DOCSLIB.ORG

Russia Tier 1 | Uscirf-Recommended Countries of Particular Concern (Cpc)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Russia Tier 1 | Uscirf-Recommended Countries of Particular Concern (Cpc) RUSSIA TIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC) KEY FINDINGS During 2017, Russia showed no signs of wavering from the acted with total impunity, arresting and kidnapping persons repressive behavior it demonstrated in 2016 that led USCIRF suspected of even tangential links to Islamic militancy. Russia to recommend its designation as a “country of particular con- is the sole state to have not only continually intensified its cern,” or CPC, for the first time in April 2017. The government repression of religious freedom since USCIRF commenced continued to target “nontraditional” religious minorities, monitoring it, but also expanded its repressive policies to the including Jehovah’s Witnesses and Scientologists, with fines, territory of a neighboring state by means of military invasion. detentions, and criminal charges under the pretext of com- A visit by USCIRF to Ukraine in December 2017 confirmed that bating extremism. Most notably, the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russian-occupied Crimea, the Russian authorities continued were banned outright, as was their translation of the Bible, to kidnap, torture, and imprison Crimean Tatar Muslims at will, and their followers persecuted nationwide. Adherents of the while Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, often referred to Islamic missionary movement Tabligh Jamaat, members of the as the Donbas, continued to hold expropriated church build- Islamic fundamentalist movement Hizb ut-Tahrir, and readers ings and intimidate religious communities. Based on these of the works of Turkish theologian Said Nursi were sentenced particularly severe violations, in 2018 USCIRF again finds that to prison terms of between three and 18 years for peaceful Russia merits designation as a CPC under the International religious expression. In the North Caucasus, security forces Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT • Designate Russia as a CPC under IRFA; under section 604(a) of IRFA and • Encourage increased U.S. funding • Work to establish a binding agreement the Global Magnitsky Human Rights for Voice of America (VOA) Russian with the Russian government, under Accountability Act, and asset freezes and Ukrainian Services and for Radio section 405(c) of IRFA, on steps it can under the Global Magnitsky Act; Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) take to be removed from the CPC list; • Raise concerns on freedom of religion Russian and Ukrainian Services, so that should negotiations fail, impose sanc- or belief in multilateral settings and uncensored information about events tions, as stipulated in IRFA; meetings, including at the Organization inside Russia, including those related to religious freedom, continues to be • Urge the Russian government to for Security and Cooperation in Europe disseminated; amend its extremism law in line with (OSCE), and urge the Russian govern- international human rights standards, ment to agree to visits by the United • Call on the Russian government to stop such as adding criteria on the advocacy Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on persecuting religious minorities in the or use of violence; freedom of religion or belief and the occupied areas of Crimea and Donbas, OSCE Representatives on Tolerance, beginning by reversing the ban on • Press the Russian government to and to establish an international moni- the Crimean Tatar Mejlis and abolish- ensure that laws such as the extremism, toring presence in occupied Crimea; ing repressive religious registration religion, and foreign agents laws are not requirements; and used to limit the religious activities of • Press for at the highest levels and work peaceful religious groups, and to imple- to secure the release of prisoners of • Include violations of freedom of reli- ment European Court of Human Rights conscience, and press the Russian gov- gion or belief and related human rights decisions relating to freedom of belief; ernment to treat prisoners humanely in all relevant discussions with the Rus- and allow them access to family, human sian government over Russia’s illegal • Use targeted tools against specific rights monitors, adequate medical annexation of Crimea and support of officials and agencies identified care, and lawyers, and the ability to rebels in the Donbas, and work closely as having participated in or being practice their faith; with European and other allies to apply responsible for human rights abuses, pressure through advocacy, diplomacy, including particularly severe viola- • Ensure the U.S. Embassy, including and targeted sanctions. tions of religious freedom; these tools at the ambassadorial level, maintains include the “specially designated appropriate contacts with human nationals” list maintained by the U.S. rights activists, and that the ambas- Department of the Treasury’s Office sador meets with representatives of of Foreign Assets Control, visa denials religious minorities; USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2018 TIER 1 TIER RUSSIA COUNTRY FACTS FULL NAME RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY* Russian Federation 68% Russian Orthodox 7% Muslim GOVERNMENT 25% Other (including Protestants, Catholics, Jehovah’s Wit- Presidential Federation nesses, Buddhists, Jews, and Baha’is) POPULATION 142,000,000 GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism *U.S. Department of State BACKGROUND other communities can be financially blacklisted or The Russian government views independent religious liquidated, and individuals can be subjected to criminal activity as a major threat to social and political stability prosecution for a social media post. and to its control, an approach inherited from the Soviet In July 2016, the Russian government adopted a period. It maintains and frequently updates laws that package of amendments, known as the Yarovaya Law, restrict religious freedom, including a 1997 religion law that significantly enhanced the scope and penalties and a 2002 law on combating extremism. The Russian of the religion and anti-extremism laws. The religion religion law sets strict registration requirements on law now broadly defines “missionary activities” to religious groups and empowers state officials to impede forbid preaching, praying, disseminating religious their activity. The religion law’s preface, which is not materials, and even answering questions about legally binding, singles out Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, religion outside of officially designated sites. With no and especially Orthodox Christianity as the country’s independent judiciary in Russia, any religious speech four traditional religions; other religious groups are or activity not explicitly sanctioned by the authorities treated with suspicion. Over time, the Russian govern- now has the potential to be criminalized, depending ment has come to treat the Moscow Patriarchate of the on the whims of local law enforcement and prosecu- Russian Orthodox Church (MPROC) as a de facto state tors. Those convicted of extremism are now subject to church, strongly favoring it in various areas of state up to six years’ imprisonment, major fines equivalent sponsorship, including subsidies, the education system, to several years of average annual wages, and/or bans and military chaplaincies; this favoritism has fostered a on professional employment. climate of hostility toward other religions. The Federal List of Extremist Materials, main- The anti-extremism law lacks a clear definition tained by the Ministry of Justice, is a key feature of the of extremism, and the use or advocacy of violence is extremism law. Any Russian court may add texts to the not necessary for activity to be classified as extremist. list; as of the end of 2017 there were over 4,000 items on Because virtually any speech can be prosecuted, the that list, including many with no apparent connections law is a powerful way to intimidate members of reli- to militancy. gious and other communities. Books may be placed by Several other laws punish peaceful religious expres- court order on a list of banned materials. Religious and sion, nonconformity, or human rights activity. These USCIRF | ANNUAL REPORT 2018 TIER 1 TIER RUSSIA include a 2012 law that effectively bans unsanctioned participants threatened with prosecution. Witnesses were public protests, a 2012 law that requires nongovernmen- dismissed from their jobs, schoolchildren and their parents tal organizations (NGOs) that receive funds from abroad were interrogated and threatened, and the community’s to register as “foreign agents,” and a 2013 amendment buildings and property were burned and vandalized. Jeho- that criminalizes offense to religious sentiments. vah’s Witnesses also were no longer permitted to request In March 2014, Russia illegally annexed the alternative service as conscientious objectors and were Ukrainian Black Sea peninsula of Crimea. Almost all ordered to report for military service. of the 300,000 Crimean Tatars, an indigenous Muslim At year’s end, Jehovah’s Witness Dennis Chris- ethnic group, oppose Russian occupation owing to their tensen, a Danish citizen arrested in May during a prayer Soviet-era experiences—Joseph Stalin deported the service in the city of Orel, remained detained, awaiting entire community to Central Asia in 1944, resulting in trial. Another Jehovah’s Witness, Arkady Akopyan, has the death of up to half of the Crimean Tatar population. been on trial since May 2017 in the province of Kab- In March 2014, Russian-backed separatist forces also ardino-Balkaria; the two prosecution witnesses against began asserting control over the eastern
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Russian 'Sovereign Internet' Facing Covid-19
    The Russian ‘Sovereign Internet’ Facing Covid-19 Francesca Musiani, Olga Bronnikova, Françoise Daucé, Ksenia Ermoshina, Bella Ostromooukhova, Anna Zaytseva To cite this version: Francesca Musiani, Olga Bronnikova, Françoise Daucé, Ksenia Ermoshina, Bella Ostromooukhova, et al.. The Russian ‘Sovereign Internet’ Facing Covid-19. Institute of Network Cultures. Stefania Milan, Emiliano Treré & Silvia Masiero (eds.) COVID-19 from the Margins. Pandemic Invisibilities, Policies and Resistance in the Datafied Society, pp. 174-178, 2021, Theory on Demand #40, 978-94-92302-72-4. hal-03128294 HAL Id: hal-03128294 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03128294 Submitted on 2 Feb 2021 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. COVID-19 FROM THE MARGINS PANDEMIC INVISIBILITIES, POLICIES AND RESISTANCE IN THE DATAFIED SOCIETY EDITED BY STEFANIA MILAN, EMILIANO TRERÉ AND SILVIA MASIERO A SERIES OF READERS PUBLISHED BY THE INSTITUTE OF NETWORK CULTURES ISSUE NO.: 40 174 THEORY ON DEMAND #40 30. THE RUSSIAN “SOVEREIGN INTERNET” FACING COVID-19 Francesca Musiani , Olga Bronnikova, Françoise Daucé, Ksenia Ermoshina, Bella Ostromooukhova & Anna Zaytseva Despite the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic in Russia, a state of emergency has not been declared in the country; only specific regions have entered into a state of “high alert” since early April.
    [Show full text]
  • Social Media User Arrests, State-Supported Vigilantism and Citizen Counter- Forces in Russia
    Global Crime ISSN: 1744-0572 (Print) 1744-0580 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fglc20 (Con)trolling the Web: Social Media User Arrests, State-Supported Vigilantism and Citizen Counter- Forces in Russia Rashid Gabdulhakov To cite this article: Rashid Gabdulhakov (2020): (Con)trolling the Web: Social Media User Arrests, State-Supported Vigilantism and Citizen Counter-Forces in Russia, Global Crime, DOI: 10.1080/17440572.2020.1719836 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2020.1719836 © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Published online: 19 Feb 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 405 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fglc20 GLOBAL CRIME https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2020.1719836 ARTICLE (Con)trolling the Web: Social Media User Arrests, State-Supported Vigilantism and Citizen Counter-Forces in Russia Rashid Gabdulhakov Department of Media and Communication, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands ABSTRACT KEYWORDS This article applies Haggerty and Ericson’s surveillant assemblage Internet governance; Russia; concept to the recent wave of social media user arrests in Russia. In social media; surveillant doing so, it addresses the legislative frameworks applied to online assemblage; vigilantism self-expression, depicts the nuances of legal charges pressed against select social media users, assesses the role of formal law enforcement and vigilant citizens recruited to extend the state’s watchful gaze, and elaborates on citizen counter-forces resisting the tightening state control over the digital domain.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia the Ingush-Ossetian Conflict in the Prigorodnyi Region
    Russia Page 1 of 32 RUSSIA THE INGUSH-OSSETIAN CONFLICT IN THE PRIGORODNYI REGION Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Human Rights Watch New York · Washington · London · Brussels Copyright © May 1996 by Human Rights Watch. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 96-75960 ISBN: 1-56432-165-7 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report is based on a trip to the Republic of Ingushetiya, hereafter Ingushetiya, and the Republic of North Ossetia- Alaniya, hereafter North Ossetia, both states of the Russian Federation, from August 11-19, 1994. Until 1994, North Ossetia was the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), a part of the former Soviet Union. Until 1992, Ingushetiya was part of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), and was also part of the former Soviet Union. Human Rights/Helsinki representatives visited Vladikavkaz, Kartsa, Chermen, Tarskoye, Kurtat, Dachnoye, and Maiskii in North Ossetia and Nazran and Gaziyurt in Ingushetiya. Jeri Laber and Rachel Denber edited the report, and Shira Robinson provided production assistance for its publication. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki thanks both North Ossetian and Ingush authorities as well as officials from the Russian Temporary Administration (now the Temporary State Committee) for their cooperation with the mission participants. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki would like to express our appreciation to all those who read the report and commented on it, including Prof. John Collarusso of McMaster University. We would also like to thank the members of the Russian human rights group Memorial, who provided generous assistance and advice. In 1994 Memorial published an excellent report on the conflict in the Prigorodnyi region, "Two Years after the War: The Problem of the Forcibly Displaced in the Area of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict." Finally, we would like to thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Henry Jackson Fund, the Merck Fund and the Moriah Fund for their support.
    [Show full text]
  • The Russian Federation
    FOLLOW-UP TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY ON “BLOCKING, FILTERING AND TAKE-DOWN OF ILLEGAL INTERNET CONTENT”1 Elena Sherstoboeva, Ph.Ds. in Communications and Journalism and Valentina Pavlenko May 2019 THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 1. Legal Sources As the Russian Federation has no specific internet-related laws, its regulation of online content is based on a great variety of sources. An intricate legislative system for blocking, filtering and take-down of illegal online content operates under numerous amendments to existing laws as well as subsidiary governmental regulations. This update of the 2015 report on the Russian Federation therefore contains a number of references to previously existing legislation which has only partially been amended in recent developments. Online content remains mostly overseen by one governmental agency, the Federal Service for Supervision of Communication, Information Technologies, and Mass Communications (Roskomnadzor)2. The internet has been actively regulated in Russia since the early 2010s, a period punctuated by the growing impact of online platforms on public opinion in the country, most notably during the 2011-20133. The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation4 has no specific guarantees for online freedom of expression but provides strong general guarantees for this right. Its Article 29 protects freedom of speech and thought, freedom of mass information, the right to express opinions and the right to access information. It also contains an absolute ban on censorship. Like international standards, the Russian
    [Show full text]
  • The North Caucasus Region As a Blind Spot in the “European Green Deal”: Energy Supply Security and Energy Superpower Russia
    energies Article The North Caucasus Region as a Blind Spot in the “European Green Deal”: Energy Supply Security and Energy Superpower Russia José Antonio Peña-Ramos 1,* , Philipp Bagus 2 and Dmitri Amirov-Belova 3 1 Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidad Autónoma de Chile, Providencia 7500912, Chile 2 Department of Applied Economics I and History of Economic Institutions (and Moral Philosophy), Rey Juan Carlos University, 28032 Madrid, Spain; [email protected] 3 Postgraduate Studies Centre, Pablo de Olavide University, 41013 Sevilla, Spain; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +34-657219669 Abstract: The “European Green Deal” has ambitious aims, such as net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. While the European Union aims to make its energies greener, Russia pursues power-goals based on its status as a geo-energy superpower. A successful “European Green Deal” would have the up-to-now underestimated geopolitical advantage of making the European Union less dependent on Russian hydrocarbons. In this article, we illustrate Russian power-politics and its geopolitical implications by analyzing the illustrative case of the North Caucasus, which has been traditionally a strategic region for Russia. The present article describes and analyses the impact of Russian intervention in the North Caucasian secessionist conflict since 1991 and its importance in terms of natural resources, especially hydrocarbons. The geopolitical power secured by Russia in the North Caucasian conflict has important implications for European Union’s energy supply security and could be regarded as a strong argument in favor of the “European Green Deal”. Keywords: North Caucasus; post-soviet conflicts; Russia; oil; natural gas; global economics and Citation: Peña-Ramos, J.A.; Bagus, P.; cross-cultural management; energy studies; renewable energies; energy markets; clean energies Amirov-Belova, D.
    [Show full text]
  • Renewed Circassian Mobilization in the North Caucasus 20-Years After the Fall of the Soviet Union
    Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe Vol 11, No 2, 2012, 103-135 Copyright © ECMI 21 December 2012 This article is located at: http://www.ecmi.de/publications/detail/issue-22012-vol-11-254/ Renewed Circassian Mobilization in the North Caucasus 20-years after the Fall of the Soviet Union Lars Funch Hansen* University of Copenhagen The renewed ethnic mobilization among Circassians in the North Caucasus region in Russia that has unfolded since the latter half of the 2000s is illustrated by the establishment of new civil society organizations and a substantially increased number of internet-based initiatives. All of this reflects a new and increased form of agency and unity among the Circassians in which youth activism has played key role. It also illustrates how Circassian civil society actors and cyber-activists have not only been able to establish a counter-public sphere or develop a new space for action, but also increasingly have been able to move key issues from Circassian spheres into the wider public sphere of mainstream Russian media and politics. The upcoming 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, in particular, has functioned as a lever in this process, which has also resulted in increasing support among Circassians for calls for recognition of the nineteenth century forced expulsion of the majority of the Circassians from the Caucasus as an act of genocide. In this manner, a mega-event such as the Sochi Olympics has contributed to generating a more radical or politicized understanding or framing of the Caucasian exodus that, since the fall of the Soviet Union, has generally been known as “our national tragedy”.
    [Show full text]
  • Himalayan Journal of Education and Literature Macrocosm and Its Dark in Cherkess Women's Poetry Today
    Himalayan Journal of Education and Literature Open Access Research Article Macrocosm and Its Dark in Cherkess Women's Poetry Today Кhuako Fatimet Doctor of Philology, Professor, Maikop State Technological University, Russia *Corresponding Author Кhuako Fatimet Abstract: As revealed in the presented work, the Circassian literature of the post- Soviet period, based on the then newly emerged concept of the macrocosm and personality, exacerbated the layer of creative immersion in being. This was due to the Article History fact found in the work: the word-creation of poets, caused by the oppressive Received: 30.04.2021 destruction of perestroika, is often aimed at regulating ordinary issues, necessarily Accepted: 10.05.2021 saturated with black-and-white problems and its antipodes. Accordingly, the closeness Published: 20.05.2021 of the art authors considered in the article as research objects to the media environment that paints the realities of life is evident. The analyzed materials here are Citations: poetic works of female Circassian lyrics (in particular, Sanyat Gutova, Muliat Emizh). Кhuako Fatimet. (2021); Macrocosm and The rationale for this choice is given in the Introduction, and it allows us to assume Its Dark in Cherkess Women's Poetry Today. the relevance of the study. The methods involve textual comparison, analysis, Hmlyan Jr Edu Lte, 2(3) 9-14 commenting based on facts and personal experience. The direct and natural rhythmization of the century that has come with a peculiar, thorough reflection on the Copyright @ 2021: This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the macrocosm has perceptibly determined, in particular, the literary texts of the Creative Commons Attribution license which Circassian poetesses who create today, and in various genres.
    [Show full text]
  • The Digital Counter-Revolution: Why the Kremlin Pursues a Sovereign Internet Author(S): Plattner, Antonin Publication Date: November 2019 Category: Analysis
    Title: The Digital Counter-Revolution: Why the Kremlin pursues a sovereign Internet Author(s): Plattner, Antonin Publication date: November 2019 Category: Analysis Keywords: Internet, sovereignty, authoritarianism, democracy, governance, technology, infrastructure, national security, Russia Cover page photo: People attend an opposition rally in Moscow, Russia, on 10 March 2019. Participants in the rally are protesting against the bill about sovereign RuNet and censorship on the Internet. EPA/Maxim Shipenkov/Scanpix Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely those of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation. ISSN 2228-2076 ©International Centre for Defence and Security 63/4 Narva Rd., 10152 Tallinn, Estonia [email protected], www.icds.ee in all modesty, thought he was the chosen one to avenge the insult of the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”.2 Ever since, an unwavering spirit of restoration has animated his political views: restoring the Kremlin’s prestige and strength both domestically and internationally remains his only ideological driver. Thus, his political vision On 25 July 2019, the Select Committee on started out with an end in mind. Intelligence of the US Senate released a report The “colour revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia on “Russian active measures campaigns and 1 and Kyrgyzstan (and the small-scale protests interference in the 2016 U.S. election”. Its they inspired in Moscow in 2005) convinced main finding is that “extensive activities” had Putin that his reactionary “project” could be been carried out “at least from 2014” until “at transcended by progressive forces, ready to least 2017” but that “Russian intentions break the spell of a country doomed to be ruled regarding U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Conflicts in the North Caucasus
    Central Asian Survey, (1998), 17(3), 409-441. Conflicts in the North Caucasus SVANTE E. CORNELL* Although the conflicts that have attracted most international attention in the post- cold war era have been those of the Transcaucasus, another area of both potential and actual turmoil is the North Caucasus. The first example of serious conflicts in the area, naturally, is the war in Chechnia. However, the existence of this war, and its astonishing cruelty and devastation, has been instrumental in obscuring the other grievances that exist in the area, and that have the potential to escalate into open conflict. These can be divided into two main categories, which however spill over into one another. The first type of conflicts are those among the peoples of the region; the second type is conflicts between these peoples and Russia. Doubtlessly, the main example of the unrest in the North Caucasus has been the short but bloody war between the Ingush and the Ossetians. However, this war distinguishes itself only by being the only one of the conflicts in the region that has escalated into war. Among the other known problems, three issues call for special attention: First and perhaps most pressingly, the bid for unity of the Lezgian people in Dagestan and Azerbaijan; Second, the latent problem between the Turkic Karachai and the Circasssian peoples in the two neighbour republics of Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria; and thirdly the condition of the most complex of all the North Caucasian republics: Dagestan. It seems logical in this study to start with the most well-known of these issues: the war that raged in November 1992 in the Prigorodniy raion between the Ingush and the North Ossetians.
    [Show full text]
  • Review TRIER Edited
    TOM TRIER, HEDGIV LOHM, DAVID SZAKONYI: Under Siege. Inter-Ethnic Relations in Abkhazia. xi + 159 pp., maps. London: Hurst & Company. 2010. £25. The more information provided to Western audiences about Abkhazia and its dispute with Georgia, the better, so that attitudes and policies can be predicated on facts rather than ignorance, as has regularly been the case. But not all works are necessarily (wholly) accurate in what they present to their readers. The present volume is a mixture of wheat and chaff, and the latter could easily have been winnowed out prior to publication. Abkhazia achieved de facto independence from Georgia at the end of September 1993 after a 14-month war. Though official recognition was granted by Russia on 26 August 2008, and since then by three other states, most of the international community is not (yet) prepared to acknowledge Abkhazia’s de iure status. This needed to be stated once in the Introduction; but inserting the words ‘de facto’ each time the country or one of its governmental posts is mentioned soon irritates the reader. The authors’ fieldwork was conducted in 2007, and, unfortunately, some of their statements are out of date. Though I would advise those unfamiliar with the region to look elsewhere for background to the current situation, what the authors have to say about their central concern of inter-ethnic relations is perceptive and pertinent. Recognising the achievements made by Abkhazia, despite years of international sanctions and blockade, the authors address a wide range of issues that the authorities will eventually have to tackle. And, given the multi-ethnic makeup of Abkhazia’s population, the problems facing the Abkhazians do not solely concern relations with those remaining from the pre-war Kartvelian population, who are mostly Mingrelians largely confined to the southernmost province of Gal and whom, in line with norms in Georgia, the authors style Georgians.
    [Show full text]
  • USCIRF Inventing Extremists
    INVENTING EXTREMISTS The Impact of Russian Anti-Extremism Policies on Freedom of Religion or Belief UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM Headquarters of St Petersburg and Leningrad Region Branch of Russian Federal Security Service ST PETERSBURG, RUSSIA - DECEMBER 16, 2017: Bolshoy Dom [Big House] in Liteyny Avenue, the headquarters of the St Petersburg and Leningrad Region Branch of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Alexander Demian- chuk/TASS (Photo by Alexander Demianchuk\TASS via Getty Images) INVENTING EXTREMISTS The Impact of Russian Anti-Extremism Policies on Freedom of Religion or Belief By Maria Kravchenko JANUARY 2018 COMMISSIONERS Daniel Mark Chairman Sandra Jolley Vice Chairwoman Kristina Arriaga Thomas J. Reese S.J. Tenzin Dorjee John Ruskay Jackie Wolcott Clifford D. May Erin D. Singshinsuk Executive Director UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WHO WE ARE WHAT IS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM The U.S. Commission on International Religious Free- Inherent in religious freedom is the right to believe or dom (USCIRF) is an independent, bipartisan U.S. federal not believe as one’s conscience leads, and live out one’s government commission created by the 1998 Interna- beliefs openly, peacefully, and without fear. Freedom of tional Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) that monitors the religion or belief is an expansive right that includes the universal right to freedom of religion or belief abroad. freedoms of thought, conscience, expression, associa- USCIRF uses international standards to monitor viola- tion, and assembly. While religious freedom is Ameri- tions of religious freedom or belief abroad and makes ca’s first freedom, it also is a core human right interna- policy recommendations to the President, the Secretary tional law and treaty recognize; a necessary component of State, and Congress.
    [Show full text]
  • OSW Report | Digitalisation Under Surveillance. the Development of the 5G Network in Russia
    DIGITALISATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 5G NETWORK IN RUSSIA Iwona Wiśniewska WARSAW OCTOBER 2020 DIGITALISATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 5G NETWORK IN RUSSIA Iwona Wiśniewska © Copyright by Centre for Eastern Studies CONTENT EDITORS Adam Eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak EDITOR Małgorzata Zarębska CO-OPERATION Szymon Sztyk, Katarzyna Kazimierska TRANSLATION OSW CO-OPERATION Nicholas Furnival CHARTS Urszula Gumińska-Kurek MAP Wojciech Mańkowski GRAPHIC DESIGN PARA-BUCH DTP IMAGINI PHOTOGRAPH ON COVER Gorodenkoff / Shutterstock.com Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw, Poland tel.: (+48) 22 525 80 00, [email protected] www.osw.waw.pl ISBN 978-83-65827-57-9 Contents MAIN POINTS | 5 I. THE DIGITAL SECTOR OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY | 7 1. Current state of the development of the digital economy in Russia | 7 2. State involvement in the sector | 8 3. Subordination of digitalisation to the security agenda | 12 4. The regulatory framework of the digital transformation | 16 5. Selected actors involved in the “Digital Economy” national programme | 18 6. Financing the “Digital Economy” programme | 22 II. RUSSIA’S 5G NETWORK DEVELOPMENT PLANS | 25 1. The current state of the mobile market in Russia | 25 2. The development of the 4G network in Russia | 27 3. Russia’s 5G network development plans | 31 4. 5G network testing | 34 5. Works on the ‘concept for the creation and development of the 5G/IMT-2020 network in Russia’ | 36 5.1. The vision of the 5G network as proposed by the Ministry for Digital Development | 36 5.2. Criticisms of the draft concept for the development of the 5G network | 38 6.
    [Show full text]