EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
Review of a Longstanding Trans-Atlantic Partnership
Report 46 September 2013
Arne Lahcen
Short title: ESPI Report 46 ISSN: 2076-6688 Published in September 2013 Price: €11
Editor and publisher: European Space Policy Institute, ESPI Schwarzenbergplatz 6 • 1030 Vienna • Austria http://www.espi.or.at Tel. +43 1 7181118-0; Fax -99
Rights reserved – No part of this report may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or for any purpose with- out permission from ESPI. Citations and extracts to be published by other means are subject to mentioning “Source: ESPI Report 46; September 2013. All rights reserved” and sample transmission to ESPI before pub- lishing.
ESPI is not responsible for any losses, injury or damage caused to any person or property (including under contract, by negligence, product liability or otherwise) whether they may be direct or indirect, special, inciden- tal or consequential, resulting from the information contained in this publication.
Design: Panthera.cc
ESPI Report 46 2 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
Table of Contents
Executive Summary 52H
1. Introduction 73H
1.1 The Global and Political Context 74H
1.2 The Space Policy Context 85H
1.3 Structure of the Study 96H
Part I. Collaboration Record Analysis 107H
2. Historical Foundations 128H
2.1 Processes of Internationalisation and Globalisation of Meteorology 129H
2.1.1 The International Meteorological Organisation 1210H
2.1.2 The World Meteorological Organisation 1311H
2.2 Establishment of NOAA 1412H
2.3 Establishment of EUMETSAT 1513H
3. Geostationary Satellites 1614H
3.1 Formalisation Process of Back-Up Support 1615H
3.1.1 GOES Satellite Back-Up 1616H
3.1.2 Atlantic Data Coverage 1717H
3.1.3 Back-Up Agreement 1918H
3.2 Data Policy on Geostationary Satellites 2019H
3.2.1 The Geostationary Agreement 2020H
3.3 Geostationary Satellite Activities and the Theoretical Framework 2221H
4. Polar Orbiting Satellites 2322H
4.1 The First Developments in Polar Orbiting Collaboration 2323H
4.1.1 The American Meteorological Polar Satellite System 2324H
4.1.2 The Choice of a European Meteorological Polar Satellite System 2325H
4.1.3 Towards the Initial Joint Polar System 2426H
4.2 The Initial Joint Polar System 2627H
4.2.1 Negotiation Phase 2628H
4.2.2 The Initial Joint Polar System Agreement 3229H
4.3 Evolution of the IJPS Collaboration 3430H
4.3.1 The Need for Flexible, Continued Collaboration 3431H
4.3.2 The Future Collaboration Taking Shape 3532H
4.3.3 Joint Transition Activities 3633H
4.3.4 Antarctica Data Acquisition 4034H
4.4 The Road towards a Joint Polar System 4135H
4.4.1 Future Outlook: The Joint Polar System 4136H
4.5 Polar Orbiting Satellite Activities and the Theoretical Framework 4237H
5. Ocean Surface Topography Missions 4438H
5.1 First Ocean Altimetry by Satellites 4439H
5.1.1 Prior Missions 4440H
5.2 The Ocean Surface Topography Mission/Jason-2 4541H
5.2.1 A Four Agency Approach 4542H
5.3 Jason Follow-On 4743H
5.3.1 Jason-3 4844H
5.3.2 Preparations for Jason Continuity of Services 5045H
5.4 Ocean Altimetry Missions and the Theoretical Framework 5146H
ESPI Report 45 3 September 2013
Part II. Inter-Organisational Assessment 5247H
6. Partnership Assessment 5348H
6.1 Collaboration: Definition and the Progressive Continuum of Collaborative Strategies 5349H
6.2 Geostationary Satellite Activities as a Form of Coordination 5550H
6.3 Polar Orbiting Satellites as a Form of Cooperation 5651H
6.4 Ocean Altimetry Satellites as a Form of Collaboration 5852H
6.5 Overall Structure Analysis 5953H
6.5.1 Implications of the Partnership 6054H
7. Cost-Benefit Impact Assessment 6255H
7.1 A Cost-Benefit Framework for Analysis 6256H
7.1.1 Generic Cost-Benefit Dynamics in Observing Systems 6357H
7.2 Cost Impacts of the Partnership 6458H
7.2.1 Diseconomies of Scale 6559H
7.2.2 Economies of Scale 6660H
7.3 Benefit Impacts of the Partnership 6661H
7.3.1 Synergies in Remote Sensing Capabilities 6762H
7.3.2 Increased Pace of Technological Progress 6763H
7.4 Cost-Benefit Impact: Results and Interpretation 7064H
7.4.1 Cost-Benefit Dynamics in Collaboration 7065H
7.4.2 Cost-Benefit Dynamics in the NOAA-EUMETSAT Partnership 7266H
7.4.3 Spill-Over Effects 7467H
Conclusions 7568H
List of Acronyms 7869H
Acknowledgements 8270H
About the Author 8271H
ESPI Report 46 4 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
Executive Summary
The application of remote sensing technolo- In the field of polar orbiting satellites the gies to operational meteorology has pro- agencies have been able to establish a state- foundly impacted the accuracy of weather of-the-art observing constellation that sup- forecasting. Meteorological satellite data is ports a broad range of environmental moni- currently used by many different parts of toring applications and weather forecasting. society to ensure safety of the population, to The seeds for this joint undertaking were protect property and to increase economic sown in the margins of the G7 summit in performance and scientific knowledge. The 1983. Although the negotiation processes collaboration between the European Organi- preceding the signing of the Initial Joint Polar sation for the Exploitation of Meteorological System agreement in 1998 were challenging, Satellites (EUMETSAT) and the United States’ the eventual results substantially exceed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini- political ambitions that were formulated at stration (NOAA) has played an important role the outset of this endeavour. Besides the in the establishment of these capabilities. division of responsibilities in the mid-morning This study assesses the various dimensions of and afternoon polar orbits the organisations partnership between EUMETSAT and NOAA have implemented a sharing of infrastructure and shows how this particular trans-Atlantic and an exchange of instruments that cur- collaboration has produced tangible and stra- rently guarantees timely data access and tegic benefits for both organisations, their homogeneous data sets for their user com- user communities and the governments that munities. Latest developments in this field provide their funding. are concerned with the follow-up activities required for the implementation of their Joint In its first part this study chronologically de- Polar System. The Jason missions are the scribes the evolution of the record of collabo- most recent field of activity brought under ration between both organisations in their the umbrella of the partnership. What initially fields of engagement. This starts with an started out as a successful ocean altimetry outline of the historical foundations that pre- mission between the U.S. National Aeronau- ceded the first collaborative activities be- tics and Space Administration (NASA) and the tween EUMETSAT and NOAA. Awareness of French space agency “Centre national these developments is essential to grasp the d’études spatiales” (CNES) has now trans- structure and unique features of the global lated into a long term operational service meteorological community and the surround- provided under the auspices of EUMETSAT ing geo-political environment in which this and NOAA in collaboration with the founding partnership is so strongly embedded. Subse- partners. The Jason missions are fully inte- quently the negotiation processes and legal grated platforms that make use of critical agreements of joint activities in the fields of American and European technologies. More- geostationary, polar orbiting and ocean al- over, the performance of ocean altimetry will timetry missions are documented. A theoreti- be even further optimised in the future “Ja- cal framework on the key elements required son Continuity of Service”. for success in international collaboration in space missions is applied as a narrative The collaboration record analysis reveals that throughout the first part of the study. The the road towards these achievements has first systemic basis of working together oc- been complicated by various internal and curred in 1993, when the organisations for- external factors. Nevertheless EUMETSAT and mulated a set of contingency conditions un- NOAA have shown that even organisations der which they agreed to provide mutual with different industrial policies, technologies back-up support. The result was increased and data policies can establish long term robustness of the observation capabilities in successful collaboration based upon principles geostationary orbit. Two years later they of reciprocity, mutual understanding and signed an agreement that acknowledged and sense of partnership. regulated the reciprocity of their exchange of The second part of the study takes a more data. Still in effect today, these agreements analytical approach. The partnership assess- ensure a higher reliability of their geostation- ment in the study analyses how the two me- ary satellites and data access continuity for teorological operational agencies work to- their user communities.
ESPI Report 45 5 September 2013
gether from a more structural point of view. due to their partnership. Elements that have To this effect a theoretical framework is ap- brought about this long term performance plied which distinguishes different forms of optimisation include an interwoven dynamic collaboration based upon their structural of collaboration and competition and resource characteristics in terms of focus, commitment reallocation in the data processing chain of and resource deployment. This reveals that meteorological products. Together these two each field of joint activity displayed in the elements have a considerable impact on the EUMETSAT-NOAA partnership is particular benefit-to-cost ratios of both organisations and, that the organisations have gradually and their funding governments that go well increased their commitment over time as the beyond mere cost sharing. The economic joint undertakings turned out to be successful benefits derived from meteorological data in and beneficial for both partners. Over time comparison to the investment costs required this has resulted in a full spectrum partner- to establish polar orbiting and ocean altim- ship that is characterised by strong interde- etry operational programmes have very likely pendency and mutual levels of trust. In this more than doubled compared to the scenario sense the cemented partnership as it exists where the organisations would have dupli- today has become a keystone element in cated full systems by themselves. fulfilling the user requirements defined for EUMETSAT, NOAA, their funding governments the Global Observing System in the World and the meteorological community should Meteorological Organization’s framework. take note of the value of this partnership. It A cost-benefit impact assessment in the final has enabled their user communities to benefit chapter of the report analyses the impact of from more data products, increased accuracy the collaboration on the organisations’ overall and a better timeliness and robustness of the costs and performance. It reveals that observing systems, all at a lower cost. To- EUMETSAT and NOAA have been able to get a gether these elements have translated into double win out of their partnership. The an increased ability to protect human life, agencies have been able to establish state- property and infrastructure and added value of-the-art observing system at a lower cost. to the American and European economies. In This has been possible because the approach addition the partnership has created positive with respect to resource pooling was based spill-over effects in the context of the World upon comparative cost advantages that re- Meteorological Organisation in terms of ex- sulted from existing experience and fields of ample-setting, scientific research and the expertise on both sides of the Atlantic. In facilitation of development aid applications. their polar orbiting programmes this has The unique combination of different added taken the form of divided orbital responsibili- values displayed in this partnership raises the ties and an exchange of instruments. In questions as to how it can be maintained, ocean altimetry, both sides provided com- further optimised and even leveraged to plementary technologies that are critical for other activities in the future, especially in mission success. In turn, this specialisation times of tightening budgets. The strong di- has also translated into considerable im- mension of international collaboration in op- provements in performance. In short, differ- erational meteorology as exemplified in this ences in remote sensing technologies have report would merit further consolidation in a yielded unexpected synergies that were to a political sense. In the United States the value large extent the result of serendipity. In the is already acknowledged as a principle in the Initial Joint Polar System, the combination of National Space Policy of the Obama Admini- EUMETSAT and NOAA expertise has given rise stration. In Europe, however, this formalisa- to new forecasting skills that currently benefit tion still needs to be undertaken. Given that user communities and decision-makers. In it could give this long-term partnership a the Jason missions the merging of American stronger political foundation on both sides of and European technology onto fully inte- the Atlantic, it should be definitely considered grated platforms has increased the accuracy during the reiteration of the European Space and reliability of the data they provide. Over Policy. time both organisations have experienced an increased pace of technological innovation
ESPI Report 46 6 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
1. Introduction
The application of remote sensing technolo- also sheds light on the political ambitions that gies to operational meteorology has pro- were at the foundation of this partnership. foundly impacted the accuracy of weather forecasting. Today, data provided by geosta- tionary, polar orbiting and ocean altimetry satellites is used by many different parts of 1.1 The Global and Political society to ensure the safety of the population Context and to protect property. In addition, accurate weather forecasting helps to increase eco- Many external developments in Europe and nomic performance as estimations have the United States have directly and indirectly shown that about one third of the gross do- given shape to the evolution of the mestic product generated in developed EUMETSAT-NOAA partnership and its form as economies is sensitive to weather fluctua- it exists today. In fact, the foundations for 1, 2 tions.0F 1F Furthermore, the data is used by the this partnership were laid well before the first science community to increase our knowledge experiences in meteorological satellites. In- of the environment and to monitor the effects ternational coordination among meteorolo- of planetary climate change. gists and weather centres had begun already th Collaboration between the European Organi- in the 19 century, and really took off after sation for Meteorological Satellites the Second World War when the World Mete- (EUMETSAT) and the United States’ National orological Organisation (WMO) was estab- Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration lished in the United Nations framework. The (NOAA) has significantly contributed to WMO, having established dedicated pro- achieving the state-of-the-art observing sys- grammes and mechanisms to stimulate coor- tem capabilities currently in orbit. The opera- dination, has continuously offered a context tional agencies have jointly built up a long- that facilitates data exchange and the work- standing and diverse record of working to- ing together of its members. As a result, gether in a number of fields that allow their NOAA and EUMETSAT were immediately em- user communities to reap social and eco- bedded in the networked structure of the nomic benefits that would not be obtainable global meteorological community following by a single agency under the same condi- their creation, in 1970 and 1986 respectively. tions. This study assesses the various dimen- Yet, the first direct incentives for the partner- sions of partnership between EUMETSAT and ship emerged on a national level in the NOAA and shows how this particular trans- United States. After a series of promising Atlantic collaboration has produced tangible technology demonstrations and successful and strategic benefits for both organisations, proof-of-concept missions in the 1960s and their user communities and the governments 1970s, it became clear that American efforts that provide their funding. Finally also the in polar orbiting meteorology would translate spill-over effects of this partnership in the into a truly operational service, in addition to framework of the World Meteorological Or- the already established service of geostation- ganization are addressed. ary coverage. This idea started to self- Although the joint undertakings between reinforce when the meteorological offices – EUMETSAT and NOAA are the main focus of typically adopting a conservative approach this study, it is important to note that this with respect to innovation in order to guaran- collaboration needs to be placed in a wider tee the reliability of their services – became context. Not only does this help clarify the more familiar and comfortable with the use of reasons behind the establishment of the col- satellite data in their Numeral Weather Pre- laboration, its structure and strengths, but it diction (NWP) models throughout the 1980s. At that time, however, the Reagan admini- stration was implementing structural budget 1 Lazo, Jeffrey K., Lawson, Megan, Larsen, Peter H. and, savings to address the economic conse- Waldman, Donald M. “U.S. Economic Sensitivity to quences of the oil crises and the related Weather Variability.” Bulletin of the American budgetary deficits. The U.S. federal govern- Meteorological Society 92 (2011): 709 – 720. 2 EUMETSAT, The Case for EPS/MetOp Second ment felt that if meteorological observations Generation: Cost Benefit Analysis, 2012. from the polar orbits were becoming a long
ESPI Report 45 7 September 2013
term operational service, this should take the rect working together between the opera- form of an international collaboration. There- tional meteorological agencies on both sides fore, the U.S. in 1983 declared its intent to of the Atlantic has not evolved in a vacuum. downscale the civilian American polar-orbiting On the contrary, it has been shaped by dif- programme from two orbit coverage to one, ferent driving forces such as domestic poli- announcing it would only guarantee coverage tics, institutionalism, economic motivations, of the afternoon orbit after the mid-1990s. changing technologies and evolving user re- Not only would this opening up of the mid- quirements. Although some of these ele- morning polar orbit to other partners result in ments have sometimes complicated progress cost savings for the American government; it in negotiations between EUMETSAT and would also ensure a more balanced input in NOAA, their mutual interest in fulfilling their the WMO’s Global Observing System. Be- missions and satisfy their user communities’ cause the first bilateral contacts with different requirements beckoned them further in the international partners yielded no concrete spirit of collaboration. In a second part the results, the project was brought into the con- partnership will be analysed from a structural text of the G7. By doing so the United States point of view. It reveals that the partnership aspired to give the project more political im- has come a long way since its beginnings. petus, while at the same time the scientific Over time, the collaboration between both nature of meteorology could bring a positive organisations has widened and intensified; dynamic of international collaboration into a and as a result, the partnership consolidated, trans-Atlantic political scene that was mostly becoming an integral part of the ecosystem dominated by the prevalence of the Cold War of space-based operational meteorology. The and economic turmoil. In the margins of the final chapter presents an assessment of its G7 summit held in Williamsburg in 1983 the impacts on NOAA’s and EUMETSAT’s expendi- political representatives decided to set up a ture and performance which sheds a light on panel dedicated to remote sensing. The dis- the value of this partnership. cussions in the panel revealed that the Euro- pean states were in favour of supporting a Europeanised initiative to achieve meteoro- logical coverage in the mid-morning polar 1.2 The Space Policy Context orbit. European states had taken a similar approach when the geostationary Meteosat The range of the activities jointly pursued by satellites of the European Space Agency EUMETSAT and NOAA has increased consid- (ESA) were translated into an operational erably over time. What started out as a mod- service to be executed by the newly formed est form of working together based upon international organisation EUMETSAT. This technical, operational and political needs in pointed the way towards EUMETSAT involve- the late 1980s has now resulted into a solid ment in polar orbiting satellites. In this sense partnership that produces strategic and tan- it is considered the immediate cause of the gible benefits in Europe, the United States, initiation of the partnership. and beyond. In the period following Europe’s agreement in Only recently has this transatlantic partner- principle to share the burden of the meteoro- ship started receiving attention and consid- logical polar service with the United States, eration from policy makers. This lag is due to EUMETSAT – still a small organisation at the the fact that it took some time before the time – was endowed with the resources to strategic importance and the value of this take up this commitment. The European partnership were fully understood on both Space Agency took up the role of develop- sides of the Atlantic. The benefits resulting ment and acquisition agency for new series of from EUMETSAT-NOAA collaboration, and the satellites, which ensured that critical Euro- realisation that this partnership is to be a pean expertise was leveraged into the young long-term given, have grown as the collabo- organisation. This enabled EUMETSAT to rative activities increased and intensified. achieve observation capabilities conforming Moreover, on the European side, the full pol- to the set of requirements of its user com- icy dimension to this partnership was only munities in a relatively short time. enabled when the European Union (EU) was given an explicit mandate for space activities Shortly after the initiation phase both organi- following the entry into force of the Lisbon 3 sations started working together directly, Treaty in 2009.2F based upon their own agreed conditions. In the first part, this study will thoroughly de- scribe those negotiations and the resulting achievements of the partnership in the fields 3 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European of geostationary, polar orbiting and ocean Union and the Treaty establishing the European Commu- altimetry satellites. It will also show that di- nity, Lisbon, done 13 December 2007, entered into force 1 December 2009, C306/01 (2007).
ESPI Report 46 8 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
In the United States, the use of international the partnership should definitely be consid- partnerships in operational satellite meteorol- ered in the next iteration of the European ogy is considered as a guiding principle in the Space Policy. National Space Policy of the Obama Admini- 4 stration.3F On the European side, however, this partnership merits further consolidation from a policy perspective. In spite of the fact 1.3 Structure of the Study that the transatlantic dimension of Earth Ob- servation programmes is recognised in the As indicated above, this study will be struc- dialogue on civil space cooperation between tured around two main parts, each with a the European Union and the United States, it slightly different focus. This makes it possible is not yet included as one of the principles in to distinguish the description of the estab- 5 6 lishment and evolution of collaboration from the European Space Policy.4F 5F Acknowledge- ment of this partnership on space policy level the more analytical chapters that seek to give would however be a sensible thing to do from interpretation to the implications of the part- a strategic point of view. The need to match nership. In this sense the twofold approach space competences to strategic goals is cur- creates a more holistic perspective on the rently stimulating the European Union to seek partnership and a balance between descrip- to develop a coherent, widely shared ap- tion and analysis. proach to space activities. In doing so the EU The first part of this study is a collaboration has an interest in making sure its activities record analysis. The chapters in this part and programmes are embedded in a cohesive cover the pre-collaboration phase and an overall policy that truly links space utilisation extended history on the collaboration activi- to its other competences and policies. Earth ties in the programmes of geostationary, observation data, because of its diverse us- polar orbiting, and ocean surface topography ability, already has an indispensable support satellites. These chapters describe the major function in the daily execution of a number of milestones in the development of collabora- EU policies, including but not limited to: agri- tion in these fields, and in parallel shed light culture and fishery, environmental policy, on the driving forces steering this evolution. scientific research and innovation, climate In this regard, a theoretical framework will be change, internal market, transport, and en- applied as a narrative to review the condi- ergy. In addition, some data resulting from tions for success in international space mis- the EUMETSAT-NOAA partnership might be- sions. This distinguishes those conditions for come strategically more relevant as the EU success in the EUMETSAT-NOAA partnership further deploys its Common Security and that are universal and those that are more Defence Policy. If the EU acknowledges the specific to the EUMETSAT-NOAA partnership trans-Atlantic dimension of the space based in particular. meteorological capabilities it makes use of, this might further anchor the partnership and The second part of this report, the inter- demonstrate that the EU is a major stake- organisational assessment, looks at the un- holder in the process. The latter is especially derlying dynamics in the collaboration. The relevant considering that the ties between first chapter in this part is a partnership as- the EU and EUMETSAT have been strengthen- sessment based upon a theoretical frame- ing over the last years, partially because of work for different collaborative strategies. It the implementation of the Copernicus pro- is applied to reveal the structural differences gramme. Finally, a recognition in the Euro- between the three fields of collaboration as a pean Space Policy would close the policy loop function of their degree of integration. This supporting the partnership, giving it a assessment yields information on how the stronger political foundation on both sides of partners have become mutually dependent the Atlantic. For these reasons, recognition of on each other for the satisfaction of the re- quirements of their user communities and how they have been able to achieve this 4 “National Space Policy of the United States of America” 28 Jun. 2010 The White House 12 May 2013 strong partnership. The final chapter of the
ESPI Report 45 9 September 2013
Part I. Collaboration Record Analysis
The theoretical framework of the key ele- and EUMETSAT can count on the exper- ments in international collaboration in space tise and experience provided by their de- missions is elaborated below and then later velopment agencies NASA and ESA, re- applied on a continuous basis as a narrative spectively for implementation expertise. throughout the various chapters of Part I of More importantly, however, the user this study. This framework is based upon the communities of the organisations are an findings of the Joint Committee of the U.S. integral part of the global scientific com- National Research Council and the European munity in meteorology and climate moni- Science Foundation. In the study “U.S.- toring, ensuring strong bottom-up scien- Europe Collaboration in Space Science”, the tific support in the definition of user re- Joint Committee identified eight key elements quirements and scientific instrumenta- that it believes are essential to success in tion. 7 international collaboration in space missions.0F6F 3. Shared objectives. Some shared goals Although these elements are by no means and objectives for international collabora- exhaustive and, the particular case of tion should be agreed by all parts of the EUMETSAT-NOAA collaboration has more organisation. This includes scientists, en- special features to it, they form a good start- gineers, administrators and the manage- ing point, allowing further specifications to be ment level. In addition, the organisation added. All eight are described in the follow- has to receive a specific mandate to en- ing: gage in this commitment, either from the 1. Historical foundation. A partnership will political level or from its Council. Again, have more chances of success if the this element is of a particular nature in agencies have a shared context within the NOAA-EUMETSAT relationship. As which the nature of their collaboration both are operational organisations with project fits. This context encompasses a end-to-end systems and a long-term per- common understanding of the science spective, it is easier to align the views of and engineering required for the project. the scientific and engineering staff. In In case of EUMETSAT and NOAA, or addition, for both organisations the user rather the wide field of satellite meteorol- communities are the central stakeholders ogy, the history and basis started in the for whom the continuity and quality of International Meteorological Organisation service is assured. The latter is an ele- and was taken further in the framework ment of key importance in the strategy of the World Meteorological Organisation documents of both organisations. when the United States and later Europe 4. Clearly defined responsibilities. The Joint developed their first meteorological satel- Committee stated that cooperative pro- lites. Given that this element is an inte- grams must involve a clear understanding gral part of developments in the pre- of how the responsibilities of the mission collaboration era, the second chapter will are to be shared among the partners, a focus on the historical foundations of the clear management scheme with a well- relationship. defined interface between the parties, 2. Scientific support. To establish compelling and efficient communication. Hence, suc- scientific justification of a mission and its cessful missions require that each partner components, review by international ex- has a clearly defined role and a real stake perts is appropriate. Experts can deter- in the success of the mission. It is clear mine whether the science is of excellent that this part becomes more critical in quality and meets high standards and more integrated collaboration strategies; whether the methods proposed are cost this is definitely reflected in the processes effective. From a financial and political of negotiation addressed throughout this point of view, strong support by the sci- study. In legal terms, this element is entific community is a way to overcome guaranteed by means of memoranda of budget restrictions and administrative de- understanding, formal agreements and lay. In terms of scientific support, NOAA exchange of letters at managerial level; all of them that have had an impact on defining of responsibilities between the 7 National Academy of Sciences, European Science Foun- dation, eds. U.S.-European Collaboration in Space Sci- parties will be described throughout part ence. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1998. I.
ESPI Report 46 10 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
5. Sound plan for data access and distribu- partners are involved. NOAA and tion. Similar to the need for clearly de- EUMETSAT have set up specific structures fined responsibilities, cooperative ven- to manage and guide review processes, tures should have a well-organised and such as their High Level Working Group. agreed-upon process for data calibration, These bodies and procedures will be de- validation, access, and distribution. As scribed with respect to the different col- EUMETSAT and NOAA have specific laboration areas. agreements on data policy and data de- 8. Beneficial characteristics. This element is nial, they treat this part of their collabo- crucial to initiate collaboration in the first ration as a separate component. place. Although the beneficial characteris- 6. Sense of partnership. According to the tics must not be exactly equal for both joint NRC–ESF committee, the success of partners and there might be a shift of an international space scientific mission benefits over time, the overall structure requires that collaborative efforts rein- should deliver benefits on a fairly even force and foster mutual respect, confi- basis. Typically, the shared benefits go dence, and a sense of partnership among beyond exchanges of scientific and tech- participants. Each partner’s contributions nical data, know-how and access to train- must therefore be acknowledged in the ing. According to the Joint Committee of media and in publications resulting from the ESF-NRC, successful collaborations joint missions. In the EUMETSAT–NOAA have had at least one – but usually more case, this manifests itself in recognition – of the following characteristics: (1) of the other partner in policy documents unique and complementary capabilities and in the global meteorological space offered by each international partner, community, for example. such as expertise in specific technologies or instruments, or in particular analytic 7. Recognition of importance of reviews. The methods, (2) contributions made by each study states that periodic monitoring of partner that are considered vital for the science goals, mission execution, and the mission, such as providing unique facili- results of data analysis is necessary to ties like launchers, instruments, space- ensure that international missions are craft subsystems, or ground receiving both timely and efficient. Particularly in stations, (3) significant net cost reduc- the event of unforeseen problems in mis- tions for each partner, which can be sion development or funding, this is vital documented, leading to favourable cost- for minimising delays or the updating of benefit ratios, (4) international scientific scientific imperatives throughout the pro- and political context and impetus and, (5) gramme development. Ensuring this re- synergistic effects and cross-fertilisation quires an appropriate protocol for review- 8 of benefits.7F The beneficial characteristics ing ongoing collaboration activities. As of the EUMETSAT-NOAA partnership in the need for clearly defined responsibili- the various collaboration areas are one of ties, this element becomes more critical the focal points of this study. They will in more integrated collaboration strate- further described and assessed in Part II. gies, especially when more than two
8 Ibid.
ESPI Report 45 11 September 2013
2. Historical Foundations
The first historical foundations that influenced be collected by instruments calibrated to a later developments in the EUMETSAT-NOAA single standard, and recorded in similar units. partnership date back to well before the first The establishment and enforcement of stan- meteorological satellites were launched in dards, however, proved to be remarkably outer space. This chapter will review devel- difficult, even on national level and whenever opments in the global meteorological com- national standards differed, the use of data munity that took place before the first col- exchange systems posed problems. To ad- laboration between EUMETSAT and NOAA, dress this standardisation issue, national even before these organisations were estab- weather services throughout Europe and the lished. The first development was the process United States founded the International Me- 11 of internationalisation – and later globalisa- teorological Organisation, or IMO.4F10F tion – of the meteorological community, which dramatically changed its modus oper- 2.1.1 The International Meteorological Organisa- andi. tion Founded in 1873, the IMO was born from the 2.1 Processes of Internation- realisation that weather systems move across boundaries and that forecasting thus required alisation and Globalisation upstream and downstream collection of of Meteorology weather data. A major milestone in this proc- ess was the decision of the 1905 IMO Confer- In the 1850s, telegraphy permitted meteor- ence of Directors to develop a telegraph- ologists for the first time to create and share based worldwide weather station network. It 9 was decided that this network should collect, so-called ‘synoptic weather maps’2F8F . In a rela- tive short time, scientists were offered the calculate, and distribute monthly and annual opportunity to watch the development and averages for pressure, temperature, and movement of weather phenomena like precipitation from a well-distributed sample storms, and warn those downwind. Although of land based meteorological stations, in ef- these empirically based findings did not fect a global climatological database. The achieve great accuracy at the time, these distribution standard was two stations within dramatic ‘God’s-eye views’ brought new visi- each ten-degree latitude/longitude quadran- bility to meteorology and offered opportuni- gle. In the end, the network comprised about ties for the military and agricultural services 500 land stations between 80°N and 61°S. In the year 1917, the first annual data set, for of the industrialised nations in Europe and 12 10 1911, appeared.5F11F North-America.3F9F Further increasing the usefulness and accu- Despite these first steps of internationalisa- racy of these weather services by means of tion in the meteorological community, the international data sharing, however, posed results turned out to be rather unsatisfactory. some challenges. For a long time national One of the reasons was the structure of the weather services were primarily concerned IMO which, in retrospect, has been described with the collection and charting of data, using as a typical pre-World War II scientific form existing networks of military, astronomical of internationalism. For 75 years, the organi- and amateur observers. First, there was a sation was limited to a cooperative associa- need for additional professional observers tion of national weather services without in- and operational data networks. Second, all tergovernmental organisation status. The this data from various sources needed to be principle of interaction was explicitly volun- centralised on national level. In order to ad- tary and as a result, IMO policies functioned dress both challenges properly, data had to merely as recommendations. National iden- tity, sense of independence and cultural prac- tices lead nations to refuse or simply ignore proposed standards. Moreover, data sharing 9 Synoptic Weather Maps are snapshots of simultaneous observations taken over larger areas. 10 Edwards, Paul N. “Meteorology as Infrastructural 11 Ibid. Globalism„ OSIRIS 21 (2006): 229 – 250. 12 Ibid.
ESPI Report 46 12 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
and bartering were for a long time limited by Unlike its predecessor, the members of the the telegraph networks’ technical capabilities, WMO are representatives of their respective while in the pre-computer era the collecting countries, not their weather services. Al- and integrating of data from different chan- though the WMO convention carefully avoided nels and media remained slow, labour inten- any claim to absolute authority – and hence sive, and error-prone. These factors led to the WMO, in principle, could not produce significant delays in the publication of what binding standards – it was stated that mem- 13 were in the end mediocre annual datasets.6F12F bers were required to ‘do their utmost’ to implement WMO decisions. This intergovern- The IMO leaders were aware of this endemic mental structure, founded in a post-war at- institutional weakness. In an attempt to re- mosphere of optimism, has eventually en- gain central control of standard-setting proc- abled the WMO to play a unique and powerful esses, they came to agree on the need for an role in contributing to the safety and welfare intergovernmental standard-setting authority, 15 of humanity.8F14F It achieves this through sev- and posted a letter to governments with a eral methods. First, it promotes collaboration request for such mandate in 1929. Largely in the establishment of networks for making because of the impact of the Great Depres- meteorological, climatological, hydrological sion, the proposal was neglected and only and geophysical observations, as well as the revisited by the IMO at its 1935 meeting in exchange, processing and standardisation of Warsaw. It was decided that future meeting related data, and assists technology transfer, invitations would be sent directly to govern- training and research. In addition, the WMO ments, asking them to appoint each weather fosters collaboration between the meteoro- service director as an official government logical and hydrological services of its mem- representative. In parallel, the organisation ber-states, and furthers applications for me- began drafting a World Meteorological Con- teorology, agriculture, aviation, shipping, the vention, which was presented to the 1939 environment, water issues and the mitigation meeting in Berlin. The conferees forwarded of the impacts of natural disasters, in addi- the draft convention to a committee for re- 16 tion to classic public weather forecasting.9F15F finement. The plan called for final approval at the 1941 IMO Conference of Directors, but of An important milestone in the historical 14 course, the Second World War intervened.7F13F trans-Atlantic relationship in satellite meteor- ology was the establishment of the WMO’s From a historical point of view, the creation World Weather Watch (WWW) Programme. of the IMO was the first step in the process of This programme was developed together with internationalisation of the meteorological the Global Atmosphere Research Programme community. Although in many aspects the (GARP), in response to a United Nations standard-setting and thus harmonising role of Resolution, adopted in 1962, to develop “me- the IMO was limited, it created an environ- teorology and atmospheric sciences for the ment in which networking and modest forms benefit of all mankind”. While GARP, spon- of collaboration were encouraged. The or- sored by the International Council of Scien- ganisation reflected and consolidated the idea tific Unions and the WMO, had the aim of that meteorology by definition transcends the improving the quality of Numerical Weather national level; states and their national Prediction and to extend the forecast range, weather services are reliant upon each other. the WWW coordinated space- and ground- This feature seemed so strongly embedded in based observations from all the world; over- the nature of meteorology that it has ever seeing the actual gathering and distribution since determined the path-dependency of of meteorological data and products to WMO further developments in this scientific field. member states. One of the major mecha- nisms to provide continuous and reliable ob- 2.1.2 The World Meteorological Organisation servational data world-wide in the WWW Pro- gramme is the Global Observing System After World War II, the 1946 IMO Conference (GOS). Although the GOS started with a rela- of Directors acknowledged the need for an tively narrow set of observational require- 17 organisation supported by governments. ments10F16F , it was recognised early on that Preparations continued with a conference in 1947 in Washington DC. The convention en- tered into force in early 1950, and one year 15 Ibid. later the World Meteorological Organisation 16 “WMO in Brief” 12 Nov. 2012. World Meteorological (WMO) was officially created as one of the Organization
ESPI Report 45 13 September 2013
space-based observation from satellites was marine fisheries, one of the missions of NOAA to be an important component, next to ob- was to lead the development of consolidated servations from land, sea and aircraft. This national oceanic and atmospheric research awareness was raised by the impact of and development program and provide a TIROS-1, the first meteorological satellite variety of scientific and technical services to placed in orbit by the U.S. National Aeronau- other U.S. Federal agencies, private sector 21 tics and Space Administration (NASA) in interests and the general public.14F20F This in- 18 1960.11F17F The images of TIROS-1 brought fore- cluded a responsibility to predict changes in casters all over the world a better under- the oceanic and atmospheric environments standing of the state of the planet’s atmos- and living marine resources, and to provide phere. European meteorologist made use of related data, information, and services to the the data made available by the Americans public, industry, the research community, and as a result, European involvement in and other government agencies. satellite meteorology began to form in the NOAA works towards this mission through six minds of meteorologist and space scien- 22 19 major line offices15F21F and with the support of tists.12F18F more than a dozen staff offices. Most relevant Under the WWW and GARP framework, con- in the context of space and collaboration with sensus grew that in order to ensure global EUMETSAT is the National Environmental space-based coverage, the space component Satellite, Data and Information Service, or of the GOS should include four or five geosta- NESDIS. This line office was established when tionary satellites and two or three polar orbit- NOAA's operational meteorological satellite ing satellites. Hence, already in September program became a reality, as the experimen- 1967, D.A. Davies, then Secretary-General of tal geostationary satellite experiment was the WMO, officially put the challenge of a transformed into a continuous, operational joint European effort in space meteorology program in 1974/5. NASA's Synchronous before the Commission for Science and Tech- Meteorological Satellites (SMS) 1 and 2 were 20 nology of the Council of Europe.13F19F the prototype for NOAA's Geostationary Op- erational Environmental Satellites (GOES). The WMO, by means of its global membership GOES-1, the first NOAA-owned and operated and the deep-rooted culture of working to- geostationary satellite, was launched on 16 gether and sharing of information, was able October 1975. A few years later, in June to establish a solid global overall framework 1979, the first NOAA-funded satellite in the for meteorology, the crowning attainment of NOAA system of polar-orbiting environmental which was the establishment of a coordinated satellites was launched. Endowed with a international meteorological satellite pro- clearly-defined mandate and sufficient fund- gramme in the form of the GOS. This global ing, NOAA was able to transform itself into a development in turn had repercussions on world leader in application of space-based local level, as the United States and Europe observing systems for operational environ- had to develop dedicated structures to estab- mental forecasting and related services dur- lish and maintain these space-based capabili- ing the 1970s. ties, and to guarantee the long-term continu- ity of the services they provided. With the Americans having covered two geo- stationary slots and their polar orbiting satel- lite system in pre-operational proto-type 23 flight status16F22F , the European meteorological 2.2 Establishment of NOAA community started to further elaborate the idea of a joint European contribution in the The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad- form of a geostationary satellite programme. ministration (NOAA) was founded within the After all, many European states - being active United States Department of Commerce in
1970. In line with the rise of the environ- 21 mental movement at the time, NOAA was “A History of NOAA” 8 Jun. 2006 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 14 Nov. 2012 designed to unify the nation’s widely scat-
ESPI Report 46 14 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
members of the WMO - could not fail to take operational programme of the first Meteosat up their role in the establishment of the satellites, however, were characterised by Global Observing System. This process was heated discussions on the approach with re- not an isolated spontaneous undertaking, on gard to its translation into an organisational the contrary, American representatives at the structure and the allocated budget for opera- time were actively looking for possible part- tional satellite meteorology. The Meteosat ners to implement the space component of Agreement was eventually translated into a the GOS in the networked community mete- pre-operational programme by the European orology had become. Space Agency’s Programme Board for Mete- 26 orological Satellites in the mid-1970s.19F25F Fol- lowing the successful procurement, launches and operations of the first three Meteosat 2.3 Establishment of satellites, it became clear that this service EUMETSAT had become a long term operational com- mitment and as such, did not really fit into Subsequently, the challenge of a joint Euro- the scope of the European Space Agency. pean undertaking in satellite meteorology It was not until the Intergovernmental Con- started to become clear. Initially, it was ference in Paris in 1983 that it was officially France that had the idea of establishing a decided to create EUMETSAT, and to make national geostationary satellite programme this newly formed international organisation that they called Meteosat. As the nascent responsible for three satellites in the Me- idea of a European contribution conflicted teosat Operational Programme (MOP) series. with the French plans, in December 1970 the EUMETSAT’s founding convention was opened Director of the French National Meteorological for signature on 24 May 1983 and entered Service expressed his concerns in a letter to into force on June 1986. The organisation Hermann Bondi, Director-General of the officially took over responsibility for the op- European Space Research Organisation erational Meteosat series on 1 January 1987, (ESRO). The Ad Hoc Meteorology Group initi- the first operational satellite, MOP-1, being ated by ESRO gathered half a year later in launched in March 1989. During the inaugural Zurich to discuss this issue. The Group de- Council Meetings, the delegates decided to cided that ideally the European system would select Germany as the location for consist of following elements: (1) a geosta- EUMETSAT’s headquarters, and John Morgan tionary satellite able to provide cloud cover was appointed as the organisation’s first di- images in the visible and infrared spectrum, rector. With the European meteorological (2) one polar-orbiting satellite for atmos- collaboration now finally translated into a pheric soundings and, (3) a communications working structure with an operational pro- package to collect and relay the meteorologi- 24 gramme, the basis was laid for further devel- cal data from ground-based platforms.17F23F opments and collaboration at international Some weeks later, after having reflected on level. this issue, France proposed to the Chairman of ESRO’s Council that their Meteosat concept be implemented on European level, by ESRO and the European meteorological community. After internal assessment and consultation with meteorological experts, ESRO consid- ered Meteosat ready for adoption as a Euro- pean project. Following this decision, the meteorological community in Europe started defining the technical features of the mission. In addition, an Ad Hoc Group opted for a centralised ap- proach, keeping raw satellite and meteoro- logical data processing together. With the structure put forward, the eight ESRO Mem- ber States that were participating in the pro- 25 ject18F24F signed the Meteosat Agreement in July 1972. The gathering of funds and the pre-
24 EUMETSAT, 25 Years of EUMETSAT – 25 ans d’EUMETSAT, 2011, 320 p. 25 These countries were Belgium, Denmark, France, 26 In 1975, the European Space Agency was founded as a Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United single integrated organisation to take over the Kingdom. responsibilities of ESRO and ELDO.
ESPI Report 45 15 September 2013
3. Geostationary Satellites
This chapter will focus on the forms of col- the geostationary orbit. This back-up of Me- laboration between EUMETSAT and NOAA in teosat-2 lasted until 1988 and so NOAA di- the field of geostationary satellites. This type rectly supported EUMETSAT in its mission of satellite is placed in an orbit at about upon its establishment in 1986. The American 36,000 km above the Earth’s surface, in the side regarded this support as part of its equatorial plane. As the orbital period in this commitment to its partnership with the Euro- particular position takes as long as it takes pean meteorological community, but at the the Earth to revolve around its axis – one day same time deemed it useful in case one of – the satellite appears to be fixed with re- their GOES satellites failed in the future be- spect to the Earth’s surface, providing a con- cause of a technical malfunction or reaching stant view of the region beneath it. In this the end-of-lifetime without having a spare position, geostationary meteorological satel- one available. Europe could be expected to lites are able to provide very frequent obser- come to its aid in this case. All the while, vations in the infrared and the visible spec- global coverage in the GOS was ensured trum. through the GOES re-positioning. What started out as a case-based form of support between EUMETSAT and NOAA later 3.1.1 GOES Satellite Back-Up evolved into a formal form of collaboration, formalised by a back-up agreement and geo- In January 1989, EUMETSAT Director John stationary data agreements. This transition Morgan received a letter from Thomas N. ensured that the benefits of collaboration in Pyke, NOAA NESDIS Administrator, with a the field of geostationary satellites were mu- request for support in helping to maintain tual and on a transparent, continuous basis. geostationary coverage for North and South America. NOAA was faced with a failure of its GOES-6 satellite, which brought the number of U.S. operational imaging geostationary 3.1 Formalisation Process of satellites back to one, instead of the nominal Back-Up Support two. With only one satellite, the back-up op- erational scenario of NESDIS was for the satellite to cover the Atlantic and Pacific sec- The first trans-Atlantic geostationary collabo- tors alternately, according to season. This ration predates EUMETSAT’s establishment. scenario, however, caused a decrease in cov- In 1985 NOAA repositioned its GOES-4 satel- erage, not only for North and South America, lite to cover the observation gap over Europe but also for the areas of the Atlantic Ocean created by the partial loss of service of Me- that were of direct interest to Europe. More- teosat-2 whose Data Collection Service (DCS) over, it was understood that the launch of the for in-situ observations failed. Although this next geostationary satellite, GOES-I, could function could be continued by Meteosat-1, not take place before November 1990. NOAA the latter ran out of hydrazine propellant in was afraid of a further delay in the launch of 1985. GOES-I combined with a premature failure of This arrangement for support was facilitated GOES-7, particularly because the confluence by the Coordination on Geostationary Mete- of such situations would lead to full loss of orological Satellites, an international group coverage of the Americas; a serious disconti- whose name was later changed into Coordi- nuity of GOES service. nation Group for Meteorological Satellites For this reason, NOAA requested that the (CGMS) to include low-Earth orbit satellites. Meteosat-3 satellite be moved to a position at At the time of the malfunction, ESA was still 50° west to facilitate coverage of the U.S. operating the meteorological satellites and and the Western Atlantic. After all, Meteosat- the agency had strongly networked with 4 was already in place, covering Europe and NOAA on the American side. This strong con- Africa and so Meteosat-3 served as a hot nection – resulting from the coordinated im- stand-by satellite. This, however, required plementation of the GOS – was an enabler for the assent of ESA as the owner of the satel- a more committed form of collaboration be- lite, and EUMETSAT as one of the funding tween the two agencies, as shown by the fact partners. The issue was addressed at that the American partners were willing to EUMETSAT’s Policy Advisory Committee (PAC) reposition one of their GOES-satellites to meeting in March 1989 and received a very ensure global meteorological coverage from positive response. Given the longstanding
ESPI Report 46 16 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
tradition of collaboration in meteorology and of ADC was endangered. As the majority of the fact that NOAA had previously helped EUMETSAT Member States were anxious to EUMETSAT by repositioning its GOES-4 satel- accommodate the American request as soon lite, this willingness to help out the American as possible, they were willing to accept an partner did not come as a surprise. interpretation that ADC would be considered to be part of MOP. A resolution to this effect Although there was a strong willingness to was prepared by the EUMETSAT secretariat contribute to possible solutions of the GOES- and put to the vote. Fourteen Member States 6 failure, the exact implementation was trou- were in favour; the Netherlands abstained bled by disagreement among the European because they wanted more information on partners. EUMETSAT’s Scientific and Techni- the costs related to the ADC, while France did cal Group (STG) reviewed two proposals. One not participate in the vote. The French dele- was suggested by ESA’s European Space gation challenged the legality of the ADC Operations Centre (ESOC), which was at the resolution and was therefore not willing to time still responsible for satellite operations pay for its implementation. The disagreement in the EUMETSAT Meteosat Operational Pro- led to a serious impasse between the gramme (MOP). Specifically, ESOC proposed EUMETSAT Member States. to keep control over the satellite and also take responsibility for the dissemination of It is important to note that this deadlock was the data to the United States. The second not related to the willingness to help out the proposal was put forward by France, and American partner. France – just like the other entailed that ESOC would retain the ground EUMETSAT Member States – was eager to control function, but that France would take facilitate NOAA’s request. The issue was care of data processing and image dissemina- caused by an internal organisational dispute tion. Although the French proposal was on the European side, highlighting also a cheaper – and this was also acknowledged by fundamental disagreement on the nature of the majority of the STG – there was a strong the EUMETSAT Convention, more specifically preference for the ESOC proposal because it its interpretation. In this respect, the short- would require the least reconfiguration of coming clearly reflected a common feature of METEOSAT operations. newly formed organisations, namely the poor adaptability of their legal frameworks to un- The issue was taken up at the 10th EUMETSAT foreseen circumstances, accompanied by the Council meeting in June 1989. Many delega- lack of organisational experience to address tions were in favour of encouraging the use them in an appropriate way. Moreover, in this of national facilities, but feared that in this particular case the debate was intensified due particular case, the data processing and im- to time pressure. age dissemination might be a task too big for a national institute to perform, with possible Following further consideration in PAC the risks of delay. In addition, the Italian delega- ADC issue came before the EUMETSAT Coun- tion raised questions about the completeness cil again in December 1989. France pointed of the stated motivations for repositioning out that Annex 1 of the EUMETSAT Conven- Meteosat-3 to 50° West, stating that the title tion described the MOP as consisting of one “GOES Back-up” might be misleading, as this operational satellite and a second one “not in action would benefit Europe as well, given use”. Giving Meteosat-3 an operational role in that most weather systems affecting Europe parallel to Meteosat-4 hence conflicted with form over the Atlantic. This convincing point the description as drafted in the annex, which – supported by other Council members – led meant that the required amendment of the to the then freshly coined designation of “At- annex would involve a time-consuming proc- lantic Data Coverage” (ADC), which has been ess of parliamentary approval in some Mem- used ever since. ber States. Other delegations argued that the annex as drafted in the convention did not preclude further developments and that 3.1.2 Atlantic Data Coverage therefore approval could be granted by only a two-thirds majority. Nevertheless, the French Finding a Mandate within EUMETSAT did not change their position and conse- quently, the deadlock remained unresolved. Ironically, the consensus for the new desig- nation reinforced the argument raised by the Eventually, a breakthrough solution was French delegation that moving Meteosat-3 found. After a period of informal discussions was a departure from the Meteosat Opera- in the PAC, a new resolution was prepared tional Programme and therefore constituted a and presented. In this compromise, which new programme. Since a new programme still did not resolve the fundamental constitu- required unanimous approval and possibly tional issue, the French contribution to the another scale of contributions compared to ADC was to be calculated at the lower GNP the existing MOP, the timely implementation rate, while other member states contributed
ESPI Report 45 17 September 2013
on the MOP basis. Also, it was agreed that out to be successful, and Meteosat-3 was in the financial ceiling of the MOP – the cost-to- place and operational as of August 1991, completion – would not be exceeded. This before the Atlantic hurricane season started. resolution was approved unanimously, ena- Not only was the execution of the ADC bene- bling EUMETSAT to use Meteosat-3 at 50 ficial for both the American and European degrees West in August 1991. Although meteorological community; the investments clearly a success it was still two and a half in infrastructure resulted in a strategic capac- years after the initial letter of Thomas N. ity that would prove to be useful for the fur- Pyke. ther collaboration between the two trans- Atlantic partners in the field of geostationary ADC – Implementation satellites. The next step in the ADC was its practical ADC – Extension implementation, which was a joint effort be- tween EUMETSAT, ESA and the Centre de During the implementation of ADC, it was Météorologie Spatiale (CMS) of the French already apparent that the American GOES- National Meteorological Service. The WMO NEXT satellite programme, the follow-up to was also involved in the coordination of the the GOES programme, was hampered by ADC dissemination schedule. ESOC was at development problems. The United States the time still responsible for the operations of was faced with the possibility that GOES-7, in 27 the satellites of the MOP.20F26F It was requested orbit since 1987, would cease to provide any to move the Meteosat-3 satellite to 50 de- services at some point, leaving it without any grees West and to provide pre-processing of geostationary image data after the end of the the satellite data and dissemination of high ADC. Obviously, this situation would severely resolution image formats for a period not impede hurricane and storm monitoring over exceeding three years, starting from the date the Western Atlantic, an area of such vital the satellite was operable in its new position. importance for the United States. All the while, EUMETSAT, being responsible To bridge the gap until the operational phase for the Meteosat Operational Programme, of the GOES-NEXT, various options for con- remained under full control of the satellite. tinuing data coverage on a contingency basis This included the right to move the satellite – were considered by the U.S. The option of with assistance of ESA – back to its previous prolonging the use of Meteosat-3 was even- position if needed. tually selected as the primary contingency The necessary technical preparations at ESOC plan. NOAA informed EUMETSAT that it was were completed by October 1990. A complete internally authorised and endowed with suffi- set of additional telecommunication links cient financial resources to continue Me- between the ground stations and ESOC had teosat-3 operations. From a technical point of already been implemented in 1989. The view, this option was feasible for the satellite Phase 1 installations included the splitting of had sufficient on-board fuel to support nor- redundant equipment, installation of an inde- mal operations until mid-1994. pendent imagery chain, hard- and software To provide a pan-optic view of the Americas modifications at the Meteosat Ground Com- with only one geostationary satellite – recall puter System, and the installation of an addi- that GOES-7 was nearing its end of lifetime – tional dissemination chain for digital dissemi- it was proposed to move Meteosat-3 to a new nation formats. New mission controllers to nominal position further West, at 75 degrees. operate Meteosat-3 were recruited and In this new position the satellite would be out trained. of range of the Odenwald, Germany ground At the CMS station at Lannion, France, prepa- station normally used for the control and rations included updates of the operations of EUMETSAT’s geostationary GOES/METEOSAT Relay Computer system fleet, and therefore the NOAA CDA station at and extensions of the local ground facilities of Wallops Island would be used to route data the site. More specifically, the uplink antenna transfer, telemetry and telecommanding, was modified to allow frequent pointing be- while central control would remain with tween the two METEOSAT spacecraft at 0 and ESOC. This is the so-called bent pipe configu- 50 degrees West during ADC operations. ration. Despite the organisational challenges result- EUMETSAT’s then director, John Morgan, ing from a multiple agency involvement, the addressed the delegates of the EUMETSAT practical implementation of the ADC turned Council, stressing the gravity of the situation. He argued strongly that EUMETSAT should respond favourably to the NOAA request. 27 In fact, ESOC remained responsible for all EUMETSAT Despite some technical anomalies observed satellite operations until 1995, when the EUMETSAT in Meteosat-4 and Meteosat-5, it was ex- control centre tool over the operations.
ESPI Report 46 18 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
pected that full services over Europe and reduce the risk to both parties of losing sys- Africa could be guaranteed, and that it was tem coverage. This is done by providing each therefore acceptable to further provide the other with emergency back-up coverage un- services of Meteosat-3 to NOAA. Moreover, der certain conditions. NOAA was ready to take over all the costs The provisions for back-up activities were incurred in the extension of the ADC and based on the state of infrastructure in geo- willing to examine if it could contribute to the stationary orbit. In this regard, a baseline deficit in contributions that had occurred in system was defined for both organisations. the ADC implementation. For NOAA, this consisted of two operational The EUMETSAT Council, in support of the GOES satellites operated at 75° and 135° request, authorised the Director to establish West longitude. The configuration for and sign the necessary agreements with EUMETSAT consisted of one operational Me- NOAA and ESA to implement the proposal as teosat satellite operated at 0° longitude. If an outlined. A tripartite exchange of letters be- operational GOES or Meteosat satellite failed, tween EUMETSAT, ESA and NOAA was signed it was agreed that both parties would carry in February 1992, covering the installation out back-up arrangements until the baseline required for the bent-pipe operation at the system had been restored. The conditions for NOAA CDA station at Wallops and the X-ADC this back-up agreement are listed in table 1. operations, which would expire at the end of the life of Meteosat-3. As agreed, the cost of activities under the exchange of letters was EUMETSAT NOAA funded by NOAA. Moreover, EUMETSAT and ESA agreed to keep open the possibility of One operational GOES One operable Me- considering in due course the further exten- fails and there is no teosat fails and there sion of collaboration with NOAA beyond the other operable GOES is no other operable lifetime of Meteosat-3, should NOAA still have in orbit Meteosat in orbit the have need for support and should capac- A GOES launch is not A Meteosat launch is ity still be available on the European side. possible within the not possible within Operational support under the Atlantic Data next 4 months the next 4 months Coverage Extension further fostered the At least two operable At least two operable sense of partnership between the organisa- Meteosat are in-orbit. GOES are in-orbit. tions, and in this sense paved the way for the first structured formal form of collaboration: Table 1: The Requisites for Back-up Arrangements be- the Back-up Agreement. tween EUMETSAT and NOAA.
3.1.3 Back-Up Agreement From a structural point of view, the Back-up Agreement is structured around following The emergency situations that had occurred four premises: (1) the collaboration between both in Europe and the United States showed EUMETSAT and NOAA under the agreement is that despite a relative conservative satellite based on reciprocity; (2) both organisations delivery schedule, a robust launch policy and seek to balance their respective measures adequate funding, launch and premature over time; (3) there is no exchange of funds; satellite failures or delays in satellite deploy- (4) carrying out the respective responsibilities ment could threaten continuity of coverage. under the agreement is based upon a best The Atlantic Data Coverage, followed by the efforts approach. The general provisions X-ADC, was not the first example of collabo- clearly reflect the idea that the balance of ration on back-up between EUMETSAT and responsibilities for geographic coverage of NOAA, as it was preceded by the NOAA repo- both parties should be unchanged. The sitioning of its GOES 4 satellite between 1985 agreement was designed to improve the reli- and 1988. These activities showed that in ability of the global geostationary meteoro- addition to internal contingency plans, inter- logical satellite system and to diminish the national collaboration is vital of emergencies. risks of loss of coverage in the event of emergency situations. Furthermore, the These experiences and considerations led agreement set out the mechanisms for man- EUMETSAT and NOAA to discuss the possibil- agement and coordination, information trans- ity of making common contingency plans to fer and release, data policy, liability, settle- be in a better position to solve such emer- ment of disputes and taxes and customs. gency situations. Bilateral discussions even- tually led to the draft Agreement on Back-up It should be noted that from an analytical of Operational Geostationary Meteorological perspective, the signing of the Back-up Satellite Systems (further referred to as “the Back-up Agreement”). It defines long term collaboration activities required in order to
ESPI Report 45 19 September 2013
28 Agreement21F27F in August 1993 fundamentally price, assuming further that the price of input transformed the nature of the relationship data cannot be a barrier to business devel- between NOAA and EUMETSAT. Until then, opment, and that revenue will somewhat mutual support of back-up activities had reduce the contributions from taxpayers. The taken place on a case-by-case basis and was conflicting positions were resolved in the reactive in nature. The coming into force of framework of the WMO, with the adoption of the Back-up Agreement, however, introduced Resolution 40, which identifies essential data a proactive component to the collaboration available free of charge without restriction between the organisations. After all, the na- and allows WMO members to identify non- ture of future collaboration was anticipated essential and other data which is subject to and translated into a formal legal framework restrictions, e.g. through licensing. EU direc- and implementation protocol. Finally, it tives have further established that meteoro- should be noted that the Back-Up Agreement logical data shall be available under the same is based on a non-exchange of funds basis. conditions, including price, to the private Whereas NOAA paid for the technical prepa- sector and the commercial arms of those rations and lease of the equipment required National Meteorological Services entitled to for the repositioning of Meteosat-3 under the have commercial activities. The latter are ADC and X-ADC activities, the idea for the ensured a level playing field by introducing a future was one of balanced input and hence it degree of cost recovery vis-à-vis commercial was agreed that no more funds would be providers. Not surprisingly, these basic dif- exchanged. The signing of the Back-Up ferences were reflected in the respective data Agreement was one of the first key mile- policies applicable to NOAA and EUMETSAT stones in the EUMETSAT-NOAA partnership. satellite date and products, in particular for geostationary orbit data. Although data policy and data denial are 3.2 Data Policy on Geosta- treated as separate components in the col- laboration between the two organisations, tionary Satellites their negotiation and implementation will be discussed separately for geostationary and The necessity of a sound plan for data access polar orbiting satellite programmes. This is and distribution had already been stressed in done not only to ensure consistency with the the theoretical framework of this study, since overall structure of this study, but it also it was one of the key elements for successful facilitates a better distinction between the collaboration in space missions as identified specific issues of concern in both fields of by the Joint Committee of the U.S. National collaboration. This is especially helpful in the Research Council and the European Science analysis of the crisis that occurred during the Foundation. In the case of meteorology, this negotiations on data policy and data denial in feature is even more relevant considering the Initial Joint Polar System (IJPS), an issue that data are used by downstream user that will be addressed thoroughly in chapter communities for weather forecasting. four. In this respect, a major challenge for the collaboration between EUMETSAT and NOAA 3.2.1 The Geostationary Agreement was the difference in philosophies upon which the principles of the European and American The need for an agreement on data policy data policies are based. The United States arose as of 1995 when EUMETSAT started to apply the so-called “full and open” data pol- prepare encryption of its geostationary High icy, which is in line with the idea that civil Resolution Images (HRI). The possibility of meteorological data should be freely available encryption enabled EUMETSAT to have secure to citizens and the private sector because control of access to data at individual file and they are paid by taxpayers. With a free and individual user level. EUMETSAT’s access to open data policy the U.S. government also American geostationary satellite data from intends to support the development of com- the GOES-system did not pose any particular mercial meteorological sectors. In Europe, problems or changes because of the applica- the production of meteorological data is also tion of the “full and open” data policy in the financed by tax revenue, but most of the United States. To maintain access to the governments considered that data should be EUMETSAT data, the American partners made available at some cost for use for stated they would appreciate a mutual commercial purposes. This seeks recognition agreement on data use rather than a unilat- of the economic value of the data through a eral license given to them by EUMETSAT. Such an agreement would also emphasise the reciprocity of their collaboration, which would 28 The EUMETSAT Council voted in favour of the Back-up Agreement at the 23rd Council in June 1993, which gave be less clear should a unilateral license be the Director the authorisation to sign it. granted.
ESPI Report 46 20 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
The EUMETSAT Council started to reflect on to as the “Geostationary Agreement”. Shortly the proposal for an agreement with the U.S. after, the Geostationary Agreement was 29 on geostationary (and polar) data use in May signed and entered into force.22F28F The provi- 1994 and used its data policy – as agreed in sions were in line with the principles defined 1991 – as a legal reference. The organisa- by the EUMETSAT Council. tion’s Working Group on Data Policy (WGP) and its Policy Advisory Committee (PAC) rec- Extension of the Geostationary Agreement ommended basing the HRI data agreement upon four major principles: The duration of the ‘initial’ Geostationary Agreement was stipulated to be five years, • The agreement ensures that both parties which meant that is was due to expire on 20 make their data available to the other July 2000. Given the wish of both parties to partner under certain conditions on a no- continue collaboration in geostationary mete- exchange of funds basis. orology, a new agreement had to be drafted. • U.S. governmental authorities can use Consultation between the partners resulted in EUMETSAT data worldwide for official a draft proposal for the Extension of the duty purposes. NOAA shall provide EUMETSAT-NOAA Geostationary Agreement. EUMETSAT with a list explaining what Although the spirit of this proposed ‘Extended kind of EUMETSAT data is used by U.S. Geostationary Agreement’ was similar to its Governmental Authorities and for which predecessor, some changed were made, as it purposes. was necessary to incorporate new develop- • EUMETSAT data is freely available for re- ments. For example, NOAA was interested in search purposes in the USA. However, being granted access to Meteorological Data this shall be carefully monitored to avoid Dissemination (MDD) material from the Me- commercial use of the data received at teosat satellites. This request was granted; no cost. access to MDD was added to the Image Data • A subset of EUMETSAT three-hourly data made available without fee to NOAA and was may be redistributed by NOAA to Ameri- provided for official duty use without territo- can commercial users. Hourly and half- rial restriction. NOAA also proposed rephras- hourly data, however, shall not be acces- ing the liability clause because of an ongoing sible without a prior licence to be granted policy debate within the U.S. Government on by EUMETSAT. The latter is granted on a the use of language in international agree- non-discriminatory basis against a fee in ments. It was deemed that the notion of wil- accordance with general EUMETSAT tar- ful misconduct was not sufficiently defined iffs. and thus its use would weaken the parties’ Following authorisation by the 25th commitment to cross-waiver of liability. EUMETSAT Council, a draft agreement con- In contrast to the Geostationary Agreement, taining the above elements was consequently the duration of the renewed agreement was proposed by the EUMETSAT Secretariat to linked to the end of life of the EUMETSAT NOAA in the summer of 1994. After initial satellites under the Meteosat Transition Pro- discussions NOAA informed the Secretariat in gramme (MTP), instead of a fixed period. The September that year that the U.S. had de- MTP program was established to ensure op- cided to undertake a general review of its erational continuity between the end of the data policy and that therefore no formal ne- successful Meteosat Operational Programme gotiations could take place with EUMETSAT in 1995 and Meteosat Second Generation until this review had been completed. The (MSG), which eventually came into operation secretariat, taking note of the situation, drew at the start of 2004 using improved satellites. attention to the fact that Meteosat HRI data The MTP provided an overlap with MSG by would be encrypted from September 1995 continuing the current Meteosat system until onwards and that it would be in the interest the end of the year 2005. of NOAA to have an agreement on data ac- cess as early as possible, given that some Access to Meteosat Second Generation Geosta- technical adjustments of receiving facilities tionary Data would become necessary for data decryption. By 2002, the run-up to the Meteosat Second In July 1995 – a few months before the en- Generation was taking place, and so both cryption was to go into effect – NOAA indi- partners started to prepare a draft agreement cated that the internal review of data policy that would guarantee NOAA access to images issues on the American side had nearly been and MDD material from EUMETSAT’s new and completed. On this basis, informal negotia- improved generation of geostationary satel- tions between the trans-Atlantic partners proceeded, resulting in a draft agreement on 29 “Access to Images from the EUMETSAT Geo- The Geostationary Agreement was signed by EUMETSAT and NOAA on the 12th and the 20th of July stationary Meteorological Satellites”, referred 1995, respectively.
ESPI Report 45 21 September 2013
lites. The eventual result – not surprisingly – meteorological community creates an open was very much in line with the spirit of the and very science-oriented context that facili- Extended Geostationary Agreement. After all, tates the decision-making process and im- the structure and stipulations in the previous plementation of both NOAA’s and agreements had proven to be a solid basis for EUMETSAT’s activities. collaboration in the field of data exchange, In terms of shared objectives, it is very clear therefore all clauses were altered only to that the two partners are closely aligned: i.e. include references to the MSG Image Data both are operational agencies with a similar and MDD Material. Further, the agreement mission and modus operandi regarding time also stated that the free access granted to horizon, risk-avoidance, requirements and NOAA was given in recognition of its contri- user-communities. With criteria four and five, butions to the WMO’s GOS and the meteoro- the definition of responsibilities and plans for logical satellite data provided to EUMETSAT, data access and distribution were guaranteed its Member States and user communities. by the stipulations in the Back-Up Agreement Signed in June 2003 for a period of five and the Geostiaonary Agreement. Although years, this agreement too was followed up by the joint geostationary activities were among an Extension Agreement in July 2008, which the first direct bilateral forms of collaboration automatically renews itself after five years, between EUMETSAT and NOAA, the fledging unless either party objects by providing 60 sense of partnership was demonstrated by days written notice to terminate to the other the willingness to help out each other by re- party. position satellites and the executed activities, both legal and technical, related hereto. Moreover, the non-exchange of funds basis of 3.3 Geostationary Satellite the Back-Up Agreement shows that there was sufficient trust and confidence between the Activities and the Theo- partners that over time efforts would be more retical Framework or less balanced and mutual. In other words, EUMETSAT and NOAA regarded each other’s Now that all collaborative activities between technical capabilities as more or less of the EUMETSAT and NOAA in the field of geosta- same quality and reliability; otherwise, the tionary satellites have been described, they non-exchange of funds basis would have can be linked to the theoretical framework on been detrimental for one of the parties. Re- the “key elements to success in international views take place through the renewals of the collaboration in space missions” presented at legal agreements that are intended to pro- the beginning of the study. long them and at the same time keep them up-to-date. The historical foundations preceding the first pursued geostationary undertakings were Finally, beneficial characteristics of these first already described elaborately in the second collaborative undertakings are definitely pre- chapter of the study. In addition to those sent. Although they will be addressed in foundations laid before the establishment of much more depth in the final chapter of the NOAA and EUMETSAT, the collaboration re- study, it is clear that the stipulations of the cord revealed that both organisations initially two agreements guarantee a more secure started collaborating on an ad hoc and case- data access and, increased continuity of data based basis, as illustrated by the reposition- providence for the user communities in cases ing of the GOES-4 satellite and later the Me- of performance anomalies or premature sat- teosat-3 satellite. These developments paved ellite failures. the way for the structural, pro-active joint All these elements demonstrate that the activities deployed later: the Back-Up Agree- working together in geostationary satellite ment and the Geostationary Agreement. In meteorology entails all elements essential for terms of scientific support, the second crite- successful collaboration and while some crite- rion, both organisations can internally and ria – such as the historical foundations and externally count on a wide range of expertise shared objectives – were intrinsically fulfilled, from scientists, management and engineers. others were guaranteed by the choices made In addition, the user-driven structure of the in their collaboration record.
ESPI Report 46 22 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
4. Polar Orbiting Satellites
Unlike geostationary satellites, the ground lites in the early 1970s, the TIROS-N se- 30 track of polar orbiting satellites moves with ries.23F29F respect to the Earth’s surface. Passing close An important step in the process of polar to the poles at approximately 800 km above orbiting satellite collaboration was the the planet, these satellites cover a different authorised declassification of the previously ground swath on each successive orbit. Gen- secret Defense Meteorological Satellite Pro- erally, polar-orbit meteorological satellites gram (DMSP) in the United States. This deci- are given a sun-synchronous orbit that en- sion, made by President Nixon in 1973, led to sures that the satellite ascends or descends a restructuring in order to avoid the danger over any given Earth latitude at the same of partial duplication and the related redun- local mean solar time. This time consistent dant development cost of funding two similar position facilitates the comparability of the series. As a consequence, NOAA was directed detailed and specialised data on the Earth’s to use the DoD spacecraft design for the next surface and atmosphere their instruments generation of polar-orbiting satellites. An provide. This data supports a broad range of important element in this second generation environmental monitoring applications includ- series was the choice of using a two space- ing weather analysis and forecasting, climate craft NOAA system to cover the morning and research and prediction, global sea surface 31 afternoon orbit.24F30F In the 1980s, however, temperature measurements, atmospheric NOAA needed to balance the high cost of soundings of temperature and humidity, space systems and the growing need to pro- ocean dynamics research, volcanic eruption vide a complete and accurate description of monitoring, forest fire detection, global vege- the atmosphere at regular intervals as input tation analysis and many others. to numerical weather prediction and climate monitoring support systems. This implied NOAA was considering the option of covering 4.1 The First Developments only one orbit in the future. As this restruc- turing would have repercussions on the bal- in Polar Orbiting Collabo- ance of input of the Global Observing Sys- ration tem, intergovernmental discussions were initiated to guarantee the continuity of ser- vice of the GOS in the long term. 4.1.1 The American Meteorological Polar Satellite System 4.1.2 The Choice of a European Meteorological The United States has been experimenting Polar Satellite System with polar orbiting satellites since the begin- ning of its space programme in the 1950s. The official U.S. announcement declaring the The ninth Television Infrared Observation intent to downscale the American polar- Satellite (TIROS-9), developed by NASA, was orbiting programme from 1995 onwards was the first to provide a complete daily coverage made by the Reagan Administration in 1983, of the entire sun-illuminated portion of the coincidentally also the year in which the Earth. It was launched into sun-synchronous, EUMETSAT convention was opened for signa- near polar-orbit in 1965. Throughout the ture. More precisely, American morning and 1960s and 1970s a period of phenomenal afternoon orbit satellites were to be launched discovery and development in remote sensing characteristics occurred as a result of the 30 These second generation satellites provided day and symbiotic and productive relationship be- night viewing of the Earth’s cloud formulation with visible tween NASA, the U.S. Department of Defence and infrared scanning radiometers, simultaneous direct (DoD) and NOAA. As an heir to this environ- readout broadcasts, and data storage for later playback to mental satellite technology, NOAA was able a central processing ground station. They also measured snow and ice extent, sea surface temperatures, and to establish its own programme of opera- gathered vertical atmospheric temperature and moisture tional ‘second generation’ polar orbiting satel- profiles over the entire globe on a daily basis. 31 A major aim in the second generation of polar orbiting satellites in the U.S. was to achieve daily, day and night global atmospheric sounding coverage.
ESPI Report 45 23 September 2013
in 1994 and 1995, respectively, and thereaf- nuity, reliability and affordability in the ISS ter, only the afternoon orbit would have con- solution. Eventually, in early 1989, NOAA tinuity within the NOAA responsibility. It finally abandoned the ISS option in favour of should be recalled that this decision was independent polar-orbiting satellites. As a driven by cost savings in the United States consequence, the specifications on implemen- and by the will to get a more balanced global tation were now to be elaborated further on input in the WMO’s GOS framework. It was the European side only. Nonetheless, ESA generally understood that Europe was ex- and EUMETSAT were confronted with a differ- pected to take over coverage in the morning ent mind-set regarding the set-up and struc- orbit. Following this declaration, the issue of ture of this venture. The EUMETSAT Council global Earth observation was taken up by the approved a resolution that stated that G7 summit in 1983. The political leaders at EUMETSAT was prepared to consider a fixed the G7 forum held in Williamsburg, Virginia, financial contribution to the polar-orbiting decided to set up a dedicated panel of ex- activity and to prepare a follow-on pro- perts on remote sensing from space to take gramme that would ensure long-term com- up the matter. This panel, attended by repre- mitment. In parallel, ESA was developing the 32 sentatives of the G7 Member States25F31F , along Polar-Orbiting Earth Mission (POEM) as a with ESA and the European Commission, met follow-up to its European Remote Sensing one year later in Washington DC to discuss (ERS) satellites, and these parallel paths the possible contributions they could make to resulted in lack of clarity on the further de- 33 34 a polar-orbiting mission.26F32F In response to one ployment of a European polar system.27F33F This of the recommendations from the panel, the lasted until the EUMETSAT Council meeting in permanent coordination platform ‘Committee June 1992, where it was decided that ESA on Earth Observation Satellites’ (CEOS) was should formulate a revised plan based on the established. Although ESA envisaged a polar- splitting of the POEM concept into two parts, orbiting mission by the mid-1990s, it took a the Environmental Satellite (Envisat) and the somewhat cautious approach in the discus- Meteorological Operational Satellite pro- sions regarding operational meteorology from gramme (MetOp). This milestone set the the mid-morning orbit. It considered that scene for the preparation of a new polar- additional support for meteorological satel- orbiting programme for EUMETSAT, which lites would prove difficult given its relatively together with ESA, would be jointly responsi- recent involvement in geostationary meteoro- ble for the procurement of the MetOp satel- logical satellites. Some of the European lites. The Preparatory Programme for the states present were in favour of a European EUMETSAT Polar System (EPS), the European initiative as a contribution to the international component of the Initial Joint Polar System, polar-orbiting system, analogue to the Euro- had commenced. peanised structure of the Meteosat pro- gramme. This pointed the way towards future EUMETSAT involvement, however, many ob- 4.1.3 Towards the Initial Joint Polar System stacles impeded a fast final decision. Before the Initial Joint Polar System (IJPS) A major barrier at the time was the scope of was established by NOAA and EUMETSAT, the International Space Station (ISS). NASA both organisations had the intent of sharing was strongly in favour of having an array of infrastructure and exchanging instruments in operational meteorological instruments on the field of polar orbiting satellites. Although board the ISS, as this would have the advan- eventually only the infrastructure was shared tage of on-board maintenance and upgrading and the instruments were only later ex- through human involvement. Meteorologists changed under the IJPS agreement, these on both sides of the Atlantic, however, had prior actions stimulated the sense of partner- reservations as to its effectiveness for opera- ship between both organisations, and as such tional meteorology. EUMETSAT acted as a they paved the way for the later deployment focal point for the general European require- of the IJPS. ments and after a while it became clear there were serious shortcomings in terms of conti- Sharing of Infrastructure In 1987, the French Meteorological Service 32 asked EUMETSAT to consider the possibility These countries were France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United of taking over NOAA equipment it had been States and, Canada. using at the CMS site at Lannion, France. The 33 EUMETSAT was not present because its convention was still open for signature, but it would later become a member of the International Polar Orbiting Meteorological 34 It should be noted that ESA offered EUMETSAT a free Satellite group (IPOMS), a specialised body proposed by flight on its polar platform. This offer, however, carried no the panel to focus – among other things – on the commitment to any launches after that flight. Thus, this implementation of the polar orbiting component of the offer did not meet the long term operational requirements GOS. of EUMETSAT.
ESPI Report 46 24 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
equipment and ground facilities at Lannion through industry, by the U.K. Meteorological were initially given for exploitation to the Office, which had provided this instrument for French Met Service to support NOAA polar- the previous NOAA-K, NOAA-L and NOAA-M 35 orbiting satellites (TIROS-N series) in 1981.28F34F satellites. AMSU-B was designed as a multi-
The major driving force behind the request to channel microwave radiometer0H intended to EUMETSAT was a new superseding EEC- examine several bands of microwave radia- regulation that would end the tax and VAT tion from the atmosphere to perform humid- exemption this material had been subject to ity soundings in cloudy conditions. The pro- for many years. Acquisition by EUMETSAT curement of the AMSU-B for the NOAA-N would avoid this impending taxation, and at satellite would consist of purchase through a the same time offer a European perspective dedicated EUMETSAT contract. Eventually, for the use of this equipment. The latter was however, this instrument was exchanged as especially relevant in the context of expand- part of the activities defined in the IJPS ing EUMETSAT data processing activities. agreement. Moreover, the support of EUMETSAT would be The other instrument, a Microwave Humidity a small contribution as it increased the Euro- Sounder (MHS), was to be provided to NASA pean input regarding meteorological observa- for the purpose of its Earth Observation Sys- tions by satellites, thus decreasing the total tem Programme (EOS). Initially conceived as imbalance of input on the EUMETSAT side a large undertaking, the EOS was put that had developed in the late 1980s. It through a restructuring process after reduc- should be recalled that at the time, NOAA tion in funding levels by the U.S. Congress. was still providing back-up support by reposi- Structurally, this meant that the instruments tioning its GOES-4 satellite and no back-up had to flown on a series of intermediate-sized support provided by EUMETSAT to NOAA had and smaller spacecraft instead of a series of yet taken place. In this regard, the take-over large platforms. More specifically, the Micro- of equipment helped EUMETSAT gain some wave Humidity Sounder (MHS) instrument political impetus at a time when the organisa- was a successor to the AMSU-B and was de- tion was still small and had to prove its capa- signed to provide and improve continuity with bility to build solid partnerships and to live up the polar sounding capabilities aboard the to its international commitments. Finally, this EOS-PM spacecraft scheduled for launch in takeover would be beneficial from a purely 36 December 2000.29F35F Although this provision meteorological point of view as well, since the was initially hard to reconcile with the operation involved acceleration of the acqui- EUMETSAT Convention, later amendments sition of data on Western Europe, an essen- expanded the objectives of EUMETSAT to tial element in weather forecasting. include contributing “to the operational moni- It was understood that the allocation of the toring of the climate and detection of global equipment from CMS to EUMETSAT would climatic change”. The basic assumption for take place without any exchange of funds, the provision of these instruments was that and that CMS – together with NESDIS – the synergetic sounding data from AMSU-A, would provide, at its own cost, the facilities MHS and AIRS, installed on the NASA EOS and personnel necessary to fulfil its responsi- platforms, could be made available to bilities under the agreements. After agree- EUMETSAT and its users via NOAA. The ad- ment by EUMETSAT’s STG and AFG, the Se- vantage of this pre-operational demonstra- cretariat prepared two draft arrangements, tion of the Advanced Infra-Red Sounder AIRS one between France and EUMETSAT and one was that it would enable the major forecast between NOAA and EUMETSAT. Eventually centres in Europe to assess the value of hy- the signing of the Memorandum of Under- perspectral infrared soundings, which standing (MoU) and exchange of letters be- EUMETSAT deployed on the MetOp satellites tween EUMETSAT and NOAA/NESDIS in No- in 2006, based on different technology devel- 37 vember 1988 made official the allocation of oped in Europe by CNES.36F Although eventu- the Lannion equipment to EUMETSAT. ally this instrument was not delivered to NASA due to programme restructuring, ex- Exchange of Instruments change of instruments would become one of Part of the EUMETSAT Polar System (EPS) Preparatory Programme was to procure two 36 Technically, the instrument was replaced by a similar instruments that would be provided to NOAA. microwave humidity sounder called HSB. The spacecraft Until then this Advanced Microwave Sounding was later renamed Aqua and was eventually launched on Unit B (AMSU-B) had been developed, May 4, 2002. 37 The CrIS instrument flown on the Suomi NPP satellite launched by the U.S. in 2011 was based on the same 35 technology as IASI, and the NOAA National Weather The ownership of the equipment, however, remained in the hands of NOAA all the time, CMS was responsible for Center benefited from the operational use of IASI data to the exploitation. prepare for using similar CrIS data.
ESPI Report 45 25 September 2013
the keystones of collaboration between the ground segments. The two series consist of a partners in the future IJPS constellation. morning service fulfilled by the EUMETSAT Polar System (EPS) programme, providing MetOp-A and MetOp-B and an afternoon ser- vice fulfilled by NOAA providing the NOAA-N 4.2 The Initial Joint Polar and NOAA-N’ satellites, including an ex- System change of instruments for flight on each other platform. Figure 1 illustrates the IJPS constel- This section describes the establishment of lation, showing the different satellites, the Initial Joint Polar System or IJPS. Con- ground systems and facilities for data dump- ceptually, the IJPS comprised two series of ing, both domestically and for the blind or- two polar orbiting satellites and respective bits.
Figure 1: The Initial Joint Polar System Configuration.
In retrospect, the IJPS turned out to be the ments. Eventually, ESA and EUMETSAT edged most complex and challenging achievement closer to harmony on the EPS programme so far of the EUMETSAT-NOAA relationship in and it was agreed that ESA would provide terms of effort and achieving progress and most of the funding for the first satellite in results. Issues of data policy and data denial the series (MetOp-A) and would, with turned out to be two of the major obstacles EUMETSAT, oversee the procurement of the in the negotiation phase, and will be ad- remaining two satellites (MetOp-B and -C). dressed thoroughly in this chapter. ESA would also take responsibility for the storage of the satellites and would be in- volved in the preparation for launch in all 4.2.1 Negotiation Phase cases. EUMETSAT would contribute to the On the European side, negotiations with cost of the first MetOp satellite and would NOAA on what was coined the Initial Joint fund the recurring satellites’ ground seg- Polar System were accompanied by intense ments, launch services, the launch early orbit internal debates on the exact nature of the (LEOP) phases. One of the policies that EUMETSAT Polar System. The EPS was con- EUMETSAT adopted in the EPS programme ceived as a three satellite programme over was the insistence on firm fixed price con- 14 years, including the satellites MetOp 1, 2 tracts that sought to avoid the risk of cost and 3. The nomenclature in the series was overruns. This has worked very much to its later transformed into A, B and C, respec- advantage and increased the political support tively. This confluence of internal programme for the EPS programme. development with an international dimension At the same time, EUMETSAT and NOAA were proved to be a challenging undertaking. In- in full negotiations on the intended IJPS joint- ternally, the complexity of the MetOp mis- venture. The EUMETSAT Council was develop- sions gave rise to conflict with ESA on the ing a proposal for the treatment of polar or- payload and on the nature of the procure- biting data. This was necessary to proceed in ment process to be followed for the instru- the negotiations with the American partners.
ESPI Report 46 26 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
Some developments in the United States, government’s wish to keep the confidentiality however, radically changed the expected of the decision-making process intact vis-à- course of the negotiations. vis industry until a final decision had been made. Given that DoD would occupy one The Impact of U.S. Convergence orbital slot and that IJPS was conceived as a two orbital slot satellite system – recall one On the American side, convergence turned morning orbit foreseen for EUMETSAT and the existing civil and military operational one afternoon orbit to be continued by NOAA meteorological satellite programmes into a – there was a risk of EUMETSAT becoming single, integrated, end-to-end satellite sys- redundant in the deployment of the overall tem. This joint programme was formed in polar observing system. Moreover, approval 1994 by a Presidential Decision Directive for the MetOp polar satellite system had not under the Clinton Administration. The U.S. yet been completed internally, which meant it government had traditionally maintained two became very hard for EUMETSAT to convince operational weather satellite systems, each its member states to provide the required with an over 40-year heritage of successful funding. EUMETSAT officials involved in the service: NOAA’s Polar-orbiting Operational negotiations at the time recall it took a lot of Environmental Satellite (POES)1H covering the negotiation effort and appealing to NOAA to afternoon orbit, and the U.S. Department of convince the U.S. to speak of a three satellite Defence’s (DoD) Defense Meteorological Sat- system, and to include EUMETSAT in the mid- ellite Program (DMSP) covering the early- 38 morning orbit30F37F . Eventually this was accom- morning orbit. At the time, however, changes plished although it was not an easy exercise in world political events and declining agency as the military dimension in the converged budgets prompted a re-examination of the American system brought in new require- two systems and a consideration of combin- ments fundamentally different from the civil- ing them. In 1992, a U.S. National Space ian modus operandi characterising NOAA and Council study recommended convergence of EUMETSAT. In this respect, EUMETSAT offi- the two separate weather satellite systems. cials experienced difficulties because DoD Following further recommendations and influ- seemed reticent to rely on international part- enced by increased interest of the U.S. Con- ners. gress, NOAA, DoD and NASA initiated studies in 1993 to determine how to converge the Eventually, with EUMETSAT confirmed as an two systems. A completed study revealed integral partner in the polar satellite system, that a converged system could reduce agency negotiations on the specifications of the de- duplication and bureaucracy, substantially ployment proceeded. The negotiation phase reduce costs, and satisfy both civil and mili- on the issues of data denial and data policy tary requirements for operational, space- for the implementation of the IJPS was initi- based, remotely sensed environmental data. ated by the convergence on the American This tri-agency study formed the basis for the side in the early 1990s and ended when a development of the implementation plan for final compromise was reached on all specifi- what would later become the National Polar- cations as formalised in the final IJPS agree- orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite ment signed in 1998. Spanning many years, System, NPOESS. An Integrated Program different incidents throughout this period had Office (IPO) was set up to provide each of the seriously tested the solidity of the partnership participating agencies with lead responsibility that had grown between NOAA and for one of three primary functional areas. EUMETSAT. In retrospect, this tumultuous NOAA was given overall responsibility for the period can be divided into a first phase of converged system and was also responsible dissension, following a phase in which com- for satellite operations. NOAA was also the promise-seeking held the upper hand. The primary interface with the international and main reason for this equivocal course were civil user communities. DoD was made re- the envisaged underlying principles for the sponsible for supporting the IPO for major to-be-applied data policy and data denial in systems acquisitions, including launch sup- the eventual agreement, for which the solu- port. NASA had primary responsibility for tion lay in a compromise rather than convinc- facilitating the development and incorpora- ing the other partner to change its respective tion of new cost-effective technologies into data policy. After all, the specific data policies the converged system. applied by both organisations went back to their organisational structure and working In the negotiations between EUMETSAT and environment and hence could not be changed NOAA, this element entered very late and that easily. The following two sections de- without prior consultation and hence the ne- gotiation process was fundamentally trans- formed in a very short time. The late an- 38 The early morning orbit with an equatorial crossing time nouncement was due to the United States at 5.30 a.m. fell under the responsibility of the Department of Defence.
ESPI Report 45 27 September 2013
scribe the parallel negotiation processes and instruments over restricted areas during outcomes for the IJPS on data policy and times of conflict for reasons of national secu- data denial, respectively. rity. The EUMETSAT Secretariat informed the U.S. representatives of its reservations about Negotiations on Data Policy data denial in general because of its exclusive civilian character and that if data denial Around 1994, the initial EUMETSAT proposal should be debated by the EUMETSAT Council for the use of polar satellite data was struc- then it could only be considered on the basis tured around three points. The organisation’s of a proposal which fully respected an equal Working Group on Data Policy (WGP) and partnership between the organisations in- Policy Advisory Committee (PAC) recom- volved. Consequently, data denial was mended an agreement based upon following treated as a separate topic in the negotia- principles: tions on the IJPS and hence will be discussed • Low Rate Picture Transmission (LRPT) subsequently. data from both the European and the Following a discussion on this item at the 25th American polar satellites would be avail- EUMETSAT Council in June 1994, the Council able without any restrictions. deferred agreement on the proposal for polar • Global data and High Rate Picture orbiting satellite data pending the outcome of Transmission (HRPT) data from the further discussions on convergence of U.S. American satellite would be available programmes. The main open point between without any restrictions. both partners was the question whether • The EUMETSAT satellite would be built EUMETSAT’s data control would apply world- with an encryption capability. Concerning wide or only with regard to Europe. One year global data and HRPT data from that sat- later, at the 27th EUMETSAT Council in 1995, ellite EUMETSAT reserved the right to the negotiation efforts had resulted in a draft encrypt and control the data at a later agreement on the establishment of an Initial stage if necessary to protect the rights of Joint Polar System comprising of two series its Member States. In any event there of 2 polar orbiting satellites and their respec- would be no restrictions for official U.S. tive ground segments, including the ex- governmental authorities’ use worldwide. change of instruments for MetOp-A, B and In abovementioned principles, there is dis- NOAA-N and NOAA-N’. The EUMETSAT Secre- tinction concerning the availability of the high tariat intended to conclude the agreement rate picture transmission in the NOAA and but a consensus had not yet been reached on EUMETSAT satellites. In the EUMETSAT case, articles dealing with data policy. EUMETSAT the technical possibility for data encryption believed it should have the right to control served a functional purpose that was based access to HRPT and Global Data from the upon the specific data policy of the organisa- EUMETSAT satellites and that this control tion. Obtaining observations from meteoro- should not just apply to U.S. Government logical satellites is expensive. This was one of Agencies and other U.S. users. Access to the reasons why different European states HRPT and Global Data from EUMETSAT satel- had come together to share resources lites for non-U.S. users would be granted on through their participation in EUMETSAT. This a non-discriminatory basis according to de- 39 voluntary collaboration however implied that fined data policy principles.31F38F In the American free riding behaviour could be possible if all view, however, the right for EUMETSAT to data was available at no cost. If any country control access to IJPS data disseminated from not a member of EUMETSAT could receive all the EUMETSAT satellites would only be possi- high rate transmission data for free there ble within European territory, and not on a would be no incentive for any country to ap- global basis. It was agreed that the ply for membership and pay contributions. In EUMETSAT PAC would review the issue and this way, the data policy of EUMETSAT was – in addition to the reasons relating to WMO Resolution 40 – also shaped by its govern- 39 Certain data and types of use are subject to a fee, any ance structure. This required that a compro- user may obtain a license plus decryption key and is mise be found with organisations that oper- subject to license conditions. All National Meteorological ate on a national agency basis, like NOAA. Services of Members of the WMO are provided a set of data free of charge. For data sets beyond this "basic" data The converged satellites would satisfy both set, the following applies: All National Meteorological military and civil requirements, and conform- Services in countries with a Gross National Product of less ing to American practice, data from the con- than 2000 U.S. $ per capita may receive all data without any fee. Other National Meteorological Services are only verged system NPOESS would be openly dis- subject to fees for this additional data. Commercial users tributed under normal conditions. The U.S., have full access; however, there is a fee depending on the however, would have the possibility of re- kind of use intended. Research and educational use is free stricting access to data from certain of its of charge and access is provided at no more than the marginal cost.
ESPI Report 46 28 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
several options were subsequently put on the U.S. instruments except during crisis or war. table: For EUMETSAT this option was hard to ac- cept, as it would entail that each potential 1. Platform provider’s policy applies. All data instrument provider could come to the plat- from all instruments is subject to plat- form operators and propose to fly a new in- form operator’s policy. Encryption capa- strument with a completely new data policy. bility may be used at a platform opera- This could lead to conflict and to consequent tor’s discretion to implement this policy. lack of progress because potential instrument For the EUMETSAT platform, this involves providers would lack a clear understanding of use of data control (encryption), licensing what the technical and legal constrains of and fees. For the NOAA platform, data flying with a particular partner are. In the would be distributed without restriction light of long term development of increased consistent with U.S. data policy. international collaboration, EUMETSAT could 2. Instrument provider’s policy applies. Ac- not support this option as a general principle. cess to all data from any instrument is Ideally, EUMETSAT preferred to apply its pol- subject to the policy of the party that icy to all its satellites in the IJPS constella- provides the instrument. Data from NOAA tion, thereby enabling users to recognise the satellites is distributed without restriction immense value of the satellite data while to all users consistent with U.S. data pol- providing a mechanism to ensure a direct icy. Data from EUMETSAT instruments is benefit to those countries which provide the distributed in accordance with EUMETSAT actual funding, namely its Member States. In data policy. the context of the negotiations on data policy 3. Regional approaches: for the integrated IJPS system, EUMETSAT had a preference for option 1 because of its 1. EUMETSAT applies its policy and con- clarity; it would give an agency direct control trols data from the entire MetOp pay- over the data from the platform that it oper- load within a defined region and the ates and ensure that there is only one data U.S. establishes policy for the rest of platform for a given platform. For the U.S. world from its instruments. For the this option would only be politically viable if EUMETSAT platform, this entails use EUMETSAT did not apply restrictions to data of data control (encryption) within beyond those identified as acceptable in 3.1. the region. For the NOAA platform, Moreover, option 1 would imply that the U.S. data are distributed without restric- could be unable to ensure access to U.S. tion consistent with U.S. data policy. instruments data by NMSs globally even 2. EUMETSAT applies its policy and con- though these data are to be considered part trols data from the entire MetOp pay- of a single data set, which would be in con- load for all regions except the United travention of U.S. policy directives. States, including official United States Government duty use world- wide. For the EUMETSAT platform, EUMETSAT NOAA this entails global use of data control Assessment Option Assessment (encryption). For the NOAA platform, data are distributed without restric- Politically unvia- tion consistent with U.S. data policy. Preferred option 1 ble under most conditions 4. Procurement approach. EUMETSAT pro- cures the necessary U.S. instruments and Not preferable thus applies its policies to the entire pay- because of risk of 2 Preferred option load. NOAA procures the necessary conflict EUMETSAT instruments and thus applies Second best op- Second best op- its policies to the entire payload. Data tion / Compro- 3.1 tion / Compro- from NOAA satellites is distributed with- mise mise out restriction; data from EUMETSAT in- struments is distributed in accordance Complexity of Politically not 3.2 with its policies. licensing viable Based upon these different approaches, both Risk of diver- Politically not organisations put forward their preferred 4 gence and com- viable options. Ideally, the U.S. preferred there to plexity in IJPS be no restrictions placed on IJPS data at all, but as this option would be impossible given Table 2: Overview of the IJPS Data Policy Options and EUMETSAT’s data policy it had a preference their Attributes. for option 2, as this would ensure that no restrictions would be placed on data from
ESPI Report 45 29 September 2013
Further, U.S. officials stated they would be gional option 3.1, the EUMETSAT Council able to accept option 3.1 as a compromise, defined the conditions of access to so-called with some greater understanding on the na- “non-essential” that would be subject to use ture of the regional control EUMETSAT would within the EUMETSAT-zone. As opposed to exercise. Interestingly, this option combined the essential data set from EUMETSAT polar features of option 1 and 2, the EUMETSAT satellites, the non-essential data is subjected and NOAA preferences, respectively. Having to licensing and encrypted. The EUMETSAT regard for the U.S. policy, EUMETSAT also Council endorsed the view that, regarding the considered option 3.1 as a possible compro- non-essential data from U.S. instruments mise. In this regional option the U.S. policy aboard MetOp, EUMETSAT regulations would would apply worldwide for all instruments only apply for the use of these data in the except for use with Europe, while the EUMETSAT zone. It also stressed that in or- EUMETSAT policy would apply worldwide for der to enforce such regulations, it was neces- all EUMETSAT instruments except for use sary that the direct reception of this non- within the U.S. It is this symmetry that made essential data be controlled by encryption on this option acceptable as a compromise solu- a global and permanent basis. The Council tion. unanimously agreed that the Secretariat should further negotiate with the United Options 3.2 and 4 were not really favoured States officials in order to finalise the agree- by either partner. For EUMETSAT option 3.2 ment on this basis. Following the mandate would entail a huge deal of complexity be- given to the Director by Council, a meeting cause there would be licensing of the use of was held in January 1996 with U.S. represen- data from U.S. instruments over the entire tatives. In order to avoid a deadlock situa- world, while users could get free and unre- tion, a possible compromise approach was stricted access to the same data from the explored at the meeting. In addition, in the American satellites. For the United States, EUMETSAT PAC meeting of March 1996 it was this option was politically unviable for essen- agreed that for the IJPS the MHS data would tially the same reasons that were problematic be treated as essential data on both the U.S. in option 1: it would restrict the world com- and EUMETSAT platforms and that the munity’s access to data from U.S. instru- EUMETSAT Council would need to agree the ments and at worst, even restrict the use of terms of any conditions of use of the non- the data itself. Option 4 was not preferred by essential data. In essence, the compromise the U.S. because it would basically avoid the refers to the following key issues: compromise required for a common approach to a shared platform. It would imply signifi- • The U.S. accepts that certain data from cantly divergent data policies for separate their instruments on MetOp may be elements of the joint system. In fact, it would categorised as "non-essential data" by even reduce the cooperative and joint as- EUMETSAT. pects of the IJPS constellation as a whole, • EUMETSAT accepts not to control access increasing the risk of divergence between to data from U.S. instruments on MetOp. both partners because of the lack of historical This means that no encryption would ap- precedents for collaboration. The latter was ply to U.S. instruments during the Initial problematic because it could have serious Joint Polar System period. impacts on system optimisation and the abil- • The U.S. accepts that non-essential data ity of the U.S. to rely on the EUMETSAT ele- from U.S. instruments on METOP may be ment for national security purposes. subject to conditions on use (e.g. licens- EUMETSAT considered this option politically ing and charging) within the EUMETSAT unrealistic because it implied that the U.S. zone. would procure instruments in Europe and In the period following, discussions between EUMETSAT would procure instruments in the EUMETSAT officials and the United States U.S. Moreover, because of duplication of in- representatives progressed well and by mid- strument development cost, this option would 1996, most issues regarding IJPS data policy have decreased one the most substantial had been resolved. benefits of IJPS undertaking: economies of scale. Negotiations on Data Denial Further elaborating the compromise solution, 40 In parallel to the discussions on data policy, in line with the WMO Resolution 4039F , re- negotiations proceeded on the implementa- tion of data denial for U.S. instruments on 40 Secretariat of The World Meteorological Organization, MetOp-A and B. Data denial was one of the Resolution 40: “WMO Policy and Practice for the fundamental principles of the converged sys- Exchange of Meteorological and Related Data and tem; it must ensure the ability to selectively Products Including Guidelines on Relationships in Commercial Meteorological Activities” during The Twelfth deny critical environmental data to an adver- World Meteorological Congress (1995) (Cg-XII). sary during crisis or war, while enabling the
ESPI Report 46 30 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
use of such data by U.S. and allied military Allied national security objectives – forces. It was envisaged that the full con- e.g., whether it affects the lives of verged system would come into effect after U.S. and/or Allied personnel and re- NOAA-K, L, M, N and N’. The U.S. indicated sources; that while full convergence of instruments • an adversary’s ability to receive and and spacecraft would not occur before the exploit environmental data from U.S. construction of MetOp-A and B, there would sensors for military purposes; be a high possibility that MetOp-B would fly • an adversary’s ability to receive and during a time-frame in which it would be the exploit similar environmental data only mid-morning satellite and that MetOp-A from other sources for military pur- would still be in orbit during this time frame. poses; The U.S. therefore required that the data • what advantage the U.S. instru- denial capability be included in the NOAA- ments’ data would provide an adver- EUMETSAT IJPS Agreement for the American sary, given that similar data may be instruments flying aboard MetOp-A and B. available from other resources; This way, data denial would begin to be ap- • the impact of denying data to non- plied to U.S. instruments on both the U.S. adversaries who may also be affected converged system and the EUMETSAT plat- by data denial; forms at the time of the launch of the first • the U.S. would consider its interna- afternoon converged satellite. This decision to tional obligations, include those with develop an integrated structure suddenly EUMETSAT and its members, in mak- introduced a military component into the ing a decision on data denial. negotiations between EUMETSAT and NOAA, b. The Process for Decision would need to organisations that until then had been coop- reflect the equal partnership nature of erating on a civilian and user community the collaboration by timely and reliable oriented structure. consultation in the process leading up to Initially, the EUMETSAT Secretariat had res- a decision to deny data. ervations about the general concept of data • the EUMETSAT director would be the denial and its implementation because of the 41 focal point for consultations with the civilian character of the organisation.32F40F Fur- U.S. and be empowered by the ther, it informed the U.S. representatives EUMETSAT Council to act on its be- that if data denial should be debated by the half, which implies no concurrence is EUMETSAT Council it could only be consid- required by all EUMETSAT Member ered on the basis of a proposal that fully re- States individually; spected an equal partnership between the • the United States would inform the organisations involved. This meant that data EUMETSAT Director at the earliest denial could not just be imposed in a unilat- possible time that it was considering eral manner and without prior consultation. data denial; this would ensure that The United States agreed and negotiations the views of EUMETSAT would be in- were initiated to elaborate the further imple- tegral to the overall U.S. decision- mentation of data denial on the EUMETSAT making process; satellites. A first issue that required further • the United States would use the clarification was the procedure and process abovementioned criteria to assess for decision making to be followed and the the situation and inform the exact implementation for data denial on U.S. EUMETSAT Director. Since the criteria instruments. Both parties put forward their would be pre-agreed by the initial views and ensuing negotiations be- EUMETSAT Council, the Director tween the EUMETSAT Secretariat and the would be able to authorise implemen- United States yielded following common ap- tation to proceed data denial on a proach: timely basis; a. The Criteria for Decision are intended to • if more partners were part of an in- serve as a framework used by NOAA to ternational coalition including the explain its intention to the EUMETSAT Di- United States, a broader consultation rector: process will take place. • whether a condition of crisis or war c. The Implementation of data denial would exists or is developing and whether be performed by EUMETSAT on the fol- the crisis or war poses an immediate lowing basis: and serious threat to the U.S. and/or • to a specific user; • to a group of users; 41 Note that some of the EUMETSAT Member-States are • to a geographic region; or not members of NATO, such as Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland.
ESPI Report 45 31 September 2013
• to all users except the pre-defined 4.2.2 The Initial Joint Polar System Agreement list of users (incl. EUMETSAT and its Member States’ national meteorologi- By June 1996, most issues had been resolved cal services) on the understanding and NOAA was authorised to sign the Agree- that none of these users would redis- ment. In a vote, the EUMETSAT Council tribute data; and unanimously approved the collaboration • within a specific time frame. agreement with NOAA on an Initial Joint Polar Orbiting operational Satellite System. This This common approach was translated into a agreement took into account the modifica- draft ‘Procedure and Process for Decision tions requested by NOAA and those pre- Making and Implementation of Data Denial on sented by the EUMETSAT Secretariat. Apart U.S. instruments’ that further defined all from a number of editorial corrections and elements of data denial as described in the clarifications, modifications included provi- negotiations more precisely: crisis or war, sions on a geographically separate back-up critical data, adversary. In addition, this draft Command and Data Acquisition (CDA) ground procedure stated that both parties agreed station and a geographically separated back- that, in due course, reciprocal arrangements up Spacecraft Control Centre, in accordance could be established between the U.S. and with the EPS Programme Proposal. The ap- EUMETSAT to meet possible EUMETSAT data proval was given on the understanding that denial requirements. This draft document was the Agreement would only enter into force reviewed at the 19th EUMETSAT PAC Meeting after formal approval of the EPS Programme, in November 1995. Here, the United Kingdom and that the application of the EUMETSAT suggested that also European non-member data policy by possible future Cooperating states co-operating with EUMETSAT should be States could be addressed with NOAA in a treated as Member States for data denial, as separate exchange of letters. The latter guar- this would be consistent with the proposal to anteed the equal treatment of current and include them in the EUMETSAT zone in the future Cooperating Non-Member States of data policy negotiations. Also, the PAC rec- EUMETSAT. ommended that the provision for reciprocity in data denial should be stipulated in a legal The IJPS Agreement in Detail article rather than in the implementation th procedure. With the understanding that these At the 38 EUMETSAT Council in July 1998, changes would be made to the draft agree- EUMETSAT Director-General Tillmann Mohr ment, the EUMETSAT Council unanimously was pleased to announce that NOAA con- agreed to the inclusion of data denial as an firmed that the U.S. inter-agency clearance integral element of the collaboration agree- process had been completed, and thus that ment with the United States for the IJPS. NOAA had obtained the authority to sign the Agreement as soon as EPS entered into force. Both organisations set up a common Data This major achievement illustrated that the Denial Working Group (DDWG) that was United States had confidence in the imminent mandated to further elaborate on the issue. full start of the EPS Programme and One year prior to the launch of the first EUMETSAT’s capability to set up its opera- MetOp satellite, the DDWG completed a com- tional polar orbiting satellite system. The prehensive Data Denial Implementation Plan agreement was eventually signed by both (DDIP), which was reviewed and signed by parties in November 1998. both parties in 2004. Structures like the DDWG can be seen as a form of review as The preamble to the IJPS Agreement outlines they ensure continuous monitoring and im- the general context and major milestones in plementation of collaboration activities. the historic records of EUMETSAT and NOAA. Among other things, this ensures compliance Also, it recalls the longstanding and fruitful with each organisations’ operational needs collaboration between EUMETSAT and NOAA and is therefore vital for programme devel- in the field of Earth Observation and indicates opment in a solid cooperative framework. The the usefulness of polar-orbiting collaboration theoretical framework presented at the be- for research on climate change and other ginning of this study has already made clear sectors of the global Earth observation and that sound plans for data access and distribu- science user communities. Following Article 1 tion and reviews are indispensable for mis- describing the purpose of the IJPS in function sion success in international collaboration. of WMO and its GOS objectives, the Agree- For operational meteorology these elements ment addresses the future ambitions of this are even more critical as it operates on initiated collaboration. It states that the par- longer timescales. ties shall continue planning to extend the respective satellite series and to continue the interrupted availability of data from the sys- tem; generally improving polar observations beyond the satellite system as described in
ESPI Report 46 32 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
the overall agreement. This long term com- poses were included in an annex as described mitment is also reflected by the fact that IJPS in the previous section. – as the name indicates – concerns an initial To ensure a smooth IJPS implementation and operational system, implying the establish- operations, structures for management, co- ment of a follow-up system in the future. ordination and consultation were established. The general system configuration and the Although both IJPS management structures responsibilities of NOAA and EUMETSAT are remained independent, each party would covered in articles 3, 4 and 5, respectively. consult as necessary with the other party on These include the spacecraft NOAA-N and any matters under its control that might af- NOAA-N’ on the American side and MetOp-A fect the Agreement’s implementation. To this and 2 on the European side, the instrumenta- effect, both organisations agreed to develop tions carried by and exchanged between both and approve a Programme Implementation parties and the ground segments for space- Plan (PIP). This PIP set forth the points-of- craft control and, command and data acquisi- contact and management structures, all de- tion (CDA). In this respect, there are four tails required for the technical and manage- CDA sites that are active to support IJPS rial components of the IJPS deployment and services. NOAA operates one at Wallops Is- the services and technical documents to be land (Virginia) and a second one for data exchanged by both organisations. In addition, capture and satellite telecommanding at Fair- each party nominated a programme manager banks (Alaska). Those operated by responsible for the implementation of its own EUMETSAT are located in Fucino (Italy), and programme and ensuring close coordination in Svalbard (Norway). One of the unique as- between the NOAA and EUMETSAT responsi- pects of IJPS is the ability for EUMETSAT to bilities. These programme managers alter- command MetOp satellites through the Fair- nately chair a committee in charge of facili- banks station, and NOAA to command its tating consultation and coordination on the IJPS satellites through the Svalbard site. right level. Furthermore, the Agreement in- cluded general articles on: liability, based Similar to the approach taken in the geosta- upon a cross-waiver of liability clauses, title tionary collaboration, there is no exchange of and risk, settlements of disputes and, taxes funds foreseen; each party will bear the costs and customs. of fulfilling of its respective responsibilities. The financial obligations of both parties are Finally, the last Articles stipulated the circum- subject to the funding procedures and to the stances in which the Agreement could be availability of the appropriated funds. Be- amended and terminated. Noteworthy here is cause NOAA – unlike EUMETSAT – must rely that in the event of major technical schedule on yearly appropriations from the U.S. Con- or funding difficulties and if despite all rea- gress, it agreed that the funds required to sonable efforts the difficulties cannot be re- meet its obligations under the IJPS Agree- solved, either Party may terminate the ment would be included within the highest Agreement. In doing this, however, it would possible priority in its annual budget request. have to consider any major disadvantages for This expressed strong recognition of the im- the other party. If a party gave notice of portance of the IJP System to U.S. missions termination, both organisations had to reach and a strong sense of partnership towards agreement as soon as possible concerning the European partner. the terms of condition of termination, with a view to ensuring the orderly reorganisation or In terms of data policy, the regional approach termination of the IJPS. was integrated with the platform provider approach. This means that all data from In addition to the Agreement, a number of NOAA satellites would be provided to other issues related to the interpretation of specific users in accordance with U.S. data policy and provisions of the Agreement had been raised mutatis mutandis the same reasoning was both by EUMETSAT and the United States. applied to data from EUMETSAT satellites. Several exchanges of letters took place to However, EUMETSAT agreed not to control cover the exact implementation of the CDA access to the data from the NOAA instru- back-up ground station, the application of ments on the EUMETSAT satellites in the EUMETSAT data policy for future EUMETSAT sense that it would limit the application of its cooperating states, the non-discriminatory data policy concerning use of data from such basis for the application of the IJPS Agree- NOAA instruments to the territories of its ment and agreement not to protect eventual Member States only. In other words, the use IPR resulting from the IJPS. of data from NOAA instruments on EUMETSAT platforms was not subject to EUMETSAT data policy outside the EUMETSAT zone. The stipu- lations regarding data denial for military pur-
ESPI Report 45 33 September 2013
4.3 Evolution of the IJPS Col- anced collaboration while keeping its own data policy, European industry should main- laboration tain autonomy in strategic areas and, an eco- nomic solution should be implemented. For the latter there was strong support for small 4.3.1 The Need for Flexible, Continued Collabora- satellites, providing they could be delivered in tion a cost effective way. All along, the implementation of the IJPS The EUMETSAT Secretariat prepared a policy collaboration was accompanied by negotia- document that reflected the principles of fu- tions and discussions on the nature and base- ture collaboration and stipulated the long line of future collaboration activities. To en- term objective of having a joint series of sure timely follow-up, NOAA and EUMETSAT small missions, with each partner looking needed to accelerate their discussions on after one orbit (morning and afternoon) for post-EPS collaboration shortly after the sign- particular observation. For the short term, it ing of the IJPS Agreement. The reason was was necessary to agree on a balanced ex- that the Integrated Programme Office (IPO), change of instruments with the flight of Euro- in charge of the U.S. Converged Programme, pean instrumentation on NPOESS and Europe had already established requirements for the considering implementing the morning mis- upcoming NOAA Polar-orbiting Operational sion through a series of small satellites. Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and was planning to develop new sounding Regarding the exchange of instruments re- and imaging instruments which could be seen quired for the MetOp-C, the NOAA Assistant as duplicating European assets of the MHS, Administrator for NESDIS and the Director of IASI and GOME-2 instruments. Although in EUMETSAT reached the conclusion in 1998 principle such requirements and develop- that the only feasible and affordable solution ments were specific to the NPOESS system – would be to fly the identical instruments to be operated in the METOP-C timeframe – AMSU-A and AVHRR, just as on MetOp-A and they were also expected to form the Ameri- -B. There are a few reasons why the instru- can assets for the systems to be flown after ment package remained the same. The IPO – EPS. In this context, EUMETSAT needed first responsible for the procurement of the to establish an agreement for the U.S. pay- NPOESS programme – had embarked on par- load to be flown on MetOp-C, because the allel phase B studies for new instruments it provision of these instruments was not cov- was expecting to select for NPOESS platforms ered by the IJPS Agreement with NOAA. Sec- between 2000 and 2001, dates which could ondly, both organisations had to discuss op- not be made compatible with the MetOp-C tions for future collaboration in the post-EPS need dates. Also, the new complex imaging era. EUMETSAT felt such discussions were instruments driven by the U.S. Department of needed to avoid that U.S. decisions a priori Defence requirements were not going to be curtail the possibilities for collaboration or compatible with MetOp-C capabilities in terms result in a ‘fait accompli’ situation as regards of data rate or physical accommodation. the possible European role in the definition, Moreover, information on the design of such design, development and operation of a Joint instruments could not be made available due Polar System. The general objective for to legal constraints in the context of parallel EUMETSAT was to reach agreement with competitive studies. Unlike the case of NOAA and their U.S. partners on the basic MetOp-A and -B, no HIRS/4 would be flown principles for future co-operation. on MetOp-C, as the EUMETSAT instrument IASI would have proven its value by then. Initial Developments The EUMETSAT assumption was that all other instruments as part of the American IJPS The EUMETSAT Policy Advisory Committee contribution would be supplied at no cost to (PAC) agreed on the importance of EUMETSAT by the United States. Following EUMETSAT being actively involved in the discussions between EUMETSAT and the definition of the overall strategy for collabo- American partners, this was seen as the only ration with the USA on the post EPS satellite viable way forward by both sides. The system and that to this effect a meeting EUMETSAT PAC recommended that the Direc- would be organised with NOAA in 1999. In tor be given by the Council the mandate to parallel, the PAC requested the Secretariat to finalise the negotiations with the U.S., noting pursue mechanisms for post EPS user re- that the preferred option regarding the legal quirements. At the same time, the PAC pro- framework would be an extension of the cur- duced a set of basic principles upon which rent IJPS Agreement. future collaboration would have to be based. The conclusions were that Europe should In parallel to the negotiations on the ex- have a clear and valued role within a bal- change of instruments, informal discussions
ESPI Report 46 34 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
were held in 1998 and 1999 between the JPL India, Russia and others. This general AIRS project Team and the EUMETSAT Secre- policy to broaden collaboration in terms tariat. It became clear that NASA, EUMETSAT of participation would also be addressed and CNES had a common interest in cooper- in the MoU. The idea that more concrete ating on some activities relevant to AIRS and activities and discussions on broader col- 42 IASI33F41F . More precisely, the NASA AIRS in- laboration with other satellite operations strument and the IASI instrument are in could easily take place within existing in- many respects comparable and collaboration formal groups was also supported; between the procuring organisations could • It was proposed to extend the current deliver risk reduction. European activities in IJPS Agreement to MetOp-C on the as- support of AIRS calibration and validation sumption that it would fly the American would benefit NASA and would offer Europe instrumentation AVHRR, AMSU-A and the the possibility of collecting expertise on the SEM instruments. NOAA officials con- post-launch pre-operational activities to the firmed that NOAA would be ready to pro- benefit of IASI afterwards. After the initial vide these instruments to EUMETSAT; negotiations which outlined the scope of the collaboration, the duties foreseen for the • Regarding the potential way forward, the respective partners were agreed and formal- potential use of small satellites was con- ised shortly after by means of a Letter of sidered. Participants agreed that, despite Agreement signed by the different partners. the fact that small satellites provide an optimum route for additional missions with specific orbit requirements, it was 4.3.2 The Future Collaboration Taking Shape still not clear whether they could offer a cost-effective way to replace the current The Baseline for Further Collaboration and IJPS system with state-of-the-art technology. Extension Therefore, the high-level group was tasked to propose an action plan to pre- An important milestone for the baseline of pare a study on small satellites technol- future collaboration in Low Earth Orbit Pro- ogy; grammes was the discussion meeting held in Darmstadt on 21 January 2000 between • There would be an exchange of staff be- EUMETSAT and NOAA, represented at admin- tween EUMETSAT and NOAA and also istrator level by Jim Baker. It was structured here, the high-level working group was around six main elements: tasked to prepare a relevant statement of work. • A first point was the reconfirmation of the collaboration between the agencies. Also at the meeting, NOAA representatives It was agreed that the parties would de- suggested that consideration should be given velop a Memorandum of Understanding to the possibility of a joint altimetry mission. (MoU) setting out the basis for long-term It was noted that, viewed from the United collaboration. That way, the MoU would States, EUMETSAT would be a logical partner allow NOAA and EUMETSAT to jointly with NOAA to carry the NASA/CNES Jason plan future cooperative programmes mission into operational status by means of covering issues such as realisation of follow-up missions. This proposal was not left joint studies on technical issues, common unaddressed as both organisations success- experiments, observer status for NOAA in fully established this venture later on. This the EUMETSAT Council and EUMETSAT further broadening of the set of collaboration being represented as an observer on activities between the organisations will be 43 relevant NOAA boards34F42F ; discussed thoroughly in chapter five of this study. • The U.S. proposed establishing a high- level working group tasked with prepara- The high-level working group established by tion for future collaboration. This idea the partners elaborated on the nature of fu- was unanimously accepted; ture working together, which resulted in a proposed baseline for the exchange of in- • The possibility of involving other interna- struments. It was stated that NOAA agreed to tional partners in the undertaking of a provide AVHRR, AMSU-A, SARSAT and SEM joint polar system such as Japan, China, instruments for MetOp-C in a timeframe con- sistent with the schedule of the MetOp indus- 42 Recall that the IASI instrument to be flown on the trial contract and the overall IJPS schedule. EUMETSAT MetOp platforms was developed by CNES in Attention was drawn to the fact that these the framework of a collaboration agreement. instruments also serve as spares for NOAA-N, 43 Eventually this did not happen, but a similar baseline NOAA-N’ and MetOp-A and B. This meant plan for future collaboration was signed on 27 August 2013 that under certain circumstances reshipping in the office of the Delegation of the European Union to the United States in Washington DC. to the U.S. could be required for use on
ESPI Report 45 35 September 2013
NOAA-N and/or NOAA-N’. If one or more ment for a joint polar system. Also, it would spares had to be used for these satellites, replace the existing extension of the IJPS then a solution would have to be found by Agreement, as all relevant provisions for the the partners. Unfortunately, this scenario exchange of instruments and agency repre- became reality as will be explained later in sentatives were also included. this chapter. Further, the instruments were to In the initial draft, the Joint Transition Activi- be provided to EUMETSAT on a non-exchange ties as defined involve elements of three po- of funds basis and under the same terms as lar-orbiting satellite systems: POES, EPS, and those applicable to the U.S. instruments on NPOESS. New in this agreement was the ref- MetOp-A and -B. NOAA, however, could not erence to the six satellites in the NPOESS commit to full technical support beyond the series, C-1 through C-6, covering the early NOAA-N’ launch, which was scheduled for morning, mid-morning and afternoon orbit. 2008. Additional support therefore would Structured around MetOp-C satellite activities potentially require a separate agreement. To and the provision of NOAA POES instruments, avoid a complete redraft of the IJPS Agree- the sharing of data and data products from ment in order to extend it to apply to MetOp- MetOp-C and the NPOESS Series, and addi- C, it was agreed to cover this extension tional transition activities, the draft agree- through an exchange of letters, and to re- ment defined the responsibilities for NOAA solve all details of a technical and program- and EUMETSAT, both individually and jointly. matic nature through amendments to the Also, it stipulated that both parties would IJPS Programme Implementation Plan. work together on a long-term basis to define The exchange of staff between both organisa- a joint polar system based on common user tions was seen as a good opportunity to fa- requirements, based upon all reasonable cilitate the implementation of the IJPS and to efforts, within 8 years of signature of the JTA prepare future LEO programmes. After formal Agreement. This was done in order to ensure unanimous agreement, EUMETSAT and NOAA continuity of data services from the systems, each appointed a liaison engineer, located in a major driving force in operational satellite Washington DC and Darmstadt, respectively. meteorology. In terms of funding, data pol- The extension of the IJPS Agreement was icy, data denial and other standard provi- formalised through an exchange of letters in sions, the content and structure of the draft May 2000. This was, however, only the first JTA Agreement was similar to the IJPS step in the era of post-IJPS collaboration. Agreement. From a partnership point of view, the inter- 4.3.3 Joint Transition Activities esting thing about the JTA Agreement is that it was amended several times, once during The JTA Agreement the drafting process and four times after it was signed. These amendments occurred as After further reflection the high-level working a response to incidents that affected the group suggested that it would be better to availability of instruments and a restructuring cover both the elements of collaboration fore- of the NPOESS Programme on the American seen for the transition phase and the baseline side. for future collaboration under one umbrella agreement. Normally, this joint planning for Amendments to the Draft JTA Agreement future cooperative programmes would take place through a Memorandum of Understand- For EUMETSAT one particular development ing but the United States stated that it would raised questions and concerns regarding the be difficult to process this MoU in an election balanced relationship it had established with year. Therefore both aspects were subsumed NOAA. When the United States Government into a proposed ‘Joint Transition Activities awarded a contract for the implementation of regarding Polar-Orbiting Operational Envi- the NPOESS satellite system, it included a – ronmental Satellite Systems’ Agreement. The for EUMETSAT unexpected – procurement for drafting of this so-called JTA Agreement both advanced imaging and sounding instru- started in autumn 2001. Further discussions ments to be flown on the mid-morning satel- took place in EUMETSAT in February 2002, a lites. This meant that, if equipped with a full few months later in Washington in June and package of sounding instruments, the satel- by teleconference in September that year. lites would entirely duplicate EUMETSAT EPS These preparatory discussions led to a final capabilities of the MetOp satellites and this negotiation meeting in EUMETSAT on 26 Sep- based on a unilateral U.S. decision. Not only tember 2002. The draft JTA Agreement de- would this conflict with the agreement fined all the terms of collaboration between reached in the margins of the G7 summit, NOAA and EUMETSAT during the transition which highlighted the importance of sharing from the IJPS Agreement to a future Agree- responsibilities for observations in the Low Earth Orbit between Europe and the USA, but
ESPI Report 46 36 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
it could also raise internal problems for the letter co-signed by the EUMETSAT Direc- EUMETSAT. After all, a significant factor in tor-General and the EUMETSAT Council obtaining support for and commitment to the Chairman. This included recognition by NOAA EPS Programme had been the strategic part- that the IASI sounder, as specified, was ex- nership with the American partners. The uni- pected to meet or exceed the NPOESS re- lateral action taken by the U.S. implied that quirements. NOAA confirmed that it would EUMETSAT had to identify a way forward to not fly an advanced sounding package in the maintain the overall integrity of the partner- mid-morning orbit as long as EUMETSAT ship that was built upon reciprocity. would be providing advanced atmospheric EUMETSAT noted that if this were not possi- temperature and humidity sounder data. The ble, its Member States might question the JTA Agreement and its side letters were continued funding of the EPS/MetOp pro- signed in Darmstadt in June 2003. gramme. EUMETSAT feared that if no solution to this turf-issue was found it might be det- First Amendment: Impact of NOAA-N’ Recovery rimental to the willingness of the European states to join in future partnership pro- A few months after the JTA Agreement was grammes. Also there could be implications on signed, an unfortunate incident occurred in a wider front, as international efforts through the assembly room of Lockheed Martin Space the Integrated Global Observing Strategy Systems in California. As the NOAA-N' satel- Partnership to achieve more integrated strat- lite was being rotated from vertical to hori- egy for observations could suffer. In an inter- zontal position, it fell, causing considerable national context, the NOAA-EUMETSAT stra- damage to the spacecraft. The instruments tegic partnership was seen as a model for had to be removed from the spacecraft for an implementation, and if the international assessment that had to determine whether community received the message that the they remained flight qualified or required United States and Europe could not work replacement. In this process, NOAA received together in this area, then the ability to forge assistance from its partners EUMETSAT and new partnerships would have been in jeop- CNES. The problem was that if instruments ardy. were damaged, this could severely affect the implementation of the EUMETSAT Polar Sys- After informing NOAA through a letter co- tem. Two different Agreements were applica- signed by the EUMETSAT Director-General ble in this case. For MetOp-C it was foreseen and the EUMETSAT Council Chairman, U.S. in the JTA Agreement that NOAA would pro- Navy Vice Admiral Lautenbacher said that vide to EUMETSAT the AVHRR, AMSU-A1 and MetOp high level specifications might fulfil A2 and SEM instruments. Recall, however, NPOESS sounding requirements for the mid- that these instruments served as spares for morning orbit and therefore the U.S. decided the IJPS satellites, and given the fact that not to fly these capabilities on this orbit. This NOAA-N’ was damaged because of the acci- would mean that the capabilities of MetOp dent NOAA could no longer warrant the would not be duplicated and the strength of readiness of these instruments for flight on the NOAA - EUMETSAT collaboration would MetOp-C. The IJPS Agreement, which was continue to show. After this confirmation was still valid, stated that EUMETSAT would pro- formalised by the U.S., including the pro- vide a MHS Flight Model 2 Instrument for posed amendments by NOAA to the draft JTA NOAA-N’. In other words, EUMETSAT was in a Agreement to express this position, the position where the American instruments for EUMETSAT Council authorised the Director- MetOp-C could not be provided in the time- General to sign. It was proposed to have an frame foreseen, while at the same time, exchange of side letters as well which would EUMETSAT had to ensure the provision of an formalise the mutual understandings reached instrument to replace the one that might by the parties on points raised by the U.S. in have been damaged. the answer of Vice Admiral Lautenbacher to
EUMETSAT Instruments for NOAA NOAA Instruments for EUMETSAT
To be flown on NOAA-N' (IJPS) To be flown on MetOp-C (JTA)
AVHRR Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer
MHS Microwave Humidity Sounder AMSU-A 1/2 Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit 1 and 2
SEM Space Environment Monitor
Table 3: Instruments Subject to Exchange that were Affected by the NOAA-N’ Incident.
ESPI Report 45 37 September 2013
Shortly after the incident, NOAA assured the Secretariat and NOAA, NOAA proposed a EUMETSAT Council that its collaboration with similar mechanism to cover the repair of the EUMETSAT in MetOp-C was receiving due MHS FM2 instrument by assuming responsi- consideration and that it was developing op- bility for some of the long-term maintenance tions to deal with the NOAA-N’ accident. of the AVHRR instrument for Metop-C. That EUMETSAT received a written proposal on 30 way, EUMETSAT would have guaranteed September 2004. In this communication, maintenance for both the AVHRR and AMSU- NOAA confirmed its intention to extend its A1 and A2 instruments. Just like the previous support for the two AMSU-A units, designated arrangement, this cooperative effort required for integration on MetOp-C, from 2010 to a further amendment to the JTA Agreement. 2014, at no cost to EUMETSAT. This pro- In May 2005, the first flight model of the longed service would be offered in return for Microwave Humidity Sounder (MHS) instru- EUMETSAT’s agreement to deliver to NOAA a ment was successfully launched aboard the retested MHS by November 2005. If for some NOAA-N satellite. This represented the first reason EUMETSAT discovered a major prob- ever space hardware procured directly by lem during the testing of the MHS instru- EUMETSAT and launched into space in polar ment, both parties would agree to consult of orbit. The MHS was intended to replace the possible ways forward. Also, as these under- AMSU-B instrument as it delivered strong takings altered the agreement of the JTA improvements in radiometric performance Agreement, NOAA proposed to amend it at and therefore in the accuracy of the final the earliest convenience. Finally, NOAA asked 45 product.36F44F Through this collaboration, under EUMETSAT to confirm whether it would be the IJPS programme, EUMETSAT had a fully able to deliver an MHS instrument for inte- operational and accurate MHS instrument in gration on NOAA-N’ by November 2005. orbit generating the expected meteorological The assessment revealed that the AVHRR, products. The users were expected to benefit the AMSU-A1 and A2 units and the SEM in- from the improvements that the MHS instru- strument were damaged and needed re- ment offered over its predecessor. It was placement. NOAA would use the complete set proposed the damaged MHS FM2 instrument of spare instruments nominally allocated for for the NOAA-N’ satellite would be repaired MetOp-C for use on NOAA-N’, and decided to and when done the repaired FM2 instrument fund the rebuild of the instruments damaged would be returned to NOAA in March 2006, in during the accident. More precisely, it would line with NOAA’s needs. The JTA Agreement provide flight models for AVHRR, AMSU-A1 was amended for a second time in November and A2 instruments for MetOp-C. The SEM 2005 to incorporate these changes. instrument, however, would not be provided to EUMETSAT. Third Amendment: SEM Instrument on MetOp-3 In order to comply with NOAA’s request re- Originally, the MetOp industrial baseline garding MHS, EUMETSAT needed to place a stated that each of the three MetOp satellites Contract Change Notice with the MHS con- would embark a ‘Space Environment Monitor’ tractor by the end of 2004. The EUMETSAT instrument or SEM. During the negotiations Council – supported by the findings of the for the first amendment to the JTA Agree- PAC –decided to supply a re-tested MHS for ment, NOAA indicated that in view of the NOAA-N’, providing that the support for payload complement embarked on their mid- AMSU-A1 and A2 instruments from 2010- morning NPOESS satellite, the SEM instru- 2014 would be included in an amendment to ment would no longer be required on MetOp- the JTA Agreement. These amendments were C and hence, the spare instrument used for agreed and entered into force as of January NOAA-N’ would not be rebuilt for MetOp-C. 2005. After that, however, some restructuring took Second Amendment: MHS FM2 Repair place in the American NPOESS Programme. Due to severe technical problems on NPOESS The MHS FM2 Re-test programme was and consequential financial issues, the U.S. started in January 2005 and the instrument had delayed the launch of the first NPOESS successfully completed all environmental by 3 years. They also changed the order of testing and characterisation tests. Unfortu- launch and there would be no mid-morning nately, on 15 September EUMETSAT was NPOESS platform until 2016. This meant the informed by Astrium-Portsmouth about an United States would rely upon MetOp data for anomaly that was observed on channel H1 44 during the final functional test35F43F . In subse- 45 quent discussions between the EUMETSAT It should also be noted that the AMSU-B instruments suffer from electromagnetic interference from the spacecraft S-band transmitters, which requires on ground 44 Channel H1 was observed not to function and to provide correction of the science data. The MHS PFM instrument flat counts over all scenes. does not suffer from such interference.
ESPI Report 46 38 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
the period 2007-2016. In further discussions, It was noted, however, that the termination the United States even indicated that they of the NPOESS programme would not have a might propose to scrap the mid-morning USA negative impact on the collaboration between platform altogether. As part of the restructur- EUMETSAT and NOAA under the JTA Agree- ing, the U.S. Authorities required NOAA to ment. Rather, as part of the restructuring, a investigate with EUMETSAT the possibility of satellite would be available on the NOAA side re-integrating the SEM instrument on the for the afternoon orbit. More precisely, the MetOp-C satellite. NOAA, in its request, pro- NPOESS Programme was replaced by the posed to deliver an instrument similar to the Joint Polar Satellite System Programme one flying on the first two MetOp satellites (JPSS). As in the past, NOAA was given re- and indicated that the lead time to acquire sponsibility for the afternoon orbit, while en- this new instrument was estimated to be 18- vironmental measurements from early morn- 24 months. On the European side, industry ing orbit would be obtained from the Defense confirmed there would be no technical prob- Weather Satellite System (DWSS). The lem to re-integrate the instrument onto the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) – origi- MetOp-C satellite and that this could be ar- nally proposed as a proof-of-concept satellite ranged by a contract change involving some – was repurposed to support NOAA opera- cost impacts to be borne by EUMETSAT. tions after the decision on restructuring. The divergence of the U.S. civil and military op- Similar to the former two amendments to the erational meteorological programme signifi- JTA Agreement, NOAA and EUMETSAT cantly increased the strategic importance of worked on a solution whereby the transfer of the MetOp satellites covering the mid- funds between the two partners would be morning orbit. The vital role of EUMETSAT in avoided. In return for bearing the re- covering the mid-morning orbit was also ex- integration costs, EUMETSAT would receive plicitly stated in the report that described the maintenance of the AMSU-A units until the 46 impacts of the Nunn-McCurdy Certification37F45F launch of MetOp-C, then foreseen for October of the NPOESS programme on the climate 2015 and maintenance of the AVHRR instru- 47 programme goals of NASA and NOAA.38F46F The ment covered by NOAA until 3,5 years after latter was a clear sign of the mutual and bal- the planned launch date of the last IJPS sat- anced input-based relationship between both ellite, foreseen for September 2004. The agencies and as such it can be seen as a key EUMETSAT Secretariat was convinced these milestone in the recognition of partnership modifications would bring a fair solution to between both trans-Atlantic partners. the issue of the SEM instrument on MetOp-C. This third amendment to the JTA Agreement In view of the increased strategic importance was approved by the EUMETSAT Council in of the MetOp satellites, NOAA agreed to re- 2008. move the obligation of EUMETSAT to maintain the U.S. instruments on Metop-C. Instead, Fourth Amendment: Impact of NPOESS Restruc- the maintenance of these instruments would turing now be undertaken by NOAA in a similar way as for Metop-A and -B, with the assumption In the United States, the NPOESS Programme of a launch date of Metop-C before 2017. This continued to suffer from cost overruns and restructuring of the organisations’ responsi- schedule delays. The status of the pro- bilities had to restore the balance of input in gramme was reviewed and it turned out that the overall polar system. A fourth amend- the joint execution of the programme be- ment to this effect was signed in 2011. Table tween three agencies (DoD, NOAA and NASA) 4 presents an overview of the satellite con- of different size with different objectives and stellations as they were eventually estab- acquisition procedures was troublesome. An Independent Review Team concluded that the programme, in the absence of managerial 46 The Nunn-McCurdy Act requires the DoD to report to the and funding adjustment, had a low probabil- U.S. Congress whenever a major defense acquisition ity of success and that data continuity was at programme experiences cost overruns that exceed certain extreme risk. Therefore, in February 2010, thresholds. See: Schwartz, Moshe. “The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress.” 21 the White House announced that NOAA and Jun. 2010
ESPI Report 45 39 September 2013
lished and delivered, based upon the IJPS in 2009 and 2012, respectively. Because of and JTA Agreements. the restructuring of the NPOESS programme into the JPSS, the American polar-orbiting The IJPS constellation achieved double orbit programme is to be spread over the time- coverage when MetOp-A started operations in frame of the JTA and the JPS. The NPP satel- the mid-morning orbit in 2006, as NOAA-N, lite was renamed the Suomi National Polar- launched in 2005, was already covering the Orbiting Partnership (SNPP). It was the first afternoon orbit. The second American and European satellites were added to the system
EUMETSAT NOAA
Initial Joint Polar System (IJPS) Constellation
Mid-morning Orbit Afternoon Orbit
Satellite Launch Date Satellite Launch Date
MetOp-A October 2006 NOAA-N May 2005
MetOp-B September 2012 NOAA-N' February 2009
Joint Transition Activities (JTA) Constellation
Mid-morning Orbit Afternoon Orbit
Satellite Launch Date Satellite Launch Date
Suomi / NPP October 2011 MetOp-C 2016 (expected) JPSS-1 2016 (expected)
Table 4: Satellites in the IJPS and JTA Constellations.
next generation polar-orbiting satellite and The need to further improve the timeliness of boasts five instruments, which will be the IJPS data and product delivery to end users same payload and main instruments carried was already recognised in the Joint Transition on JPSS-1. Its design life is five years and Activities agreement between NOAA and was launched with a Delta-II launcher from EUMETSAT. To that end, both partners exam- Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. JPSS- ined potential solutions to add ground sta- 1, the second spacecraft within NOAA’s next tions in the southern hemisphere. In October generation of polar orbiting satellites, is 2007, EUMETSAT’s then Director General, scheduled to launch in 2016. The satellite will Lars Prahm, received a letter from NOAA take advantage of the successful technologies Assistant Administrator Mary E. Kicza propos- developed through the Suomi NPP satellite ing a joint solution that NOAA saw as an effi- and has a design life of seven years. cient means of establishing downlink capabil- ity for the MetOp satellite series in Antarctica within targeted timelines for operational 4.3.4 Antarctica Data Acquisition readiness. At that time NOAA was procuring The latest development in the IJPS – JTA high-bandwidth satellite communications context was the Antarctica Data Acquisition services from McMurdo station designed for (ADA) for the MetOp satellites. This recently three polar orbiting satellites. Because of the established capability connects the U.S. restructuring of the NPOESS programme, McMurdo Station in Antarctica to EUMETSAT’s however, only two orbits would be occupied ground facilities in Darmstadt, decreasing the by the American polar meteorological pro- latency of MetOp satellite data by fifty per- grammes. Because of this the bandwidth cent; from 130 minutes to 65 minutes. The could comfortably accommodate MetOp data, ADA capability was the first operational sys- decreasing the latency of the MetOp satel- tem to provide half-orbit polar orbiting satel- lites. As NOAA had budgeted for these activi- 48 ties, no funding from EUMETSAT was required lite data.47F other than modifications to its data recovery and processing infrastructure and the “last- mile” communications costs near the 48 Valenti, James M., Monham, Andrew, Keegan, Conor, Mungley William G. and Smith, Patrick D., “Metop’s Antarctic Data Acquisition Project: An International
ESPI Report 46 40 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
EUMETSAT headquarters in Darmstadt, Ger- 4.4 The Road towards a many. Because of the many advantages and relative low costs in the ADA solution, the Joint Polar System proposal was very well received at the EUMETSAT Council of June 2008. In spite of the many internal and external developments that have challenged the For the practical implementation, NOAA and course of polar orbiting collaboration between EUMETSAT could count on key support and NOAA and EUMETSAT, continuous efforts experience provided by the American NSF have delivered considerable tangible benefits and NASA, who performed the technical in- for both organisations, making it the flagship stallations and updates required for this ca- achievement of their partnership. Because of pability. The final terms were agreed to in these benefits – which will be further de- 2009, and the formal agreement, known as scribed in Part II of the study – the follow-up the Supplement to the Program Implementa- programme of the IJPS is currently taking tion Plan (PIP) for the Cooperation between shape. the NOAA and EUMETSAT on MetOp Data Downlink at McMurdo Station, Antarctica was 49 signed in 2011.72H Today, the improved latency 4.4.1 Future Outlook: The Joint Polar System of the MetOp satellites in orbit provides both European and U.S. weather services more In terms of collaboration intensity, the main frequent environmental observations for difference between the IJPS / JTA Agree- near-real-time mesoscale and mid/long-range ments and the constellation of the JPS will be global weather forecasts. the absence of exchange of instruments. Therefore, the future potential of the Joint Polar System will be mainly at the level of data and services and the integration of ground segments and operations.
EUMETSAT NOAA
Joint Polar System (JPS) Constellation
Mid-morning Orbit Afternoon Orbit
Satellite Launch Date Satellite Launch Date 2019 EPS-SG 2020s (TBD) JPSS-2 (expected)
Table 5: Satellites expected to be provided under the JPS Agreement.
48FEven though the lack of instrument exchange CERES instrument, the payload will be identi- might increase the autonomy of both organi- cal to that of the JPSS-1. Table 6 lists all sations in terms of technological capabilities, instruments and describes their function. it will also involve higher development costs In terms of ground infrastructure on the U.S. because of duplication of efforts. Although side, the JPSS Common Ground System the EPS-SG programme is still to be ap- (CGS) converges the NOAA-NASA civil polar proved, it is very likely that it will be con- environmental satellite programme, NPOESS ceived as a two-satellite programme as to Preparatory Project (NPP), and the Air Force’s avoid going through the time and energy Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS) consuming decision-making process twice. ground systems into a single, common sys- tem that will satisfy both the U.S. and its The American Joint Polar Satellite System – partners’ international environmental moni- JPSS toring satellite needs from polar orbit. Although not the first satellite under the American JPSS programme, the JPSS-2 will be the first satellite to be part of the trans- Atlantic JPS venture. The JPSS programme will provide operational continuity of the POES programme, the SNPP and ground sys- tems. Except for an updated version of the
49 Ibid.
ESPI Report 45 41 September 2013
Instruments Function VIIRS The Visible Infra- Takes global visible and infrared observations of land, ocean, and at- red Imaging mosphere parameters at high temporal resolution. Radiometer Suite CrIS The Cross-track Will produce high-resolution, three-dimensional temperature, pressure, Infrared Sounder and moisture profiles. These profiles will be used to enhance weather forecasting models, and will facilitate both short- and long-term weather forecasting. Over longer timescales, they will help improve understanding of climate phenomena such as El Niño and La Niña. ATMS The Advanced A cross-track scanner with 22 channels, provides sounding observa- Technology Mi- tions needed to retrieve profiles of atmospheric temperature and mois- crowave Sounder ture for civilian operational weather forecasting as well as continuity of these measurements for climate monitoring purposes. OMPS Ozone Mapper An advanced suite of three hyperspectral instruments, extends the 25- Profiler Suite plus year total-ozone and ozone-profile records. These records are used to track the health of the ozone layer. OMPS products, when combined with cloud predictions, also help produce better ultraviolet index forecasts. CERES Clouds and Senses both solar-reflected and Earth-emitted radiation from the top of Earth's Radiant the atmosphere to the Earth's surface. Cloud properties are deter- Energy System mined using simultaneous measurements by other JPSS instruments such as the VIIRS and will lead to a better understanding of the role of clouds and the energy cycle in global climate change.
Table 6: U.S. Polar Satellite System Instruments in the JPSS Programme.
The EUMETSAT Polar Programme Second Gen- eration – EPS-SG 4.5 Polar Orbiting Satellite In Europe, activities are on-going for the Activities and the Theo- definition of the follow-on EUMETSAT Polar System, to replace the current satellite sys- retical Framework tem in the 2020 timeframe and contribute to the Joint Polar System to be set up with The collaboration record in this chapter re- NOAA. This follow-on programme has been vealed that the negotiations and resulting coined EPS Second Generation (EPS-SG) and joint activities in polar orbiting satellites were its corresponding satellite development pro- much more elaborate and complex than gramme was approved by the ESA Ministerial those displayed in the field of geostationary Council in November 2012. Through consulta- satellites. As a consequence the challenges tion with users and application experts, re- related to the fulfillment of the eight criteria quirements have been defined for a range of for successful implementation of space mis- candidate missions mainly in support of op- sions in an international context were also erational meteorology and climate monitor- greater. Nevertheless, the IJPS is now im- ing. Currently a number of on-board instru- plemented successfully and the planning ac- ments, satellite platforms and ground support tivities for the JPS are taking shape. Various infrastructure are under study in coordination factors have helped the challenging execution with ESA, NOAA, DLR and CNES. EUMETSAT of polar orbiting collaboration activities. has decided on a twin satellite configuration First, in addition to the historical foundations and payload. The full programme will be pre- already present, the implementation of the sented to the EUMETSAT Member States in IJPS benefitted from the experience and trust 2014 and its approval is expected by the end gained in the existing joint geostationary of that year. satellite activities. This made both organisa- tions more accustomed to each other’s struc- ture and ways of operating. Because of the exchange of instruments, the scientific sup- port provided was much more comprehen- sive. Also the flows of information and sup- port were more mutual and inter-agency based compared to before. The shared objec- tives on the other hand were again very
ESPI Report 46 42 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
closely aligned, given that polar orbiting sat- and the duplication of MetOp capabilities in ellite programmes had taken a similar posi- the to-be converged NPOESS system before it tion in both partners’ portfolio of meteoro- was restructured. Fortunately, the two part- logical programmes. The Initial Joint Polar ners have showed genuine sense of partner- System Agreement and the Joint Transition ship by being flexible when unforeseen cir- Activities Agreement, approved and signed cumstances required amendments to the JTA after lengthy negotiation processes, set forth Agreement in order to safeguard the bal- the division of responsibilities and plans for anced input on the system. For review pur- data access and distribution, while the condi- poses, dedicated structures were established tions for data denial for U.S. military pur- to guarantee continuous follow-up of activi- poses are described in an annex. ties such as the Data Denial Working Group and the structures for management, coordi- Perhaps the most interesting criterion in the nation and consultation as defined in the IJPS IJPS venture was the sense of partnership and JTA agreements. and its influence on the developments in the negotiation processes. Although the sense of Finally, the IJPS and JTA constellations have partnership between NOAA and EUMETSAT generated considerable benefits for has eventually helped reaching the break- EUMETSAT, NOAA, their funding govern- throughs required for progress in certain ments, and their user communities. These deadlock situations, it has nevertheless will be thoroughly assessed in the final chap- proved to a critical factor in the discussions ter of the study. regarding the data policy and data denial,
ESPI Report 45 43 September 2013
5. Ocean Surface Topography Missions
Seventy-one percent of the planet Earth’s count the imperfect spherical shape of the surface is covered by water, making the planet and atmospheric conditions. Satellites world’s oceans a key dimension in the com- can now deliver data within an accuracy of plex and interactive system that determines one centimetre and can deduce other impor- global weather and climate. For this reason tant information such as wave height, wind oceanographers and climatologists use oce- speed over the ocean, surface roughness, anic models to investigate large-scale ocean ocean currents etc. In this respect ocean circulation, ocean dynamics and their interac- altimetry data is applied in a wide series of tion with the atmosphere. products and services varying on both spatial and temporal scales. An important element in oceanic modelling is ocean surface topography. Being influenced by ocean circulations and variations in water 5.1.1 Prior Missions temperature and salinity, the surface of the ocean displays certain topography with “hills” The first real successful ocean altimetry mis- 50 sion to be launched was the TOPEX – Posei- and “valleys”.39F49F Data on these variations in 51 ocean surface topography – which can be as don mission50F , jointly developed by CNES much as two meters – are useful for two rea- and NASA. Launched in 1992, it was origi- sons. First, they help us understand how the nally designed to have a lifetime of three to ocean and its circulations move heat around five years but the satellite went on to per- the globe, which in turn increases the accu- form for over thirteen years, providing exten- racy of both short term to seasonal weather sive information on sea levels, currents, 52 forecasts and climate change models. Sec- ocean circulations and tides.41F51F The mission 53 ond, long term observations of the average was praised42F52F and proved that – given ocean surface topography reveal changes in enough accuracy – satellites can sample ade- global sea levels as a result of climate quately and globally, offering a “God’s-eye” change. view on our oceans and their dynamics that other measurement could not deliver. For this reason, the development space agencies CNES and NASA decided a follow-up mission 5.1 First Ocean Altimetry by would be pursued. Satellites Its follow-up, Jason-1, was eventually launched in December 2001. This mission, Historically, ocean surface topography was the direct predecessor of Jason-2, continued derived from buoys and measurements by to supply the research community with valu- ships of temperature and salinity at depth. able oceanic data. Even before its launch, However, the data obtained was mostly CNES was interested in ensuring continuity of fragmented in both space and time, putting limits on the oceanic models that were de- 51 Actually, some other proof of concept missions have rived from it. It was only recently that satel- preceded the TOPEX – Poseidon mission. The first one, lites radically changed the act of oceanic GEOS-3, was launched by NASA in 1975. A few years modelling. later the NASA SEASAT mission, launched in 1978, dem- onstrated the feasibility of global satellite monitoring of More precisely, an ocean altimetry satellite oceanographic phenomena. However, it only operated for measures sea height by sending a radar sig- 105 days because of a payload failure. GEOSAT, launched by the U.S. Navy in 1985 operated until 1990 nal down to the sea surface and analysing the and was decisive in the follow-up process of ocean altim- return signal. In doing so it takes into ac- etry from space. 52 EUMETSAT, 25 Years of EUMETSAT – 25 ans d’EUMETSAT, 2011, 320 p. 50 Actually, the ocean surface, even if undisturbed by 53 Influential oceanographer Walter Munk stated that he waves or tides, is not a perfect sphere. The Earth's geoid considered TOPEX – Poseidon as the most successful is a calculated surface of equal gravitational potential ocean experiment ever performed. See: Sullivant, energy that represents the shape the sea surface would be Rosemary. “Topex/Poseidon Sails Off Into the Sunset” 1 if the ocean were not in motion. The ocean surface May 2006. National Aeronautics and Space Administration topography is then calculated as the difference between 22 Mar. 2013 this reference ellipsoid and the actual surface height as
ESPI Report 46 44 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
service beyond Jason-1. NASA, however, was had been received, the new amended con- less enthusiastic in sharing the cost of what vention was acknowledged by a EUMETSAT essentially becoming an operational service. Council resolution, entering into force in No- 57 In searching for possible partners for the vember 2000.46F56F This paved the way for initiative, CNES approached EUMETSAT. On EUMETSAT involvement in ocean monitoring. the other side of the Atlantic, for similar rea- It was at the 48th Council meeting in June sons, NOAA was also considering an involve- 2001 that the ocean altimetry programme ment in what would now become a long-term first appeared on the EUMETSAT Council operational activity. Meetings between both agenda. Conforming to the procedure for organisations were held to discuss the outline optional EUMETSAT programmes, the Secre- of a possible joint programme. What eventu- tariat outlined the role the organisation would ally emerged was a proposal for a partnership play in this mission and adopted an “initiating of four organisations: CNES and EUMETSAT resolution”. Subsequently, potential partici- on the European side and NOAA and NASA on pating states would be invited to adopt a the American side. The idea emerged to set- programme declaration and programme defi- up an Ocean Surface Topography Mission nition which would then approved by the (OSTM) of which Jason-2 would be the space 54 Council. After this, the programme declara- segment.43F53F tion would be opened for signature. An op- tional programme only takes effect once at least one third of all EUMETSAT Member 5.2 The Ocean Surface To- States have signed the Declaration within an established timeframe and the subscriptions pography Mission/Jason-2 of the participating states have reached 90% of the total financial envelope for the pro- 5.2.1 A Four Agency Approach gramme. The response around the Council table was EUMETSAT’s First Optional Programme generally positive and so the procedure as described to establish the optional pro- Involvement in an ocean altimetry mission gramme was initiated. Throughout this pro- was slightly more challenging for Eumetsat cedure, the composition of the group of po- than for NOAA, given that the organisation tential participants slightly changed because had no prior experience in this particular field of internal decisions of the different Member of earth observation. Also, because altimetry States. At the 53rd Council meeting in June was not part of its ‘core responsibilities’ as 55 2003, the necessary 90 per cent figure had described in the EUMETSAT convention44F54F , it been attained and so the Jason-2 programme would be conceived as the organisation’s first 58 entered into force.47F57F optional programme. The possibility of optional programmes, open Structure of the Ocean Surface Topography for participation by Member States that agree Mission to do so, was put on the table during the discussions on the Atlantic Data Coverage in Given that the Ocean Surface Topography the early 1990s. At the time, the French Mission (OSTM) - with the Jason-2 satellite as delegation proposed amendments to the con- the space component - would be a quadripar- vention so as to make decision-making pro- tite project between EUMETSAT, NOAA, CNES cedures more efficient, the possibility of al- and NASA, cost and responsibilities would be lowing optional programmes, and a possible shared. The main responsibilities would be role for EUMETSAT in climate monitoring. shared as follows: Although the proposed amendments to the • NASA would provide the launcher, a convention could count on wide support Delta rocket and the radiometer instru- among the EUMETSAT Member-States, it took ment. several years until all of them had ratified 56 them.45F55F Shortly after sufficient ratifications the amendments were signed, as this would be concerned with climate monitoring. 54 EUMETSAT, 25 Years of EUMETSAT – 25 ans 57 By the beginning of the year 2000, all EUMETSAT d’EUMETSAT, 2011, 320 p. Member States of that time had ratified and signed it, 55 Mandatory programmes were described as “basic except for Italy and Greece. programmes required to continue the provision of 58 In the end, after additional subscriptions following the observations from geostationary and polar orbits” and they programme initiation, 17 EUMETSAT Member States would require a unanimous vote from the Council. Satellite participated in the Jason-2 programme: Belgium, programmes could be adopted as optional if there was not Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, unanimous support for them. Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 56 A major driving force in this ratification process was the Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and The United fact that no polar programme could be established before Kingdom.
ESPI Report 45 45 September 2013
• NOAA would have responsibility for op- The satellite would be launched into a circu- eration of the satellite. lar, non-sun-synchronous orbit at an inclina- • CNES would provide the satellite bus tion of 66 degrees to Earth’s equator. Orbit- PROTEUS and the other instrumentation ing at an altitude of approximately 1340 and have responsibility for the advanced kilometres, it would be in a position to moni- processing of the data. tor 95 percent of Earth’s ice-free ocean every • EUMETSAT would be responsible for the ten days. The instruments to be provided by dissemination of data and near-real-time CNES and NASA were based upon the exper- products to users through its telecom- tise established by both partners in ocean munications facilities and for archiving altimetry and location technology. An over- the data for further use by researchers. view of the instrumentation, its function and provider is presented in Table 7.
Payload Instru- Provider Description mentation The mission's main instrument, derived from the Poseidon-2 al- timeter on Jason-1. Poseidon-3 is a radar altimeter that emits pulses at two frequencies and analyses the return signal reflected Poseidon-3 Altimeter CNES by the surface. The signal round-trip time is estimated very pre- cisely, to calculate the range after applying corrections. The pri- mary goal of the dual-frequency operation is to provide a precise ionospheric correction. Measures radiation from the Earth's surface at three frequencies. These different measurements are combined to determine atmos- Advanced Microwave NASA pheric water vapour and liquid water content. Once the water Radiometer (AMR) content is known, it is possible to determine the correction to be applied for radar signal path delays.
Location Systems Provider Description Uses a ground network of 60 orbitography beacons around the Doppler Orbitogra- globe, which send signals to a receiver on the satellite. The rela- phy and Radio- tive motion of the satellite generates a Doppler shift in the sig- positioning Inte- CNES nal's frequency that is measured to derive the satellite's velocity. grated by Satellite These data are then assimilated in orbit determination models to (DORIS) keep permanent track of the satellite's precise position in its or- bit. GPSP uses the Global Positioning System (GPS) to determine the Global Positioning satellite's position by triangulation. At least three GPS satellites System Payload NASA are needed to establish the satellite's exact position at a given (GPSP) instant. Positional data are then integrated into an orbit determi- nation model to continuously track the satellite's trajectory. The LRA is an array of mirrors that provide a target for laser Laser Retroreflector tracking measurements from the ground. By analysing the round- NASA Array (LRA) trip time of the laser beam, we can locate where the satellite is in its orbit and calibrate altimetric measurements.
Table 7: Payload Instruments and Location Systems on the Jason-2 Satellite.
partners’ agreement. Although it was signed The OSTM Memorandum of Understanding by four Partners, the two U.S. agencies, A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was NASA and NOAA, acted jointly as one Party to drafted to set fort the detailed respective the MoU representing the United States gov- responsibilities and the terms and conditions ernment. This arrangement was necessary under which the four partners had agreed to for formal reasons, but the obligations set out collaboration on the OSTM. The MoU has a in the MoU text were defined individually for strong heritage from the previous MoUs each of the four partners. signed between NASA and CNES on The mission description in the MoU explicitly TOPEX/Poseidon, Jason-1 and the CALIPSO refers to the heritage of the TOPEX/Poseidon environmental satellite mission. The OSTM and Jason missions and highlights the impor- MOU took the shape of a ‘three parties, four tance of bringing high precision altimetry to
ESPI Report 46 46 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
full operational status. More precisely, the clearly reflects confidence and determination aim is to provide data products for a period of among the partners with regard to mission five years to the operational and research success and the governance model conceived communities in the fields of marine meteorol- as a four partite undertaking with shared ogy and sea state forecasting, operational responsibilities and balanced input. oceanography, seasonal and climate forecast- By July 2005, the final draft – including all ing and general ocean, Earth system and principles as explained above – was nearly climate research. Subsequent articles in the complete and the MoU was agreed by the MoU list all respective responsibilities of four partners. Shortly after, the U.S. State CNES, NASA, EUMETSAT and NOAA in detail. Department gave final clearance, which The lists reveal a substantial amount of inter- meant the MoU was ready for signature, agency contact and follow-up to secure the pending EUMETSAT Council approval. The smooth implementation of the four partners’ latter took place at the 58th EUMETSAT Coun- different responsibilities in the OSTM. To this cil meeting in November 2005. Following this effect the partners agreed to establish an approval, the OSTM MoU was signed by all OSTM Joint Steering Group (JSG). The JSG four partners in April 2006. The launch date comprises of up to two senior representatives for the Jason-2 satellite was targeted for June from each partner that meet at least once a 2008 and with an estimated satellite life time year. The JSG will be co-chaired by NASA and of five years, the mission would last at least CNES during mission development until until mid-2013. This target was eventually handover of the satellite operations, and by met, as the satellite was launched success- NOAA and EUMETSAT following handover of fully on June 20, 2008 aboard a Delta II 7320 the satellite operations and control functions. rocket at the Vandenberg Air Force Base in This body is also responsible for approving California. changes that may impact other partners in terms of cost, mission performance, schedule and end of life of mission. In parallel, it is also authorised in the area of conflict resolu- 5.3 Jason Follow-On tion and to review project status. The data policy for the OSTM is much less differenti- Because of the requirement of continuity in ated and complex than the model established operational altimetry services beyond Jason- in polar orbiting satellite collaboration. The 2, discussions regarding a follow-on pro- partners agreed to make available to each gramme to the OSTM were held during its other all telemetry and data products in a implementation phase and, in fact, the need timely manner and without any conditions as was even recognised earlier. EUMETSAT and to the partners’ use of telemetry and data NOAA had already formally identified this products. Also, as the OSTM would be a joint perspective in the Joint Transition Activities contribution to the world-wide exchange of agreement signed in 2003, which explicitly meteorological data and related data and refers to the implementation of a Jason-3 products under the auspices of the WMO, the satellite. It is important to note that planning partners agreed to consider all data products for a Jason follow-on mission was embedded in the OSTM as “essential data and products”. in a context of international coordination. The latter implies that they are made avail- One of the reasons is that for nowcasting and able as such to other users on a free and Numerical Ocean Prediction, at least three – unrestricted basis. Interestingly, the MoU but preferably four – altimeter missions are also includes an article on the provision of needed to monitor mesoscale ocean circula- future collaboration, after the Jason-2 end of tions. Partially for this reason the global im- lifetime, as it is noted that “all partners will plementation for ocean surface topography is consider working together, as appropriate, on being coordinated in the framework of the a long-term basis to help define the research Committee on Earth Observation Satellites’ and operational requirements for implemen- Constellation for Ocean Surface Topography tation of future ocean surface topography (OST). In this framework the Jason missions missions involving Europe and the United – given their high accuracy and medium in- States, with the objective of ensuring fitness clination orbits – are considered as the refer- for purposes of research and continuity of ence missions for global ocean altimetry (see data and services for all applications”. This figure 2).
ESPI Report 45 47 September 2013
59 Figure 2: Overview of Global Altimeter Missions as Coordinated by the CEOS Constellation for Ocean Surface Topography.48F73H
58FIn this context of international coordination, a Jason-3 mission would be an excellent com- 5.3.1 Jason-3 plement to the Sentinel-3 satellites in the planned Global Monitoring of Environment In March 2006, a series of informal discus- and Security programme (GMES - hereinafter sions was held at the Symposium on 15 years referred to as Copernicus, its new name). progress in altimetry in Venice, Italy. Follow- Unlike Jason-3, the Sentinel-3 satellites will ing these talks, NOAA and EUMETSAT pro- be launched into a sun-synchronous, high posed an approach for Jason-3, which was inclination orbit. This way the Jason-3 mis- afterwards endorsed by the management of sion would not only ensure continuity with its both partners. It was agreed to establish a predecessors, the synergy and commonalities joint NOAA-EUMETSAT Focus Group with with the Sentinel-3 satellites would also overall responsibility for preparing a concep- augment sampling capabilities on a global tual approach and, consistent with the scale. Because the latter would benefit user OSTM/Jason 2 MoU wording, to invite NASA communities, the planning for Jason-3 was and CNES to participate as members. The strongly highlighted as a priority in the Euro- Focus Group then established two joint pean Commission’s Copernicus programme. groups: an Applications Working Group, and More precisely, the Copernicus ‘Working an Implementation Working Group. The Ap- Group on Space Infrastructure’ for Marine plications Working Group was tasked to iden- Core Services (MCS) identified Jason-3 as a tify overall needs, both operational and re- critical component for space based ocean search, for satellite altimetry and the basis monitoring. In turn, this European Commis- for those needs. The Implementation Working sion involvement changed the financing Group was tasked to identify options for the structure of the mission, which would be di- implementation of a system capable of meet- vided among three partners on the European ing the needs identified by the Applications side instead of two: CNES, EUMETSAT and Working Group. the European Commission. Based upon the findings and recommenda- tions of the Application Working Group, the Implementation Working Group – gathering representatives from NOAA, NASA, CNES and EUMETSAT – focused on two main aspects: 59 “Global Altimeter Missions” 24 May 2011. Committee on the sharing of responsibilities between Earth Observation Satellites 3 Apr. 2013 Europe and the United States and, the cost
ESPI Report 46 48 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
EUMETSAT. The first one considered Jason-3 explore possibilities of developing a Jason as a gap filler with a strong heritage of the follow-on mission through a CNES, NOAA and Jason-2 mission, and not as a new series. For EUMETSAT partnership, with the objective of this type of mission, the main constraint responding to the needs expressed by the would be a launch as soon as possible, at Copernicus Marine Core Service. At the 62nd lowest cost possible. The second option would EUMETSAT Council in June 2007, the Secre- see Jason-3 paving the way for the next dec- tariat was authorised to work on the prepara- ade of ocean altimetry. In this option most tion of a Jason Follow-on Preliminary Proposal choices for who provides what would be and Initiating Resolution, to be submitted to open, one major exception being the altime- the EUMETSAT Council in December 2007. ter because of the synergies with the altime- In the meantime, the discussions in the ter proposed for the Sentinel-3. EUMETSAT framework of the High Level Coordination addressed these two options in a position Group on Copernicus Space Component paper that elaborated all further implications. (HLG-GSC) led to the formulation of three This paper was handed to the European options for a Jason-3 mission. The first two Commission DG Enterprise and Industry, were very much in line with the options which would convene a meeting of the Euro- EUMETSAT proposed; one being a Jason-2 pean partners in the project, including ESA as recurrent spacecraft based upon the estab- the implementing agency of the space com- lished U.S.-European collaboration, the other ponent of Copernicus. Also, the issue of Ja- one would be a more advanced mission son-3 conceptualisation would be addressed based on technology that was being devel- by the Copernicus Space Component High oped for Cryosat. The third option proposed level Coordination Platform jointly set-up by by the HLG-GSC, however, was a downscaled the European Commission and ESA. Sentinel-3 mission, disembarking the two After having reviewed several options for instruments that were not required for ocean 60 Jason-3, the Implementation Working Group altimetry49F59F . The chairman of the HLG-GSC converged on the idea that a Jason follow-on proposed that ESA and EUMETSAT would with a strong heritage from past missions converge on a single proposal to be discussed would be the best way to ensure continuity at the HLS-GSC meeting of January 2008 and and avoid data gap, while minimising the that users would be consulted through the risks inherent to such a programme and op- Copernicus Marine Core Services Implemen- timising its costs. This would be the only way tation Group. At the same time, CNES would to be compliant with the need for continuity perform a detailed technical analysis of the of observation required by the Copernicus proposals and the views of EUMETSAT Mem- Marine Core Services (MCS). It was the opin- ber States would be sought at the next ion of the Working Group that the implemen- EUMETSAT PAC meeting in October 2007. tation of a new and more expensive scheme Eventually, the discussions and negotiations for a one-shot mission should be avoided translated into a sharing of responsibilities because of the complexity of a new scheme similar in structure to the one displayed in and risk of delay detrimental for the MCS. the implementation of Jason-2. A detailed overview is provided in Table 8. As consultation was taking place in the framework of the joint Focus Group, internal In this scheme, CNES would play the role of programme development needed to be initi- system prime for the customers EUMETSAT ated on the European side to ensure timely and NOAA. The funding formula was slightly progress. In order to start the formal ap- different to the approach taken in Jason-2. proval procedure for optional programmes, it Because of the Copernicus context and the was essential for EUMETSAT to get confirma- fact that the Copernicus Marine Core Service tion of the U.S. commitment to continue the group identified Jason-3 as a top priority, the partnership. For this purpose, the EUMETSAT European Commission would also contribute Director General held exploratory talks with to the mission. the Assistant Administrator for NOAA NESDIS NOAA secured its participation in the Jason-3 in July 2006. Later that year, in November, programme and has given it top priority for EUMETSAT received a letter sent by NOAA securing climate-related measurements. On Administrator Conrad C. Lautenbacher con- the European side, the Jason-3 Programme firming NOAA’s interest in strengthening the collaboration in satellite altimetry by means of the Jason-3 mission. At the same time, the EUMETSAT Secretariat received a letter from the President of CNES to indicate the interest of the French space agency in developing a Jason follow-on programme. These events 60 These instruments are the Ocean and Land Colour comforted the Secretariat on the need to Instruments and the Sea and Land Surface Temperature instrument.
ESPI Report 45 49 September 2013
Europe Shared United States
Use of the PROTEUS platform The use of a ground segment, The provision of a radiometer which was already used on both for satellite and instrument and of the other precise orbit Jason-1 and 2, as well as some command control and for product determination elements other missions. The element generation, based on a maximum (similar to the LRA, GPSP was procured by CNES as part re-use of existing elements. instruments). of 6 platforms that were con- tracted to Alcatel. The use of an Altimeter based The use of an operations scheme The provision of a launcher on Poseidon 3 flying on Jason- based on the Jason-2 one. NOAA and launch support activities 2. would be in charge of routine sat- to achieve a more balanced ellite operations. Processing and cost sharing between Europe The provision of the DORIS data dissemination to be ensured and the United States. location instrument. by EUMETSAT and NOAA.
Table 8: Sharing of Responsibilities between NOAA and EUMETSAT for Jason-3.
was approved in 2010 by the participating co-fund the recurrent Jason-CS-B satellite 61 EUMETSAT Member States.60F The Jason-3 together with the European Commission. The satellite is currently scheduled for launch in European Space Agency on the other hand is March 2015. responsible for the development of the first Jason-CS-A satellite; the prototype proces- sors; delivery of the LEOP services, and pro- 5.3.2 Preparations for Jason Continuity of Ser- curement of the recurrent satellite on behalf vices of EUMETSAT and the European Commission Throughout the conceptualisation and pro- subsequently, given that ESA is responsible curement of Jason-3, the long-term perspec- for the development of the Copernicus space tive for ocean altimetry – beyond the Jason-3 component. The European Commission will timeframe after 2020 – was given considera- co-fund the recurrent Jason-CS satellite with tion. In this respect, the EUMETSAT Secre- EUMETSAT and funds the operations of Ja- tariat was actively triggering discussions with son-3 and both Jason-CS satellites, including the partners in order to define the nature of a the LEOP service for the second Jason-CS-B future global altimetry system. These discus- satellite. Finally, NOAA is expected to provide sions were mainly held in the frame of the launch services for both Jason-CS satellite, CEOS Ocean Topography Constellation (OST), the U.S. payload instruments and ground segment support, and will contribute to the which is co-led by NOAA and EUMETSAT. The 63 advantage of discussing this issue in the operations.51F62F CNES CNES will support EUMETSAT CEOS OST context was that it ensured that and NOAA in their mission design. This ap- all potential partners around the world would proach, combining the operation of Jason-3 be involved. The OST requirements were with the development and operations of two elaborated in a report following the CEOS Jason-CS satellites, is known as the Coperni- workshop of January 2008 that took place in cus High Precision Ocean Altimetry activity. 62 Asmannhausen, Germany.61F Given that Jason-CS will serve as the future The eventual way forward will be a continua- reference mission of the Ocean Surface To- tion of the existing partnership between the pography constellation, a same or better level United States (NOAA and NASA) and Europe of performance as the earlier Jason series will (EUMETSAT, ESA, CNES) and industry. In the be guaranteed. The spacecraft will be based distribution of responsibilities in Jason CS on a platform derived from CryoSat-2, but EUMETSAT is leading the system definition adjusted to the specific requirements of the and is responsible for the Jason-CS ground Jason-CS mission and specific orbit. Currently segment development; operations prepara- the development process for Jason CS is in phase B2 and the proposed design is com- tion and operations of both satellites, and will 64 posed of the following instruments:52F63F
61 These are: Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and, the United Kingdom. 63 “Jason-CS (Jason Continuity of Service) is the second 62 “CEOS Ocean Surface Topography Constellation component of the hybrid solution (Jason-3 + Jason-CS) Strategic Workshop.” December 2008 EUMETSAT 11 Apr. agreed in 2009.” 20 Jun. 2013 EUMETSAT 27 Jun. 2013 2013
ESPI Report 46 50 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
• A radar altimeter, developed by ESA, the operationalisation of ocean altimetry for based on the heritage from the Sentinel- meteorology had the same impact, position 3 SARL instrument, but with a design and significance for the agencies on both adopted to allow the interleaved mode sides of the Atlantic. As opposed to the legal combining the SAR and the LRM modes; agreements used to define the responsibilities • An AMR-C Microwave radiometer, pro- and plans for data access and distribution in vided by NOAA; the geostationary and polar orbiting satellite • GNSS Precise Orbit Determination Re- activities, memoranda of understanding were ceiver, developed by ESA and derived used to set forth the legal stipulations in the from the GNSS Receiver on Sentinel-3; Jason missions. Given that the Jason mis- • The same DORIS Receiver as on Jason-3 sions are fully integrated platforms that make and Sentinel-3; use of American and European technology, • The same Laser Reflector Array as on Ja- recognition to the other partners is always son-3, provided by NOAA; given in policy documents, presentations and • A radio-occultation instrument based on in other sources such as on the internet. a Tri-G receiver, provided by NOAA. These elements clearly constitute a sense of partnership aligned with the overall partner- ship exhibited in the EUMETSAT-NOAA rela- 5.4 Ocean Altimetry Missions tionship. Thorough review is somewhat more critical in and the Theoretical the Jason missions as they are implemented Framework by four different agencies instead of two: EUMETSAT, NOAA, CNES and NASA. To this The Jason missions are the last joint activities effect, the MoU defined a substantial amount to be linked to the theoretical framework on of interagency contact and follow-up to se- the eight key elements for success to interna- cure the smooth implementation of the four tional space missions. Not surprisingly, in this partners’ different responsibilities. Measures field of collaboration the criteria for success- include the establishment of a Joint Steering ful implementation also are met. Group responsible for the follow-up during mission development until hand-over of sat- In terms of historical foundations, the col- ellite operations and any changes that may laboration in ocean altimetry could count on impact other partners in terms of cost, mis- the extensive inter-organisational experience sion performance, schedule and end of life of gained throughout the implementation of the mission. IJPS constellation. In addition the Jason mis- sions and their implementation approach Finally, the benefits of the collaboration in the were already given shape by CNES and Jason missions go beyond the mere cost NASA. The latter also brought leverage into sharing, as both sides of the Atlantic have the EUMETSAT-NOAA partnership in terms of provided technologies critical for mission scientific support by engineers, scientists and success. These benefits in terms of cost and management practices. The shared objectives performance will be addressed in more detail were of course again very closely aligned, as in the final chapter.
ESPI Report 45 51 September 2013
Part II. Inter-Organisational Assessment
The Collaboration Record Analysis, Part I of occurred and intensified the partnership will the study, focused on the historical context, be assessed by means of a theoretical the different negotiation processes and the framework on collaborative strategies. This is resulting formal agreements and constella- accompanied by a summary of all physical tions between NOAA and EUMETSAT. The established systems and segments. Finally, eight key elements required for international the strategic benefits of the partnership will space missions were applied as a framework be assessed. This chapter will demonstrate for interpretation. The aim of the Inter- that the benefits for both partners are tangi- Organisational Assessment, Part II, is to ana- ble and considerable and, that the partners lyse the partnership and its benefits from a have sometimes delivered particular and more structural point of view. In the first unique leverage to each other. instance the structural changes that have
ESPI Report 46 52 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
6. Partnership Assessment
So far this study only briefly touched upon • Trust is influenced by factors such as the structural changes that have occurred prior working experience, lack of under- throughout the evolution of the EUMETSAT – standing of the other organisation’s op- NOAA relationship. Supported by a theoretical erational mode and even personal rela- framework on the progressive continuum of tionships between agency representa- collaborative strategies, this section of Part II tives. will offer a more comprehensive and analyti- • Turf is the range of the authority or in- cal overview of the structural underlying dy- fluence exerted by an entity. It is also namics in the partnership. The information related to the perceived position of the upon which this analysis is based was ac- other partner in the collaboration. Turf quired by means of interviews with 65 issues, for example, may arise when one EUMETSAT and NOAA staff53F64F and by analys- agency perceives that another agency ing the structures of the physical constella- reaps more benefits from the collabora- tions they have jointly established. tive efforts, or takes on a lesser degree of responsibility, or has more decision 68 making power.56F67F 6.1 Collaboration: Definition The degree to which agencies are able to and the Progressive Con- overcome these three main barriers to a large extent determine what kind of collabo- tinuum of Collaborative ration they can engage in. In this regard, five Strategies different forms have been described in the literature. Ordered as a function of increased In a general sense collaboration has been be commitment, these are: (1) networking, (2) defined as “a process to reach goals that coordination, (3) cooperation, (4) collabora- 66 tion and, (5) integration. In this categorisa- cannot be achieved by one single agent”.54F65F In this regard, the concept ‘collaboration’ is tion, the term collaboration is a more specific used as an umbrella term and includes fol- form of the same-named umbrella term that lowing components: (1) jointly developing has been used so far to cover all forms of and agreeing on a set of common goals and working together, this should be kept in mind directions; (2) sharing responsibility for ob- throughout the rest of this chapter. Together taining those goals and, (3) working together these different forms of working are called to achieve those goals, using the expertise “the progressive continuum of collaborative 67 strategies”. In the EUMETSAT-NOAA case, and resources of each collaborator.55F66F The three major constraints in the establishment especially the first four forms matter, as none of collaboration are time, trust and turf. All of the systems established entail a merging three are necessary to engage in more com- of the two organisations or their branches. mitted forms of working together. Moreover, Table nine lists the four relevant forms of they often influence each other: working together and describes their major features. • Time is a necessity in the evolution of working together between organisations and although collaboration takes more time and effort than providing services independently in the long-term it will save time.
65 On the NOAA side this includes Charles Wooldridge, Mike Haas, Peter Wilczynski, Jim Silva, Laury Miller and, Jim Yoe. In EUMETSAT information was provided by Paul Counet, Francois Parisot, Pierre Ranzoli, Gökhan Kayal, Silvia Castañer, Tillmann Mohr and Marc Cohen. 66 Himmelman, A.T. Collaboration for a Change: Definitions, decision-making roles, and collaboration process guide, Himmelman Consulting, Minneapolis, 2002. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid.
ESPI Report 45 53 September 2013
Networking Coordination Cooperation Collaboration
Relationship Informal Formal Formal Formal
Intensity ☼☼☼☼ ☼☼☼ ☼☼ ☼
• Exchanging infor- • Exchanging • Exchanging in- mation for mutual information formation for benefit. for mutual mutual benefit. • Exchange of • Altering activities, benefit. • Altering activi- information deploying re- Definition • Altering ac- ties and de- for mutual sources, and en- tivities to ployment of re- benefit. hancing the mu- achieve a sources to tual capacity to common pur- achieve a com- achieve a common pose. mon purpose. purpose. • Making access to services or • Sharing of re- • Information resources • Enhancing each sources to exchange is more user- other's capacity to achieve a com- the primary friendly is the achieve a common mon purpose is focus. primary fo- purpose is the the primary fo- Characteristics • Minimal cus. primary focus. cus. time com- • Moderate • Extensive time • Substantial mitment, time com- commitments, time commit- limited lev- mitments, very high levels of ments, high els of trust. moderate trust. levels of trust. levels of trust. • Moderate to extensive mu- • No or minimal tual deploy- • Full-scale deploy- • No mutual mutual shar- ment of re- ment of resources. sharing of Resources ing of re- sources. • Full sharing of resources sources nec- • Some sharing risks, responsibili- necessary. essary. of risks, re- ties and rewards. sponsibilities and rewards.
69 Table 9: The Progressive Continuum of Collaborative Strategies.74H
5768FIt is important to emphasise that each of the the joint activity concerned, the organisa- strategies can be appropriate for particular tions’ technological capabilities and the finan- circumstances. This is because a trade-off cial resources required. has to be made between the efforts and In order to get a realistic and consistent benefits that are associated with each type of overview of the NOAA-EUMETSAT partnership collaboration. Although intense forms of one has to consider the long term develop- working together can bring great leverage ment and dynamics of these different collabo- and generate synergies that translate into rative strategies and link them to the con- considerable benefits, their initiation and straining factors time, turf and trust. First, maintenance also tend to be associated with this helps clarify why some issues were easily more complex challenges in terms of, for overcome, while others have – as it goes – example, political feasibility, engineering posed challenges to the progress in the rela- requirements and management. In other tionship between EUMETSAT and NOAA. Sec- words, moving up one progressive stage is ond, it serves as measure of solidity and not an improvement per definition. The opti- strength of the partnership that has grown mal form of partnership for a specific activity since the first networking contacts in the depends on many factors, like the strategy of mid-1980s. The latter is important to grasp the organisations in question, the nature of the value of the benefits this partnership has produced. This will be addressed in the sub- 69 Ibid.
ESPI Report 46 54 September 2013 EUMETSAT–NOAA Collaboration in Meteorology from Space
sequent chapter, the cost-benefit impact takes the form of trans-organisational data assessment. access by means of data exchange and, im- proved chances of data access continuity in times of loss of coverage. Also, unlike coop- eration activities, the coordination in geosta- 6.2 Geostationary Satellite tionary activities does not involve a deploy- Activities as a Form of Co- ment or sharing of resources. Actually, the Back-Up and Geostationary Agreements are ordination explicitly structured around the premises of no exchange of funds and a best efforts ap- In the field of geostationary satellites the proach. partnership has resulted in two crowning achievements that are still in force today: the Turf has never really been a restraining factor Back-Up Agreement and the Geostationary in the field of geostationary satellites, mainly Agreement. It should be recalled that the first because turf issues are more prone to arise in was signed in 1993 to proactively regulate more complex forms of working together the requirements and procedure for back-up than mere coordination. These are typically assistance in the event of loss of coverage characterised by stronger commitments, from geostationary meteorological satellites. higher integration and critical sharing of risk The second, signed in 1995, was conceived and responsibilities. One reason for this lack as a plan for data access and distribution of complexity is the clearly geographically following encryption of High Resolution Im- separated slots in the geostationary orbit ages by EUMETSAT. with their fixed area of coverage and related lack of incentive for integrated platforms and In the theory of the progressive continuum of exchange of instruments. On the operational collaborative strategies, the joint geostation- side, the transparent and clear stipulations of ary activities correspond to a form of coordi- the Back-Up Agreement assure equal com- nation. This means they are more committed mitments under similar circumstances, which and formal than just networking, but at the assure a certain balance between input and same time less integrated than cooperation gains, given that both organisations have activities. This becomes clear when the defi- more or less some consistency in their pro- nition, characteristics and resource deploy- grammatic development. Luckily, the Ameri- ment of coordination are applied. Here, the can partners felt they could rely on the Euro- information exchanged for mutual benefit pean partner’s capabilities for the Back-Up takes the form of the organisations’ core Agreement. Reasons for this include the prior product: the data as made available under working experience under the Atlantic Data the Geostationary Agreement. User commu- Coverage and the leverage of ESA meteoro- nities on both sides of the Atlantic incorpo- logical expertise into EUMETSAT at the time rate the data obtained from both GOES and of its creation. In this sense the first real METEOSAT satellites in their models and achievements were indirectly supported by eventually products and services. The altera- the historical foundations in the networked tion of activities on the other hand is re- community, which had created sufficient trust flected by the Back-Up Agreement and the for coordination activities. When all these technical preparations related thereto. Defin- elements are taken together, there was in- ing the protocol for satellite back-up events, trinsically not much room for turf issues to it ensures that the common purpose of conti- arise. As will be explained further, this was nuity of coverage in the Global Observing slightly different in the evolution of polar System framework is guaranteed. At the orbiting satellite joint activities. same time, the amount of time and levels of trust required to establish and maintain this Overall, the constraining factors shaping this coordination are relatively limited. Data ex- coordination were at the time very much change under the Geostationary Agreement influenced by their timing and sequence in takes place on an automatic basis, while the the overall cooperation record. Not much Back-Up Agreement only involves activities time had passed since the establishment of under relatively rare circumstances. Both EUMETSAT and the organisation was still organisations also retain total independence small, undergoing a process of maturation. in the development and operation of their Table 10 schematically maps the structural own satellites. Taken together, the main fo- elements of the geostationary activities to the cus of the geostationary coordination activi- corresponding form of working together as ties is increasing the user friendliness of both identified in the progressive continuum of the American and European systems. This collaborative strategies.
ESPI Report 45 55 September 2013
Geostationary Satellites
Legal Agreements and Constellation Characteristics
Back-Up Agreement (1993)
• Altering activities by means of satellite back-up under certain predefined conditions. Definition • Common purpose is the achievement of the goals in the WMO GOS Framework.
• No time commitments to maintain this coordination of back-up. • Organizations remain fully independent and autonomous in development Characteristics and operations. • Making access to satellite data more user friendly (i.e. robust) is the main focus.
• No sharing of resources in nominal scenarios; only for a limited time when necessary. Resources are thus shared but not on a systematic nor Resources full-time basis. • Best effort approach in case of emergency.
Geostationary Agreement (1995)
• Exchange of information for mutual benefit by full exchange of data be- Elements tween EUMETSAT and USG in the interest of their user communities. • Low time commitments because of the automated exchange of data. Characteristics • Moderate levels of trust, mainly in the quality and continuity of data pro- vided.
Resources • No sharing of resources, only data.
Structural Form of Working Together
Networking Coordination Cooperation Collaboration