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Summer 1997

Flooding The The Politics Of Site Selection And Design

Robert Kelley Schneiders Tech University

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Schneiders, Kelley, "Flooding The Missouri Valley The Politics Of Dam Site Selection And Design" (1997). Great Plains Quarterly. 1954. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/1954

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Great Plains Studies, Center for at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Great Plains Quarterly by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. FLOODING THE MISSOURI VALLEY THE POLITICS OF DAM SITE SELECTION AND DESIGN

ROBERT KELLEY SCHNEIDERS

In December 1944 the Con­ Dakota is 160 feet high and 10,700 feet long. gress passed a and Harbors Bill that The behind it stretches 140 miles authorized the construction of the Pick-Sloan north-northwest along the Missouri Valley. plan for Missouri development. From , near Pierre, , sur­ 1946 to 1966, the Corps passes even Dam at 242 feet high of Engineers, with the assistance of private and 9300 feet long.! Oahe's reservoir stretches contractors, implemented much of that plan 250 miles upstream. The completion of ­ in the Valley. In that twenty­ rison Dam in , and Oahe, Big year period, five of the world's largest earthen Bend, Fort Randall, and Gavin's Point dams were built across the main-stem of the in South Dakota resulted in the innundation Missouri River in North and South Dakota. of nearly 700 miles of the Missouri Valley from The size of these structures defies the imagi­ Yankton, South Dakota, to Williston, North nation. in southeast South Dakota.2 The inundation of such a vast stretch of the caused tremendous changes in the lifestyles of the people who lived within or near the valley. Many Euro­ pean-American ranchers and farmers had to relocate their families and reestablish agricul­ tural enterprises in other areas. The residents Robert Kelley Schneiders is an instructor of history at of Niobrara, Nebraska, and Pollock, South Da­ Texas Tech University. His fields of specialization are kota, moved their homes and businesses after agricultural history and rural studies, emphasizing US two Pick-Sloan dams flooded the towns. environmental history. Indians in and Nebraska were affected by the inundation of their reserva­ tion lands-all of the Missouri Valley bottom­ [GPQ 17 (Summer/Fall 1997): 237-491 lands located on the Crow Creek, Lower Brule,

237 238 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER/FALL 1997

Missouri Ri~~T Division

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I , __ _ mI'. " -__--- Missouri River Basin Fio. 1. Indian reservations along the main-stem of the Missouri River in northeast Nebraska. South Dakota. and North Dakota. Note the location of the reservations in relation to the Pick-Sloan dams and . The Corps of Engineers. in cooperation with political representatives from the Missouri Basin. designed and built the dams to maximize reservoir storage capacity while sparing major urban centers from inundation. Large reservoirs in turn guaranteed the legislative success of the dam-building program. Author's adaptation of a map provided by the Missouri River Division. US' Army Corps of Engineers. Omaha. Nebraska.

Cheyenne River , Standing , and reservoirs of the Pick-Sloan Plan? Were the Fort Berthold reservations. Indians on these inundations of Indian land the inevitable re­ reservations, and on the Yankton, Rosebud, sult of a decision-making process that objec­ and Santee reservations, lost a total of 353,313 tively chose the best sites for dams and acres for reservoir .3 In addition, reservoirs on the Missouri River? Furthermore, the Indian towns of Fort Thompson (Crow why were Pick-Sloan's Missouri River dams Creek Reservation), Lower Brule (Lower Brule and reservoirs designed and constructed at Reservation), River Agency (Chey­ locations that were so disadvantageous to In­ enne River Sioux Reservation), and nine towns dian interests? Why were the reservoir water on the Fort Berthold Reservation were inun­ storage levels behind each dam so high that dated. Approximately 3538 Indians were large Indian populations had to relocate above forced to relocate from the valley lands to the the valley floor? In order to answer these ques­ uplands or to off-reservation towns.4 Another tions, I begin with an examination of the ori­ 6900 Indians were affected in varying degrees gins of the Pick-Sloan Plan then detail the of severity.s various factors that determined the location This article addresses a series of related of Pick-Sloan's Missouri River dams. I con­ questions. First, why did the Indians lose so clude by arguing that the sites of the Pick­ much land and so many communities to the Sloan Plan dams were chosen primarily for FLOODING THE MISSOURI VALLEY 239 political reasons rather than because of geo­ (, North Dakota, South Dakota, logical or considerations. ) had endured a decade of and hardship in the 1930s and viewed im­ ORIGINS OF THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN pounded Missouri River water as a resource for averting future economic downturns and The Pick-Sloan Plan emerged out of the agricultural disasters. These states hoped to efforts of individuals and organizations solve their economic problems, stop out-mi­ throughout the Missouri River Basin who gration, and prevent the hardships that the sought river development. The most impor­ unpredictable weather patterns of the Great tant of these was the Missouri River States Plains had had on their economies.8 Committee, formed in the early 1940s to pro­ Upper Missouri River Basin residents hoped mote a comprehensive development scheme to develop the Missouri River for , for the Missouri River. Pick-Sloan was largely hydroelectric power, and navigation. Aware the creation of the Missouri River States Com­ of the multiple economic problems in the Mis­ mittee, which brought together numerous in­ souri River Basin, Clifford Stone of , terest groups that favored Missouri River a lawyer and judge who had been instrumental development and enabled them to coordinate in water resource development in his home their efforts. The organization's power state and who had organized an interstate co­ stemmed from its ability to lobby the public ordinating committee to develop the Colo­ and Congress.6 rado River, advised the governors of the In the fifty years before 1940, small towns Missouri Basin to meet and coordinate their and counties throughout the Dakotas had pro­ goals for river development.9 Stone believed moted small, localized river development that a unified basin lobbying group would be schemes. For instance, business and political effective in securing project funds from the organizations in Mobridge, South Dakota, had US Congress. lO sought a dam on the Missouri River to their In December 1941, one week after the west since the early 1920s. , South bombing of Pearl Harbor and America's entry Dakota, boosters had wanted a hydroelectric into World War II, representatives from the facility at the Big Bend of the Missouri since Bureau of Reclamation, Army Corps of Engi­ the 1910s. And members of the Lower Brule neers, business interests in the upper basin, and Tribe had lobbied the Bureau of Indian Af­ representatives from the states of fairs and the Department of Interior for the South Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming, Mon­ construction of a dam or power plant on reser­ tana, and Nebraska met in Bismarck, North vation land at Big Bend in the 1930s. All of Dakota, to discuss and coordinate their plans for these early promotional efforts came to naught, Missouri River development. This meeting re­ as no one river project garnered enough state­ sulted in the formation of the Missouri River wide political or financial support, and such States Committee (MRSC). Over the next federal officials as those in the Army Corps of several years, this committee became influen­ Engineers who viewed dams as a threat to navi­ tial in pushing for a comprehensive, basin­ gation below Sioux City opposed Missouri wide program for the Missouri River.l1 River development in the Dakotas prior to In July 1942 the MRSC held its first meet­ the 1940s.7 ing in Billings, Montana, and agreed to seek Beginning in the early forties, Missouri the participation of the other basin states in a River development efforts expanded. Major permanent organization. By 21 1943 the cities and states within the Missouri River Ba­ MRSC had added , Missouri, and , sin began to organize to promote a program of for a total of eight members.12 This broader interstate or federal development of the river. coalition of the Missouri River Basin's politi­ The states of the upper Missouri River Basin cal and economic interests, however, did not 240 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER/FALL 1997

Plan. Under his direction the MRSC con­ ducted a massive public relations drive throughout the basin to garner public support for dams, channelization works, and along the Missouri River. Cities all along the valley, including Williston, Bismarck, Pierre, Chamberlain, Yankton, Sioux City, Omaha, and Kansas City, hosted public forums during 1942, 1943, and 1944, but no forums were ever held in any of the Indian communities along the Missouri River.J5 Why were the Indians of the Dakotas not represented on the MRSC and why were pro­ motional meetings only held in off-reserva­ tion towns and cities? First, the Indian population on the reservations could not af­ the and irrigation water provided by any proposed project, so it did not FIG. 2. Merrill Q. Sharpe, c. 1942. Courtesy of Missouri River Division, US Army Corps of make sense to the MRSC members to visit the Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska. reservations promoting products tribes could not buy. Second, the members of the MRSC conducted the meetings in the cities and towns that would provide the tax revenue for project construction. Since the reservation popula­ tion could not contribute to financing the represent the Indians living on reservations project, they did not, from the committee's adjacent to the Missouri Ri~er in Nebraska point of view, need to be convinced of the and the Dakotas. According to Robert Hipple, project's benefits. Finally, members of the editor of the Pierre Capital Journal, a member MRSC, and off-reservation population in gen­ of the MRSC's successor Missouri Basin Inter­ eral, believed lands were agency Committee, and a congressional lob­ underutilized. They believed that reservation byist for Missouri River development, the fully land was more beneficial to society at large constituted MRSC did not have one Indian and the Indians themselves if it was used for representative. As a matter of fact, the MRSC river control works than if it was left to the did not seek to include the Indians of the Mis­ management decisions of the Indian popula­ souri Valley within the organization.B On the tion and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 16 remote reservations of the upper Missouri At the MRSC-sponsored public forums, River, the Indian population had little or no Army engineers and Bureau of Reclamation idea that plans and policies were being formu­ field agents explained how the river would lated that would dramatically affect their lives. actually be engineered to meet society's de­ In 1943, the MRSC appointed South Da­ mands. Business people and politicians ex­ kota Merrill Q. Sharpe (Fig. 2) as plained the economic benefits of harnessing the committee's chairperson. Sharpe was a the water of the river. The public relations native of Kennebec, South Dakota, and had strategy was successful. There was no orga­ been involved in Missouri River development nized off-reservation opposition within the schemes since the early 1930s.14 Governor basin to controlling the Missouri River and Sharpe would playa crucial role in the politi­ using its to stabilize and promote the cal compromises that created the Pick-Sloan basin's economyY FLOODING THE MISSOURI VALLEY 241

In the early forties opposition to a basin­ of Kansas City, Missouri, sustained heavy dam­ wide approach to controlling the Missouri age from the waters. The dis­ River arose over the specifics of river develop­ rupted rail and river traffic along the Missouri ment, not development itself. In 1943 and and rivers during the wartime emer­ 1944, interest groups haggled over the types gency. High water also caused damage in lower of dams and reservoirs to be built. Later in the states. The floods gave ur­ decade, as several dams of the Pick-Sloan Plan gency to the demands for Missouri River de­ neared completion, the debate centered on velopment and prompted Congress, with the what organizations or governmental entities support of lower basin congressional represen­ would administer the completed works. Dif­ tatives, to order the Army Corps of Engineers ferent economic and political interests wanted to submit a plan to prevent future flooding. different aspects of the river development plan The Corps responded with the Pick Plan, stressed over others.18 named for its author, Colonel Lewis Pick, the Farmers, business people, and politicians Army Corps of Engineers, Missouri River Di­ from the upper basin (Montana, North Dakota, vision, Engineer Y South Dakota, and Wyoming) represented by Under the Pick Plan, the Corps proposed the National Reclamation Association, South building dams at Garrison in North Dakota, Dakota Reclamation Association, Montana and Oahe (Pierre), Fort Randall (Lake Andes), Stockgrowers Association and a number of and Gavin's Point (Yankton) in South Da­ chambers of commerce wanted dams that met kota.22 These four dams would fulfill lower their needs for irrigation and hydroelectric basin demands for and naviga­ power. Lower basin residents from Kansas, Mis­ tion and provide incidental irrigation and souri, Iowa, and Nebraska, led by the Kansas hydroelectric power benefits.23 The "Compre­ City Chamber of Commerce, Mississippi Val­ hensive Report on Missouri River Develop­ ley Association, and the National Rivers and ment," an Army Corps of Engineers policy Harbors Congress, wanted a plan that pro­ paper, stated that for the Pick dams, "Exclu­ tected their cities from devastating floods, sive power storage would not be provided but opened them to deep-draft traffic, and power would be generated with water released provided them with cheap power. The goals for navigation and sanitation purposes."24 The of the upper and lower basin did not coin­ Corps made it clear that upper basin demands cide. If the upper basin irrigationists received for irrigation water would be secondary to the water they wanted for their crops, com­ lower basin demands for navigation. mercial interests in the lower basin believed The Pick Plan also called for the con­ they would have to abandon their navigation struction of low, re-regulating dams below the channel. Both upper basin and lower basin big dams to eliminate destructive surges when residents understood that water required to the big dams released large amounts of water. sustain a six-foot or possibly nine-foot naviga­ Re-regulation prevented high water from erod­ tion channel from Sioux City to St. Louis for ing river banks, disrupting downstream navi­ eight months a year would lower the proposed gation, and disturbing municipal water upstream reservoirs and siphon off water re­ supplies. According to the Army Corps of quired for irrigation. No one in the MRSC Engineers "Comprehensive Report," these re­ had an. immediate solution to this conflict of regulating dams would "Be constructed a short interest.19 distance downstream of each major dam, suf­ Devastating floods in 1943 exacerbated the ficiently high to create poundage to permit debate over river development. Three succes­ releases from the lower dam at a uniform sive floods from April through June ravaged rate."25 Re-regulating dams were to be built towns and farms throughout the valley.20 below the Garrison, Oahe, and Fort Randall Omaha, Nebraska, and the bottomlands east dams. The Army Corps of Engineers had not 242 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER/FALL 1997 chosen a definite site for a re-regulating dam the nation of the multiple benefits to la­ below Garrison, but the re-regulating dam for bor, , business, postwar adjust­ Fort Randall would be at Gavin's Point, near ment, and other national objectives which Yankton, and for Oahe at the Big Bend of the require that the project get started now ...27 Missouri. The Pick Plan split the Missouri River Assurances of goodwill by the Army Corps States Committee along regional lines. Prior of Engineers and Sharpe to build more storage to the plan's submission to Congress, the Army into their Pick Plan were not enough to con­ Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Rec­ vince the Bureau of Reclamation and upper lamation had maintained a functional work­ basin irrigationists that their interests would ing relationship. The Pick Plan's public be satisfied. In May 1944 the Bureau of Rec­ disclosure in 1944 destroyed that lamation responded with its own plan, which alliance and pitted the Reclamation Bureau emphasized irrigation and hydroelectric and its upper basin constituency against the power. This plan, known as the Sloan Plan Corps and its lower basin supporters. MRSC after its author, William G. Sloan, a Bureau Chairperson Merrill Q. Sharpe favored the of Reclamation field agent stationed in Bill­ Pick Plan because it was the first compre­ ings, Montana, called for the construction of hensive dam building program for the Mis­ dams on the main-stem of the Missouri River souri River ever submitted to Congress.26 at Oahe (Pierre), Big Bend (30 miles north of Although the plan favored navigation inter­ Chamberlain), and Fort Randall (Lake Andes). ests over irrigation, Sharpe considered it the The dams at Oahe and Fort Randall were to best available and realized that South Dakota provide the necessary water storage to irrigate would benefit substantially from its imple­ land in both North and South Dakota. The mentation. bulk of the land Sloan hoped to irrigate was Sharpe sought to gain the support of the located in eastern South Dakota in the James upper basin states for the Pick Plan. During River Valley. The hydroelectricity produced congressional hearings on 16-17 February by the three dams would pump stored water 1944, Sharpe urged cooperation between the for irrigation while surplus electricity could various basin interests, presenting an insight­ be sold to recover the costs of the projects.28 ful analysis of the problems and potentials of The submission of the Sloan Plan led Sharpe river development. He noted that the con­ on a frantic effort to mend the split between flict between the irrigation and navigation the upper and lower basin states and between interests was predicated on a perceived short­ the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army age of water and could be resolved through Corps of Engineers in order to save a com­ the construction of dams that could hold back prehensive, basin-wide development plan fi­ enough water for both lower and upper basin nanced by the federal government. On needs. As he summed it up, "I think a com­ 5 August 1944 Sharpe called the MRSC to plete answer for many years to come is found Omaha, Nebraska, where upper and lower ba­ in the single word 'storage'." Sharpe concluded sin interests recognized the folly of attempt­ by warning that if sufficient storage did not ing to develop the Missouri River without solve the conflict, then the entire develop­ each other's cooperation. If the two factions ment plan would be threatened. went their own separate ways, the develop­ ment plan would be jeop~rdized by the result­ It seems to me that such a result [increasing ant political and legal infighting. Congress reservoir water storage capacity] should be would not authorize the construction of two reached rather than letting any conflict of programs in direct conflict with one another, interests bring the matter to an impasse so the upper basin states and the Bureau of which will deprive the Missouri Valley and Reclamation joined with the lower basin states FLOODING THE MISSOURI VALLEY 243 and the Army Corps of Engineers to create a sites had to be chosen for the construction of revised river development plan that met the the dams. Second, the dams and reservoirs needs of all interested groupS.29 had to be designed in minute detail to insure At the Omaha meeting the MRSC passed a that basin interests received the promised ben­ resolution that satisfied the demands of upper efits. And third, the weather had to cooperate basin interests and made the Pick-Sloan com­ by producing enough rainfall to fill the reser­ promise possible. Point five of the resolution voirs. The first two hurdles could be overcome stated, with the proper application of science and , but no one controlled the weather, That authorization of the Bureau of Recla­ and this worried everyone. If the did not mation plan now before Congress ... is fall and drain into the Missouri Valley to be necessary to a comprehensive development stored behind the dams, the political compro­ of the Missouri River .... We ask the Presi­ mise that had created the Pick-Sloan Plan dent and the Congress of the United States would crumble. to authorize and direct the United States Site selection was dependent upon geology, Army Engineers and the United States Bu­ cost-effectiveness, demographics, and politi­ reau of Reclamation to bring before Con­ cal considerations. The geological character gress a coordinated plan ...30 of the Missouri Valley limited the of pos­ sible sites to the upper basin. From Fort Peck The MRSC then distributed this resolution Dam in Montana to Yankton, South Dakota, throughout the executive and legislative the Missouri Valley is only one to five miles branches of the federal government. The suc­ wide, but below Yankton, the valley widens cess of the compromise was contingent upon dramatically, becoming an alluvial flood plain the site selection and design of multiple-pur­ five to seventeen miles across, through which pose dams. The dams proposed by the Bureau the river great distances. Dams in of Reclamation in the Sloan Plan and by the the lower valley would be exorbitantly expen­ Army Corps of Engineers in the Pick Plan were sive because they required great amounts of designed almost exclusively for their particu­ earth fill, and they would be unsafe because lar constituencies. If the compromise were to subsurface mineral deposits are less stable over work and the off-reservation interest groups long stretches. Thus, the dam engineers fo­ of the entire basin were to avoid legal hag­ cused their attention on the Missouri in North gling over the river's water, the plans of the and South Dakota where the valley is narrow Army Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Rec­ and relatively stable subsurface minerals ex­ lamation had to be altered, new dam sites cho­ ist.32 sen, each previously proposed dam redesigned, The Missouri Valley in South Dakota is and reservoir water storage capacities in­ underlain with deposits of and creased. Only these alterations would insure Niobrara chalk. Engineers deemed both of continued congressional support for the de­ these subsurface minerals suitable for the velopment of the Missouri. All parties in­ placement of large earth-fill dams, but the volved realized that disunity among the basin depth of these minerals affected the cost of states would threaten congressional appropria­ the dams. Since the dams had to be attached tions for the projects.3l to the chalk or shale, digging down to deeper deposits would be more costly.33 Another geo­ LOCATING THE DAMS logical consideration was the relation of the sites to of the Missouri River. The A number of hurdles had to be overcome dams needed to capture all, or most, of the for the multiple-purpose dam concept to be water entering the valley, because if a major successful in the Missouri Valley. First, proper 's water were not captured its flood 244 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER/FALL 1997

FIG. 3. Portions of the original Indian community of Lower Brule. Courtesy of the Missouri River Division, US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska.

waters could wreak havoc on downstream ur­ afford to construct these facilities at the site, ban centers and agricultural lands and possi­ so dams near cities or towns were preferable.36 bly disrupt navigation.34 Engineers also considered the difficulty and Non-geological factors also affected the cost of acquiring the lands needed for dam cost-effectiveness of the dam sites. Engineers sites and reservoirs as well as the cost of relo­ had to consider the proximity of sites to avail­ cating valley residents. Purchasing prime ag­ able transportation facilities, since large pieces riculturalland, or expensive urban real estate, of machinery and equipment would have to would have increased the overall cost of a be brought in by railroad and highway. For a dam's constructionj therefore, "underutilized" site distant from a railhead or highway, the or cheap, "low quality" Indian land was pref­ cost of constructing a would have to be erable.37 Furthermore, moving a large off-res­ added to the cost of the dam itself.35 ervation urban population-and railroad The dams also had to be close to towns, , sewer facilities, buildings, and other housing, , and recreational facilities, property-would cost far more than moving as construction personnel needed food, cloth­ residents of Indian reservations whose worldly ing, shelter, medical care, and some place to possessions and homes had less market value. spend their spare time. The Corps could not Since power was to be one of the products of FLOODING THE MISSOURI VALLEY 245

FIG. 4. The relocated Indian community of Lower Brule, . The abandoned town can be seen in the background. Courtesy of the Missouri River Division, US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska.

the dam, transmission lines carrying the hy­ given to the existence of cities which might droelectric power from the site to the avail­ be wholly or partially inundated by these able market needed to be as short as possible. reservoirs, and the railroads and highways The biggest influence on site selection for in the reservoir areas. the dams of Pick-Sloan, however, was the re­ Larger cities in this category are Chamber­ lation of the dams to off-reservation urban lain, Pierre, and Mobridge in South Da­ centers in the Dakotas. Each dam and reser­ kota, and Bismarck and Williston in North voir had to spare the large urban centers while Dakota. Accordingly, the sites described providing the reservoir storage capacity to in this report have been selected at such meet the water demands of basin interest distances downstream from these cities that groups. The importance of the population sufficient storage [in the reservoirs] will be centers to the site selection process was ex­ provided without undue flooding of expen­ plicitly stated in the 1944-45 "Comprehen­ sive real estate.... Thus the height to sive Report on Missouri River Development": which Fort Randall Dam can be built is limited by Chamberlain and the railroad In determining the location of the multiple­ and highway crossings in that vicinity, purpose reservoirs, consideration must be while the proximity of the city of Pierre, 246 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER/FALL 1997

FIG. 5. Fort Randall Dam, c. 1950. In this photo, the embankment of the dam rises above the valley floor. After massive Euclid dump trucks deposited earth on the surface of the embankment, bulldozers and rollers compacted the material. The Corps of Engineers and the Missouri River States Committee limited the height of Fort Randall Dam to prevent excessive water damage to the town of Chamberlain, but these organizations did not reduce the dam's height to spare the Indian community of Fort Thompson, approximately 30 miles north, northwest of Chamberlain. Courtesy of the Missouri River Division, US Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska.

S. Dakota, to the upper reaches of the Fort By 1944 the Corps, the Bureau of Randall Reservoir precludes any further Reclamation, and the MRSC had come to an consideration for dams below Pierre. agreement on the selection of dam sites on the Missouri River. There were to be five The report continued, dams on the main-stem of the river. Four dams, Oahe, Big Bend, Fort Randall, and One of the reasons for selecting the Garri­ Gavin's Point, were to be built in South Da­ son site was that it is above Bismarck .... kota. The fifth, Garrison, was to be located in The storage limit for Garrison reservoir was North Dakota. Engineers and politicians chose dictated by damages imposed at and in the these dam sites because of their cost-effec­ vicinity of Williston, near the Montana tiveness and topographical attributes. Most border.38 importantly, the five dams of the Pick-Sloan FLOODING THE MISSOURI VALLEY 247

FIG. 6. Fort Randall Dam and . c. 1965. The Corps of Engineers began storing water behind Fort Randall Dam in 1952. Within a few months. Fort Randall Reservoir stretched twenty-five miles upstream. By the fall of 1954. the reservoir (later named in honor of South Dakota Senator Francis Case) approached its maximum level. inundating vast tracks of valley bottomland on the Crow Creek and Lower Brule Indian reservations. Courtesy of the Missouri River Division. US Army Corps of Engineers. Omaha. Nebraska.

Plan would minimize damage to off-reserva­ Sloan's dams that off-reservation cities re­ tion urban centers in the Dakotas while still ceived. The Corps, the Bureau of Reclama­ providing the reservoir storage capacity to sat­ tion, and the MRSC were unwilling to change isfy off-reservation demands for flood control, the sites of Pick-Sloan's dams or alter their navigation, hydroelectricity, and irrigation. reservoir storage capacities to spare Indian valley lands or towns. The reason was simple­ SACRIFICING INDIAN LANDS any reduction in reservoir storage capacity to take into consideration Indian interests would Indian lands and towns located along the mean a reduction in the cost-to-benefit ratio Missouri River in the Dakotas and Nebraska of the project. An unfavorable cost-to-ben­ did not receive the same degree of consider­ efit ratio increased the likelihood that Con­ ation in the site selection and design of Pick- gress would not fund the project. Moreover, if 248 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER/FALL 1997

Indian interests in preserving their lands from 2. US Army Corps of Engineers, Missouri River inundation, or in developing the Missouri Division, Master Water Control Manual, Missouri River, Review and Update, Draft Environmental Im­ River for their own needs and wants, had been pact Statement (Omaha: US Army Corps of Engi­ considered by the MRSC, Corps, and Bureau neers, Missouri River Division, 1994), pp. 3-5. of Reclamation, off-reservation interests would 3. Department of the Interior, Bureau of In­ have received fewer benefits from the dam dian Affairs [BIA], Missouri River Basin Investiga­ projects and this in turn would have threat­ tions Project Report Number 138, Damage to Indians of Five Reservations from Three Missouri River Reser­ ened the implementation of the Pick-Sloan voirs in North and South Dakota (Billings: BIA, Plan. A reduction in benefits to off-reserva­ 1954), p. 35. tion interests might have led to the withdrawal 4. Ibid., p. 49; Department of the Interior, BIA, of congressional support for the plan. Missouri River Basin Investigations Project Report Excluded from the planning process, the Number 165, Damage to Indians on the Crow Creek and Lower Brule Reservations from the Indians of North and South Dakota discov­ and Reservoir Project (Billings: BIA, 1960), p. 4. ered that much of their land had been sacri­ 5. BIA, Report 138 (note 3 above), p. 6. ficed to the Pick-Sloan dams in order to make 6. Readers interested in the various organiza­ the plan a reality. Without the reservoir water tions involved in Missouri River development storage provided by the Indian reservation bot­ should examine the excellent collection of papers located at the Herman T. Pott National Inland tomlands, the Pick-Sloan compromise would Waterways Library, St. Louis Mercantile Library, not have been possible. Maximizing reservoir 510 Locust Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63188. water storage capacity was the key to the com­ 7. Robert K. Schneiders, "To Dam the Missouri promise and only Indian lands could provide River: A History of Big Bend Dam and the Lakota the water storage space. None of the planners Indians," (master's thesis, Iowa State University, 1993), p. 44. recognized that the bottom lands were of irre­ 8. "Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Plan," Proceed­ placeable economic value to the Indians, who ings of a Conference held in Des Moines, Iowa 10-11 could hunt and grow traditional crops on lands August 1983, by the Missouri Basin States Associa­ that were "useless" only from the point of view tion (Omaha: Missouri Basin States Association, of technologically dependent commercial ag­ 1983), p. iii. 9. M.Q. Sharpe, "History of the Missouri River riculture. Without the Indian bottomlands, States Committee," in South Dakota Historical Col­ dams and reservoirs on the main-stem of the lections, Vol. 22 (Madison [South Dakota) Daily Missouri would not have been as cost effec­ Leader, 1946), p. 402. tive for non-reservation populations, which 10. Sioux Falls , 23 May 1954; "Pick­ in turn would have threatened their sources of Sloan Missouri Basin Plan," Proceedings (note 8 above), pp. 10-11. congressional funding. Engineering consider­ 11. Sharpe, "History" (note 9 above), p. 400. ations were a factor in the site selection and 12. Ibid., p. 404. design of Pick-Sloan dams, but political con­ 13. Robert Hipple, interview by author, 20 May siderations, especially a concern for maintain­ 1992, tape recording, Pierre, South Dakota. ing the Pick-Sloan compromise and sparing 14. Sharpe, "History" (note 9 above), p. 405. 15. Hipple interview (note 13 above). off-reservation urban centers, were the pri­ 16. Missouri Basin Inter-Agency Committee and mary reasons the dams and reservoirs were the Missouri River States Committee, The Mis­ designed to be so high and built at locations so souri River Basin Development Program (Washing­ disadvantageous to Indian interests. ton, D.C.: GPO, 1952), pp. 26-29; Department of the Interior, BIA, Missouri River Basin Investiga­ NOTES tions Project Report Number 22, Harnessing the Big Muddy, Report prepared by Frances S. Cushman 1. Department of the Army, US Army Corps of and Gordon Macgregor (Haskell Institute, Kansas: Engineers, The Federal Engineer: Damsites to Missile Bureau ofIndian Affairs, 1948), pp. 156, 157; De­ Sites, A History of the Omaha District, US Army partment of the Interior, BIA, Missouri River Basin Corps of Engineers (, DC: GPO, 1985), Investigations Project Report, Summary of Indian In­ pp. 107, 135. terests in Missouri River Basin Projects in Central FLOODING THE MISSOURI V ALLEY 249

South Dakota: Possible Effects of the Fort Randall 24. Department of the Army, US Army Corps of Project, the Big Bend Project, and South Dakota Pump­ Engineers, Omaha District, "Comprehensive Re­ ing Units on the Crow Creek Reservation, the Lower on Missouri River Development, Appendix Brule Reservation, the Rosebud Reservation, and the VIII, Plan of Improvement," (unpublished manu­ Yankton Reservation (Billings: BIA, 1947), p. 2. script, Omaha: US Army Corps of Engineers, n.d. 17. Hipple interview (note 13 above), Sioux City [c. 1944-45]), p. 4. Journal, 24 August 1943. 25. Ibid., p. 20. 18. Sharpe, "History" (note 9 above), p. 407. 26. Hipple interview (note 13 above); Congress, 19. Congress, House, Committee on Flood Con­ "Statement of M.Q. Sharpe" (note 19 above), p. 3. trol, "Statement of M.Q. Sharpe, Governor of 27. Congress, "Statement ofM.Q. Sharpe" (note South Dakota," Hearing before the Committee on 19 above), pp. 9, 11. Flood Control, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 16-17 Febru­ 28. Hart, Dark Missouri (note 23 above), pp. 127, ary 1944, p. 9; Gerald P. Nye, "What Congressmen 125. Say," in The Future Development of the Missouri 29. "Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Plan," Proceed­ River Valley, A Report on the Program and Activities ings (note 8 above), p. 12. of the Missouri River States Committee, (: 30. Ibid., p. 13. The Council of State , 1944), p. 12. 31. Congress, "Statement ofM.Q. Sharpe" (note 20. Michael L. Lawson, Dammed Indians: The 19 above), p. 11. Pick-Sloan Plan and the Missouri River Sioux 1944- 32. Corps of Engineers, "Comprehensive Report" 1980 (Norman: University of Press, (note 24 above), Appendix VIII, p. 16. 1982), p. 9. 33. Department of the Army, US Army Corps of 21. "Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Plan," Proceed­ Engineers, US Army Engineer District, Omaha, Mis­ ings (note 8 above), p. x; Congress, "Statement of souri River, Big Bend Reservoir, South Dakota, Design M.Q. Sharpe" (note 19 above), p. 3; Department Memorandum Number MB-1, Site Selection (Omaha: of the Army, Damsites to Missile Sites (note 1 above), US Army Corps of Engineers, 1957), pp. 4-7. p. 75; Charles B. Hoeven, "What Congressmen 34. Corps of Engineers, "Comprehensive Report" Say," in The Future Development of the Missouri (note 24 above), Appendix VIII, p. 15. River Valley (note 19 above), p. 29. 35. Corps of Engineers, Design Memorandum 22. Department of the Army, Damsites to Missile Number MB-1 (note 33 above), pp. 4-8. Sites (note 1 above), p. 76. 36. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 23. Hipple interview (note 13 above); Henty 37. Corps of Engineers, "Comprehensive Report" Hart, The Dark Missouri (Madison: University of (note 24 above), Appendix VIII, p. 17. Press, 1957), pp. 121-25. 38. Ibid., p. 17