ARTICLES 101 Exploring Conceptual Art The four uses of the phrase «Conceptual Art» singled by Brook reveal a high level of Davide Dal Sasso ambiguity due to its use. Nominally we could Università di Torino use the phrase to refer to an artistic movement (Italia) or a general set of new experimental practices of the 60s that don’t accept the traditional methods of art making. In the first meaning 1. The Idealistic Obstinacy of the phrase is differently coined and used by Conceptual Art two artists1, and it is not completely working if referring to other kinds of artistic move- any philosophers and critics agree ments. Conceptual Art in this case would be that Conceptual Art is distin- the name of the artistic movement initially guished not only to be a loose col- based upon the creative activities and the Mlection of various practices but especially for critical statements of many different artists, its significant contradictions that increase the largely American2. In the second meaning in- theoretical controversy about it. stead, the phrase is used to describe a decisive According to the theorist Donald Brook tendency for the profound change of art due (1972) the phrase «Conceptual Art» has dif- to the new experimental practices of the 60s ferent senses and it is used with a general non- that also established a large part of the succes- acceptance. His argument is based on the fol- sive artistic evolution until today. lowing premises: (i) this obscure label refers The controversy about Conceptual Art is to many kinds of processes and objects; (ii) corroborated by this nominal ambiguity that artists’ justifications about them are vague; reflects: the uncertain nature of Conceptual (iii) their writings, in many cases, are in gib- Art, its invisible boundaries but, at the same berish. So defining Conceptual Art is a com- plex matter. Brook acknowledges that this dif- ficulty is related to four uses of the phrase: to 1 Henry Flynt in his Concept Art (1961) speaks about indicate a primacy of a conceptual approach an art whose material are «concepts»; Sol LeWitt in to art in contrast to the perceptual one; to em- his Paragraphs on Conceptual Art (1967) remarks the phasise that Conceptual Art is art of ideas and primacy of ideas in art. not art of physical objects; to claim that it is 2 In this view the main American conceptual artists also an artistic process based on a semantic were Robert Barry, Douglas Huebler, Joseph Ko- suth and Lawrence Weiner, supported by the gal- paradox that changes art and points out the lery director and intelligent divulger of their activi- critical approach to its nature; to remark the ties, Seth Siegelaub. Anyway, in a historical view, restricted meta-activity character through Sol LeWitt, Walter De Maria, Bruce Nauman, Hans which art became essentially a comment on it- Haacke, Robert Smithson, The Art & Language self. Group and many others are also considered as con- ceptualists. ISSUE VI – NUMBER 1 – SUMMER 2014 PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS 102 ARTICLES time, its visible heritage from Modernism3 and sues implied in them. Lastly, the third group also its questionable philosophical references of works, in which language and thought are upon which are based many of its different intriguing subjects to an obstinate model of practices. reflection, increases confusion and nonsense. Philosopher Richard Sclafani (1975) So Sclafani concludes that Conceptual Art is a doesn’t believe that the conceptual movement nonsensical and confused kind of art. has any implications for art or for philosophy. Consequently, the risk to define Concep- He grouped the conceptual works in three tual Art as not art or to assign it the «anti-art» categories: extra radical; quasi-philosophical label is very high. (based on a self-referential character); and Although it is also possible to define art ac- based on a language and thought model of re- cording to an institutional framework4, a flection. A conceptual confusion is to the basis problem still remains: how can we determine of the first group of works: it’s not possible the boundary between what is art and what is that if someone calls something «Art», then it not? Philosopher George Dickie (1975) ar- is art. Surely, the success of a conceptual art- gues that this was possible using the phrase work – also the famous urinal exhibited by «anti-art», especially to refer to actions and Duchamp – is strictly linked to the artistic statements of some artists: the performers. community context. But the contextual state- Actions and statements are not artefacts. Per- ments are not sufficient so that something be- formers don’t produce any material objects comes art. It seems that for conceptualists it through their actions and declarations, so they was impossible «to reject a claim of art status» make anti-art. As Dickie explains what per- (Sclafani 1975: 456). As Sclafani explains: formers do «is real anti-art: art because they «Not everyone can be an artist simply as he use the framework of the artworld, anti be- pleases, and not everything can be a work of cause they do nothing with it». For this rea- art simply on anyone say’s so. Without logi- sons they are «bureaucrats» because «they oc- cal constraints on artmaking and arthood, the cupy a niche in an institutional structure but concepts ‘artist’ and ‘work of art’ are rendered do nothing which is really productive» vacuous» (ibidem). With the extra-radical (Dickie 1975: 421). In his ontology of art artworks many conceptualists lose the Dickie doesn’t include artists’ actions and Duchamp’ lesson, since they claimed that it statements, and his theoretical perspective was essentially a contextual statement to con- seems to be in accordance with the one of the fer arthood. The quasi-philosophical works – dematerialisation of art – as described by largely based on incursions in analytical phi- losophy – prove an unfavourable intellectual 4 The institutional framework – as it as theorised by complexity, as a heritage of philosophical is- Dickie at this stage of his research – consists in a core of: (1) creators; (2) presenters; (3) appreciators; (4) theorists, critics and philosophers of art; (5) ex- 3 See Wood (2002). hibition machinery. See Dickie (1975). PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS ISSUE VI – NUMBER 2 – SUMMER 2014 ARTICLES 103 many artists and theorists5. If this is correct manifestations – concepts are imperceptible, then we could conclude that most of concep- instead their manifestation are perceptible – tual artworks are anti-art because they are Jamieson proposes to distinguish three kinds dematerialised. Once again, also with these of Conceptual Art in which: outlines of Dickie, the problem of a Concep- tual Art definition emerges (especially if we 1. Art object is imperceptible but its existence accept the dematerialisation of art’s topic). is contingent on its perceptible expression. According to philosopher Dale Jamieson 2. Art object is imperceptible and it has no (1986) literature about Conceptual Art is per- perceptible expression, but its existence is vaded by an «endemic confusion». It seems contingent on its apprehension by some audi- that defining Conceptual Art may be possible ence. only referring to the definitions of the concep- 3. Art object is imperceptible, it has no per- tual artists or to the descriptions of critics. ceptible expression, and it doesn’t need to be Both reveal a connection with the indetermi- apprehended by an audience. nacy of a presumed conceptual framework and with the absurd target of the demateriali- In his account Jamieson points out that in sation of art. About this second matter Jamie- first kind of Conceptual Art, objects are ma- son argues that «the claim that conceptualists terial supports and documentations of ideas. “eliminate” the art objects is nonsense» In the second kind conceptual artworks are (Jamieson 1986: 118). Conceptual artworks essentially thought as performances rather are objects. Without them there would be no than objects. Finally, in the third kind they are Conceptual Art. Moreover Jamieson faced similar to things yet not known that depend also other questions concerning: the concep- on some theory about them. About the second tual artworks classification – «why should kind of conceptual works Jamieson notes that earthworks be classed as conceptual piece?» viewing the artwork as a performance implies (ibidem); the inadequate conception of the any distinction between Conceptual Art and shift from object to concept (explained as the traditional one. About the third kind of criticism against economical market, com- works Jamieson points out a theory- modities and so on and so forth); the use of dependence of them: «[t]he point is that even word «conceptual» without reference to style, in order to grasp what the artwork in question time relations etc. If the term is used to speak is, one needs some theory about the nature of about the ontological and epistemological sta- conceptual artworks. Traditional artworks are tus of certain artworks, then we might differ- much more autonomous with respect to entiate them to the traditional ones. Focusing theory» (Jamieson 1986: 122). Concluding his on the relation between concepts and their account Jamieson pronounces also a verdict: «conceptual art has little to offer to aesthetic theory» (ibidem). Except one, other kinds of 5 See Lippard, Chandler (1968). Conceptual Art have been anticipated by phi- ISSUE VI – NUMBER 1 – SUMMER 2014 PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS 104 ARTICLES losophers: the first by Collingwood and the 2. Artworks as Conductors of second by Croce. However, the third seems Ideas to teach that «forgotten thoughts or things unknowable can be artworks» (ibidem). ince the 60s many conceptualists have These criticisms feed the controversy aimed to the dematerialisation of art about Conceptual Art. At the same time they objects essentially to defend first a not point out the idealistic trend that has charac- commercialS and anti-market art making and terised the first and radical productive period second a political approach integrated in their of Conceptual Art in which the main target productive activities.