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Exploring Conceptual The four uses of the phrase «» singled by Brook reveal a high level of Davide Dal Sasso ambiguity due to its use. Nominally we could Università di Torino use the phrase to refer to an artistic movement (Italia) or a general set of new experimental practices of the 60s that don’t accept the traditional methods of art making. In the first meaning 1. The Idealistic Obstinacy of the phrase is differently coined and used by Conceptual Art two artists1, and it is not completely working if referring to other kinds of artistic move- any philosophers and critics agree ments. Conceptual Art in this case would be that Conceptual Art is distin- the name of the artistic movement initially guished not only to be a loose col- based upon the creative activities and the Mlection of various practices but especially for critical statements of many different artists, its significant contradictions that increase the largely American2. In the second meaning in- theoretical controversy about it. stead, the phrase is used to describe a decisive According to the theorist Donald Brook tendency for the profound change of art due (1972) the phrase «Conceptual Art» has dif- to the new experimental practices of the 60s ferent senses and it is used with a general non- that also established a large part of the succes- acceptance. His argument is based on the fol- sive artistic evolution until today. lowing premises: (i) this obscure label refers The controversy about Conceptual Art is to many kinds of processes and objects; (ii) corroborated by this nominal ambiguity that artists’ justifications about them are vague; reflects: the uncertain nature of Conceptual (iii) their writings, in many cases, are in gib- Art, its invisible boundaries but, at the same berish. So defining Conceptual Art is a com- plex matter. Brook acknowledges that this dif- ficulty is related to four uses of the phrase: to 1 Henry Flynt in his Concept Art (1961) speaks about indicate a primacy of a conceptual approach an art whose material are «concepts»; Sol LeWitt in to art in contrast to the perceptual one; to em- his Paragraphs on Conceptual Art (1967) remarks the phasise that Conceptual Art is art of ideas and primacy of ideas in art. not art of physical objects; to claim that it is 2 In this view the main American conceptual artists also an artistic process based on a semantic were Robert Barry, Douglas Huebler, Joseph Ko- suth and Lawrence Weiner, supported by the gal- paradox that changes art and points out the lery director and intelligent divulger of their activi- critical approach to its nature; to remark the ties, Seth Siegelaub. Anyway, in a historical view, restricted meta-activity character through Sol LeWitt, Walter De Maria, Bruce Nauman, Hans which art became essentially a comment on it- Haacke, Robert Smithson, The Art & Language self. Group and many others are also considered as con- ceptualists.

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time, its visible heritage from Modernism3 and sues implied in them. Lastly, the third group also its questionable philosophical references of works, in which language and thought are upon which are based many of its different intriguing subjects to an obstinate model of practices. reflection, increases confusion and nonsense. Philosopher Richard Sclafani (1975) So Sclafani concludes that Conceptual Art is a doesn’t believe that the conceptual movement nonsensical and confused kind of art. has any implications for art or for philosophy. Consequently, the risk to define Concep- He grouped the conceptual works in three tual Art as not art or to assign it the «anti-art» categories: extra radical; quasi-philosophical label is very high. (based on a self-referential character); and Although it is also possible to define art ac- based on a language and thought model of re- cording to an institutional framework4, a flection. A conceptual confusion is to the basis problem still remains: how can we determine of the first group of works: it’s not possible the boundary between what is art and what is that if someone calls something «Art», then it not? Philosopher George Dickie (1975) ar- is art. Surely, the success of a conceptual art- gues that this was possible using the phrase work – also the famous urinal exhibited by «anti-art», especially to refer to actions and Duchamp – is strictly linked to the artistic statements of some artists: the performers. community context. But the contextual state- Actions and statements are not artefacts. Per- ments are not sufficient so that something be- formers don’t produce any material objects comes art. It seems that for conceptualists it through their actions and declarations, so they was impossible «to reject a claim of art status» make anti-art. As Dickie explains what per- (Sclafani 1975: 456). As Sclafani explains: formers do «is real anti-art: art because they «Not everyone can be an artist simply as he use the framework of the artworld, anti be- pleases, and not everything can be a work of cause they do nothing with it». For this rea- art simply on anyone say’s so. Without logi- sons they are «bureaucrats» because «they oc- cal constraints on artmaking and arthood, the cupy a niche in an institutional structure but concepts ‘artist’ and ‘work of art’ are rendered do nothing which is really productive» vacuous» (ibidem). With the extra-radical (Dickie 1975: 421). In his ontology of art artworks many conceptualists lose the Dickie doesn’t include artists’ actions and Duchamp’ lesson, since they claimed that it statements, and his theoretical perspective was essentially a contextual statement to con- seems to be in accordance with the one of the fer arthood. The quasi-philosophical works – dematerialisation of art – as described by largely based on incursions in analytical phi- losophy – prove an unfavourable intellectual 4 The institutional framework – as it as theorised by complexity, as a heritage of philosophical is- Dickie at this stage of his research – consists in a core of: (1) creators; (2) presenters; (3) appreciators; (4) theorists, critics and philosophers of art; (5) ex- 3 See Wood (2002). hibition machinery. See Dickie (1975).

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many artists and theorists5. If this is correct manifestations – concepts are imperceptible, then we could conclude that most of concep- instead their manifestation are perceptible – tual artworks are anti-art because they are Jamieson proposes to distinguish three kinds dematerialised. Once again, also with these of Conceptual Art in which: outlines of Dickie, the problem of a Concep- tual Art definition emerges (especially if we 1. Art object is imperceptible but its existence accept the dematerialisation of art’s topic). is contingent on its perceptible expression. According to philosopher Dale Jamieson 2. Art object is imperceptible and it has no (1986) literature about Conceptual Art is per- perceptible expression, but its existence is vaded by an «endemic confusion». It seems contingent on its apprehension by some audi- that defining Conceptual Art may be possible ence. only referring to the definitions of the concep- 3. Art object is imperceptible, it has no per- tual artists or to the descriptions of critics. ceptible expression, and it doesn’t need to be Both reveal a connection with the indetermi- apprehended by an audience. nacy of a presumed conceptual framework and with the absurd target of the demateriali- In his account Jamieson points out that in sation of art. About this second matter Jamie- first kind of Conceptual Art, objects are ma- son argues that «the claim that conceptualists terial supports and documentations of ideas. “eliminate” the art objects is nonsense» In the second kind conceptual artworks are (Jamieson 1986: 118). Conceptual artworks essentially thought as performances rather are objects. Without them there would be no than objects. Finally, in the third kind they are Conceptual Art. Moreover Jamieson faced similar to things yet not known that depend also other questions concerning: the concep- on some theory about them. About the second tual artworks classification – «why should kind of conceptual works Jamieson notes that earthworks be classed as conceptual piece?» viewing the artwork as a performance implies (ibidem); the inadequate conception of the any distinction between Conceptual Art and shift from object to concept (explained as the traditional one. About the third kind of criticism against economical market, com- works Jamieson points out a theory- modities and so on and so forth); the use of dependence of them: «[t]he point is that even word «conceptual» without reference to style, in order to grasp what the artwork in question time relations etc. If the term is used to speak is, one needs some theory about the nature of about the ontological and epistemological sta- conceptual artworks. Traditional artworks are tus of certain artworks, then we might differ- much more autonomous with respect to entiate them to the traditional ones. Focusing theory» (Jamieson 1986: 122). Concluding his on the relation between concepts and their account Jamieson pronounces also a verdict: «conceptual art has little to offer to aesthetic theory» (ibidem). Except one, other kinds of 5 See Lippard, Chandler (1968). Conceptual Art have been anticipated by phi-

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losophers: the first by Collingwood and the 2. Artworks as Conductors of second by Croce. However, the third seems Ideas to teach that «forgotten thoughts or things unknowable can be artworks» (ibidem). ince the 60s many conceptualists have These criticisms feed the controversy aimed to the dematerialisation of art about Conceptual Art. At the same time they objects essentially to defend first a not point out the idealistic trend that has charac- commercialS and anti-market art making and terised the first and radical productive period second a political approach integrated in their of Conceptual Art in which the main target productive activities. However, with a com- was the dematerialisation of art object. The plete elimination of the objects none of the main directions of this trend are summarised tow aims would be satisfied. Let’s consider in: a defence of mental processes considered the first productive period of Conceptual Art: conclusive to make art; an idiosyncratic atti- obsolescence is not eminently only about tude toward materials and objects; the inclina- physical objects, but mainly to visual repre- tion to the attainment of the dematerialisation sentations. To challenge capitalist market of art. The latter becomes exactly the decisive integrated in the artworld means questioning topic to investigate Conceptual Art: is it really the traditional methods for making images. possible to eliminate physical objects in art? These latter are the real targets of many con- Of course, this is a fascinating proposal, an ceptualists that introduce new ways to elabo- ambitious goal whose achievement would de- rate representation reducing saliency of visual termine the definitive transformation of art. In shapes. Conceptualists adopt an articulated practice, however, things went differently. In reductionist process to make art. So, on the the second productive period of Conceptual one hand images become visual recordings Art – between the late 60s and the early 70s – like documents and on the other hand making we can record a change: artists return inten- art means using directly human bodies, vari- tionally to objects and materials. For this rea- ous materials and objects. At the same time, son now I would focus on this change of di- these latter become essential to explicit, to ad- rection, which I think is to the basis of the vertise and to share socially the conceptual evolution of art in the last fifty years. Perhaps content of the artworks. In the following I this is a risky way to approach Conceptual would consider the impact of the reduction- Art, but I would like to show that we might ism introduced through Conceptual Art6. start our philosophical investigations on art examining what at first was not considered 6 In 1972 Italian philosopher Ermanno Migliorini relevant by conceptualists: exactly matters considers – in a phenomenological view – what he and objects, that never really disappeared. defines the «Conceptualist Paradigm», as character- This change of direction allows us to focus on ised exactly by a double reductionism: aesthetical the strict adherence to the reality that charac- (to the áisthesis) and artistic (to the póiesis). The first reductionist process is the principal aim of terises the contemporary evolution of art.

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Contrary to what is usually believed, phys- are also conceptual artworks that are based on ical objects are still essential for concep- visual postponements: video- and photo- re- tualists. They make art using ordinary or cordings in particular – and, in a certain way, natural objects, human bodies in action or also texts that postpones objects, bodies and mere materials exhibited in some places. So, a performances through documentary traces. conceptual artwork, rather than being thought But unlike traditional artworks, videos and as an idea, should be recognised immediately photos used by conceptualists have no per- as a material presence; as a matter presented functory or visual relevance exactly because in a certain place. Surely, also paintings and are mere recordings that transmit conceptual sculptures were considered as material pres- content much more quickly than traditional ences, but they are used in function to elabo- works. This content is essentially a set of co- rate a visual image and to depict something ordinates – information or instructions – that that is not really present to us, but only dupli- allows us to meet a photo- or a video- subject cated and postponed by such materials. In a as if it was present to us through the picture, different way, conceptual artworks are essen- although it is only present through it. So ob- tially materials used to exhibit really, and first jects, space, human bodies, natural envi- of all, themselves without constrictive con- ronments etc. recorded by videos and photos nections with the elaboration of a visual could be understood according to the «pres- image that depicts a real or an imaginary en- ence-as-absence structure of pictures» (Noë tity. Being objects, bodies and materials pre- 2012: 85), acknowledging however an in- sented in a place, conceptual artworks are creased content accessibility. A conceptual available to us, to our perception – about this artwork should be recognised as a material specific point I agree with philosopher Alva presence that transmits, in a clear and acces- Noë that «perceptual presence is availability», sible way, ideas. it’s a question of style to access the world To understand a conceptual artwork not through our sensorimotor understanding only the knowledge of the art history, but first (Noë 2012: 19-24). The availability of materi- of all the knowledge of our real world is re- als, bodies and objects is decisive to our inter- quested, its objects and subjects and their spa- action and comprehension of conceptual art- tial and temporal coordinates to explain their works since they are in our own plane of re- relations. When we see the real chair – the ality – differently to objects, bodies or materi- material one – exhibited in Kosuth’ piece One als represented by images. Of course, there and Three Chairs (1965) we immediately ac- knowledge an ordinary object belonging to Minimal Art, the second one of Conceptual Art. In our world, its ambient position and its new their relation, artistic and aesthetical reductionism value as artwork since it is exhibited into an express – Migliorini notes – a shift towards the sig- institutional place. Moreover the photo and nificant matter of the value of art. See Migliorini the dictionary definition of «chair» emphasise 1972. the connection between concept and object.

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These acknowledgments are relevant for at tween artist and viewers. This is the basic rule least two reasons. On the one hand, through to share art in our society. And this is also a the description of the materials exhibited we direction that seems implicated in the words can access to the idea of a deconstruction from of a radical conceptualist as LeWitt – even the ‘chair-object’ to the ‘chair-concept’ trans- though with many theoretical complications. mitted through this work. On the other hand, In his Sentences on Conceptual Art (1969) he also if we did not accept that it was an art- writes: «(10) Ideas alone can be works of art; work, then probably we’ll have to deal with they are in a chain of development that may the issues of the nature of art and of the eventually find some form. All ideas need not closely relation between the work and the in- be made physical» (LeWitt in Alberro, Stim- stitutional framework that guarantees it to be son 1999: 107). Of course, an idea is conceiv- such. Moreover, in the same moment in which able as an abstract object, but to grasp it as one says: «this is not an artwork, but only a embedded into an artwork – or to find out a chair», he claim both his skeptical reasons piece’s creative process – it is necessary its against the work and also his exigency to put transmission through a physical object. LeW- in question and discuss the concepts of «art», itt than also writes: «(13) A work of art may «artworks», «artist» and «aesthetical experi- be understood as a conductor from the artist’s ence». This is because through their works mind to the viewers. But it may never reach conceptualists challenge our traditional belief the viewer, or it may never leave the artist’s about art. More precisely, in the words of the mind.» (ibidem). The term «conductor» re- philosopher Elisabeth Schellekens, «[f]irst and veals the artist’s choose to transmit the idea foremost, Conceptual Art challenges our intu- through the artwork. Nevertheless if LeWitt ition concerning the limits of what may count is right, the idea (that moreover he means as as art and what it is an artist do» (Schellekens an abstract object different to the concept7) is 2007). a secret content present only into the artist’s But why objects, materials and documenta- mind and not exactly expressed through the tion – their material presence – should be so artwork. Unexpectedly, this is the typical relevant? Many conceptualists claim the pri- situation in which we are approaching tradi- macy of ideas intentionally corroborating tional art. With paintings and sculptures we their inaccessibility and so risking their pri- partially know which is the subject and never vate closing in their minds. Although concep- which is the idea that the artist would like to tualists insist that the transmission of ideas can transmit through his work. Barely we fail to easily be obtained through their statements or actions, their ‘permanent conduction’ – what I 7 In the ninth sentence LeWitt writes: «The concept mean as the opportunity to share and under- and idea are different. The former implies a general stand an idea over time, in the course of his- direction while the latter is the components. Ideas tory – is possible only through a material ob- implement the concept.» (LeWitt in Alberro, Stim- son 1999: 106). ject physically put into middle position be-

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recognize the referents of visual representa- phase of Conceptual Art, between the late 60s tions. So, why should we claim an Idea Art or and the early 70s, it’s a confirmation of this di- a Conceptual Art, if we don’t have any oppor- rection: it was exactly the period in which ar- tunity to access its conceptual contents? It tists reconsider the significance of the objects9. seems we are at a blind spot. In other words, after a first radical experi- I think that an alternative to this impasse is mental period in which artists claim the pri- possible. Since in traditional artworks ideas macy of ideas putting out the objects, in a sec- are exactly inaccessible – essentially because ond time they reconsider the latter, making they are masked by images, as if they were ar- art according to a new materialisation model tist’s secrets – we may suppose that historical based on the reductionism. conceptualists reducing the significance of This awareness of the material relevance to images and its visual saliency aimed to explicit transmit ideas is also a consequence of the in- and transmit immediately accessible ideas coherent theoretical anti-object claim, never over time through their works. I guess this fully satisfied neither in the first period of was possible whether this communicative Conceptual Art. Such a methodological ten- transmission is supported by a material trace sion into artistic processes is verifiable inves- that makes it recoverable. This basic material tigating several conceptual artworks belong- trace has no formal relevance because it is ing to both periods that exhibit this immediate formally reduced. The reductionism is im- accessibility to ideas. plicit in the conceptualists’ approach to art so In 1969 artist Robert Barry dispersed a litre that the phrase «less is more»8 indicates a of Argon gas in the atmosphere working on methodological rule to make a conceptual the Santa Monica Sea. Surely, the Argon gas artwork. The more the work’s external form is imperceptible. However, the act of disper- is reduced – in terms of a ‘short form’ – the sion in that specific natural environment is greater the emergence of ideas will be. In this possible according to its contextual materials view a conceptual artwork is a reduction to: and the use of a glass cruet originally contain- an ordinary or a natural object, a human body ing the gas successively dispersed. I don’t say engaged in performance, a video-, photo- and that the cruet has the same value of the act of textual- documentation that explicit its con- dispersing Argon gas in the atmosphere. But I ceptual content. For this reasons, I’m inclined would say that the objects – and the envi- to think that we might grasp the conceptual ronmental context too – are essential to content directly going back from the material Barry’s aims. Neither the documentation nor object to the idea. And the second evolutional the photos can be considered of secondarily importance. Without them, today we would 8 This phrase was originally adopted by the Ger- not have historical memory of Inert Gas Se- man-American architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (1886-1969) reflecting about a minimalist approach to design and architectural works. 9 See Smith 1999.

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ries: Argon [from measured volume to indefinite mediation of light, the problem of the lamp or expansion] – Barry’s artwork. Documentation of the source, but the use of light, and it is not is essential because allows the transmission of merely an artistic problem, but a concrete, vi- essential coordinates to understand the idea – tal matter influencing our grasp of reality» and, in many cases, also the artistic agency at (Celant 1969: 54-5). Also human beings en- the origin of a conceptual artwork. gaged in several performances – like objects Now, let’s consider the transparency of and materials – influenced our re-action and other artistic pieces belonging to the concep- our approach to reality. The experience of tual framework. Spill (Scatter Piece) (1966) is performance influences our grasp of reality as an artwork by Carl Andre based on the ges- a consequence of the reductionism adopted by ture of toppling from a canvas bag 800 plastic conceptualists. blocks on the floor. After the fall, the blocks create a totally random structure added on the floor’s surface. «Combination» and «random- 3. To Explicit Ideas through Body ness» are two concepts immediately accessible Presence examining the blocks of plastic and recognis- ing their position on the floor. The Nominal man is closed in a room with a co- Three (to William of Ockam) (1963) is an art- yote: something dangerous will work by Dan Flavin. Composed by some flo- happen to him? This is not the in- rescent tubes, allows to see a reduction. Acipit of a novel but a short description and a Three, two and one neon on the wall in an legitimate question about a real event: one ambient illuminated by their white light. The week’s performance of German artist Joseph methodological principle of Ockam’s Razor – Beuys in René Block Gallery in New York, in refering to parsimony and economy in order 1974. Posing some questions about this art- to avoid to multiply elements if it is not neces- work and describing it, we will also take its sary – results as a reduction of the same tubu- main concept: a wild coyote encounters a hu- lar neon – from three to one. We can access to man being closed with him in a room. The the idea through the description of the ma- animal symbolises the United States of terial objects. And this means to start our in- America, the German artist Europe. The en- vestigations by focusing first and foremost on counter is first between man and animal and objects and materials. With the words of the secondly – let’s say, according to a symbolic curator and theorist Germano Celant we project plane – between United States and could say about Flavin’ works that «[t]he Europe. So I Like America and America Likes news, then is the light, not its image. The only Me is a transparent artwork: first we can im- purpose is to put the spectator before object mediately access to the ideas about a relational light – commonly considered as an instru- instability and the risks connected to the en- ment – in order to give him a chance to grasp counter between a man and an animal, and it directly. […] The problem is no longer the secondly we’ll be able to face also the sym-

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bolic plane about the Germany/U.S.A. rela- could not immediately see and we could grasp tionship implicated in the artwork. So first we only through an interpretative process. Nev- meet the two livings presented in the gallery ertheless, is the same presence of Abramović, and than the mythologies and the reflections his bodily presence, to be decisive first to our about political, cultural dialectical and hierar- aesthetical re-action and secondly to our chical implications between different societies thought about her work. Who participated in the world. Without excluding Beuys’s en- this performance experienced a human being ergetic conception of a «group soul of all that silently looked at another one; a real per- forms of life» – an «essential part of his con- son sitting on a chair not an image of it. Why cept of reality» (Tisdall 2008: 11) – it is the did many people, once seated in front of presence of the livings and the objects in the Abramović, start crying? I would say because Block Gallery to afford Beuys’ creative pro- her bodily presence has a greater impact on cess, his critical statements about society them, on their sensitivity and perception, in- (consider the pile of The Wall Street Journal deed different from the presence of a painting present in the gallery) and his remarks about of it. It is really difficult to establish a com- natural connections between higher and lower parison between a performance and a tradi- forms of life. tional artwork. In this regard, philosopher I think that a phenomenon in particular Arthur Danto remarks: «the practice of no was relevant for our philosophical investigat- other art requires the sacrifices that perform- ions of conceptual artworks and their relation ance exacts. […] It crosses boundaries most with reality, the phenomenon of presence. art does not approach, though it has occurred Presence of several objects, materials and to me that some of the strong depictions of bodies implies, first of all, a reflection on our physical suffering painted for purposes of sensitive approach to them. Experience of a strengthening faith in the Counter- human being in front of us is profoundly dif- Reformation in Rome, have something like ferent to make experience of a picture of it. that effect. […] The body itself renders point- The presence of the former implies our direct less the effort to try to depict it naturalisti- approach with it, since it’s not postponed by cally: this is what bodies are.» (Danto 2010: an image. It is no present as absent and our 32). One of Abramović’ ideas concern exactly perception is engaged by profiles that change the bodily presence in a specific space and when we approach it and move around it, in time according to a certain state of mind to accordance to the environmental availability the basis to experience it during a perform- (cfr. Noë 2012). ance: how is it possible to transmit that? The The real presence of a body, especially in same presence of the body and its availability the case of performance, might be also shock- to the viewer’s perception in a place allow to ing. Surely we could think that Marina grasp these concepts. Abramović’ The Artist is Present (2010) was Conceptual artworks are more accessible also an artwork about something that we than traditional ones, since they are conceiv-

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able as ‘transparent material presences’. 4. Conceptualism and New Materi- Transparency of their contents is due to the alisation in Art presence of ordinary and natural objects, of human beings (in some cases, also animals) nvestigating art we might consider con- engaged in several performances that we im- ceptualism as a methodological trend in- mediately recognise. The role of documenta- herited by Conceptual Art and widely tion as material traced is therefore evident: Ishared by contemporary artists. However, on without video or photo recordings we would the subject of conceptualism in art there isn’t a not have neither the coordinates to access to peaceful and unique theoretical conception. In the concept of a work nor historical memory this regard I would like to present some re- of them. marks about conceptualism in order to con- Conceptual content embedded in an art- sider its strict connection with a new model of work is secreted in traditional art, not in Con- materialisation and some consequences of its ceptual Art. Conceptualists claim the primacy impact on art. of ideas and of the cognitive approach to art According to art historian Paul Wood in through the disappearance of objects but, on there isn’t the same critical the contrary, they laid the foundation of spirit of historical Conceptual Art. Original bringing back art to the ordinary – corrobo- intents of conceptualists would have been rating original Duchamp’s intuition. Only contradicted. Their creative model was based with a varieties of objects and materials pre- on a radical criticism against capitalism’s rules sented in several places artists can transmit and an analytical approach towards mind and ideas and share them socially with the view- body. In the actual artistic scene things are not ers. To explicit ideas is one of the basic meth- the same. Wood writes that «[t]he analytical odological rules of conceptualism that is based strand of Conceptual art, linked as it was to a on a new model of materialisation to make left-wing class politics, was eclipsed by a bur- art. Thus, no wonder then that conceptual ar- geoning of performance-related activities (of- tist John Baldessari, during a conversation ten accompanied by video technologies or in- with the curator Hans Ulrich Obrist, has stallations) and frequently underwritten by a stated about his studio (a kind of archive): politics of identity. This shift lies behind the «it’s small for me. Conceptual artists aren’t emergence of a notion of ‘conceptualism’ that supposed to need space!» (Baldessari, Obrist has come into currency to describe the range 2009: 35). of object-, video-, performance- and installa- tion-based activities that currently hold sway across the international art scene. ‘Conceptu- alism’ in this sense is effectively a synonym for ‘postmodernism’.» (Wood 2002: 75). I don’t completely agree with these re- marks. Accepting that the claims of original

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conceptualists since the 60s are based on an Live in Your Head: When Attitudes Become idealistic obstinacy – as we saw, largely criti- Form. Works – Concepts – Processes – Situa- cized by many philosophers and theorists – tions – Information. With the exhibition Szee- we might acknowledge also their utopian mann was able to point out and remark the view concerning the dematerialisation and the features of this new artistic horizon. An ar- contrast to the capitalist market as essential tistic object is the secondary product of men- reasons to support their postmodernist ap- tal processes. At the same time, materials and proach to art. In a different perspective, we objects (formally reduced) reveal the ideas could say that between the late 60s and the and the agency transmitted by the artists. early 70s, exactly with the return to the ob- What does this mean? I would say that it is jects, conceptualists succeed to increase their possible to go back from physical object to critical attitudes towards many social, cultural understand ideas and agency transmitted by and political issues. So, if this perspective is an artist. In this regard, Szeemann acknow- correct than we could think also that concep- ledges the two essential art traits that persist tualism was synonym of postmodernism only also today: (i) the primacy of the creative pro- in the first ‘hyperbolic idealistic phase’ of cess and the agency of the artist both coincid- Conceptual Art in which artists insisted on the ing with the formal reduction of the works; dematerialisation of the art objects. More pre- (ii) the adaptation of the creative regulatory cisely, conceptual artworks can be conceived framework necessary to elaborate an artwork as postmodernist in two senses: because they to the exhibition space. In other words, for were made chronologically after the modern- Szeemann it was clear that acknowledging an ist paradigm or because they are results of the object means immediately individuating the primacy of ideas and of a constructivist ap- process through which it was elaborated, re- proach, both typical of the postmodernist duced or only placed. Furthermore, the ar- paradigm. Returning to the objects conceptu- tistic process necessary to make an artwork is alists inspire newly a reflection about our real adapted to the social, exhibition and relational world, our ordinary and natural objects, the space in which the work will be placed. Al- limits and the opportunity to approach and though characterised by stylistic irrelevance, a acknowledge them. I propose a different use mere object or a simple material connotes it- of the term «conceptualism». I would use it to self, denotes attitudes and transmits ideas. refer to the art adherence to ordinary and re- Therefore, the return to the simplicity of the ality. So in this perspective, through concep- materials – as Szeemann correctly remarked tualism a revival of art based on a new materi- yet – is the guarantee of a direct and immedi- alisation model that characterized the artistic ate access to the work and to its content. scene since the 60s until today begins. Szeemann was again right when he said that In 1969 curator and art historian Harald through these practices artists help to make Szeemann explores this innovative scene with a great exhibition at the Bern Kunsthalle titled

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the public more aware of both the processes environments. In many cases it means to and the materials presented10. grasp not only a conceptual disagreement Now let’s consider many works we could but also a physical friction. Both confirm a meet in our contemporary artworld: how has new art role: through it we could explore art changed after conceptualism? In 2003 and reconsider not only imaginary worlds Colombian artist Doris Salcedo installed but also reality. So this means to explore di- 1550 wooden chairs stacked in the empty rectly its «limits» and «possibilities», ac- space between two buildings, in Yemeniciler knowledging external world essentially as Caddesi No.66 in Istanbul. In 2005 during «unamendable» – as maintained by philoso- her exhibition at Castello di Rivoli in Turin, pher Maurizio Ferraris in his remarks con- Salcedo reworked one of the institution’s cerning a positive evaluation about the em- major rooms by extending the majestic ergence of thought and sense from reality vaulted brick ceiling. In order to access to (cfr. Ferraris 2013). Clearly, I’m not saying Salcedo’ ideas – but also to explain Untitled that our sensitive approach to reality is the (2003) and Abyss (2005) – it is sufficient to principal and the only aim of all concep- describe first their constituent materials and tualists and neither of all contemporary ar- objects, their position and their relations tists in general. Rather that it become of with environments and ambient. In the first primarily importance through the establish- case it is the idea of «precariousness» to be ment of conceptualism since the 70s. accessible to us; in the second work it is in- Whether we want to trace some general stead the one of «obstruction». features of conceptualism we could list at Conceptualism is implemented in parallel least the following methodological rules by a new materialisation in art that requests, adopted by many artists: (a) to involve in- first of all, a reflection about our sensitive tentionally the viewers making ideas acces- approach to external world. This is essen- sible through the reductionism adopted in tially an aesthetical approach based on our art making; (b) to engage viewers in terms of direct experience of material elements, vari- a fully multi-sensory experience through ances and invariances of physical objects and performances, relational and participative events modifying ambient and environ- 10 In 1969 during a television interview, Szeemann ments; (c) to raise questions about the nature explains clearly that it is not possible to understand and the knowledge of art; (d) to encourage the works of the artists active in those years in terms of a movement or a ‘school’. He opts instead for the explorations of reality and its social, natural, recognition of a trend shared by performers and ar- political implications. As a consequence we tists, summarizing it in the following key elements: could think about a conceptual form of art in the reaction to the geometrical inclination typical of two different ways. First an art that allows the artistic production of the 60s; the resumption of us to go back to the object in direction to the Duchamp’s practice of ready-made, of the pol- appreciate a project, an idea or directly a re- lockian gesture and of actions and happenings. flection about the nature of art. Further-

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more, a conceptual form of art allows also to Bibliography explore our reality and its social, natural possibilities and complexity; the relational Alberro, Stimson (Eds.) (1999), Conceptual and spatial coordinates between objects and Art: A Critical Anthology, The MIT Press. subjects present in our external world. In Baldessari J., Obrist H. U. (2009), The Con- this second sense art strictly concerns a versation Series, n.18, Valter König, Köln. thought about reality – and this is a second Brook D. (1972), “Toward a definition of way in which we could think about art after Conceptual Art”, in Leonardo, 5, 1, pp. conceptualism. 49-50. As I tried to show, between the 60s and Celant G. (1969), Dan Flavin, in «Casa- the 70s of the last century, art through con- bella», 332, pp. 54-55; now also published ceptualism and a new model of materialisa- in Feldman P., Karsten S. (Eds.), It Is tion has encouraged our explorations and What It Is Writings on Dan Flavin since remarks about reality and its social, rela- 1964, Thames and Hudson, 2004, pp. 54- tional, political, participative and moral im- 55. plications. Of course art still remains con- Danto A. C. (2010), Danger and Disturba- nected with fiction and its visual views. Ab- tion: The Art of Marina Abramović, in straction, representation, narrative implica- Biesenbach, K. P. (Ed.) (2010), Marina tions and visual deformations still are rel- Abramović: The Artist is Present, The Mu- evant topics still. Today, however, after the seum of , pp. 29-36. achievement of conceptualism, through art Dickie G. (1975), “What Is Anti Art?”, in we can explore also new fields concerning Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, our reality: popular culture, quotidian ob- Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 419-421. jects, politics, globalism, audience, institu- Ferraris M. (2013), Realismo Positivo, tional machinery, gender’s questions and Rosenberg & Sellier, Torino. many others11. Flynt H. (1961), Essay: Concept Art (Provi- sional Version), in L. M. Young (Eds.), An Anthology, Jackson Mac Low, New York, 1963. Jamieson D. (1986), “The Importance of Be- ing Conceptual”, in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.45, No. 2, pp. 117- 11 The list proposed by the critics Eleanor Heartney 123. in her catalogue concerning the relations between Heartney E. (2013), Art and Today, Phaidon, art and toady emphasises exactly this combination London. between historical fictional fields and new realistic Lippard L., Chandler J.(1968), “The Dema- areas connected with contemporary art. See Heart- terialization of Art”, in Art International, ney (2013). 2; now also published in Id., Changing: es-

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says in Art Criticism, Dutton, New York, 1971, pp. 255-276. LeWitt S. (1967), “Paragraphs on Concep- tual Art”, in «Artforum», 5:10 (Summer 1967), pp. 79–84; now in Alberro, Stim- son (Eds.) (1999), pp. 12-16. LeWitt S. (1969), “Sentences on Conceptual Art”, first appeared in 0–9, no. 5 (January 1969), pp. 3–5; now in Alberro, Stimson (Eds.) (1999), pp. 106-108. Migliorini E. (1972), Conceptual Art, Il Fior- ino, Firenze. Noë A. (2012), Varieties of Presence, Har- vard University Press. Sclafani R. J. (1975), “What Kind of Non- sense Is This?”, in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 455-458. Schellekens E. (2007) Conceptual Art, entry of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conce ptual-art/). Smith R. (1999), “Conceptual Art: Over, And Yet Everywhere”, in The New York Times; also available on line http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/25/ /art-architecture-conceptual-art- over-and-yet. Tisdall C. (2008), Joseph Beuys, Coyote, Thames & Hudson. Wood P. (2002), Conceptual Art, Tate Pub- lishing.

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