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- , ICTR CRIMIN.AL REGISTRY RECEIVED UNITED NATIONS NATIONSUNIES International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Tribunal penal international pour Ie Rwanda THE PROSECUTOR AGAINST FERDINAND NAHIMANA AMENDED INDICTMENT The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, pursuant to the authority stipulated in Article 17 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the Statute of the Tribunal) charges: FERDINAND NAHIMANA with CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT GENOCIDE, GENOCIDE, DIRECT AND PUBLIC INCITEMENT TO COMMIT GENOCIDE, COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, all offences stipulated in Articles 2, and 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal, and as set forth below: PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/551a5f/ ./ 1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 1.1 The revolution of 1959 marked the beginning of a period of ethnic clashes between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Rwanda, causing hundreds of Tutsis to die and thousands more to flee the country in the years immediately following. The revolution resulted in the abolition of the Tutsi monarchy and the proclamation of the First Republic in early 1961, confirmed in a referendum held in the same year. Legislative elections held in September 1961 confirmed the dominant position of the MDR-P ARMEHUTU (Mouvement Democratique Republicain - Parti du Mouvement d'Emancipation Hutu), led by Gregoire Kayibanda, who was subsequently elected President of the Republic by the Legislative Assembly on 26 October 1961. 1.2 The early years of the First Republic, which were under the domination of the Hutus of central and southern Rwanda, were again marked by ethnic violence. The victims were predominantly Tutsi, the former ruling elite, and those related to them, who were killed, driven to other regions of Rwanda or forced to flee the country. The gradual elimination of the opposition parties in those early years confirmed the MDR-PARMEHUTU as the single party, the only party to present candidates in the elections of 1965. 1.3 The early part of 1973 in Rwanda was again marked by ethnic confrontations between the Hutus and Tutsis, prompting another exodus of the Tutsi minority from the country, as had occurred between 1959 and 1963. This new outburst of ethnic and political tension between the North and South resulted in a military coup by General Juvenal Habyarimana on 5 July 1973, shifting power from civilian to military hands and from the Hutus of central Rwanda to Hutus of the northern prefectures of Gisenyi (Habyarimana's native region) and Ruhengeri. 1.4 In 1975, President Habyarimana founded the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour Ie Developpement(MRND), a single PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/551a5f/ party, and assumed the position of party chairman. The administrative and party hierarchies were indistinguishable in this single party state from the level of the Preietto the bourgmestres, and down to that of the conseiIlers de secteur and responsables de cellule. 1.5 From 1973 to 1994, the government of President Habyarimana used a system of ethnic and regional quotas which was supposed to provide educational and employment opportunities for all but which was used increasingly to discriminate against both Tutsis and Hutus from regions outside the northwest. In fact, by the late 1980s, persons from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri occupied many of the most important positions in the military, political, economic and administrative sectors of Rwandan society. Among the privileged elite, an inner circle of relatives and close associates of President Habyarimana and his wife, Agathe Kanziga, known as the Akazu, enjoyed great power. This select group, almost exclusively Hutu, was supplemented by individuals who shared its extremist Hutu ideology, and who came mainly from the native region of the President and his wife. 1.6 In 1990, the President of the Republic, Juvenal Habyarimana, and his party, the MRND, were facing mounting opposition from, among others, Hutus. 1.7 On 1 October 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), made up mainly of Tutsi refugees, attacked Rwanda. Within days the government began arresting thousands of people, presumed to be opponents of Habyarimana and suspected of being RPF accomplices. Although the Tutsi were the main target, Hutu political opponents were also arrested. 1.8 Following pressure from the internal opposition and the international community, and the RPF attack of 1 October 1990, President Habyarimana permitted the introduction of multiple political parties and the adoption of a new constitution on 10 June 1991. The Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour Ie Developpement (MRND) was renamed Mouvement Repub1icain National pour la Democratie et Ie Developpement (MRND). The first transitional government was made up almost exclusively of MRND members, 3 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/551a5f/ following the refusal of the main opposition parties to take part. With the second transitional government in April 1992, the MRNO became a minority party for the first time in its history, with 9 ministerial portfolios out of 19. On the other hand, the MRNO retained its domination over the local administration. 1.9 The new government then entered into negotiations with the RPF, which resulted in the signing of the Arusha Accords on 4 August 1993. The Accords provided for a new system of sharing military and civilian power between the RPF, the opposition parties and the MRNO. 1.10 By the terms of the Arusha Accords, which provided for the integration of both sides' armed forces, the new national army was to be limited to 13,000 men, 60% FAR (Forces Al111ees Rwandaises) and 40% RPF. The posts of command were to be shared equally (50%- 50%) between the two sides, with the post of Chief of Staff of the Army aSSigned to the FAR. The Gendarmerie was to be limited to 6,000 men, 60% FAR and 40% RPF, with the posts of command shared equally (50%-50%) between the two sides and the post of Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie assigned to the RPF. 1.11 As regards representation within the government, the Arusha Accords limited the number of ministerial portfolios to be held by the MRNO to five, plus the Presidency. The other portfolios were to be shared as follows: RPF, five; MOR (Mouvement Democratique Republicain), four (including the post of Prime Minister); PSO (Parti Sodal-Democrate), three; PL (Paro Libera!), three; and the POC (Parti Democrate-Chretien), one. 1.12 In addition, the parties to the Arusha Accords agreed to reject and fight any political ideology based on ethnic differences. Thus, the political forces that were to participate in the transitional institutions agreed to abstain from all sorts of violence and inciting violence by written or verbal communication, or by any other means, and to fight all political ideologies aimed at fostering any form of ethnic discrimination. 4 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/551a5f/ 1.13 For the men and women close to President Habyarimana, including the members of the Akazu, who held positions of prominence in the various sectors of Rwandan society, this new power-sharing plan, as demanded by the political opposition and as stipulated in the Arusha Accords, meant a relinquishment of power and the loss of numerous privileges and benefits. At the same time, many of the military were facing massive demobilisation with the implementation of the Arusha Accords. Lastly, the constitutional statute of the Accords jeopardized the existence of the media which advocated an ideology of ethnic division. 1.14 From 1990, Habyarimana and several of his close associates devised a strategy of inciting hatred and fear of the Tutsi minority as a way of rebuilding solidarity among Hutu and keeping themselves in power. They strongly opposed any form of power sharing, including that envisaged by the Arusha Accords. 1.15 Determined to avoid the power sharing prescribed by the Arusha Accords, several prominent civilian and military figures pursued their strategy of ethnic division and incitement to violence. They targeted and labelled as RPF accomplices the entire Tutsi population, and also Hutus opposed to their domination, particularly those from regions other than northwestern Rwanda. At the same time, they sought to divide Hutu opposition parties, attracting some of their members back to the support of Habyarimana. These efforts to divide the Hutu opposition were favored by the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, a democratically elected Hutu President in neighboring Burundi, by Tutsi soldiers of the Burundi army. By late 1993, two of the three major parties opposed to the MRND had each split into two factions. The faction of each known as the "Power" faction aligned itself with the MRND. 1.16 The strategy adopted in the early 1990s, which culminated in the widespread massacres of April 1994, comprised several components, which were carefully worked out by the various prominent figures who shared the extremist Hutu ideology, including the members of 5 PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/551a5f/ the Akazu. Added to the incitement to ethnic violence and extermination of the Tutsis and their accom.plices was the organization and military training of the youth wings of the political parties, notably the Interahamwe (youth wing of the MRND), the preparation and broadcasting of lists of people to be eliminated, the distribution of weapons to civilians, the assassination of certain political opponents and the massacre of many Tutsis in various parts of Rwanda between October 1990 and April 1994. 1.17 The incitement of ethnic hatred took the form of public speeches by people sharing the extremist ideology. These political and military figures publicly appealed to hatred and fear of the Tutsis and urged the Hutu majority to finish off the enemy and its accomplices. A perfect illustration is the speech made in November 1992 by Leon Mugesera, vice-chairman of the MRND for Gisenyi prefecture, who at the time was already inciting the public to exterminate the Tutsis and their accomplices.
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