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Countering Terrorism Michael Chandler and Rohan Gunaratna CAN WE MEET THE THREAT OF GLOBAL VIOLENCE? ‘Gunaratna is the foremost English-speaking expert on the terror network’ Dan Rather, CBS Evening News Countering Terrorism Countering Terrorism Can We Meet the Threat of Global Violence? Michael Chandler and Rohan Gunaratna reaktion books Published by Reaktion Books Ltd 33 Great Sutton Street London ec1v 0dx, uk www.reaktionbooks.co.uk First published 2007 Copyright © Michael Chandler and Rohan Gunaratna 2007 All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publishers. Printed and Bound in Great Britain by William Clowes Limited, Beccles, Suffolk British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Chandler, Michael Countering terrorism: can we meet the threat of global violence? 1. Terrorism – Prevention 2. Terrorism – Prevention – International cooperation 3. War on Terrorism, 2001– 4. Security, International I. Title II. Gunaratna, Rohan, 1961– 363.3´25 isbn-13: 978 1 86189 308 6 isbn-10: 1 86189 308 6 Contents Introduction 7 1 The Current and Future Terrorist Threat 16 2 To Know and Understand One’s Enemy 36 3 Iraq: A Strategic Defeat? 52 4 Iran – The Open Flank 74 5 Terrorism: An Enduring Threat 85 6 The United Nations: Rising to the Challenge 99 7 Afghanistan: The Taliban and the Threat Beyond 117 8 Initial Reactions to 9/11 126 9 Towards Tougher Sanctions 135 10 Life-blood of Terrorism 150 11 Terrorism and Modern Communications 178 12 The Reluctant Leadership 194 13 Pathways Out of Violence 201 References 221 Acknowledgements 234 Index 236 Introduction he blasts came at ten minutes to nine in the morning rush hour. Within fifty seconds of each other, three bombs Texploded, one each on separate trains on the Underground railway system – the Tube: the first on a Circle Line train between Liverpool Street and Aldgate stations; the next on a Piccadilly Line train, deep under the city, travelling from King’s Cross towards Russell Square; and the third on another Circle Line train in Edgware Road station. Fifty-seven minutes later, at 9.47 a.m., a crowded Number 30 bus heading for Hackney was blown apart in Tavistock Square. This was the ‘breaking news’ in London on the morning of 7 July 2005. The ‘inevitable’ had happened. As far back as 2003 the head of mi5, the uk’s Security Service, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, and London’s Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir John Stevens, had both warned that it was not a case of ‘if ’ but ‘when’ there would be an attack in the United Kingdom by militant extremists associated with the al-Qaida terrorist network. The London ‘7/7’ attacks bore all the hallmarks of an al- Qaida style atrocity. Multiple, simultaneous explosions, with no prior warning given, designed to cause mass casualties, achieve maximum publicity and have a seriously adverse impact on the morale of the nation’s population and its economy. Although the terrorists may have had some success with the first two aspects of their intended aim, they missed out on the third. Those responsible for planning and executing these attacks had totally underestimated the indomitable spirit of the people of London. Through this fortitude, taken together with the uk’s counter- terrorism strategy and the London Resilience programme, many 7 lives were saved, with most of the injured rescued and treated rela- tively quickly.1 This ability to reduce the impact of the attacks was due to a considerable amount of planning and rehearsals by all the agencies that have to work together in the event of major incidents in the capital. Within minutes of reality dawning that morning as to what was actually happening in central London, the emergency serv- ices swung into action. Police, fire and ambulance services, doctors and paramedical teams, and London’s transport staff all had roles to play, as did the Accident and Emergency (a&e) departments at key London hospitals. Given the confined spaces in which the terrorists detonated their bombs, the casualties could have been much worse. In the end 56 people were killed and it was estimated that more than 600 were injured. Although traffic on much of London’s public transport and mass-transit systems, particularly the Underground network in central London, was temporarily suspended on 7 July, by the next morning it was almost ‘business as usual’. Understandably, this was not the case at the locations of the terrorist attacks: as ‘scenes of crime’ (soc) they were being subjected to intensive forensic examination. Using a known Islamic website, a previously unknown group calling itself ‘The Secret Organization of Al-Qaeda in Europe’ claimed responsibility for the attacks. In the words of the website, the attacks were reprisals for the British involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the origin and authenticity of the group has not been confirmed. Also this so-called ‘secret organization’ made no mention in its statement with respect to the g-8 summit, which, coincidentally or not, was starting its first day on 7 July at Gleneagles in Scotland. Britain’s Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was swift in his condemnation of the atrocities and those behind the blasts. In view of the serious- ness of the atrocities perpetrated that morning in London, Blair broke off his chairing of the summit to fly to London and be briefed by ministers and key government officials. Before departing, however, he gave a sombre but strident response to the terrorists and their sponsors: Britain would not be bowed by terrorists. Flanked by all the heads of state and dignitaries attending the summit conference – many of whom later gave their own responses of support and solidarity with the British at this outrage – Blair made it clear that no stone would be left unturned until all those responsible, in any way, for the attacks had been brought to justice. 8 Countering Terrorism The attacks that morning in London almost hijacked the agenda of the summit just at a time when the g-8 and representatives of cer- tain African countries were debating significant financial assistance from which a number of countries in the ‘global south’ would benefit. To add to the irony of the situation, the sort of countries that would be beneficiaries are similar to those from which terrorists of the type responsible for the blasts that morning originate. There are a variety of causes that have contributed or continue to contribute to this phenomenon of terrorism. Poverty, perceived injustices and double standards on which terrorism can feed are but a few. Poor living standards, unemployment and inadequate or non- existent education systems leading to futures without hope all provide fertile ground on which terrorism easily breeds. Corrupt and/or dic- tatorial governments denying populations even the most basic form of democracy can exaggerate their peoples’ frustrations and accelerate their radicalization by extremist clerics. Humanitarian assistance accompanied by the encouragement to convert to Islam can make the difference between surviving and starving to death. The ‘club of the eight most industrialized nations’, despite its ideals and rhetoric, has been slow to reach out to the ‘global south’; that is until this g-8 Summit of 7 July 2005 agreed a number of measures aimed at allevi- ating poverty in at least eighteen African nations. However, the g-8 nations have not responded to the global threat from transnational terrorism in ways that might be more pertinent and, in the longer term, have a much more positive impact. Because the commitments and responses from the nations of the ‘industrialized north’ have fall- en short of the investment needed, financial vacuums have developed. Depending on the country in question, these have often been filled by Islamic-based charities, invariably with strings attached. For vested reasons insufficient pressure has been applied to such states as Saudi Arabia. Many Muslim humanitarian organizations or charities, with their head offices in the Saudi kingdom, have knowingly or unwittingly been abused downstream to provide financial support to terrorist organizations. The fact, so often trotted out, that this was a political expedient in the West’s not-so-clandestine efforts that resulted in the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan no longer holds water. Nor does the fact that there was a certain ambivalence on the part of some Western governments to the misuse of ngos, such as the Third World Relief Agency (twra), to assist covertly beleaguered Introduction 9 Muslims in the Bosnian conflict (1992–5) with war-like materiel. Just because it suited the situations at the time is no excuse for the process to be allowed to continue as an accepted practice, particularly in sup- port of terrorist groups. Humanitarian organizations have an impor- tant role to play in conflict zones to assist the displaced, the needy, the injured and the sick. These functions must stand apart from any assis- tance to the belligerents to ensure the neutrality of the ngos is not compromised. At the same time, extremist Muslim clerics proclaiming a Wahabist or Salafist strain of Islam, with little if any understanding of the real world, have been left, carte blanche, to encourage an extreme and ‘un-Islamic’ interpretation of their faith. They have been free to preach and ferment aggression towards the Jews, the United States and its allies. But in addition to these more widespread and general causes, which encourage a radical, extreme and fundamentalist form of Islam, the London bombings have taken on a much more sinister aspect. For the first time in Western Europe, Islamist terrorists have resorted to suicide attacks.
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