What Did Socrates Love? Tomáš Hejduk
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4 What Did Socrates Love? Tomáš Hejduk At the very beginning of the history of philosophy we find Socrates saying that the only thing he really knows is love.1 Nevertheless, scholars remain unclear about exactly what knowledge of love Socrates was claiming to possess. This chapter draws upon the Lysis , Symposium , and Phaedrus to identify the object of Socrates’s love and the rationale for his endorsement of a curiously modified traditional pederasty. 2 The first section shows that the object of Socrates’s love cannot be identified with the objects of various desires instantiated in the individual parts of the soul. The second section demonstrates that Socrates loves the other as a divine being and that his love involves both ‘need love’ and ‘bestowal love.’ The final section attempts to show that, in the strongest sense of Socrates’s erôs , the true object of his love is love itself. At the outset, we may do well to acknowledge that if we want to under- stand the idea of love in a human life, we have to remember the original experience from which it was born. All thoughts and conceptions analyzed here represent a conceptually more accurate elaboration of an old idea of love, though necessarily at the expense of some wider dimensions of the life experience within which it originates. Our return to Socrates recalls some lost dimensions of the original experience. More specifically, the life of love, (the right kind of love) is life in the presence of the god. Conceptions of dialogical love, love at first sight, the irreplaceability of the beloved, and so on acquire their fundamental context from this. 1 The plurality of the objects of ‘love’: parts of soul When Socrates analyzes the sense of ‘love’ in the Phaedrus , he uses the famous image of the charioteer and two horses to represent the three parts of soul – reason, spirit, and appetite. 3 Each part longs for its own 56 C. Maurer et al. (eds.), Love and Its Objects © Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2014 What Did Socrates Love? 57 proper object. The black horse or the appetitive element (in the terms of the Republic ) longs for bodily pleasure (sexual satisfaction) or profit. In the Symposium , the appetite is a physically oriented passion that can assert itself only on the lowest rung of the ladder of love and only before the human being starts an erotic ascent. 4 By contrast, the white horse, or spirited element in the Phaedrus , longs for honor, victory, and good reputation. In terms drawn again from the Symposium , this is a spiritual love which looks toward beautiful activities and laws. Meanwhile, the charioteer or the rational element longs for contemplation. But the situ- ation is difficult because contemplation, which reason apparently longs for, excludes ruling the whole soul or the whole human being or even the whole polis as a community of persons. After all, to devote oneself to the tasks of ruling , of government, means to resign from the desired contemplation of ideas and instead preoccupy oneself – out of necessity, not of love – with earthly matters .5 2 The whole person: love for the other From the range of Socrates’s dialogues on love, and with the aid of succes- sive dramatic and analytic readings, we can infer claims about love for the whole soul and for a whole person. Such love never reduces to the listed desires of the individual parts of soul ( Phaedrus ) or to the individual stages and channeling, or cathecting, of psychic desires ( Symposium ). The object of such love cannot be identified easily with a body, profit, honor, beauty, or good. Rather, its object is simply a beautiful boy in whom all of love’s longings (all the parts or stages) somehow meet (Obdrzalek 2012, p. 78). This love for a boy has a good deal to tell us about the real object of Socrates’s love and about his recommendations concerning the role of love in human life: 6 ‘After all, the lover himself cannot become immortal except by giving birth in the beauty he has at last found. He does that, however, precisely by arranging for his beloved to grow up, become truly virtuous, and be with him in the contemplation of ... true beauty’ (Reeve 2011, p. 16). In this sense, Vlastos concisely describes the difference between the Socrates’s and Plato’s love: ‘So what he [Socrates, T.H.] loves in a beautiful boy, is a beautiful boy’ (1991, p. 38). What this tells the reader is that the whole of the soul’s longing is more than just a set of parts. Naturally when answering the question ‘What does it mean to love a beautiful boy?’ we can turn to the analysis of the three parts and answer that the lover always loves the three proper objects of desire that the boy instantiates. This will, however, not be all or even the most important part of the story because the reverse 58 Tomáš Hejduk is also true: the longings of the individual parts of soul can make sense only in the context of a very personal love. This is the thesis explored and supported below. 2.1 The open admirer: Socrates’s need love In passages of the Phaedrus where the reader might expect a speech on beauty and on the other objects that fall within the range of the chari- oteer’s and the philosopher’s longing for contemplation and truth, it is curious but clear that love for the boy himself still remains central. Socrates at length describes the concord and bliss of affectionately living with others (256a–257a). And, after the end of the palinode, he then prays to Erôs, 7 ‘Grant that I may be held in higher esteem than ever by those who are beautiful’ (para tois kalois timion einai , 257b). 8 The philosopher’s erotic art ( techné erotiké) and love of those who are beautiful ( hoi kaloi ) both depend upon the favor of the beautiful and simultaneously aid in its evocation. What does such true love for boys look like, according to the Socratic art of love? It seems to stand or fall with the art of seeing. The boy by his character resembles the god, and the true lover is the one who can see the similarity and come to properly worship the boy as he would the god. Socrates (both in his teaching and life) is not far from Simone Weil’s view that ‘love sees what is invisible.’ Socrates polemizes against traditional pederasty in which the boy has to accept a subordinate passive position and satisfy the lover. Instead of love, he is allowed to experience maximally a certain form of friendship with the lover. Socrates attacks the asymmetry here, the imbalance of relationship: it does not truly bring any satisfaction to the boy who is consumed by the lover as by a predator ( Charmides 155d–e; Phaedrus 241d1) or by the community where the boy is accepted through the act of subordination. Socrates, by contrast, associ- ates the boy with a god to whom the lover is in many respects subordinate and obliged. Socrates proclaimed what Gaita perceives as the nature of true love: ‘Treat me as a human being, fully as your equal, without conde- scension’ (Gaita 2000, p. xx). In Socrates’s time, children – specifically boys – were ‘invisible to the moral faculties of their fellows’ (Gaita 2000, p. xx). But Socrates recognized the wealth (the divinity on which alone one can base humanity) that was within them. Socrates’s fear for loss of the expertise in love (257a) is then the fear for the loss of sight (243a). And this too shows that love for Socrates is what enables the lover to see divine preciousness of the young.9 Worshiping boys, then, involves care for godly character and for its development both in the beloved and in oneself (252c–253c). 10 In other words, ‘those who are beautiful,’ whose favor Socrates cares to keep, are What Did Socrates Love? 59 both boys and gods themselves. Theirs is the greater part of beauty. These erotic passages also identify the highest goal of life as proclaimed by Socrates: be pleasing to the gods and imitate them ( homoiôsis theôi kata to dynaton ). 11 Even in the most perfect love (that is, the philosopher’s), the love in question is not only about the charioteer’s contemplation of the true being. It concerns also a relationship with the gods and the imitation of the gods. This is indicated not only by Socratic description of the unceasing worry of the true lover, and his beloved’s similarity to the god, but it is a pattern and background to such worry. The god who is the cause of all this in the end turns his attention away from himself, and in doing so represents at least in the same strength contemplation as care for the world. And this is something for which neither charioteer nor any part of the soul obviously longs. The object of Socrates’s love in this sense is the god as an infinite source of inspiration. The philosopher thus represents a kind of need love, which is in fact a love for the prudential wisdom that enables a human being to live well (Rudebusch 2009, p. 187). This might seem to indicate that love for the boy is primarily or covertly an egocentric desire to reach harmony in one’s own life. However, leading a balanced, meaningful life as such implies mutuality as an imitation of the gods – mutuality between people, gods, and the whole of the world.