KENYATTA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF SECURITY DIPLOMACY AND PEACE STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CONFLICT AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

ANALYSIS OF HATE SPEECH IN PROMOTING INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICT IN NAIROBI COUNTY AND UASIN GISHU COUNTY AFTER GENERAL ELECTIONS IN 2007/8 IN KENYA.

CHARLES LWANGA OKATA OBULUTSA

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF SECURITY DIPLOMACY AND PEACE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN PEACE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT OF KENYATTA UNIVERSITY

NOVEMBER 2020

DECLARATION Declaration by the Student

This research project is my original work and has not been submitted for a degree in any other university.

Names: Charles Lwanga Okata Obulutsa

Signature…………………………………… Date………………………. Registration Number: C50/CTY/PT/21216/2012

Declaration by the Supervisor

Signature…………………………………… Date……………………….

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the supervisor.

Dr. George Maroko

i DEDICATION

I dedicate this research study to my father Cornelius Obulutsa and my mother Getrude Obulutsa.

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge the Almighty God for giving me strength and support during this period of my study. His support gave me the needed confidence to complete my research work. My sincere gratitude goes to my supervisor Dr George Maroko who encouraged me constantly to push on with my research study amid very pressuring work assignments. Finally I sincerely thank my wife and children for their patience and support as I committed myself to this research study amid my professional work and family responsibilities. May God bless you all.

iii ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CIPEV Commission of Inquiry into The Post-Election Violence

DPP Director of Public Prosecutions.

ICC International Criminal Court.

NCIC National Commission on Integration and Cohesion.

TJRC Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission

KPS Kenya Police Service

PEV Post-Election Violence

GOK Government of Kenya

KANU Kenya African National Union

KADU Kenya African Democratic Union

KPU Kenya People’s Union

FORD Forum for the Restoration of Democracy

DP Democratic Party

NARC National Alliance Rainbow Coalition

ODM Orange Democratic Party

PNU Party of National Unity

IEBC Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

GEMA Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association

iv DEFINITION OF OPERATIONAL TERMS

Hate speech

Nasty words uttered by an individual or a group who intend to hurt feelings of others with contempt, hatred, hostility and violence against an individual, persons, a group or community on the basis of ethnicity, religion , race or political affiliation.

National Reconciliation:

Restoring mutual respect between individuals and persons from different cultural, ethnic, social, economic and religious backgrounds.

Prosecute:

To arrest and charge a suspect in court on allegation of committing a criminal offence.

Peace: the absence of war or conflict in society. A situation of cal m and peace

Secutity: Being free from danger, anxiety or fear. Refers also to measures undertaken by the government to prevent attacks.

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ...... I

DEDICATION ...... II

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... III

1.0 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1.1 Statement of the problem ...... 3

1.2 General Objective of the study ...... 3

1.3 Research Questions ...... 4

1.4 Significance of the study...... 4

1.5 Scope of the study...... 5

1.6 Limitations of the study ...... 5

1.7Assumptions of the Study ...... 5

2.0 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 7

2.1 Introduction ...... 7

2.2 Theoretical Framework ...... 16

2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ...... 18

3.0 CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...... 19

Introduction ...... 19

3.1 Research Method ...... 19

3.2 Research Design ...... 19

3.3 Location of the study ...... 19

3.4 Target Population ...... 20

vi 3.5 Sampling Procedures and techniques ...... 20

3.6 Data collection Methods ...... 21

3.7 Research instruments ...... 21

3.8 Pilot Study ...... 22

3.9 Reliability ...... 22

3.10 Validity ...... 22

3.11 Data Analysis Techniques ...... 23

3.12 Ethical Considerations ...... 23

4.0 CHAPTER FOUR DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS ...... 25

4.1 Questionnaire Response Rate ...... 25

4.2 Demographic Data of Respondents ...... 25 a. Respondents by Gender and Age ...... 26 b. Respondents by Age Group ...... 27 c. Respondents by Marital Status ...... 28 d. Highest level of education? ...... 29 e. State of employment ...... 30 f. Years in current Employment ...... 31 g. Cadre of Staff ...... 32 h. PEV was caused by ethnic hostilities ...... 33 i. Ethnic hostilities were caused by incitement ...... 34 j. Ethnic incitement was caused by hate speech ...... 35 k. Hate speech was the main cause of 2007 PEV ...... 36 l. Government response to hate speech was effective ...... 37

vii m. Hate speech can be prevented through criminal legislation ...... 38 n. Hate speech can be prevented through reconciliation and non-criminal approaches ...... 39 o. PEV can be avoided through strong electoral laws ...... 40 p. Government response to hate speech was effective ...... 41 q. The lack of impartiality by the ECK was the main cause of the 2007 PEV ...... 41

5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 52

5.1 Summary of findings ...... 52

5.2 Conclusion ...... 54

REFERENCES ...... 55

APENDICES...... 59

APPENDIX I: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION ...... 59

APPENDIX II QUESTIONNAIRES ...... 60

APPENDIX III: RESEARCH PROJECT WORK PLAN ...... 66

APPENDIX IV: RESEARCH PROJECT BUDGET ...... 67

viii ABSTRACT

Hate speech became the common method adopted by politicians from different ethnic groups in Kenya for gaining support and sympathy for their candidature during the previous elections in 1992, 1997 and 2007. In Uasin Gishu County and Nairobi County, this method worked very effectively in 2007, as it created ethnic tensions eventually and resulted in causing violent conflicts in Nairobi City and Uasin Gishu County. This study analysed the influence of hate speech in inciting ethnic hostility and violence during and after the elections of the 2007/2008 in Nairobi County and in Uasin Gishu County. The Specific objectives of the study were: to examine the causes of ethnic incitement using hate speech during and after the 2007/2008 elections, to assess the effect of ethnic incitement using hate speech after the 2007/8 elections in Nairobi County and Uasin Gishu County, to assess the effect of ethnic incitement using hate speech on the post-election violence in 2007/8, to establish the government response to ethnic incitement using hate speech during 2007/8 elections in order to stop future occurrence. The study was conducted in Kibera Sub county and Mathare Valley of Nairobi City and also Eldoret city area of Uasin Gishu County. The residents of the two counties participated in the violence and incitement. They provided vital information on the incitement and hate speech which led to the ethnic violence in those areas. The study adopted a quantitative research method. The study used descriptive survey research design. The target population was based on 300 entities including, civil servants, community leaders, religious leaders, civil society and village elders. A sample of 50 residents of Nairobi City and 50 residents in Uasin Gishu County who witnessed the violence in 2008 participated in the study. Data was gathered using primary and secondary methods. Questionnaires were distributed to respondents for the purpose of collecting data. Purposive sampling method was used to get specific information from government officials, community leaders, civil society and other people who witnessed the violence. The collected data was coded, processed, and analysed through the use of SPSS tool. The findings, conclusions and recommendations were presented through reports, diagrams, graphs, tables and diagrams. The study covered the period between 2007 and 2009. The study concluded that hate speech was responsible for the deadly violence which engulfed Kenya during the 2007/8 elections. The study recommended that, the election machinery should be made tamper proof and be managed electronically to remove possible interference from hired hackers and unfaithful personnel and that the election laws should be re-written to include heavy sentences for election related fraud which may stir up post-election violence and that the security personnel should be re-trained on matters affecting the handling of election related disputes to enable them handle the disputes professionally.

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1.0 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION This chapter presents the background of the study, the statement of the problem, the objectives of the study the research questions, the significance of the study, the scope of the study, the limitations of the study and the study assumptions.

1.1 Background to the study The concept of hate speech is understood and variously used by different people and in different contexts. Generally, hate speech are spoken words which offend and threaten or insults groups of people based on race, colour, religion, ethnic groups national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability or other traits and has been used to cause conflict, insecurity and national instability.

Jenkins (2010) asserts, that hate speech is pronounced willingly and deliberately to cause fear panic and with a possibility of scaring the affected to flee their residences. In the year 2007- 2008 more than 1,300 Kenyans were killed and more than half a million displaced in the wake of a presidential election, one of the triggers of that violence, the inflammatory language of politicians, remains a serious threat to peace and stability.

Internationally hate speech has been considered as the cause of disharmony and conflict within states. Hate speech has resulted in causing genocide in during NAZI reign in Germany. In Nazi Germany, many Jews were killed in prisons and torture chambers for no other reason than for being Jews. In Bosnia hate speech was blamed for causing ethnic cleansing against Muslims in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. In South Africa under white Rule between 1960 until 1994, politicians and administrators applied apartheid system and used hate speech to dominate indigenous black Africans by referring to them as inferior because of their colour. Hate speech was used to propagate racial discrimination and oppression. In DRC, the conflict started with leadership differences between Mobutu and Lumumba in 1963. The conflict in DRC lasted for decades and was only brought under control after 30 years by the international community. By this time in the 1990s many people in DRC had been displaced, while many more including Lumumba had been assassinated in 1964. According to Mazrui (1994) hate speech and political violence was experienced in DRC until Kabila moved with liberation forces and restored peace and stability in the country.

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Owiro 2001 explains that, the conflict in Rwanda started with the assassination of former President Habriyamana resulting in the 1994 genocide as a result of hate speech and political differences. Following Hibriamana’s death in a plane crash in 1994, hate speech was used to spur hatred between Hutus and Tutsis.Extremist Hutus then planned to carry out the genocide of nearly half a million Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

In Kenya, post-election violence has been experienced many times due to political differences between different leaders. Prior to the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya, there were no specific laws which defined and criminalized hate speech. In preceding election years from as early as 1992, pockets of violence were witnessed in the country stemming from inflammatory statements made by politicians warning members of other communities to lie low or leave certain areas. belong to this ethnic group. Oucho 2009.

Presentations made to various Judicial Commissions of Inquiry into the land clashes, post- election violence, the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission and Tana River clashes point to hate speech as being a catalyst to simmering differences and competing interests. It can be generalized that hate speech is used by political opponents to threaten and silence their political opponents and silence them where one dominant ethnic group has numerical advantage over the other.

Kenya has been particularly vulnerable to politically generated ethnic violence. Since the start of multi-party politics, it has experienced political violence in 1992, 1997 and in the 2007/2008 post-election violence. These periods are significant as they are the periods around the general elections. The ethnic oriented political violence has not only had a negative impact on national cohesion, but has also been detrimental to the political and economic development of the country. The high costs have motivated the need to have a greater understanding of political violence in Kenya. (Kimani 2009)

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1.2 Statement of the problem Kenya has been vulnerable to violence during every election period as hate speech becomes the precursor to electoral violence. Since the start of multi-party politics Kenya has experienced wide-scale violence based on political differences. This happened in 1992, 1997 and in the 2007/2008 post-election violence. These incidences represent significant stages as they are the periods around the general elections. The ethnocentric political violence has not only had a negative impact on national cohesion, but has also been detrimental to the political and economic development of the country. It has also come around with serious consequences. These high costs of violence have motivated the need to have a greater understanding of political violence in Kenya (Okoth 2009)

Hate speech has played a role in creating conflicts within society. After the bungled 2007 election, as part of the healing process engineered by the Kofi-Annan led Panel of Eminent Persons, the Kenya National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) was set up in 2008 to promote ethnic harmony. The failure to prosecute such authors may mean the vice will continue.

The effects of hate speech in society cannot be overlooked because time and again poisonous propaganda has been the fuelling factor of some of the world’s worst human rights violations and catalyst to conflict and violence. In1992, 1997 and in 2007 many people lost their lives in Rift Valley due to post election violence. Many others were displaced and lost their homes. This study assessed the causes of hate speech during the 2007 and 2008 General Elections and found that ethnic hatred, political competition hate speech were the main causes of post- election violence in Kenya. The study also analysed their effects on various ethnic groups in Nairobi County and in Eldoret City in Usain Gishu County. The study came up with recommendations on how post -election violence can be avoided by promoting strong elections management laws which will prevent any future election conflicts.

1.3 General Objective of the study This study analysed the ethnic incitement using hate speech during the 2007/2008 post- election period in Nairobi County and in Uasin Gishu County..

1.3.1 The Specific objectives of the study i. To examine the causes of hate speech during the 2007/2008 general elections in Nairobi County Uasin Gishu County.

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ii. To assess how hate speech caused -ethnic incitement during the 2007/8 general elections in Nairobi City and Uasin Gishu Counties iii. To examine how ethnic incitement created inter-ethnic violence after the 2007/2008 elections iv. To examine the modes of response by security organs to hate speech, ethnic incitement and ethnic violence after the 2007 elections.

1.4 Research Questions i- What were the causes of hate speech after the 2007 elections? ii- How did hate speech cause ethnic incitement after the 2007 elections in Nairobi City and Uasin Gishu Counties iii- How did ethnic incitement cause inter-ethnic violence after 2007 elections? iv- What was the response of the security organs to hate speech, ethnic incitement and violence after the 2007 elections?

1.5 Significance of the study. The 2007/8 post-election violence took place because of hate speech which culminated into ethnic incitement sponsored by political leaders and community leaders. Hate speech has been used in many countries to promote ethnic and racial hostilities. In some countries hate speech has resulted into genocide and ethnic cleansing. Electoral violence in African countries including Kenya is very frequent as the results of elections are usually contested due to skewed electoral processes which favoured some parties. This study is important in that it assessed the factors which lead to hate speech, the effects of hate speech inciting violence and ethnic hostility. The study revealed the political and economic causes of hate speech. It pointed out the effect of hate speech on dividing communities and causing political instability. The study came up with policy recommendations aimed at controlling hate speech mongering by instituting laws to control hate speech. The recommendations fronted by this study will help the government to respond to hate speech timely and expeditiously. They will enable the government to take strong action against hate speech promoters by punishing them.

The policies recommended should help Kenya and other African countries to manage their political systems by avoiding post-election violence. The study has added new knowledge on

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how the bad elections can influence violence in countries. The study has boosted intellectual knowledge on hate speech and election related violence.

1.6 Scope of the study. This study assessed the effects of hate speech on inciting ethnic hostilities between communities during electioneering periods with the intention of influencing the election results in one way or another. The study focussed on the 2007/2008 post- election period which was marred with violence. The study was conducted in Kibera, Mathare areas of Nairobi City and Eldoret City in Uasin Gishu County. The study covered the period between 2007 and 2009 when the post- election violence was at its peak. The study assessed the chain of events which led to the beginning of hate speech, the escalation of ethnic hostility and the eruption of violence which left nearly 1300 people dead in the whole country. The study will also explain factors which led to the displacement of nearly 700,000 people in Eldoret and parts of Rift Valley Region. The study also assessed the loss of property and livestock, mass displacement of population, physical injury and death. The study was conducted among residents of Kibera Sub-County of Nairobi City and Uasin Gishu County which has borne the brunt of tribal instigated violence.

1.7 Limitations of the study The study was limited by a number of factors such as lack of cooperation by the respondents due to the sensitivity of the subject. Some respondents were not willing to give any information about the events which took place during the PEV period. This was due to a number of reasons such as the trauma which they went through during election period. Language barrier may also cause another limitation as the researcher and research assistants may not be conversant with the languages in the study location. The researcher overcame the limitations by getting research assistants who understood the local languages. To overcome the limitation of reliability of information, the researcher targeted civil servants and community leaders who are credible and expected to provide truthful information

1.7Assumptions of the Study I. The researcher assumes the respondents will be willing to provide information on the causes of hate speech during the 2007/2008 general elections in Nairobi County and Uasin Gishu County.

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II. The researcher assumes that hate speech caused-ethnic incitement during the 2007/8 general elections III. The researcher assumes that ethnic incitement created inter-ethnic violence after the 2007/2008 elections IV. The researcher assumes that the response by security organs failed to respond appropriately to hate speech, ethnic incitement and ethnic violence after the 2007 elections.

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2 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction This chapter reviewed the related literature, the theoretical framework, the conceptual framework and the knowledge gap.

2.1.1 Causes of hate speech According to Mazrui (1998), States in the Horn of Africa including Kenya are, or until recently have been, examples of what Ali Mazrui called "ethnocracy," meaning monopolistic control of a state by one or more ethnic groups, a basic cause of conflict within the region. Examples include Arab control of Sudan, Issa Somali control of Djibouti, and former Amhara control of Ethiopia and Kenya controlled by Kanu and PNU parties. This control by one party representing one ethnic group creates a feeling of doubt after elections are held as people feel that results are predetermined in favour of the ruling party. Even when there is a will to share power, it is difficult to develop coalitions across ethnic, religious, or regional blocs. Groups experience intense pressure to consolidate power in case there is a serious challenge. Fear of eventually losing power can lead to a rapid effort to expand resources, often illicitly and extra-judiciously, under the control of the group(s) in authority. (Mazrui 1998)

In Africa tribal conflict has continued to cause havoc and assault in a number of countries such as Southern Sudan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Rwanda among others. Rwanda is one of the countries in Africa which has experienced ethnically structured conflict resulting to death. A plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundi’s leader Cyprian Ntaryamana was brought down over Kigali, leaving no survivor. This led to mass genocide against the Tutsis by Hutus. The getting killing of Tutsis spread very fast from Kigali to all provinces within Rwanda, with people slaughtered for six months. That time, local representatives and authorities sponsored called on normal Rwandan civilian’s radio stations to murder their neighbours. Survivors thus had no option but to seek refuge to the neighbouring countries since the conflict lasted for a long time before it could end.

According to Barkan (1993) electoral chaos has been blamed on political tribalism in Kenya. Tribalism, and for this case political tribalism, has become a cancer that Kenya has not been able to rid itself off. Tribalism is the emphasis on high loyalty to groups. It harbours loyalty to one's tribe with strong negative feelings for those from another tribe (Standard Newspaper, September 2016) The origins of tribalism are said to have started due to colonialism since

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before then, most of the different tribes did not interact with each other as much. People tended to stay within their regions, those in Western Kenya stayed there, the ones in Central Kenya and just everyone stayed where there were. Urbanization is also a cause of tribalism, and so is the political culture that came with an independent Kenya (Standard Newspaper, September 2016). The British colonialists mostly used the "divide and rule," and they concentrated on the differences of the people which led to clashes and lack of trust amongst communities. This is what Kenya inherited from the British and these divisions are still present in Kenya today. Kenyans have not been able to rid themselves of these issues from the colonial times since they have mostly concentrated on their differences instead of their similarities and aspects from the different tribes that are likely to help the country progress. During independence, two parties which ran on a similar platform but differed considerably in ethnic and social bases ran for the election in 1961 and 1963. These are the same ethnic cleavages Kenya is still experiencing today. Murethi (2016).

Political tribalism in Kenya has been blamed for the failure of the country to progress. It has been blamed for the rampant corruption that exists in Kenya and lousy leadership at whatever level. This issue started too at independence where Jomo Kenyatta, the prime minister then and the head of KANU, used a "carrot-and-stick approach" towards the opposition at that time. He promised positions and patronage to those in the opposition who were willing to defect to the ruling party but withheld even the distribution of public services like roads, education, and healthcare to areas where the opposition leaders originated. This deprivation eventually led the opposition to merge with the ruling party and from there Kenya became a one-party state with Jomo Kenyatta as the first president. Even from early on, it is evident that political tribalism affected the development of Kenya. Barkan (1993)

In Kenya conflicts issues between neighbouring neighbourhoods have been observed on several situations. Conflict is described by greed and grievances where there is sense of cultural marginalization as your group is drawback by another in conditions of usage of natural resources (Hussein, 1998). For example, the Turkana and Pokot experienced sporadic conflicts as a result of fight for pasture and water for their animals not forgetting boundary disputes. This has mainly been attributed to lack of proper channel of communication to facilitate peaceful coexistence among them (Government of Kenya, 2006).

According to Kimani (2008) some of the issues that have caused hate speech and prevented Kenya from having fair, free and transparent elections go back to the colonial times and have

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continued to handicap Kenya's path to real democracy. These evils are tribalism, corruption, ignorance, and neo-colonialism. These atrocities have been used and continue to be used by those who know how to use them to gain the upper hand and, in the process, they leave those with good intentions and the poor without a voice. The Kenyan politicians have used the above-referenced evils to their advantage. Due to these kinds of practices, the following ethical issues have been rampant in Kenya during the election period and there is a great need for these to be addressed.

The disagreements are as a result weak structures that have been laid down by organizations that cater for conflict protection and response. Colonialist invasion into the country and scramble for land, made land to be an ideal wealth that has been fuelled politically within country. Politicians too scramble for land and others even go to an extent of grabbing leading to clashes in the Rift Valley in 1992, 1997 and 2007 (Wamwere 2008).

Pastoralists also fight for land to graze like in 1993, fight between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu displaced several resulting to institutions of learning being closed (Kimani, 2009). Two people sustained serious injuries at the volatile Kericho/ Kisumu border following a fresh breakout of violence between two communities living along the common border between Kericho West and Nyakach districts. The fighting, which took place in broad daylight, left several houses and acres of sugar plantations razed down, as angry youth crisscrossed the border torching houses and farms as area security teams tried to bring the situation under control. A few minutes past 1pm Saturday afternoon, despite the heavy presence of security officers who were patrolling the border area, an armed group of young people believed to be from Kaplelartet Village in Kericho West District crossed into Kasan Village in Kisumu County where they attacked 77-year old Musa Okwany with a machete. Okwany sustained a deep wound on the left side of the head after the incident and was rushed to hospital for treatment.

2.1.2 Ethnicity as the cause of violence after the 2007/8 elections Richard Jenkin (2010) examines the debates on whether any such categorization as ‘ethnic group’ actually exists and if ‘ethnicity’ matters. Jenkins argued that ethnicity does exist and it is a social construct. Despite it being considered a marginalized community’ the impact of ethnicity on a society is far from imaginary - rather, it has far reaching implications on how we understand and navigate our world. He argues that our conceptualization of ethnicity

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should continue to be re-examined in the face of changing social contexts. He proposes that people mistakenly believe that certain social categories such as ethnicity are natural, inevitable, and unchanging facts about the social world. They believe that particular social categories are fixed by human nature rather than by social convention

The issue of hate speech has received significant attention from legal scholars and philosophers alike. But the vast majority of this attention has been focused on presenting and critically evaluating arguments for and against hate speech bans as opposed to the prior task of conceptually analysing the term ‘hate speech’ itself. This two-part article aims to put right that imbalance. It goes beyond legal texts and judgements and beyond the legal concept hate speech in an attempt to understand the general concept hate speech, and does so using a range of well-known methods of conceptual analysis that are distinctive of analytic philosophy. One of its main aims is to explode the myth that emotions, feelings, or attitudes of hate or hatred are part of the essential nature of hate speech. It also argues that hate speech is best conceived as a family resemblances concept. One important implication is that when looking at the full range of ways of combating hate speech, including but not limited to the use of criminal law, there is every reason to embrace an understanding of hate speech as a heterogeneous collection of expressive phenomena. Another is that it would be unsound to reject hate speech laws on the premise that they are effectively in the business of criminalising emotions, feelings, or attitudes. Sendagire et al (2009).

Horowitz (1985) explains that, ethnic turmoil is a conflict in which the interests of those involved are described in condition, commotion and triggers Thus, ethnic unrest is one of the major dangers to international security and peacefulness. Violations of individual human rights and cultural issues always form the combination of ethnically based issues. Ethnic instability and competition are major causes of war globally. In the 19th century, almost 100 ethnic parties got involved in havoc. During this time about three quarters of violence were between government and politically organized members.

In the United States of America, the ethnic conflict was between the Indigenous Red Indians and the white settlers. The white settlers were oppressing the indigenous Red Indians because they consider them as substandard and this brought a whole lot of tension, consistent fights resulting to death and damage to properties (Barber, 1968)

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Racial tension in America led to the forming of extremist groups including the Ku Klux Klan. The group was created by the white people who hated the Negroes and their goal was to power up hatred in America and cause assault by attacking the Negroes and the whites who socialize with the dark-coloured people. This resulted in the forming of an organization called Black Panthers by the Negroes to counter strike the Ku Klux Klan impact, leading to consistent street violence, fatalities and devastation of properties on both edges. The two teams did not believe that folks of different races can exist in harmony as one in the U.S.A Derek (1971)

The conflicts issues in Northern Ireland or Israel / Palestine, for example, are not spiritual issues, but political issues, because the goals on the line are politics, not religious in dynamics. (Allen, 1994)

Inside the Soviet Union regular ethnic conflict resulted in its disintegration according to (International Crisis Group, 2012). Cultural conflict that occurred following the collapse of Soviet Union has not been solved in a few locations including the ethnic conflict between Ingush and Ossetian over Prigorodny area. The friction between Ingush and Ossetian remains quite strong rendering it very hard for affirmative peaceful contract as it remains one of the dangerous locations in the North Caucasus.

According to Musyoka (2014) elections in Kenya, as witnessed in the past, follow ethnic divisions and tribal alignments and so is political violence. The history of Kibera slum thus, creates a prolific scenario in explaining the impact of political violence on Kenyans. The chapter shows clearly that ethnicity in Kibera build slowly since her first settlement years and did not disappear after Kenya’s Independence. The same has rather become an important tool for mobilizing support in national politics. Other communities like the Luo, Kamba and Kikuyu have become the main powerbrokers in Kibera, replacing the Nubis who are now only a small community in Kibera. Without political support or leverage the Nubis have lost their supremacy in Kibera, and even lost control over part of their rental rooms. This process in fact already started much earlier, when the Nubis could not stop the influx of ‘outsiders’ in Kibera, in the 1970s. The ‘outsiders’ were protected and aided by the authorities that were of the same ethnic group.

According to Furedi (1989) the boundaries of ethnic and administrative units have remained coterminous ever since Kenya was colonised. This is the one colonial legacy which has

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baited the country to the extent it is repugnant to development. Administrative maps of Kenya in 1924, 1929, 1961 (Ominde, 1968) and even today provide evidence of this trait persisting in Kenya. The apparent bait was the work of the Regional Boundaries Commission which the British Government established in July 1962 to determine provincial boundaries in Kenya. Based on the boundaries that existed and, alleged ,the people’s wishes to belong to regions of their choice(methodology for this unclear),the Commission divided Kenya into six regions and the Nairobi area (Ominde,1968:14); the seven provinces recommended were Central, Coast, Nairobi, Northern Frontier, Nyanza (included the present Nyanza and Western provinces and Kericho district) and Southern. Apart from Nairobi and Rift Valley provinces, all other Kenyan provinces hold one dominant ethnic group or culturally similar groups. Apparently, mischief dictated the decision of the colonially controlled Commission to bequeath to Kenya one of the problems that keeps rearing its ugly head from time to time. This explains why majimbo, which the smaller ethnic groups used as a trump card to acquire their territories and thus avoid domination by the larger ethnic groups. Indeed, its reappearance in political exploits immediately before the 1992multi-party elections never allowed its different interpretation during the Bomas Draft of the Constitution to gather much support in certain quarters. Although the system of coterminous ethnic-administrative units works well in countries such as South Africa and Ghana, it remains Kenya’s nightmare, one that haunts leaders and prickles the led. It flares up whenever conflict erupts, and clearly did so in the post-election violence when certain ethnic groups singled out and attacked other unwanted groups. The land question: an unfinished agenda Still lingering on as a colonial legacy is the controversial “land question” and well-recognised inherent problems on which different commissions have prescribed recommendations that have never been implemented. Land has been at the core of Kenya’s political evolution since the colonial period. In fact, the “land question” originated during the 1930s when the Kenya Land Commission (1932-33) – otherwise known as the Carter Land Commission – made recommendations that planted seeds of discord, among them: rejection of the notion that that Africans had any land rights in the former “White Highlands”; setting the stage for the Resident Labour Ordinance of1937, which defined squatters as labourers; directing that the disaffected Kikuyu be awarded 21, 000 acres (8,500 hectares) of land and £2,000 as compensation for loss of land (Furedi, (1989)

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According to Oucho 2009, Cultural affinity and differences engendered ethno-cultural animosity and unnecessary stereotyping between ethnic groups, often ending up in ethnic strife, conflict and violence in 2007 elections in Kenya. It has been noted that the “ethno- conflict theory” incorporating social, political and economic structures, religion, language and folk psychology, though not sources of conflict identifies variables within a cultural system that with time can both cause conflict and contribute to conflict resolution (Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2000).

The effects of hate speech on violence

According to Kimani (2009) Hate speech succeeded in creating ethnic hostilities in the affected areas. It succeeded in instigating ethnic violence in many areas of Kenya. The conflicts turned violent and 2009) v most affected areas were Eldoret areas of Uasin Gishu and, Mathare area and Kibera areas of Nairobi city during the first eruption, while the second eruption affected Naivasha town, Nakuru town, Limuru town and Thika town where there were efforts to conduct revenge evictions and displacements.

Dida (2012) explains that, when politicians intervene during conflicts there is a strong allegation and mistrust put against them for being partisan. Politicians are the major contributors fuelling ethnic conflict by either failing to intervene or by spreading propaganda which undermines the good relationships between different ethnic groups.

According to Baxter (1994) most politicians usually influenced their supporter’s behaviour’s before and after the electioneering period particularly in a situation where an opponent enjoys more support of a particular ethnic group within the same jurisdiction. He/ She may have to poison the mind of his supporters to cause mayhem in order to displaced his opponent supporters to gain advantage for example the first multi-party general election in Kenya in 1992 saw forceful evictions of ethnic groups with different political views from those of their counterparts

Kimani (2009) asserts that some politicians were associated with ethnic stereotypes and incitements that deter good relationships between different ethnic communities living in harmony in the same region. Such derogatory remarks create animosity between different ethnic groups such experience was not only evidenced in Nyakach Sub County in Kisumu- Kericho Counties but also in other parts of Kenya, during the general elections of 2007/2008; different ethnic groups turned against one another. Some politicians incite their ethnic groups

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to raid and steal livestock from other ethnic. This practice continues as frequently as it is convenient to the politicians concerned. The 2007/8 violence was instigated by such politicians whose aim was to cause as much ethnic division as possible’

2.1.3 The effects of Ethnic incitement on violence after the 2007/8 elections According to Materu (2014) the 2007/8 post- election violence had a very serious effect on the various sections of the country. In Nairobi City, Mathare and Kibera slums were the first to erupt into the rhythm of ethnic violence. This started from 31st, 0f December 2007. This was followed by Eldoret in Uasin Gishu, and other parts of the country. When calm returned to these areas then a second eruption of violence arose in Naivasha based on a deliberate attempt to avenge the first range of violence. The second stage of violence was properly planned and well organized as opposed to the first reaction which was spontaneous. The second set of violence was aimed at removing the perpetrators of the first violent eruptions where the majority of affected people were Kikuyus and members of the then ruling party of PNU.

Muteru (2014) explains that, the second eruption started in February 2008 in Naivasha, Nakuru, Thika, Kiambu and Limuru towns, it was aimed at removing the non-Kikuyus from the areas where they worked as non- resident workers. The eruption was violent, vicious accompanied by serious human rights abuses such as rape cases, murders, and tortures. Since it was well planned it achieved more destruction than the first set of violence. Hate speech in Kenya was used to mobilize ethnic hostility against those who were considered to be non - residents of particular areas. In some cases, there was even community leadership support for the removal of certain ethnic groups from some areas.

Oucho (2009) asserted that, hate speech was used to create ethnic animosity and that the worst areas affected by hate speech were Eldoret city, Burnt Forest and Kiambaa in Uasin Gishu County, Mathare slums and Kibera slums in Nairobi County where the hate messengers attempted to eliminate people from other ethnic groups by killing them or asking them to return to their ancestral homes.

Oucho (2009) explains that post-election violence ranged from killing and maiming of people and livestock, looting and destruction of property and arson. Concurring with OHCHR (2008) that variants of spontaneous, organized and retaliatory violence occurred, Apart from looting and arson. There was wide spread rape, displacements injuries and mass evictions of

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Residents who were either not speaking the local language or understanding the local language were forced out of their homes leaving their properties behind. Oucho (2009)

2.1.4 The response by the security organs to ethnic incitement The response to hate speech incitement and violence in 2007 was sluggish and unequal to the seriousness of the problem at hand.

According to Nzau (2010) the political leadership reacted lamely by excusing the happenings as political. The security organs looked compromised by politicians and did not respond promptly or decisively. Their response was complacent allowing the violence to continue for as long as possible in order to please the beneficiaries. However, some attempt was made urging the citizens on both sides of the violence to contain their tempers and avoid an outright ethnic conflict. This appeal succeeded in slowing the effect of the ethnic hostilities. However, by the time conflict was brought to an end over 1300 people had died and nearly 700,000 people had been displaced. This was quite different from Rwanda where the conflict resulted in over half a million deaths genocide killed over half a million people.

Kimani (2010) attributes the low number of deaths experienced in Kenya to the quick intervention by the international community who did not hesitate to intervene before things got out of hand. The institutions charged with prosecuting hate speech mongers are usually unresponsive or ineffective depending on the cause of hate speech. If hate speech is propagated by pro system supporters, the prosecuting agencies may lack the capacity to effectively arrest and prosecute them.

Makali (2009) advised that, following the post- election violence, Kenya should pass legislations on curbing hate speech and hate mongers. This would prevent politicians from using hate speech from propagating hatred in the name of political elections. He explained that, hate speech should be brought under control through parliamentary legislation and hate mongers should be prosecuted.

According to Nzau (2010) the report prepared by the Commission of Inquiry on the Post - Election Violence in Kenya (CIPEV) also known as the Waki Report explained the role of hate speech and the violence that took place in Kenya and blamed it on selfishness by leaders Nzau also explained that the findings of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) of Kenya’s recent report should be implemented.

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According to the Human Rights Watch the security response has been mediocre and not meant to contain the situation or prevent violence or intimidation. In July 2007, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that there was a need for the Kenyan authorities to investigate allegations of threat and intimidation between community members in Naivasha, a sub- county in Nakuru County, before the August 2017 elections. HRW had interviewed different people, and they found reason to be concerned since a lot of people in Naivasha had described threats and intimidation and that the police had neither conducted any investigations on the threats nor had they prosecuted the culprits or provided any protection to the residents. In this community, those members who were supporting the opposition were being forced to pack their belongings and leaving the area ahead of the elections. Due to these moves, the head of the Catholic Church in Nakuru had expressed his concerns over the rate at which community members were fleeing the area. The HRW advised that at the time of coming to press they had received and documented six incidents of threats against opposition supports and that it was evident that such threats were prevalent.The opposition community members had repeatedly been told to stay away from polling stations if they intended to vote for the opposition party.HRW did not receive any reports that the ruling party supporters had received any threats or were vacating any opposition strongholds (HRW, 2008)

This indicates that many incidences could have been avoided if the security agencies and the government could have acted with speed to contain the eruption of hate speech and violence.

2.2 Theoretical Framework This study adopted the theories of contrasting transmission and ritual models of communication and schema theories

2.2.1 Carey's (1989) contrasting transmission and ritual models of communication. Adoption of the transmission model directs the attention of courts and legislative bodies to effects of hate speech such as emotional and behavioural changes in the recipients of the speech. In contrast, the ritual model illustrates the reinforcement of negative attitudes and disparate treatment of minorities that occurs with the repetitive use of hate speech. Although the ritual model serves a heuristic function by providing public with a framework for understanding harm caused by hate speech, its adoption to determine liability for individual instances of communication raises trouble and hate First Amendment issues.

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2.2.2 Schema Theory Schema theory posits that prior knowledge is organized in dominant or abstract mental structures, termed as schemas, and an individual interacts and processes the externally given information depending on how these mental structures are formulated [9,16]. Relating this schema theoretical perspective to the discussion of the top-down and bottom-up information processing would suggest that the processing approach is contingent on the formed schemas in the consumers, which is the fundamental product type that is reviewed. This theory is relevant in this study as it explains how schemes are prepared and executed to achieves schemes by political leaders in order gain political advantage.

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2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Independent Variables Dependent Variables

hate speech during elections-political competition-ethnic incitement

-ethnic incitement -hostility- violence- Ethnic hostility and violence during 2007/8 PEV

Effects of hate speech on ethnic Deaths, injuries, looting,

Response by security organs -slow-compromised-security Political culture

Slow response Lack of national cohesion

-Political environment

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3 CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction This chapter contains the research methods, Research Design, Target population, study location, the sampling techniques and methods, data collection instruments the pilot study, the validity and reliability, data analysis techniques and the ethical considerations. The study used quantitative research method.

3.1 Research Method Research methodology is referred to as a systematic way of resolving a problem. Research methodology guides the process of conducting research. This study used quantitative research method to conduct the study. Quantitative method enables researchers to gather opinions from the respondents through questionnaires in a structured and systematic way. This study gathered opinions of respondents through questionnaires and analysed these views using descriptive and inferential statistics. (Creswell 2003)

3.2 Research Design This research study employed descriptive research design. Descriptive survey involves data collection through interviews or sampled questionnaires to a specific group of people (Kombo & Tromp, 2006). Descriptive research design can also be used for investigating of a phenomenon by gathering samples for the analysis and discovery of occurrences. Orodho (2004) stated that a survey research design gives descriptions of the nature of a phenomenon and examines actions as they are. Descriptive survey design is suitable for this study as it will enable the researcher to assess the opinions of respondents in the study areas. The respondents in this study were able to respond to the questionnaires and give their opinions. The FGDs in Nairobi County and Eldoret City were also able to explain what happened during the PEV2007/8 effectively by describing them as requested by the questionnaires. (Creswell 2003)

3.3 Location of the study The study was conducted in Nairobi County and Uasin Gishu County. In Nairobi County Kibra Slums and Mathare slums were the main areas of the study because the two localities were the epicentre of the 2007/8. In Uasin Gishu County the epicentre of the conflict was in Eldoret City and Burnt Forest and Kiamba area. It was also conducted in Eldoret City in

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Uasin Gishu County. The choice of the locations was based on the fact that the areas recorded the highest incidents of post- election violence and deaths. (Kimani 2009)

3.4 Target Population Kombo and Tromp (2006) describe target population as a population as a group of individuals, objects or items from which samples are taken for measurement. This study was carried out in Kibra and Mathare slums of Nairobi County and also in Eldoret City in Uasin Gishu County. Due to the sensitivity of the subject of PEV2007/8 the target population was based on the government administrators, community leaders, church leaders, and the civil society. The target population was 300 entities from the two counties. Table 3.1 Target population

Location Number of entities

Kibera 100

Mathare 100

Eldoret 100

TOTAL 300

Source Researcher

3.5 Sampling Procedures and techniques According to Orodho (2008) sampling is a process of selecting representatives systematically from a larger populace. Its objective is to acquire accurate empirical data at a minimized cost as compared to examining all the possible occurrences. According to Orodho (2008), there are no particular rules that govern how to obtain an appropriate sample. The table for determining sample size from a given population Krejcie and Morgan (1970) table was used (Appendix V). They stated that the constant increasing need for a representative statistical sample in empirical research has created the demand for an effective method of determining sample size. To address the existing gap, Krejcie & Morgan (1970) came up with a table for determining sample size for a given population for easy reference.

The study adopted purposive and random sampling methods. Purposive sampling method enabled the researcher to collect views from people with proper information and records which helped the researcher to form opinions and get the required data for the study. These

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included government officials including chiefs, Assistant Sub County Commissioners, Village leaders and Church leaders.

The with proper study adopted Mugenda and Mugenda central point of between 10% and 30 % of the total study population. Out of a population of 300 a sample of 100 entities was select purposively and randomly to participate in the study.

Table 3.2 Sample size

Category Population Sample size Percentage % Kibera-Govt officials, Church 100 33 33 leaders, community leaders Mathare -Govt officials, Church 100 33 33 leaders, community leaders Eldoret-Govt officials, Church 100 34 34 leaders, community leaders Total 300 100 100 Source, Researcher (2018)

3.6 Data collection Methods The researcher used pretested closed ended questionnaires to collect data. According to Cooper and Schindler (2006) a q questionnaire is a set of well predetermined outlined questions aimed at capturing the required data.

3.7 Research instruments

The data collection process was conducted using questionnaires as the main tool of data collection. Generally, questionnaires are research instruments that gathers data over large samples (Kombo and Tromp, 2006). Kombo and Tromp, (2006), also stated that the questionnaires save on time, uphold confidentiality, minimize bias and they enable data collection over large samples. Furthermore, they are also secretive and provide more answers than in an ordinary interview schedule. Questionnaire items will be designed based on the study objectives as well as the literature review. To accommodate for language barriers, the research use research assistants in the data collection. Interview schedules will also be used to gather information.

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3.8 Pilot Study Piloting of the instruments was done among 10 non sampled participants in Katwekera Kibra and Mathare North area of Nairobi which was not included in the main research. The area had experienced serious violence during the PEV of 2007/8. The findings were similar

Were quite similar to the main findings after the main research which proved that the data collection instruments were appropriate and measured the required problems appropriately. The piloting was important for gauging the clarity and relevance of the questions in the questionnaires. The piloting assisted in improving validity and reliability of the instruments used in collecting data from the field.

3.9 Reliability According to Best (1998), reliability is the degree of consistency as demonstrated by measuring instruments or the procedure, in regard to whatever is being measured. He put forward that reliability is a level of internal consistency or stability during the period of the measuring research instruments. Roscoe (1969) asserts that the split half method can be applicable in acquiring internal consistency. The instruments are divided into two; one half of even-numbered items and the other of odd-numbered items. The correlated results value provides the internal consistency of one half that is the degree to which the two halves of the test are equivalent or consistent in terms of items. The co-efficient was obtained through Pearson product moment formula. The reliability of the instruments was achieved as the results obtained from the field was reliable/ In Makina area of Kibra, Laini Saba, Lindi and Ayany the findings about the PEV showed that incitement was the main cause of violence This proves that the questions which were contained in the questionnaires were reliable and measured the intended problem. In Mathare area the various sections such as kwa chief and Mathare North, the respondents were able to respond to the questionnaire and during the FGD articulate the issues which led to the PEV 2007/8.

3.10 Validity Validity is the degree to which results obtained from the analysis of the data actually represent the phenomena under study (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). The researcher tested the answers for content validity. The respondents from various areas in Kibra gave views which reflected the real situation. The respondents answered the questionnaires according to

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the various areas where they were residing. Kibra has about ten sections reflecting some ethnic. They include Kisumu Ndogo, Gatwekera, Lain Saba, Kianda, Soweto, Karanja, Mashimoni, Kichinjio, Makina, Siranga. The answers each group gave reflected the communities from which they came. Kothari (2008) defines content validity as the extent to which a measuring instrument provides adequate coverage of the topic under study. Expert opinion from the supervisors and other experts in the area of study was used to check on the content and construct validity of the instruments. They l read through the draft instruments and thereafter their recommendations were incorporated in coming up with the final instruments that will be used for data collection. The answers given by the respondents indicated that the principle of validity of results was achieved.

3.11 Data Analysis Techniques Data was cross-examined to ascertain their accuracy, completeness and identify those items which will be wrongly responded to, spelling mistakes and blank spaces. They were coded and the quantitative data was entered into the computer for analysis using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences version 17.0. This generated the frequencies and percentages which were used to discuss the findings. Qualitative data was analysed following the steps suggested by Kothari (2004). Kothari suggest that qualitative data analysis consists of three procedures namely data reduction, data display and conclusion after drawing inferences. In the first step, the qualitative data will be reduced, organised, coded and a summary was written and irrelevant data will be discarded. In data display step, the researcher drew conclusions from the mass of data. In the final stage, the researcher used the data to develop conclusions regarding the study.

3.12 Ethical Considerations In order to observe the ethical requirements, the researcher got a permit from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NCOSTI). The researcher also got permission from the authorities in the Nairobi County Commissioner, The Inspector general of Police and the KU Postgraduate department. In order to observe ethical considerations to participants, the researcher explained to the respondents the purpose of the study before involving them. He also explained the importance of the result of the study to them. The researcher assured the respondents that their responses would be used for the purpose of the study only and that their identities would remain confidential.

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The study therefore abided by a vast majority of today's social scientists’ ethical principles which included the following:

i. Professional competence:

The researcher maintained the highest levels of competence in his work; he recognized the limitations of the expertise; and undertook only those tasks for which he is qualified for by education, training, or experience. value to the society.

ii. Integrity:

The researcher was honest, fair, and respectful to others in their professional activities in research, teaching, practice, and service. The researcher conducted his research in ways that inspired trust and confidence; and did not knowingly make statements that were false, misleading, or deceptive

iii. Professional and scientific responsibility:

The researcher adhered to the highest scientific and professional standards and accepted responsibility for the work. He understood that they form a community and showed respect for the respondents even when they disagreed on theoretical, methodological, or personal approaches to the entire research process.

iv. Respect for people’s rights, dignity, and diversity:

The researcher at all costs during the research; respected the rights, dignity, and worthiness of all people and the respondents that he interacted with during the research process. He eliminated bias in the study, and did not tolerate any forms of discrimination based on age; gender; race; ethnicity; national origin; religion; sexual orientation; disability; health conditions; or marital, domestic, or parental status, during the entire study. The researcher acknowledged the rights of others to hold values, attitudes, and different opinions

Social responsibility:

The researcher respected the professional and scientific responsibility to the communities and conducted the research with an open mind.

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4 CHAPTER FOUR DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS This chapter presents the analysis of data and its presentation in tables, charts and diagrams. The data presented covers respondent’s demographic data that includes gender, age, marital status, employment status and academic qualifications. The presentation of data is based on the objectives.

4.1 Questionnaire Response Rate The researcher administered the research instruments (questionnaires) to the subjects and the response rate is shown by the data on Table 4.1 below.

Respondents Sampled Returned Achieved return respondents rate% Questionnaires 100 92 92%

Table 4.1: Questionnaire Return Rate The data on table 1.1 Of the 100 sampled respondents only 8 (8%) questionnaires were not returned. This is because the sampling method was purposive and random sampling methods. Those who were targeted purposively and randomly were responsible persons such as chiefs, Sub county officials, security officials, village elders and church leaders. This made the participants to be responsible and participate in large numbers. Thus, the return rate of 92%.

4.2 Demographic Data of Respondents The study sought to establish the demographic information of the respondents which included; Gender, age, highest level of education, years of residence in area and occupation. Data on sex was to take care of gender considerations; data on age was to establish whether the respondents were mature enough to understand the concepts under discussion, data on highest level of education was to establish whether the respondents had adequate training to understand variables on factors that contributed to 2007/2008 Post Election Violence, data on years of residence in area and communal occupation was to make sure that the respondents were residents and to establish whether there exists a relation between public contribution and government performance. The findings were as indicated herein.

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a. Respondents by Gender and Age

Gender

8.7%

43.5%

47.8%

No Response Male Female

Figure 4.1: Gender distribution The data on table below and figure above shows an almost balanced distribution. 47.8% (44) of the respondents were males where as 43.5% (40) respondents were females. The findings indicate that the study was geared toward being gender sensitive as initially intended.

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 8 8.7 8.7 8.7

Male 44 47.8 47.8 56.5

Female 40 43.5 43.5 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

Table 4.2: Gender distribution

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b. Respondents by Age Group

Distribution by Age Group 45.0% 40.2% 40.0%

35.0% No Response 29.3% 30.0% 20 years and Below 25.0% 21 to 30 years 20.0% 31 to 40 years 15.2% 15.0% 41 to 50 years 8.7% 10.0% 51 to 60 years

5.0% 3.3% 3.3%

0.0%

Figure 4.2: Respondents by Age The table below shows of the 92 respondents under study, majority 40.2% (37) of respondents were those aged between 31 to 40 years. 29.3% (27) were youth between 21 to 30 years, followed by 41 to 50-year age bracket at 15.2% (14). 8.7% (8) were 20 years and below; and Senior citizens made up 3.3% (3) of the respondents. The data also shows 3.3% (3) gave no response. It can be deduced from the findings that the information they provided is dependable since competent reasoning is expected of respondents with such level of maturity.

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 3 3.3 3.3 3.3

20 years and Below 8 8.7 8.7 12.0

21 to 30 years 27 29.3 29.3 41.3

31 to 40 years 37 40.2 40.2 81.5

41 to 50 years 14 15.2 15.2 96.7

51 to 60 years 3 3.3 3.3 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

Table 4.3 Respondents by age:

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c. Respondents by Marital Status

Marital Status of Respondents

7.6%

52.2% 40.2%

No Response Single Married

Figure 4.3: Respondents by Marital Status The data shows 52.2% (48) of the respondents are married whereas 40.2% (37) are single. 7.6% (7) of the respondents declined to reveal their marital status

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 7 7.6 7.6 7.6

Single 37 40.2 40.2 47.8

Married 48 52.2 52.2 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

Figure 4.4: Respondents by Marital Status

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d. Highest level of education

Education Level

20.0

25.1 University 41.0 Tertiary college 5.1 Secondary 0.5 Primary None 8.2 No Response

0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 Percentage

Figure 4.5: Education Level Figure 1.3 above indicates that majority 41% (80) of the respondents had secondary school education, followed by 25.1% (39) having attended college; this followed closely by 20% (39) with University education. The data shows 5.1% (10) have been through primary school where the remaining 8.7% either declining or havening no schooling background as shown in Table 1.4 below. These findings indicate that respondents had at most the basic prerequisites to be knowledgeable in factors influencing government performance.

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 16 8.2 8.2 8.2

None 1 .5 .5 8.7

Primary 10 5.1 5.1 13.8

Secondary 80 41.0 41.0 54.9

Tertiary college 49 25.1 25.1 80.0

University 39 20.0 20.0 100.0

Total 195 100.0 100.0

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Table 4.4: Education Level

e. State of employment

Employment Status

12.0% 22.8%

65.2%

No Response Employed Unemployed

Figure 4.6: State of Employment The data shows majority of the respondents 65.2% (60) were employed whereas 12.0% (11) were had no employment. 22.8% (21) of the respondents did not disclose their current state of engagement

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 21 22.8 22.8 22.8

Employed 60 65.2 65.2 88.0

Unemployed 11 12.0 12.0 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

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Table 4.5: State of Employment

f. Years in current Employment

Years in Current Employment

35.0% 32.6%

30.0% 28.3%

25.0% No Respone 10 years or Less 20.0% 16.3% 11 to 20 years 15.0% 12.0% 21 to 30 years

10.0% 8.7% 31 to 40 years

5.0%

0.0%

Figure 4.7: Years in current Employment Assuming the respondents were employed, we sought to find out how many years the respondent spent in their current engagement. The data shows 32.6% (30) majority spent 10 years or less in their current employment. 16.3% (15) spent between 11 to 20 years, 12% (11) between 21 to 30 years and 8.7% (8) having spent 31 to 40 years. 28.3% (26) did not give response on the years spent on their current engagement

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 26 28.3 28.9 28.9

10 years or Less 30 32.6 33.3 62.2

11 to 20 years 15 16.3 16.7 78.9

21 to 30 years 11 12.0 12.2 91.1

31 to 40 years 8 8.7 8.9 100.0 Total 90 97.8 100.0 Missing System 2 2.2 Total 92 100.0

Table 4.6: Years in current Employment

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g. Cadre of Staff

Cadre of Staff

13%

41% No Response Senior Staff Junior Staff

46%

Figure 4.8: Cadre of Staff Assuming the respondent was employed, the research sought to know broadly the current capacity in which the respondent served. 45.7% (42) served in Senior level capacity, whereas 40.2% (37) served at junior level capacity. The remaining 13% did not give response on their level of capacity.

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 12 13.0 13.2 13.2

Senior Staff 42 45.7 46.2 59.3

Junior Staff 37 40.2 40.7 100.0

Total 91 98.9 100.0

Missing System 1 1.1

Total 92 100.0

Table 4.7: Cadre of Staff

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h. PEV was caused by ethnic hostilities

PEV cause by Ethnic hostilities

2.2%

50.0% Not Sure Agree 44.6% Strongly Agree

3.3% No Response

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% Title

Figure 4.9: PEV was caused by ethnic hostilities

Majority of the respondents 50% (46) strongly agreed the post-election violence was caused by ethnic hostilities. Furthermore 44.6% (41) agreed with this sentiment. 3.3% (3) did not respond and 2.2% (2) were not sure of the cause.

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 3 3.3 3.3 3.3

Strongly Agree 41 44.6 44.6 47.8

Agree 46 50.0 50.0 97.8

Not Sure 2 2.2 2.2 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

Table 4.8: PEV was caused by ethnic hostilities

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i. Ethnic hostilities were caused by incitement

Ethnic hostilities as a result of Incitement

1.1%

30.4% Not Sure Agree 66.3% Strongly Agree

2.2% No Response

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% Title

Figure 4.10: Ethnic hostilities were caused by incitement Majority of the respondents agreed that the ethnic hostilities were as a result of incitement. 66.3% (61) strongly agreed similarly 30.4% (28) agreed with the case. In contrast, 1.1% (1) weren’t sure whereas 2.2% (2) gave no response

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 2 2.2 2.2 2.2

Strongly Agree 61 66.3 66.3 68.5

Agree 28 30.4 30.4 98.9

Not Sure 1 1.1 1.1 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

Table 4.9: Ethnic hostilities were caused by incitement

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j. Ethnic incitement was caused by hate speech

Ethnic incitment as a result of hate speech?

1.1

15.2 Disagree Not Sure 43.5 Agree Strongly Agree 27.2 No Response 13.0

.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0

Figure 4.11: Ethnic incitement as a result of hate speech? The larger majority of the participants, 43.5 % (40), agree that ethnic incitement was a result of hate speech, similarly 27.2% (25) strongly agreed with the sentiment. On the other hand, about 1.1 % (1) of respondents disagreed with this notion, 15.2% (14) were not sure and 13% (12) offered no response.

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 12 13.0 13.0 13.0

Strongly Agree 25 27.2 27.2 40.2

Agree 40 43.5 43.5 83.7

Not Sure 14 15.2 15.2 98.9

Disagree 1 1.1 1.1 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

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Table 4.10: Ethnic incitement was caused by hate speech

k. Hate speech was the main cause of 2007 PEV

Hate speech as the main cause of 2007 PEV

1.1%

16.3% Disagree Not Sure 18.5% Agree Strongly Agree 62.0% No Response 2.2%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0%

Figure 4.12: Hate speech as the main cause of 2007 PEV The data shows that majority of the respondents 62% (57) concurred hate speech was the main cause of the 2007 Post Election Violence. Furthermore, 18.5% (17) also agreed with the notion.

16.3% (15) were not sure of the view whereas 1.1% (1) disagreed and 2.2% (2) offered no response.

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 2 2.2 2.2 2.2

Strongly Agree 57 62.0 62.0 64.1

Agree 17 18.5 18.5 82.6

Not Sure 15 16.3 16.3 98.9

Disagree 1 1.1 1.1 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

Table 4.11: Hate speech as the main cause of 2007 PEV

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Government response to hate speech was effective

Government response to hate speech was effective

68.5%

4.3% Disagree Not Sure 4.3% Agree Strongly Agree 7.6% No Response 15.2%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0%

Figure 4.13: Government response to hate speech was effective Majority of the respondents 68.5% (63) disagreed that the Government’s response to hate speech was effective. Conversely. 7.6% (7) and 4.3% (4) of respondents who strongly agreed and generally agreed with the sentiment. A further 15.2% (14) offered no response

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 14 15.2 15.2 15.2

Strongly Agree 7 7.6 7.6 22.8

Agree 4 4.3 4.3 27.2

Not Sure 4 4.3 4.3 31.5

Disagree 63 68.5 68.5 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

Table 4.12: Government response to hate speech was effective

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l. Hate speech can be prevented through criminal legislation

Hate speech can be prevented through criminal legislation

13.0%

13.0% Disagree Not Sure 19.6% Agree Strongly Agree 53.3% No Response 1.1%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0%

Figure 4.14: Hate speech can be prevented through criminal legislation As shown in the figure above and table below, majority of respondents 53.3% (49) strongly agreed that hate speech can be prevented through criminal legislation. 19.6% (18) agreed with the sentiment whereas 13% (12) disagreed and the other 13% (12) were not sure. A minor 1.1% offered no response on the matter.

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 1 1.1 1.1 1.1

Strongly Agree 49 53.3 53.3 54.3

Agree 18 19.6 19.6 73.9

Not Sure 12 13.0 13.0 87.0

Disagree 12 13.0 13.0 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

Table 4.13: Hate speech can be prevented through criminal legislation

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m. Hate speech can be prevented through reconciliation and non-criminal approaches

Hate speech can be prevented through reconciliation and non-criminal approaches

4.3%

Disagree 25.0% Agree 69.6% Strongly Agree No Response 1.1%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0%

Figure 4.15: Hate speech can be prevented through reconciliation and non-criminal approaches Regarding preventative measures, majority of respondents 69.6% (64) strongly agreed that hate speech can be prevented through reconciliatory and non-criminal approaches, moreover, 25% (23) agreed with this view. Conversely so, 4.3% (4) disagreed with this notion whereas 1.1% offered no response.

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 1 1.1 1.1 1.1

Strongly Agree 64 69.6 69.6 70.7

Agree 23 25.0 25.0 95.7

Disagree 4 4.3 4.3 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

Table 4.14: Hate speech can be prevented through reconciliation and non-criminal approaches

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n. PEV can be avoided through strong electoral laws

PEV can be avoided through strong electoral laws

1.1%

1.1% Disagree Not Sure 23.9% Agree Strongly Agree 72.8% No Response 1.1%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 80.0%

Majority of the respondents 73.8% (67) strongly agreed that Post Election Violence can be avoided through strong electoral laws. Similarly, 23.9% (22) of the respondents agreed with this sentiment. 1.1% (1) disagreed whereas 1.1% (1) were not sure about the view. 1.1% (1) offered no response on the view.

b8. PEV can be avoided through strong electoral laws

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 1 1.1 1.1 1.1

Strongly Agree 67 72.8 72.8 73.9

Agree 22 23.9 23.9 97.8

Not Sure 1 1.1 1.1 98.9

Disagree 1 1.1 1.1 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

Table 4.15

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o. Government response to hate speech was effective

p. The lack of impartiality by the ECK was the main cause of the 2007 PEV

The lack of impartiality by the ECK was the main cause of the 2007 PEV

1.1%

25.0% Disagree Not Sure 23.9% Agree

47.8% Strongly Agree No Response 2.2%

0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0%

47.8% (44) strongly agreed that the post-election violence was as a result of impartiality by the electoral commission. Moreover, this is further supported by those who agree 23.9% (22). 25% (23) of the respondents were not sure about the view whereas 1.1% (1) disagreed. 2.2% (2) offered no response on the matter

Valid Cumulative

Frequency Percent Percent Percent

Valid No Response 2 2.2 2.2 2.2

Strongly Agree 44 47.8 47.8 50.0

Agree 22 23.9 23.9 73.9

Not Sure 23 25.0 25.0 98.9

Disagree 1 1.1 1.1 100.0

Total 92 100.0 100.0

Table 4.16

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DISCUSSIONS ON FINDINGS

According to results from data analysis the response rate by the participants was very encouraging the return rate from the 100 sampled participants, more than half responded by filling the questionnaires and answering the questions very well. The response rate was 92%. was due to the fact that the study sampling method was purposive and random. Creswell (2005) attributes the acceptable study return rate of between 50% and 80% to be representative enough sample for validating a successful research. Process, Data shows that gender balance was demonstrated during the sampling for the research process. From the data 43% percent of the participants were women while 47% were men. Gender equality rules were therefore respected and observed during the research process.

Data analysed indicates that the respondents who answered the questionnaires demonstrated their honesty and clarity with their answers. The majority of the respondents identified incitement as the main cause of ethnic hostilities. In Mathare and Kibra the respondents the majority of the respondents responded by saying that ethnic hostilities were actually caused by hate speech. 90% of the respondents believe that ethnic hostilities appealed to hate speech and incitement. Ethnic incitement caused the 2007/8 post- election violence which resulted in the deaths of many Kenyans. Oucho (2009) noted that hate speech in CORD strongholds and PNU strongholds resulted in high levels of incitement against their opponents. This was provoked by hate speech, name calling and threats and eventually physical violence. In areas of Uasin Gishu like Burnt

Forest non local communities were referred to as Madowa dowa so as to exited ethnic and political hostility. The local communities responded to the incitement and in some cases killed many members of the non-local communities. In Burnt Forest members of minority community were attacked while in Church (Nzau 2009} According to the data, hate speech was Speech experienced mainly in the strongholds of PNU and CORD. In Eldoret City and Speech experienced Nairobi County, hate speech divided the areas into zones for or against their opponents. According to Kimani (2009) hate speech prepared the ground for violence in Kibra, Mathare and Eldoret City. According to Murunga (2011) hate speech was adopted during the first wave of violence in December/January 2007/8 and the second retaliatory wave of violence between February and March 2008.

Data also showed that ethnicity and ethnic based politics was one of the causes of 2007/8 PEV. Hate speech by politicians was directed to ethnic groups supporting CORD and PNU appealing to ethnic loyalty in order to help their parties to win. According to Parsons (2009) many locations of Kibra were highly incited and ethnic hostility was heightened as a result of political differences during the first wave of violence were again more than 90% of the respondent agreed that ethnicity was one of the causes of the PEV among other causes such as hate speech. Ethnicity has been experienced in Kenya since Kenya’s 42

independence from Britain in 1963. Hate speech generated the enmity between different political players whose background is supported by ethnic political base.

The results of data analysis explained that respondents agreed generally that ethnic incitement played a big role in formenting PEV of 2007/8. Over 90% of the respondents believe that hate speech was the main cause of ethnic incitement in most areas where ethnic violence took place. Hate speech was used to create hostility based on political grounds. Oucho (2009) explained that hate speech was used to attract political support and generate hostility against the opponents. The Politian who propagated hate speech achieved their target because they were able to use their followers for over a month to perpetuate violence and isolate their enemies mercilessly. According to Human Rights watch, many Kenyans in Kibra, Mathare, and Eldoret City suffered serious humiliation and punishment at the hands of their political and ethnic opponents.

Materu (2014) observed that ethnic incitement was very successful in dividing Kenyans along ethnic lines and generating a conflict which nearly divided the country along ethnic and political allegiances. Materu explains further that the revenge attacks by Kikuyus was well organized by politicians who used Mungikis and youths to attack people in Naivasha, Nakuru, Limuru, Thika and almost reached Nairobi with their revenge attacks which were aimed at displacing members of CORD communities to return to their ancestral homes. Dida (2008) noted that Ethnic incitement came through hate speech and was meant to incite the local residents against the residents from other areas speaking different languages. This incitement took a very bad turn in Eldoret city where people from other areas were forced to seek protection in police stations churches and government offices. Makali a KTN analyst noted that the Electoral Commission of Kenya was part of the compromised cause of the 2007/8 PEV. Their performance and announcement of Kibaki as winner was seen to be a betrayal of the truth. This caused the initial reaction and eruption of the violence. The sampled respondents agreed that the Electoral Commission of Kenya was not partial during the conducting of the elections. There was a general feeling that The ECK Chairman was compromised in one way or another and that the announcements which he made favoured the ruling party PNU which the electorate in the surveyed area felt was unfair. The participants dubbed the ECK as the real cause of 2007/8 PEV

The response rate to this question was almost the same to the other questions confirming that, the ECK was the main cause of the 2007/8 Post Election Violence. They however explained that hate speech and ethnic incitement were used to achieve political ambitions of political leaders.

The respondent’s sentiments agreed with the Murunga (2011) assertion that hate speech requires inter- community reconciliation and bonding to avoid any future conflicts and post- election violence. According the results in the data analysis, most respondents supported the need for reconciliation by over 80%. 43

The data analysis revealed that the respondents felt that any future PEVs could be avoided through strong electoral laws and political honesty. The respondents agreed that electoral laws could be useful in stemming post- election violence by subjecting players to rules and laws. Over 80% of the participants agreed with this idea. The participants agreed with Nzau (2011 assertion that political honesty and national cohesion was important before strong electoral laws could be put in place and respected by politicians.

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS WITH ONE GROUP IN KIBERA, ONE GROUP IN MATHARE, AND ONE GROUP IN ELDORET CITY.

QUESTIONS ON FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

1. Describe the main factors which caused the violence after 2007/8 general elections 2. How did hate speech contribute to post-election violence 3. How did ethnicity instigate post-election violence? 4. How did political competition contribute to post-election violence? 5. Was the post-election violence handled properly and effectively by the security organs? 6. Did the government respond timely and effectively to quell the post-election violence? 7. What were the main effects of the post-election violence in your area? 8. How can another post- election violence be avoided in future?

The questions sought to assess the response of the participants to the questions concerning the

Factors which contributed to the post-election violence of 2007/8 and how it can be avoided in future. The researcher held one focus group discussions with community representatives in Nairobi County and one in Eldoret County. In Nairobi the discussions were held in Kibera slums and one was held in Mathare slums. In Eldoret County the discussion with focus group was held in Eldoret town to discuss the 2007/8 PEV.

Below is the summary of the discussions with FGDS

Group one Kibera Makina

The residents of this area were mostly supporters of CORD party during the 2007/8 general elections. Their comments resembled the political division which had hit the country in 2007/8.

i. On the factors which caused the violence after 2007 elections, the Kibra group comprised of people from Nyanza and Western Kenya, Nubian, Kikuyus and Kamba’s. The participants agreed that, violence was sparked by unfair election results which were announced by the ECK (Electoral Commission of Kenya) which stole the election results from their leader Raila and handed it over

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to PNU. This created anger and frustration and made CORD supporters to be frustrated. The participants agreed that in Kibra hate speech played a part in precipitating violence by laying the ground for political competition based on our party must win. According to the information from participants, violence and conflict was bound to take place either way. Somehow, on the ground the local communities had been informed that Kibaki’s government would try to hold on to power even after losing. The ground looked like it had been set for violence if this happened. The violence took place as they had expected. Some of the conflict erupted by incitement while some conflict erupted spontaneously. ii. On the question of hate speech, the participants said that hate speech came after the results were announced against their expectations. Every one responded to hate speech after the results were announced against their expectations. They however added that hatred and ethnic division had been created earlier during the campaign period .at the participants said that drums of ethnic hatred had been spread during campaigns. Violence would have erupted even if CORD party had won the elections. Hate speech had prepared the ground for violence in Kibra. During the second spate of violence in Kibra, the group which attacked people was in a revenge mission to counter the first attack. In this second revenge attack a number of people were killed in a well-planned attack. This attack was carried out by vigilantes from Central Kenya who were believed to be acting on instructions form some authority. The participants referred to them as an improved outfit of Mungikis vigilantes.

iii. On the question of hate speech provoking, violence the participants pointed out that due to frustration, they paid attention to hate speech and found themselves so angered. They found themselves being drawn into very aggressive violence which they had not premeditated. The participants pointed out that hate speech became so predominant before and after elections. There was no voice to calm the angry people. There was no voice of reason. All politicians were drawn in war of words and war of supremacy. The desperation was felt even among church members and leaders. People of Kibra turned themselves in robots for use in any violent situation. No one was there to cool the situation. iv. On the question of ethnicity as the cause of violence, the majority of the participants said that the they believed that election results were altered to provide former president Mwai Kibaki presidency illegally because of tribal consideration. They found themselves supporting ethnic positions against what they saw as a common political enemy. Ethnicity became a driving force to force the truth to be respected. The residents of Kibra decided to act as a unit against unfairness.

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The participants claimed that their reaction was spontaneous. They were not recruited to oppose anyone. They were acting in unity against the Kibaki win which to them was theft of power. v. The participants said that the political competition played a role in fanning PEV in 2007 because the ruling party PNU had decided to manipulate the election results. The Kibra residents believe that the government had all along planned to manipulate the election process in favour of president Kibaki. They believed that all the campaigns and the process was a formality to aid the process of stealing the elections. They believed that political competition was to blame for 2007 PEV as the process for stealing the elections had been planned and executed by government machinery. vi. The participants said that the government handled the PEV very poorly, by taking sides against the opposition supporters and mishandling opposition supporters who got in problem with the law. According to the participants, the government officials were involved in instigating the killings of pro opposition supporters in Nairobi and other areas. They said that the killings were meant to scare the opposition supporters and weaken their base. According to the participants, the security agents including police and GSU were given instructions to kill the opposition supporters in order to scare the opposition leaders. The security agents heeded word from the masters but some security officers with relatives in the opposition areas reacted with caution and did not carry out orders which they believed would hurt some people known to them. In general, the security agents over reacted against the opposition supporters in many areas engulfed with violence while they did very little reprimand PNU supporters. They actually were seen to favour the and protect the PNU supporters. vii. -The PEV had very serious effect on the people of Kibera, many people were killed by security forces. Many others were injured very seriously, others were maimed. The participants narrated how many women were raped, men were mishandled. Insecurity situation was created, many people lost their jobs, others lost their businesses and lively hoods. The PEV created a new way of relating to each other with caution and fear based on political affiliation and ethnic background. According to the participants The PEV provoked ethnic hatred. Fear of members of other ethnic groups and fear of political domination. Many people of Kibra lost their belongings and became very poor. They had to start afresh when order was restored. viii. -On the question how to avoid future PEVs most of the participants pointed out that unless the electoral process was amended or more violence would be experienced during and after future elections. They noted that, Kenya’s elections were marred with fraud, bribery, open cheating and arrogance by certain ethnic groups who felt that they were the rightful owners of Kenya and political thugs who bought loyalty with money

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2nd Focus group meeting with residents in Mathare

Causes of violence, hate speech, competition for power and Ethnicity

In 2007 Mathare area had two distinct groups one group supporting PNU and the other group supporting CORD. This area recorded many PEV related deaths. Other than Eldoret the violence here was intense with ethnic provocations and pronouncements. The participants here were from former PNU supporters and former CORD supporters. They both asserted that the violence was very intense and destructive. Participants from both sides agreed that Mathare area was the base of political hatred for PNU supporters and CORD supporters where all stakes were in the plate for political competition resulting into violence. With its location on the slopes of Mathare river, participants explained that hate speech, ethnicity and political competition were the main causes of PEV. They asserted that in Mathare Valley the conflict of ethnicity is what governs the political superiority in the area. They explained that, although there are people from different ethnic backgrounds residing in Mathare, political representation has favoured CORD and parties related to Raila Odinga. Since 1992. This has created a tense situation with the people from Mount Kenya region who are the second largest in Mathare. They have felt that they should be able provide political leadership but have been frustrated by the fact that CORD and other opposition parties get the support of people from other ethnic groups like Luhya, Kisii Kamba and others who join together and defeat their candidate during elections. Participants in the discussion pointed out that there has been very little ethnic intolerance between different ethnic groups in Mathare. The killings were so violent and destructive during the 2007/8 PEV. Many people were killed because of their ethnic backgrounds, children were drowned in river Mathare due to very intense ethnic divisions.

Handling of the PEV

According to Participants Residents of Mathare believe that the PEV was pre -planned by the then political players in Kibaki government. They said that the PEV was handled with ruthlessness to opposition supporters who were killed or maimed during demonstrations and perceived riots or opposition. The security agents were not interested in restoring peace and order. They were interested in punishing opposition supporters. Mathare residents believe that the violence could have been contained before many people lost their lives. They also believe that the government was not ready to stop it until it was reinstalled back to power.

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Government Response

The participants believe that the government was using the violence and lack of order to buy time and re- install itself back in power. Government response was very minimal. It was very poor. The security agents were sent to act on behalf of the Government. They did very little to prevent PEV. It was worse during the second wave of violence which resembled mass action and mass civil disobedience. The government acted too late according to the participants. In many cases the security organs ignored information on the impending attacks.

Effects of Violence

According to the participants, Mathare may have experienced most of the damage as a result of the 2007/8 PEV There was a lot of destruction in the informal sector, houses, businesses and the infrastructure. Many people were displaced and property looted and destroyed. Women in many areas were subjected to rape and other sexual abuses. In Mathare area many respondents reported that, women were subjected to all kinds of mistreatment by armed thugs in the name of elections. This happened mostly during the retaliatory second wave of PEV.

Preventing another PEV

The participants believe that competition for political power was the main cause of the 2007/8 PEV. They believe that in order to prevent future PEVs Kenyan’s should find a more inclusive way of sharing political power. They noted that there will never be affair election where power and wealth is enjoyed by one community. They said that electoral process can only be fair if power and wealth is shared by all citizens. They pointed out that security organs will not listen to the poor, but only to those in power.

The political organs should adopt an inclusive approach so as to avoid marginalization Once the political inclusivity is adopted, Kenyans will unite as a s one and support other political outfits.

Focus Group discussion in Eldoret

The researcher held a discussion with focus group in Eldoret Town. This is the area where the worst effect of 2007/8 PEV was experienced because of the population of non- indigenous residents of Eldoret City. The discussions were frank but considering the current political re-alignments taking place in Kenya today the response was affected by the political feelings of being side-lined. Most participants were not open to discuss the PEV because of the bad memories, however there was adequate response to explain the feelings. The participants were in two groups namely the indigenous residents of Eldoret and the non- residents of Eldoret who migrated to Eldoret during and after colonialism. These included Kikuyus, Abagusi, Luos, Luhyas all of who were affected by the 2007/8 post-election violence.

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Causes of the 2007/8 PEV added that land grabbing in Rift Valley by outsiders fuelled the violence in Eldoret during the PEV. On the question of ethnicity and political competition, they agreed that these problems could be resolved through power sharing arrangements but the government had to find a way of encouraging inclusivity.

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Preventing Another PEV

The participants believe that competition for political power was the main cause of the 2007/8 PEV. They believe that in order to prevent future PEVs Kenyan’s should find a more inclusive way of sharing political power. They noted that there will never be affair election where power and wealth is enjoyed by one community. They said that electoral process can only be fair if power and wealth is shared by all citizens. They pointed out that security organs will not listen to the poor, but only to those in power. They said that, the political organs should adopt an inclusive approach so as to avoid marginalization Once the political inclusivity is adopted, Kenyans will unite as a s one and support other political outfits.

4.21 Focus Group discussion in Eldoret East The researcher held a discussion with focus group in Eldoret Town West This is the area where the worst effect of 2007/8 PEV was experienced. The discussions were frank but considering the current political realignments taking place in Kenya today the response was affected by the political feelings of being side- lined. Most participants were not open to discuss the PEV because of the sad memories however, there was adequate response to explain their feelings. The participants were in two groups namely the indigenous residents of Eldoret and those who migrated to Eldoret during and after colonialism.

Causes of the 2007/8 PEV

The participants generally agreed that divisive politics, competition for political power, and ethnicity were the were not main causes of PEV. However, the indigenous residents of Eldoret added that land grabbing in Rift Valley by outsiders played a part in fuelling the violence in Eldoret during the PEV and the years before.

On the question of ethnicity and political competition, they agreed that these problems could be resolved through power sharing arrangements but the government had to find a way of encouraging inclusivity and unity. The participants said that Kenyan communities were not united, the communities were each focused on outdoing each other and gunning for political control.

Response to PEV by security organs

According to the participants, the response by security organs to PEV in Eldoret was slow, biased and pro- government. The security organs particularly the police and GSU were more concerned with controlling the CORD protestors the participants in the discussion. They also noted that the police were caught unprepared by the spontaneous eruption of violence which affected most CORD strong holds.

Response by the Government

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Most participants in the Focus Group Discussions in Eldoret asserted that the government response to the eruption of PEV was, slow, confused and undecided. They said that the government leaders were a part of the problem hence the government was weakened in its reaction. The government was not in a strong position to intervene in the violence. In Eldoret and other parts of Kenya, renegades had started doing whatever they wanted like erecting road blocks and demanding for protection money from local motorists. The violence became too big for the government to manage.

Effects of 2007/2008 PEV

According to participants in the focus group discussions, the PEV had a very devastating effect in Eldoret town and County as a whole. According to the participants non indigenous residents in all parts of Eldoret County and Eldoret town were subjected to very aggressive and unfriendly treatment Many of them had to run to police stations and churches for security. Participants said that without the intervention of external players the situation could have been very devastating. Many people from other parts the country living in Eldoret were killed in the violence. The participants narrated how some people were burnt in their houses while others were burnt to death in a church in Burn forest area of Eldoret County. According to the participants in the discussions, many people lost their lives and their properties in Eldoret County as a whole. The participants said that till today some former owners of land and properties have never returned to their properties. They a said that many IDPs who were displaced during 2007/8 PEV have remained un- resettled to date. The PEV also had a devastating effect on the economy of Eldoret County and other neighbouring counties according to the participants. The PEV brought distrust to the communities in Eldoret and other communities in Kenya. A situation that prevails till today.

Avoiding another PEV in future The participants said that in order to avoid future PEVs the country should inculcate the following ideas; 1- The spirit of inclusivity 2- The spirit of power sharing 3- The adoption of respect for the rule of law 4- Unity of all Kenyans 5- Political tolerance 6- Rotational and inclusive presidency. 7- Effective electoral laws 8- Stop the use of money for influencing election process 9- Have a shared leadership institution 10- Avoid expensive electoral processes

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5.CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of findings The study had sought to find out the causes of hate during the 2007/8 General elections, to examine the causes of hate speech during the 2007/2008 general elections, to assess how hate speech caused -ethnic incitement during the 2007/8 general elections in Nairobi City and Uasin Gishu Counties, to examine the modes of response by security organs to hate speech, ethnic incitement and ethnic violence after the 2007 elections. Those who participated in the study were of different backgrounds and professions although the majority of them were residents of the locations where post p- election violence took place. The respondents were well aware of the incitements which took place and the violence which ensued thereafter.

I-On the causes of hate speech during the post- election violence, the respondents said that hate speech was caused by political differences between the Party of National Unity (PNU) the party Coalition for Democracy (CORD) who used hate speech to convince their supporters to rally behind their respective parties and ensure that they win the elections. The supporters took advantage of hate speech to create hostility and start violence in various strong holds of both parties. According to Nzau (2016) hate speech was propagated to drum support for political parties by inciting ethnic hatred among the various ethnic groups. This culminated into the post63- election violence.

According to Musyoka (2014) Political violence has played out in different manners throughout Kenya’s history. The Kenyan slogan of peace, love and unity well known since independence was in many ways a myth waiting to be shattered judging from her unstable violent election spells. Early in 2008, the Ugandan writer and commentator Kalundi Serumaga wrote about the Kenyan middle class' capacity to "normalize the absurd." If anything, the surprise was that it had taken so long for the bubble of normality to burst. Many factors helped foment the violent election spells: rampant corruption from the president downwards, some of the starkest economic inequalities on earth, fragmentation of already corrupt ruling elite along ethnic lines, and a disproportionately young population. The cauldron simply boiled over in 2007. The failure of the 2007 elections was merely a trigger for events that would have taken place at some point in the future. There had long been an overwhelming sense of exclusion and alienation among large sections of the populace. For Kenya's alienated ethnic groups, the 2008 political violence was, in a tragic way, the most significant moment of collective empowerment they had ever experienced from the political leaders.

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On the causes of hate and effects of speech, the respondents said that hate speech was used as a vehicle for dividing people along ethnic lines so that they could vote in line with the wishes of the political leaders. Hate speech was used by both CORD and PNU politicians in Nairobi City, in Nakuru County, in Eldoret City and in Mombasa County. However, the violence was experienced in the same areas where hate speech was experienced the most. Kibera and Mathare in Nairobi City, Eldoret City and its environments particularly Burnt forest area where violence was at its worst during the first phase. During the second phase of the post- election violence affected included Nakuru, Naivasha and the environments of Nairobi the differential impacts of violence on men and women not merely by recourse to biological differences, but also by tracing the different vulnerabilities that derive from the social roles men and women assume, voluntarily or involuntarily. As Moser (2004) has argued, a gender analysis assists in understanding why men and women as social actors and with differential access to resources are differentially affected by violence. In Nairobi city

The Kibera sums was greatly affected by many actors choosing to engage in robberies, murder, rape and displacement members of other communities In Mathare slums the violence was worse including the rapes of both men and women, child abuse and child murders by throwing children in river Mathare. Many upcountry residents of Mathare were assaulted and displaced by vigilantes of PNU party. In Eldoret county the effects were similar and ugly. Many people from other areas were displaced, some killed, other relieved of their properties using force. Most of the respondents and those who took part in discussion forum asserted that the response by security organs was slow and un-coordinated. The security organs seem to have been caught unawares by the displaced, eruption of violence. The respondents believe that the response by security forces was one sided and was directed at oppressing the opposition supporters. The respondents noted that the security organs used excess fire to quell the violence in opposition strong holds during the first eruption of violence. However, during the second eruption of violence which was orchestrated deliberately by vigilantes from central Kenya to avenge the first eruption of violence, were treated with less force compared to the rioters who took part during the first eruptions immediately after the elections. The Government in power also did not make much effort to cool the tempers of the citizens. The Government officials played a wait and see game with the hope that, the situation could solve itself. The situation did not solve itself and the violence stopped only when there was regional intervention by the African Union emissary and UN special envoy Secretary General Kofi Annan. Without the intervention of the special envoys the post-election violence in Kenya could have been wider spread and more destructive. The findings agree with the assertions by Murithi 2009 that, for Kenya to rid itself from tribalism and all it entails, it is essential that it puts in place measures that will prevent conflict from "igniting, escalating and relapsing, which could include institutions and mechanisms of negotiations, mediation, forgiveness, and reconciliation (Murithi, 2009). 53

5.2 Conclusion It can be concluded that hate speech and ethnic incitement were the main drivers of political competition in 2007/8 in Kenya which resulted into post-election violence. Politicians appealed to their supporters using hate speech as a weapon of dividing the population. It can also be concluded that the security organs responded dismally to the post- election violence. It appeared like the violence was allowed to continue so as to cover up the anomalies which had taken place during the general elections. by being slow in responding to distress calls or by ignoring genuine cases of distress calls. The security organs, instead reacted oppressively to the opposition supporters while ignoring the atrocities of those who were supporting the government side who were in power. This response invited more violence as people felt betrayed by security organs.

5.3 Recommendations

The researcher noted that the post - election violence was caused by factors which could have been avoided. Hate speech and ethnic incitement can be avoided by putting in place strong measures to prevent and control such explosive activities which can result in destruction and deaths. The researcher also noted that the government reaction was not adequate to resolve the conflict or restore the confidence of the electorate. The researcher came up with the following recommendations to avert any future post -election violence.

i. The institutions handling elections should be drawn from irreproachable personnel who will act impartially and restore the credibility of the electoral process. This will restore faith and trust in the elections and restore confidence in the electorate. from here there will be trust in the process and the electorate will be reassured of their voting process. ii. The election machinery should be made tamper proof and be managed electronically to remove possible interference from hired hackers and unfaithful personnel. iii. Election laws should be re-written to include heavy sentences for election related fraud which may stir up post-election violence. This will deter any attempts to engage in election fraud or post- election violence. iv. The security personnel should be re-trained on matters affecting the handling of election related violence so as not to cause un-necessary deaths and injuries during and after general elections.

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APENDICES

APPENDIX I: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION Dear Respondent,

REF: REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY

I am a student at Kenyatta University Nairobi campus in Nairobi. I am undertaking a Master of Arts degree in Conflict Management and Resolution For the purpose of fulfilling the Master’s degree requirements, I have to undertake a research study, on .”ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF HATE SPEECH ON PROMOTING ETHNIC HOSTILITY AND VIOLENCE DURING THE 2007 POST ELECTION PERIOD IN NAIROBI AND UASIN GISHU “

I am collecting information for the study by distributing questionnaires to respondents. Kindly spare some time to answer the questions in the questionnaire. The information collected will be treated with strict confidentiality. The respondents confidentiality will be preserved..

Thank you for your co-operation.

Yours Faithfully,

Charles Lwanga Obulutsa

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APPENDIX II QUESTIONNAIRES The purpose of this questionnaire is to request information on this study, It aims at analysing the ethnic incitement using hate speech during the 2007/2008 post-election period in Nairobi City County and in Uasin Gishu County.

You are requested to participate in this study by filling in the questionnaire. You are assured that your identity will be treated with confidentially. Please answer all the questions provided as honestly as possible.

PART A: PERSONAL DATA

1. SEX (A) MALE (B) FEMALE

2. AGE (A) 20 YEARS AND BELOW

(B) 21 TO 30 YEARS

(C) 31 TO 40 YEARS

(D) 41 TO 50 YEARS

(E) 51 TO 60 YEARS

3. MARITAL STATUS (A) SINGLE (B) MARRIE

A- EMPLOYED B- NOT EMPLOYED

(A) 10 YEARS DOWN

(B) 11 YEARS TO 20 YEARS

(C) 21 YEARS TO 30 YEARS

(D) 31 YEARS TO 40 YEARS

5. CADRE OF STAFF (A) SENIOR STAFF

(B) JUNIOR STAFF

6. HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION: (A) POST GRADUATE

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(B) GRADUATE

(C) SECONDARY SCHOOL

PART B: GENERAL QUESTIONS.

1.The PEV of 2008 was caused by political intolerance

Chose one option below

Strongly Agree

Agree

Not sure

Disagree

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PEV was caused by ethnic hostilities

Strongly Agree

Agree

Not sure

Disagree

Politicians were to blame for PEV of 2007/2008

Chose one option below

Strongly Agree

Agree

Not sure

Disagree

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Hate speech was the main cause of 2007 PEV

Chose one option below

Strongly Agree

Agree

Not sure

Disagree

Ethnic incitement was the main cause of hate speech

Chose one option below

Strongly Agree

Agree

Not sure

Disagree

63

The 2007 PEV Ethnic violence was as a result of power struggle

Strongly Agree

Agree

Not sure

Disagree

The 2007 PEV could have been avoided if leaders were not greedy for power

Chose one option below

Strongly Agree

Agree

Not sure

Disagree

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PEVs can be avoided through strong electoral laws

Chose one option below

Strongly Agree

Agree

Not sure

Disagree

The lack of impartiality by the ECK was the main cause of the 2007 PEV

Chose one option below

Strongly Agree

Agree

Not sure

Disagree

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APPENDIX III: RESEARCH PROJECT WORK PLAN The following is a schedule of activities indicating when each respective activity is due to occur:

July July Aug Sept. Oct. NOV

ACTIVITY/DATE

2018 2018 2018 2018 2018 2019 Proposal development and writing

Presentation of Proposal Formal Approval of study Preparation of research materials and data collection Research Data Analysis Final Research report Writing Submission of report

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APPENDIX IV: RESEARCH PROJECT BUDGET BUDGET ITEM COST (Ksh.) Printing and Photocopying 20,000 Stationery 30,600 Transports Costs 40,200 Wages 40,500 Food and Drinks 25,000 Miscellaneous 55,400 Internet searching 45,000 Research Assistants 60,000 TOTAL 290,700

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MAP OF ELDORET TOWN

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MAP OF MATHARE SLUMS

69

MAP OF KIBRA

KIBERA ENVIRONMENT

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RESEARCH LICENCE

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THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION ACT, 2013

The Grant of Research Licenses is Guided by the Science, Technology and Innovation (Research Licensing) Regulations, 2014 CONDITIONS 1. The License is valid for the proposed research, location and specified period 2. The License any rights thereunder are non-transferable 3. The Licensee shall inform the relevant County Director of Education, County Commissioner and County Governor before commencement of the research 4. Excavation, filming and collection of specimens are subject to further necessary clearence from relevant Government Agencies 5. The License does not give authority to tranfer research materials 6. NACOSTI may monitor and evaluate the licensed research project 7. The Licensee shall submit one hard copy and upload a soft copy of their final report (thesis) within one of completion of the research 8. NACOSTI reserves the right to modify the conditions of the License including cancellation without prior notice National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation off Waiyaki Way, Upper Kabete,

P. O. Box 30623, 00100 Nairobi, KENYA Land line: 020 4007000, 020 2241349, 020 3310571, 020 8001077 Mobile: 0713 788 787 / 0735 404 245 E-mail: [email protected] / [email protected] Websitewww.nacosti.go.ke

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LETTER FROM POST GRADUATE SCHOOL

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RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION LETTER

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