Don’t Mind the Gap: Intuitions, Emotions, and Reasons in the Enhancement Debate

by ALBERTO GIUBILINI

ur moral judgments about bioethical is- to some biotechnologies or their uses. Such reliance sues (as about many other issues) tend to on intuitions and emotions is widely acknowledged be heavily affected by our intuitive and as one of the distinguishing features of this conserva- O 3 4 emotional responses. This is not surprising if we tive strand by both its supporters and opponents. think of how often bioethical issues touch on our Granted, a number of antienhancement positions taboos and deeply held values. Consider the recent exist that clearly do not fall within the conservative debate on so-called after-birth abortion, for exam- tradition of social and political thought5—for exam- ple. According to a prominent conservative thinker, ple, positions that raise objections based on egalitar- “anyone should immediately be able to see that killing ian arguments.6 What distinguishes the conservative infants because they are unwanted is unacceptable” strand examined here is, however, its focus on the (emphasis added).1 The word “immediately” here methodology of bioethical discussion and particu- suggests that it is our intuition, before any possible larly on the weight that intuitions and emotions argument, that tells us that infanticide is impermissi- should play in such discussion. ble. This is just one example of a common approach Two argumentative strategies have been adopted to (at least some) bioethical issues. Reliance on in- to philosophically defend the role of intuitions and tuitive and emotive responses is widespread across emotions in bioethical debates. The first strategy many other areas of bioethics. The current debate is to claim that at least some intuitive and emotive on biotechnological human enhancement is particu- responses—particularly about “playing God” with larly interesting in this respect. A strand of “biocon- human nature—capture something beyond our servatives” that has explicitly drawn connections to reasoning capacity that nonetheless expresses some the modern conservative tradition, dating back to form of not fully articulable “wisdom,”7 such as Edmund Burke,2 appeals to the alleged wisdom of particular insights about human dignity.8 Michael our intuitions and emotions to ground opposition Sandel has suggested that our capacity to grasp the wrongness of playing God with genetics is limited by the too-narrow language of modern ethics, which Alberto Giubilini, “Don’t Mind the Gap: Intuitions, Emotions, and Reasons in the Enhancement Debate,” Hastings Center Report 45 is based only on the three notions of “autonomy, (2015): 1-9. DOI: 10.1002/hast.458 fairness, and individual rights.”9 Leon Kass offered

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 1 perhaps the most famous formulation defending two theses. The first is that Aristotle’s conception of the virtuous of this intuitive and emotive biocon- reliance on intuitions and emotions is man as someone capable of intuitive servative approach when he wrote not a prerogative of bioconservatives: insights, up to contemporary debates that “[i]n crucial cases . . . repug- bioliberals have their typical intu- about the (alleged) wisdom of ex- nance is the emotional expression of itions and emotive responses and are perts’ intuitions19 and neo-Humean deep wisdom, beyond reason’s power for this reason exposed to potential interpretations of moral reasoning to fully articulate it . . . . To pollution biases in the same way as bioconser- in the debate on biotechnologies.20 and perversion, the fitting response vatives are. The second thesis is that The same view is supported by recent can only be horror and revulsion; and reliance on intuitions and emotions findings and theories in neurobiol- conversely, generalized horror and is not necessarily antithetic to reason ogy and moral psychology and subse- revulsion are prima facie evidence of and rationality. This latter thesis has quent developments in metaethics.21 foulness and violation.”10 been philosophically defended with Consider, for example, findings and The second—and more concilia- particular reference to the debate on theories about the essential role of tory—strategy is to appeal to a form biotechnologies,17 while the former is emotions for the correct functioning of what might be dubbed “compan- perhaps more controversial and more of our practical rationality22 and of ions-in-guilt arguments.”11 The idea difficult to accept—at least for biolib- intuitions in our moral and practi- here is that no moral approach is erals. In both cases, I will support the cal decision-making.23 These theories ultimately based solely on reasons, claims by drawing on resources from have informed critical analysis that is and therefore the explicit appeal to the field of moral psychology and the relevant to many areas of applied phi- intuitions and emotions is no more sciences of the mind and, particularly, losophy—from risk-assessment24 to flawed than arguments displaying by applying to some positions in the interpretation of political divisions.25 logic and reasons.12 A neo-Humean enhancement debate recent findings Quite surprisingly, in spite of the version (one adapted from the phi- about the role of intuitions and emo- controversy regarding the (alleged) losophy of David Hume) of this view tions in human moral assessment. wisdom of intuitions and emotions in holds that there is room for reasons This new empirically informed per- bioethics, the debate about enhance- and arguments in (bio)ethics, but spective holds promises for solving ment biotechnologies has remained only as long as they concern empiri- the methodological controversy be- untouched by the potential insights cally verifiable facts and comparisons tween bioconservatives and bioliber- that this kind of psychological reflec- between relevantly similar cases or als. My aim is not, of course, to find a tion might bring. This paper aims to generalizations from cases, but not common ground on substantial ethi- fill this gap in the literature. when discussing moral principles cal issues concerning the permissibil- A note on terminology is necessary. themselves.13 Moral evaluations are ity of cloning or of enhancement.18 Following a common trend in moral the result of the projection onto a Nor is my aim that of going beyond a psychology,26 metaethics,27 and ap- state of affairs of human attitudes and polarization on substantial issues be- plied ethics28 alike, I will consider, for concerns,14 which also affect our per- tween liberals and conservatives that the present purposes, “emotions” and ception of the wrongness of altering after all characterizes many forms of “intuitions” as two relevantly simi- (human) nature through bioenhance- disagreements (religious, political, lar types of mental phenomena and ment.15 moral). However, it is essential to use the terms (almost) interchange- So-called bioliberals, those who in find some common methodological ably. Both intuitions and emotions principle do not oppose human bio- premise starting from which a proper happen automatically and without enhancement, tend to rely on rational dialogue and a proper debate might awareness, and both can have cogni- arguments and to see intuitions and take place. Sharing a methodology tive contents and be motivational at emotions mostly as sources of biases. for ethical discussion is important the same time. According to Sabine This approach often translates into because, as I will show, dismissing Roeser, for example, “[E]thical intu- shifting the burden of proof onto bio- bioethical positions merely on the ba- itions are paradigmatically cognitive conservatives and challenging them sis of their methodological assump- moral emotions,”29 and according to to provide arguments against the pro- tions—as participants in the debate Jonathan Dancy, “[R]ecent intuition- posed enhancement to back what bi- on biotechnology often do—can ism can allow itself a richer concep- oliberals perceive as merely intuitive, lead authors to overlook important tion of intuition, one that allows us to emotive, and irrational reactions.16 insights coming from the opposite think of an intuition as intrinsically In this article, I am going to show field. motivational, and so not ‘purely’ cog- that the methodological divide be- The view that intuitions, emo- nitive.”30 Jonathan Haidt proposes tween bioliberals and bioconservatives tions, and rationality are not that “cognitive elements of emo- is less significant than at first glance it mutually exclusive but actually in- tions—such as appraisals of events appears to be and less significant than terdependent has a long philosophi- and alterations of attention and vigi- it is often taken to be. I will do so by cal tradition. It dates back at least to lance—are subtypes of intuitions”

2 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT that “happen automatically and with case are heavily affected by the way cases of “moral dumbfounding,” conscious awareness of the outputs, the options are described. A study has when people unsuccessfully try to but not of the process.”31 Ultimately, shown that people tend to consider provide reasons that they think a cer- this literature seems to concur with the very same option—for instance, tain practice—for instance, secret in- Dancy on the claim that “the stan- diverting the trolley to a side track so cest between consenting adults, with dard contrast between intuition and that one person instead of five will be contraception used—is wrong, but emotion is a mistake.”32 killed—more permissible if it is de- still are not willing to give up their scribed in terms of the persons who conviction after they are shown that Intuitions, Emotions, and would be saved rather than in terms what they say cannot do the explana- Biases in (Bio)ethics of the persons who would be killed.38 tory work. For instance, one reason It is interesting to note, how- often provided in discussion about udgments, including ethical ones, ever, that, despite such unreliabil- this kind of incest is that it would en- Jthat are not based on rational scru- ity, many thought experiments and tail the risk of genetic abnormalities tiny but instead grounded in emo- theoretical frameworks that are used in the offspring, but subjects would tions and intuitions are often subject to ground substantial bioethical po- not change their negative evaluation to biases.33 I use “bias” in a very gen- sitions are based on moral intuitions of incest even if it were pointed out eral sense to include all the distorting or emotions. The trolley case, first that different contraceptives would psychological (including emotional) introduced to discuss the morality be used; rather, they would come up mechanisms that systematically affect of abortion,39 is just one example. In with some alternative reason to ex- the rationality of a certain (moral or what is known as the “non-identity plain their evaluation, but, again, this nonmoral) judgment. For instance, problem,” Derek Parfit focused on reason could be easily dismissed with- an “affect heuristics”34—a tendency the intuition that it is impermissible out any effect on their moral stance, to make quick judgments based on to conceive a child with a certain and so on. This suggests that such a feelings rather than calculation— (mild) disease when a normal child stance is grounded in a strong intu- may bias risk assessment. Fear, for could be easily conceived instead (for ition rather than in reasons and, more example, leads people to amplify risk instance by postponing the intended importantly, that because of this in- estimates: the more dreadful a certain pregnancy by a few months).40 The tuitive or emotive nature, the stance outcome is, the more probable it is non-identity problem is a “problem” is likely to be irrational or biased.43 perceived to be, and the same holds precisely because it is hard to justify Often these psychological find- for a range of negative emotions.35 rationally the intuition if we consider ings have focused on the difference “Probability neglect” is another in- that the alternative for the potential between the moral psychology of self- teresting psychological phenomenon mildly handicapped child would be reported liberals and of self-reported whereby, when assessing a certain nonexistence. The intuition in the conservatives. Interestingly, evidence risk, people become the less sensitive non-identity problem is currently up- suggests that reliance on intuitions to information about the actual prob- held to support “bioliberal” positions and emotions is not a prerogative of abilities of a certain outcome, the in the enhancement debate, such as the “conservative mind”; rather, the worse the feeling experienced about the idea that we could or even should difference between liberals and con- that outcome.36 Risk assessment is select the “best” embryo in the case of servatives is that they rely on differ- not a type of moral judgment, but in vitro fertilization although failing ent sets of intuitions.44 And the same it can affect moral judgments if, and to do so would not harm anyone.41 seems to be true if, instead of intu- to the extent that, moral judgments One might wonder whether reliance itions, we consider the emotional as- need to take consequences and prob- on intuitions in such cases is any dif- pects of the conservative and liberal abilities into account. ferent, with regard to the risk of bi- approaches. Evidence suggests, for ex- Other kinds of distorting factors ases, from reliance on intuitions by ample, that the autonomy-based mo- affect more directly moral intuitions, bioconservatives. rality that defines the liberal approach in other words, moral beliefs that are Recent studies and findings in is characterized by a specific emo- held “independent of any process moral psychology suggest that in the tion, namely anger, that is generally of inferring them from any other vast majority of cases, our moral judg- aroused when autonomy violations belief.”37 One such factor is the so- ments are the expression of intuitions occur, as opposed to emotions such called framing effect, the tendency or emotions, rather than of reason as contempt or disgust that character- to assess a certain scenario depending alone.42 According to the social intu- ize the conservative approach.45 Also on how it is described rather than on itionist model proposed by Jonathan in this case, the difference between what it actually contains. For exam- Haidt, reasoning and principles are, liberals and conservatives is based on ple, our intuitions about the moral at best, post hoc rationalizations of two different sets of emotions, rather permissibility of the different options our intuitive and emotive evalua- than on the different use they make in the well-known imagined trolley tions. This is illustrated by the many of arguments and reasoning.

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 3 Intuitions, Emotions, and Biases in Bioconservatives their assessment of the possible con- the best embryo in order to give the sequences of the use of some biotech- best start in life to your child. Parfit any philosophers are skepti- nologies. The mere possibility that admitted his frustration at not being Mcal about the role of intuitions some new biotechnologies such as able to provide the “Theory X” that and emotions in ethics. Skepticism is genetic engineering or cloning would justifies this kind of intuition; Harris particularly pronounced in bioethics bring about scary scenarios like the and Savulescu just seem to take the because scientific progress constantly ones depicted in fictional works such intuition as a solid basis for their ar- proposes new possible scenarios that as Gattaca or Brave New World could guments. As Rebecca Bennett puts are very different from the ones that make these scenarios look more prob- it, “Unlike [with] Parfit, Harris and have shaped the evolutionary devel- able than they actually are. There Savulescu’s examples are used to show opment of intuitions and emotions is evidence showing such mecha- that because we feel that a choice is in the human mind.46 For instance, nisms at work in perception of risk wrong it therefore must be actually some bioliberals claim that opposi- and acceptance of nuclear power.51 wrong to make these choices” (em- tion to human enhancement that is Prospects fueled by sci-fi novelists or phasis added).54 based on intuitions or emotions is the Hollywood industry might affect Or take again the Reversal Test, easily subject to status quo bias and judgments on the permissibility of which arguably is a perfect example that it is subject to this type of bias biotechnologies in the same way. It of bioliberals’ “rational” approach. precisely because it is based on intu- is noteworthy that some of the most The test might offer a useful concep- itions and emotions rather than rea- strenuous opponents of enhance- tual tool to certify the rationality of son.47 Status quo bias is defined as an ment biotechnologies often remind procreative beneficence. Bioliberals “inappropriate (irrational) preference people of scary fictional scenarios or might argue that if you think that for an option because it preserves the other things that cast a shadow over selecting the best embryo is not per- status quo” (p. 658). The key words our “posthuman future” in order to missible, then the burden of proof is here are “irrational” and “inappropri- support their positions.52 This might on you to demonstrate that either (1) ate.” What makes a preference irra- be a strategy to instill a sentiment the opposite solution would be better tional and inappropriate? If we want of fear in others, but might also be (choosing the “worst” embryo) or (2) to claim that a piece of reasoning is a symptom of bioconservatives’ own the current state is optimal (the natu- biased and irrational, we presumably fears, which might distort their prob- ral lottery is optimal); if you can’t do need a standard of rationality to ap- abilistic assessment of the possible that, then your position is affected by peal to. The “Reversal Test” devised consequences of adopting certain a status quo bias. No bioconservative by Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord is a biotechnologies. would uphold 1, and probably very proposed standard. According to this, few would bite the bullet by buying if an opponent of a certain form of Intuitions, Emotions, and 2. However, this heuristics sets some enhancement (increasing the level Biases in Bioliberals rules of the game that might them- of serotonin in our brain to improve selves be questioned. For example, impulse control, for instance48) is hether Haidt’s (and col- enhancement implemented in the not willing to claim that a certain Wleagues’) theory about the in- form of a “liberal eugenics” policy parameter in the human physiology tuitive and emotive foundations of might actively promote inequalities should be modified in the opposite the liberal mind is true is debatable in any given society between those direction (decreasing the level of se- on empirical grounds, and not all who can and those who cannot (and rotonin), and if the opponent cannot the evidence available supports the maybe in some cases do not want demonstrate that the current level of social intuitionist model.53 What is to) undergo enhancement interven- that parameter is optimal either, then, true is that bioliberals do base some tions;55 in other words, egalitarian other things being equal (for exam- of their arguments on unanalyzed in- goals might not be adequately pro- ple, there is no significant transition tuitions, in spite of their defense of moted in a society where enhance- cost involved), the opposition to that rationality in ethics. For example, it ments are liberally pursued,56 even if enhancement intervention is biased. is only by accepting the intuitive re- within a liberal framework enhancing Concerns about interfering with the sponse to the non-identity problem were the most rational option accord- course of evolution, which are often that John Harris and Julian Savulescu ing to the reversal test. So, in virtue put forward by bioconservatives,49 can endorse the principle of procre- of the questionability of these rules, might be seen as an example of status ative beneficence: since no harm an opponent of enhancement might quo bias. would be done to the future person consistently claim that neither 1 nor The distorting influence of emo- if a “normal” or even a defective em- 2 is true, but that from this negation tions on risk assessment50 provides bryo were implanted instead of the it does not follow that procreative a further reason for thinking that “best embryo,” it is hard to argue that beneficence is a valid principle. In bioconservatives might be biased in there is a moral obligation to select other words, one might argue that

4 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT the reversal test is an expression of a gumentative strategies are mutually to further their own, opposite causes. “neoliberal orthodoxy”57 of individu- exclusive. For instance, either it is rea- Haidt uses Damasio’s observations as alistic choice in free markets, which sonable to predict, based on empirical evidence in support of his thesis that is simply assumed but not critically evidence about the diffusion of other our morality is based on emotions assessed, for example, in light of the technologies, that enhancement will rather than on rationality,64 whereas aforementioned egalitarian objec- result in inequalities, or it is not. If Roeser uses the same evidence to tions. it is not, then no further argument is support the thesis that our morality At this point, one might argue that required to address the objection. If it is based on emotion and therefore on it simply is not true that bioliberals is, then either the value of liberty and rationality.65 This suggests, at the very rely on an uncritical and intuitive of the expected utility that enhance- least, that the notion of “rationality” endorsement of liberty in spite of the ment might bring about outweighs is in need of clarification, particularly potential costs in terms of equality. In equality costs (at least when these with regard to its relation to emotions fact, the bioliberal approach is often costs are not too high), or it does and intuitions. presented by its defenders as the re- not. If it does, then, again, no fur- What I want to focus on here is sult of a reasonable balance between ther argument is required. If it does the evidence that suggests that intui- liberal and egalitarian requirements. not, then bioliberals are required to tive and immediate responses in gen- There are, however, reasons to be provide other arguments, for example eral can be the result of automatized suspicious, if we analyze the differ- the argument that enhancement ac- processes based on explicit and con- ent claims bioliberals have put for- tually promotes equality. The point is sciously held reasons, thus expressing ward to defend their views against that in the presence of different possi- a form of rationality. This would im- equality-based objections. There are ble and mutually exclusive strategies, ply that although most of our moral at least four such claims. The first is when one would be sufficient, it is judgments might be intuitive or empirical in nature: some bioliberals hard to see how any of these strategies emotional, this is not the whole story, have pointed out that bioenhance- can do any actual justificatory work and some intuitive and emotional re- ments would become progressively, in defending enhancement from sponses might deserve more attention and relatively rapidly, accessible to equality-based objections. These dif- and scrutiny than currently granted. almost everyone, as has been the case ferent possible responses look very Let’s see more in details. with many other new technologies.58 much like post-hoc rationalizations Two sets of empirical data are The second claim is that bioenhance- of the intuition that liberty should be particularly interesting for the pres- ment could actually promote equal- the guiding principle when it comes ent discussion: First, high-priority ity by correcting the unfairness of to human enhancement, no matter and consciously held goals can pre- the genetic lottery, for instance, if we what the possible costs in terms of vail over temptations, stereotypes, prioritized enhancements of those equality. But if this last claim is defen- and immediate reactions through a with a low level of functioning of sible, then reasons must be provided “behavioral inhibition system” once any capacity.59 The third claim is that to support the point (and perhaps the people have been made aware of hav- equality matters, but not so much as intuition) that liberty matters more ing acted contrary to these goals and to outweigh the importance of lib- than equality when the two principles experience a self-directed negative erty to make procreative choices.60 conflict with one another. feeling (in particular, experiments Finally, some have pointed out that have focused on racial stereotypes we already accept, and indeed pro- “Reasoned Intuitions”? that conflict with consciously held mote, inequalities through other, egalitarian goals).66 Second, the way more traditional means (for instance, ne important source of criticism high-priority (moral) goals can pre- by allowing those who can afford to Oof the intuitive and emotive ac- vail can itself be an emotional or in- send their children to private schools count of moral judgments stems from tuitive response,67 which is consistent to do so), and there is no reason for the view that emotions, intuitions, with empirical findings about the au- thinking that the same inequalities and rationality cannot be separated tomatization of high-priority (moral brought about through new forms of in the way Haidt and other moral and nonmoral) goals.68 human enhancement should be con- psychologists presuppose. Rather, as From empirical studies on resis- sidered morally different.61 has been claimed, ethical intuitions tance to temptations, for example, Analyzing each of these claims and emotions “can be the source and Fishbach and colleagues have con- would be well beyond the scope of this the result of ethical reflection and de- cluded that “with continuing at- paper. What I want to point out here liberation.”62 It is interesting to note tempts at self-control individuals may is that a liberal defense of enhance- how Haidt and Roeser use neurobi- develop facilitative links between rep- ment cannot consistently embrace all ologist Antonio Damasio’s studies on resentations of momentarily activated of them to respond to equality-based how our practical rationality requires temptations and the corresponding objections, because some of these ar- the correct functioning of emotions63 high-priority goals with which they

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 5 may interfere. Because of the general intuitionist claim that “intuitions counts of “wisdom” are often ground- pervasiveness of self-control striv- are a product of our rational faculty,” ed in epistemic humility (the sense ings, such facilitative links may be which “might be the result of a long in which, for instance, Socrates was overlearned to the point of their a) process of reflection.”74 wise) or accuracy. Alternatively, they subliminal activation, and b) relative Let us now turn again to the en- are based on knowledge about how independence of cognitive resourc- hancement debate to try to apply to live well and on appreciation of es.”69 This means that people’s au- these insights. The fact that someone the value of living well (in the sense tomatic, immediate reactions might feels “repugnance” at the thought of of Aristotelian practical wisdom).77 be due to higher-priority moral goals human cloning or intuits the exis- Sometimes accounts are hybrid ver- that are not directly recalled, but that tence of a “Factor X” that accounts sions, including aspects of these dif- have been overlearned so that their for human dignity75 means only that ferent definitions.78 None of these application does not require any con- the individual’s judgments on the definitions seem, however, to cap- scious resource. impermissibility of using certain bio- ture the meaning that Kass and other These results were replicated technologies are not inferred from any conservatives attach to the notion across a wide variety of (moral and principle. It does not mean, however, of wisdom. Their “wisdom” could nonmoral) goals,70 also outside the that the judgments cannot be justified rather be intended as a capacity for domain of temptations. John Bargh by any principle (or “higher-priority moral insights that make up for the and colleagues, for instance, have moral goal”) or that they are not ex- limitations of our moral reasoning. detected such mechanisms at work plained by an independent reflection As Levin writes, “[T]hese sentiments when the goal activated is to perform on moral goals that the individual has and insights are reasonable but not well at tasks or to cooperate with previously made, for example, due fully rational. They are wise but not others. These results have been in- to his or her education or upbring- fully explicit.”79 In this view, intu- terpreted as suggesting that “mental ing (for instance a reflection on the itions and emotions are a source of representations of goals can become threat to egalitarian goals posed by a wisdom, but wisdom is not the same activated without an act of conscious “neoliberal orthodoxy”). In the same as rationality. Nor is it something less will, such that subsequent behavior way, an intuition that it is wrong to or more than rationality. Simply, it is is then guided by these goals within alter the course of evolution or God’s taken to be something different, but the situational context faced by the plan is an immediate response that more powerful than rationality in individual.”71 In other words, “over can arise on the background view providing moral insights. Why this time the goal representation will de- that “playing God” is, for some rea- should be the case is, however, unclear, velop an automatic association with son, wrong, a view on which there is considering that the best (in other the features of those situations in a philosophical debate where reasons words, empirically informed) expla- which that goal has been repeatedly can be given and assessed. And this nation for why some intuitions and and consistently chosen and pursued is a view that, exactly like a “liberal emotions can convey moral insights in the past” (p. 1015) so that eventu- orthodoxy” or an egalitarian objec- is that they are the result of automa- ally environmental cues, rather than tion, can be articulated and is subject tized moral reflection. Rationality is conscious choice, activate the (moral) to rational scrutiny. not something easily separable from goal. intuitions and emotions, but there is The more general principle of psy- Rationality, Wisdom, and the no need to postulate a separate fac- chology here at work is that, when Arena for the Enhancement ulty or virtue, such as “wisdom,” to the same goal is repeatedly activated Debate account for the fact that there might in the same kind of situations, ef- be deep insights speaking through fortful conscious reflection tends to he lack of clarity surrounding our emotions or intuitions: reflection drop out, as no longer necessary to Tthe concept of “rationality” rec- and reasons can and should be used apply that goal, with the consequent ommends caution when bestowing to justify such insights. judgments becoming automatized certificates of rationality to oneself, To be sure, this analysis raises the responses.72 More importantly for or of lack thereof to one’s opponents, complex philosophical problem of the present discussion, “on the basis as bioliberals tend to do. The same is the foundation of morality, some- of the assumption that goals become true when the concept invoked is that thing whose discussion (let alone automated through their repeated of “wisdom,” which is more common solution) is well beyond the scope of selection in a given situation, such among conservatives. Clearly defin- this paper. One might argue, in other automatic goals should generally be ing “wisdom” is problematic because, words, that even this “second-order” in line with the individual’s valued, as has been pointed out, “[t]here are rational defense would be grounded aspired-to life goals and purposes.”73 as many definitions of wisdom as in some other intuition or emotion, Actually, this evidence seems to pro- authors who attempt to understand thus triggering an infinite regress. vide empirical confirmation for the what wisdom is.”76 Philosophical ac- Here I want just to point out that,

6 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT even if infinite regress justified an in- favor of intuitions and emotions). ally impermissible outcome. Perhaps tuitionist or a sentimentalist metaeth- However, it is bioliberals, in other a platonic type of republic would be ics, we would still gain something in words, those more fiercely opposed better than a democracy, all things terms of reflective capacity and dia- to intuitions and emotions in ethi- considered. But this kind of issue logue if we tried to dig a bit deeper cal discussion, who have the most demonstrates the importance of mak- than the first level of intuitive and compelling reasons for overcoming ing reasons and underlying concerns emotive responses and to accept the their tendency to dismiss opponents’ explicit so that the ultimate moral idea that intuitions and emotions can methodological approach. In fact, my or philosophical issues at stake—in express reasons, and sometimes good analysis suggests that often their op- this case, the right balance between ones. My analysis aims at encourag- ponents’ methodological approach— egalitarian and liberal values—can ing those who take part in bioethi- reliance on intuitive and emotive be detected, unpacked, and ratio- cal discussion to work in both these stances—is also their own method- nally discussed, instead of remaining directions, rather than dismiss oppo- ological approach. hidden and unexamined in intuitive nent positions just because they are Furthermore, bioliberals are called and emotive responses that might or articulated through the (allegedly) on to make a bigger effort than bio- might not be wise. narrow language of “autonomy, fair- conservatives to overcome their Acknowledgments ness and individual rights”80 or be- skepticism toward their opponents’ cause they are the product of intuitive methodological approach. One im- I would like to thank Steve Clarke or emotive reactions.81 As Kaebnick portant aspect of bioethical discus- for very helpful comments on previ- has put it, even if “[w]e will not be sion that is often overlooked is that ous versions of this paper, as well as the able to support our positions with ar- bioconservatives are frequently keen editor and an anonymous reviewer of guments that are entirely noncircular, to provide reasons and arguments in the Hastings Center Report for their sug- . . . we should still be able to articu- support of their intuitions.83 Even gestions on how to improve it. I also late, convey, and defend our views.”82 Kass, after having claimed that re- received extremely helpful feedback After all, even logic has fundamental pugnance might be the last voice that from audiences at the New Zealand principles that cannot be defended in speaks up in defense of our humanity, Bioethics Conference, at the University terms of something other (or more outlines some more general concerns of Otago, Dunedin, in January 2014, fundamental) than logic itself, but about cloning and the wide use of and during my presentations at the this fact provides no reason to dismiss biotechnologies in human reproduc- Center for Applied Philosophy and logic or to see logic as something pre- tion that go beyond mere reliance at the Public Ethics Seminar, on the carious. on gut feelings, for instance, slippery Canberra and Wagga Wagga campuses, In light of the analysis conducted slope arguments or concerns about respectively, of Charles Sturt University. here, two things are required of par- confounding the moral relations and This research was supported under ticipants in the enhancement debate. roles in a family.84 These concerns can the Australian Research Council’s The first is the capacity to recognize be articulated and then assessed based Discovery Projects funding scheme the intuitions that ground one’s mor- on reason-giving, arguments, and re- (project number DP130103658). al stances, a task in which bioconser- flection. Notes vatives are certainly performing much Bioconservatives should, however, better than bioliberals. The second is be more open and explicit about this 1. R. George, “Infanticide and Madness,” a convincing demonstration—a ra- latter aspect of their argumentative Journal of Medical Ethics 3, no. 5 (2013): 299-301, at 299. tional argument to the effect that— strategy. There is no need to push— 2. Y. Levin, “The Paradox of Conservative the more general goals that these as they often do—the problematic Bioethics,” The New Atlantis, no. 1 (2003): intuitions and emotions express are thesis that intuitions and emotions 53-65. justifiable through arguments and are better than explicit arguments to 3. Levin, “The Paradox of Conservative reason-giving. If this justification put up a convincing case against en- Bioethics”; E. Cohen, “Conservative Bioethics and the Search for Wisdom,” through articulable reasons can be hancement. Consider the following Hastings Center Report 36, no. 1 (2006): provided, then it would make sense example. Robert Sparrow has argued 44-56. to say that the intuitions or emotions that moral bioenhancement threatens 4. R. Macklin, “The New Conservatives through which they express them- egalitarian goals because it foreshad- in Bioethics: Who Are They and What Do selves are a source of wisdom or, to ows a division of classes where the They Seek?,” Hastings Center Report 36, no. 1 (2006): 34-43; A. Charo, “Passing On use an equivalent word, of rationality. morally enhanced, as in Plato’s ideal The Right: Conservative Bioethics Is Closer The aim of this paper is to en- republic (or perhaps as in Gattaca), Than It Appears,” Journal of Law, Medicine courage both parties engaged in the would have a stronger claim to gov- and Ethics, 32 (2004): 307-14. enhancement debate to abandon ern over, and therefore dominate, the 5. A. Giubilini and S. Sanyal, “The Ethics what often looks like a methodologi- morally “normal.”85 Now, it is not of Human Enhancement,” Philosophy Compass 10, no. 4 (2015): 233-43. cal dogmatism (either against or in obvious that this would be a mor-

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 7 6. R. Sparrow, “Better Living through 21. See, for example, S. Roeser, Moral 36. C. Sustein, “Terrorism and Chemistry? A Reply to Savulescu and Emotions and Intuitions (Basingstoke, UK: Probability Neglect,” Journal of Risk and Persson on ‘Moral Enhancement,’” Journal Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Uncertainty 26, no. 2 (2003): 121-36, at of Applied Philosophy, 31 no. 1 (2014): 22. See, for example, A. Damasio, 133. 23-32; M. Mehlman and J. Botkin, Access Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the 37. W. Sinnott-Armstrong, “Framing to the Genome: The Challenge to Equality Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994). Moral Intuitions,” in The Neuroscience of (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 23. See, for example, T. Gilovich, D. Morality: Emotions, Brain Disorders, and Press, 1998). Griffin, D. Kahneman, eds., Heuristics and Development, ed. W. Sinnott-Armstrong, 7. L. Kass, “The Wisdom of Repugnance: Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 47- Why We Should Ban the Cloning of (New York: Cambridge University Press, 82, at 47. Humans,” The New Republic, June 2, 1997, 2002); J. Haidt, The Righteous Mind: Why 38. L. Petrinovich and P. O’Neill, 17-26. Good People Are Divided by Politics and “Influence of Wording and Framing 8. F. Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Religion (New York: Pantheon, 2002). Effects on Moral Intuitions,” Ethology and Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution 24. D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Sociobiology 17 (1996): 145-71. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011); 39. P. Foot, “The Problem of Abortion 2002). Gilovich et al., Heuristics and Biases; S. and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” Oxford 9. M. Sandel, “The Case against Roeser, “Intuitions, Emotions and Gut Review 5 (1967): 5-15. Perfection,” The Atlantic, 293, no. 3 (2004): Reactions in Decisions about Risks: 40. D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons 51-62, at 51. Towards a Different Interpretation of (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1987), at 367-68. 10. L. Kass, “The Wisdom of ‘Neuroethics,’” Journal of Risk Research 13, 41. J. Savulescu, “Procreative Repugnance,” at 21. no. 2 (2010): 175-90. Beneficence: Why We Should Select the 11. H. Lillehammer, Companions in 25. J. Graham, J. Haidt, and B. Nosek, Best Children,” Bioethics, 15, no. 5/6 Guilt: Arguments for Ethical Objectivity “Liberals and Conservatives Use Different (2001): 413-26; see also Bennett, “When (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). Sets of Moral Foundations,” Journal of Intuition Is Not Enough.” 12. M. Hauskeller, “Reflections from a Personality and Social Psychology 96 (2009): 42. Haidt, The Righteous Mind; J. Troubled Stream: Giubilini and Minerva 1029-46; Haidt, The Righteous Mind. Greene, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” on After-Birth Abortion,” Hastings Center 26. See, for example, Haidt, The Righteous in The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotions, Report, 42, no. 4 (2012): 17-20, at 18. Mind, at 45, and Roeser, “Intuitions, Brain Disorders, and Development, ed. 13. G. E. Kaebnick, “Reasons of the Emotions and Gut Reactions in Decisions Sinnott-Armstrong, 35-79. Heart: Emotion, Rationality, and the about Risks.” 43. Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 74-92. ‘Wisdom of Repugnance,’” Hastings Center 27. See, for example, J. Dancy, “Intuition 44. Ibid. Report, 38 no. 4 (2008): 36-45. and Emotion,” Ethics 124, no. 4 (2014): 45. Rozin et al., “The CAD Triad 14. S. Blackburn, Ruling Passions (New 787-812. Hypothesis: A Mapping between Three York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 28. See, for example, R. Bennett, Moral Emotions (Contempt, Anger, 15. G. E. Kaebnick, Humans in Nature: “When Intuition Is Not Enough: Why the Disgust) and Three Moral Codes The World As We Find It and the World As Principle of Procreative Beneficence Must (Community, Autonomy, Divinity),” We Create It (New York: Oxford University Work Much Harder to Justify Its Eugenic Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Press, 2014); see, especially, chapter 2. Vision,” Bioethics, 28, no 9: 447-55. 76, no. 4 (1999): 574-86. 16. J. Harris, Clones, Genes, and 29. Roeser, “Intuitions, Emotions and 46. R. Roache and S. Clarke, Immortality (New York: Oxford University Gut Reactions in Decisions about Risks,” “Bioconservatism, Bioliberalism, and the Press), at 56-59 and 181; N. Agar, Liberal 180. Wisdom of Reflecting on Repugnance,” Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement 30. Dancy, “Intuition and Emotion,” Monash Bioethics Review 28, no. 1 (2009): (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), at 153; N. 790. 1-21. Bostrom and T. Ord, “The Reversal Test: 31. Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 329. 47. Bostrom and Ord, “The Reversal Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied 32. Dancy, “Intuition and Emotion,” Test,” 669. Ethics,” Ethics 116, no. 4 (2006): 656-79; 788. 48. G. Kahane and J. Savulescu. R. Macklin, “The New Conservatives in 33. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and “Normal Human Variation: Refocusing Bioethics.” Slow; D. Kahneman D. and A. Tversky, the Enhancement Debate,” Bioethics (ear- 17. Kaebnick, Humans in Nature. “Choices, Values, and Frames,” American ly epub August 2, 2013): doi:10.1111/ 18. It has been argued, however, that, Psychologist 39, no. 4 (1984): 341-50; A. bioe.12045. in fact, even on some substantial issues Tversky and D. Kahneman, “Judgment 49. Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future, 7. such as the ideal of human “authenticity,” under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” 50. Slovic and Peters, “Risk Perception the divide between “critics” and “enthu- Science, 185 (1974): 1124-31. and Affect”; Sustein, “Terrorism and siasts” of human enhancement is not as 34. M. Finucane et al., “The Affect Probability Neglect.” marked as one might initially think. See E. Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and 51. E. Peters and P. Slovic, “The Role Parens, Shaping Our Selves: On Technology, Benefits,” Journal of Behavioral Decision of Affect and Worldviews as Orientating Flourishing, and a Habit of Thinking (New Making 13 (2000): 1-17; P. Slovic et al., Dispositions in the Perception and York: Oxford University Press, 2015); see, “The Affect Heuristic,” in Heuristics and Acceptance of Nuclear Power,” Journal of especially, chapter 3. Biases, ed. Gilovich et al., 397-420. Applied Social Psychology 26, no. 16 (1996): 19. L. Bortolotti, “Does Reflection 35. P. Slovic and E. Peters, “Risk 1427-53. Lead to Wise Choices?,” Philosophical Perception and Affect,” Current Directions 52. L. Kass, Toward a More Natural Explorations 14, no. 3 (2011): 297-313; J. in Psychological Science 15, no. 6 (2006): Science: Biology and Human Affairs (New Weinberg et al., “Are Philosophers Expert 322-25; J. Lerner et al., “Effects of Fear and York: Free Press, 1985), 35; Fukuyama, Our Intuiters?,” Philosophical Psychology 23, no. Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A Posthuman Future, 5-6; Sandel, “The Case 3 (2010): 331-55. National Field Experiment,” Psychological against Perfection,” 54; R. Sparrow, “A Not- 20. Kaebnick, Humans in Nature. Science 14, no. 2 (2003): 144-50. So-New Eugenics: Harris and Savulescu on

8 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT Human Enhancement,” Hastings Center 61. S. Chan and J. Harris, “In Support 71. Bargh et al., “The Automated Will,” Report 41, no. 1 (2011): 32-42, at 34. of Human Enhancement,” Studies in Ethics, 1015. 53. J. Kennett and C Fine, “Will the Law, and Technology 1, no. 1 (2007): ar- 72. Bargh et al., “The Unbearable Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? The ticle 10. Automaticity of Being,” 468-69 and 473- Implications of Social Intuitionist Model 62. Roeser, “Intuitions, Emotions and 74. for Meta-ethics and Moral Psychology,” Gut Reactions in Decisions about Risks,” 73. Bargh et al., “The Automated Will,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12, no. 1 175. 1016. (2009): 77-96; C. Fine, “Is the Emotional 63. Damasio, Descartes’ Error. 74. Roeser, “Intuitions, Emotions and Dog Wagging its Rational Tail, or Chasing 64. Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 65. Gut Reactions in Decisions about Risks,” It?,” Philosophical Explorations 9, no. 1 65. Roeser, “Intuitions, Emotions and 180; Bortolotti, “Does Reflection Lead to (2006): 83-98. Gut Reactions in Decisions about Risks,” Wise Choices?,” 306. 54. Bennett, “When Intuition Is Not 180. 75. Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future. Enough,” at 4. 66. M. Monteith, “Self-Regulation of 76. Bortolotti, “Does Reflection Lead to 55. See, for example, Sparrow, “A Not- Prejudiced Responses,” Journal of Personality Wise Choices?,” 300. So-New Eugenics”; Sparrow, “Better Living and Social Psychology 65, no. 3 (1993): 469- 77. R. Nozick, “What Is Wisdom and through Chemistry?” 85; M. Monteith, et al., “Putting the Brakes Why Do Philosophers Love It So?,” in The 56. M. Selgelid, “Moderate Eugenics and on Prejudice: On the Development and Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations, by Human Enhancement,” Medicine, Health Operation of Cues for Control,” Journal of R. Nozick (New York: Simon and Schuster, Care and Philosophy 17 no. 1 (2014): 3-12. Personality and Social Psychology 83, no. 5 1989): 267-78, at 269; S. Ryan, “What Is 57. K. Birch, “Neoliberalising Bioethics: (2002): 1029-50. Wisdom?,” Philosophical Studies 93, no. 2 Bias, Enhancement and Economistic 67. Roeser, “Intuitions, Emotions and (1999): 119-39. Ethics,” Genomics, Society and Policy 4, no. Gut Reactions in Decisions about Risks.” 78. S. Ryan, “Wisdom,” The Stanford 2 (2008): 1-10. 68. A. Fishbach, R. Friedman, A. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 58. A. Sandberg and J. Savulescu, “The Kruglanski, “Leading Us Not unto Zalta, 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/ar- Social and Economic Impacts of Cognitive Temptation: Momentary Allurements chives/sum2013/entries/wisdom/. Enhancement,” in Enhancing Human Elicit Overriding Goal Activation,” Journal 79. Levin, “The Paradox of Conservative Capacities, ed. J. Savulescu, R. Ter Meulen, of Personality and Social Psychology 84, no. Bioethics,” 55. and G. Kahane (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2 (2003): 296-309; J. Bargh et al., “The 80. Sandel, “The Case against 2011), 92-113. Automated Will: Nonconscious Activation Perfection,” 51. 59. A. Buchanan et al., From Chance to and Pursuit of Behavioral Goals,” Journal 81. For a development of this point, see Choice: Genetics and Justice (Cambridge: of Personality and Social Psychology 81, the interesting discussion in Parens, Shaping Cambridge University Press 2000); no. 6 (2001): 1014-27; J. Bargh and T. Our Selves, particularly p. 46. J. Savulescu, “Justice, Fairness, and Chartrand, “The Unbearable Automaticity 82. Kaebnick, Humans in Nature, 43. Enhancement,” Annals of the New York of Being,” American Psychologist 54, no. 7 83. Levin, “The Paradox of Conservative Academy of Sciences 1093 (2006): 321-38. (1999): 462-79. Bioethics.” 60. J. Savulescu, “In Defence of 69. Fishbach et al., “Leading Us Not 84. Kass, “The Wisdom of Repugnance,” Procreative Beneficence: A Reply to Parker,” unto Temptation: Momentary Allurements 21. Journal of Medical Ethics 33, no. 5 (2007): Elicit Overriding Goal Activation,” 298. 85. Sparrow, “Better Living through 284-88, at 288; Savulescu, “Procreative 70. Ibid.; see p. 306. Chemistry?” Beneficence,” 423.

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