Mapping the Yemen Conflict
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Yemen in Crisis
A Conflict Overlooked: Yemen in Crisis Jamison Boley Kent Evans Sean Grassie Sara Romeih Conflict Risk Diagnostic 2017 Conflict Background Yemen has a weak, highly decentralized central government that has struggled to rule the northern Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the southern People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).1 Since the unification of these entities in 1990, Yemen has experienced three civil conflicts. As the poorest country in the Arab world, Yemen faces serious food and water shortages for a population dispersed over mountainous terrain.2 The country’s weaknesses have been exploited by Saudi Arabia which shares a porous border with Yemen. Further, the instability of Yemen’s central government has created a power vacuum filled by foreign states and terrorist groups.3 The central government has never had effective control of all Yemeni territory. Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was president of Yemen for 34 years, secured his power through playing factions within the population off one another. The Yemeni conflict is not solely a result of a Sunni-Shia conflict, although sectarianism plays a role.4 The 2011 Arab Spring re-energized the Houthi movement, a Zaydi Shia movement, which led to the overthrow of the Saleh government. Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi took office as interim president in a transition led by a coalition of Arab Gulf states and backed by the United States. Hadi has struggled to deal with a variety of problems, including insurgency, the continuing loyalty of many military officers to former president Saleh, as well as corruption, unemployment and food insecurity.5 Conflict Risk Diagnostic Indicators Key: (+) Stabilizing factor; (-) Destabilizing factor; (±) Mixed factor Severe Risk - Government military expenditures have been generally stable between 2002-2015, at an average of 4.8% of GDP. -
USG Yemen Complex Emergency Program
ACTIVE USG PROGRAMS FOR THE YEMEN RESPONSE Last Updated 02/12/20 0 50 100 mi INFORMA Partner activities are contingent upon access to IC TI PH O A N R U G SAUDI ARABIA conict-aected areas and security concerns. 0 50 100 150 km N O I T E G U S A A D ID F /DCHA/O AL HUDAYDAH IOM AMRAN OMAN IOM IPs SA’DAH ESTIMATED FOOD IPs SECURITY LEVELS IOM HADRAMAWT IPs THROUGH IPs MAY 2020 IPs Stressed HAJJAH Crisis SANA’A Hadramawt IOM Sa'dah AL JAWF IOM Emergency An “!” indicates that the phase IOM classification would likely be worse IPs Sa'dah IPs without current or planned IPs humanitarian assistance. IPs Source: FEWS NET Yemen IPs AL MAHRAH Outlook, 02/20 - 05/20 Al Jawf IP AMANAT AL ASIMAH Al Ghaedha IPs KEY Hajjah Amran Al Hazem AL MAHWIT Al Mahrah USAID/OFDA USAID/FFP State/PRM Marib IPs Hajjah Amran MARIB Agriculture and Food Security SHABWAH IPs IBB Camp Coordination and Camp Al Mahwit IOM IPs Sana'a Management Al Mahwit IOM DHAMAR Sana'a IPs Cash Transfers for Food Al IPs IPs Economic Recovery and Market Systems Hudaydah IPs IPs Food Voucher Program RAYMAH IPs Dhamar Health Raymah Al Mukalla IPs Shabwah Ataq Dhamar COUNTRYWIDE Humanitarian Coordination Al Bayda’ and Information Management IP Local, Regional, and International Ibb AD DALI’ Procurement TA’IZZ Al Bayda’ IOM Ibb ABYAN IOM Al BAYDA’ Logistics Support and Relief Ad Dali' OCHA Commodities IOM IOM IP Ta’izz Ad Dali’ Abyan IPs WHO Multipurpose Cash Assistance Ta’izz IPs IPs UNHAS Nutrition Lahij IPs LAHIJ Zinjubar UNICEF Protection IPs IPs WFP Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food IOM Al-Houta ADEN FAO Refugee and Migrant Assistance IPs Aden IOM UNICEF Risk Management Policy and Practice Shelter and Settlements IPs WFP SOCOTRA DJIBOUTI, ETHIOPIA, U.S. -
A New Model for Defeating Al Qaeda in Yemen
A New Model for Defeating al Qaeda in Yemen Katherine Zimmerman September 2015 A New Model for Defeating al Qaeda in Yemen KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN SEPTEMBER 2015 A REPORT BY AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 3 Part I: Al Qaeda and the Situation in Yemen ................................................................................................. 5 A Broken Model in Yemen ...................................................................................................................... 5 The Collapse of America’s Counterterrorism Partnership ........................................................................ 6 The Military Situation in Yemen ........................................................................................................... 10 Yemen, Iran, and Regional Dynamics ................................................................................................... 15 The Expansion of AQAP and the Emergence of ISIS in Yemen ............................................................ 18 Part II: A New Strategy for Yemen ............................................................................................................. 29 Defeating the Enemy in Yemen ............................................................................................................ -
YEMEN Outlook for April-September 2020 Risk Overview – 2 April 2020
YEMEN Outlook for April-September 2020 Risk Overview – 2 April 2020 COVID-19 epidemic in Yemen Risk 1: Renewed Houthi offensive in Marib Risk 5: causes displacement east/southwards and severely reduced access to essential services Risk 4: Rapid depreciation of the Yemeni riyal sparks inflation reducing households’ ability to purchase basic goods and services Risk 3: De -facto partition results in reduced provision of basic services and reduced operating space for humanitarian actors Risk 2: Conflict escalates across the southwest causing significant loss of life, mass displacement, and severely reduced access to essential services. Questions? Feedback? Contact [email protected] ACAPS Yemen Analysis Hub: Risk Report March 2020 Risk 1: Renewed Houthi offensive in Marib causes displacement Risk 3: De-facto partition results in reduced provision of basic services east/southwards and severely reduced access to essential services and reduced operating space for humanitarian actors Given that the Houthis have established a commanding hold over much of the north, The Houthis currently see themselves in a position of strength compared to the and that there is little prospect of the GoY regaining outright control of Yemen, both Government of Yemen (GoY). Control of Marib would nearly complete the Houthis sides may choose to focus their efforts on peace negotiations. Saudi Arabia could help control over northern Yemen. An intense conflict in Marib would cause casualties and to negotiate peace and recognise the Houthis’ mandate to administer much of displace over 500,000 people into the eastern and southern corners of Marib northern Yemen. This could result in a shifting focus towards post conflict governance (immediately to Harib), potentially spilling into Bayhan and Shabwah. -
Regional Programme Gulf States the Yemen
Regional Programme Gulf States Policy Report – October 2019 The Yemen War Actors, Interests and the Prospects of Negotiations Introduction Fabian Blumberg Recently, there have been important developments in the war in Yemen; a war which has, according to the UN reports, created the worst humanitarian disaster of the 21st century. On the one hand, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) withdrew significant part of its military forces from Yemen declaring the time has arrived for a peace settlement to the conflict. On the other hand, militants of the South took control over Aden from the internationally-backed government amid a fierce armed confrontation between the forces of the two sides leading to a crack in the Arab Coalition that is fighting the Houthis since March 2015. News also has erupted as the Houthis claimed that they managed to attack Saudi Arabia’s largest oil facilities at the 19th of September. Back in March 2019, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) had organized a workshop in Cadenabbia, Italy, to discuss the prospects of peace in Yemen after the Stockholm agreement between the international recognised government and the Houthis. Entitled “Yemen’s War: Actors, Interests and the Prospects of Negotiations”, the workshop was attended by experts on Yemen from Europe, Germany, US, and Yemen who provided informed opinions about the conflict in Yemen and on the best way to advance peace among the warring parties. Building on that, KAS has asked experts to write down their analyses on the situation and their recommendations on how to bring about peace in Yemen. They also provide ideas for the contribution German foreign policy could provide. -
Yemen Six Month Economic Analysis Economic Warfare & The
HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME Yemen Six Month Economic Analysis Economic Warfare & the Humanitarian Context January 2017 HUMANITARIAN FORESIGHT THINK TANK HUMANITARIAN FORESIGHT THINK TANK Yemen Six Month Economic Analysis / January 2017 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY An inclusive political solution to the conflict is unlikely in the next six months, despite the high possibility of state economic collapse and a metastasizing humanitarian crisis across the country. President Hadi’s refusal to accept the terms of a recent UN peace plan is likely stalling Saudi financial relief and threatens to fracture his support base in the south. Meanwhile, the crippled state economy is supporting a thriving shadow economy, which will fragment power structures on both sides of the conflict as stakeholders engage in war profiteering. Not only will this diminish the chances for unity in the long run, it also increases food insecurity and poverty for the most vulnerable, while benefiting those in power who already dominate the parallel market. Amidst this turmoil, AQAP and IS influence will increase. This report will examine the economic context affecting humanitarian needs in Yemen, and present scenarios offering potential trajectories of the conflict to assist in humanitarian preparedness. Source: Ali Zifan (6 December 2016), Insurgency in Yemen detailed map, Wikipedia INTRODUCTION The slow progress in the war between the internationally-recognized Yemeni government of Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the Zaidi Shia Houthi-Ali Abdallah Saleh alliance has caused the Saudi- backed Hadi coalition to instrumentalise the Yemeni economy, conducting a war of attrition. As Sanaa’s Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) hemorrhaged through its reserves in the previous two years of war, growing criticism of the governor’s alleged complicity in Houthi embezzlement culminated in the 18 September decision by the Hadi government to move the CBY from the Houthi-controlled capital to Aden and position a new governor to run the institution. -
Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report May 2019
UNICEF YEMEN HUMANITARIAN SITUATION REPORT MAY 2019 - Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report marginalized community during a cholera prevention session conducted femaleby religious leaders in in Al Hasabah district, Sana’a.in ©UNICEF Yemen/2019/Mona Adel. childA from a Highlights May 2019 • On 16 May, multiple air strikes hit various locations in Amanat Al Asimah and Sana’a 12.3 million governorates, killing children and wounding more than 70 civilians. Seven children # of children in need of humanitarian between the ages of 4 and 14 were also killed on 24 May in an attack on the Mawiyah assistance (estimated) district, in the southern Yemeni city of Taiz. This attack increased the verified number 24.1 million # of people in need of children killed and injured the escalation of violence near Sanaa and in Taiz to 27 in (OCHA, 2019 Yemen Humanitarian Needs only 10 days, but the actual numbers are likely to be much higher. Overview) • The number of Acute Watery Diarrhoea/suspected cholera cases has continued to rise 1.71 million since the start of 2019, with 312 out of 333 districts reporting suspected cases this year # of children internally displaced (IDPs) so far. Since 1 January 2019 to 31 May 2019, there have been 365,223 suspected cases 4.7 million and 638 associated deaths recorded (CFR 0.20 per cent). Children under five represent # of children in need of educational assistance 360,000 a quarter of the total suspected cases. # of children under 5 suffering Severe Acute • UNICEF continues to assess and monitor the nutrition situation in Yemen. -
Ibb Hub 4W: Health Cluster Partners DRAFT December 2020
YEMEN Ibb Hub 4W: Health Cluster Partners DRAFT December 2020 To visit online Health Cluster Interactive 4W Saudi Arabia Click Here Oman Raymah HEALTH CLUSTER PARTNERS AND HEALTH FACILITIES Yemen 2 UN Agencies 37 Hospitals Eritrea Al Bayda 5 NNGOs 52 Health Centers Djibouti Al Qafr Yarim Somalia Dhamar 9 INGOs 29 Health Units 16 118 Ar Radmah Active Health Al Qafr Hazm Al Udayn As Saddah Partners Facilities Al Makhadir Hubaysh Number of Health Partner provinding Health Services Al Hudaydah Partner Mental An Nadirah Medical Reproductive Child H Capacity Medical Pharmac Operationa Ibb organization by NCD Health Ash Sha'ir Consultations Health Services Building Support euticals l Support Ibb Governorate Services Ba'dan Ibb Al Dhihar Al Udayn BFD l l l Far Al Udayn Al Mashannah Jiblah INTERSOS l l l l l l l l Mudhaykhirah MSI l l Mudhaykhirah As Sabrah Al Dhale'e As Sayyani MdM l l l l l l l l Dhi As Sufal Shara'b As Salam UNFPA l l Shara'b Ar Rawnah WHO l l l l YFCA l At Ta'iziyah Selah l l Maqbanah Taizz Al Qahirah Taizz Al Mudhaffar Mawiyah l l l l Salh ADD Sabir Al Mawadim BFD l l l Sabir Al Mawadim Al Misrakh Al Mukha Human Access l Mawza Jabal Habashy DEEM l l l l l l l Al Misrakh Dimnat Khadir FHI360 l l l l l Sama HI l As Silw Al Ma'afer MSI l l Al Mawasit PU-AMI l l l l l l l Hayfan QRCS l l l l l l l SCI l l l l l l l l Ash Shamayatayn UNFPA l l Al Wazi'iyah WHO l l l l Selah l l Dhubab Lahj Partners per District ≥ 6 Aden 5 Eritrea 0 10 20 KM 4 3 Djibouti 2 1 Product Name: Health Cluster Partners per Governorate December 2020 Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. -
Justice in Transition in Yemen a Mapping of Local Justice Functioning in Ten Governorates
[PEACEW RKS [ JUSTICE IN TRANSITION IN YEMEN A MAPPING OF LOCAL JUSTICE FUNCTIONING IN TEN GOVERNORATES Erica Gaston with Nadwa al-Dawsari ABOUT THE REPORT This research is part of a three-year United States Institute of Peace (USIP) project that explores how Yemen’s rule of law and local justice and security issues have been affected in the post-Arab Spring transition period. A complement to other analytical and thematic pieces, this large-scale mapping provides data on factors influencing justice provision in half of Yemen’s governorates. Its goal is to support more responsive programming and justice sector reform. Field research was managed by Partners- Yemen, an affiliate of Partners for Democratic Change. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Erica Gaston is a human rights lawyer at USIP special- izing in human rights and justice issues in conflict and postconflict environments. Nadwa al-Dawsari is an expert in Yemeni tribal conflicts and civil society development with Partners for Democratic Change. Cover photo: Citizens observe an implementation case proceeding in a Sanaa city primary court. Photo by Erica Gaston. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Ave., NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No. 99. First published 2014. ISBN: 978-1-60127-230-0 © 2014 by the United States Institute of Peace CONTENTS PEACEWORKS • SEPTEMBER 2014 • NO. 99 [The overall political .. -
Politics, Governance, and Reconstruction in Yemen January 2018 Contents
POMEPS STUDIES 29 Politics, Governance, and Reconstruction in Yemen January 2018 Contents Introduction . .. 3 Collapse of the Houthi-Saleh alliance and the future of Yemen’s war . 9 April Longley Alley, International Crisis Group In Yemen, 2018 looks like it will be another grim year . 15 Peter Salisbury, Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme Popular revolution advances towards state building in Southern Yemen . 17 Susanne Dahlgren, University of Tampere/National University of Singapore Sunni Islamist dynamics in context of war: What happened to al-Islah and the Salafis? . 23 Laurent Bonnefoy, Sciences Po/CERI Impact of the Yemen war on militant jihad . 27 Elisabeth Kendall, Pembroke College, University of Oxford Endgames for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in Yemen . 31 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy Yemen’s war as seen from the local level . 34 Marie-Christine Heinze, Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient (CARPO) and Hafez Albukari, Yemen Polling Center (YPC) Yemen’s education system at a tipping point: Youth between their future and present survival . 39 Mareike Transfeld, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin Graduate School of Muslim Cultures and Societies Gasping for hope: Yemeni youth struggle for their future . 43 Ala Qasem, Resonate! Yemen Supporting and failing Yemen’s transition: Critical perspectives on development agencies . 46 Ala’a Jarban, Concordia University The rise and fall and necessity of Yemen’s youth movements . 51 Silvana Toska, Davidson College A diaspora denied: Impediments to Yemeni mobilization for relief and reconstruction at home . 55 Dana M. Moss, University of Pittsburgh War and De-Development . -
ISIS in Yemen: Redoubt Or Remnant? Challenges and Options for Dealing with a Jihadist Threat in a Conflict Environment
JOURNAL OF SOUTH ASIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES ISIS in Yemen: Redoubt or Remnant? Challenges and Options for Dealing with a Jihadist Threat in a Conflict Environment by NORMAN CIGAR Abstract: The emergence of ISIS has represented a significant security risk to U.S. interests and to regional states. In Yemen, the ISIS threat has evolved within Occasional Paper #1 the country’s devastating civil war and, while its lethality has declined, this study Villanova University suggests it remains a factor of concern, Villanova, PA and assesses the challenges and options available for the US and for the November 2020 international community for dealing with this threat. ISIS in Yemen: Redoubt or Remnant? Challenges and Options for Dealing with a Jihadist Threat in a Conflict Environment by Norman Cigar “The fight against terrorism is far from over” Leon E. Panetta, Former Director CIA, 25 August 20191 Introduction and Terms of Reference Even in its short history, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has posed a significant security challenge both to U.S. interests and to regional states. As the ISIS Caliphate disintegrated recently in its heartland of Iraq and Syria under a succession of blows by its international and local adversaries, the focus of the international community often shifted to ISIS’s outlying branches. However, contrary to early optimism, ISIS has proved a stubborn survivor even in its Iraq-Syria core, while its presence in branches or affiliates in areas such as the Sinai, the Sahara, West Africa, Mozambique, Yemen, and Khurasan (Afghanistan/Pakistan) also continues to be a significant security threat to local and international interests.2 Moreover, each theater of operations presents a unique set of characteristics, complicating the fight against such local ISIS branches. -
Contemporary Jihadi Militancy in Yemen
CONTEMPORARY JIHADI MILITANCY IN YEMEN HOW IS THE THREAT EVOLVING? ELISABETH KENDALL JULY 2018 POLICY PAPER 2018-7 CONTENTS * 14 COMMUNICATIONS CHALLENGES * 15 DECENTRALIZATION AND/OR * SUMMARY FRAGMENTATION * KEY POINTS * 18 PART FOUR: ISLAMIC STATE IN YEMEN * 1 INTRODUCTION * 21 CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD * 2 PART ONE: FORMATION & EVOLUTION * 27 ENDNOTES * 4 PART TWO: AQAP GOALS & GOVERNANCE * 32 ABOUT THE AUTHOR * 5 LOCAL INTEGRATION AND BRANDING * 32 ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE * 6 TRIBAL RELATIONS * 8 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT * 8 YOUTH ENGAGEMENT * 9 SIGNS OF DECLINE IN AQAP * 11 PART THREE: CURRENT AQAP CHALLENGES & PRESSURES * 11 INCREASING COUNTERTERRORISM STRIKES * 12 DWINDLING SUPPORT * 14 WEAK LEADERSHIP © The Middle East Institute The Middle East Institute 1319 18th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036 MOHAMMED HUWAIS/AFP/Getty Images SUMMARY KEY POINTS Regional conflict and internal chaos have allowed militant jihadi * The two core goals of AQAP are expelling infidels from Muslim lands and introducing an Islamic regime that would rule groups to rise and flourish in Yemen. This paper analyzes two by Islamic law. While these goals have remained constant, circumstances and experience have refined AQAP’s approaches of the most prominent such groups, al-Qaeda in the Arabian to engaging local populations in the pursuit of these goals. Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State in Yemen (ISY), by * The main challenges and pressures facing AQAP, some of which scrutinizing the factors that led to their respective ascents, and are shared by ISY, include increasingly frequent counterterrorism strikes, dwindling public support, weak leadership, poor examining the challenges and pressures that have caused their communications, and decentralization and/or fragmentation.