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NATO Briefing.Pmd Harvard Model Congress Europe 1956 HISTORICAL NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION Soviet Invasion of Hungary Algerian Revolt Against France Suez Crisis BY BRIAN COYNE Introduction Internal Conflicts and Interconnected Issues The NATO nations, like any other group of nations, Even in a decade as marked by global strife and had conflicting interests and values. France’s commitment to change as the 1950s, the year 1956 stands out as one of the what it considered its “civilizing mission” in Algeria conflicted most turbulent in modern history. Tensions mounted between with the anti-colonialism of the United States and Britain, which superpowers and crises threatened to bring the international at this point was accepting the loss of its empire. The conflict order crashing down. In 1956, more was decided about the between two individual NATO nations and Egypt, a Soviet short and long term future of the world than almost any other client, further threatened world peace, making the efforts of year of the century. Historical NATO will focus on the three NATO as a whole to manage the situation in Hungary even great events of that year. First, we will tackle the attempt by more difficult. In this briefing the three issues will be dis- Hungary to break out of the Communist bloc and the subse- cussed separately, but it should be remembered that, as is the quent Soviet invasion. This crisis will be heightened by the case in real world politics, nothing occurs in a vacuum. Sepa- beginning of the intensely bloody insurrection by Algerians rate crises in an interconnected world almost always become against their French colonial masters. Finally, the Suez Crisis, entangled. in which Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, will escalate the tensions nearly to their breaking point. In order to deal with What Can NATO Do? these challenges, we must first consider the purpose of NATO as a body as well as the influence exerted by individual mem- ber states. The following discussions of the three issues are his- tory; that is, they explain what actually happened in 1956. However, our committee is not meant to be a precise re-enact- NATO in 1956: The Free World United ment of how NATO actually responded. The events that actu- ally took place are, to a great extent, the results of decisions made—and those not made—by NATO in 1956. Our commit- Today NATO is often seen as an odd cousin of the tee will have the chance to try its own hand at history, making UN or the EU, struggling to find a definite role. In 1956 and its own decisions that will not necessarily be the same as those throughout the Cold War, NATO was the Free World incar- made historically. Our simulation will begin October 1, 1956. nate, the focus of the effort to stop Soviet expansionism. The Therefore anything that takes place after that date should not Soviet crackdown on Hungary was a key test of the alliance; be considered fixed for the purposes of the committee. NATO had to stand up to Communism without provoking a NATO is, as its name suggests, a close alliance of the world war. This would have been a difficult enough balancing members for their mutual security. However, “mutual security” act had NATO simply been a unitary rational actor with no must be defined if it is to mean anything. Much of the internal dissension. But this was not the case, and it is here committee’s debate will be over what constitutes mutual secu- that the other two issues come in. rity. For example, France believe that they, and by extension the Free World, were not secure unless their rule in Algeria was 1 Harvard Model Congress Europe 1956 Historical NATO: Soviet Invasion of Hungary secure. Yet other nations disagreed. When all of the Recent Developments member states agree to do something, NATO can be ex- tremely powerful; it, as a whole, can issue proclamations, impose sanctions, and even take on military campaigns. The Hungarian Revolution Additionally, it should be remembered that every ambas- sador to NATO has the ear of his or her home government The Hungarian Revolution began on October 23, and has great influence in making decisions. These dual 1956, when massive crowds took to the streets of Budapest roles, of the ambassadors individually as officials of their and other cities, chanting “Russians go home!” and pro- home governments and the ambassadors collectively as claiming their support for Nagy’s liberalization. Nagy freed the brains of the Free World, add up to a great deal of many political prisoners in the coming days, announced power indeed. his intention to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact, and pleaded publicly for UN and Western help in oppos- ing the Soviet intervention that could already be seen coming. Soviet leader Nikita Kruschev, unable to defeat the Hungarian liberals covertly, sent the Red Army into the country on November 1. The USSR justified the inva- SOVIET INVASION OF sion by claiming that Nagy was seeking to sabotage so- cialism in Hungary and was governing illegally. Thus the Warsaw Pact nations had a duty to intervene and restore HUNGARY “legitimate” government. The Soviet Response On November 3, a new Hungarian government History and Background was formed by János Kádár, a hard line Communist, with support from Moscow, and in the next few weeks his forces, along with the help of the Soviet Army, con- quered much of the country. By mid-December, the Years of Communist Rule resistance was essentially extinguished. More than 20,000 Hungarians were killed and tens of thousands more imprisoned, including Nagy, who perished in a Hungary came under Soviet domination begin- Soviet prison in 1958. More than 7,000 Soviet soldiers ning in 1944, when the Red Army overthrew the Nazi also died in the conflict. In the aftermath, resistance allied government and occupied the country. Hungary’s against Soviet rule in Eastern Europe went deeper un- old leaders were purged and the economy was collec- derground and attitudes on both sides of the Iron Cur- tivized. Hungary became a founding member of the tain hardened significantly. Warsaw Pact, the Communist equivalent of NATO. However, communist rule and Soviet domination were NATO’s Role never very popular in Hungary, and a reform minded premier, Imre Nagy, came to power in 1953. Nagy re- As can be seen from this summary, NATO and moved state controls on media and other aspects of life the West took a passive role in the crisis. Various declara- and discussed the possibility of withdrawing Hungary tions were issued by the democratic nations, but no ac- from the Warsaw Pact. At this point Moscow became tion was taken. John Foster Dulles, United States Secre- concerned and began a campaign to undermine Nagy tary of State at the time, was asked in late October whether through its agents lower in the Hungarian Communist the United States would take action; his famous, brusque Party ranks. The stage was set for a showdown. It is response was “The United States does not consider Hun- important to note that Nagy and most of his supporters gary an ally.” There was intense public debate at the time, were dedicated socialists. They sought to end Soviet throughout the West but particularly in the United States, domination not in order to embrace Western capitalism, about whether and how to intervene. The debate regard- but because they believed the Soviets were corrupting ing the best way to resist Soviet expansionism continued communist principles. throughout the Cold War. 2 Harvard Model Congress Europe 1956 Historical NATO: Soviet Invasion of Hungary Observers disagreed about what Soviet aims ac- Advocates of Intervention tually were. Were they simply trying to keep control of Hungary, which had been a recognized part of their sphere of influence since the end of the war, or was it a first step Advocates of intervention made several compel- towards greater expansion? Some advocated confronting ling points. They pointed to the example of the Munich the Soviets wherever possible, but others worried that Conference of 1938, when Britain and France appeased this could lead to nuclear war. In 1947, George Kennan Hitler’s demands and abandoned democratic Czechoslo- wrote his famous article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” vakia to Nazi Germany. They pointed to the West’s aban- in which he argued that containment – the strategy of not donment of Ethiopia, occupied by the Fascist Italian gov- attacking the USSR but not allowing any expansion – was ernment in 1935 despite the pleas of their emperor, Haile the best policy to avoid a devastating war. Selassie. Selassie prophetically warned the League of Nations that if they did not stop aggression, then they would be the next victims. Advocates of intervention ar- Focus of Debate gued that the Soviets were testing the West, trying to see how far they could go before provoking a response. After Hungary, which country might fall next? Perhaps if NATO presented a credible demand for self-determination in The Debate over Containment Hungary, the Soviets would back down. Opponents of Intervention Containment was one of the most famous of the various anti-Soviet strategies advocated in the United States and elsewhere during the Cold War, but it was never Opponents of intervention argued that advocates the only one. The debate over containment versus direct of intervention had miscalculated the potential dangers of confrontation with the Soviets was the major question engagement. Perhaps the Soviets would back down in that divided NATO at the time of the invasion of Hungary. the event of a demand from NATO, but perhaps they States on the front-line of the Cold War, such as West would not.
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