NORTHERN UGANDA: UNDERSTANDING

AND SOLVING THE CONFLICT

14 April 2004

ICG Africa Report N°77 Nairobi/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 1 I. INTRODUCTION ...... 4 II. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT ...... 2 A. THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE ...... 2 B. ACHOLI INSURRECTION AND GRIEVANCES ...... 3 C. THE LRA INSURGENCY...... 4 D. LRA OPERATIONS ...... 5 1. Leadership and structure...... 5 2. Tactics...... 5 3. Abductions...... 6 4. The Sudan factor...... 7 5. The spread of the insurgency outside Acholiland...... 7 6. Operational vulnerabilities...... 8 E. THE LRA AND ACHOLI GRIEVANCES...... 9 III. THE FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT ...... 10 A. POLITICAL USES OF THE CONFLICT ...... 10 1. Acholiland...... 10 2. The politics of security and opposition...... 11 3. NRM politics and the military ...... 12 B. THE ARMY’S OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS...... 13 1. From bush army to conventional force...... 13 2. Identifying the operational problems...... 13 3. Corruption and its consequences ...... 16 IV. FINDING SOLUTIONS...... 18 A. A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY ...... 18 1. Creating a negotiation opportunity ...... 18 2. Security sector reform...... 20 3. Humanitarian action...... 22 B. LONG-TERM RECONCILIATION...... 23 C. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS...... 24 1. The Sudan factor...... 24 2. The U.S. initiative...... 25 V. CONCLUSION ...... 27 APPENDICES A. MAP OF UGANDA ...... 28 B. TIMELINE OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA ...... 29 C. GLOSSARY ...... 32 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...... 34 E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS ...... 35 F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS ...... 41

ICG Africa Report N°77 14 April 2004

NORTHERN UGANDA: UNDERSTANDING AND SOLVING THE CONFLICT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For nearly eighteen years the insurgency of the difficult to place within a coherent strategy aimed Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph at achieving an identifiable political outcome, it is Kony, has produced great suffering in Northern also difficult to develop an effective counter Uganda, including some 1.5 million internally strategy. LRA targeting of the Acholi has created a displaced persons (IDPs). UN Under-Secretary- self-perpetuating cycle of loss, resentment and General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland hopelessness that feeds the conflict but also widens recently termed the situation among the worst the gap between the government and local humanitarian disasters in the world. In February populations. 2004, in one of the most horrific atrocities since the conflict began, the LRA massacred approximately President Museveni pursues a military solution in 200 civilians, revealing serious deficiencies in the part to justify the unreformed army that is a key government’s capacity to defend the population and pillar of his regime. Indeed, the war helps him defeat the insurgency. The conflict seriously justify and maintain the status quo in Ugandan blemishes the record of President Yoweri politics, denying his opposition a power base and Museveni’s National Resistance Movement offering numerous opportunities for curtailing (NRM), which has otherwise brought relative freedom of expression and association in the name stability to the country. The international of “the war against terrorism”. As long as the community has leverage and at least strong situation in the North is dominated by security humanitarian reasons to urge a more politically matters, the monopolisation of power and wealth oriented strategy to resolve the conflict. by Southerners is not put into question.

The conflict has four main characteristics. First, it Without the active support of the Acholi, however, is a struggle between the government and the LRA. the government is unlikely ever to defeat the LRA. Secondly, it is between the predominantly Acholi While the political and security configurations of LRA and the wider Acholi population, who bear the conflict need to be changed, Museveni’s the brunt of violence that includes indiscriminate response to international pressure and proposals for killings and the abduction of children to become negotiation such as Washington’s Northern Uganda fighters, auxiliaries, and sex slaves. This violence is Peace Initiative (NUPI) has been sceptical at best. aimed at cowing the Acholi and discrediting the Although the LRA’s desire for genuine dialogue government. Thirdly, it is fuelled by animosity appears minimal, the government has rarely acted between Uganda and Sudan, who support rebellions in good faith when a variety of actors have sought on each other’s territory. Finally, it continues the to promote a settlement. The small likelihood that North-South conflict that has marked Ugandan the LRA will respond to a concerted effort to politics and society since independence. negotiate does not remove the onus from the government to make the attempt. That would signal The LRA insurgency lacks any clear (and to both its opponents and supporters – and to the negotiable) political objective. Its claim to people of Northern Uganda – that it is genuinely represent the grievances of the Acholi people is at pursuing all options. The Khartoum government, odds with its methods. Because LRA actions are Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page ii

the LRA’s only known external supporter, should The role of the international community has been also be drawn into a negotiating strategy. central to the conflict and will be central to achieving a resolution. The government needs to be Most discussion of how to end the conflict centres attentive to the advice of donors, from whom it on the false dichotomy of a military versus a receives approximately half its budget. It has a negotiated solution. Elements of both approaches good record on a number of issues, such as AIDS will be required, along with recognition of the prevention, which disposes the international limitations of each. A purely military solution community positively towards it, but the conflict in could conceivably deal with the immediate the North undoes much of this goodwill. Uganda’s manifestation of Uganda’s northern problem, the friends have an interest and a right to pressure it on LRA, but would make solving the North-South the humanitarian disaster produced by the divide and achieving national reconciliation even continuation of the LRA insurgency. The U.S. more unlikely. The army’s operational deficiencies initiative, however, would have greater promise if in any event make such a solution unlikely. Washington also worked more closely with would- Similarly, there are limitations to negotiations, be European partners. which can be manipulated by the belligerents for battlefield advantage, leading to more violence. RECOMMENDATIONS A main vulnerability of the LRA is that Joseph Kony is central not only to its organisation and To the Government of Uganda: tactics but also to its very purpose. Reported leadership tensions, particularly in a deteriorating 1. Build confidence between the government and military and political environment, may provide an local populations in the North and Northeast opportunity to split the insurgency by isolating or by: removing him. (a) making greater efforts to develop the capacity of local agencies; Another major element of any successful strategy will have to be a genuine effort to address (b) improving and increasing dialogue with Northerners’ grievances. The Acholi must be made Acholi and other community leaders; and to feel more a part of Ugandan society. The NRM (c) transferring unpopular and antagonistic simply has not unified the country after the turmoil officials out of the region. created by colonial policies of ethnic division and decades of armed conflict. Rectifying this will 2. Create a single authoritative team to represent require specific political, economic and social the government in contacts and negotiations initiatives aimed at building the North’s stake in the with the LRA, announce that a ceasefire is central government and enhancing local decision- available as a first step towards comprehensive making. It is in the interest of Acholi leaders to political negotiations if the LRA makes a clear develop mechanisms for articulating the views of gesture, and otherwise lay out objectives and their people, and it is in the interest of Museveni expectations for such initiatives in coordinated and the NRM to promote the emergence of public messages. effective and credible Acholi leaders. 3. Exclude Joseph Kony from application of the Amnesty Act but continue to offer amnesty to There is not yet enough pressure on the LRA to all other LRA commanders in order to develop make a political opening possible. While potential divisions within the leadership, and Museveni’s government should make an honest, improve reintegration incentives and programs unconditional attempt at negotiations, the nature of for amnestied LRA returnees. the LRA is such that creating an environment conducive to negotiations should not mean 4. Prioritise security sector reform by: renunciation of military and political pressure on (a) implementing fully the recommendations the insurgency, including by invoking the help of of the defence review; the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Sudanese government. (b) expanding current investigations into army corruption and prosecuting publicly, independently and transparently all those with cases to answer; and Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page iii

(c) creating an independent body to political and security issues influencing the investigate human rights abuses by army LRA and increase consultation on it with other personnel and cooperating fully with any countries engaged with and in Uganda. investigation pursued by the International Criminal Court (ICC). To Donors: 5. Provide greater protection to civilians and 12. Work with the Ugandan government to IDPs through better focused military develop incentives for LRA commanders and operations, including improved coordination fighters to drop out of the insurgency. between regular and militia forces, and increase coordination between those forces 13. Condition all military assistance to Uganda on and humanitarian agencies. security sector reform, particularly with respect to corruption and human rights. 6. Return IDPs to their homes and villages when the security situation improves. 14. Create an international contact group to act as a conduit for communications between the To the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA): parties to the conflict. 15. Increase humanitarian assistance to affected 7. Declare a willingness to accept a ceasefire as a populations. step towards negotiations, cease all operations against civilians, including attacks on IDP To Participants in the Sudan Peace Process: camps and abduction of children, cease using abductees as combatants and allow the return 16. Ensure that any planned observer/monitoring of abductees who do not wish to remain with mission for Southern Sudan established as part the LRA. of a comprehensive agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLA takes into To the Acholi Community: account the presence of the LRA and includes areas that the LRA operates from such as the 8. Work to improve the relationship with the Imatong Mountains. government by creating a single authoritative body to represent a unified Acholi view on the To the International Criminal Court (ICC): conflict, seeking partnerships to better the humanitarian and political environment, and 17. Investigate war crimes and crimes against publicly rejecting the LRA, including by humanity committed by any party in the ending any support it may obtain from Acholi context of the conflict in Northern Uganda, within or outside Uganda. with particular attention to building a dossier for possible prosecution of LRA leader Joseph To the Sudan Government: Kony.

9. Cease all support for the LRA and persuade it To the World Bank: to end military operations and enter into negotiations. 18. Focus the Social Action Fund on building the Ugandan government’s capacity to deliver To the U.S. Government: services in the North, rather than creating a separate parallel funding mechanism. 10. Exert pressure on Sudan to stop aiding the LRA and support a peaceful resolution to the Nairobi/Brussels, 14 April 2004 conflict. 11. Refashion its Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI) to focus more directly on the

ICG Africa Report N°77 14 April 2004

NORTHERN UGANDA: UNDERSTANDING AND SOLVING THE CONFLICT

I. INTRODUCTION Defence Force, UPDF)2 related to corruption, politicisation, logistics, structure, equipment and tactics are dealt with. Furthermore, to end the The war between the Ugandan government and the insurgency and promote conditions for national Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), now in its reconciliation and prosperity, the government’s eighteenth year, has frustrated the country’s strategy must include political measures designed aspirations to develop a pluralist political system to improve the conditions of those affected by the and entrench the rule of law. It is tarnishing the conflict. The objectives should be to keep pressure record and international prestige of the National on the LRA militarily, politically and Resistance Movement (NRM), which came to diplomatically and to isolate the charismatic Joseph power in 1986 with a comprehensive program to Kony, the leader upon whom the insurgency is overcome the turmoil and bloodshed that had dependent. This would maximise the opportunity disfigured Ugandan politics since independence.1 for negotiations, particularly with those in the LRA The corruption, maladministration and increasing leadership who may, in a deteriorating intolerance of political opposition that have begun environment, seek a way out. The international to shadow the NRM’s many achievements are community has an important contribution to make, exacerbated by the war, or at least made more politically and financially, in helping the difficult to remedy. government develop and implement a comprehensive strategy. The government has largely attempted to defeat the LRA militarily, while paying little regard to the effects of its strategy on the population or to the wider factors that underlie the conflict. Military action to impede LRA operations and better protect the population should be an important element of any strategy but it will not be more effective unless problems within the military (Ugandan People’s

1 Uganda is considered by many in the development field to have made significant progress in several important areas. It implemented universal primary education in 1996 and tripled school enrolments between 1996 and 2000. It has shifted some budget priorities to target poverty reduction, resulting in a decrease in those living below the poverty line from 56 per cent in 1993 to 35 per cent in 2000. It has reversed the rate of HIV/AIDS transmission. As a result of such 2 The Ugandan People’s Defence Force is frequently referred achievements, it is anticipated to be one of only two African to as the UPDF. To simplify reference in this report, which states to receive U.S. funds from the Millennium Challenge contains so many similar acronyms, however, this institution Account to further good governance reforms. See UNESCO will be cited henceforth simply as “the army” or “the EFA 2000 Assessment, available at www.unesco.org. military”. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 2

II. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT government of Milton Obote, who used the army to overthrow the constitution and the king of Buganda, a region from which the constitutional A. THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE monarchy originated. Obote’s use of the military opened a Pandora’s box that led to his overthrow The conflict in Northern Uganda is deeply rooted in by Idi Amin, who was himself toppled by the inter-ethnic competition for power in both Uganda National Liberation Front/Army government and military. The conditions for this (UNLF/A), assisted by the Tanzanian army, in competition were largely set during colonial rule 1978. The brief presidencies of Yusuf Lule and and then manipulated by post-independence Godfrey Binaisa followed,3 while a military governments. The pattern until the NRM came to commission held real power.4 power in 1986 was one of economic and political division between North and South, with further After Obote rigged the 1980 elections, the political regional subdivisions, particularly in the North system that had existed since independence was between the Acholi, Langi and West Nilers. The challenged by Yoweri Museveni's National victory of the NRM, an organisation mostly of Resistance Army (NRA), which began a protracted Southerners, produced new cleavages that have yet guerrilla war in the south and northwest. Massacres to be overcome and are manifested clearly in the in the Luwero Triangle during Operation Bonanza, armed struggle. perpetrated by Obote’s mainly Acholi and Langi troops, are estimated to have cost at least 300,000 The North-South divide results from an economic lives,5 mostly of Baganda people. They continue to imbalance that suited the objectives of the colonial cast a shadow over attempts to solve present day administration. Before the Second World War, North-South problems.6 For many, the NRA Ugandans, North and South, were recruited into the insurgency against Obote was merely a British colonial armed force, the King’s African continuation of the ethnic competition that typified Rifles (KAR), but this changed radically after 1945. Ugandan politics – a case of Bantu-speaking Those at the vanguard of the anti-colonial struggle Southerners wanting to remove from power came mainly from the South, which had the Northerners speaking Nilotic languages. greatest concentration of the country’s economic and educational elite. Fearing the consequences if Obote was deposed for a second time in June 1985, that region also had large numbers of trained by the top UNLA commanders led by Lt. General soldiers, the British began to recruit mainly in the Bazilio Olara Okello and General Tito Okello North. Consequently, the Acholi and West Nile Lutwa, both Acholi. There had been growing ethnic groups came to dominate the KAR. This also resistance among some in the Uganda People’s meant there was a balance of power between Congress (UPC) to Obote’s refusal to negotiate largely Southern civilian and largely Northern with the NRA, as well as a feeling that the killing military elites. At the same time, the British had reached an unacceptable level. Many Acholi in deliberately reserved the introduction of industry the army felt they were bearing the brunt of the and cash crop production to the South, for which fighting. However, the principal reason for the coup the North became a reservoir of cheap labour. was the higher status Obote had bestowed upon key UNLA officers from his Langi tribe. For the first These policies created an intractable challenge to time in Uganda’s history, the Acholi had broken the building a unified nation-state when independence came on 9 October 1962. The Acholi in particular had been told by their colonial masters that they 3 were born warriors, effectively transforming them Lule became president in April 1979 but was removed by into a military ethnocracy. The post-colonial the Military Commission and replaced by Binaisa in June 1979. After Binaisa was removed in May 1980, the Military governments of Milton Obote and Idi Amin found Commission ruled directly until December 1980 elections this formula politically expedient, which in turn brought Obote to power a second time. further fuelled ethnic polarisation and the 4 See P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence (Kampala, militarisation of politics. 1992), pp. 138-145. 5 Ibid. The key role of the military in politics and of ethnic 6 The effects of massacres on the psyche of all protagonists competition became evident under the first are central to the failure to overcome the cycle of ethnic retaliation after the NRA came to power. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 3

Northern Acholi-Langi alliance and taken control intentionally some argued. Even today, this old of the country. suspicion persists. The disempowerment felt by the Acholi was exacerbated by the failure of the NRA Ongoing random killings by UNLA soldiers in leadership to bring security to the North. Indeed, it Kampala and elsewhere as well as objections by was accused of perpetrating atrocities there. various armed groups allied to the two Okellos over the agreement they had reached with the NRA7 In August 1986, a Buganda militia operating with confirmed for the NRA that only a complete the NRA, the Federalist Democratic Movement of removal of the whole system would give Uganda a Uganda (FEDEMU),9 massacred 40 civilians in chance to overcome its divisions. The defeat of the Tito Okello’s village of Namokora in Kitgum,10 Okellos by the NRA marked the first time socio- partly in retaliation for UNLA killings in Luwero. economic, political and military power had shifted In July 1987, the NRA executed some 97 civilians to the South, to the great discontent of the Acholi. at Kona Kilak in Gulu. In June 1988, 40 civilians were massacred at Koch Goma. It is also reported that the NRA buried a number of people alive B. ACHOLI INSURRECTION AND during its Operation North and that its 'Gunga' GRIEVANCES Battalion11 raped both men and women in the presence of their families for the explicit purpose of Their military dominance, before and after collective community humiliation and degradation. independence, reduced the need for the Acholi to Many Acholi and others believe that the NRA interact politically with tribes from other parts of chose not to use its disciplined forces in the North, the country. Young Acholi men had few job sending instead the most brutal and unruly elements prospects other than the army. The period from from the 35th Battalion, composed of FEDEMU 1971 to 1986, however, was tumultuous for the fighters, in a deliberate strategy of revenge and Acholi elite and peasant alike. In 1971, Amin took subjugation.12 The events in the North in the power and ordered all Acholi and Langi officers to immediate aftermath of the NRA victory reinforced barracks, where he massacred them. When the prejudices and created perceptions that justified on NRA came to power and similarly ordered officers both sides the next phase of conflict. to return to barracks, this was refused, out of fear there would be a repeat of the killings. NRA/FEDEMU atrocities fed suspicions that a Southern war of revenge was being undertaken The NRA victory produced a great deal of resentment against Museveni for having displaced a 9 Northerner – Tito Okello from power. “Northerners The FEDEMU was not part of the original NRA, but a felt cheated by the British and Baganda during fighting group that forged an alliance with it when the latter was about to take power. colonial rule”, said a senior government official. 10 8 C. Lamwaka, “The Peace Process in Northern Uganda”, “This second cheat made us feel even more bitter.” ACCORD, 2002. By August of 1986, there was a counter-reaction. 11 The rape of men later became known as ‘tek gunga’ in Violence was perpetrated by both civilians and Acholi. See Human Rights Watch, The Scars of Death: ousted UNLA soldiers on Southern victims. The Children abducted by the LRA in Uganda, September 1997; historical fault lines of ethnic retaliation had re- also F. Van Acker, “Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army: the New Order No One Ordered”, IPDM - UA emerged. discussion paper 2003-6, 6 October 2003, p. 13, at http://www.ua.ac.be/main.asp?c=*IOBE&n=4267&ct=0015 The fundamental changes that the NRM launched 95&e=o17562. in other parts of Uganda also marked the beginning 12 A report by the Human Rights and Peace Centre of Acholi grievances against the new order in the (HURIPEC) in association with others goes much further, country. The Acholi felt the government failed to stating that, “the war in Acholiland was not the result of the apply its own stated objectives to the North, atrocities committed in the Luwero Triangle, but rather the atrocities committed in the Luwero Triangle were the consequence of an ethnic-oriented war that was initiated by the NRM/A in Luwero Triangle against the northerners. This 7 Beginning in August 1985, Tito Okello Lutwa and the also suggests that until that objective was achieved, the war NRA held peace talks in Nairobi. An agreement was signed in the north had to continue”. HURIPEC, “The Hidden War: in December 1985 but not everyone in the NRA was Forgotten People – War in Acholiland and its Ramifications committed to it. for Peace and Security in Uganda”, Kampala, October 2003, 8 ICG interview, Kampala, December 2003. pp. 24-29. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 4

against the Acholi. Another factor that seemed to by Alice Auma “Lakwena”, a spiritual medium, it reinforce fear among the Acholi was the NRA’s posed a considerable threat to the government until failure to integrate ex-UNLA fighters into its new its defeat near Jinja that same year. Alice Auma army, as it had done with other armed groups. proclaimed that a spirit called Lakwena Deposed Acholi officers started their first armed (messenger) had ordered her in August 1986 to end rebellion, as the Uganda People’s Defence Army her work as a healer and mobilise a force to wage (UPDA), from Southern Sudan to where they had war against the evil that had invaded Acholiland.16 fled. The UPDA’s emergence in 1986 was On its face, the HSMF was a peasant cult, but it generally accepted across the Acholi region as a was able to attract broader support than the UPDA, means to recapture power, although it lacked a extending beyond the Acholi to most tribes in coherent program, and its political wing, the northern and eastern Uganda. Although it Uganda People’s Defence Movement (UPDM), disregarded essential elements of military tactics, it was far away in London. It was formed for revenge, was successful for a short period, even coming in order to reverse a humiliating defeat, and was within 100 kilometres of Kampala before its final composed mainly of thousands of former UNLA defeat. soldiers.13 The main legacy of this tumultuous period was a After an unsuccessful military campaign, the fusion of UPDA conventional military tactics and UPDA held negotiations with the NRM that led to a objectives – Acholi restoration and defeat of the peace agreement in 1988.14 These agreements were NRM – with HSMF spiritualism. To this, Joseph followed by NRA military operations to finish off Kony added his own dimensions of terror and recalcitrants, during which a number of renowned coercion to make the LRA the unique force it is UPDA leaders were killed. Suspicion re-emerged, today leading to new groups that had broad support as a collective effort to preserve the Acholi from the threat of extinction they believed the NRA posed. C. THE LRA INSURGENCY The 1988 NRA counter-insurgency was brutal, including deliberate destruction of civilian food Kony is said to be a relative of Alice Lakwena. He stocks and domestic animals. Acholi are still bitter claims similar prophetic powers, operates in her old with the army and government over the loss of region and recruited some of the same Acholi army cattle, which destroyed much of the prosperity and veterans into his core force. His movement is a economic life in the North. The situation was direct continuation of the UPDA and HSMF aggravated by frequent raids by Karamojong cattle insurgencies. After eighteen years, however, he rustlers from neighbouring Kotido district, who remains a mystery. His spiritualism is not just an 17 stole the remaining stock, especially in Kitgum. effective control mechanism over his fighters,

Even as the UPDF was disappearing, a new movement emerged. This was the Holy Spirit justification for social rebellion against an established order, Mobile Forces (HSMF), formed in 1987. It marked nationalist revival and restoration of ethnic identity. 16 a new millenarian manifestation of the war.15 Led For more on the HSM see H. Behrend, Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits, (Oxford, 1999). 17 A speech reported to be by Kony to his fighters in March 2003 includes the key ingredients of spiritualism and 13 Some of the UNLA’s new officer cadets had been recently coercion: “All of us will keep on praying and when you are trained by the British Military Training Team (BMTT) but praying concentrate on the Rosary, Holy Spirit, Holy Mary, most of its troops were largely unskilled, unable to cope with so that they can help us win this war. Now as I talk, the civilian life, and had extremely poor discipline. By alienating commanders of UPDF are in the Arab defences in Sudan much of the population, their excesses greatly contributed to here. Commanders, if you don't follow what I have told you, the downfall of the Obote and Okello regimes. God will kill you. If not, I will kill you myself. When we 14 The London-based political wing led by Otema Alimadi, a start fighting the enemies, we will get a lot of equipment prime minister in the second Obote regime, was not included from them. You should therefore not leave anything behind in the peace agreement. It concluded a separate agreement because they will help us in the operations. I want to tell you with the government in Addis Ababa in 1990. that our power in fighting is the same as that of the 15 The millenarian element of the HSMF was built on the government. Now that the government (UPDF) has arranged interaction of Christianity, including strict biblical conduct, to destroy us, we should show them who we are. I want to with traditional Acholi beliefs in the power of protective tell you that I have so many miracles to show out to these charms and traditional anointment. It was used as people and I will use all means in order to show out all these Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 5

mostly abductees. It also influences many Acholi. 2. Tactics “The spiritualism captivates the people”, said a Ugandan official.18 The attribution of superhuman The LRA is not motivated by any identifiable powers to Kony explains for many the army’s political agenda, and its military strategy and failure to defeat him. Some of this belief in Kony's tactics reflect this. Although it does occasionally invincibility is shared by army troops, many of evoke Acholi nationalism and emancipation, these whom are fellow Acholi. are irreconcilable with its violence against the Acholi. It is a self-sustaining war machine, with strong and flexible internal organisation. Its logic is D. LRA OPERATIONS focused on discrediting the rule of President Museveni and on the survival of the organisation 1. Leadership and structure19 and its key personnel. The latter is achieved by economic extortion, terrorising civilians, abducting Kony stands at the apex of the LRA structure, children as porters (which increases LRA mobility politically, militarily and spiritually. He is central and helps it move looted goods to market20) and not only to the its organisation and actions but to its sex slaves. The leadership turns most abductees very purpose. In his physical and spiritual self he into soldiers and wives. Logistically, it is tightly manifests the new society he and the LRA are managed with good record keeping. Long years of supposed to be striving for. The degree that Kony stockpiling weapons21 give it the potential to directs operations is difficult to establish. There is sustain operations regardless of short-term no doubt that while he has a significant influence setbacks. For example, the LRA began stockpiling upon the insurgency’s overall strategy, its weapons in Imatong well before Operation Iron Fist implementation is very much the responsibility of began and has been able to sustain and expand its those who came to the LRA from the UNLA and operations in response. The key to its survival is, as UPDA and who along with Kony make up the high one Ugandan official put it, "survival by the gun”.22 command. They have included: “Brigadier” Vincent Otti (LRA second-in-command), The LRA has never established bases inside “Brigadier” Okello Matata (third-in-command) and Northern Uganda, thus reducing its vulnerability to “Brigadier” Tolbert Nyeko (army commander, attack. However this creates logistical constraints reported killed in January 2004). that usually can only be met by exploiting the local population. Supply needs are minimal; it uses little The LRA appears to be organised in four brigades: ammunition and can get food and everything else Control Alter (sometimes referred to as "Trinkle"), locally through purchase and looting. The which includes the leadership, Sinia, Stockree and consistent method of operation is the maintenance Giiva. Each brigade is estimated to have between of an extremely mobile foot network. With good 300 and 800 members and three battalions. These knowledge of the northern terrain, it operates in a latter vary in size but are estimated to have been highly decentralised fashion. It infiltrates into around 250 each when Operation Iron Fist (OIF) assigned area in units of 100 to 160, breaks into was launched by the army in April 2002 as an smaller groups of approximately twenty, and again attempted knock-out blow. Total LRA size is into yet smaller groups to undertake ambushes and estimated to be about 3,000, but this may vary other operations. It only needs observation units as greatly depending on attrition and reinforcement support while the main units hit defenceless targets. (i.e. abductions). It is not clear how many of this The ferocity of the attacks is designed to traumatise total are fighters and have received a degree of people into fleeing to towns, a strategy aimed at military training and how many are denying the army human intelligence and allowing auxiliaries/porters or wives and families. the LRA to loot abandoned homes and properties.

20 A number of interviewees told ICG that looted goods are miracles, but I want you”. Obtained from the Ugandan sold in shops in the North, some operated by relatives and Ministry of Defence de-classified library. associates of senior LRA operatives. This is said to generate 18 ICG interview, Kampala, December 2003. major income for the families of these LRA leaders. 19 The sources for this section are government military 21 ICG interview with government official, Kampala, December personnel and journalists interviewed between November 2003. 2003 and January 2004. 22 ICG interview, Kampala, December 2003. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 6

Its ability to move in small groups, using Global terrorise the civilian population. Today, the LRA Positioning Systems (GPS), radios and telephones does not accept voluntary recruits. Captured ex- and armed with light weapons,23 has shown that the combatants show a fear of accountability or LRA can exercise efficient tactical command and revenge.25 Behind the abductions is a carefully control over a considerable territory. It prioritises crafted element of the war. Children and young survival by avoiding direct confrontation with the girls are meant to provide labour and sex, as well as army, and focuses on ambushes and soft targets. serve as weapons of terror against their own parents The policy of self-preservation for the commanders and community, creating in the process a sense of is the key to maintaining the organisation. hopelessness, despair and hatred for the Abductees provide disposable fighters, who can government. When children are killed, their parents easily be replaced and are often sacrificed to ensure mourn their death and condemn the army for killing the escape of commanders. The army has those who are the victims of the war, adding to the recognised this tactic; its recent successes in killing resentment for failing to protect them from being LRA commanders may have resulted from moving abducted in the first place.26 its focus in battle from the frontline combatants to the likely locations of commanders to the rear. When the abductees kill their own parents or kin, it causes bitterness and condemnation of both the The LRA's conduct of operations makes it resistant LRA and the army, the former for committing the to conventional military defeat, but not invincible violence, the latter for failing to protect both the as many assume. Its tactics do not require much abductees and the community. This phenomenon sophistication as they do not seek to minimise their also produces ambiguities in the conduct of army own casualties as a normal military organisation operations. LRA methods make the killing of its would and are not concerned to any degree with the (abducted) fighters, who are easily replaced, a poor negative effects of their operations on the local measurement of success.27 More importantly, each population. They need only avoid contact with the death potentially alienates the Acholi population army, locate soft targets and attack them with further from the agency that is supposed to be indoctrinated and/or coerced fighters.24 This is protecting them. This dynamic represents a lose- effective in terms of an intention to terrorise and lose situation for army and government. The army sustain the organisation. The key to defeating the faces difficulties in conducting even the most LRA is not to be found solely in military rudimentary security operations while attempting to operations, but also in changing the environment minimise casualties to fighters/abductees, when the that makes its tactics effective through political, only distinction made is probably whether they are economic and social means. armed and/or under the control of their commanders. The answer to this dilemma lies at the 3. Abductions operational level, in better protecting the population (children in particular) from abduction, while Since the Acholi started questioning LRA motives concentrating on targeting the LRA leadership in 1996, a year marked by intense fighting, the instead of merely killing as many of the fighters as insurgency has resorted to abductions and the possible. massacre of suspected government allies to

23 The LRA inventory includes mortars, machine guns, anti- tank and anti-vehicle mines, explosives, and recoilless (anti- 25 Part of the initial indoctrination is said usually to involve a vehicle) guns. requirement that the abductees commit an act of brutality 24 Much of the literature assumes that LRA tactics are sound. (often coerced), frequently against a relative, thereby For example the recent report by the Refugee Law Project, incriminating and traumatising him so that he thereafter is “Behind the Violence”, Working Paper No. 11, Kampala, reluctant or unable to return to his village for fear of February 2004, p. 22, implied that the avoidance of attack retribution. ICG interviews, Ugandan officials, October and helicopters is a sign of sound tactics. However, such December 2003. assessments seem to be based primarily upon the mere fact 26 ICG interview, George Omona, ACCORD, Gulu, October that the LRA has maintained the conflict over such a long 2003. period. This is more a consequence of army inadequacies and 27 The Ugandan media almost daily includes reports from the other factors, however, than the LRA’s tactical skill. When Army spokesman that a number of LRA fighters have been faced with a well-coordinated attack, the LRA has suffered killed and abductees rescued. It also reports civilians killed many casualties, recently also among its commanders. by the LRA. Army casualties are seldom reported. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 7

4. The Sudan factor refugee camps.29 Kony’s new base is in the Imatong Mountains in Southern Sudan, an excellent Since 1994, the LRA's only known supporter has hideout that affords easy defence and difficult been the Sudanese government, which has provided detection due to the rugged terrain. There is some safe havens and arms. The link between the LRA conjecture that the LRA’s recent arms acquisitions and Khartoum is a necessary but not sufficient were a farewell package from a government that explanation for continuation of the conflict. In feels it may no longer be able to afford to harbour a many respects undue emphasis has been placed terrorist group but wishes to increase its capacity to upon it. However this support has been a significant sustain operations in Northern Uganda for a long factor in increasing the deadliness and time. How true this is may become evident as the sustainability of LRA operations. Sudan peace process plays out over the next months. Sudanese support is reportedly in retaliation for the Ugandan government's support of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) 5. The spread of the insurgency outside insurgency. Both sides deny that they are providing Acholiland material aid to the other's rebels. After the LRA In the face of progress in peace negotiations was declared a terrorist organisation by the U.S. between Khartoum and the SPLA in 2003,30 the Department of State in late 2001, however, Sudan LRA took a number of steps to reinforce its quietly claimed it had cut off supplies to the LRA position. It reorganised its command structure, in an effort to improve relations with Washington. went on an arms acquisition spree, particularly for This purported cut-off was short-lived. After the landmines, and most controversially, in mid-2003, LRA helped the Sudanese government recapture it launched attacks further east into Iteso and Langi the Sudanese garrison town of Torit from the areas. In doing this, Kony may have wanted to shift SPLM/A in October 2002, the flow of arms and the dynamic of the insurgency away from ammunition, including anti-tank landmines, Acholiland in order to give it a more national resumed. dimension. The cooperation he may have hoped to receive from these areas, however, appears not to The LRA’s fighting ability has made it valuable for have materialised though the LRA initially had the Sudanese government’s efforts to counter the some success in killing and abducting unprotected SPLA and the latter’s main supporter in Kampala. civilians before the government and army Military supply was reduced in 1999-2000, responded. This produced a propaganda gain as it however, due to the Ethiopia-Eritrea war. An discredited the government and created a crisis. agreement between Uganda and Sudan that was There may have been a hope to replicate the brokered by the Carter Center led to improved ambiguous attitudes toward the government that cooperation, and the effects of its international assist the insurgency and impede the army in isolation has motivated Khartoum to seek to Acholiland. The intention may also have been to improve its status with the West.28 Nevertheless, Khartoum probably cannot completely cut its links to Kony until the Sudanese civil war is settled. 29 ICG interview with Ugandan officials, Kampala, Sudan has been central to the LRA’s survival. December 2003. 30 When it is under serious pressure, it has been able A "Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements" to retreat safely to Southern Sudanese rear bases to was signed by the Sudan government and the SPLA in Naivasha, Kenya, on 25 September 2003. It has the potential recuperate and rearm. The LRA has stockpiled to change the security dynamics in Southern Sudan weapons it has received from Sudan against the fundamentally and affect the LRA directly, as it stipulates contingency of a cut-off. Sudan has also provided that all but 12,000 of Khartoum’s soldiers will be re- medicine and food. Despite the agreement with deployed from the South within 30 months of the entry into Uganda, Sudan continues to support the LRA from force of a comprehensive peace agreement. The 12,000 bases near Torit and Juba, which it claims are troops that would remain would be placed in joint/integrated units alongside SPLA fighters. If implemented – and such a comprehensive peace agreement has not yet been signed – this could result eventually in the severance of the supply links between the Sudan government and the LRA. See ICG 28 ICG interview with Foreign and Commonwealth Office Africa Report No73, Sudan: Toward an Incomplete Peace, official, London, 30 September 2003. 11 December 2003. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 8

threaten the vital trade route to the east by moving and politically. The key characteristic – and main towards Mbale, thereby threatening an economic vulnerability – is Kony himself. As noted, his crisis. control through spiritual and coercive means is central to sustaining the organisation. His removal After the move east into Teso, however, the death is the key to undoing the LRA's cohesion and 31 of Brigadier Tabuleh (then third in command) left motivation and creating new opportunities for the LRA structure there disorganised and on the peace. run. The LRA moved some units out of Teso into Lira, and attempted to regroup. They intended to Kony's key lieutenants are probably motivated by a withdraw into their Gulu and Kitgum hideouts, but combination of factors. There is likely to be some the bulk went back into Southern Sudan because of residual Acholi nationalism, especially for those dry season exposure. Nevertheless, damage has previously associated with the UNLA/UPDA. For been done, and the epicentre of the humanitarian them, however the LRA is mainly a means to their emergency has now shifted eastward. own empowerment and survival, which makes them vulnerable to coercion or cooption by a better The move to the east may also have been prompted deal, particularly if the LRA's fortunes decline or by a need to expand the LRA’s logistics (supplies reports of increased friction between Kony and his and abductees) within Uganda, possibly because of immediate subordinates are true.32 In 1997 Kony changing circumstances in Sudan and because killed his then deputy Lagony and replaced him much of the Acholi countryside had already been with Vincent Otti. There were reports in late 2003 laid waste. However, the relatively rapid response that he had fallen out with Otti, and more recently of the UPDF, including the Local Defence Units that he had threatened to kill his senior (LDUs), and the animosity of the population will commanders for betrayal and disobedience. These make it difficult for the LRA to copy its operations commanders could take matters into their own in Acholi and maintain a more permanent presence. hands if enough felt threatened and saw a suitable alternative such as an amnesty and/or resettlement. Even as the situation in Sudan changes, the LRA will need to maintain proximity to that border so it The motivation of LRA junior commanders and can retreat there when under heavy pressure. This fighters varies greatly.33 Some subscribe to Kony's also makes a long-term presence in the east spiritualist path to Acholi emancipation and might unlikely. Should Khartoum and the SPLA conclude continue to fight for a similar cause even if the a peace agreement, an international observation LRA were to be defeated. Many, however, remain mission could not likely monitor LRA bases in the with the LRA because they see this as better than Imatong Mountains in Southern Sudan effectively. returning to the largely impoverished North with no The LRA would likely retain the capacity to hide hope of economic betterment. The creation of there. It would also be able to launch further attacks effective, long-term government reintegration into Uganda which, though the level of activities programs for these individuals, and for the North would probably be lower, would likely be of generally, might provide strong incentives for many sufficient intensity that the humanitarian crisis LRA fighters to lay down their arms and return to would not be much relieved since it does not families and communities. require a significant level of military by the LRA to sustain the current deplorable situation. LRA operations, while largely supportable locally, could suffer from changing regional circumstances. 6. Operational vulnerabilities There is also some vulnerability to the attitude of local populations, as shown by the difficulties the The LRA is in many respects a unique and LRA has experienced in the east because of both idiosyncratic organisation. However, a number of active and passive resistance to it in the Langi and its characteristics and methods of operation create vulnerabilities that may be exploitable militarily 32 Sunday Vision, 1 February 2004. 33 ICG interviews in Northern Uganda, November 2003 to February 2004 and with EU official, March 2004. The junior 31 Taubleh, who was behind the move to the east, fought commanders and fighters referred to here differ from recent with the UPA, based in Iteso, until its defeat, and then joined abductees in that they exercise a degree of choice in the LRA. ICG interview with government officials, Kampala remaining with the LRA and are part of the insurgency’s January 2004. hard core “professionals”. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 9

Iteso areas. Therefore, as discussed in more detail against their respective support bases. In fact, the below, the relationship between the government abduction of children after 1994 became necessary and army and the Acholi population could be to sustain the LRA's numbers, and the terror critical to defeating the LRA. Use of insecure instilled in the population became a political and communications (satellite and mobile phone) operational objective. assists the LRA to coordinate operations but yields intelligence that the government (assisted by the While the vast majority of Acholi reject the LRA as U.S.) could exploit better. their representative, their animosity to the NRM and the army creates a dangerous ambiguity which robs both the government and the Acholi of the E. THE LRA AND ACHOLI GRIEVANCES necessary environment in which the LRA can be defeated. This ambiguity provides opportunity for Although few are willing to say that the LRA is the LRA to continue to operate, even without direct fighting to rectify historical Acholi grievances, support from the Acholi. It also is a significant these grievances do exist, and many see the LRA, impediment to a coordinated policy between the for all its faults, as the only group that is effectively government and the Acholi for solving the conflict. confronting Museveni. This feeling is likely to be The ambiguity is evident in differing opinions strongest amongst the Acholi diaspora, which is not about the causes of the conflict, how to counter the directly affected by either the LRA's actions or by LRA and how to find peace. For those in Kampala any positive deeds of the government. and Acholi who see the conflict in its simplest manifestation as a continuation of the North-South The LRA's Acholi nationalism is simplified to struggle, the situation is not only inevitable, but being anti-Museveni and against Southern tribes, preferable to peace. manifested through religious rituals practiced by the LRA. The most extreme expressions of its anti- For the great majority of Ugandans, including NRM campaign are the abductions, rape, and Acholi, who want peace, this ambiguity must be summary executions of non-combatants as a means resolved. The onus for creating an environment for not only to discredit the army for not protecting peace is on the government, while Acholi leaders civilians, but also as punishment of the Acholi for need to reject the LRA unequivocally and learn their lack of open support to the rebellion, from the actions of the Langi and Iteso how to especially since 1996. respond to its threat. The government must also acknowledge the wrongs that have been done the At the core of the LRA rebellion is a belief that Acholi, many resulting from its own failures such Acholi pride and culture have been contaminated as the early atrocities, economic loss, particularly by “foreigners”. To be seen to support the army, of cattle, and ongoing abuses by UPDF personnel which represents these foreigners, is a betrayal of that are not adequately punished. Acholi nationalism. But many Acholi see the risks of supporting or not supporting the LRA as equal because “abducted children are sent to kill their own parents and kin causing both anger and sympathy whenever when such abducted children are killed by either side”.34 The violence the LRA inflicts upon the Acholi negates any claims it or its supporters can make that it is a legitimate champion of Acholi grievances.

The LRA initially justified its attacks on Acholi as necessary to discipline traitors and enforce the anti- Museveni element of the insurgency. However, their scale and arbitrariness cannot be equated to any coherent measures, such as those, for example, by the Viet Cong or Irish Republican Army (IRA)

34 ICG Interview, Gulu, October 2003. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 10

III. THE FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE willing supporters of any alternative to Museveni. CONFLICT In many aspects, therefore, Acholiland politics is no longer driven by choices based on old groupings like the Democratic Party (DP) or Uganda People’s President Museveni wants a military solution, not Congress (UPC) but by massive protest against a only because he sees the LRA as a military or even government that forces the Acholi to move to a criminal problem, but also because it would bring camps where the LRA still kills and abducts them. him and the NRM substantial political capital. The Hopelessness causes the Acholi to reject both war has been a disaster for Uganda but it has Museveni and Kony, the evidence of the former allowed him to maintain an unreformed and corrupt being documented by the 1996 and 2001 army as a key pillar of the regime. It stands in the presidential and parliamentary elections. During way of thorough security sector reform and gives both, the Acholi clearly expressed a desire for him the arguments with which to resist mounting political change in the hope that a new government international pressure to reduce defence spending would address the war and their woes. drastically. It also gives him pretexts to maintain the political status quo by denying the opposition a Because both the NRM and the LRA are unpopular, power base and curtailing freedom of expression voices representing the interests of old political and association in the name of “the war against parties presented an alternative at the 1996 and terrorism”. 2001 elections. In 1996, Paul Semwogerere, the DP leader from Buganda, a region traditionally Museveni’s response to prodding by the U.S., in opposed to Northern domination, received strong particular, and to consolidated proposals such as Acholi support. In 2001, Kiiza Besigye of the USAID’s Northern Uganda Peace Initiative western Banyankole/Bakiga groups, a former army (NUPI), has been sceptical. Its actions suggest the officer once close to Museveni, won Acholi votes. LRA has little desire for genuine dialogue but the Support for both men expressed a desperate government has not always responded in good faith yearning for change. Since then, opposition to the to past attempts by a variety of actors (Carter NRM has been intensified. Centre, St. Egidio, Acholi religious leaders, Betty Bigombe) to promote such dialogue. Museveni's In the presidential elections of 1996, in Gulu alone, propensity for issuing unconditional ultimatums has Museveni won only 8.5 per cent of the vote, while frequently ensured that there was no possibility of Paul Semwogerere, representing the opposition progress. Nevertheless, the government has the Inter-Party Political Forces Co-operation (IPFC), responsibility to create the mechanisms that would got 90.5 per cent. In Kitgum, Museveni got 10.5 allow it to pursue negotiations should the per cent, Semwogerere 88.4 per cent. In 2001 opportunity present itself. Museveni did slightly better but the opposition still had a large margin: in Gulu, Museveni had 11.5 percent, Besigye 81.8 per cent. In Kitgum, A. POLITICAL USES OF THE CONFLICT Museveni won 21.3 per cent, Besigye 72.4 per cent.35 The continuation of the conflict in the North cannot be seen in isolation from the larger political Significantly, the voting was not based on ethnic or situation in Uganda, especially central issues religious politics. It was a remarkably widespread surrounding the consolidation and perpetuation of protest vote against the NRM, in an election the NRM’s power. The conflict has to be analysed conducted under tight army security in the IDP in view of the competition between the NRM and camps. That even army presence and monitoring, or opposition forces, and through the specific leverage intimidation as was reported in the west and central that it gives the government to protect the army as a regions, did not influence voters to back Museveni, key power base.

1. Acholiland 35 “Comparative Statistical Analysis of the 2001 & 1996 Presidential Elections”, the Directorate of Research, NRM Because of the war, and the NRM’s nature as a secretariat, Kampala, 24 July 2001. The 2001 election broad movement of which all citizens are obliged attracted six candidates including Museveni and Besigye. by law to be members, the Acholi have become The others were Agrey Awori, Francis Bwengye, Chapaa Karuhanga and Kibirige Mayanja. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 11

confirms that Northerners wished to reject the produced little social transformation. Recently the NRM. The parliamentary elections followed the prime minister’s office launched the Northern same pattern. Exact figures on the parliamentary Uganda Social fund, which also seems lacklustre. voting in Acholi are not easy to come by but election officials say 90 per cent opposed the 2. The politics of security and opposition NRM.36 Continuation of the conflict provides a crisis Acholi generally perceive the continuation of the environment that enables the government to justify war as punishment for their refusal to endorse measures that would be unacceptable in different Museveni’s leadership. The LRA insurgency circumstances, such as the continued presence of provides an ideal opportunity for the NRM to keep many former and current army personnel within its Northerners in general at the periphery and the ranks. The close nexus between political and topic of the North-South divide out of the national military considerations impedes sound policy political debate. As long as the situation of the development and implementation as well as North is dominated by security matters, the sharing transparency and accountability. Much can be of national resources, the general cohesion of the justified by citing the threat from Kony and social and political fabric and the monopolisation terrorism. of power and wealth by Southerners are not questioned. The recent Anti-Terrorism Act defines terrorism broadly and is a potent tool to stifle criticism and Limited efforts to reform the socio-economic intimidate opponents.38 An example is the environment have failed dismally. Although the prosecution of journalists from The Monitor who war has cost the Acholi two generations of young incorrectly reported that a UPDF helicopter had people who know nothing but war and poverty, been shot down. The army spokesman suggested government programs continue to be viewed with this report might be subject to the Anti-terrorism suspicion. One such is the Security and Production Act, and prosecution has proceeded. Similarly, a Program (SPP), designed in May 2003 as a number of journalists may be prosecuted because transitional socio-economic effort to create better their phone number was found recently on the body conditions for those in the IDP camps of Gulu, of a dead LRA commander. The government Kitgum and Pader districts. Based on the targets not only journalists but also other critics of experience of the Israeli Kibbutz and Moshav the army such as members of the Acholi Religious system, the SPP is meant to use communal and Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), most recently Fr. government land to create farms called Security Carlos Rodriguez, whom the army wanted to deport and Production Units (SPUs). The main crops after he made a number of claims about one of its would be maize, beans, upland rice and sorghum. cordon-and-search operations at Pabbo IDP camp.39 The project, though not yet implemented, already Some of these claims proved not to be accurate, causes tension among IDPs, who view it as a although it is unlikely that he deliberately intended government land grab. Indeed the program would to misinform the public. be disastrous. Communal land ownership is sensitive in the North. Mass cultivation would Regardless, the army’s call for deportation is destroy traditional boundaries, where ownership is symptomatic of its heavy handedness and inability not title based, but passes through traditional to accept criticism. This attitude also pervades the inheritance. Attempts in the 1990s to reconstruct political leadership. Those who oppose the NRM the North through the Northern Uganda line or suggest that its handling of the conflict is Reconstruction Program (NURP I and NURP II)37 not effective are liable to be accused of

36 ICG telephone interview with Electoral Commission households moving into poverty are from Northern Uganda. official, Kampala, 17 February 2004. See “Background to the Budget, Financial Year 2003/04”, 37 The NURP, launched in July 1992, was divided into two MOFED, Kampala, June, 2003. components, NURP I and NURP II. It got initial funding of 38 Anti-Terrorism Act, section 7 (1). A terrorist is defined as U.S.$93.6 million from the World Bank, donor countries and someone who “indiscriminately commits certain violent acts, aid agencies and thereafter other sources. Findings based on with intent to cause injury or death, for purposes of a 1992/1999 households survey by the Ministry of Finance influencing the government or intimidating the public or a and Economic Development (MOFED) show that one third section thereof and for political or other aim”. of the chronically poor and a disproportionate number of 39 The Monitor, 10 February 2004. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 12

collaborating with the enemy or undermining the The adverse consequences of inter-sectoral state.40 allocations undermined confidence in the budget process among stake holders including donors, in The government also uses allegations of links to the much the same way as it impaired the capacity of LRA to discredit the opposition. The LRA is the ministries to deliver public services and maintain country’s only insurgency but after the 2001 control systems.42 presidential elections, Kiiza Besigye’s Reform Agenda (RA) was tied to it by the government. According to donor sources, the ministry of James Opoka, an Acholi and one of Besigye’s defence wants another increase that would be in the strongest campaign managers, was said to be the range of 28 to 30 per cent. If this happens, defence link. He was killed by Kony in March 2003 would consume over UShs 400 billion (U.S.$222 together with ten LRA fighters. At the same time million), out of an estimated total government the RA was linked to an obscure rebel group, the expenditure of UShs 2,741 billion (U.S.$1.52 People’s Redemption Army (PRA), which billion) or some 2.6. per cent of GDP, according to allegedly received backing from Rwanda and provisional data based on the 2002/2003 financial operated in the eastern portion of the Democratic year projections. Currently donor support accounts Republic of Congo (DRC). for over 50 per cent of the Uganda budget, although donors do not give exact figures.43 Although these charges must be treated with much scepticism, the anti-terrorism law can be used The war not only justifies a large army44 but also against any who challenge their authenticity. The allows Museveni to protect from scrutiny an threat of a death sentence for anyone found guilty institution that is central to the NRM political of complicity with groups defined as terrorist project and his own power. The current Defence clearly weakens opposition to the NRM’s growing Review Program is an attempt, under donor authoritarianism. pressure, to create a procurement strategy that will enable it to function with less corruption and By maintaining a good international image through politics, as well as better commanded and the global wars against AIDS and terrorism, ethnically balanced.45 The army bill presented to Museveni hopes to have his own authoritarian parliament in 2003 is meant to create a legal tendencies overlooked or excused. He has sought in framework for such a reform. particular the patronage of U.S. President Bush. As long as the war goes on, however, national 3. NRM politics and the military security arguments can be used to keep a cover on the political and economic activities of senior army The war in the North also makes it easy to reject officers and management. Already such arguments calls to reduce defence spending. Museveni are being used to prevent audits of the army’s so- frequently criticises donor requirements to hold called classified accounts, even by the Public defence expenditure at the current UShs 300 billion Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament or the (U.S.$166 million) or 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Auditor General. The on-going investigations into Product (GDP). He argues that the army needs “ghost soldiers” by serving army officers under Lt. more money to purchase systems such as attack General David Tinyefuza raises questions of 41 helicopters, troop transport helicopters and tanks. credibility and impartiality as well as the criteria In 2003 a 23 per cent cut had to be made in the used to identify those who are being court- non-priority budget items of most ministries in martialed on charges of financial impropriety and order to cover increased defence spending. Part of professional misconduct. Although the army has the justification was that a fifth army division had admitted that ghost soldiers are as old as the been created to deal a decisive blow to the LRA.

42 “Background to the Budget, Financial year 2003/04”, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 40 In a July 2003 speech, Museveni accused those who raised (MOFED), Kampala, June 2003. concerns about army operations, in this case with respect to 43 Ibid. the use of attack helicopters, of being the “silent supporters 44 According to official figures, the army has five divisions of terrorism", quoted in HURIPEC, op. cit., p. 158. of 11,000 soldiers each. 41 ICG interview with Western diplomats, Kampala, 24 45 ICG interview with Western diplomat, Kampala, 9 October 2003. February 2004. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 13

NRM’s military arm itself, key veterans of that 1. From bush army to conventional force institution such as Lt. General Salim Saleh and Major General James Kazini, both relatives of The NRM’s military force emerged victorious from Museveni, are not being treated like others whose the war against Obote and Okello after first conduct has been questioned. mounting an effective insurgency, then conducting larger scale operations to defeat the UNLA and A further concern is that the army is used to protect capture Kampala. The legacy of this campaign Museveni’s own power base within the continues to influence Ugandan politics and Bayankole/Bahima constituency, which is over- military affairs. Organisationally the NRM’s represented within the military’s higher echelons.46 fighters were transformed from a guerrilla force Banyankole/Bahima domination of the top ranks into a conventional infantry-based army. However, undermines any attempt to project the army as a the guerrilla mentality has persisted. There are national institution with a national outlook. The some questions in respect to the ability of many absence of a national outlook in turn reduces the commanders to learn the lessons of the current army to an arm of NRM ideology that serves the operational situation and adjust their doctrine and relatively narrow political interests of its founder tactics to the prevailing threat. A Western official and a few kinsmen, most of them dependent for suggested that within the army command there is a 47 their survival and protection on the political “lack of strategic vision”. One lesson of their own patronage of their leader. early days that has been ignored is the vital importance of maintaining sound relationships with The army leadership is also increasingly derived the population. The army is no longer itself an from the former Presidential Protection Unit (PPU), insurgent force but local support is perhaps even renamed and expanded as the Presidential Guard more important for countering an insurgency. Brigade (PGB) in 2002. The current Army Commander, Major General Aronda Nyakairima, Paradoxically, perhaps the most damaging legacies was once an intelligence officer of the Presidential of the bush war of the early 1980s are the strong Guard. The current PGB Commander, Lt. Colonel bonds of personal loyalties between Museveni and Leo Kyanda, has strong ties with the president’s those who fought with him and have subsequently family and works closely with his son, Major held senior military positions. These bonds were Muhoozi Kainerugaba. The chief of Military critical when the NRM was an insurgency and also Intelligence, Colonel Noble Mayombo, is in the first period of its governance when it set out Museveni’s former aide de camp and a member of to transform Uganda. But they have also greatly inner PGB circles. impeded the army’s performance, as many who have proved to be corrupt or incompetent in meeting the present security challenges have been B. THE ARMY’S OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS allowed to retain important positions. These loyalties are exacerbated by the army’s Museveni’s insistence on a military solution means politicisation, which undercuts its development into his strategy relies upon the army both as an a competent professional military force. institution and operationally. While there are signs of improvement, the military’s problems will not be 2. Identifying the operational problems fixed easily. The longevity of the LRA insurgency cannot be explained simply, as some in the government and army are wont to do, as a consequence of an Acholi desire to resist the NRM. As already discussed, the 46 The army’s senior ranks include President Museveni, who historical legacies, the characteristics of the LRA is commander-in-chief; five Lt Generals, Elly Tumwine itself, and government policies have all contributed. (Muyankole Muhima), David Tinyefuza (Muyankole One of the most important factors has been the Muhima), Salim Saleh (Muyankole Muhima and half- brother to Museveni), Jeje Odongo (Teso) and Moses Ali army’s inherent flaws, which have been made all (West Nile); Major General Aronda Nyakairima (Muhima the more stark by the emphasis placed on the from Rukungiri); Chief of Staff Brigadier General Joshua military option. Masaba (Gishu); Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel Benon Biraro (Ankole); and former Army Commander and Major General James Kazini (Muyankole Muhima). 47 ICG interview, Kampala, November 2003. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 14

The army’s performance in its campaigns in the The army’s main measurement of success seems to Congo (DRC) in the late 1990’s particularly in be the body count, which is misleading as it ignores battles with the Rwandan army at Kisangani,48 the lack of importance the LRA places upon the revealed a number of deficiencies, most notably the abductees it has turned into combatants. Whenever high command’s interference in combat operations, the army kills a number of LRA, more are a problem that persists in Northern Uganda. The abducted. Many commentators have suggested that most worrying aspect is the president's propensity the army is mostly killing recent abductees, not the to go into the field to influence, if not command, LRA’s hard-core fighters. At times abductees are tactical operations. In some respects this is another tied together to prevent escape; when the army fires manifestation of the bush war legacy and rockets and heavy artillery, most of the casualties Museveni's role as a successful guerrilla are child soldiers. The government gave assurances commander. While it is understandable that he that Operation Iron Fist would not affect its efforts would want to visit combat zones to encourage his to rescue abductees but military operations often troops and assure the civilian population, the direct continue to be clumsy, bloody and indiscriminate. command of operations suggests a number of concerns. Despite the ongoing cycle of killings and abductions, the government, from Museveni down, It is a sign there are problems Museveni feels he constantly declares that defeat of the LRA is must address personally, showing a lack confidence imminent or, even more unrealistically, that the war in his commanders. It also indicates unwillingness has been won.52 Some of the LRA’s deadliest and to acknowledge the distinctions between strategic, highest profile operations start after the president or operational and tactical levels of command that other senior officials have made dismissive enable effective political and military synergy.49 pronouncements. While a degree of rhetoric might Military setbacks and incidents, such as LRA be expected, continual claims of victory only attacks in areas where he has recently been and has strengthen the suspicion that the government does proclaimed a success, become personal defeats for not understand the conflict. the president that corrode his political standing. An effective counter-insurgency campaign needs to The army is built around five infantry divisions, focus on multiple elements: popular support three of which are committed to the LRA (which, contrary to some claims, the LRA does not insurgency. Tactically, its operations are focussed have); good intelligence (including from the on zonal forces50 tasked with protecting key assets population); domination of the area of operations and the civilian population and mobile forces through proactive patrolling and interdiction tasked with pursuing the LRA.51 On the face of it operations (though the LRA’s mobility makes the this would appear a logical division of missions but domination of key areas such as towns less a number of factors make the approach largely significant); and destroying the insurgent forces ineffective. Primarily it remains a reactive strategy, themselves. The decision in the early 1990's to reliant upon good intelligence and mobility, which force much of the population – reportedly 200,000 the army mostly lacks. people – into “protected areas” in effect surrendered much of the countryside to the LRA and further increased the animosity of the Acholi,

who suspected the government of stealing their 48 ICG correspondence with Gérard Prunier, November 2003. land. 49 Similar concerns were raised by the judicial commission that investigated the "junk helicopters" scandal (see below) Although not all IDPs have been uprooted as a in respect to the president's personal role in the procurement result of forced relocation by the army, government system. policy has exacerbated displacement and 50 An apparent reason for raising LDUs and militias has been consequent impoverishment. Furthermore, to free regular army elements for more frequent mobile operations. However, this is only sensible if the LDUs are effective at protecting and the army is effective at engaging the LRA. 52 For instance the commander of the 4th Division in Gulu 51 It was reported that the army had a specialised counter- was reported to have claimed that the war against Kony was insurgency brigade operating in the North. However, this in fact over, Monitor, 27 January 2004, in the week before proved not to be so and is part of the “ghost soldiers” the LRA killed 30 civilians. Similar claims were made problem discussed below. before the Barlonyo massacre of 200 in mid-February 2004. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 15

government strategy is frustrated when the army is with bows and arrows to face the LRA. Some unable to protect the IDPs. Daily reports of the Acholi who joined earlier militias were sent to the killing of LRA combatants are usually Congo (DRC) instead of remaining near home to accompanied by news of killings and abductions protect their families. perpetrated by the rebels, often within the IDP camps, thus further undermining the confidence of Operation Iron Fist was launched in April 2002 the population in the army. As military pressure is after an agreement with the Khartoum government increased, the insurgency can be expected to that allowed the Ugandan army to operate up to a increase attacks on IDP camps and other vulnerable certain distance inside Sudan in pursuit of the LRA. civilians, as it did after Operation Iron Fist was It was supposed to be the “knock out blow” on the launched. The army cannot realistically be expected LRA, which had camps in Southern Sudan, to prevent every LRA action but it must put greater including a headquarters at Lubanga-tek that was effort into protecting civilians and providing other well equipped with vehicles, radio communications humanitarian support.53 and weaponry provided by Khartoum. The operation destroyed these camps and documented Partly in order to address the problem of Sudanese support of the LRA, but it did not destroy insufficient troops to provide full security, the the insurgents, who, knowing the army was government has focused recently on the creation of coming, either retreated deeper into Sudan or Local Defence Units (LDUs). These are returned to Northern Uganda, where the level of paramilitary groups composed of local recruits with violence against civilians increased noticeably. The minimal training. The Arrow Boys militia in Teso, operation is theoretically still underway but has led by Captain Mike Mukula, Minister of State for become a familiar war of attrition.56 Health, has been particularly effective. The Rhino Group, led by Musa Echweru, the Soroti Regional This failure should have persuaded the army of the District Commissioner (RDC), in Lira is also very limitations of conventional operations against an popular locally, where the army is recruiting 10,000 elusive opponent that does not need to defend militia. The militias are tasked with securing roads territory and is not greatly affected by casualties. and protecting IDPs, thus freeing the army to take The emphasis on expensive conventional systems the offensive. However, as the recent massacre at such as tanks and attack helicopters rather than Barlonyo showed, the coordination of operations improved mobility, intelligence and and intelligence between army and militias is poor. communications has left the army short of the tools Attention needs to be paid to the welfare of militia it requires to counter the LRA militarily. It needs to members if the experiment is not to be plagued by develop new structures, acquire the right equipment desertions.54 and develop sound counter-insurgency strategy and tactics, but to do so it will have to overcome the The government is having less success at forming intransigence and inflexibility of its commanders in militias in Kitgum and Gulu. “The government is both Kampala and the field. afraid to arm the population in Gulu because of opposition to Museveni”, said a high-ranking The army’s inability to meet its challenges has official. “Even if they don’t join Kony, they could other causes as well. The Congo campaigns, for start another war after this one is finished”, another which it was not prepared and following which it said.55 Acholi leaders have not generally been as has not replenished equipment or retrained and supportive of the LDU concept as counterparts in rested many of its personnel, produced a high level Teso and Langi region. This is partly due to of battle fatigue for troops who have been on previous experiences when Acholi were armed only continual duty for years. As a consequence of donor concerns over corruption and the government’s general approach to the insurgency,

53 President Museveni has been under pressure to cap Particularly serious examples of the army’s inability to defence spending at 2 per cent of GDP. This is provide adequate protection occurred in the first week of February 2004. LRA fighters dressed as army personnel infiltrated an IDP camp in Abia, north of Lira, and killed approximately 45 people and followed this with a massacre at Barlonyo that took the lives of over 200. 54 Welfare problems in the regular army are discussed below. 56 The army has recently announced that it will be returning 55 ICG interview, Kampala, Dec 03. to Southern Sudan, The New Vision, 4 February 2004. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 16

deeply resented within the army and government.57 all further erode morale and represent a greater Holding the defence budget at 2 per cent, however, threat to the army and its personnel than Joseph does not necessarily produce a commensurate Kony's rebels. reduction in corruption or increase in efficiency. Defence spending and reform need to be looked at 3. Corruption and its consequences qualitatively, not quantitatively. The more likely effect of a quantitative measure is to further The level of corruption in the army has reached decrease legitimate expenditure while waste and levels that can no longer be hidden. Museveni corruption remain constant. Moreover, in order to himself is reportedly shocked and embarrassed.61 meet the shortfall, the government reduced the Corruption and mismanagement are believed to budgets of all other departments by 23 per cent, consume approximately a quarter of the defence thus weakening social spending. budget,62 with many at the top and close to the president implicated. The types of corruption vary Expansion of the Presidential Protection Unit to a widely and include: low-level theft and extortion brigade (3,000-plus personnel) is not a sign that the from civilians; creation of “ghost soldiers” whose government is assigning the right priorities within pay is pocketed; acquisition of faulty equipment the defence budget. The money – reportedly some (from uniforms to helicopters and tanks- usually as 58 30 per cent of that budget – could be spent better a result of a bribe or personal business association); elsewhere, such as for improving the welfare of and exploitation of resources in the Congo, soldiers or raising a special forces capability to including the suspicion that this was the motivation target the LRA leadership. That a key officer in the for the intervention. Much is difficult to prove, as it new brigade is the president's son and it has a high is either concealed by national security claims or percentage of his own ethnic group feeds relies upon informal personal relationships and suspicions he is creating a personal militia to networks. However, the UN and the government ensure he remains in power whatever the outcome have investigated a number of cases. of the 2006 presidential election.59 The Porter Commission63 was established to The army’s problems can only be addressed investigate accusations of the UN Panel on qualitatively through a thorough reform process Exploitation in the DRC against the government supported by the donor community.60 The generally and/or Ugandan citizens, including military poor morale and physical conditions are obvious personnel. The Commission's report concluded that symptoms of wider problems, such as corruption, some members of the army, and Major General which impede performance. Complaints are Kazini,64 who was Army Commander until June particularly acute among non-Acholi, who feel they 2002, in particular, and civilian associates had are risking their lives to save some Acholi from engaged in corrupt and inappropriate activities. It other Acholi, a view also reflected by some at urged that a defence review should make or higher levels. Visible corruption, failure to pay recommend: soldiers regularly, poor conditions and equipment ‰ …a careful assessment of the ability, intelligence and education achievements of 57 The army was reduced from approximately 100,000 to some 50,000 to 60,000 in the late 1990s, a figure that senior particular officers. Some of those who have commanders told ICG they considered inadequate to conduct given evidence before this Commission have operations in the North and Northeast while properly rotating barely been able to make themselves and reinforcing units. ICG interview, October 2003. The understood, even to the rank of Major. army’s precise size is difficult to ascertain, in part due to the problem of “ghost soldiers” discussed below. 58 ICG interview, Kampala, February 2004. 59 A Western official said that Museveni was deeply affected by the assassination of former Congo president Laurent Kabila in 2001; the expanded Presidential Guard is to ensure 61 ICG interview, December 2003. he does not meet the same fate. ICG interview, Kampala, 62 ICG interview with Western diplomat, October 2003. October 2003. 63 The Porter Commission was set up by President Museveni 60 This may require an increase in defence spending above in 2001 to investigate the allegations against Uganda in the the 2 per cent cap, however, contingent upon certain report of the UN Panel on the Exploitation of Resources in processes being put in place to ensure accountability and the DRC. effectiveness. 64 See Porter Commission, Recommendations, para. 44.2. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 17

‰ A stringent examination of the capacity of the transaction. The government lost U.S.$6 million to officer to fulfil his office as a professional $12 million and had to spend additional funds to soldier. make the two defective aircraft useable.

‰ The commitment of the officer to the defence The latest public manifestation of corruption within of the State rather than self-advancement and the army is the “ghost soldiers” saga, which self-enrichment. And respect for civil 65 continues to be investigated but has already authority as required under the Constitution. resulted in the court martial of a number of These recommendations amounted to an indictment personnel for other offences, including Major of the army as an institution where personal and General Kazini and Brigadier Henry Tumukunde, political associations can prevail over the former chief of the Internal Security professionalism and duty. Officer inadequacies Organisation (ISO). The army has suspended all have created an environment where corrupt paymasters. The ghost soldier phenomenon is reported to have arisen in the mid-1990s in the 4th activities are not only perpetuated but also hidden 71 and protected, often to the great detriment of the Division based in Gulu, and have included use of military mission. personal bank accounts to deposit and disburse public money and the deaths and disappearances of Perhaps the best example of this is the “Junk personnel associated with these payments. Perhaps Helicopters” scandal. Concerns about the purchase the starkest demonstration of the problems was the of MI-24 attack helicopters from Belarus, through a recent discovery of reportedly some 4,000 Ugandan intermediary, led to a judicial commission Rwandans who left the NRM’s forces in the early of inquiry,66 whose findings were later endorsed in 1990s to form what became the army of the current a parliamentary white paper. The commission Rwandan government but remained on Kampala’s 67 payroll along with dead Ugandan veterans. The recommended that General Salim Saleh and 72 others be prosecuted for their roles in the handling president was reported to be “shocked”. of the purchase.68 It also pointed to failures in the procurement system. A proper assessment of needs These and other incidents undermine the morale of and the utility of the system had not been the army and the confidence of Ugandans in their undertaken; the decision to purchase was an government and society. They also undermine the enthusiastic personal and political one of the confidence of the donor community, which covers 69 approximately 50 per cent of Uganda's budget, in president himself; and the problems arose from the integrity of the government and the utility of its the “special relationship” between the president and support. For instance, the Dutch ambassador told the general (his half-brother).70 As a consequence Finance Minister Gerald Ssendaula as they signed of a flawed procurement process exploited by an agreement bringing The Hague’s bilateral aid for corrupt individuals, the government bought 2003 to €34 million euro (UShs 78 billion) that “in helicopters that on delivery were found not the past year, progress in the fight against airworthy, contrary to the conditions of the contract corruption has been disappointing, we eagerly and the reports of personnel involved in the await the follow up of the junk helicopters and the Porter reports, which have to do with corruption in 73 65 Ibid, para 44.4. the army”. Many donors interviewed by ICG 66 See “Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Purchase of expressed the same sentiments. It is likely that Military Helicopters”, Government of Uganda, 24 August without more accountability and prosecution of 2001. corruption, Uganda will see a reduction in financial 67 A nom de guerre. His real name is Caleb Akwandwanaho. and political support. 68 Saleh admitted he agreed to accept a U.S.$800,000 inducement for ensuring the purchase of the helicopters through a middle man. The commission recommended that he and the other key actors be prosecuted under the 71 The New Vision reported on 16 December 2003 that Prevention of Corruption Act, 1970. This recommendation Defence Minister Amama Mbabazi's report on ghost soldiers has been endorsed by the government white paper on the in the army discovered the most cases were in Northern judicial inquiry. See “Judicial Commission”, op. cit., paras 3, Uganda, and the most egregious of these happened between 3.5 , and 3.5.9. 1996 and 1998 when the army was building a local defence 69 Ibid, para 2.2.2 for the president’s comments on the need force (LDU). to acquire the helicopters. See also para 2.2.9-10. 72 The Monitor, 6 December 2003. 70 Ibid, paras 3.3.8-9. 73 The Monitor, 27 November 2003. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 18

In response to such pressure, President Museveni IV. FINDING SOLUTIONS usually adopts a belligerent tone, at least publicly, as he did in the celebration of the eighteenth anniversary of his movement’s victory, on 26 The dynamics between the Acholi, the LRA and the January 2004, when he called for donors not to Ugandan and Sudanese governments have interfere in the country’s internal politics. While produced a conflict in Northern Uganda that belies primarily reacting to reported public statements by a one-dimensional solution. Most debate centres on diplomats regarding whether he should stand for a the false dichotomy of a military vs. negotiated third term, the downplaying of army corruption as solution. A military-only solution – unlikely in any the result of “small paymasters” was hardly event because of army deficiencies – would deal reassuring. Donors have no right to dictate the form with the immediate manifestation of the problem, and substance of Uganda's constitutional the LRA, but not solve the North-South divide or arrangements but they do have a right to insist on produce national reconciliation. Similarly, probity and accountability for the funds they negotiations may create the illusion of progress or disburse. be manipulated by the belligerents to gain a battlefield advantage that leads to increased Army personnel have been responsible for human violence, while addressing only the humanitarian rights abuses, which according to Human Rights consequences of a conflict would treat the Watch include summary execution, torture, rape, symptoms, not the cause. An effective strategy will child recruitment, and inhuman conditions of need to aim comprehensively at achieving a detention in unauthorised locations74. Such 75 negotiated settlement while maintaining military occurrences and the failure to correct them are pressure to contain the conflict and minimise characteristic of the conflict. Just as failure to victims, while at the same time enhancing the prosecute corruption undermines government prospects of national reconciliation and improving legitimacy and army effectiveness, so does the the humanitarian situation in the North and failure to address human rights abuse openly and Northeast. honestly. Beyond individual actions, wider accusations need to be accounted for, including the recruitment of child soldiers and support for A. A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY paramilitary groups such as the Kalangala Action Plan.76 Government policy needs to address the LRA insurgency and Northern grievances simultaneously. The LRA should be dealt with through military, humanitarian and diplomatic and political means. Northern grievances require economic and political reforms. Only a more comprehensive counter-insurgency campaign

74 coupled with effective economic and political See “Renewed Conflict in Northern Uganda”, Human initiatives can provide the key to a solution in the Rights Watch, July 2003. 75 According to Human Rights Watch, when abuses occur, North. As yet, there is not enough military pressure "they are rarely prosecuted for crimes committed against to make any diplomatic opening possible, and not civilians. Even when UPDF [army] abuses have been enough of a diplomatic opening to render such investigated, the investigations have sometimes been kept pressure meaningful. A progressive approach internal and therefore have created an appearance of should provide sufficient space to create impunity, which has not improved public trust. UPDF opportunities, build confidence and test the responses to allegations of abuses against civilians, such as commitment of the parties to resolve the conflict. rape, unlawful killing, and torture, range from the crime going unpunished, to being ‘punished’ by transferring the accused, to the court martial of some individual soldiers 1. Creating a negotiation opportunity without proper investigation, all the way to the rare true court martial. Often it appears that the action followed, or the The Museveni government needs to make an honest punishment meted out, is at the sole discretion of the attempt at negotiations. Establishing a clear and individual field commander", ibid, p. 41. 76 unequivocal path for talks with whomever in the Ibid, pp. 47-50, the Kalangala Action Plan, is a LRA wishes to pursue them is important for a paramilitary group used by the NRM to threaten political opponents during the 2001 Presidential elections. number of reasons. First, it matters politically at Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 19

home and abroad for Museveni to counter the LRA is reportedly highly suspicious of Washington suspicion that he is pursing a military strategy for but the State Department would need to go beyond personal advantage or seeks only a military solution its self-imposed, terrorist list-driven limitation of to a North-South dispute. Secondly, it may provide being willing to discuss only humanitarian issues the opportunity for splitting the LRA. with the LRA. Indeed, a solely humanitarian focus might delay substantial dialogue and actually allow LRA commanders appear to believe they can the LRA to recuperate. The army believes that survive and perhaps continue to prosper if they Kony has taken advantage of past peace initiatives remain in the bush but would be killed if they came to rearm, reorganise, and recruit. out. To lay the groundwork for dialogue, the government could undertake confidence-building Ugandan civil society and opposition figures want measures. Potentially one of the most important the U.S. to use its leverage to promote a solution in involves amnesty. This has been on offer, in one the North. However, there is a widespread feeling form or another, to all members of the LRA since that it has been too soft on Museveni. A Northern 1998. The relevant legislation was recently activist said, “The U.S. is sending mixed signals. extended for six months but is due for further State is telling the government to dialogue, while review in April 2004 when the government has the DOD [Department of Defence] is pushing indicated it intends to modify the terms to exclude, military aid. This encourages Museveni to be for the first time, Joseph Kony and otherwise rigid”.78 unspecified leadership elements. It should consider maintaining the offer for all members of the LRA – The concerns of the army and of those opposed to including commanders – except Kony in order to Museveni will have to be met by an incremental encourage potential divisions within the approach based first on a truce and improved leadership.77 It should also transfer unpopular humanitarian access. Once there are signs that the officials away from the North, transmit strong, LRA leadership, with or without Kony, is interested coordinated public messages laying out objectives in negotiations, measures such as limited or general and expectations, and deploy a single “peace team”. ceasefires can be implemented to test each side's In the past, too many initiatives, with competing commitment. After this, it should be possible to incentives, often worked at cross-purposes. Both allow those LRA fighters who want talks to move the government and the LRA exploited this into de-militarised zones. Unless the LRA applied a anarchy. One centrally backed, clear path must be comprehensive ceasefire, normal security laid out. operations would continue outside those zones.

President Museveni must be seen to support this Any strategy will have to encompass those to approach fully, backed by the U.S. and EU. whom the LRA listens or relies upon, such as shop- Consideration should be given to invoking a third owners, businessmen, parliamentarians and others party facilitator, perhaps a "troika" of the U.S., to whom it turns when it needs something or wants Sudan (the only government with access to the to get a message out. Fear of possible U.S. actions LRA) and a neutral country such as Ireland, Austria will be an important motivation for the LRA, and or Switzerland. Such a team could help bring about this potential leverage should be used. The U.S. conditions to allow direct negotiations between the will have to lean heavily on Sudan to cut off its government and the LRA at a suitable time. The support to the LRA and bring the insurgency to the table. Khartoum has begun to view the LRA as a

liability internationally but much depends on how 77 After considerable lobbying by the Acholi Religious useful it considers it internally. This depends in Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), the government turn on the process of peace negotiations with its introduced legislation in 1998 which offered a blanket SPLA foe. The international observer mission that amnesty to all LRA fighters and commanders who returned is expected to be part of any agreement to end from the bush. This has been renewed on a number of Sudan’s civil war should give priority attention to occasions. The Amnesty Act is problematic in a number of respects. For example, there are inconsistencies between it monitoring possible resupply of the LRA along and the Anti-terrorism Act. See Refugee Law Project, op.cit. with Sudanese militias in the south of that country. p. 46. There is also a question of the possible impact on Other leverage should be employed as well. For transitional justice in the event that its implementation resulted in failure to prosecute those who committed very serious crimes under both national and international law. 78 ICG interview, December 2003. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 20

example, suggestions that its leaders might become 2. Security sector reform liable to trial for war crimes before the International Criminal Court (ICC) could be made to induce the Despite slow improvements in army tactics and LRA to negotiate. fewer attacks in 2003 than in 2002, the effect on civilians over the past twelve months has been Kony is unlikely to participate in any meaningful greater. Three further districts are in a state of war. dialogue but it is important to create realistic exit IDPs have increased 40 per cent to roughly 1.5 strategies for his commanders and fighters. This million. At least 20,000 children are estimated to requires a deft combination of more focused and have been abducted since Operation Iron Fist efficient military pressure, targeted diplomacy, began. Thousands of civilians – “night commuters” reintegration programs for LRA personnel willing – are coming into towns after dark. The army to lay down arms, and robust, visible political and clearly needs to become more effective in counter- economic initiatives in the North. Incentives to insurgency. This entails implementing the LRA commanders and fighters should include: conclusions of the defence review with specific focus on how it fights in the North. ‰ insurance of physical security; Stronger efforts at curbing corruption will be ‰ relocation options; necessary. The recent firing of senior commanders ‰ physical protection; show Museveni’s desire to improve relations with donors and clean up the army before the 2006 ‰ welfare issues (houses, allowances, etc.); presidential election but further prosecutions and sackings are required. ICG is told they are planned. ‰ DDR for the combatants; “We have moved very firmly and we have much 80 ‰ rehabilitation for the North, and more to go,” promised a senior UPDF official. The U.S. and UK should make continued ‰ jobs in the government or UPDF where cooperation with the military conditional upon possible or appropriate. serious measures being taken. The recent statement by the prosecutor of the ICC The culture of impunity is being addressed for the that he will investigate the LRA and Kony79 adds to first time. Major General Aronda, the new Army his pariah status. Other measures, such as a Commander, is considered to be a professional, substantial bounty, should be considered. methodical and at times ruthless officer who will If after political measures have been exhausted the go after corruption diligently. The sweeping away consensus is talks will not resolve the conflict, of Kazini and Saleh loyalists will boost morale. channels should be kept open but options will Political support for Aronda as he pursues the root narrow to reducing the effects of the conflict by causes of the army’s problems will be the key. As providing security and improved living conditions one Western military analyst told ICG, “the rank 81 in the North. However, this requires major army and file may be illiterate, but they are not stupid”. reform Many high-ranking officials are overconfident, particularly about Operation Iron Fist, citing army 79 ICC Statement of the Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo to success at dislodging the LRA from its bases in Diplomatic Corps The Hague, Netherlands 12 February 2004. Southern Sudan and "pinning [it] down" in the The ICC is pursuing preliminary contacts with Ugandan North. They do not believe the government could officials. If a full-scale investigation is ultimately to be credible, the ICC presumably would need to extend it to abuses do more in the overall struggle. Many consider that committed by the Ugandan army as well. There may also be such inadequacies as there are result from donor- need to reconcile aspects of the ICC’s operation with demanded cuts in defence spending and see the implementation of the Amnesty Act should the latter be used to recent defence review as vindication of their view offer immunity to former insurgents against whom the court that the government has under-spent on defence. might wish to pursue a case. On the general matter of the “The Ugandan government hasn’t failed; it is good relationship of the ICC to amnesty acts and truth and reconciliation commissions (not specifically with regard to to see the international community joining us” said Uganda), see Justice Richard May of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, “Memo for Workshop on International Criminal Accountability”, Washington, D.C., 6-7 80 ICG interview, Kampala, November 2003. November 2003. 81 Ibid. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 21

a senior army commander.82 They suggested that will be very much influenced, however, by the the approach taken several years earlier with the extent of government commitment to deal with Ugandan National Rescue Front (UNRF) II, which problems that have been extant for years, especially involved offering a few positions to leaders, was an corruption. appropriate model for dealing with the LRA.83 However this may reflect a misunderstanding of the The review, if implemented, will also assist in the fundamental differences between the LRA and development of a better organisation and strategy other insurgent movements that over the years have for dealing with the LRA. Reinforcing battalions to been integrated into the army. Such a their proper size after ghost soldiers are removed misunderstanding is shared by a number of NGOs would have a dramatic effect on performance and and diplomats. morale. Senior commanders see the importance of the review. “Before this, there was no consensus The UK assisted the army to undertake a defence about problems and their solutions”, said a senior review, the first of its kind in Africa. It is just officer. “The review will go a long way to building completed, and the government is now deciding consensus internally and with donors”.85 Planned what to do about its findings. It came about in and existing U.S. training and support aim to response to the donor-imposed cap of 2 per cent of promote a more professional and mobile army GDP for military spending and represents a great focused on the protection of civilians and better opportunity for a comprehensive transformation of able to fight an effective counter-insurgency the army in management, command and control, campaign against the LRA. mobility, motivation, procurement, and accounting. If its recommendations are implemented, the Army officers speak of new procurement general results should be: regulations, communications equipment, and modernised units. The U.S. wants to support ‰ a more professional, non-political army; Ugandan efforts to create a senior staff college, focusing on civil-military relations and ‰ improved and transparent procurement; professionalism. This could help shape the military ‰ a rationalised command structure with for decades, as further restructuring would 86 separate political-strategic, operational and inevitably flow from this effort. Foreign Military tactical levels of responsibility; and Financing (FMF) has been approved to train six battalions in counter-insurgency and provide night ‰ more effective field operations. vision equipment, although disbursement of the funds is on hold because of concerns about the This transformation is envisaged to take place over 87 fifteen years, with a projected first-year cost on the army’s human rights record. This training may order of UShs 400 billion, (U.S.$222 million), an increase of approximately 28 to 30 per cent in the current defence budget that would bring it to 85 84 ICG interviews, Kampala, December 2003. approximately 2.6 per cent of GDP. The 86 The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) has – in the context government will need to remain focused on the of its global counter-terrorism effort – focused on providing issue of affordability, which means it may be intelligence support to the Ugandan army. EUCOM and the heading for another disagreement with donors, army have created a counter-terrorism fusion cell in which daily although the degree of analysis and justification in joint intelligence assessments are made. 87 the review should reduce friction. Donor agreement The Department of State's 2003 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in respect to Uganda stated that "the Government's human rights record remained poor; although there were some improvements in a few areas, serious problems 82 ICG interview, Kampala, December 2003. remained. Domination by the [National Resistance] Movement 83 The UNRF, led by Moses Ali -- now a government minister - of the political process limited the right of citizens to change - was an armed group from West Nile and including many their government. Security forces committed unlawful killings. former soldiers of Idi Amin that opposed the NRM. The UNRF Security forces were responsible for short-term disappearances. II contained those UNRF elements that did not join the initial Torture by security forces and beating of suspects to force integration and continued to fight. Most of these eventually confessions were serious problems. Security forces were accepted amnesty and integration in 2002. responsible for incommunicado detention, and prison conditions 84 “Uganda Defence Review - Summary of key Findings and remained harsh and life threatening. The Government punished Proposed Strategy for Defence Transformation”, November some security force officials who were guilty of abuses; 2003. however, impunity remained a problem. Arbitrary arrests and Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 22

eventually provide a base upon which to establish a uncertain whether Museveni will seek another term special forces capability to target the LRA as president in 2006. leadership. That could reduce reliance on blunt conventional forces and free funding, troops and 3. Humanitarian action material to improve protective forces.88 Many of the humanitarian problems facing the The U.S. has also provided non-lethal equipment, population in the conflict areas result from such as high-tech surveillance gear and heat displacement. Much can be alleviated by returning sensors. In return it receives public support for its as many people to the countryside as possible once war on terrorism and, under a longstanding the security situation improves. Where return is not agreement, the use of Entebbe airfield when possible, the government needs to improve security needed.89 This relationship has been criticised for and living conditions at the IDP camps. President causing Washington to overlook government faults, Museveni reportedly reacted to a question relating including in the conduct of the conflict in the to the recent LRA massacres at the Abia IDP camp North. However, ICG interviews with U.S. officials by saying that if “conditions were unbearable they indicated a strong awareness of the realities. The would have got out. They are not in prison”.91 If close bilateral relationship potentially gives the accurately reported, this is a clear example of the U.S. unmatched ability to offer incentives and attitude that needs to be adjusted if the government apply pressure. It should use that leverage to make and those most affected by the war are to gain a significant difference in Northern Uganda. confidence in each other.

The ethnic composition of the army and its loyalty Relocations are largely a result of both implicit and especially to Museveni present problems in any explicit army policies and actions that make it attempt to make it truly professional. Recruitment, untenable for many to remain in their homes. Their for example, is often conducted outside the return to the countryside requires reversing the established constitutional requirement that it be a tendency to move them into centralised locations nation-wide exercise on a designated day. that may make them more inviting targets for the Museveni is the army’s founder, and he often still LRA and exacerbate their economic and social recruits and controls it on the basis of patronage problems. Explicitly, it means reversing the and loyalty to himself and NRM ideology. After Security and Production Program (SPP). The winning the contested 2001 presidential election, he government also needs to pay more attention to made this clear when he stated that the army is one those who cannot return home. This involves more of three legs on which the NRM rests.90 Given the than protecting international NGOs such as the continued persecution of opposition politicians, World Food Programme better. It must be seen such as the former presidential candidate Besigye, providing relief to its own endangered citizens. who question the army’s competence and management, it is doubtful that the NRM is willing International support should be focussed not only to let it become fully accountable to the parliament on alleviating the immediate effects of the conflict and subject to public scrutiny, at least not while it is but also on enabling political progress. Increased humanitarian aid to IDP camps is at the heart of USAID’s Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI). If talks move forward, the U.S. is prepared detention, including those of opposition politicians and their to help resettle people from the camps to their supporters, and prolonged pre-trial detention were problems." home areas. The hope is that both sides could 88 This might result either in efforts to make the LDUs more accept limited demilitarised zones so civilians professional, which would reduce concerns as to their future could return to their fields, in a slowly expanding, role and influence, or, if the regular army were not required de facto ceasefire. However, NUPI may rely too to pursue the LRA, in reduction of LDUs. heavily on an inappropriate model from Sudan’s 89 Uganda was one of only four African countries to support the war in Iraq. The U.S. considers it, therefore, an important Nuba Mountains. Army officers reject a ally in the region. comparison to the ceasefire there. They say the 90 “The Movement Cannot Rig”, The New Vision, 16 March LRA is not comparable to the SPLA, which 2001. The other two legs are the Local Councils (LCs) – the controls territory so that such measures as administrative bodies established by the NRM across the country – and the State House (the Presidential residence and office). 91 The Monitor, 9 February 2004. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 23

“corridors of tranquillity” are appropriate. The any policy initiatives that might emerge in response LRA, however, controls no territory, cannot move to the LRA. In general, such an agenda includes: humanitarian aid and has never made an agreement that it has kept. They also cite great differences in ‰ post war reconstruction assistance – geography. infrastructure, capacity building for institutions, support for agricultural production Noting that food is presently delivered to the IDP and trade, promotion of private enterprise; camps, a European aid official asks, “what would corridors of tranquillity do besides possibly making ‰ affirmative action: scholarships, employment the delivery a bit cheaper”? In fact, it would be opportunities; naïve and dangerous – in response to a deal on ‰ decentralisation, as the most effective way to corridors of tranquillity – to end military escorts transfer resources and decision-making to the with food deliveries. A Western military analyst North; also calls humanitarian corridors naive: “Kony could issue orders to subordinates not to ambush, ‰ social reform, prioritising schools, clinics, but if they are hungry they will disregard these housing (Kony has burned down many instructions. Morale and command/control are villages), social services, and drugs for deteriorating within the LRA. However, safe HIV/AIDS patients; havens might work: security guarantees and ‰ settlement and reintegration of IDPs, requiring assistance could be provided to these areas while 92 agricultural inputs, micro-enterprise negotiations are ongoing”. opportunities, and construction-related employment; B. LONG-TERM RECONCILIATION ‰ psychological and social support for LRA combatants, abductees and traumatised The Acholi must be made to feel a part of Ugandan communities; and society. The NRM simply has not succeeded in unifying the country. To rectify this will require ‰ civil society support. specific political, economic and social initiatives There is a wide diversity in the “Acholi view”, aimed at building the North’s connections with the 93 central government while enhancing autonomy and however. Many religious, political, civil society, localized decision-making. The World Bank’s and traditional leaders represent only a portion of Social Action Fund should focus on supporting their people’s interests and lack the strategic reach decentralisation by building the government’s to deal with the full scope of problems that need to capacity to deliver services in the North, rather than be solved. This division in their leadership will creating a separate parallel funding mechanism for only assist maintenance of the status quo. It is very social goods. It needs to focus its support on the much in the interest of the Acholi, therefore, to districts. A critical element of any long-term develop mechanisms with which to develop and solution will be restoring the economic viability of convey a comprehensive and authoritative the conflict- ridden areas. presentation of their needs and demands. It is also in the interest of Museveni and the NRM to Acholi politicians are beginning to perceive the full promote the emergence of effective and credible measure of the LRA's unacceptability, although Acholi leaders who can act as interlocutors for many also believe that the government is simply Acholi concerns and as a conduit to assist in taking advantage of the U.S. to get more aid and solving the LRA conflict and the wider question of sympathy. However, some of the Acholi diaspora the North-South divide. remains pro-LRA, seeing the insurgency as a tool with which to undermine Museveni. Numerous After eighteen years of war, it is clear that the Northern political and civil society actors have tried NRM cannot solve the problems alone. For this, to assert a more coherent political and economic it must work with the Acholi. This means agenda for the region that would take advantage of listening to and understanding views that

93 This opinion was commonly expressed in ICG interviews 92 ICG interviews, Kampala, December 2003. with Western diplomats. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 24

Museveni and the NRM do not necessarily agree country as well as continue attacks in Northern with – a tendency that is often not apparent. In Uganda. Intra-South negotiations would be critical the long term, and after ending the LRA threat, and real power sharing within Southern Sudan a there will need to be a mechanism similar to a vital conflict prevention measure to reduce the national truth and reconciliation commission possibility of disaffected elements seeking despite potential problems in differing notions of relationships with the Ugandan insurgency. justice that are apparent to a degree in the current The biggest fear among senior Ugandan army amnesty program. Traditional Acholi notions of officers is that peace between the SPLA and the forgiveness and reconciliation may not Khartoum government could lead to a South-South necessarily correspond to the standards of conflict between the SPLA and groups that oppose national and/or international law. However, a it in its home region. The likelihood is low, but if process of national reconciliation cannot be the conflict does break out, it would harm efforts to dictated by one party’s view as to appropriate counter the LRA. Kony’s staying power over the mechanisms for forgiveness and punishment. years has been maximized by support from both Khartoum and his anti-SPLA Southern Sudanese In addition to issues directly related to the allies. There is a widespread belief in the Ugandan conflict, general issues of democratic government that if the U.S. leans on Khartoum, it development within Uganda are important for in turn has the leverage over Kony to bring him to achieving long-term solutions. Multi-party the negotiating table. It would be worthwhile at democracy that is not subject to the control of least to try to deploy those Sudanese politicians any particular segment of society is a sound basis who have a long history with the LRA leader to for both reconciliation and unity. make the effort.

The merger between the SPLA and the Equatoria C. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS Defence Force (EDF) announced on 5 March 2004, and their recent joint, if limited, military operations 1. The Sudan factor in Southern Sudan against the LRA are meaningful developments for Kony’s prospects in that country. A peace agreement in Sudan, even if achieved, will The EDF was responsible for initially bringing the not produce an immediate benefit in Northern LRA to Sudan in the mid-1990's and facilitated its Uganda. The LRA remains one of Khartoum’s contacts with the Khartoum government.94 It proxy militias. The strategic functions it has carried continued to act as its link to the Sudanese out for its patron have been the defence of Juba and authorities, provided safe passage and acted at the effort to pin down the Ugandan army so it is times as a conduit for supplies. less able to support the SPLA. Regardless of a treaty, the SPLA will not physically control the The contacts between the EDF and the SPLA began entire south of Sudan, although it would become in late 2002, following the Sudan government’s more difficult for the LRA to operate. Supply lines recapture of the strategic town of Torit, which the are vital. If Khartoum were to break with the past EDF had played an important part in enabling.95 and end all support to Southern proxy militias, the Those contacts developed in part because the EDF LRA’s days would be numbered but it is likely that resented its exclusion from the IGAD peace some in Sudan’s government will want to keep process, which made good progress through much elements of the more effective militias functional as of 2003. A decision was taken at a December 2003 a hedge against the SPLA as well as the Ugandan meeting to move toward merger96 though the EDF army. wanted several months in which to remove its people to SPLA-controlled areas in Eastern If supplies are kept up, the LRA can remain a Equatoria before making the news public. An potent force for destabilisation. There is a danger informal ceasefire has existed between the two that pro-Khartoum Southern Sudanese militias such as the Southern Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) would continue to work with it. The LRA could 94 ICG interview with EDF Commanders in Khartoum, 1 maintain alliances with anti-SPLA groups in October 2003. Southern Sudan and help undermine the 95 ICG interview, 6 March 2004. implementation of the peace agreement in that 96 ICG interview, 13 March 2004. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 25

groups since January 2004, at which time the EDF money, an interest that in recent years has caused also stopped supporting the LRA. In late February, them, for example, both to place restrictions on a week before announcement of the merger and their military aid after the rapacious Ugandan after the LRA raided some 3,000 cattle from EDF- incursion into the Congo and to seek to cap military controlled areas, the SPLA and EDF began joint expenditures as a percentage of GDP. actions against the Ugandan group.97 International calls for the government to abandon The effect of the merger on the LRA's presence in its military strategy and pursue only a negotiated Southern Sudan is likely to be significant, but not settlement, while well intentioned and crippling. Most damaging will be the loss of safe understandable from a humanitarian perspective, passage south of Juba and Torit. However, a senior are misplaced.101 While it is probably true that there SPLA commander acknowledged that "the LRA can be no purely military solution, neither donors will not suddenly become a priority for the nor the government have the means to induce the SPLA".98 Another senior SPLA commander said, LRA to negotiate. The idea that a single solution, "our real priority remains the government of Sudan, whether military, negotiated or humanitarian, can not their militias. The only way to stop the LRA is in itself solve the conflict and the problems of to stop the source and get the GoS [government of Northern Uganda, runs counter to complex reality. Sudan] out of Juba and Torit".99 The conflict in Northern Uganda, although Sudanese President al-Bashir’s recent public predominantly an internal affair, has not escaped reference to Kony and the LRA as terrorists is the influence of the U.S. war on terrorism. unlikely to be more than rhetoric.100 But his use of Museveni has been one of the staunchest supporters that terminology and Sudan’s renewal through May in Africa of U.S. policy, in part no doubt because 2004 of the agreement permitting Uganda’s army to he desires Washington’s backing against the LRA pursue the LRA across the border suggest and its Sudanese supporters. It is natural for him to Khartoum is becoming increasingly sensitive to the try to argue for links between Kony and al-Qaeda, costs involved in association with the LRA. via Khartoum, as hard as he can. The basis for U.S. help to him should be the desirability of peace in 2. The U.S. initiative Uganda and in Southern Sudan, however, not an inaccurate characterisation of the LRA. The international community has been central to the conflict in Northern Uganda. As has been The U.S. should be prepared to use its influence. Its noted, the Museveni government receives credibility with both the Ugandan and Sudanese approximately half its budget from donors, which governments makes it the best positioned power to requires it at least to give a careful hearing to bring those parties together. It has numerous lines advice. It has a good record in a number of areas, into the LRA, while both John Garang, the SPLA such as AIDS prevention. Such successes dispose leader, and the Khartoum government have the international community positively towards reportedly asked how they can be helpful in this Uganda. However, the conflict in the North undoes regard. The first efforts to engage with the LRA much of this good will and is causing many donors, have not been successful but U.S. diplomats say particularly those giving budgetary support, to they have not ruled any approach out, and a question the effectiveness of their aid. meeting with Kony would be a possibility. Uganda is tolerant of the USAID NUPI initiative but is not Any donor pressure on the sensitive issue of the prepared to do anything that would be considered conflict in the North has to recognise that the active support. “The idea of talking to Kony is Museveni government is primarily responsible for welcome, even though we know it is impossible”, solving that problem. Nevertheless, donors have a said a senior government official, who added: legitimate interest in querying the use of their “Kony lives like a king with 32 wives and 60

97 ICG interviews, March 2004. 101 For instance, Agnes van Ardenne the Netherlands 98 ICG interview, 13 March 2004. minister for development co-operation, suggested during a 99 ICG interview, 6 March 2004. visit to Uganda in October 2003 that "we should bring 100 "Bashir declares Kony a terrorist", New Vision, 5 March President Museveni and Kony to a negotiating table", 2004. IRINNEWS.Org, 7 November 2003. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 26

children; he has surface to air missiles; he is better acknowledge the failure of past efforts with Kony. armed than the majority of African armies; what In ICG’s many interviews, European governments can we offer him that can lure him out of the (and NGOs generally) expressed a number of bush”?102 specific concerns and questions:

Much rumour and misinformation circulates about ‰ Will the LRA participate in a dialogue the extent of U.S. assistance to the Ugandan army facilitated by the U.S. while the latter is and about the details of NUPI. Key U.S. officials arming Kampala’s military and has designated see NUPI as an opportunity to build on anticipated it as a terrorist organisation? success in the Sudanese peace talks, since the LRA and the Ugandan government reportedly have ‰ What are Museveni's motivations? Will he just pretend to talk in a doomed initiative in order indicated privately that they could talk with each to justify a more robust military response? other. Nevertheless, since no meetings have been held and none are scheduled, there is no reason to ‰ Is U.S. military aid too blunt an instrument for hold out high expectations. Indeed, according to a enhancing the army’s performance? There is a humanitarian aid official, “there is too much pressing need to identify the kind of aid that trumpet blowing in Washington about NUPI. They improves the army rather than simply are talking about creating humanitarian corridors increasing the killing power of a badly 103 between Gulu and Kitgum. It is pure fantasy”. organised force that often hits the wrong people. The U.S. has sent a letter to the LRA asking for a meeting between it, the Museveni government and ‰ Why is Acholi civil society, which could help a USAID representative to talk about humanitarian the U.S. interpret the issues, not involved in aid because of the growing access problem the initiative? presented by attacks on assistance convoys. It ‰ Why is the U.S. going it alone? There is not asked for a written reply through the Sudanese much information sharing and joint government. The SPLA indicated that it would strategising with other governments or the provide security so the LRA could get to such a donors group. There would be more strength meeting, and Khartoum said it would provide in a multilateral initiative built around security at the negotiating venue. If humanitarian consensus. aid agreements could be reached and implemented, then the parties could talk further. The letter was The U.S. could allay most of these concerns by delivered on 17 September 2003 through the U.S. consulting more with other governments, Embassy in Khartoum. The U.S. heard nothing particularly those who are closely engaged in until a message came back from one of the Uganda. Since international mechanisms would be interlocutors asking about security for Kony at the required to support and sustain a negotiation talks. A response through another interlocutor process and then deliver the economic, demanded food for the LRA as a precondition for a humanitarian and security support required after meeting. The U.S. is uncertain about whether either any agreement, it would seem reasonable to of these responses was from Kony, and is unwilling advance these from the beginning. to put anything on the table (e.g., food) as a precondition for talks.104 Another theme that has commonly arisen in ICG interviews, especially with Acholi civil society European governments generally are suspicious of organisations, involves the desire for international these efforts. They feel cut out of NUPI and intervention in the form of observers and/or disagree with Washington’s decision to resume peacekeepers. However, this is an expectation that military aid to the Ugandan army. They worry that is unlikely to be met, at least in the near term. An the diplomatic and military aspects of U.S. policy observer mission would not be undertaken by the are not coordinated and have different objectives. international community (including the African They favour talking over fighting, although they Union) or be feasible without the agreement of the Ugandan government. The notion of peacekeepers in the present environment is even less likely. 102 ICG interview, Kampala, December 2003. 103 Ibid. 104 ICG interviews, Kampala, November 2003. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 27

V. CONCLUSION

The LRA insurgency is a significant challenge for the Ugandan government and people. Legacies of the colonial and post colonial periods are much a part of this conflict, which has lasted 18 years. The LRA, while purporting to represent the grievances of the Acholi, is carrying out a campaign of terror, motivated by a mix of spiritualism and survival that is utterly at odds with its stated aims. Nevertheless, the NRM government has failed both to defeat it and to bridge the gulf that divides Kampala from the Acholi population, without which it will not be possible to achieve a true peace in and with the North. President Museveni’s own legacy and that of his movement will be judged by their ability to solve the immediate and long term problems associated with the conflict. They have primarily pursued a strategy to defeat the LRA militarily but lack the ability to do so, primarily due to the weakness of the army.

To solve the conflict, the government, supported by the international community, needs to develop and implement a comprehensive strategy that encompasses security, political and humanitarian action. It must reform and reorient the army, develop a clear path for negotiating with those insurgents who wish to stop fighting, and advance the country’s transition to greater democracy. It must also work immediately with international and Ugandan partners to alleviate the humanitarian suffering of the approximately 1.5 million persons who have been displaced by the conflict.

Nairobi/Brussels, 14 April 2004

Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 28

APPENDIX A

MAP OF UGANDA

Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 29

APPENDIX B

TIMELINE OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA105

Dateline UPDA HSMF LRA NRA-Army

January 1986 NRA topples Okello government. May 1986 Fighting in the North between NRA and fleeing UNLA troops; Gulu and Kitgum declared war zones. August, 1986 Former soldiers of the Alice Auma, a little NRA 35th battalion UNLA attack Bibia in known medium in composed of Gulu and 30 are killed Kitgum, claims the spirit FEDEMU fighters by the NRA. First Lakwena ordered her to massacres civilians UPDA incursions from stop healing and raise in Namukora, in Sudan. HSMF to wage war response to UPDA against evil in Acholi. attack. October 1986 HSMF attack Gulu and are defeated. November 1986 Alice takes over 150 troops from UPDA and successfully attacks NRA at Corner Kilak (Kitgum). December 1986 Attack against NRA in Pajule, then Lira, Soroti. February 1987 Kony joins UPDA as “spiritual mobiliser” in Major Benjamin Apia’s black battalion. Kony and his followers seize UPDA division commanded by Okello Okeno; more UPDA soldiers later join Kony from 80th brigade. March 1987 First protected camps for civilians created in Gulu. June 1987 Government declares amnesty for rebels willing to surrender. July “Operation Coy” to 1987/September flush out UPDA. 1987 November 1987 HSMF defeated near Kony attacks UPDA HQ Jinja. Alice arrested in near Pawel Owor. Kenya for illegal entry on 30 December. January 1988 Alice’s father (Severino Kony attacks 115th

105 Adapted from van Acker op.cit., Table 1, p. 48. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 30

Dateline UPDA HSMF LRA NRA-Army

Lukoya) attempts to brigade of UPDA and continue HSMF in integrates it into his force Kitgum. 23 March 1988 Agree to ceasefire and Lukoya joins Kony, as Sign peace sign formal peace well as Lukonyomoi of agreement with agreement with NRA. United Uganda Godly UPDA. Movement (UUGM). May 1988 Peace talks with NRA Overall commander of President Museveni led by Salim Saleh in UPDA, Odong Latek, extends amnesty to Gulu. joins Kony with 39 all armed groups. soldiers. June 1988 Peace treaty between Peace treaty with UPDA and NRA. Over UPDA. Also start of 2000 UPDA join NRA major operations by NRA against remaining rebels. February 1989 Museveni declares three- month moratorium on military operations near Gulu; after failure, NRA intensifies assaults and moves people back into camps. April 1991 Launches a major four-month “Operation North” led by Minister of State for Defence David Tinyefuza to end insurgency. July 1991 Major revenge killings and atrocities against citizens. January 1994 Peace talks started, led by Betty Bigombe; talks break down after President issues ultimatum for conclusion in seven days. 1994 Sudanese support for Kony; mass abductions of children start. February 1996 LRA offensive in Gulu. June-December Kony spreads the Presidential and 1996 message that if Paul Parliamentary Semwogerere of DP elections; Museveni becomes president, he wins but receives will lay down arms. little support in Acholi areas. Acholi living in the diaspora convene “Kacoke Madit”, a series of London meetings to seek a solution for Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 31

Dateline UPDA HSMF LRA NRA-Army

the conflict. January– Kony starts a series of Parliament December 1997 heavy attacks on Kitgum recommends population; into 1999; escalation of military many atrocities by LRA efforts to end war. against Acholi. Saint Egidio host meeting of LRA and government in Rome. March-June . The Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative 1998 presents a memorandum for peace to Museveni and hold Bedo Piny, a three-day consultative meeting to focus on ending the war September 1998 Amnesty Act is published in Uganda Government Gazette. December 1999 Signing of Nairobi Peace Agreement between Uganda and Sudan. June 2001 Local peace talks in Gulu under auspices of District Reconciliation and Peace Team (which end in failure). April 2002 Army launches “Operation Iron Fist” against LRA in Sudanese territory after agreement with Khartoum; this shatters a two-year period of relative quiet. 2003 Unilateral ceasefire by LRA produces limited government ceasefire; nomination of presidential peace team and unsuccessful attempts to start negotiations; large-scale violations of ceasefire; expansion of conflict to Teso and West Nile. LRA moves into Soroti, Katakwi and Lira. The Arrow Group and Amuka group formed in Teso and Lango to fight LRA. Top LRA commanders Charles Tabuley, Tolbert Nyeko and Caesar Acellam killed. Jan 2004 Museveni asks International Criminal Court to investigate LRA abuses. ICC prosecutor appears Onwards willing to explore this. Frontier Guards formed in Kitgum to fight LRA. UPDF offensive against LRA continues. Sudanese ambassador to Uganda, Sirajal-Din Hamid, says Khartoum prepared to help investigate Kony and have him arrested. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 32

APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY

ADF Allied Democratic Forces

APG Acholi Parliamentary Group

ARLPI Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative

BMTT British Military Training Team

DMZ Demilitarised Zones

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

EDF Equatoria Defence Force

EU European Union

EUCOM United States European Command

FEDEMU Federalist Democratic Movement of Uganda

FMF Foreign Military Funding

FUNA Former Uganda National Army

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GPS Global Positioning System

HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus

HSM Holy Spirit Movement

HSMF Holy Spirit Mobile Forces

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPFC Inter-Political Forces Coalition

LDU Local Defence Unit

LRM/A Lord's Resistance Movement/Army

NCC National Consultative Council

NC National Conference

NEC National Executive Committee

NIF National Islamic Front Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 33

NRM/A National Resistance Movement/Army

NUPI Northern Uganda Peace Initiative

OIF Operation Iron Fist

PGB Presidential Guard Brigade

SPLM/A Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

SSDF Southern Sudan Defence Force

UFM/A Uganda Freedom Movement/Army

UN OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance

UNLA/F Uganda National Liberation Army / Front

UNRF Uganda National Rescue Front

UPA Uganda People's Army

UPC Uganda People's Congress

UPDF Uganda People's Defence Forces

UPDM/A Uganda People's Democratic Army / Movement

USAID United States Agency for International Development Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 34

APPENDIX D

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 100 Zimbabwe; in Asia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, staff members on five continents, working through Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent Afghanistan, Kashmir and Nepal; in Europe, Albania, and resolve deadly conflict. Bosnia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole ICG’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, political analysts are located within or close by Colombia. countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments ICG raises funds from governments, charitable from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports foundations, companies and individual donors. The containing practical recommendations targeted at key following governmental departments and agencies international decision-takers. ICG also publishes currently provide funding: the Australian Agency for CrisisWatch, a 12-page monthly bulletin, providing a International Development, the Austrian Federal succinct regular update on the state of play in all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian Department most significant situations of conflict or potential of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian conflict around the world. International Development Agency, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign ICG’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely Affairs, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the by email and printed copy to officials in foreign German Foreign Office, the Irish Department of Foreign ministries and international organisations and made Affairs, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, generally available at the same time via the the Luxembourgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the organisation’s Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. ICG New Zealand Agency for International Development, works closely with governments and those who the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs influence them, including the media, to highlight its (Taiwan), the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the prescriptions. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish Ministry of The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures Foreign Affairs, the United Kingdom Foreign and from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the Commonwealth Office, the United Kingdom media – is directly involved in helping to bring ICG Department for International Development, the U.S. reports and recommendations to the attention of senior Agency for International Development. policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its Foundation and private sector donors include Atlantic President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans. Ford Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Henry Luce ICG’s international headquarters are in Brussels, with Foundation Inc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York, London Foundation, John Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott and Moscow. The organisation currently operates Foundation, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, thirteen field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogotá, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Cairo, Freetown, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kathmandu, Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish Community Endowment Nairobi, Osh, Pristina, Sarajevo and Tbilisi) with Fund, the United States Institute of Peace and the analysts working in over 40 crisis-affected countries Fundação Oriente. and territories across four continents. In Africa, those countries include Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic April 2004 Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea,

Further information about ICG can be obtained from our website: www.crisisweb.org

Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 35

APPENDIX E

ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS∗

AFRICA A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi, Africa Report N°57, 21 February 2003 ALGERIA∗∗ Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: a New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration, Africa Report N°63, 23 The Civil Concord: A Peace Initiative Wasted, Africa Report May 2003 (also available in French) N°31, 9 July 2001 (also available in French) Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri, Africa Report N°64, Algeria’s Economy: A Vicious Circle of Oil and Violence, 13 June 2003 Africa Report N°36, 26 October 2001 (also available in French) The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Time for Pragmatism, Africa Report N°69, 26 September 2003 CENTRAL AFRICA Refugees and Displaced Persons in Burundi – Defusing the From Kabila to Kabila: Prospects for Peace in the Congo, Land Time-Bomb, Africa Report N°70, 7 October 2003 (only Africa Report N°27, 16 March 2001 available in French) Burundi: Breaking the Deadlock, The Urgent Need for a New Réfugiés et Déplacés Burundais: Construire d’urgence un Negotiating Framework, Africa Report N°29, 14 May 2001 Consensus sur le Rapatriement et la Réinstallation, Africa (also available in French) Briefing, 2 December 2003 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed, HORN OF AFRICA Africa Report N°30, 7 June 2001 (also available in French) Disarmament in the Congo: Investing in Conflict Prevention, God, Oil & Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan, Africa Briefing, 12 June 2001 Africa Report N°39, 28 January 2002 Burundi: 100 Days to Put the Peace Process Back on Track, Capturing the Moment: Sudan’s Peace Process in the Africa Report N°33, 14 August 2001 (also available in French) Balance, Africa Report N°42, 3 April 2002 “Consensual Democracy” in Post Genocide Rwanda: Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State, Africa Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections, Africa Report Report N°45, 23 May 2002 N°34, 9 October 2001 Dialogue or Destruction? Organising for Peace as the War in The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: Political Negotiation or Game Sudan Escalates, Africa Report N°48, 27 June 2002 of Bluff? Africa Report N°37, 16 November 2001 (also Sudan’s Best Chance for Peace: How Not to Lose It, Africa available in French) Report N°51, 17 September 2002 Disarmament in the Congo: Jump-Starting DDRRR to Ending Starvation as a Weapon of War in Sudan, Africa Prevent Further War, Africa Report N°38, 14 December 2001 Report N°54, 14 November 2002 Rwanda/Uganda: A Dangerous War of Nerves, Africa Salvaging Somalia’s Chance for Peace, Africa Briefing, 9 Briefing, 21 December 2001 December 2002 Storm Clouds over Sun City: The Urgent Need to Recast the Power and Wealth Sharing: Make or Break Time in Sudan’s Congolese Peace Process, Africa Report N°38, 14 May 2002 Peace Process, Africa Report N°55, 18 December 2002 (also available in French) Sudan’s Oilfields Burn Again: Brinkmanship Endangers The Burundi: After Six Months of Transition: Continuing the War Peace Process, Africa Briefing, 10 February 2003 or Winning the Peace, Africa Report N°46, 24 May 2002 Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia, Africa Report (also available in French) N°59, 6 March 2003 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Sudan’s Other Wars, Africa Briefing, 25 June 2003 Countdown, Africa Report N°50, 1 August 2002 (also available in French) Sudan Endgame Africa Report N°65, 7 July 2003 The Burundi Rebellion and the Ceasefire Negotiations, Africa Somaliland: Democratisation and Its Discontents, Africa Briefing, 6 August 2002 Report N°66, 28 July 2003 Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace?, Africa Report N°68, 24 Liberalisation, Africa Report N°53, 13 November 2002 (also September 2003 available in French) Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace, Africa Report N°73, The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict, 11 December 2003 Africa Report N°56, 24 January 2003 Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis, Africa Report N°76, 25 March 2004 SOUTHERN AFRICA

∗ Released since January 2001. Zimbabwe in Crisis: Finding a Way Forward, Africa Report ∗∗ The Algeria project was transferred to the Middle East N°32, 13 July 2001 & North Africa Program in January 2002. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 36

Zimbabwe: Time for International Action, Africa Briefing, 12 Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security Map, Asia October 2001 Report N°20, 4 July 2001 (also available in Russian) Zimbabwe’s Election: The Stakes for Southern Africa, Africa Uzbekistan at Ten – Repression and Instability, Asia Report Briefing, 11 January 2002 N°21, 21 August 2001 (also available in Russian) All Bark and No Bite: The International Response to Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the “Island of Democracy”, Zimbabwe’s Crisis, Africa Report N°40, 25 January 2002 Asia Report N°22, 28 August 2001 (also available in Russian) Zimbabwe at the Crossroads: Transition or Conflict? Africa Central Asian Perspectives on the 11 September and the Report N°41, 22 March 2002 Afghan Crisis, Central Asia Briefing, 28 September 2001 Zimbabwe: What Next? Africa Report N° 47, 14 June 2002 (also available in French and Russian) Zimbabwe: The Politics of National Liberation and Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, Asia Report N°25, 26 International Division, Africa Report N°52, 17 October 2002 November 2001 (also available in Russian) Dealing with Savimbi’s Ghost: The Security and Humanitarian Afghanistan and Central Asia: Priorities for Reconstruction Challenges in Angola, Africa Report N°58, 26 February 2003 and Development, Asia Report N°26, 27 November 2001 (also available in Russian) Zimbabwe: Danger and Opportunity, Africa Report N°60, 10 March 2003 Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace, Asia Report N°30, 24 December 2001 (also available in Russian) Angola’s Choice: Reform Or Regress, Africa Report N°61, 7 April 2003 The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign, Central Asia Briefing, 30 January 2002 Decision Time in Zimbabwe, Africa Briefing, 8 July 2003 (also available in Russian) WEST AFRICA Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, Asia Report N°33, 4 April 2002 Sierra Leone: Time for a New Military and Political Strategy, Central Asia: Water and Conflict, Asia Report N°34, 30 May Africa Report N°28, 11 April 2001 2002 Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, Africa Report N°35, 24 Kyrgyzstan’s Political Crisis: An Exit Strategy, Asia Report October 2001 N°37, 20 August 2002 Sierra Leone: Ripe for Elections? Africa Briefing, 19 The OSCE in Central Asia: A New Strategy, Asia Report December 2001 N°38, 11 September 2002 Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability, Africa Report Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform, Asia Report N°42, N°43, 24 April 2002 10 December 2002 Sierra Leone after Elections: Politics as Usual? Africa Report Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan’s Failing Dictatorship, N°49, 12 July 2002 Asia Report N°44, 17 January 2003 Liberia: Unravelling, Africa Briefing, 19 August 2002 Uzbekistan’s Reform Program: Illusion or Reality?, Asia Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Report N°46, 18 February 2003 (also available in Russian) Fresh Start?, Africa Briefing, 20 December 2002 Tajikistan: A Roadmap for Development, Asia Report N°51, Tackling Liberia: The Eye of the Regional Storm, Africa 24 April 2003 Report N°62, 30 April 2003 Central Asia: Last Chance for Change, Asia Briefing, 29 April The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Promises and Pitfalls of 2003 a “New Model”, Africa Briefing, 4 August 2003 Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir, Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance, Africa Asia Report N°58, 30 June 2003 Report N° 67, 2 September 2003 Central Asia: Islam and the State, Asia Report N°59, 10 July Liberia: Security Challenges, Africa Report N°71, 3 November 2003 2003 Youth in Central Asia: Losing the New Generation, Asia Côte d’Ivoire: “The War Is Not Yet Over”, Africa Report Report N°66, 31 October 2003 N°72, 28 November 2003 Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for Guinée: Incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne, Africa Report Engagement, Asia Report N°72, 22 December 2003 N°74, 19 December 2003 (only available in French) The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways Forward for the Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils, Africa Report N°75, International Community, Asia Report N°76, 11 March 2004 30 January 2004 INDONESIA ASIA Indonesia: Impunity versus Accountability for Gross Human Rights Violations, Asia Report N°12, 2 February 2001 CENTRAL ASIA Indonesia: National Police Reform, Asia Report N°13, 20 February 2001 (also available in Indonesian) Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia Report Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis, Indonesia Briefing, 21 February N°14, 1 March 2001 (also available in Russian) 2001 Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia’s Localised Poverty Bad Debt: The Politics of Financial Reform in Indonesia, and Social Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001 (also Asia Report N°15, 13 March 2001 available in Russian) Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 37

Indonesia’s Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, Indonesia MYANMAR Briefing, 21 May 2001 Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, Asia Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society, Asia Report N°27, 6 Report N°17, 12 June 2001 (also available in Indonesian) December 2001 Aceh: Can Autonomy Stem the Conflict? Asia Report N°18, Myanmar: The Military Regime’s View of the World, Asia 27 June 2001 Report N°28, 7 December 2001 Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan, Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid, Asia Report Asia Report N°19, 27 June 2001 N°32, 2 April 2002 Indonesian-U.S. Military Ties, Indonesia Briefing, 18 July 2001 Myanmar: The HIV/AIDS Crisis, Myanmar Briefing, 2 April 2002 The Megawati Presidency, Indonesia Briefing, 10 September 2001 Myanmar: The Future of the Armed Forces, Asia Briefing, 27 September 2002 Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya, Asia Report N°23, 20 September 2001 Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics, Asia Report N°52, 7 May 2003 Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, Indonesia Briefing, 10 October 2001 NORTH KOREA Indonesia: Next Steps in Military Reform, Asia Report N°24, 11 October 2001 North Korea: A Phased Negotiation Strategy, Asia Report N°61, 1 August 2003 Indonesia: Natural Resources and Law Enforcement, Asia Report N°29, 20 December 2001 (also available in Indonesian) SOUTH ASIA Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku, Asia Report N°31, 8 February 2002 Afghanistan and Central Asia: Priorities for Reconstruction Aceh: Slim Chance for Peace, Indonesia Briefing, 27 March 2002 and Development, Asia Report N°26, 27 November 2001 Indonesia: The Implications of the Timor Trials, Indonesia Pakistan: The Dangers of Conventional Wisdom, Pakistan Briefing, 8 May 2002 Briefing, 12 March 2002 Resuming U.S.-Indonesia Military Ties, Indonesia Briefing, Securing Afghanistan: The Need for More International 21 May 2002 Action, Afghanistan Briefing, 15 March 2002 Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the “Ngruki The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward? Afghanistan & Network” in Indonesia, Indonesia Briefing, 8 August 2002 Pakistan Briefing, 16 May 2002 Indonesia: Resources and Conflict in Papua, Asia Report Kashmir: Confrontation and Miscalculation, Asia Report N°39, 13 September 2002 N°35, 11 July 2002 Tensions on Flores: Local Symptoms of National Problems, Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military, Asia Report Indonesia Briefing, 10 October 2002 N°36, 29 July 2002 Impact of the Bali Bombings, Indonesia Briefing, 24 October The Afghan Transitional Administration: Prospects and 2002 Perils, Afghanistan Briefing, 30 July 2002 Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Pakistan: Transition to Democracy? Asia Report N°40, 3 Terrorist Network Operates, Asia Report N°43, 11 December October 2002 2002 (also available in Indonesian) Kashmir: The View From Srinagar, Asia Report N°41, 21 Aceh: A Fragile Peace, Asia Report N°47, 27 February 2003 November 2002 (also available in Indonesian) Afghanistan: Judicial Reform and Transitional Justice, Asia Dividing Papua: How Not to Do It, Asia Briefing, 9 April Report N°45, 28 January 2003 2003 (also available in Indonesian) Afghanistan: Women and Reconstruction, Asia Report N°48. Aceh: Why the Military Option Still Won’t Work, Indonesia 14 March 2003 Briefing, 9 May 2003 (also available in Indonesian) Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, Asia Report N°49, Indonesia: Managing Decentralisation and Conflict in 20 March 2003 South Sulawesi, Asia Report N°60, 18 July 2003 Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire – Soft Landing or Strategic Aceh: How Not to Win Hearts and Minds, Indonesia Pause?, Asia Report N°50, 10 April 2003 Briefing, 23 July 2003 Afghanistan’s Flawed Constitutional Process, Asia Report Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still N°56, 12 June 2003 Dangerous, Asia Report N°63, 26 August 2003 Nepal: Obstacles to Peace, Asia Report N°57, 17 June 2003 The Perils of Private Security in Indonesia: Guards and Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation, Asia Militias on Bali and Lombok, Asia Report N°67, 7 November Report N°62, 5 August 2003 2003 Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Asia Report N°64, 29 September Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections, Asia 2003 Report N°71, 18 December 2003 Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan, Asia Report Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia N°65, 30 September 2003 Report N°74, 3 February 2004 Nepal: Back to the Gun, Asia Briefing, 22 October 2003 Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 38

Kashmir: The View from Islamabad, Asia Report N°68, 4 Milosevic in The Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia and December 2003 the Region, Balkans Briefing, 6 July 2001 Kashmir: The View from New Delhi, Asia Report N°69, 4 Macedonia: Still Sliding, Balkans Briefing, 27 July 2001 December 2003 Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock, Balkans Kashmir: Learning from the Past, Asia Report N°70, 4 Report N°114, 1 August 2001 December 2003 Bosnia’s Precarious Economy: Still Not Open for Business; Afghanistan: The Constitutional Loya Jirga, Afghanistan Balkans Report N°115, 7 August 2001 (also available in Briefing, 12 December 2003 Bosnian) Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism, Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution? Balkans Asia Report N°73, 16 January 2004 Report N°116, 10 August 2001 Nepal: Dangerous Plans for Village Militias, Asia Briefing, Macedonia: War on Hold, Balkans Briefing, 15 August 2001 17 February 2004 Albania’s Parliamentary Elections 2001, Balkans Briefing, Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?, Asia Report 23 August 2001 N°77, 22 March 2004 Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum, Balkans Briefing, Elections and Security in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing, 30 March 8 September 2001 2004 Serbia’s Transition: Reforms Under Siege, Balkans Report N°117, 21 September 2001 (also available in Serbo-Croat) TAIWAN STRAIT The Wages of Sin: Confronting Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Taiwan Strait I: What’s Left of “One China”?, Asia Report Balkans Report N°118, 8 October 2001 (also available in N°53, 6 June 2003 Bosnian) Taiwan Strait II: The Risk of War, Asia Report N°54, 6 June Facing Up to War Crimes, Balkans Briefing, 16 October 2001 2003 Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism, Taiwan Strait III: The Chance of Peace, Asia Report N°55, 6 Balkans Report N°119, 9 November 2001 June 2003 Kosovo: Landmark Election, Balkans Report N°120, 21 Taiwan Strait IV: How an Ultimate Political Settlement Might November 2001 (also available in Albanian and Serbo-Croat) Look, Asia Report N°75, 26 February 2004 Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery, Balkans Report N°121, 29 November 2001 (also available in Bosnian) ∗ Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to EUROPE Resolve It, Balkans Report N°122, 10 December 2001 (also available in Serbo-Croat) BALKANS Kosovo: A Strategy for Economic Development, Balkans Report Religion in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°105, 31 January 2001 N°123, 19 December 2001 (also available in Serbo-Croat) Turning Strife to Advantage: A Blueprint to Integrate the A Kosovo Roadmap: I. Addressing Final Status, Balkans Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°106, Report N°124, 28 February 2002 (also available in Albanian and 15 March 2001 Serbo-Croat) Montenegro: Settling for Independence? Balkans Report A Kosovo Roadmap: II. Internal Benchmarks, Balkans Report N°107, 28 March 2001 N°125, 1 March 2002 (also available in Albanian and Serbo- Croat) The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion, Balkans Report N°109, 5 April 2001 Belgrade’s Lagging Reform: Cause for International Concern, Balkans Report N°126, 7 March 2002 (also available in Montenegro: Time to Decide, a Pre-Election Briefing, Serbo-Croat) Balkans Briefing, 18 April 2001 Courting Disaster: The Misrule of Law in Bosnia & After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°127, 26 March 2002 (also Peace, Balkans Report N°108, 26 April 2001 available in Bosnian) No Early Exit: NATO’s Continuing Challenge in Bosnia, Serbia: Military Intervention Threatens Democratic Reform, Balkans Report N°110, 22 May 2001 Balkans Briefing, 28 March 2002 (also available in Serbo- Albania: The State of the Nation 2001, Balkans Report Nº111, Croat) 25 May 2001 Implementing Equality: The “Constituent Peoples” Decision A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for Regional Stability, in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°128, 16 April Balkans Report N°112, 15 June 2001 2002 (also available in Bosnian) Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace, Balkans Report Still Buying Time: Montenegro, Serbia and the European N°113, 20 June 2001 Union, Balkans Report N°129, 7 May 2002 (also available in Serbian)

Policing the Police in Bosnia: A Further Reform Agenda, ∗ Reports in the Europe Program were numbered as ICG Balkans Report N°130, 10 May 2002 (also available in Bosnian) Balkans Reports until 12 August 2003 when the first Moldova UNMIK’s Kosovo Albatross: Tackling Division in Mitrovica, report was issued at which point series nomenclature but not Balkans Report N°131, 3 June 2002 (also available in Albanian numbers was changed. and Serbo-Croat) Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 39

Fighting to Control Yugoslavia’s Military, Balkans Briefing, CAUCASUS 12 July 2002 Bosnia’s Alliance for (Smallish) Change, Balkans Report Georgia: What Now?, Europe Report N°I51, 3 December 2003 N°132, 2 August 2002 (also available in Bosnian) MOLDOVA Macedonia’s Public Secret: How Corruption Drags the Country Down, Balkans Report N°133, 14 August 2002 (also Moldova: No Quick Fix, Europe Report N°147, 12 August 2003 available in Macedonian) Finding the Balance: The Scales of Justice in Kosovo, Balkans Report N°134, 12 September 2002 LATIN AMERICA Moving Macedonia Toward Self-Sufficiency: A New Security Colombia’s Elusive Quest for Peace, Latin America Report Approach for NATO and the EU, Balkans Report N°135, 15 N°1, 26 March 2002 (also available in Spanish) November 2002 (also available in Macedonian) The 10 March 2002 Parliamentary Elections in Colombia, Latin Arming Saddam: The Yugoslav Connection, Balkans Report America Briefing, 17 April 2002 (also available in Spanish) N°136, 3 December 2002 The Stakes in the Presidential Election in Colombia, Latin The Continuing Challenge of Refugee Return in Bosnia & America Briefing, 22 May 2002 (also available in Spanish) Herzegovina, Balkans Report N°137, 13 December 2002 (also available in Bosnian) Colombia: The Prospects for Peace with the ELN, Latin America Report N°2, 4 October 2002 (also available in Spanish) A Half-Hearted Welcome: Refugee Return to Croatia, Balkans Report N°138, 13 December 2002 (also available in Serbo- Colombia: Will Uribe’s Honeymoon Last?, Latin America Croat) Briefing, 19 December 2002 (also available in Spanish) Return to Uncertainty: Kosovo’s Internally Displaced and the Colombia and Its Neighbours: The Tentacles of Instability, Return Process, Balkans Report N°139, 13 December 2002 (also Latin America Report N°3, 8 April 2003 (also available in available in Albanian and Serbo-Croat) Spanish and Portuguese) Albania: State of the Nation 2003, Balkans Report N°140, 11 Colombia’s Humanitarian Crisis, Latin America Report N°4, March 2003 9 July 2003 (also available in Spanish) Serbia after Djindjic, Balkans Report N°141, 18 March 2003 Colombia: Negotiating with the Paramilitaries, Latin America Report N°5, 16 September 2003 (also available in Spanish) A Marriage of Inconvenience: Montenegro 2003, Balkans Report N°142, 16 April 2003 Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy, Latin America Report N°6, 13 November 2003 (also available Kosovo’s Ethnic Dilemma: The Need for a Civic Contract, in Spanish) Balkans Report N°143, 28 May 2003 (also available in Albanian and Serbo-Croat) Hostages for Prisoners: A Way to Peace in Colombia?, Latin America Briefing, 8 March 2004 (also available in Spanish) Bosnia’s BRCKO: Getting In, Getting On and Getting Out, Balkans Report N°144, 2 June 2003 Thessaloniki and after I: The EU’s Balkan Agenda, Europe MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA Briefing, 20 June 2003 Thessaloniki and after II: The EU and Bosnia, Europe Briefing, ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 20 June 2003 Thessaloniki and after III: The EU, Serbia, Montenegro A Time to Lead: The International Community and the and Kosovo, Europe Briefing, 20 June 2003 Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Middle East Report N°1, 10 April 2002 Serbian Reform Stalls Again, Balkans Report N°145, 17 July 2003 Middle East Endgame I: Getting to a Comprehensive Arab- Israeli Peace Settlement, Middle East Report N°2, 16 July 2002 Bosnia’s Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building, Balkans Report N°146, 22 July Middle East Endgame II: How a Comprehensive Israeli- 2003 Palestinian Settlement Would Look, Middle East Report N°3; 16 July 2002 Two to Tango: An Agenda for the New Kosovo SRSG, Europe Report N°148, 3 September 2003 Middle East Endgame III: Israel, Syria and Lebanon – How Comprehensive Peace Settlements Would Look, Middle East Macedonia: No Room for Complacency, Europe Report N°149, Report N°4, 16 July 2002 23 October 2003 The Meanings of Palestinian Reform, Middle East Briefing, Building Bridges in Mostar, Europe Report N°150, 20 12 November 2002 November 2003 (also available in Bosnian) Old Games, New Rules: Conflict on the Israel-Lebanon Border, Southern Serbia’s Fragile Peace, Europe Report N°I52, 9 Middle East Report N°7, 18 November 2002 December 2003 Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires: Lessons from Territories: A Legitimate Target?, Middle East Report N°13, 2 the Balkans, Europe Briefing, 23 January 2004 April 2003 Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?, A Middle East Roadmap to Where?, Middle East Report N°14, Europe Report N°153, 25 February 2004 2 May 2003 Serbia's U-Turn, Europe Report N°I54, 26 March 2004 Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 40

The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap: What A Settlement Freeze The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratisation Means And Why It Matters, Middle East Report N°16, 25 and Regional Instability, Middle East Briefing, 8 October 2003 July 2003 (also available in Arabic) Hizbollah: Rebel without a Cause?, Middle East Briefing, 30 Iran: Discontent and Disarray, Middle East Briefing, 15 October July 2003 2003 Dealing With Hamas, Middle East Report N°21, 26 January Dealing With Iran’s Nuclear Program, Middle East Report 2004 N°18, 27 October 2002 Palestinian Refugees and the Politics of Peacemaking, Middle Iraq’s Constitutional Challenge, Middle East Report N°19, East Report N°22, 5 February 2004 13 November 2003 (also available in Arabic) Syria under Bashar (I): Foreign Policy Challenges, Middle Iraq: Building a New Security Structure, Middle East Report East Report N°23, 11 February 2004 (also available in Arabic) N°20, 23 December 2003 Syria under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges, Middle Iraq's Kurds: Toward an Historic Compromise? Middle East East Report N°24, 11 February 2004 (also available in Arabic) Report N°26, 8 April 2004 Identity Crisis: Israel and its Arab Citizens, Middle East Report N°25, 4 March 2004 ISSUES REPORTS EGYPT/NORTH AFRICA∗ HIV/AIDS Diminishing Returns: Algeria’s 2002 Legislative Elections, Middle East/North Africa Briefing, 24 June 2002 HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, Issues Report N°1, 19 June 2001 Algeria: Unrest and Impasse in Kabylia, Middle East/North Africa Report N°15, 10 June 2003 (also available in French) Myanmar: The HIV/AIDS Crisis, Myanmar Briefing, 2 April 2002 The Challenge of Political Reform: Egypt after the Iraq War, Middle East Briefing, 30 September 2003 (also available in EU Arabic) The European Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO): Crisis IRAQ/IRAN/GULF Response in the Grey Lane, Issues Briefing, 26 June 2001 Iran: The Struggle for the Revolution’s Soul, Middle East EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Report N°5, 5 August 2002 Conflict Prevention and Management, Issues Report N°2, 26 June 2001 Iraq Backgrounder: What Lies Beneath, Middle East Report N°6, 1 October 2002 EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update, Issues Briefing, 29 April 2002 Voices from the Iraqi Street, Middle East Briefing, 4 December 2002 Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in a Fragile CRISISWATCH State, Middle East Report N°8, 8 January 2003 Radical Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan: The Mouse That Roared? CrisisWatch is a 12-page monthly bulletin providing a succinct Middle East Briefing, 7 February 2003 regular update on the state of play in all the most significant Red Alert in Jordan: Recurrent Unrest in Maan, Middle East situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. It is Briefing, 19 February 2003 published on the first day of each month, as of 1 September 2003.

Iraq Policy Briefing: Is There an Alternative to War?, Middle

East Report N°9, 24 February 2003 War in Iraq: What’s Next for the Kurds?, Middle East Report N°10, 19 March 2003 War in Iraq: Political Challenges after the Conflict, Middle East Report N°11, 25 March 2003 War in Iraq: Managing Humanitarian Relief, Middle East Report N°12, 27 March 2003 Baghdad: A Race against the Clock, Middle East Briefing, 11 June 2003 Governing Iraq, Middle East Report N°17, 25 August 2003 Iraq’s Shiites under Occupation, Middle East Briefing, 9 September 2003

∗ The Algeria project was transferred from the Africa Program to the Middle East & North Africa Program in January 2002. Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 41

APPENDIX F

ICG BOARD MEMBERS

Martti Ahtisaari, Chairman Mark Eyskens Former President of Finland Former Prime Minister of Belgium Maria Livanos Cattaui, Vice-Chairman Marika Fahlen Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce Former Swedish Ambassador for Humanitarian Affairs; Director of Social Mobilization and Strategic Information, UNAIDS Stephen Solarz, Vice-Chairman Former U.S. Congressman Yoichi Funabashi Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist, The Asahi Shimbun, Gareth Evans, President & CEO Japan Former Foreign Minister of Australia Bronislaw Geremek

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland S. Daniel Abraham I.K.Gujral Chairman, Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation, U.S. Former Prime Minister of India Morton Abramowitz Carla Hills Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey Former U.S. Secretary of Housing; former U.S. Trade Representative Kenneth Adelman Asma Jahangir Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Disarmament Agency Executions; Advocate Supreme Court, former Chair Human Rights Commission of Pakistan Richard Allen Ellen Johnson Sirleaf Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President Senior Advisor, Modern Africa Fund Managers; former Saud Nasir Al-Sabah Liberian Minister of Finance and Director of UNDP Regional Former Kuwaiti Ambassador to the UK and U.S.; former Minister Bureau for Africa of Information and Oil Mikhail Khodorkovsky Louise Arbour Chief Executive Officer, Open Russia Foundation Supreme Court Justice, Canada; Former Chief Prosecutor, Wim Kok International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia Former Prime Minister, Netherlands Oscar Arias Sanchez Elliott F. Kulick Former President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize, 1987 Chairman, Pegasus International, U.S. Ersin Arioglu Joanne Leedom-Ackerman Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman, Yapi Merkezi Novelist and journalist, U.S. Group Todung Mulya Lubis Emma Bonino Human rights lawyer and author, Indonesia Member of European Parliament; former European Commissioner Barbara McDougall Zbigniew Brzezinski Former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President Mo Mowlam Cheryl Carolus Former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, UK Former South African High Commissioner to the UK; former Secretary General of the ANC Ayo Obe Jorge Castañeda President, Civil Liberties Organisation, Nigeria Former Foreign Minister, Mexico Christine Ockrent Journalist and author, France Victor Chu Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong Friedbert Pflüger Foreign Policy Spokesman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Wesley Clark Group in the German Bundestag Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Surin Pitsuwan Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark Itamar Rabinovich Ruth Dreifuss President of Tel Aviv University; former Israeli Ambassador to the Former President, Switzerland U.S. and Chief Negotiator with Syria

Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict ICG Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004 Page 42

Fidel V. Ramos William O. Taylor Former President of the Philippines Chairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe, U.S. Mohamed Sahnoun Ed van Thijn Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on Africa Former Netherlands Minister of Interior; former Mayor of Salim A. Salim Amsterdam Former Prime Minister of Tanzania; former Secretary General of Simone Veil the Organisation of African Unity Former President of the European Parliament; former Minister for Douglas Schoen Health, France Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S. Shirley Williams William Shawcross Former Secretary of State for Education and Science; Member House of Lords, UK Journalist and author, UK Jaushieh Joseph Wu George Soros Deputy Secretary General to the President, Taiwan Chairman, Open Society Institute Grigory Yavlinsky Pär Stenbäck Chairman of Yabloko Party, Russia Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland Uta Zapf Thorvald Stoltenberg Chairperson of the German Bundestag Subcommittee on Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation