- History of the nuclear stockpile New details of the largely secret history of nuclear warhead production reveal that an astounding array of weapons has been created for every conceivable purpose by a gigantic, self-perpetuating system. by Robert S. Norris, Thomas B. Cochran, and retirements at some 1,100 a year-three a day-averaging William M. Arkin a net addition of approximately two a day.

HE UNITED STATES since 1945 has manufactured Stimulants to growth and diversity some 60,000 nuclear warheads in 71 types configured T Service rivalry. In the immediate aftermath of World War for U6 weapons systems costing some $750 billion. This Il, civilian and military officials were unsure of the exact amounts to an average production rate of about four war- role that nuclear weapons would play within the armed heads per day for 40 years. With the current rate of spend- forces. Clarification of some issues, such as civilian control, ing on warhead production exceeding that of the Manhat- tan Project, the present sroclcpile of some 25,500 warheads began with the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946; is once again on the rise. new agencies, offices, and bumwaacies wae created. Most That the most basic:facts about the stOCkpileare shroud- pronounced in defining a specific military role were the ed in scaecy and difficult to discover is troubling, given Strategic Air Command (SAC), established as a combat their importance. Absent from the voluminous literature command of the Army Air Corps on March 21, 1946. and about the nuclear age is any serious trcaancot of the his- the Air Force, creared in September 1947. This tradition tory of the warhead stockpile. '"Gadger," "Little Boy," and of strategic: bombing and the aucial role of the atomic "Fat Man" have been th,. eentral characters in chronicles bomb in coding World War n led Air Force and SAC gene of the dawn of the nuclear era, but a history of their many erals to assume that they wol.l,d control postwar atomic successors remains to be written. Only preliminary data can policy. But the other services "desperately wanted a role in be offered here, but a full analysis is likely to lead to new the futl1le usc of weapons and Strongly rescored the de faao insights about the Cold War, the dynamics of the arms race, Air Force monopoly of the means of delivering such weap- and features of the contemporary debate.· ons."2 By the 1960s each service had an expansive panoply The nuclear warhead stockpile grew slowly at first. Be- of warheads, weapons, and plans. cause of a scarcity of materials and laborious production Many warhead types have been adapted for more than methods there were only seven hundred by 1950. But by the one weapon system and deployed with more than one ser- mid-1950s, with the production complex in place, the stock- vice. In 40 years the Air Force has made use of 43 warhead pile began growing by thousands of warheads per year until types, the Navy and Marine Corps 34 types, and the Army it reached its peak in 1967 at just under 32,000. By 1970- 21. Jointly, the Air Force, Navy, and Marines have deployed 1971 the stockpile had dipped to 27,000, thco increased 29 typeS of bombs (18 of them thermonuclear) on 53 kinds slighdy over four years with the deploymcot of MIRVed of U.S. and Allied aircraft. Poseidon and Minuteman missiles. From 1974 it gradually Thirty-four warhead types have been configured for 43 declined before again starting upward in 1982. missile systems, including 23 surface-co-surface. six surface- The character of the present nuclear buildup is that huge to-air, six underwater-to-surface, four air-to-surface, two numbers of warheads produced during the 1950s and 1960s air-to-air, one surface-to-underwater and one underwater- are planned to be retired and replaced with larger numbers to-underwater missiles. Six warhead types have been used of new warheads. Although expendirurcs are at near-record for 13 kinds of artillery guns in five calibers. Among the highs, production rates are not. From fiscal 1984 through more bizarre of these have been a jeep- or tripod-mounted 1988 the stockpile will increase, under current plans, by nuclear bazooka (Davy Crockett), a nuclear torpedo (AS- an average of some 650 warheads per year, reaching an esti- TOR), and four kinds of atomic land mines (atomic demo- mated level of over 28,000. Production rates of new war- lition munitions). heads are in the 1,800-per-year range-five a day-with As was no doubt intended, the competition between the two design laboratories, Los Alamos and Livermore, has Robert S. Norris is a senior research associate with the Natural stimulared stockpile growth and diversity. The former, with Resources Defense Council in Washington, nc. Thom4S B. Coch- ran, a physicist. is senior smff scientist and director of the Nudear its longer history, has designed 53 warheads. while Liver- Weapons Dambook project at the Natural Resources Defense more has designed 18. Of the 30 types in the current stock- Council. WIlliam M. Arkin is director of the Amrs Race and Nu- pile Los Alamos is responsible for 18 and Livermore for U.3 clear Weapons Research Project at the Institute for Policy Studies 'Technological developments. From the outset rechnolo- in Washington, D.C. gical developments have profoundly influenced the cornpo-

August 1985 106 sinon and size of the stockpile. An immediate postwar ob- detail and chronology of the beginnings of the thermonu- jectivewas to re-engineer the Fat Man plutonium bomb of. clear era. Shot '"George;" on May 8,1951, which preceded [hetype dropped over Nagasaki to make production easier, "Item," was the first significant U.S. thermonuclear reaction. but critical components were in shore supply, particularly The first successful test of a thermonuclear device was the high-explosivecastings and initiators. Acceptable new cast- lOA-megaton "Mike" shot at Eniwetok, on October 31, ingsfinally became available in April 1947 and were incor- 1952. porated into the Mark III, and the first production model Before "Mike" two candidate warheads (the B16 and B14) FatMan entered the stockpile the same month. By the end entered development engineering in June and August 1952 of June 1947 there were 13 warheads in the stockpile, in- as part of an effort to provide an emergency capability of cluding at least nine Fat Man models stockpiled through bombs and modified B-36 bombers to deliver them." In June 30, 1946; the rest were Mark Ills. But the Mark III October 1953 three other thermonuclear warheads entered was judged to be deficient as an operational weapon: it development engineering, the B15, B17, and B24. JUStprior was[00 large and heavy, with an awkward shape and overly to the beginning of the Castle test series (with shot "Bravo" complex fusing and firing mechanisms. It also required on February 28, 1954) the first thermonuclear warhead, lengthy assembly procedures and had aeronautical and the B14, entered the stockpile on an "emergency" basis. In srrucrura1weaknesses of the tail assembly. March, April, and May, concurrently with the Castle series, One significant early technological improYelllent was the the B16, 17, and 24 were also produced in small numbers, useof fissile cores made of a composite of plutonium and providing the planned-for emergency capability. Castle test uranium. These cores, which used the plentiful and cheaper results led to decisions to produce the 21-ton, high-yield stocks of highly enriched uranium more effeai~y were (10-ra-20 megaton) Bl7 and B24 (from Oeeober 1954 to stockpiled for use in Mark m bombs by the end of 1947. Ncwember 1955) and the lighter, lowa--yie1dB1S (from April The next major technological innovation was the ~op- 1955 to February 1957); and to cancel and dismantle the ment of the levitated core. Levitation made for greater effi- B14 and Bl6. ciency,increasing the yield by 75 percent for the same quan- After the B21 and B36 bombs entered the stockpile, be- tityof fissile material. Levitation and composite cores were tween December 1955 and April 1956, the total yield of tested in Operation Sandstone in April and May of 1948 the nuclear arsenal grew exponentially, reaching its peak, and \me incorporated in the Mark IV, the first mass-pro- at approximately 20,000 megatons, by 1960. It is note- duced bomb to be built, starting in March 1949 and con- worthy that approximately half the megatonnage of the tinuing in production until April 1951. entUe stockpile Was concentrated in some 2 or 3 percent ln May 1948 Los Alamos began development engineering of the warheads, as evidenced by the sudden reduction of on [he Mark 5, the first lightweight (J,OOO-pound) bomb some 9,400 megatons with the retirement of B36 bombs intended for "tactical" use. Its entry into the stockpile in between August 1961 and January 1962. O"ier the next two May 1952 was followed closely by fi\'e additional tactical and a half ya.rs the megaconnage rose again by 5,400 mega- nuclear warheads including the versatile Mark 7, which tons, primarily because of the production of thousands of servedas the warhead for the Bureau of Ordnance Atomic B29s and W28s, and hundreds of B53s and W53s. From Rocket(BOAR); a Navy depth bomb, nicknamed "Betty"; that second peak the megatonnage began a 20-year decline theAnny's Corporal and Honest John missiles; and the first to its present level of approximately 5,500 megatons. atomic demolition munition (ADM). Also in this initial Reagan Administration officials often imply that this flurryof tactical nuclear weapons development was the first dec:1ineis evidence of the "decade of neglea" and '"unilateral atomic artillery shell, the Mark 9, for the Army's 280- disarmament" of past administrations. They know better. millimeter howitzer. What they fail to tell the public is why and how the arsenal In [he early 1950s as part of its strategic weapons pro- has in fact become more lethal and capable. gram the Atomic Energy Commission pursued parallel In mid-1960 the Strategic Air Command inventory in- development of fission warheads with yields up to several cluded approximately 1,800 bombers to which some 6,000 hundred kilotons, and fusion warheads with yields from bombs were allocated. As ballistic missiles came to domin- one co 40 megatons," The principle of boosting fission ate Strategic forces, the number of bombers declined. Those weaponswith deuterium and tritium was first recognized remaining in the force were allocated a larger number of asearly as November 1945. A boosted device was tested lower variable-yield bombs and new air-eo-surface missiles on May 24, 1951 in shot "Item" of the Greenhouse test as technological advances provided more versatility and series.producing a yield of 45.s kilotons. Full-scale devel- capability. Improved guidance systems gave greater accu- opmentof the Bl8, a high-yield fission bomb, was initiated racy, thus allowing MIRVing and a reduction in warhead at Los Alamos in August 1952, and the warhead entered yields. During the MiRVing of the ICBMs (from mid-1970 the stockpile in July 1953. These high-yield fission war- to mid-1975) and the SLBMs (from March 1971 to Septem- headswere retired in less than three years, being quickly ber 1978) the combined megaeonnage continued to decline. replaced by the more efficient, multistage thermonuclear Knowledge of the dynamics and composition of the stock- designs. pile may provide new insight into the principal milestones of Attention FO the specifics of the stockpile provides more the arms race and certain events of the Cold War. AD.exam-

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 107 u.s. government expenditures Nuclear energy military 'activities, 1940·1990

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. Fiscal . 1940 1945 1950 i955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 Years -Roosevett-f- Trurnan--+-Eisenhower-l * IJohnson!-Nixon-! Ford Icarter I-Reagan-j * Kennedy Sources: Figures from the Officeof Management and Budget; Manhattan Engineer Division:Atomic EnergyCommission; Energy Researchand Development Administration; and the Department of Energy. pie of the former is a generally overlooked consequence of the "bomber gap" of the mid-1950s. Most accounts empha- Cost of the stockpile size that the Unired StareSresponded to its inflated estimates The United States has spent a total of almost 582 billion of Soviet bombers with a significant bomber program of on nuclear warheads (S209 billion in fiscal 1986 dollars) its own. This is true, but what is overlooked is the great from 1940 through 1985 (see figure). And these amounts growth in nuclear air-defense weapons, including Genie and represent only the Department of Energy's (and predecessor Falcon air-to-air missiles; and Nike Hercules, Bomarc, agencies') share of the total nuclear weapons bill. The De- Talos, and Terrier surface-to-air missiles. partment of Defense has spent an additional S650 billion A huge infrastructure was built, and by the early 1960s (S1.7 trillion in fiscal 1986 dollars) since the end of World the continental pan alone included 2,6U interceptor air- War II on nuclear delivery systems (missiles, planes, and craft, 274 Nike Hercules batteries, 439 Bomarc missiles, so on) and other suppon costs. and hundreds of radars manned by 207,000 personnel." All The data show that the United States is currently spend- of this was to counter the Soviet threat of 100 propeller- driven Bear and 60 jet-powered Bison bombers. Combined ing for nuclear warheads at a greater rate than it was during production of warheads for air-defense missiles totaled the Manhattan Project," From 1940 to mid-1946, the ex- some 7,000 - a significant percentage of the stockpile. But penditure was 52.05 billion, equivalent to S16.14 billion in no sooner had they been produced than they began to be fiscal 1986 dollars. In budgetary terms several Manhattan withdrawn. The infrastructure was eventually dismantled Project-size programs are currently going forward. The ini- and the warheads retired. New threats were substituted for tial research effort of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl) old ones as the "miss.ilegap" crowded out the "bomber gap." alone will double that figure. MX missile costs will be over

August 1985 108 I S30 billion, and the combined Trident submarine and 1. See Thomas B. Coc:hran, William M. Arkin, Milton M. Hoenig, missile programs could be over S100 billion, though both Robert S. Norris, Nllt:kar Weapons Dar.aboolr 11.u.s. Nuclear Warhead Prodllt:tio" (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, forthcoming). programs are spread over several years. 2. SlIMIl L. Rarden, The formatiwt Yean. 1947-1950: History of the The data also show that the highest expenditure rates Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D,C.: Govanment Print- were attained during the first nuclear buildup, from fiscal ing Office, 1984), p. 423. 3. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory's first stockpile warheads were the 1952 to 1964. During this period the production complex W27 for the Regulus II missile (Sepcember 1958) and the B27 Navy bomb was built to mass-produce nuclear warheads. The Manhat- (November 1958). In addition to the 71 types deployed another 30 were tan Engineer District facilities at Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, cancelled or suspended before development was complete. 4. The largest U,s. test was the 15-megaton shot "BRAVO," February and Hanford were expanded and supplemented by a second 28, 1954. design laboratory at Livermore, California. There were also 5. Lee Bowen, History of the Air Force Atomic E."ergy Program: The a second production reactor site at Aiken, South Carolina; Development of Weapons (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force Historical Division History, 1955; declassified with deletions June 1981), pp. 211-24. a continental test site; gaseous diffusion and feed-process- 6. House Armed Services Committee, Continental Air Defense, Hearing ing plants; and specialized warhead component and assem- (July 22, 1981), p. 25. bly facilities. 7. The two peak years for the Manhaaan Proieee were fisc:al1944 and 1945 when spending was 56.24 and 56.60 billion (in fisc:al1986 dollars). With the infusion of S24.3 billion in those 13 years, This compares with cum:nt budgersof 56.63,57,27,57.70,58.06,57.32, (S101.4 billion in constant fiscal 1986 dollars) the produc- 58.47, and 58.44 billion for fisc:al 1984-1990, tion rate and the size of the stodcpile increased dramatically. 8. They are: 861 bomb, Mods 3 and 4, W76 Trident I, W79 8-inch artillery, W80 Mod 0 and 1 sea- and air·launched cruise missiles, B83 The average annual production rate jumped from a range bomb, W84 ground-Iaamched auise missilc, W85 Pershing 0. The 30 types of 200 to 400 warheads per year in the early 1950s to a include the W66 Sprint and W7l Sparan, none of whidl had been retired range of 2,000 to 6,000 warheads per year in the early as of Dec. 31, 1983. The most recent n:timnau: is the W2S /Genie in 1984. 9. Using COIlSWItfisc:al1986 dollars, the annual averages an: (in mil- 19601. The record number of types simultaneously in pro- lions): Eisenbowr-S7,904; Kmuedy-S7,69O; Ragan-57,s52;Jobnson duaion was 11 (for 23 wapons systemS)occurring betMen -54,747; TliuIWI-53,920; Caner-53,834; Nixon-53,s05; Ford- June and December of 1964. By contrast, at several points 53,317. between 1916 and 1919 there was only one type being produced. CLlI'1'eDdythere are eight types in production with a total forty Years Mter Uirosbima- of 30 in the stoclcpile. I The first of over 1,000 W81 war- The Untold Story Ivery Concerned heads designed at LiftmlOre will begin production in the American Sbould Knowat Last! spring or summer of 1986; three yean later the first of over 3,000 Los .Alamos-designed W88 Trident II warheads will i begin production. In termS of awrage annual budgets Presi- j dent Reagan's is third -only slighdy behind those of Eisen- DAYONE I hower and Kennedy, and outstripping those of Johnson, PlttERWYDEN Truman, Nixon, and Reagan's rates ale "Iroshima. -o.y One· of tile AtomicAge, Who~ the men ancl_ Caner, Ford.' whobrought tragedy to thousands? Couldwehaveended the war with- almost double those of Caner. And when future constant- out the bomb? !'tow.using fresh. never-before-published research. here is the full.incrediblvdramatic account of the events and the people who dollar conversions are done, it is possible that the Reagan ledus to the bombing and its terrible aftermath. budget might move into first place. ·"ere. quite simply. is what everyliterate person on earth should know Stockpiles past and present reflect a variety of factors. about the start of the atomic age.' -Jolul ,,"',., "Moveswith the pace of a thriller. without sensationalizing; it informs Advocates of new weapons always justify them as a neces- without descending into tedium: it inspires without preac~~ sary response to present and future interpretations of "the •Anabsorbing account that synthe5iza the political. technical and threat." As the air-defense story shows, however, several human side of this .••story: - ••....,.,_'-' types of warheads owe their existence to faulty interpreta- ·Peter Wydenvividlytells the story of those who made the bomb tions. but really did not knowhow powerful it was. Toread this book is to better understand our nuclear history and whywe must make every As more of the secret nuclear history is revealed, the effort to see to it that "The Day After' shall never come.: clearer the perspective becomes with regardto current deci- -_ ••.e-I'f.Il"'._, "I can't imagine anyone who willnot find himself drawn into the sions and events. Bureaucratic competition and inertia have story as Peter Wydenhas written it. nor can Iimagine anyone who led to nuclear warheads for every conceivable military mis- willnot be the better for having read it.• -1'1_ c_ sion, arm of service, and geographic theater- all com- •Afascinating account of a most remarkable story .. -_J.I'fcCI •••r..-~5II!cretary.' •• r pounded by a technological momentum that overwhelmed rinally ia raperback what should have been a more sober analysis of what was "ow on Sale enough for deterrence. The result is a gigantic nuclear weapons sysrem -laboratories, production facilities, forces, and so on - that has become self-perpetuating, conducting its business out of public view and with lime accountability. While there is no single key to understanding the present complex situation, a better knowledge of the stockpile can, at the very least, provoke the asking of new questions. 0

Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistS 109