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Harvard Model Congress Europe 1956

HISTORICAL NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION Soviet Invasion of Hungary Algerian Revolt Against Crisis BY BRIAN COYNE

Introduction Internal Conflicts and Interconnected Issues

The NATO nations, like any other group of nations, Even in a decade as marked by global strife and had conflicting interests and values. France’s commitment to change as the , the year 1956 stands out as one of the what it considered its “civilizing mission” in conflicted most turbulent in modern history. Tensions mounted between with the anti-colonialism of the and Britain, which and crises threatened to bring the international at this point was accepting the loss of its empire. The conflict order crashing down. In 1956, more was decided about the between two individual NATO nations and , a Soviet short and long term future of the world than almost any other client, further threatened world peace, making the efforts of year of the century. Historical NATO will focus on the three NATO as a whole to manage the situation in Hungary even great events of that year. First, we will tackle the attempt by more difficult. In this briefing the three issues will be dis- Hungary to break out of the Communist bloc and the subse- cussed separately, but it should be remembered that, as is the quent Soviet invasion. This crisis will be heightened by the case in real world politics, nothing occurs in a vacuum. Sepa- beginning of the intensely bloody insurrection by Algerians rate crises in an interconnected world almost always become against their French colonial masters. Finally, the Suez Crisis, entangled. in which Egypt nationalized the , will escalate the tensions nearly to their breaking point. In order to deal with What Can NATO Do? these challenges, we must first consider the purpose of NATO as a body as well as the influence exerted by individual mem- ber states. The following discussions of the three issues are his- tory; that is, they explain what actually happened in 1956. However, our committee is not meant to be a precise re-enact- NATO in 1956: The Free World United ment of how NATO actually responded. The events that actu- ally took place are, to a great extent, the results of decisions made—and those not made—by NATO in 1956. Our commit- Today NATO is often seen as an odd cousin of the tee will have the chance to try its own hand at history, making UN or the EU, struggling to find a definite role. In 1956 and its own decisions that will not necessarily be the same as those throughout the , NATO was the Free World incar- made historically. Our simulation will begin October 1, 1956. nate, the focus of the effort to stop Soviet expansionism. The Therefore anything that takes place after that date should not Soviet crackdown on Hungary was a key test of the alliance; be considered fixed for the purposes of the committee. NATO had to stand up to without provoking a NATO is, as its name suggests, a close alliance of the world war. This would have been a difficult enough balancing members for their mutual security. However, “mutual security” act had NATO simply been a unitary rational actor with no must be defined if it is to mean anything. Much of the internal dissension. But this was not the case, and it is here committee’s debate will be over what constitutes mutual secu- that the other two issues come in. rity. For example, France believe that they, and by extension the Free World, were not secure unless their rule in Algeria was 1 Harvard Model Congress Europe 1956 Historical NATO: Soviet Invasion of Hungary secure. Yet other nations disagreed. When all of the Recent Developments member states agree to do something, NATO can be ex- tremely powerful; it, as a whole, can issue proclamations, impose sanctions, and even take on military campaigns. The Hungarian Revolution Additionally, it should be remembered that every ambas- sador to NATO has the ear of his or her home government The Hungarian Revolution began on October 23, and has great influence in making decisions. These dual 1956, when massive crowds took to the streets of Budapest roles, of the ambassadors individually as officials of their and other cities, chanting “Russians go home!” and pro- home governments and the ambassadors collectively as claiming their support for Nagy’s liberalization. Nagy freed the brains of the Free World, add up to a great deal of many political prisoners in the coming days, announced power indeed. his intention to withdraw Hungary from the , and pleaded publicly for UN and Western help in oppos- ing the Soviet intervention that could already be seen coming. Soviet leader Nikita Kruschev, unable to defeat the Hungarian liberals covertly, sent the Red Army into the country on November 1. The USSR justified the inva- SOVIET INVASION OF sion by claiming that Nagy was seeking to sabotage so- cialism in Hungary and was governing illegally. Thus the Warsaw Pact nations had a duty to intervene and restore HUNGARY “legitimate” government. The Soviet Response

On , a new Hungarian government History and Background was formed by János Kádár, a hard line Communist, with support from Moscow, and in the next few weeks his forces, along with the help of the Soviet Army, con- quered much of the country. By mid-December, the Years of Communist Rule resistance was essentially extinguished. More than 20,000 Hungarians were killed and tens of thousands more imprisoned, including Nagy, who perished in a Hungary came under Soviet domination begin- Soviet prison in 1958. More than 7,000 Soviet soldiers ning in 1944, when the Red Army overthrew the Nazi also died in the conflict. In the aftermath, resistance allied government and occupied the country. Hungary’s against Soviet rule in Eastern Europe went deeper un- old leaders were purged and the economy was collec- derground and attitudes on both sides of the Iron Cur- tivized. Hungary became a founding member of the tain hardened significantly. Warsaw Pact, the Communist equivalent of NATO. However, communist rule and Soviet domination were NATO’s Role never very popular in Hungary, and a reform minded premier, , came to power in 1953. Nagy re- As can be seen from this summary, NATO and moved state controls on media and other aspects of life the West took a passive role in the crisis. Various declara- and discussed the possibility of withdrawing Hungary tions were issued by the democratic nations, but no ac- from the Warsaw Pact. At this point Moscow became tion was taken. , United States Secre- concerned and began a campaign to undermine Nagy tary of State at the time, was asked in late October whether through its agents lower in the Hungarian Communist the United States would take action; his famous, brusque Party ranks. The stage was set for a showdown. It is response was “The United States does not consider Hun- important to note that Nagy and most of his supporters gary an ally.” There was intense public debate at the time, were dedicated socialists. They sought to end Soviet throughout the West but particularly in the United States, domination not in order to embrace Western , about whether and how to intervene. The debate regard- but because they believed the Soviets were corrupting ing the best way to resist Soviet expansionism continued communist principles. throughout the Cold War. 2 Harvard Model Congress Europe 1956 Historical NATO: Soviet Invasion of Hungary

Observers disagreed about what Soviet aims ac- Advocates of Intervention tually were. Were they simply trying to keep control of Hungary, which had been a recognized part of their since the end of the war, or was it a first step Advocates of intervention made several compel- towards greater expansion? Some advocated confronting ling points. They pointed to the example of the Munich the Soviets wherever possible, but others worried that Conference of 1938, when Britain and France appeased this could lead to nuclear war. In 1947, George Kennan Hitler’s demands and abandoned democratic Czechoslo- wrote his famous article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” vakia to Nazi Germany. They pointed to the West’s aban- in which he argued that – the strategy of not donment of Ethiopia, occupied by the Fascist Italian gov- attacking the USSR but not allowing any expansion – was ernment in 1935 despite the pleas of their emperor, Haile the best policy to avoid a devastating war. Selassie. Selassie prophetically warned the League of Nations that if they did not stop aggression, then they would be the next victims. Advocates of intervention ar- Focus of Debate gued that the Soviets were testing the West, trying to see how far they could go before provoking a response. After Hungary, which country might fall next? Perhaps if NATO presented a credible demand for self-determination in The Debate over Containment Hungary, the Soviets would back down. Opponents of Intervention Containment was one of the most famous of the various anti-Soviet strategies advocated in the United States and elsewhere during the Cold War, but it was never Opponents of intervention argued that advocates the only one. The debate over containment versus direct of intervention had miscalculated the potential dangers of confrontation with the Soviets was the major question engagement. Perhaps the Soviets would back down in that divided NATO at the time of the invasion of Hungary. the event of a demand from NATO, but perhaps they States on the front-line of the Cold War, such as West would not. It was this second contingency that oppo- Germany, tended to be the strongest advocates of con- nents of intervention feared. Any serious threat during tainment because a war would most likely occur on their the Cold War (and these were the most stressful years of soil. the Cold War) carried with it the implicit threat of escala- tion, ending in global nuclear war. Could the leaders of A Question of Ethics NATO justify risking nuclear war over Hungary? Dulles’ reply when asked about Western aid to Hungary appears curt and unfeeling on face, but surely it concealed the But this question went beyond simple expedi- anguish of a man who wanted to come to the aid of the ency. In reality it was a question of principle. Each Hungarians but felt he could not take the risk. member of NATO considered itself a bastion of democ- Instead, they proposed employing a doctrine of racy in a world in which democracy was very much containment against the Soviets. Containment rested on threatened. Furthermore, NATO as a whole had been the idea of respecting the existing spheres of influence of set up with the specific purpose of preventing the forc- the superpowers. Hungary was without a doubt within ible imposition of Communist rule on unwilling states the recognized sphere of Soviet influence. This perhaps and peoples. The Hungarians had shown clearly that explains why the United States, among others, was not they did not want Soviet domination, even if they were willing to take risks to defend Hungary, but did take ex- also unwilling to embrace capitalism. Many argued that traordinary risks when the Soviets extended their influ- NATO had a duty to intervene to protect Hungary. A ence to Cuba. In the 1961 , US trained number of prominent Hungarian leaders publicly begged anti-Communist forces landed in Cuba, and, in the Cuban for the intervention, as they pointed to the streams of Missile Crisis of 1962, President John F. Kennedy declared Hungarian refugees crossing into the West - each with a quarantine of the island and ordered that any ship con- their own story of pain and misfortune because of the taining weapons be turned back. Both of these incidents invasion. risked escalation.

3 Harvard Model Congress Europe 1956 Historical NATO: Algerian Revolt Against France

Member nations worried that a NATO supported were those who were willing to give up their language, anti-Soviet revolt in the Soviet sphere of influence might religion, and culture. cause the USSR to support pro-Communist revolts within the Western sphere in the future. There was general agree- ment that the Soviets had to be resisted in some places Recent Developments and placated in others. Thus the question became where the line ought to be drawn. It was by no means preor- dained that Hungary had to be on one side of the line and Cuba on the other. Instead, these decisions were made by The Revolt Begins the leaders of NATO nations, but you just might choose to make them differently. The of Independence, as it has since been called, is considered to have begun on No- vember 1, 1954, when fighters of the FLN (National Libera- tion Front) attacked French police and military installa- tions as well as other symbols of French authority. As the ALGERIAN REVOLT months went by the insurgency and the French retalia- tions grew increasingly bloody. Atrocities were commit- ted on both sides. In August 1955, FLN guerrillas killed 123 civilians, including babies and old women, outside AGAINST FRANCE Philipeville, Algeria. Revenge came not only from the French army but also from vigilante gangs of colonists who roamed the countryside. It is estimated that 12,000 Muslims were killed in the aftermath of the Philippeville History and Background massacre. The fighting escalated as time went on. A new phase began on September 30, 1956, with the FLN bomb- ing of Air France offices in Algiers, attacks that killed doz- ens of civilians. That spring the FLN carried out 800 bomb- French troops first invaded Algeria in 1830, but it ings and shootings in Algiers alone. was not until the early 20th century that France estab- lished complete control over the vast country, which France Responds stretches thousands of kilometers from the shores of the Mediterranean deep into the Sahara. Unlike most other colonies, French settlers moved to Algeria en masse. By The French responded with ever harsher repris- 1956, almost ten percent of the country’s population was als, and by 1958 the conflict brought France to the brink of European. In World War II, Algerians fought alongside civil war. French military leaders in Algiers, afraid that the the Free French forces and many distinguished themselves government in Paris would abandon the struggle, seized fighting against the Germans and Italians. control of the country and soon occupied Corsica, threat- After the war, the French government took the ening to march on Paris if their demands were not met. position that Algeria would not be included in the wave of became leader of France, quickly estab- that was sweeping away European colo- lished a new constitution, and prevented a civil war in nial empires, including the French Empire. France annexed France. All the while the war in Algeria itself dragged on. Algeria directly, making it a part of metropolitan France Finally, in May 1961, France and the FLN came to an ac- itself. The French government used the French settlers, cord on a cease-fire and an independence referendum. On many of whose families had by then lived in Algeria for July 3, 1962, Algeria formally became independent. Over generations, as justification for this policy. However, by one million Algerians, including virtually the entire Euro- the 1950s, Algerian dissatisfaction with this situation in- pean and Jewish communities as well as Algerian Mus- creased. The European minority owned most of the pro- lims who had supported the French, fled Algeria for France ductive land in the country and controlled all good jobs. and elsewhere. Estimates of the death toll have ranged The only Algerians who were able to make social progress from 350,000 to 1.5 million.

4 Harvard Model Congress Europe 1956 Historical NATO: Algerian Revolt Against France

NATO’s Role ing their ideals abroad, what was often referred to as the “civilizing mission”. Algeria, Indochina, Madagascar, and other colo- The conflict over Algeria exposed deep-seated nies that the French tried to hold on to were seen as for- philosophical differences within NATO. While the Brit- merly benighted lands to which the French had brought ish, with American encouragement, were withdrawing from the benefits of modern technology, self-government, Chris- their empire in the years after the end of World War II, the tianity, and the French language. For many leaders in French were ready to shed some colonies but fiercely de- Paris, it was simply ungrateful of the Algerians to be more termined to keep others, particularly the ones that had interested in and Islam and to believe that self- major strategic significance or high European settler popu- government meant more than elective local councils loyal lations. Algeria fit both of these requirements. The rest of to Paris. the world viewed Algeria as a colony, one nation occu- pied by another. The French saw things differently. In France Finds Support 1956, Algeria technically was not a colony; rather, it was governed as an integral part of France that just happened to be south of the Mediterranean instead of north of the Some NATO nations, typically those who had Mediterranean. In the present day, Alaska, while physi- colonies of their own, were sympathetic to these claims. cally detached from the rest of the United States, is an Belgium and the Netherlands also still had a number of integral part of America and not a colony in the true sense valuable colonies that they were not eager to give up. of the word. Britain was in something of a middle position. In 1956, Britain was still the largest colonial power in the world, but it had already accepted the (troubled) independence Focus of Debate of a number of its most important territories, including India and Pakistan, and Palestine, Egypt, and . Ghana, the first independent black African nation, had become independent in March of 1956, just a few months The French Perspective before our meeting begins. In 1956, the broad concept of decolonization had been accepted by most of the European nations, at least The French had a number of arguments on their in principle. But exactly what decolonization meant was side in this claim. Algiers and Paris are roughly equal by no means sure at the time. South Africa had become distances from Marseilles, and, most importantly, there independent in 1910, but in a manner that concentrated all was an enormous population of French descendents in power and wealth in the hands of the white minority, who, Algeria. These people, called colons, not only could vote like the colons of Algeria, considered themselves the right- in French elections but also on a number of occasions ful owners of the country. almost started civil war in France and eventually forced the writing of a new constitution. They were so deter- The Role of Labels mined because they knew that, with good reason, they would not be welcome in Algeria were native Algerians ever to rule the country. Labels played a major part in this conflict, as they As far as the government was concerned, the have in essentially every debate in the modern world. In a Alaska model was the appropriate understanding of Alge- debate that has been played out again and again, the FLN ria, and they considered the FLN to be nothing more than declared themselves to be freedom fighters, while the extremists with no real support in the population. Through- French branded them terrorists. Indeed, the FLN killed out the colonial era the French held a different view of thousands of innocent civilians, many in bomb attacks their colonies than other nations. Other countries simply against specifically civilian targets such as cafés. The saw the colonies as existing for the benefit of the mother French were willing to consider some varieties of self- country, as sources of manpower, markets, raw materials, government for Algeria, but only South Africa-style mod- and prestige. The French, on the other hand, had been, els that would have left the the European colonists safe in ever since the French Revolution, concerned with spread- Algeria and with a significant concentration of power.

5 Harvard Model Congress Europe 1956 Historical NATO: Suez Crisis

France Faces Opposition from Non-colonial rule. The dynastic viceroys of Egypt behaved essentially Powers as independent monarchs but did not in any way repre- sent the native Egyptian population.

As with every global issue from this era, the Al- Britain and France Gain Control gerian struggle for independence cannot be understood fully except in the context of the Cold War. The newly decolonized nations became immediate Cold War battle- The viceroy ran into financial difficulties soon grounds as each sought to influence the new afterwards and sold his majority shares in the Canal to . The USSR supported many colonial liberation Great Britain, for which the Canal was of immense impor- movements. Even before winning independence, the FLN tance as the shortest sea route from Great Britain to India. began using Socialist rhetoric when describing its plans This sale created a situation in which the British and French for the nation. The positioned itself as the governments controlled Egypt’s main commercial resource. champion of oppressed peoples everywhere, and lent con- To make matters worse, 25,000 Egyptian laborers are esti- siderable moral and political support to the FLN through- mated to have died during the construction. However, the out the struggle. To justify its refusal to leave, France late 19th century was the heyday of colonialism, and the argued that an independent Algeria would become a So- situation was not thought to be incongruous at all. A few viet ally. However, the United States and the other NATO years later, in 1882, British troops landed at the invitation nations that did not have colonies used the Soviet issue of the Khedive (the viceroy of Egypt) to quash a minor to argue for Algerian independence. revolt. The British, in the fashion of the times, crushed To the non-colonial powers, France’s bloody re- the uprising as the Khedive had requested and then pression of Algerian only played into the hands promptly took over the country. Egypt was granted offi- of the Soviets by giving them easy material with which to cial independence in 1922, but British troops remained in paint all the capitalist nations as tyrannical imperialists. the country until 1952. Furthermore, the conflict tied down much of France’s armed forces, troops that the other NATO nations wanted to be The Pan-Arab Movement able to call upon in the event of a war with the Soviets. De Gaulle, who came to power during the Algerian convul- sions, was vehement about France being independent of Egyptian troops participated along with the rest America and NATO; he often threatened to stop cooper- of the in the 1948-9 war that erupted after Is- ating with the alliance and tried to build his own sphere of rael declared independence. The embarrassing defeat of influence in the developing world. the Egyptian and other Arab armies in that war led to con- siderable popular discontent throughout the Arab world, but particularly in Egypt. The monarchy was viewed as corrupt, decadent, and backward. Furthermore, the idea SUEZ CRISIS of pan-Arabism swept the . This was the idea that the of the Arab world into a multitude of states was the illegitimate contrivance of the former colo- nial occupiers. Instead, all Arabs rightfully made up one nation. Reformers blamed this division for the defeat in History and Background the war against Israel. Pan-Arab leaders in various coun- tries promised to unify the Arab world, raise the masses from their abject poverty, and defeat Israel in a new war.

The Suez Canal, located in Egypt, shortens the Nasser Comes to Power sea route between Europe and Asia by thousands of kilo- meters by linking the Red and Mediterranean Seas. As a result, it is one of the world’s most important shipping The most famous of these leaders was Gamel routes. The Canal was completed in 1869. Its construc- Abdel Nasser, a commander in the . In 1952, tion was financed by the French and Egyptian govern- Nasser led a coup that overthrew the pro-Western gov- ments. At this time, Egypt was nominally under Turkish ernment of King Farouk, the last of the dynasty that had 6 Harvard Model Congress Europe 1956 Historical NATO: Suez Crisis included the viceroy who sold the shares of the Canal to was not so distracted by events in Hungary that it couldn’t the British. British troops were forced to leave Egypt come to its Egypt’s aid. The Soviets began making threat- soon after. Nasser established himself as a leader not ening statements and rushed supplies and advisors to only in Egypt but also throughout the Arab world, where Egypt. The United States also decided that the war against he positioned himself as the fount of anti-colonialism, Egypt had become unacceptable and used economic pres- modernity, pan-Arabism, and “Arab ”. Despite sure to force Britain to back down. With the British out of being involved with the Non-Aligned Movement, Nasser’s the game, the French threw in the towel. Then the Israelis, Egypt came more into the Soviet orbit as the early 1950s though they won every engagement against Egypt, found progressed. By 1956, the Egyptian army was fully themselves without a friend in the and equipped, trained, and advised by Moscow. were forced to withdraw from Egypt under tremendous international . Nasser’s nationalization of the Canal was not reversed although he was induced to agree in principle to freedom of movement for foreign ships through the Canal. Recent Developments A Shift in the World Order

Nasser Nationalizes the Canal Many observers see the Suez Crisis as marking the final eclipse of the Western European great powers, Britain and France, in favor of the US and the USSR. It In mid-1956, Nasser declared the nationalization showed that, even though Britain and France had the mili- of the Suez Canal in response to a withdrawal of Western tary potential to easily defeat Egypt, the economic and aid because of his close links with the Soviet Union. Until political situation of the world precluded this as a viable that time the Canal had been run as the property of the option. , which in turn was controlled by the governments of Britain and France. Britain and France were furious, threats and accusations began to fly from Focus of Debate both sides, and war seemed likely from the beginning. To further complicate the sitaution, Egypt and Israel remained implacably hostile. Israel was infuriated that Egypt had aided raids into its territory by Palestinian guerillas since Britain and France the end of the last war. Israel retaliated with a raid into Gaza that killed more than forty Egyptian soldiers. In the debate within NATO that the conflict cre- Israel, France, and Britain Respond ated, Britain and France tried to frame the issue in terms of a Soviet (Egypt) attacking their vital interests. The worldview of many leaders within NATO in 1956 was In the summer of 1956, representatives of Israel, highly Manichean: the world was seen as sharply divided France, and Britain met in secret near Paris and agreed on between radical good and radical evil, and even the slight- a plan. Israel would invade Egypt, seizing the , est advance of the evil Soviet empire could throw the en- the , and the Suez Canal, and Britain and tire world into their hands. It was not hard to argue that France would attack Egypt by sea and air in support. Egypt control of the Suez Canal was vital in geopolitical terms. would then be forced to ask for a cease-fire, and Britain Although it later became clear that the view of Nasser as and France would send “” troops into the an obedient Soviet puppet was overstated, the national- Canal Zone, separating the combatants and re-establish- ization of the Canal did legitimately raise the possibility ing European control over the Canal in the process. As that in the future Moscow would be able to close and planned, Israel invaded Egypt on , and Britain open it on a whim. Britain and France in particular de- and France began bombing Egyptian targets. Within three spised Nasser, who supported the FLN and other anti- days, Israeli forces approached the Canal. Egypt may colonial movements and was, in their view, a constant have been weak, but it had the support of the USSR, which threat to the stability of the region. 7 Harvard Model Congress Europe 1956 Historical NATO: Suez Crisis

Competing Perspectives Bibliography

Other NATO nations, particularly those that did not themselves have colonial interests, saw it as yet more Kennan, George. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”. reluctance to abandon colonialism; after all, the Suez Ca- http://www.polisci.ucsd.edu/~bslantch/courses/nss/ nal is in Egypt and it only belonged to Britain and France documents/kennan-sources-of-soviet-conduct.html because of earlier colonial arrangements. In the 1950s and 1960s, the United Nations was still young and still feeling Wikipedia: “1956 Hungarian Revolution”. http:// out its place in the world. This era was one in which the en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956_Hungarian_Revolution definition of rights – of individuals, of peoples, and of states – were being debated and developed vigorously. “1956-The Hungarian Revolution”. http://www.af- In nationalizing the Suez Canal, Nasser did not simply north.org/1956.htm declare that “might makes right” and seize it. He was supported by a well articulated conception of economic Fryer, Peter. Hungarian Tragedy. Index Books (London, rights that, if not universally accepted, had substantial 1986). Text available online at http://home.online.no/ backing at the time in the United Nations (particularly %7Evorhaug/politics/arkiv/hungarian_tragedy/ among newly decolonized states) and was supported by index.html many theorists of international relations. The theory of economic rights was a broad one, but one of its main te- Wikipedia: “Algerian War of Independence”. http:// nets was that colonialism was, on its face, illegitimate and en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algerian_War_of_Independence could be resisted without regard for the property rights of colonial powers. Horne, Alistair (1978) A Savage War of Peace: Algeria Nasser declared that the continued control of 1954-1962, Viking. the Suez Canal by the British and French, who, among other concerns made it available to Egypt’s archenemy Wikipedia: “Suez Crisis”. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Israel, was a form of colonialism and thus illegal. As with Suez_crisis other issues, the debate within NATO was both philo- sophical and strategic, with questions of morality and in- “The Suez Crisis” The Learning Site. http:// ternational law being argued side by side with questions www.historylearningsite.co.uk/suez.htm of resisting the expansion of Soviet power. It is interest- ing to note that, in this crisis, the US and the USSR were essentially on the same side. Both felt that their clients had gone too far and neither superpower was willing to assist its clients if it meant risking a general war. As men- tioned above, this illustrated very clearly the respective power of the superpowers and their clients. Each claimed rhetorically to be willing to go to the greatest lengths to defend their allies and their cause, democracy and capital- ism for the Americans and socialism and anti-colonialism for the Soviets. Yet both were willing to risk only so much in this defense. As with the other issues, the debate in NATO over whether to intervene (or in this case to support the intervention already undertaken by Britain and France) rested ultimately on where to draw the line between resist- ing and accommodating Cold War rivals. Britain and France insist that control of the Canal is important enough to risk even a major confrontation. NATO’s reaction rests on whether the rest of the Council accepts this position.

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