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SECRET O P Permanent Upe M SGM-1204-53 SGM-1204-53 T ITTEE Ittifä Ittifä Îtmtrrt H mm FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 17 COPY NO, NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD Standing Group Gr oupe Permanent REGRADED NATO UNCLASSIFIED SGM-1204-53 Per Authority SMSM-431-99 iTTifä îtmtrrt By jJACQiaQiS;.. Date ildtJS. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC CHANNEL COMMITTEE SUBJECT: The NATO Military Command Structure 1. The Standing Group has under consideration the promulgation of a document listing the major NATO Military Commands and the first echelon of the subordinate commands and the broad areas of functional and geographical responsibility of these commands. This document will be strictly factual. It is intended only as a handy reference to existing terms of reference and not as a medium for amending these. 2 . Copies of the draft publication on the subject are contained at Enclosure. It is requested that: a. SACEUR review this publication and supply the material X for Appendix "B” to Enclosure "B", and copies of "General '-4 Instructions for SHAPE Major Subordinate Commanders". b . SACLANT review this publication and supply the material Co for Appendixes "G", "H", and "I" to Enclosure "B:|. c. CHANCOM'review this publication. FOR THE STANDING- GROUP: : z / * 2 2 > ÜÛ l o n g e r e f f e c t iv e H. L. BAYS y Colonel, USA DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC EN LECTURE DISCLOSURE PUBLIQUE IMSM-0431-99 etary -““1 IM S Control £ L L J REGRADED .TSECRET S " * “-* ___________ D Ï S T R : A B G(less 4) Par Authority WCWM r K ™ ™ « MEMO- t!2o Bj____ / ? W C - n,t. 2.1* APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE NATO DRAFT SECRET NOTE BY THE SECRETARY to the STANDING GROUP on THE NATO MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE 1. The corner stone of the NATO Military Command Structure was laid when the North Atlantic Council approved D^C, 24/3 on 18 December 1951. Subsequently, the NATO Military Command has developed in accordance with the principles established in D.C. 24/3 and as influenced by the build-up of NATO forces and by the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO membership. 2. The information contained at Enclosures "A", "B" and "C" has been obtained by extracting relevant matter, in whole or in part, from approved documents or communications. This compilation has been prepared with the purpose of providing in one source a compendium showing the major NATO Commands, the terms of reference of the major NATO Commanders and their immediate subordinate commanders and the broad areas of functional and geographical responsibility of these commanders. It does not replace or amend existing approved documents and communications. The documents and communications contained at Enclosure "D” should be referred to by those who desire the complete official information on the subject. DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC EN LECTURE DISCLOSURE PUBLIQUE IMSM-0431-99 , NATO SOM-1204-53 5ECRE APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE w m w APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE n a t o ENCLOSURE "A1 s e c & t MAJOR NAT O MILITARY COMMANDS Allied Command Europe (ACE) 1. T he Allied Command Europe is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), SACEUR has under his immediate command four major subordinate commands as follows: a. Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) under the command of the Commander-In-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe (CINCNORTH). b . Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) under the command of the Commander-in-Chief All ied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT). Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Southe rn Europe (CINCSOUTH). d. Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED) under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean (CINCAFMED). Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) 2. The Allied Command Atlantic is commanded by the Suprem e Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). SACLANT has under his immediate command the following major subordinate commands: &.■ Eastern Atlantic Area (EASTLANT) under the joint command of the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic Area (CINCEASTLANT) and the Air Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic Area (CINCAIREASTLANT). As an interim measure, pending further study and decision, SACLANT h as delegated to CINCEAST LANT and CINCAIREASTLANT the temporary additional responsibility for the area delineated in D.C. 24/2 (Final) as the Iberlant Atlantic DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC EN LECTURE DISCLOSURE PUBLIQUE IMSM-0431-99 Area. b. Western Atlantic Area (WESTLANT) under the command of the Commander-in-Chief Western Atlantic Area (CINCWESTLANT). This Enclosure may be downgraded to RESTRICTED - NATO when detached from basic document . NATO - 2 - Enclosure "A" SGM-1204-53 ABDDA\/Cn HrtB Dl ini I*-* nir/^l APII BP m m w APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSU flATO SECRET Channel-Southern North Sea Area (CHAN) 3. The Channel-Southern North Sea Area is under the joint command of the Allied Commander-In-Chief Ch annel (CINCHAN) and the Allied Maritime Air Commander-in-Chief Channel' (CINCMAIRCHAN). Canada-U.S. R egional Planning Group (CUSRPG) 4. The Regional Planning Group Organization in this area has been retained. DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC EN LECTURE DISCLOSURE PUBLIQUE IMSM-0431-99 NATO Enclosure !iA' SGM-I204-53 3 SECRET m m w appRovrn fo r Puri ir : m sn oaiirp APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE NATO ENCLOSURE "B■>T5» SECRET TERMS- OF REFERENCE OF THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS AND THEIR IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATE COMMANDER S The terms of reference of the major NATO Commanders and their immediate subordinate commanders are contained at Appendices as follows: „ a. SACEUR - Appendix "A“ - [D.C. 24/3 (Final)] b. CINCNORTH - Appendix "b I! - (To be supplied by SACEUR) £• ■CINCENT - Appöndix "C" - (SHAPE AG 2530 of 17 July 1953) d . CINCSOUTH - Appendix ”Dn - (SHAPE/376/53)* e . CINCAFMED . - Appendix "E11 - (SHAPS/377/53)* f . SACLANT - Appendix tlp H - [D.C. 24/3 (Fi^al)] £• CINCEASTLANT - Appendix "G" - (SACLANT Ser. 57 of 10 Apr 52 to be amended by SACLANT as necessary) h . CINCAIREASTLANT - Appendix ”HI! - (SACLANT Ser. 56 of 10 Apr 52 to be amended by SACLANT as necessary) i . CINCWESTLANT - Appendix "I” - (SACLANT Ser. 58 of 10 Apr 52 to be amended by SACLANT as necessary) j_. C INCHAN - Appendix !iJ" ' - {M.C. 34/1 Final) k. CINCMAIR CHAN - Appendix "K“ - (CC(52)l8)*J? 1 . CUSRPG - Appendix liL!l DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC EN LECTURE DISCLOSURE PUBLIQUE IMSM-0431-99 * Additional directives are required to complete these Terms of Reference (as specified in TOSHAP 369) NATO _ b - Enclosure B SGM-1204-53 SECR k k m APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE a p p e n d i x "a ” NATO TERMS O F REFERENCE OF THE SECRET SUPREM E ALLIED COMMANDER EU R OPE COMMANDER 1. A Supreme Allie d Commander Europe is hereby designated. His comman d, will be established in a Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE), The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEU R) shall have an Integrated staff composed of officers from all nations contributing to his command. Nations will be represented to his staff by nationa l liaison representatives. COMMAND AREA 2. T he command area of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and his major subordinate commanders, will be defined by responsible authority. SACEUR's command area, unless and until later redefined, will include the area of the three former European Regional Planning Groups of NATO, exclusive of the Channel Command area. 3. The control and the defense of the zones of the interior, including French North Africa, is the direct responsibility of the National Authorities concerned, who will grant the Allied Commanders under SACEUR all facilities necessary for the efficient conduct of their operations. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe shall have authority to conduct such combat operations In these zones, including French North Africa, as he deems necessary for the defense of Western Europe. , FORCES ` 4. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe will, have command res­ ponsibility over all Army, Navy and Air Force forces assigned to him DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC EN LECTURE DISCLOSURE PUBLIQUE IMSM-0431-99 for the defense of Western Europe.. This Appendix may be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL - NATO when detached from basic document. __ - 5 - NATO Appendix "A" to SGM-1204-53 SECRET Enci° ^ e MB" APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLO m ï o SECRET RESPONSIBILITIES AND POWERS IN WAR 5. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe will be responsible to the Standing Group for the overall direction and conduct of wartime operations within his command area. The division of respons ibili­ ties between the National Territorial Commandera and Supreme Allied Commander Europe and subordinate Allied Commanders will be as defined in M.C. 36 . 6 . The Supreme Allied Commander Europe in war will exercise the full powers of a Supreme Commander. These powers may later be defined In greater detail by the North Atlantic Council after con­ sultation with the Military Committee. RESPONSIBILITIES IN PEACE 7. The main function in peacetime of the Supreme Allied Comman­ der Europe is to ensure that, if an emergency occurs, the NATO forces made available by nations for the defense of W estern Europe will be organized, equipped, trained and ready to implement agreed war plans. Since a Supreme Comm ander's peacetime functions are in effect a pre­ lude to his wartime responsibility for the defense of his area of command, his peacetime responsibilities shall include: ja. The organization and training of national -units assigned to his command into an effective integrated force. b. The preparation of plans for the execution of his assigned missions, and their coordination with other NATO, national and Allied Commanders in accordance with the applicable principles laid down in M*C* 36.
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