HILLIER AND THE NEW GENERATION OF GENERALS: THE CDS, THE POLICY AND THE TROOPS

Douglas Bland

General , Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) of the Canadian Forces, is to some a larger-than-life personality who dominates every aspect of ’s commitment to the Afghan people. No previous CDS has commanded such close attention from the prime minister or played as central a role in the direction of Canada’s defence and foreign policies. Is he merely an eccentric aberration or is he the first of the “new breed” of post-Cold-War senior military officers who will occupy the CDS’s office? Douglas Bland considers this fundamental question as politicians in begin to ask: “After Hillier, who commands?”

Pour certains, le général Rick Hillier, chef de l’état- de la Défense (CEMD) des Forces canadiennes, est une personnalité hors du commun qui domine tous les aspects de l’engagement du Canada en . Aucun de ses prédécesseurs n’a bénéficié d’autant d’attention de la part d’un premier ministre ni joué un rôle aussi central dans la défense et la politique étrangère du pays. L’homme est-il un original inclassable ou le premier d’une « nouvelle lignée » de militaires de haut rang appelés, en cette période de l’après-guerre froide, à occuper les fonctions de CEMD ? Douglas Bland soulève cette question fondamentale à l’heure où, à Ottawa on commence à se demander qui commandera après son départ.

rooke Claxton, arguably Canada’s most effective ernment] and silent he should get out [of the service]. A minister of national defence, managed the transfor- government that wishes to stay a government,” he contin- B mation of Canada’s armed forces from 1946 to 1954 ued, “would have no choice but to replace [any officer] who thorough the turbulent post-Second-World-War demobiliza- was not content to express his opinions in private and to tion and into the dangerous early years of NATO. His funda- conform to public policy. I am,” he declared more than mental objective, at the direction of Prime Minister once, “all for silent soldiers and sailors too.” Mackenzie King, was to bring Canada’s armed forces, the control of which had been more or less usurped by the hrough the next few years trouble between the govern- Allies, once again under Ottawa’s control. T ment and military leaders continued. Some, like Claxton’s first challenge was to rein in the cohort of Lieutenant Guy Simons, left noisily and accused the young, veteran wartime generals, air marshals and admirals, government of neglect. Others, more or less on their own, who enjoyed wide public support — especially from the continued to make what they considered prudent arrange- thousands of veterans they had recently commanded — and ments with traditional allies as the evolved. In the who expected Canadian governments to follow uncritically late 1950s, these continuing strains and confusions infected their professional advice in peacetime as they had, however every defence policy question — Canada/ unwillingly, in wartime. Few of these officers, moreover, defence cooperation, nuclear weapons acquisitions and were shy about expressing their concerns openly to mem- deployment, and the Avro Arrow project — and they cli- bers of Parliament and the public. maxed during the October 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, when So serious was the contest between these postwar offi- the Diefenbaker government almost lost control of the cers and the government that Claxton was forced to warn armed forces completely. the officers that henceforth there would be “one depart- Although many observers believe that defence policy and ment and one boss...if an officer cannot be loyal [to the gov- civil-military relations have no influence on Canadian federal

54 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MARS 2008 Hillier and the new generation of generals: the CDS, the policy and the troops elections, that notion is certainly chal- of the armed services into a single serv- do. The CDS also maintains “good lenged by the defeat of John ice did not occur until 1968, the deed order and discipline” in the Canadian Diefenbaker in 1963. No matter what had been done once the chain-of-com- Forces by controlling the behaviour of scholars might suggest, Mike Pearson mand ended in the office of one officer members and units of the armed forces concluded that the Diefenbaker “gov- who held complete authority for the living in our midst. The CDS alone can ernment’s mishandling of the defence direction of Canada’s armed forces. change — or not — the government’s issue was the main reason for Hellyer may have solved one problem, defence policy intentions into practi- [Diefenbaker’s] downfall.” Pearson was but only by creating another. cal outcomes. While the government not about to let the same thing happen The chief of the defence staff can dismiss a CDS who might resist its to his government, and he sent the (CDS) of the Canadian Forces is directions, it must eventually appoint another officer as CDS if it So serious was the contest between these postwar officers and is to give orders and direc- the government that Claxton was forced to warn them that tions to the Canadian Forces. Thus, the CDS henceforth there would be “one department and one boss... if shares with the civil author- an officer cannot be loyal [to the government] and silent he ity a degree of responsibili- should get out [of the service]. A government that wishes to ty and accountability for stay a government” he continued, “would have no choice but the civil control of the armed forces. to replace [any officer] who was not content to express his The CDS is the govern- opinions in private and to conform to public policy. I am,” he ment’s official and formal declared more than once, “all for silent soldiers and sailors too.” policy advisor inter alia on matters of national defence young, self-confident , who appointed by order-in-council and policy as they may involve the armed was defence minister from 1963 to serves “at pleasure.” He or she has spe- forces; the organization and develop- 1967, to defence headquarters to bring cific authority based in law, specifically ment of military capabilities; and espe- the defence establishment to heel. in the National Defence Act, but also in cially in the command and operations “Paul the Reformer,” as one scholar custom. Neither the CDS nor any of the Canadian Forces at home and dubbed him, had a touch of Claxton in member of the Canadian Forces is a abroad. The government, unless the his outlook. He identified the “defence “public servant.” The CDS is not a del- prime minister wishes to act as his or problem” as caused by the unwieldy egate of the minister of national her own military advisor, is effectively command structure headed by navy, defence and does not draw his authori- obliged to consult the CDS in these army and air force chiefs of staff, each ty from the minister’s authority. and other matters or risk an open con- of whom had equal authority under the Neither the minister nor the prime flict with the CDS and possibly the National Defence Act, and who were minister can legally act in the place of entire senior cadre of the officer corps, determined to advance their own serv- the CDS by, for instance, issuing orders as Paul Hellyer did throughout his ice over the others. As Hellyer noted directly to any member or unit of the term in office. The prime minister, of immediately, the real defence policy Canadian Forces. In all cases orders course, is not obliged to follow the process was for each service chief “to try from the government to the Canadian CDS’s counsel, but if the government to get you alone so they can force their Forces must be passed through the CDS were to act contrary to it, the prime own views on you without any coordi- to subordinate officers. minister and not the CDS would be nation with anyone else.” accountable for the consequences. On his first day in office Hellyer aradoxically, though the civil “Shared responsibility” and was convinced of the urgent need to P authority — civilians elected to “rightful authority in law” placed in break this logjam, and in May 1964 he Parliament — is responsible and the hands of one officer create a degree tabled in the House of Commons “an accountable to for the civil of instability in Canadian civil-mili- Act to amend the National Defence control of the Canadian Forces, gov- tary relations, a fact recognized by Act”; that is, an act to transfer all the ernments cannot effect such control some experts when the office was cre- authority of the three service chiefs to without the cooperation of the CDS. ated in 1964. Richard Malone, publish- a new position, “the chief of the For example, the CDS protects the gov- er of the Free Press and an defence staff.” The bill passed quickly ernment from improper military inter- influential militia officer, for instance, and without amendment, and in late ference in political affairs, by warned Hellyer that the proposed chief 1964 Air Chief Marshal Miller was disciplining members of the Canadian of the defence staff “would become a appointed the first chief of the defence Forces who step into this arena, some- ‘supremo’ who would overpower the staff. Although the formal unification thing that in law politicians cannot minister.” Better, he suggested, an inef-

POLICY OPTIONS 55 MARCH 2008 Douglas Bland

fective, divided command system than foreign and defence policies, and even Without much pause to reflect on the a unified system that would unite all over who might be appointed minister changes in international relations at the implicit political power of the mil- of national defence. that time, they were flung willy-nilly itary under one officer. into the insanity of the Balkans War. Yet over the 40-year history of the ritics of the CDS’s place in public Little other than discipline and order office Malone’s warning seems over- C life suggest, therefore, that civil prepared them for what they experi- stated. Chiefs of the defence staff have control over the armed forces and pol- enced there. The best officers made exercised their rightful and implicit icy and a change in Canadian military sensible adjustments to the circum- authority in a very nuanced and strategy in Afghanistan will occur only stances of this and other “wars responsible way, mainly because they after General Hillier is replaced or among the people” into which their wholeheartedly support the principle decides to retire. Those who hold this government had thrust them. Armies that the civil authority must ultimate- view, however, have missed the funda- learn by doing, but it’s always the ly control and direct the Canadian mental shift, the renaissance, if you hard way to learn. Forces and Canada’s national defence. will, of the professional spirit in the While they learned about the so- Nevertheless, policy disagreements officer corps of the Canadian Forces. called new wars, they learned some- between chiefs of the defence thing else as well. And that was staff and governments, espe- that the Canadian govern- cially during defence emergen- The Liberal government of Jean ments and most Canadians cies, have from time-to-time Chrétien was particularly neglectful. cared little about what they exposed a fault-line in Reports at the time — never refuted were doing or the effects the Canadian civil-military rela- by officials or officers in Ottawa then wars were having on them or tions. Sometimes the break has their soldiers. The Liberal gov- been dramatic, as during the or since — suggest that the facts ernment of Jean Chrétien was 1970s FLQ crisis and the about casualties and dead and particularly neglectful. Reports Somalia scandal in the 1990s. severely wounded soldiers incurred at the time — never refuted by Some observers believe that in the Balkans wars were hidden officials or officers in Ottawa Canada is in another such situ- then or since — suggest that ation today, as the government from Canadians, for fear that the the facts about casualties and and the Canadian Forces and information would prompt a public dead and severely wounded the CDS struggle with the con- outcry to properly equip the soldiers incurred in the Balkans sequences of Canada’s commit- Canadian Forces for the battles the wars were hidden from ments in Afghanistan. Canadians, for fear that the General Hillier is at the government had sent them to fight. information would prompt a centre of this controversy. Spending money on the Canadian public outcry to properly equip Almost accidentally he is the Forces, even in these circumstances, the Canadian Forces for the architect of Canada’s defence was anathema to Chrétien, and so battles the government had policy, a situation forced on sent them to fight. Spending him by the absence of any the soldiers suffered, mostly in money on the Canadian coherent indication from Prime silence. Forces, even in these circum- Minister on which stances, was anathema to way to move Canada’s defence and for- The change is now so deeply embed- Chrétien, and so the soldiers suffered, eign policy. The country in 2008 is at ded in the officer corps that in all like- mostly in silence. war. That fact propels defence policy, lihood General Hillier will be replaced the armed forces and the CDS into the by another officer who holds very ut young Hillier and his comrades media spotlight and Hillier’s decisions much to Hillier’s views of the role of B experienced the slight and the onto the floor of the House of the CDS in Canadian public policy. damage first hand, and the experience Commons. Hillier is a strong advocate Three indelible and intertwined soured their attitudes toward for his views on war and peace and the experiences at the close of the twen- Canadian politicians and most of their Canadian Forces, and he is unusually tieth century engulfed the Canadian senior military leaders in Ottawa. popular — for a Canadian general — Forces and shaped General Hillier The Somali debacle was the sec- with many Canadians. These circum- and every other senior officer who ond formative event for most young stances, and the General Hiller’s skill at might replace him as CDS. First, he officers in the 1990s, whether they presenting them, appear to critics to and they were all junior commanders were in the theatre or not. Indeed, give the CDS an inappropriate and dis- — , colonels and naval cap- for almost everyone at the time “the proportionate influence over Canada’s tains — at the end of the Cold War. theatre” was the small hearing room

56 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MARS 2008 Hillier and the new generation of generals: the CDS, the policy and the troops

National Defence General Rick Hillier, the chief of defence staff, visits Canadian troops on the frontline in Afghanistan. His popularity, writes Douglas Bland, is largely due to “Canadians’ willingness to trust what he says.”

on Slater Street in Ottawa, where the and commanding military units on many junior and middle-ranking offi- television cameras revealed to offi- active operations. cers far from civilian ears admitted to a cers and soldiers across the country The most shocking revelation for deep sense of professional shame at a senior cadre of the Canadian officers who had not served in the what they had witnessed during the Forces that had so obviously lost its upper ranks of National Defence inquiry into the Somalia operation. way. They watched officers on the Headquarters were the confessions by Finally, this cadre of middle- witness stand trying to shirk the their leaders that they had surrendered ranking officers and some of their ris- consequences of their careless deci- easily and routinely to mere public ser- ing leaders came to resent politicians’ sions; trying to “pass the buck” for vants matters requiring professional expectations that loyalty to Canada their failures to their subordinates; competence and judgement — matters, and obedience to government policy and trying to hide their errors by these junior officers had been taught, should be taken by officers to mean confessing ignorance of the most fundamental to their raison-d’être as loyalty at all costs to the partisan basic military norms for deploying officers. In the aftermath of the inquiry, interests of ministers and their

POLICY OPTIONS 57 MARCH 2008 Douglas Bland

political party. Time and again, they dead returning from Afghanistan be in peace. Officers have learned again had listened to explanations from sen- provided full, open, and traditional that respect and trust can only be sus- ior officers and ministers about why military honours, no matter how this tained if it stands on a platform of they and their units would have to might embarrass the government and truth and sacrifice. Certainly, Hillier’s undertake dangerous missions with- its political agenda. Officers were ability to engage the public effective- out the proper equipment — to lead instructed that as witnesses before sen- ly in matters important to the the UN Zaire operation, “the bungle ate and parliamentary committees and Canadian Forces and to Canada’s in the jungle,” for instance. They were in public discussions elsewhere they national defence helps explain his told that “loyalty” meant covering up were to be “frank unto the Kaiser.” public popularity. But his popularity mistakes and untruths uttered by min- The most astonishing example of is more likely due to Canadians’ will- isters. The reasoning was sometimes this rebirth of pride and place ingness to trust what he says. that “the government has control of occurred unexpectedly when then Who will replace General Rick Hiller as chief of the defence Certainly, Hillier’s ability to engage the public effectively in staff of the Canadian matters important to the Canadian Forces and to Canada’s Forces? No one can say national defence helps explain his public popularity. But his today. No matter who is promoted to this singular popularity is more likely due to Canadians’ willingness to trust office, it is a safe bet that what he says. person will seem to many Canadians very much like the armed forces and so we have to minister of national defence, Art General and General Rick obey.” At other times, senior officers Eggleton, declared he had not been Hillier, the first leaders in the new gen- suggested that “by helping the gov- told that members of the Canadian eration of Canadian Forces officers. ernment out of a difficult political Forces task force in Afghanistan had in 1946 merely jam, the prime minister would be gen- captured Taliban fighters. His appar- reiterated Prime Minister Mackenzie erous and fund this or that new proj- ent expectation was that the CDS, at King’s rule for civil-military relations ect.” In every case, no rewards the time General Ray Henault, would at the time: “If an officer cannot be followed. Senior officers discovered confirm what was in fact not true. loyal [to the government] and silent that they had compromised their When subsequently General Henault he should get out [of the service].” And integrity and that of the officer corps and Deputy Chief of Staff Vice he repeated also every Canadian politi- in the eyes of the public service, some- Greg Madison were ques- cian’s preference, then and now, “for times the public, and certainly their tioned about the matter in a public, silent soldiers and sailors too” — for subordinate officers. televised meeting of the House of officers who are “content to express At the time when General Hillier Commons Committee on National [their] opinions in private and to con- was rising into the general officer Defence, members of Parliament and form to public policy.” ranks, his immediate superiors — all everyone in the room were astonished Canadians today, however, seem post-Somalia appointments — began a to hear both officers flatly (and, it to see things differently. They under- slow but deliberate re-evaluation of appeared to some, enthusiastically) stand that Canada has military themselves and their professional contradict the minister. After that secrets, but citizens clearly are not responsibilities to Canada. In several event, which brought much praise as a “all for silent soldiers and sailors very frank “general officers’ seminars” “breath of fresh air in Ottawa,” too.” Rather, they look to Canadian led by incumbent CDSs, a new alle- Canadian politicians were put on military leaders to tell them the giance grew within the officer corps. notice that they could no longer plain truth so they can judge for “Never again!” became the unofficial expect senior officers to cover politi- themselves what is to be done to pledge. Never again the compromising cians’ failures or indiscretions. defend the nation and to find for of professional standards, the surren- General Hillier is a product of Canada “a place of pride and influ- dering of professional responsibilities that recovered military ethic. He and ence in the world.” to the public service, and the offering other officers are, as well, the messen- of tainted advice meant only to protect gers of the new ethic. He and the offi- Douglas Bland is professor in and chair partisan political interests. cers who promoted him and his of the Defence Management Studies subordinate officers learned in the Program at the School of Policy Studies ommanding officers at Canadian glare of the Somalia inquiry that the at Queen’s University. He is the author of C Forces staff colleges initiated new Canadian Forces need the respect and Chiefs of Defence: Government and curricula emphasizing “truth, duty trust of Canadians if they are to have the Unified Command of the and valour.” The CDS ordered that war the support of the people in war and .

58 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MARS 2008