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INFORMATION TO USERS The most advanced technology has been used to photo­ graph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the original text directly from the copy submitted. Thus, some dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from a computer printer. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyrighted material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are re­ produced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is available as one exposure on a standard 35 mm slide or as a 17" x 23" black and white photographic print for an additional charge. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. 35 mm slides or 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. Accessing the UMIWorld's Information since 1938 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA Order Number 8804046 Soviet perceptions of global ecological problems: An analysis based on simulated interviewing Hall, Barbara Welling, Ph.D. The Ohio State University, 1987 Copyright ©1987 by Hall, Barbara Welling. All rights reserved. UMI 300 N. Zeeb Rd. A n n Arbor, MI 48106 PLEASE NOTE: In all cases this material has been filmed in the best possible way from the available copy. Problems encountered with this document have been identified here with a check mark V . 1. Glossy photographs or p_____ ag e s 2. Colored illustrations, paper or_____ print 3. Photographs with dark background_____ 4. Illustrations are poor copy______ 5. Pages with black marks, not original co p y . _ y _ 6. Print shows through as there is text on both sides_______ of page 7. Indistinct, broken or small print on several________ pages 8. Print exceeds margin requirements______ 9. Tightly bound copy with print lost_______ in sp in e 10. Computer printout pages with indistinct_______ print 11. Page(s)____________lacking when material received, and not available from school or author. 12. P age(s)____________seem to be missing in numbering only as text follows. 13. Two pages numbered . Text follows. 14. Curling and wrinkled p______ a g e s 15. Dissertation contains pages with print at a slant, filmed as received__________ 16. Other__________________________________________________________________________ UMI SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON SIMULATED INTERVIEWING DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Barbara Welling Hall, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 1987 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Chadwick F. Alger James E. Harf Richard K. Herrmann Adviser ^ Philip S. Stewart Department of Political Science FRONTISPIECE — y c A o a u tt a6 ft nee ft coidaA nauCoAec 6AU3sufk ecmecmaeHHtiM, PucynoK C.T hjhumo. From Priroda [Nature] Volume 11, 1972: inside back cover. The caption reads, "I have created more natural conditions for h e r ." (^Copyright by- Barbara Welling Hall 1987 To My Family ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS It is customary for authors to thank their spouses last. In breaking with tradition as he has done, I give my first and foremost thanks to my husband, Joe Ventresca. His constant faith and support made this dissertation possible. Dr. Chadwick F. Alger inspired my intellectual develop­ ment and introduced me literally and figuratively to international social science as a teacher, adviser, and friend. Dr. Philip S. Stewart encouraged me to pursue Soviet studies and appreciate nontraditional forms of diplomacy in East-West relations. I studied global problems for the first time with Dr. James E. Harf, who also taught me the value of the scientific method in studying politics. Dr. Richard K. Herrmann provided voluminous and valuable comments on this work and its predecessors, as well as encouragement in the transition from graduate student to assistant professor. Beyond my committee, other scholars were generous in their assistance. Dr. Lester Milbrath invited me to a pivotal panel at the 1985 conference of the International Society of Political Psychology. Dr. Harold Guetzkow opened his files to me at a critical stage in data collec­ tion. Dr. Lynton Keith Caldwell, Dr. Craig Davis, and Dr. Dennis Meadows answered numerous requests for information from a novice in their respective fields of environmental policy. Thanks go also to those responsible for supporting my studies in tangible ways: Dean Koenigsknecht of the Graduate School of The Ohio State University for providing a Graduate School Alumni Research Award; the Department of Political Science; the Fellowship Committee for the Center for Slavic and East European Studies; and the Ford Foundation Fellow­ ship Program in Combined Soviet/East European and Interna­ tional Security Studies. Thanks go also to Dr. Charles F. Hermann, Director of the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University for providing an atmosphere conducive to reflec­ tion and debate and for inviting me to participate actively in the work of the Center. My colleagues and friends at Earlham College graciously rearranged their schedules to provide me with a vital term in which to write. I am grateful to Wendy Coons, Ella Young, Sandy Wood, Beth Tabriz and the secretaries in the Department of Political Science for easing the burden in many incon­ spicuous and tremendously important ways. Thanks finally to Mark Denham, Valerie Martinez and Tom Holloway for their assistance as fellow graduate students. VITA September 27, 1957. .... Born - East Orange, New Jersey 1979.........................B.A., Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio 1983-1984 .................. Ford Foundation Fellow in Combined Soviet/East European and International Security Studies 1983-1986.................... National Resource Fellow 1984 .........................M.A. , The Ohio State University 1985-1986.................... Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of Political Science The Ohio State University 1987-present ................ Assistant Professor, Political Science and Peace and Global Studies, Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana PUBLICATIONS The Church and the Independent Peace Movement in Eastern Europe. 1986. Journal of Peace Research. 23(2): 193-208. Should the United States Agree to A Nuclear Freeze? 1985. In Don L. Mansfield and Gary J. Buckley, eds., Conflict in American Foreign Policy; the Issues Debated. Englewood: Prentice Hall. The Anti-nuclear Peace Movement: Toward an Evaluation of Effectiveness. 1984. Alternatives. 9(4): 475-517. v FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: International Relations Transnational Relations. Professors Chadwick F. Alger and James E. Harf International Security. Professors James E. Harf and Philip S. Stewart Minor Field: Comparative Politics Soviet Politics. Professors Philip S. Stewart and Richard K. Herrmann TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................... ...................... iii VITA ...................................................... v LIST OF T A B L E S ........................................... x LIST OF FIGURES .......................................... xi CHAPTER PAGE I. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM ................................. 1 l.A: Cooperation and International Relations .. 4 l.B: International Relations and the Environment . 14 l.C: The Environment, Global Problems, and the Soviet Union ................................. 18 l.D: Soviet Perceptions of Global Ecological P r o b l e m s ................................... 23 1.E: Preview of Succeeding Chapters ............. 26 II. FOUNDATIONS OF THE THREE PERSPECTIVES ............. 29 2.A: The Polemical Perspective ................ 31 2.B: The Ecological Perspective ................. 36 2.C: The Technocratic Perspective ............. 42 III. DATA COLLECTION WITH SIMULATED INTERVIEWING . 46 3.A Research Involving Soviet Actors .......... 46 3.B Simulated Interviewing ...................... 48 3.C Constructing the Interview Survey .......... 55 3.C.1: The Nature of the Problem ..... 60 3.C.2: The Solution to the Problem ... 69 3.C.3: The Value of International Cooperation 75 3.D: The Interview "Respondents" .................. 79 3.E: Collecting and Analyzing the Da t a ............ 83 vii IV. ANALYSIS BASED ON DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 88 4.A: I n t r o d u c t i o n .................................. 88 4.B: Can the Third World be concerned with Environmental Protection? .................... 93 4 >: la Nuclear Energy Safe? Is it Necessary? . 102 4.D: Do Industrialized Countries face Limits to G r o w t h ? ........................................... 112 4.E: "Summing U p " .................................... 125 V. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS ............................... 127 5.A: The Polemical Perspective .......... 128 5.A.1: The Problem .............................131 5.A.2: The So l u t i o n .............................137 5.A.3: International Cooperation ........... 140 5.B: The Ecological Perspective .................. 145 5.B.1: The Problem ............................ 151 5.B.2: The Solution .............................166 5.B.3: International Cooperation ........... 174 5.C: The Technocratic Perspective ................ 182 5.C.1: The Pr o
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