Hillier and the New Generation of Generals: the Cds, the Policy and the Troops

HILLIER AND THE NEW GENERATION OF GENERALS: THE CDS, THE POLICY AND THE TROOPS Douglas Bland General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) of the Canadian Forces, is to some a larger-than-life personality who dominates every aspect of Canada’s commitment to the Afghan people. No previous CDS has commanded such close attention from the prime minister or played as central a role in the direction of Canada’s defence and foreign policies. Is he merely an eccentric aberration or is he the first of the “new breed” of post-Cold-War senior military officers who will occupy the CDS’s office? Douglas Bland considers this fundamental question as politicians in Ottawa begin to ask: “After Hillier, who commands?” Pour certains, le général Rick Hillier, chef de l’état-major de la Défense (CEMD) des Forces canadiennes, est une personnalité hors du commun qui domine tous les aspects de l’engagement du Canada en Afghanistan. Aucun de ses prédécesseurs n’a bénéficié d’autant d’attention de la part d’un premier ministre ni joué un rôle aussi central dans la défense et la politique étrangère du pays. L’homme est-il un original inclassable ou le premier d’une « nouvelle lignée » de militaires de haut rang appelés, en cette période de l’après-guerre froide, à occuper les fonctions de CEMD ? Douglas Bland soulève cette question fondamentale à l’heure où, à Ottawa on commence à se demander qui commandera après son départ. rooke Claxton, arguably Canada’s most effective ernment] and silent he should get out [of the service]. A minister of national defence, managed the transfor- government that wishes to stay a government,” he contin- B mation of Canada’s armed forces from 1946 to 1954 ued, “would have no choice but to replace [any officer] who thorough the turbulent post-Second-World-War demobiliza- was not content to express his opinions in private and to tion and into the dangerous early years of NATO. His funda- conform to public policy. I am,” he declared more than mental objective, at the direction of Prime Minister once, “all for silent soldiers and sailors too.” Mackenzie King, was to bring Canada’s armed forces, the control of which had been more or less usurped by the hrough the next few years trouble between the govern- Allies, once again under Ottawa’s control. T ment and military leaders continued. Some, like Claxton’s first challenge was to rein in the cohort of Lieutenant General Guy Simons, left noisily and accused the young, veteran wartime generals, air marshals and admirals, government of neglect. Others, more or less on their own, who enjoyed wide public support — especially from the continued to make what they considered prudent arrange- thousands of veterans they had recently commanded — and ments with traditional allies as the Cold War evolved. In the who expected Canadian governments to follow uncritically late 1950s, these continuing strains and confusions infected their professional advice in peacetime as they had, however every defence policy question — Canada/United States unwillingly, in wartime. Few of these officers, moreover, defence cooperation, nuclear weapons acquisitions and were shy about expressing their concerns openly to mem- deployment, and the Avro Arrow project — and they cli- bers of Parliament and the public. maxed during the October 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, when So serious was the contest between these postwar offi- the Diefenbaker government almost lost control of the cers and the government that Claxton was forced to warn armed forces completely. the officers that henceforth there would be “one depart- Although many observers believe that defence policy and ment and one boss...if an officer cannot be loyal [to the gov- civil-military relations have no influence on Canadian federal 54 OPTIONS POLITIQUES MARS 2008 Hillier and the new generation of generals: the CDS, the policy and the troops elections, that notion is certainly chal- of the armed services into a single serv- do. The CDS also maintains “good lenged by the defeat of John ice did not occur until 1968, the deed order and discipline” in the Canadian Diefenbaker in 1963. No matter what had been done once the chain-of-com- Forces by controlling the behaviour of scholars might suggest, Mike Pearson mand ended in the office of one officer members and units of the armed forces concluded that the Diefenbaker “gov- who held complete authority for the living in our midst. The CDS alone can ernment’s mishandling of the defence direction of Canada’s armed forces. change — or not — the government’s issue was the main reason for Hellyer may have solved one problem, defence policy intentions into practi- [Diefenbaker’s] downfall.” Pearson was but only by creating another. cal outcomes. While the government not about to let the same thing happen The chief of the defence staff can dismiss a CDS who might resist its to his government, and he sent the (CDS) of the Canadian Forces is directions, it must eventually appoint another officer as CDS if it So serious was the contest between these postwar officers and is to give orders and direc- the government that Claxton was forced to warn them that tions to the Canadian Forces. Thus, the CDS henceforth there would be “one department and one boss... if shares with the civil author- an officer cannot be loyal [to the government] and silent he ity a degree of responsibili- should get out [of the service]. A government that wishes to ty and accountability for stay a government” he continued, “would have no choice but the civil control of the armed forces. to replace [any officer] who was not content to express his The CDS is the govern- opinions in private and to conform to public policy. I am,” he ment’s official and formal declared more than once, “all for silent soldiers and sailors too.” policy advisor inter alia on matters of national defence young, self-confident Paul Hellyer, who appointed by order-in-council and policy as they may involve the armed was defence minister from 1963 to serves “at pleasure.” He or she has spe- forces; the organization and develop- 1967, to defence headquarters to bring cific authority based in law, specifically ment of military capabilities; and espe- the defence establishment to heel. in the National Defence Act, but also in cially in the command and operations “Paul the Reformer,” as one scholar custom. Neither the CDS nor any of the Canadian Forces at home and dubbed him, had a touch of Claxton in member of the Canadian Forces is a abroad. The government, unless the his outlook. He identified the “defence “public servant.” The CDS is not a del- prime minister wishes to act as his or problem” as caused by the unwieldy egate of the minister of national her own military advisor, is effectively command structure headed by navy, defence and does not draw his authori- obliged to consult the CDS in these army and air force chiefs of staff, each ty from the minister’s authority. and other matters or risk an open con- of whom had equal authority under the Neither the minister nor the prime flict with the CDS and possibly the National Defence Act, and who were minister can legally act in the place of entire senior cadre of the officer corps, determined to advance their own serv- the CDS by, for instance, issuing orders as Paul Hellyer did throughout his ice over the others. As Hellyer noted directly to any member or unit of the term in office. The prime minister, of immediately, the real defence policy Canadian Forces. In all cases orders course, is not obliged to follow the process was for each service chief “to try from the government to the Canadian CDS’s counsel, but if the government to get you alone so they can force their Forces must be passed through the CDS were to act contrary to it, the prime own views on you without any coordi- to subordinate officers. minister and not the CDS would be nation with anyone else.” accountable for the consequences. On his first day in office Hellyer aradoxically, though the civil “Shared responsibility” and was convinced of the urgent need to P authority — civilians elected to “rightful authority in law” placed in break this logjam, and in May 1964 he Parliament — is responsible and the hands of one officer create a degree tabled in the House of Commons “an accountable to Canadians for the civil of instability in Canadian civil-mili- Act to amend the National Defence control of the Canadian Forces, gov- tary relations, a fact recognized by Act”; that is, an act to transfer all the ernments cannot effect such control some experts when the office was cre- authority of the three service chiefs to without the cooperation of the CDS. ated in 1964. Richard Malone, publish- a new position, “the chief of the For example, the CDS protects the gov- er of the Winnipeg Free Press and an defence staff.” The bill passed quickly ernment from improper military inter- influential militia officer, for instance, and without amendment, and in late ference in political affairs, by warned Hellyer that the proposed chief 1964 Air Chief Marshal Miller was disciplining members of the Canadian of the defence staff “would become a appointed the first chief of the defence Forces who step into this arena, some- ‘supremo’ who would overpower the staff. Although the formal unification thing that in law politicians cannot minister.” Better, he suggested, an inef- POLICY OPTIONS 55 MARCH 2008 Douglas Bland fective, divided command system than foreign and defence policies, and even Without much pause to reflect on the a unified system that would unite all over who might be appointed minister changes in international relations at the implicit political power of the mil- of national defence.

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