Arctic Sovereignty and the Cold War
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ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND THE COLD WAR: CANADA-U.S. RELATIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEW LINE Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By John Woitkowitz Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2009 Thesis Committee: Prof. Robert J. McMahon, Advisor Prof. Paula Baker Prof. Peter L. Hahn Copyright by John Woitkowitz 2009 ABSTRACT This thesis analyzes how Arctic sovereignty issues shaped Canada’s negotiations with the United States about the establishment of the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line) in the Canadian Arctic during the 1950s. Against the backdrop of Cold War tensions, Ottawa and Washington agreed to install a chain of radar stations along North America’s Arctic border—mostly through Canadian territory—in an attempt to detect and deter potential Soviet nuclear attacks crossing the North pole. The asymmetric nature of Canada-U.S. relations and Ottawa’s consequent dependence upon U.S. defense stewardship, however, conflicted with Canadians’ view of their country’s recent national emancipation from its colonial relationship with Great Britain. During World War II, Ottawa’s experience with Canadian-American Northern defense cooperation had been mixed as a result of U.S. construction and operation of defense installations perceived to infringe upon Canada’s sovereignty. Whereas these wartime irritations informed Ottawa’s position throughout the DEW Line negotiations, the Canadian North carried significance beyond the strategic-military rationale of the Cold War. Canada’s Arctic served as a key element in the cultural construction of a Canadian national identity, in turn influencing how Ottawa conceived of the implications of a large American presence along Canada’s Northern frontier. This study demonstrates how sovereignty concerns shaped Ottawa’s course of action during the DEW Line negotiations, ensuring Canadian ii ownership and jurisdiction. By bringing the Cold War dimension, the Canadian sovereignty debate, and the broader cultural forces into conversation with each other, this thesis argues that the interplay of these aspects in context of asymmetric Canada-U.S. relations is key to a thorough understanding of Ottawa’s position towards Washington during the DEW Line negotiations. iii Dedicated to Anke iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Research is a collaborative effort, and the preparation of this thesis would not have been possible without the continuous encouragement, support, and help of friends and colleagues. For this reason, I would like to thank those who provided me with the opportunity to spend this year at the Ohio State University and helped me during my research and writing of this thesis. I would like to express my gratitude to my advisor Robert J. McMahon whose generous support provided me with invaluable feedback and guidance throughout the year. I am furthermore indebted to Paula Baker and my colleagues of History 869 for their helpful criticism and insights. I am particularly obliged to Ryan McMahon who not only reviewed this thesis at various stages but early on pointed me to material critical to my research. David Dennis and Matt Yates also shared their excellent comments and suggestions with me. In addition, I am grateful to Peter L. Hahn for serving on my M.A. committee and introducing me to the history of U.S. foreign relations in History 770, a seminar that inspired rich discussions and vitally shaped my conception of diplomatic history. I would like to thank the Graduate Program in History at the Ohio State University for providing me with the opportunity to complete a Master’s degree during my one year exchange. Furthermore, I am beholden to the International Office at the Freie Universität Berlin and the Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures at the Ohio State University for their help in mastering administrative challenges. v Finally, I am indebted to my family for their warm support and encouragement throughout my academic career and this year abroad. I wish to thank my girlfriend Anke Herrmann. I can only attempt to do justice to her patience, love, and never-ending support by expressing my deep gratitude: thank you. vi VITA November 24, 1982 Born in Berlin, Germany October 2004 to present Magister Artium, Freie Universität Berlin; Major Field: North American Studies; Minors: Modern History and Latin American Studies September 2008 – June 2009 Master of Arts in History, Ohio State University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History U.S. Diplomatic History vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................ v VITA............................................................................................................................. vii INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 Historiography ............................................................................................................ 3 Chapter Outline........................................................................................................... 6 I. CANADA-U.S. RELATIONS: ASYMMETRY, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND AMBIGUITY.................................................................................................................. 9 II. CANADA-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION, 1940-1950 ..................................... 16 III. “THE TRUE NORTH, STRONG AND FREE”: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NORTH ............................................................................. 21 3.1. Theorizing Culture, Space, and Nationalism ..................................................... 22 3.2. The North and the Construction of a Canadian National Identity ..................... 26 IV. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEW LINE............. 36 4.1. The Road to the DEW Line, 1950-1953 ............................................................ 36 4.2. Phase 1: Early Test Sites, NSC-162/2, and Sovereignty, 1953 ......................... 40 4.3. Phase 2: The MSG Report, Canadian Participation, and Sovereignty, 1954-55 47 4.4. Phase 3: Sovereignty Concerns and the DEW Line........................................... 58 V. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................ 72 BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................... 78 viii INTRODUCTION Tales were told of American discrimination against Canadian contractors; of violations of Canadian customs and immigration procedures, by American snow trains and aircraft bringing in men and equipment; of American flags flying where Canadian flags … ought to have flown; of American security regulations forbidding Canadian journalists and, occasionally Canadian officials from visiting DEW Line stations. They all gave rise to a vague but uneasy conception that for all the rules and regulations drawn up in the international agreement of 1955, de facto control of the Canadian north had passed into American hands.1 Canada is an Arctic nation and an Arctic power. […] The Arctic and the North is central to our national identity. It is an important part of our past, our present and our future. […] Through our robust Arctic foreign policy we are affirming our leadership, stewardship and ownership in the region.2 Canada and the United States are bound together in an ambiguous relationship that looks back on a multifaceted history shaped by periods of violent conflict and intimate cooperation. Until the mid-nineteenth century, Canadians persistently feared an American annexation of the British North American colonies. As a consequence of World Wars I and II, Canada had entered into a close partnership with the United States in the realm of continental defense. As the abovementioned statements by James G. Eayrs and Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon, respectively, make plain, however, questions of sovereignty, national identity, and a wariness about American influence had 1 James Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs. October to 1955 to June 1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), 151. 2 From an April 29, 2009 press release, summing up Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon’s meeting with Arctic Council member states in Norway, “Minister Cannon Highlights Canadian Leadership on Arctic Issues at Arctic Council Meeting in Norway and Announces Creation of Canadian International Centre for the Arctic Region”, April 29, 2009, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/publication.aspx?publication_id=387104&lang=eng&docnum=114, accessed May 19, 2009. 1 not lost their relevance and continued to persist far into the twentieth century and beyond. As Washington and Ottawa, in the face of the perceived Soviet challenge, reaffirmed their wartime cooperation and engaged in the construction of an expanding North American air defense system, tensions about Canada’s sovereignty over its national territory in the Arctic emerged. The establishment of three radar chains across the North Figure 1: Early Warning Lines, Source: New York Times, November 2, 1954. American continent, the Pinetree Line, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line; see figure 1), which sought to detect and deter potential Soviet nuclear