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

47 35 5 54% 40% 6% -0.52 355

TABLE E.39 ITEM NO. 42 — FUNCTIONALISM Respondents = 87; 100 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

13 72 2 15% 83% 2% -0.81

TABLE E.40 ITEM NO. 43 — INSTITUTIONS Respondents =26; 30 percent of Total Sample

Yes No Other V.R.

18 5 3 69% 19% 11% -0.65 LIST OF INTERVIEW REFERENCES

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