FIGHTING TERRORISM in the LIBERAL STATE NATO Security Through Science Series

FIGHTING TERRORISM IN THE LIBERAL STATE NATO Security through Science Series

This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme for Security through Science (STS).

Meetings supported by the NATO STS Programme are in security-related priority areas of Defence Against Terrorism or Countering Other Threats to Security. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO STS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy.

Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience

Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action

Following a transformation of the programme in 2004 the Series has been re-named and re- organised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series.

The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

Sub-Series

A. Chemistry and Biology Springer Science and Business Media B. Physics and Biophysics Springer Science and Business Media C. Environmental Security Springer Science and Business Media D. Information and Communication Security IOS Press E. Human and Societal Dynamics IOS Press http://www.nato.int/science http://www.springeronline.nl http://www.iospress.nl

Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 9 ISSN: 1574-5597 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State An Integrated Model of Research, Intelligence and International Law

Edited by Samuel Peleg Department of Political Science and Strategic Dialogue Center, Netanya College, Israel and Wilhelm Kempf Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Germany

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State: An Integrated Model of Research, Intelligence and International Law Konstanz, Germany 15–16 April 2005

ISBN 1-58603-600-9 Library of Congress Control Number: 2006922869

Publisher IOS Press Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected]

Distributor in the UK and Ireland Distributor in the USA and Canada Gazelle Books Services Ltd. IOS Press, Inc. White Cross Mills 4502 Rachael Manor Drive Hightown Fairfax, VA 22032 Lancaster LA1 4XS USA United Kingdom fax: +1 703 323 3668 fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected]

LEGAL NOTICE The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information.

Introduction: Terrorism and the Open Society – A Question of Balance

Samuel PELEG Department of Political Science and Strategic Dialogue Center at Netanya College, Israel

In June 1974, I was staying with my Aunt and Uncle during my summer vacation. They lived in northern Israel, in the sleepy little town of Naharya. At the age of 16, it was the farthest away from home that I could go. On the fifth night of my visit, at around 2:00 a.m., we were violently awakened by a barrage of bullets and the deafening blasts of hand grenades. We were all terribly frightened and felt totally helpless. The onslaught lasted for about 30 minutes, and then suddenly everything fell ominously silent. At dawn, we learned how fortunate we had been: The attack on the apartment house was the work of a terrorist band that had crossed over the border from Lebanon earlier that night. My relatives’ building had been randomly selected, simply because it was located near the shore. The terrorists continued wounding and killing the residents of the ground floor until Israeli Special Forces moved in, surrounded them and ended their rampage. That was my first encounter with the phenomenon of terrorism – but not my last. On March 4, 1996, a beloved teaching assistant and former student, Taly Gordon, was killed by a suicide bomber, along with 19 other innocent persons who happened to be present in a central shopping mall in Tel Aviv. The terrorist was a Palestinian artist from Gaza who belonged to Islamic Jihad. Four months earlier and three kilometers away, I had attended a peace rally that ended with the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Only an hour before the murder, my wife, our small daughter and I had passed very close by the spot where the Jewish extremist who killed Rabin was patiently waiting for his opportunity. I may even have seen him. He had not appeared the least bit suspicious either to us or to the hundreds of security personnel who were guarding the area. These examples illustrate my personal acquaintance with the nature of terrorism: indiscriminate, ruthless and unexpected. Lurking in the shadows like a ferocious beast, terrorism is aggressive and vicious. To its prey, it does not matter whether the beast is hungry or has a right to kill. From the victim’s point of view, any lethal assault is depraved, senseless and criminal. Nevertheless, however clearly and unambiguously terrorism is captured in these personal recollections, it is still a highly perplexing and confusing phenomenon. Scholars and practitioners are constantly debating the nature of terrorist activities in various parts of the world. The anti-terrorist effort is notoriously faltering and indecisive, and global cooperation against terrorism is reprehensibly inadequate. These shortcomings are especially conspicuous in liberal states, where insidious, ruthless and indiscriminate terrorism exploits the liberty and vulnerability of the open society. Terrorism appears to flourish and attract attention by striking at the soft underbelly of vi democracy. The accessibility of targets and the “silent collaboration” of the media, which exploit the sensationalism of terrorist attacks for commercial advantages, play into the hands of terrorists. This is the dilemma of terrorism in the liberal state: Should democratic liberties be curtailed for the sake of greater security? Isn’t the restriction of civil liberties a triumph for terrorism? If a “golden path” must be found, combating terrorism without sacrificing human rights and freedoms, where does such a path lead? Such questions inspired the April 2005 NATO Advanced Research Workshop, which was held at the University of Konstanz in southern Germany. This volume presents the outstanding contributions of participants at that gathering. It consists of papers by 18 leading scholars and practitioners of the war against terrorism from four continents and nine countries. They include philosophers, political scientists, psychologists, criminologists, jurists, sociologists, historians, computer analysts, intelligence analysts and law enforcement officers. This remarkably varied range of participants yielded a fascinating meeting and a noteworthy, often provocative collection of papers. The great diversity enriched our undertaking with a variety of philosophies, perspectives, and understandings. It brought together a plurality of cultures, norms and experiences to afford an exhilarating mixture of definitions and approaches. The workshop benefited greatly from the open-mindedness and forbearance reserved for those unique occasions where a diverse group of persons is present. The complex and varied nature of the contributions is reflected in this collection. Terrorism and counter-terrorism are in many ways mirror images of each other, and their names reflect that notion quite well. They are both violent activities that attempt to influence political developments and situations: the former in the direction of change, instability and disorder, the latter in the opposite direction of the status quo, stability and order. They both vie for an attentive audience and for the legitimacy of the “critical mass.” The challengers aspire to convince the population of the callousness and brutality of their government, while the authorities in turn strive to portray their opponents as ruthless criminals and malefactors. Both parties try to win the hearts and minds of the people. This struggle is waged on all political fronts, whether aimed at the members of a tribe, the citizens of a nation or world public opinion. It is relevant and meaningful on every level. While counter-terrorism marches under the banner of law and morality, terrorism defies the law and attempts to recast morality in its own terms. While the former boasts of order and stability, the latter proclaims justice and equality. The papers in this book illustrate this balanced dichotomy between terrorism and counter-terrorism against the background of the liberal state. This is a unique battlefield, where the tactical advantage is seemingly conceded to terrorists, who are free to exploit the liberties of the open society, while the authorities are constrained by those very rights and freedoms. They work under the constant scrutiny of the free press, public opinion, the political opposition, human rights organizations and the guardians of legal codes. But, as already pointed out, they have only an apparent advantage, which is forfeited the more depraved and indiscriminate terrorism becomes. Then terrorists begin to lose their popular support, and the authorities begin to win citizens’ trust in their efforts to restore tranquility. Thus, it really boils down to a question of balance: of how to establish the delicate equilibrium of combating terrorism while preserving the liberties of the open society. This book begins with this question and becomes increasingly complex as it tackles the different aspects and dimensions of this dilemma. vii

The layout of the chapters follows the logic of the terrorism – counter-terrorism dichotomy. The first entries grapple with the notion of terrorism, its elusive and problematic definition, its structural preconditions, motivations and incentives. The next three chapters juxtapose terrorism with counter-terrorism and emphasize the movement – countermovement dynamics between them. This is presented via three case studies from three different corners of the globe. Then, counter-terrorism is introduced through communications and media, international law and foreign policy analyses. As in the terrorism section, both sympathetic and critical views are expressed, conveying a sense of the wide gamut of approaches to this sensitive topic. Finally, the practical and programmatic portion of the book is laid out. The three chapters of this section illustrate analytical and adaptive models for countering terrorism while minimizing the loss of the liberties of the democratic state. Thus, the book returns full circle and offers an equilibrant to the predicament of terrorism in the liberal state. My opening chapter challenges the widespread perception of terrorism as irrational, indiscriminate and improvised. Instead, I show that terrorism is a deliberate and premeditated activity that is sometimes intentionally made to seem pathological and irrational. The suggestiveness of, “Don’t offer any resistance, we are ruthless fanatics who won’t stop at anything,” might serve terrorists by intimidating the authorities and deterring citizens from cooperating with the police, but it can also benefit a State that resorts to harsh retaliatory measures against terrorists, “who don’t listen to reason.” Nonetheless, to portray terrorism as irrational is misleading and should be avoided. Unless terrorism is comprehended and countered rationally, it cannot be defeated. Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi delves into the anatomy of terrorism and turns it on its head. He demonstrates logically and eruditely the vagueness and ambiguity of the term ‘terrorism’ in contrast to the clarity and consistency it is ordinarily perceived and understood to possess. His view is that, “terrorism as a term is already a pre-judgment. It has a moral connotation. The problem is resolved beforehand, even without the necessary effort to understand. It is a partial perception which works against the objective analysis of socio-political phenomena.” Lack of communication and reciprocal demonization between the West and the Arab world are responsible for the current gulf between terrorists and the targets of terrorism, or in Hanafi’s words, the victimizers and the victims. To bridge the chasm separating the two cultures, a dialogue between equal partners must be promoted, because so far, “… the stumbling block in the Euro-Arab dialogue is the discrepancy between the European economic agenda and the Arab political agenda.” In a similar fashion, Mokhtar Benabdallaoui does not consider terrorism in the conventional sense. He relates it to the larger concept of violence and maintains that in different contexts violence changes its meaning and its legal and moral status. But despite its complex, protean nature, terrorism, the extreme form of violence, should be condemned in all its forms, including, and above all, state terrorism, which is often thought to complement and support the law. Nevertheless, concludes the author, the eradication of global terrorism should not be pursued by pointing a finger at a specific religion or culture, or by invoking cultural Darwinism. The best way to counter the phenomenon is by constructing a more just and interdependent world society, composed of autonomous and free governments and societies with the appropriate means to promote new values. viii

Dealing more with the perpetrators of terrorism than with the act itself, Anne Speckhard calls attention to the unique and devastating phenomenon of suicide terrorism. In a detailed and insightful study of suicide terrorism, one of the first of its kind, the author describes the motivations and rewards that induce young persons to become suicide bombers. The individual, psychological and social conditions that underlie and support these tragic choices are objectively depicted in order not only to better understand this most devastating form of terrorism, but more importantly, to find ways of opposing it. Speckhard offers some valuable proposals following her in-depth analysis and a series of rare interviews with prospective suicide-bombers. She argues, among other things, that “religious leaders must begin to stand up to the manipulation of Islam by Jihadist militants, and those who do speak out ought to be supported (if quietly) by the West.” The prevention and gradual reduction of the threat posed by suicide terrorism must address its root causes. She asserts further that, “Repressive governments must be encouraged and pressured to reform, so as to open the way for economic growth and increased opportunities for the frustrated, disillusioned and often well-educated youth who constitute the most explosive sector of the societies from which suicide terrorism comes.” General Mansour Abu Rashid, a former Director of the Jordanian Military Intelligence Department, discusses issues from the pure practitioner’s perspective. After discussing several practical difficulties in the conceptualization of terrorism and counter-terrorism, he turns to the pragmatic and programmatic questions of what can be done about terrorism. In a succinct and realistic manner, Abu Rashid enumerates what should be done on various levels – political, economic, ideological and informational. He concludes that: “fighting the contemporary wave of terrorism requires a multi- branched, multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional response. Although the traditional instruments – police and intelligence services – are the most critical, they are inadequate to meet the extent and emerging challenge of terrorism.” Finally, the General adds a counter-intuitive argument, which resonates well with his extensive experience: “an effort to institutionalize the war on terror should avoid trying to achieve greater intelligence-sharing. This oft-cited goal is best handled through bilateral intelligence channels.” Abu Rashid’s contribution structurally links terrorism and counter-terrorism and also relates to three further papers which do this using illustrations from three distinctive case studies: the Palestinian-Israeli, the Spanish-Basque and the Russian- Chechnyan. In the first of the three, Eitan Alimi analyzes the revealing case of the Tanzim (Arabic for organization). In the second Intifadah (2000–2004), or uprising of the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation, this militant faction of the Palestinian armed forces was at the forefront of violent assaults against the Israelis. Although regarded by Israeli Intelligence as a terrorist group, some of its leaders were previously committed supporters of the Oslo peace initiative. Alimi expands the theoretical approach to comprehending terrorism by embedded his case study in the larger framework of collective action and social movement theory. Such an approach, Alimi believes, will shed more light on the radicalization of the formerly non-extremist Tanzim and in addition supply counter-terrorism with fresh new insights to improve on the ways it has been conducted so far. Radicalization in general, and the resort to violence and terrorism in particular, can be better understood in the context of internal organizational dynamics, or in the author’s terms, the milieu of the SMO (social movement organization). “The study of counter-terrorism would benefit from viewing ix a terrorist organization as one actor in the overall ‘field of actors’ – a social movement, and from furthering the analysis of the internal dynamics within the movement.” Thereby, perceptiveness, discernment and pragmatism in understanding terrorism and counter-terrorism would be best served. Juan Aviles introduces the Spanish case, specifically the fight against the Basque separatist terror group ETA. The author poses the question of how to characterize the indiscriminate killing of civilians during armed conflict. This is a hybrid situation between the killing of civilians in peacetime, which is clearly terrorism, and the killing of army and police personnel during violent conflict, which is more like guerrilla warfare. However, ETA terrorism falls in the middle, for it also attacks (though not exclusively) civilian targets in the midst of an ongoing conflict with the Spanish government. Additionally, in an age of protracted, low-intensity conflicts, does the struggle constitute a war or an anomaly in a time of peace? How to characterize ETA then: terrorist group? guerrilla movement? paramilitary unit, or perhaps a band of committed freedom fighters? This is not simply an exercise in semantics, but rather a serious question of how to defeat Basque extremists and with what means: legal, political, military or diplomatic. Ultimately, Aviles concludes that recognizing ETA as a political actor and permitting its political arm to participate in Basque elections was a mistake. Another mistake was that the Spanish authorities resorted to undemocratic measures in their campaign against ETA. This was counter-productive and hurt the interests of the State. One of the biggest challenges, perhaps the most crucial, in fighting terrorism in an open society is waging efficient counter-terrorism without abandoning the principles of the democratic State. A Russian and an Armenian scholar introduce the problem of terrorism in Chechnya. Vorkunova and Hovhannesian argue that terrorism challenges order and stability by “ultimately … creating the conditions for chaos and uncoordinated activities. It is conceived to include systems of disorder at all levels of human activity’.” They call attention to the expansion of the official Russian approach to terrorism as the Chechnyan terrorist campaign began to take its toll on the Russian people. From the rather limited and narrow Article 205 of the Russian Criminal Code to the Russian Federation Federal Law On the Fight Against Terrorism, adopted on June 25, 1998, the scope of counter-terrorism has widened in direct proportion to the growing menace of Chechnyan terrorism. The authors point to the amalgam of traditional and modern motives in Chechnyan terrorism which render it extremely brutal and ruthless. Bolstered by intense Islamic fervor, this terrorism represents a formidable challenge to the newly founded democracy in Russia. However, as the authors poignantly stress, counter-terrorism in that region is still very cumbersome and handicapped by mutual suspicions and fears for economic, environmental and genetic security, the breakdown of the traditional system of values and the traditional way of life in the South Caucasus. The last part of the book concentrates on counter-terrorism and its challenges before the background of the open society. This section focuses on analytical models for combating terrorism in democracies without sacrificing civil liberties. Dealing again with the delicate issue of finding a balance between the necessity to oppose terrorism and the need to preserve the spirit of liberty, this section brings to the fore the legal perspective. Two experts on international law, one Israeli and the other German, present two contrasting viewpoints on that controversial subject, whose differences are quite apparent when juxtaposed. Barry Feinstein, in a carefully reasoned study of the x

State’s right to defend itself against terrorism, positively evaluates and justifies counter-terrorism as a form of preemptive strike. He draws heavily on international law when he asserts that, “[b]eyond the responsibility of a State for all acts conducted within its territory which violate the rights of another State, as well as for any resulting violations of the other State’s sovereignty, it moreover must actively prevent such acts and violations.” Of course, if there are other alternatives to the use of force against the threat of terrorism, they must be chosen. But if there are none, “the State thereby attacked is indeed permitted to exercise force to protect itself pursuant to its inherent right of self-defense” according to Article 51 of the UN Charter. But then, an obviously pragmatic, but also moral, question arises: when to launch a pre-emptive strike? What are the justifiable grounds to initiate counter-terrorism, or should anti-terrorism efforts be exclusively reactive? Must States threatened by terrorism wait for a clear and present danger to arise, or for a threat of considerable consequence? Feinstein rejects this latter alternative. He believes that counter-terrorism is applicable not only in situations where a threat is imminent, “but also in those cases where the danger is more remote, but nevertheless real,” if the intent of the terrorist to attack has been demonstrated in the past. Berthold Meyer is less willing to condone pre-emptive measures. He earnestly questions whether increasing security is a suitable means to protect liberty. In an illuminating survey of German Law and German security measures taken after 9/11, Meyer concludes that German leaders neglected their most critical obligation: to defend freedom and civil liberties. By shifting the balance between security and democracy in favor of security, and by relying too heavily on “stockpiles of paragraphs on suspicion” and presumed intentions to act, rather than on actual and demonstrated infringements of security, the German Law on Terrorism, known as Security Packet II, fails to embody the spirit of democracy. The criteria for when to apply the strict Law are the tests of sufficient probability and life experience. Using such criteria is, in the author’s words, “treading on shaky ground.” Meyer’s own recommendations are clear: there must be stricter and more demanding standards for action, even, and especially, when emotions and sentiments are strongly aroused. The usefulness of any countermeasure against terrorism must be evaluated before its implementation, and new security legislation should expire after two years unless extended. This is the only way, warns Meyer, “to prevent civil rights from being permanently limited.” Wilhelm Kempf and Lubna Nadvi also offer reservations and admonitions against excessive counter-terrorist measures. Their perspectives differ from the previous writers and reflect their respective research disciplines, psychology and political science. Kempf examines and criticizes the overly ambitious and overly aggressive trends of post-9/11 counter-terrorism. He points out that, “outrage at war is transformed into outrage at the enemy,” which does not serve democracies well. The reprehensible attacks of September 11, 2001 could, he proposes, have been adequately dealt with using strong legal, economic and diplomatic means, but instead the United Stated chose a policy of extreme force. The author attributes this response to America’s threatened pride in its world leadership. The vulnerability of the US triggered a “… natural impulse that American self-confidence needed to be restored and strength needed to be demonstrated by fighting back.” This was the wrong approach to counter- terrorism not only because it is irrational, but also because it is counter-productive and self-defeating. The US launched an all-out war against an elusive enemy and committed its armed forces to a protracted campaign that has provoked animosity and xi resentment in many parts of the world. Enormous amounts of energy and resources were invested by the American government in convincing its people of the legitimacy of the war. Such efforts can easily deceive the public, cautions Kempf, who concludes that, “Fighting terrorism exclusively by military means bears the danger that the values of democracy will gradually be reduced to a mere facade.” Nadvi also addresses the reaction to 9/11. She asks whether “… the war against terrorism that had been unleashed by a range of governments on ‘militant insurgents’ is actually curtailing terrorist activities, or whether their actions are simply serving to inflame further violent militancy.” Nadvi insightfully points to the futility of the vicious cycle of terrorism from below and terrorism from above, or insurgent terrorism and State terrorism. The two forms of terror nourish and draw energy from each other. The only way to escape the predicament of this “chaotic global security situation” is for global civil society to step in and “create a space for constructive engagement where the public can demand accountability from both governments and non-state militants who are essentially responsible for the chaos that is being unleashed on civilian populations.” This is a fresh and ambitious approach to the task of countering terrorism. Since governments are incapable of fulfilling this mission, civic networks, grass-root movements and NGOs must come together at global summits and coordinate a plan of action to prevent, or at least to reduce the prospects of global terrorism. The final three contributions offer practical approaches for combating terrorism in the liberal State. Eitan Hadar, a computer scientist, Irit Hadar, a management information systems analyst, and Alexander Bligh, a well-known political scientist with a strong military intelligence background, propose instructive and thought-provoking models to supply encompassing solutions for the shifting balance of security and freedom. The Hadars’ contribution consists of two complementary papers: one presents an archetypical model of an adaptive global intelligence system for detecting and warning against developing terrorist activities, while the other supplements and strengthens the model by adding “the human aspects that may impact the process of building and using the system, the challenges and risks derived from them, and possible solutions.” Both writers share a similar point of departure – the need to explore better collaboration against international terrorism not only across cultures, political systems and borders, but also across intelligence agencies. Eitan Hadar pinpoints the weaknesses of past endeavors in this demanding area: “conventional collaboration technologies do not provide enough flexibility to achieve these ambitious goals. These systems must adapt to rapid changes within a dynamic environment. … [and] current centralized systems are inadequate.” He then goes on to suggest a remedy in the form of a peer-to-peer network using a decentralized grid of computers that collaborate with one another on a geographically distributed computational platform. Each terminal, or each ‘node’ of the grid supplies specific and unique information that is rapidly combined into a concrete whole of relevant material on terrorism. This is a vision which focuses on the “… network language and on the interface definition of the systems boundaries and architecture.” If adopted and implemented, this model could contribute enormously to the war against terrorism. Irit Hadar offers a perspective to further improve the model. She calls attention to the human aspects involved in designing and developing artificial intelligence systems and complex computer grids. This is an opposite orientation to the previous entry: instead of mechanizing human collaboration, Irit Hadar’s vantage point is to try to humanize or personalize machines. This is crucial to the enhancement of the model, xii because a consideration of the cognitive processes of decision-makers, the associations and fears of leaders and the stigmata, prejudices and social motivations of analysts incorporated into the design of the hardware may enrich the system with human subtleties and sensitivities. The intricate situations that counter-terrorism must face can be dealt with in a significantly better way if human aspects are prudently integrated into the mechanism. Alexander Bligh combines analytical skills with an understanding of intelligence services and their needs to devise a standardized model for anti-terror agencies to share information and jointly act on their information. Bligh starts where the Hadars leave off: he develops the Hadars’ rudimentary prototype and adds preemptive and punitive dimensions. His elaborate model purports to “break down each terrorist incident into its smallest elements, endeavoring through appropriate software to find associations and commonalities among certain actions and their stages.” Thus, details are combined to create an inclusive scenario of terrorism. This clearinghouse of information, in the author’s words, will “enable law enforcement agencies, on a regular basis, to classify the degree of risk and operate within the imperatives of all pertinent laws.” With such precise means of identifying and combating terrorism, the excessive and disproportionate face of counter-terrorism, which has deleterious effects on democracy and liberty, could be avoided or at least minimized. In the concluding paper, I attempt to shed some light on the new arena and the new actors of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the post-9/11 world. The most crucial step on the road to successful counter-terrorism is the precise identification of the phenomenon of terrorism and its perpetrators. Terrorism has changed in the last two decades since the war in Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution. It has grown in range, intensity and cruelty. It has become more global, destructive and relentless. New actors have assumed the roles of perpetrators. Instead of socialist, communist or Anarchist revolutionaries, on the one hand, or fanatical nationalists and vehement de-colonizers, on the other, the new terrorists are cut from a different cloth: they are messianic fundamentalists, and their cause is redemption on their own terms. Counter-terrorism must espouse new tools and new understandings in order to come to grips with such a formidable enemy. My paper introduces revitalization movements, such as Al-Qaeda, which “must discredit the prevailing system in the most fundamental manner. Its leaders should discount and denounce every aspect of the current regime, focusing chiefly on the issues pertaining to the group’s predicament.” This partly answers the de-contextualized “why-do-they-hate-us” quandary in the wake of the terror attacks on New York and Washington. This pathetically naïve question illustrates the unsettling effects of terrorism. It challenges conventional wisdom and forces a reconsideration of taken-for-granted ‘truths’. Ignorance frustrates pre-emptive capability, and awareness is overwhelmed by surprise. If terrorism breeds and spreads through ignorance and surprise, then awareness and preparedness must become key features of counter- terrorism. xiii

Contents

Introduction: Terrorism and the Open Society – A Question of Balance v Samuel Peleg

Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures 1 Samuel Peleg The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom? 8 Hassan Hanafi September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda 14 Wilhelm Kempf Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Collective Action Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 20 Eitan Y. Alimi Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA 40 Juan Aviles Combating Terrorism Through International Law 48 Barry A. Feinstein Violence and Terrorism: The Sense and Its Names 83 Mokhtar Benabdallaoui Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws: A Tightrope Walk Between Protecting Security and Losing Liberty 88 Berthold Meyer Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents: Modular Infrastructure for Adaptive Distributed Intelligent Systems 98 Eitan Hadar The Impact of the Human Aspects in Designing Collaborative Information Technology Systems 108 Irit Hadar A Practitioner’s Thoughts About Terrorism 113 Mansour Abu Rashid The Role of Business in the UK Policing Counter-Terrorist Effort 122 Jeff Fouhy An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation 124 Alexander Bligh Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 134 Olga A.Vorkunova and David Hovhannesian xiv

The War Against State Terrorism: Reframing the Debate on Global Terrorism 154 Lubna Nadvi Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders 158 Anne Speckhard The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game 176 Samuel Peleg

Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures

Samuel PELEG Department of Political Science and Strategic Dialogue Center at Netanya College, Israel

Abstract. This article sets the tone for the entire book. It introduces terrorism as a political term: It is an act intended to influence politics. As such, it is a calculated and premeditated initiative, which is carried out with purposive motivations. Consequently, terrorism is not a spontaneous caprice or a whimsical impulse but a rational deed, which has a goal, chosen means and a fit between them. Counterterrorism, therefore, must severe this crucial link between goals and means and render terrorism less attractive to its prospective perpetrators.

Keywords. Political terrorism; rationality; stress-seekers; messianism; participation; deprivation; ideology

Introduction

“We must put an end to this madness,” vowed British Prime Minister Tony Blair after the July 7, 2005 terror attack on London, which claimed the lives of 59 people and injured many more. But this was no madness. This was a premeditated, cold-blooded and vicious assault on one of the most vibrant symbols of the open society. London was not attacked by mentally deranged outcasts that awful morning, but rather by a team of rational and calculating human bombs with a mission: to disrupt the everyday routines of a democracy. The British capital, like every other thriving, bustling city that cherishes its freedoms, was a very propitious stage for the perpetrators’ atrocities. Taking advantage of their freedom to move about at will carrying deadly explosives without the risk of being stopped and searched, the terrorists found it easy to deliver destruction into the very heart of the metropolis. Blair’s statement was typical of the immediate responses to despicable and indiscriminate terrorism. It is consoling to assume that rational persons do not commit morally depraved crimes, since they weigh the costs and benefits of their actions and are guided by some form of moral code. This perspective contrasts the reasonable and sensible against the inexplicable and insane. The most comforting way to cope with incomprehensible savagery is to quarantine the perpetrators in the category of the criminally insane and stamp them with the all-encompassing label of “mad fanatics.” Such a demarcation serves two purposes: it isolates and excludes the “bad guys” from normal society, and it protects the “good guys,” people such as we. Such an understanding actually undermines the struggle against terrorism, however, because it abandons a thorough analysis of the background and motivation of terrorism for the sake of a fleeting reassurance that “we are all right.” It trades the insecurity of 2 S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures regarding terrorism as logically patterned behavior for the reassuring preference for viewing terrorism as pathological and deviant. Labeling terrorism as abnormal exonerates society for maltreating its pariahs and excuses policymakers for their failings. This is a colossal misunderstanding.

Characteristics of Political Terrorism

There are reasons why people commit terrorism. The reasons usually involve political, ideological or social meanings and orientations. In their condemnation of terrorism, many analysts and policymakers often overlook that the perpetrators always have an ultimate objective and a designated target. The ultimate objective is to bring about political change; the chosen target can be anyone seen as blocking this desired change, or anyone perceived as responsible for an unacceptable status quo. The indiscriminate character of modern terrorism, as opposed to, for example, the selective nature of 19th century terrorism1, is explained using the distinction that has been developed between two types of victims: the innocent, or immediate victim, and the ultimate victim. The former can be a crowd of shoppers in a shopping mall, or the passengers on a bus, whereas the latter are usually policymakers and power elites [2]. The growing psychological effect of terrorism, improved technologies of violence and the distance of political leaders from society have led to differences among victims: the more spectacular the act of terrorism, the more rapid the governmental response. A government is regarded as incompetent when it does nothing to ward off the threat of terrorism or when, through its countermeasures, it aggravates the plight of those who initiated a challenge to order and stability. Increasing mistrust of and delegitimization of the system result, coupled with a harsh doctrine that provokes true believers to draconian action. Such action is often translated into political terrorism [3]. The decision to opt for terrorism may be based on three grounds: 1. Terrorism may be indicative of extremist groups that can ideologically justify violence and are disillusioned with all other channels of expression. 2. Terrorism is one of the most effective ways to disrupt the status quo or to block the emergence of an alternative, unacceptable state of affairs. Terrorism puts governments on the spot, since it challenges their capacity to govern. Thus, it compensates perpetrators for their lack of military capability to change their situation. Hence, terrorism makes a group’s power to act appear much greater than it really is, as Gideon showed with his few warriors against the Midianites. 3. By its nature, terrorism is more easily diffused across borders than any other type of politically oriented violence. It requires secrecy, commitment, loyalty, confidence, and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the cause. But these are precisely the traits that often appeal to disheartened, humiliated self- proclaimed world redeemers. Traditionally, becoming a terrorist has meant joining a marginal group or organization of radical activists, identifying with their goals and methods of operation, and accepting their norms, principles, moral codes and rules of behavior. When this was the case, this transformation

1 For an excellent comparison of ancient, old and modern terrorism see Walter Laqueur’s The Age of Terrorism [1]. S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures 3

meant a total break with a terrorist’s previous way of life and the absorption of his individual self into the collective identity of the group. Political extremists who decide to act and become terrorists see themselves not as lone assassins, but rather as representatives of a vigorous constituency. The attempt to stigmatize them as loners, madmen, psychopaths or socio-paths distorts the fact that many potential political terrorists flourish under the auspices of a protecting identity group, be it ethnic, religious or national, and are buoyed up by the camaraderie and esprit des corps of a group. What is it that prompts young, idealistic individuals who are dissatisfied with the socio-political situation surrounding them to try to change the status quo by joining a radical and violent group? We can distinguish between the “push” of individual psychological attributes and the “pull” of the organizational incentives and benefits that terrorist groups promise their potential recruits. A combination of “pushes” and “pulls” is responsible for the final matching of the terrorist organization and its recruits. The internal psychological need to become a terrorist stems from discontent and disenchantment with the existing state of affairs. A sense of revolt and defiance of materialistic and accepted reality is accompanied by profound contempt for monetary values, luxuries or the culture of consumption. The worldview of a potential terrorist is dichotomous: it is comprised of a sense of the opposition between good and evil: the unfair status of the ‘top-dogs’ who oppress the ‘underdogs’ without there being any intermediate gray tones or circumstances to mitigate the sharp contrast [5]. Potential terrorists are so convinced of their self-righteousness that they are totally insensitive to the suffering and injustice they themselves wreak in their quest to create a perfect society. Many terrorists do not personally suffer from inequality and poverty. On the contrary, they often come from middle-class families and tranquil social environments. They first encounter social injustice when they grow up and leave home, begin their university education and become aware of social and political instability in the world. Others are not attracted as much by a concern for social justice as by the thrill of action, the excitement and constant danger of being pursued day and night; psychologists call these individuals stress-seekers [6]. A similar reason for joining a terrorist group is to escape from boredom or the dull routines of everyday life. Others are intoxicated by the mystique and the aura of heroism and romanticism surrounding terrorism. They enjoy the sense of power and the advantage of being unexpected, unpredictable, and always initiating. The young terrorist or “freedom fighter” expects to enjoy eternal glory in exchange for joining the good fight; he hopes to achieve martyrdom or sainthood if he dies carrying out a dangerous mission. The organization provides an alternative framework or family for disenchanted youth. Being part of a group offers a sense of belonging and an opportunity for camaraderie, friendship and participation in a common fate. Such reassuring experiences diminish the recruit’s insecurities vis-à-vis a hostile environment and bolster his belief in the righteousness of his chosen path. Social status is also guaranteed by joining a terrorist group, especially if the organization is popularly perceived as expressing the anguish of a large, persecuted group, as in the cases of the Irish Republican Army or the various factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. In these cases, the terrorist has no need to break with his own social background, since that very milieu may have led to his recruitment by a terrorist group in the first place. The young terrorist or “freedom fighter” has the prospect of achieving 4 S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures eternal glory by joining the struggle; he can hope for martyrdom or sainthood if he perishes in the course of performing his destructive duty. Another distinction relevant to what makes terrorists tick is between rational and irrational motives for joining terrorist groups. The rational terrorist is the goal-oriented, calculating activist who makes a careful cost-benefit calculation of the risks and incentives before choosing a course of action. The rational terrorist needs material or other tangible incentives in order to become an active member of the militant group: large salaries, respected status and a luxurious life-style. Terrorists in this category act more like mercenaries or professional assassins than deeply committed idealists. Money and security can raise the appeal of terrorism: if the risk of being caught is offset by financial compensation or reduced by diplomatic immunity or safe passage through certain territories, then the advantages of the terrorist act overshadow the potential risks. Though tangible incentives are the easiest to comprehend, intangible rewards such as eternal bliss in paradise and enhanced social status for one’s family are, in the social and religious environments where they are ardently believed in, no less “rational.” The terrorist, in this case, sacrifices a transitory this-worldly life for an immensely better eternal one. On the one hand, rational participation in terrorism is inspired by purposive incentives such as consecrating the deed and glorifying the end, which justify the terrorist act as a necessary means, regardless of its seemingly depraved nature. The greater the dedication, and the greater the sense of potential fulfillment, the more likely it is that a recruit will rationally choose to participate in terrorist groups. On the other hand, irrational terrorism is often the act of emotional, spontaneously radical individuals. Such activists neither possess a burning commitment to a cause or an ideology, nor are they usually motivated by material incentives. They act instead in response to sudden, unexpected mood swings and outbursts of hatred and the desire for vengeance. Sometimes the yearning for esteem and acceptance by peers drives them to commit the most depraved atrocities. These two motivations of terrorism co-exist in many identity groups, thus both escalating their struggle and making it more effective. The leadership can be perceived as rational because it devises goals, weighs options and makes choices. The rank-and-file may be seen as emotional, driven by religious, ethnic or patriotic zeal, and bound together by the fellowship of the group. The leaders and adherents complement each other: the former derive their authority to make rational decisions from the devotion of their followers, while the latter gain deference and meaning through the ideology and tasks delegated to them by their leaders. Terrorists are well aware that they are crossing a point of no return in the strategy of the struggle and that incremental tactics of escalation are virtually impossible to adopt once the ultimate weapon has been employed. But they seem to relish the shocking impact of their deeds and utilize the immediate, short-term success of their audacity to strengthen their faltering spirits. Thus, many terrorist factions are characterized by unbounded ruthlessness and the small size of the group. Belonging to a factional, close-knit group supports the secrecy and efficiency that foster terrorism. To choose terrorism as a course of action, a recruit has to hold passionate convictions of the right sort, and must develop a profound disdain for any potential hindrance. He also has to believe that a better future is possible, even imminent, and that human effort S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures 5 may expedite motion toward this future. A passionate certitude of a cataclysmic redemption that justifies any means is archetypal of messianic thought patterns2.

Composite Profile of Political Terrorism

From the aforementioned, a quintessential description of political terrorism may be drawn. Its major characteristics include: 1. Political Terrorism Is Intentional and Rational. It is rational not in a logical- moralistic sense, but rather in a functional-strategic sense, meaning that it chooses goals and selects means which are conceived as appropriate to those goals. Political terrorism is not an incomprehensible undertaking, but rather the coherent and organized work of resolute perpetrators. 2. Political Terrorism Is Primarily a Political Act. In addition to being criminal and illegal, it is also an attempt to exert political influence on behalf of people who, in the terrorists’ view, have been neglected and abused. Terrorists as political actors who challenge the status quo [7], and who use their weapons as negotiation tactics [8], are often underemphasized in analyses. 3. Political Terrorism Is Mostly About Change. Terrorism is instigated in response to dissatisfaction with or fear of an existing or impending social and political reality. Thus, the professed objective of extremists is to undermine routine daily life and to disrupt expected agendas. Political terrorists are frequently visionaries who aspire to swift and decisive changes in the human condition (preferably in their group’s own condition). They abhor moderate change and incremental reform and inexorably sanctify their means with the justness of their cause. There have been, throughout history, political terrorists who acted in the name of preserving the status quo, but these were rare and far less significant, because the State and its agents of social control were more effective in achieving their ends [9, 10]3. 4. Political Terrorism Is a Form of Political Participation. Engaging in the exertion of power and influence and attempting to change the political agenda are evidence of a set of independent political preferences and a desire to

2 Messianism is not innately and necessarily a religious phenomenon. By definition, the major attribute of the concept is comprehensive apocalyptic and traumatic change for large populations. In order to be a true believer and survive the apocalypse, one must follow the directives and edicts of “those in the know.” While it is true that by its nature religion is more akin to notions such as boundless faith, miraculous circumstances, vast changes, and infallible, divine leadership, secular ideologies like Marxism, Maoism, or Nazism are also messianic in nature. They boast a monopoly of the truth, they demand unquestioning loyalty, and they promise a swift and limitless change for the better for those who support them. It is, thus, no wonder that such very different persons as Vladimir Lenin – the fierce Russian revolutionary – and Sayyid Qutb – the precursor of revived Islamic fundamentalism – saw themselves as “vanguards of the revolution.” 3 Terrorist groups that organize to stave off change and protect the status quo are sometimes affiliated with governments, but not necessarily. The Vendée uprising of peasants in Western France against the revolutionary government in Paris was a local initiative aimed at restoring the Monarchy and overthrowing the radical regime, but the members organized because of their own economic and religious interests [7]. Similarly, Gush Emunim, the extremist religious group of Jewish settlers on the West Bank, organized in order to thwart the prospects of the Middle East peace process. Although they reaffirmed the policy tendencies of the right-wing Shamir government at the time, they did not act in the name of that government [3]. Hence, terrorism in the name of the status quo ought to be distinguished from state terrorism, or “terrorism from above,” in which the government officially and directly employs the means of terrorism to pursue its policies [11]. 6 S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures

realize them and to benefit others with their advantages. In other words, it means the terrorist wants to participate in decision-making processes and wants to influence their outcomes. Terrorism is therefore a channel to direct participation in politics. It is a criminal and destructive channel, and yet nevertheless an effective means. 5. Political Terrorism Is the Weapon of the Weak. This dictum stems from the ironic truth that the success of the political terrorist ultimately depends on the good will of his victims. The terrorist’s accomplishments are not measured by the number of buses blown up or by the number of airplanes hijacked. They are judged by the political change they are intended to expedite. This change hinges upon governmental compliance with the terrorist’s wishes. When change can be brought about “from below,” regardless of, or despite a government’s response, terrorists become revolutionaries. 6. Political Terrorism Challenges the Existing Order and Confronts the Government. To be against the status quo means to be against the existing order. At the two extremes of the political philosophy spectrum stand order and justice [12]. Order calls for maintaining and preserving an acceptable today; justice dictates a progression toward a better tomorrow. This dichotomy pits not only order and justice against each other in opposing and uncompromising positions, but also pits challengers (i.e., terrorists) against the guardians of the status quo (i.e., governments). There is an inherent incompatibility between political terrorists and governments. 7. Political Terrorism Is a Collective Undertaking. Terrorism draws strength from a group ethos. It is a spirit of “all for one and one for all” which favors qualities such as self-sacrifice, total commitment and unconditional loyalty among extremists. The members of the terrorist movement, group, or cell4 encourage and inspire one another. They become a surrogate family for individuals who have joined them and perhaps thereby severed all ties to their former way of life. This is particularly true of Islamist terror groups, which clearly designate themselves as an alternative “community,” “nation” or “family” and demand that their followers repudiate any ties to “nonbelievers.” Although lone perpetrators often carry out many terrorist attacks, these actors usually act for, and are embraced by, a group. 8. Political Terrorism Is Sustained by Community Deprivation. Through group spirit and resolve, activists draw strength from their sense of belonging to a community. Whether it is a religious, national, ethnic or class spirit, the solidarity and cohesion that typify many terrorist groups emerge from the feeling that their identity and destiny are inextricably linked with their core community.

4 Terrorist movements, groups or cells do not merely differ in size. There are also ideological considerations here: revolutionaries have always attempted to recruit the masses for their cause in order to tilt the balance of power in the state. Thus, they have always written and spoken about ‘movements’, even when their followers were few; for incitement purposes, they had to claim to be leading a movement. In the 1960s and 1970s, the tactics used to bring about socio-political change were modified due to the repeated failures of attempted revolutions. The ideal of the urban guerrilla became popular, and with it, the tactic of “the strike in the middle,” which was advocated by Guevara and Debrais. Urban guerrilla efforts necessitated smaller operating units, hence terrorist groups. Finally, the term terrorist “cell” is an expression that originated in the anarchist terrorist tradition. The anarchist disdain for structure and hierarchy led anarchist theorists and adherents to activism in small and minimally structured units, hence, in terrorist cells [13, 9, 14]. S. Peleg / Contemporary Modern Terrorism: Actors, Motivations, Countermeasures 7

9. Political Terrorism Is Guided by Ideology. Terrorists experience a profound sense of conviction and belief. They adhere to strict precepts that are anchored in a consistent worldview and a fervent ideology. Ideology, with its clear explanation for the ills of the present and its utopian solutions for the future, supplies the energy that galvanizes terrorists to adopt frightening methods. 10. Political Terrorism Espouses a Messianic Aura. Following Rapoport’s ideas, it seems that political terrorists are on a mission to make the world a better place. Some may even perceive them as modern day crusaders who are willing to sacrifice their own welfare for the benefit of others. Their image as moved by values and steadfast commitments wins them sympathy and support, and sometimes provisions and material sustenance. Terrorists set out to proselytize the public and convince it of the justice of their cause [15]. Due to the spectacular nature of their deeds, they enjoy a permanent captive audience [16]. Ultimately, political terrorism is more complex than it was formerly given credit for being. The above discussed characteristics point to a composite profile that should be studied carefully if this phenomenon is to be countered effectively. These characteristics of political terrorism can be realized in different ways, and their consequences can be diversely appreciated. They must be heeded if terrorism is to be defeated in the 21st century. The specific type of terrorism which currently occupies the global agenda is the radical Islamist brand. It is a vicious and relentless kind of terrorism, for it combines all the above-discussed characteristics with an unyielding and uncompromising ideology. This ideology must be carefully analyzed and understood if the battle against modern terrorism is to be won.

References

[1] Laqueur, W. (1987). The age of terrorism. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987. [2] Wilkinson, P. (1986). Terrorism and the liberal state (2nd edition). New York: New York University Press. [3] Peleg, S. (1997). They shoot Prime Ministers too, don’t they? Religious violence in Israel: Premises, dynamics and prospects. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20, 227-247. [4] Peleg, S. (2002). Zealotry and vengeance: Quest of a religious identity group. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. [5] Galtung, J. (1971). A structural theory of imperialism. Journal of Peace Research, 8(2), 81-117. [6] Crenshaw, M. (1986). The psychology of political terrorism. In: Hermann, M. (ed.). Political psychology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. [7] Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. [8] Thornton, T. (1964). Terror as a weapon of political agitation. In: Eckstein, H. (ed.). Internal war. New York: Free Press. [9] Oberschall, A. (1973). Social conflict and social movement. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. [10] Rule, J. (1988). Theories of civil violence. Berkeley: University of California Press. [11] Arendt, H. (1968). On violence. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. [12] Bull, H. (1995) The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics (2nd edition). New York: Columbia University Press. [13] Brinton, C. (1965). The anatomy of revolution. New York: Vintage Books. [14] Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in movement (2nd edition). New York: Cambridge University Press. [15] Hoffer, E. (1951). The true believer: Thoughts on the nature of mass movements. New York: Harper and Row. [16] Heymann, P. (1998). Terrorism and America: A commonsense strategy for a democratic society. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 8 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom?

Hassan HANAFI Department of Philosophy at Cairo University, Egypt

Abstract. To condemn or to understand? / Victimizers and victims / Terrorism or resistance? / Terrorism of the mutual image / Dialogue between equal partners.

Keywords. Authoritarian state, state terrorism, fundamentalism, globalization, dialogue of cultures, regional co-operation

To Condemn or To Understand?

1. It is easy to condemn, but difficult to understand. Condemning without understanding results from blindness, presuppositions and the power of arrogance. It may backfire into an infinite spiral of violence which works against dialogue and conflict resolution. 2. To understand is not to justify. Understanding is the first step toward changing the roots of terrorism. To understand comes first, to change, second. Changing the roots of violence is a part of conflict resolution which works by eliminating the sources of conflict. 3. Using the term terrorism is already a pre-judgment. It has a moral connotation. The problem is resolved beforehand, even without the necessary effort to understand. It is a partial perception which works against the objective analysis of socio-political phenomena. A more impartial word is violence, including counter-violence, primary and secondary violence, oppressive and liberating violence, visible and invisible violence, state and individual violence…, etc., common distinctions in Latin American socio-political literature. 4. Global war against terrorism is a kind of counter-terrorism. Punishment is never a solution to crime. That is why capital punishment, namely the death penalty, doubles the crime of homicide, because not only the victim, but also the victimizer, is killed. Instead of a single crime sacrificing one human soul, there are two crimes, sacrificing two human souls. 5. Global war against terrorism and global war against hegemony may be of the same order of magnitude. The question is: what is the cause and what is the effect? A linear notion of causality belongs to religious thinking, pre- supposing a primary cause, while a circular notion of causality is more scientific. H. Hanaﬁ / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom? 9

6. Terrorism, or more precisely violence, cannot be theoretically understood without being existentially lived. It is not a matter of a theoretical analysis, but rather of an existential drama. It is a matter of life and death for the terrorized. 7. Science is not the gathering of intelligence. This is the function of intelligence agencies, usually linked to state power. Science is motivated by the search for “Truth,” namely the laws of reality. Espionage and superstitious techniques are not part of the methodology of science. The assault on privacy is a crime and a violation of human rights. It is usually linked to break-ins, surveillance and residence confinement. 8. Terrorism is not only a problem of security, but also a problem of justice. When forms of injustice prevail, terrorism emerges in an effort to create a more just world, even by using evil means. 9. Scholars do not work for institutions such as ministries of defense, or even for alliances such as NATO. Scholars are motivated by an interest in knowledge. They can make the military and security force more aware of the limitations of their approaches. Surely knowledge minimizes risks by revealing more horizons of conflicts and reasons for tension. Science may also create weapons of mass destruction and lead to the use of atomic weapons in wars against people in the name of the war against terrorism. 10. The Liberal State is not the only form of state. Terrorism is practiced by both liberal states and authoritarian states. Authoritarianism causes more terrorism than liberalism. In authoritarian regimes dialogue yields to violence. Divergences of views lead to power struggles and civil wars. If the Liberal State is identified with the model of the European State, then fighting terrorism means defending Europe against its enemies. National experiences are not just those of Spain and America. Both of these countries, as victims of terror, are Western states, while the victimizers in both cases were Muslim. Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Kashmir are also victims, and the West, the USA and Russia are their victimizers. Israel and India, although located in Asia, like Australia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan …, etc., act in the manner of Western cultures. The West is not a geographical site, but rather a worldview, namely that of hegemony.

Victimizers and Victims

1. It has become very common to look at terrorism from the perspective of the victim, not from that of the victimizer, as if terrorism were a one-way street, not a two-way street, blaming the victims, not the victimizers, hearing the cry of pain, but not seeing the needle, pointing the finger at the weak, not at the strong. This creates, in small nations or in individuals, a great sense of frustration against the ‘cocalization’, namely the Americanization or the Westernization of the World. 2. The New World order may be the victimizer of small nations, leading dissident groups or individuals to use violence against the symbols of power in modern times, such as the WTO, the GATT, the Pope, and even making threats against the UN system, which is often misused by the Great Powers. Globalization as a new form of hegemony is the crux of this new world that 10 H. Hanaﬁ / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom?

arose in the fifties and the sixties: decolonization, liberation movements, national struggles, the Third World emerging in the bi-polar World. 3. Big Powers, especially the Western ones, are also part of the New World Order: The Group of Eight, most industrial countries, the European Union, allied to the USA, and sometimes France, are returning to their colonial history, as in the case of Darfour in Sudan, championing the UN resolution to try war criminals, with the exception of those of the USA, before the International Court of Justice. Russia invades Chechnya to fight the Chechnyan national movement for independence, which is called separatism. Israel occupies all of Palestine, half in 1948, the other half in 1967. India, playing the Big Power in Asia, occupies Kashmir and rejects the implementation of a UN resolution concerning the right to self-determination of the Kashmiri people. 4. The sole Big Power in the uni-polar system is a source of state terrorism, the invasion of Afghanistan under the pretext of fighting terrorism, of Iraq under the pretext of seeking weapons of mass destruction. Now it is threatening Iran under the same pretext, Syria under the pretext of its sheltering terrorist groups, and Sudan to save the people of Darfour from genocide. The Big Power sometimes manipulates the UN System and sometimes violates it. 5. State Terrorism is also practiced internally by the "New Nation State." It was at the beginning the outcome of the national liberation movement. It became at the end a source of oppression. It became an Army and Police State, controlling education, information, political institutions and civil society.

Terrorism or Resistance?

1. It is glorious on the epistemological level to define terrorism. Given the specificities of different national experiences, it is hard to standardize a definition which does not take into consideration all the different kinds of terrorism. 2. There is no one stereotyped definition of terrorism. It depends on the perspective, the commitment of the scholar and his attitude to life. There is no one simple, unilateral and sole definition of terrorism, because it is a complex phenomenon. Terrorism cannot be defined as a fixed essence, but is rather a changing relationship. It refers to two sides, that of the terrorist and that of the terrorized. The operational definition is based on major distinctions. 3. Terrorism is an expression of a strong sense of frustration and feelings of injustice. If the two sides of the equation, that of the terrorist and that of the terrorized, are not equal in power, to create a fair struggle the weak side will use any means it possesses to compensate for its weakness. Power is not only physical, but also moral. It is not only destruction, but also persuasion, or more precisely, dissuasion. Nuclear weapons are created as a force of dissuasion to deter the other side from using them. 4. In the case of equal power, the struggle between two opposed sides is called battle, conflict, hostilities, or even war. Where there is a power imbalance, the weak side empowers itself by any means it has, including martyrdom, so- called suicide-bombing, or terrorism, to resist the stronger side. H. Hanaﬁ / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom? 11

5. A sense of frustration arises in the face of double-standard judgments. The Palestinian is a terrorist, not the militarized settler. The PLO is a terrorist organization, not the Likud party or the state of Israel. Hamas and Jihad are terrorist movements, while the state of Israel is a terrorist state. Iraqi resistance against American occupation is terrorism, while the American invasion of Iraq is not. 6. Therefore, individual terrorism is a myth used to justify state terrorism as a reality. Both pretend to be self-defensive mechanisms against the transgression of the other side and a legitimate self-defense against the aggression of the other.

Terrorism of the Mutual Image

1. Visible terrorism is a concrete expression of the invisible form, which is more serious and does not need security forces. This is the terrorism of the mutual image which each side, the terrorist and the terrorized, the victimizer and the victim, creates of the other. Each partner is known as such, but constructed as an image which includes one real thread and many invented ones. An image is a construct made up of perceptions, motivations, interests, power struggles, historical accumulations, misunderstandings, misconceptions and misapprehensions. Over time, images became realities and are completely substituted for them. Bloodshed on both sides is the outcome. The power of information contributes to this transformation. 2. The Muslim World has been identified as the terrorist per excellence. The mass media even identify terrorism, a socio-political phenomenon, with Islam itself, as an essence and a culture. All of its history in centers such as Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Qayrawan, Fès and in the magnificent Andalusia, Grenada, Cordoba and Seville has been reduced to 11 September in Washington and New York and the Madrid train bombings. 3. Terrorism is a sign of underdevelopment, because it solves conflicts by means of violence, not by negotiation. Terrorism against the other is also directed against the Self in “suicide bombings.” Muslim societies become number one in the number of political prisoners, torture, violations of human rights, political dictatorship, discrepancies between poverty and wealth. The statuses of women, minorities and NGOs are very deplorable. The question is how an argument de facto becomes an argument de jure. If it does, then racism, arrogance, Nazism, fascism, war and persecution will be arguments de facto against the “love thy neighbor” of Jesus, an argument de jure. 4. Given the centrality of Europe in modern times over the past five centuries, Eurocentrism has given the European consciousness a certain arrogance, intertwined with skin color and race. The ideals of the Enlightenment have made Europe a model per excellence of modernism. The West creates, and the Rest transfers. This center and periphery dichotomy created in the West a superiority complex, and in the Rest an inferiority complex. Superiority is intertwined with supremacy and hegemony, while inferiority is linked to the Semitic mind, to a primitive “mentality” and a “pensée sauvage.” The 12 H. Hanaﬁ / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom?

American question: Why they do hate us? is a real question, since 5% of the world’s population owns and consumes 75% of the world’s wealth and goods. 5. This situation has placed the victim, who is labeled a terrorist, permanently on the defensive, in defense of his own history, culture and personality. He needs some present respect and historical recognition, according to the Hegelian dialectic of master and slave. The acts of violence which erupt from time to time are the sigh of the oppressed, a self-affirmation in an unjust world. Violence aims sometimes at alleviating the suffering of the marginalized, so that the center will have an equal partner. 6. The victim is constantly being scrutinized, looked at under the microscope, objectified and reified as an object of study. How many international conferences there are, held even by NATO, on terrorism, fundamentalism, violence, reform, the other, democratization, civil society, minority rights, human rights, gender in the Muslim World, etc. Violence is a kind of a revolt of the object desiring to be a subject, a rejection of reification in an effort to rediscover one’s own subjectivity, from the object to the subject, from the observed to the observer, from Orientalism, where the West is the subject and the Rest is the object, to Occidentalism, where the Rest is the subject and the West is the object.

Dialogue between Equal Partners

1. To fight terrorism in the liberal state and to create an integrated model of research on counter-terrorism is to lay the groundwork for a dialogue between equal partners. The stumbling block in the Euro-Arab dialogue is the discrepancy between the European economic agenda and the Arab political agenda. 2. This equal dialogue is a manifestation of the dialogue of cultures, not of a clash of civilizations. A dialogue between the victim and the victimizer on equal terms substitutes arguments for bombs, the power of persuasion for military power. The honorable thing to do is to discuss, to convince or to be convinced. Using physical violence, minimum violence by the victimized and maximum violence by the victimizer, is a sign of weakness. Moses did not succeed, but Jesus did. 3. A double standard in judgment and action is one of the major factors which arouses in the victimized, who is labeled a terrorist, a sense of outrage. The bombing and killing of innocent people in Northern Ireland, in the Pays- Basque, by the ETA in Spain and neo-Nazis in Germany, the extreme right in Italy and right-wing extremists in the USA, are not counted as terrorism. Organized crime in the USA, the Mafia in Italy or Russia, are likewise not considered forms of terrorism. 4. Europe is an equal partner of the Arab World around the Mediterranean Basin. The two shores, North and South, have had relations throughout history. When the North is strong, it overflows its borders, as it did during the Greco-Roman period, and the present European hegemony. When the Southern shore is strong, it overflows into the North, as happened in the period of strong Islamic culture, especially in Spain. The North played the master twice in classical and H. Hanaﬁ / The Double Fear: Who Is Afraid of Whom? 13

modern times, and the South played the role of disciple twice in the same two periods. The South played the role of master once, in the era of Islamic civilization peaking in Andalusia, and with the recognized Islamic resurgence now a second time. Europe did acknowledge its role as disciple one time, in late Scholasticism and on the eve of modern times. Can it acknowledge the role of disciple now, in the time of the eclipse of the West, after “God is dead” and “Man is alive,” and man is also dead and nobody is alive? 5. Terrorism may be a symptom of the West wind’s eclipse and the East wind’s rise, a crossroads in world history. When the Earth moves, earthquakes follow. Signs of the European malaise can be seen in: Feyerabend’s Farewell to Reason and Against Method, Spengler’s Untergang des Abendlands, Husserl’s Krise der europäischen Wissenschaft, Scheler’s Umsturz der Werte, Toynbee’s Western Civilization on Trial, Paul Hazard’s crise de la conscience Européenne, Bergson’s la machine à faire des dieux. Postmodernism, deconstructionism, skepticism, agnosticism and nihilism are also symptoms. 6. Advanced research workshops must renew the agenda from fundamentalism to post-fundamentalism, from the war on terrorism to avenues of peace, from Globalization to Inter-dependence and regional co-operation. The current agenda in international scholarship is really obsolete. The world is changing due to the nature of things, while the agenda is fixed by ideologies, because of the fixed stereotyped images that each partner has constructed of the other. The destruction of these mutual images is one of the ways of ending the myth of terrorism. 14 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda

Wilhelm KEMPF Department of Psychology at the University of Konstanz, Germany

Abstract. Comparing US propaganda strategies after September 11 with those of the Gulf War and the Bosnia Conflict the paper argues that targeted propaganda measures were not needed in order to plant military logic in the public mind. All that was needed was a lack of understanding of the terror attack and its pseudo- explanation in terms of groundless hate. It was this mind-set, which rejected any analysis of the conflict sources, which ruled out any resolution other than the elimination of the enemy, and which even denied his most essential human rights. And it is this mind set, which threatens to reduce democracy to a pure façade, to destroy its credibility and to produce even more hatred against the Western world.

Keywords. Propaganda, military logic, peace logic, human rights, human dignity, democracy

‘So great are the psychological resistances to war in modern times, that every war must appear to be a war of defense against a menacing, murderous aggressor’ [1]. In this process, propaganda plays an important role. The aim of pro-war propaganda is to get people to strongly and personally identify with the goals of the war and to manipulate their entanglement in the conflict in order to reorganize their hierarchy of values so that winning the war is at the top, and all other values – like truth, ethical considerations and individual rights – are only subservient to this goal. In order to win public support for war, it is necessary to produce a mindset where there is a delicate balance between the experience of threat and confidence in winning the conflict. Typical features of this mindset are its Zero-Sum orientation and the designation of force as an appropriate means of conflict resolution. It is characterized by cognitive factors like x idealization of own rights and goals, x denial of the opponent’s rights and demonizing his intentions, x rejection of a peaceful settlement of the conflict, x demonizing the opponent’s actions and emphasis on his dangerousness, x denial of possibilities for cooperation, x denial of superordinate rights and goals and x justification of own side’s actions and emphasis on own strength. And it has emotional consequences, like x mistrust of the enemy, x feelings of being threatened, x denial of a threat to the opponent: If he behaves well, he has nothing to fear! x Confidence in winning: Good will prevail over Evil! W. Kempf / September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda 15

Due to the overall cognitive and emotional mindset, outrage at the war is transformed into outrage at the enemy [2]. The idea underlying traditional propaganda strategies was to transmit propaganda messages from the top on down and to unify society in its struggle against an enemy. As Lasswell [1] put it: “Civilian unity is not achieved by the regimentation of muscles. It is achieved by a repetition of ideas rather than movements. The civilian mind is standardized by news not by drills. Propaganda is the method by which this process is aided and abetted.” Accordingly, the traditional means of propaganda are: x Restrictive methods like censorship to suppress information that might reduce patriotic spirit. x Supportive methods like the fabrication, selection and exaggeration of information that might strengthen it. And the professional credo is: Truth is only raw material. Lies are merely a technical, not a moral problem. If no lies are needed, so much the better. And lies are not needed if the propagandist manages to get the public personally engaged in a conflict. This was the beginning of psychological propaganda techniques that build upon: x Polarization of identification suggestions [3]. x Production of a specific motivational logic [3] x Immunization of the propaganda message against criticism with measures like: harmonization of referential levels [3], double-bind communication (cf. Reimann, 2002), and two-sided messages [4]. The idea behind these techniques is: to get the public emotionally involved and then wait for those escalation-oriented changes in the cognitive representation of conflict that we can observe whenever a person, a group or a society is involved in competitive conflicts and that are due to the logic of the win-lose model underlying competitive conflicts [2]. Psychological preparation for war is a time consuming process, however: in the case of the Gulf War, it took 6 months, in the case of the Bosnia Conflict 6 years – but in case of the War on Terrorism it took only 6 weeks. In order to get the US public to support the Gulf War, it was necessary to construct a complex motivational logic that included a specific interpretation of the past, assessment of the present and promise for the future [5]. Interpretation of the past: The appeasement policy towards Adolf Hitler caused the Second World War and a world catastrophe. If Hitler had been stopped early enough, the war could have been avoided. The same goes for Saddam Hussein. If he is not stopped now, right after the invasion of Kuwait, he will go on to attack the whole Persian Gulf area. Assessment of the present: The collapse of socialism and the triumph of Western democracy are just the right moment to restore the position of the UN and to show terrorist states that no gains can be had through violence. Economic sanctions would work too slowly. While the world was waiting, Iraq might build nuclear weapons or might attack with chemical weapons. Promise for the future: After the war, a New World Order will be established where the rights of small nations will not be allowed to be trampled on and where the rules of international justice will be respected. The alternative scenario would be the world's oil reserves ending under the control of a nuclear-armed Iraq, and dictators everywhere would be encouraged. 16 W. Kempf / September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda

Based on this motivational logic, the right balance between threat and confidence could be established rather easily, and even more so, since most average citizens didn’t know much about Iraq or Saddam Hussein, and human rights organizations, as well as pacifist groups, had already been opposed to Saddam Hussein during the war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988), at a time when Saddam Hussein was still an esteemed ally of the United States. In former Yugoslavia, the situation was much more complicated [6]: Serbia, which had been part of the anti-German alliance during two world wars, was holding on to socialism. This was not in accordance with the interests of the European Union. German and Austrian diplomacy supported the struggle for independence in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. As these countries were ready to open their economy to the European market, this coincided with EU interests as well. Croatia and Bosnia had collaborated with the Nazis during World War II, however, and their current leadership was rather suspect: In his book Wastelands of Historical Reality, Croat President Tudjman had made statements that could easily be interpreted as anti-Semitic, and in his book The Islamic Declaration, Bosnian President Izetbegovic openly advocated creating a fundamentalist Islamic state. Although the Bosnia Conflict involved a similar motivational logic as the New World Order concept, this was not sufficient to unite the European nations against Serbia and to get the United States involved. In order to produce the necessary balance between threat and confidence, propaganda could not simply take sides against the Serbs, but differences in the media images of the three ethnic groups developed gradually and were mainly due to the different roles in which the groups were portrayed by the media. The most positive role was constructed for the Muslims, who were depicted as least confrontational and most often in a defensive position. Both Serbs and Croats, on the other hand, were portrayed more as aggressors. Although the military logic on the Serbian side was the least reported, the negative image of the Serbs resulted from other factors, however. First, Serbian actors were covered by the media twice as often as each of the other groups, and Serbian behavior was depicted as most confrontational. Second, Serbian rights and intentions were given little attention, and as possibilities for cooperation between the Serbs and their opponents were accentuated, confrontational Serbian behavior appeared to be even less justified. Third, the press stimulated the least outrage about the opponents of the Serbs and rather downplayed the suffering on the Serbian side. Fourth, incentives for social identification with Serbian victims were extremely low, and there was even a considerable amount of dehumanization of Serbian victims. While it is not surprising that the international media portrayed the Muslims in a defensive role and assigned the Serbs the role of evil-doers, the really striking move was to get the Croats out of the line of fire, and even more so, since the Croats placed the greatest emphasis on military logic and rejected the logic of peace more decisively than the other parties. Both the Croat emphasis on military logic and the rejection of peace logic by the Croats could seemingly be justified, however, by giving the highest priority to their rights and intentions, as well as by the rejection of cooperative alternatives. Nonetheless: although the international press reported quite unequally about the three ethnic groups, the coverage was quite ambiguous about all three of them. The press identified itself with none of the Bosnian war parties, but rather with the international community, which had a problem with the ethnic groups in Bosnia. W. Kempf / September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda 17

In doing so, the media supported a policy of peace enforcement (by military intervention) rather than a policy of peacemaking (by third-party mediation efforts). The more deeply the international actors got involved in the conflict, the greater was the media sympathy for them. The more they managed to stay in a neutral position, the more they were criticized, and the more negative was their press coverage. In the case of the Afghan War, things were completely different, and far less propaganda was needed to persuade the public to support the war. In order to understand this, we must be aware that the emotional and motivational correlates of warfare are not only a consequence of the respective cognitive mind set, but also that the cognitive correlates result from emotional entanglement in the conflict. There is a circular relationship between emotions and cognitions, and each influences the other [7]. In the case of the Afghan War, the public’s emotional entanglement in the conflict was the greatest possible from the start. All that was necessary in order to motivate the public to support the war was to identify the enemy, to justify military action as an appropriate response and to make victory appear probable. The attacks of September 11 were certainly criminal acts of horrendous proportions, the threat was real, and it could be experienced first hand by anybody. Thousands of innocent people were killed in the heart of the USA, and as life is the most essential human right, there was no need to idealize US rights and goals. There was also no need to demonize the attack: that it was a brutal act of terrorism was self- evident. And there was no need to emphasize the opponent’s dangerousness: The threat was real, and what happened on September 11 could have happened anywhere. As a criminal act, the terrorist attack of September 11 could have been dealt with on the basis of international law. The Taliban could have been persuaded to turn over Osama Bin Laden to a neutral country, and an independent court could have tried him. Terrorist organizations all over the world could have been fought by police operations subject to control by courts, and the struggle against terrorism could have been fought in compliance with the democratic principle of the division of power. Perhaps this is what critics like the German author Günter Grass or German President Johannes Rau were thinking of when they called for a civilized response to the terrorist acts. Obviously, however, such a civilized response was not on the political agenda. The events of September 11 were not only a terrorist attack against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, they were also a symbolic act that humiliated the US by demonstrating what had been unimaginable before: the vulnerability of the American homeland. In a situation like this, it was only a natural impulse that American self-confidence needed to be restored and strength needed to be demonstrated by fighting back. Fighting back needed to be justified, however. It could not look like pure vengeance, and to accomplish this, the attack had to be seen as more than criminal and humiliating. By interpreting the attack as an attack against civilization in general, the planned war could be made to seem like a sort of civilized police operation employing all available means, including armed force, which would add to the expectation of victory. And as every nation in the world was given a choice between unconditional solidarity with the US or being regarded as part of the terrorist network, the war presumably would not threaten any civilized country either. 18 W. Kempf / September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda

One month after the terrorist attack, on October 11, 2001, US President George W. Bush [8] came to the climax of this interpretation and even aggravated it by expressing an inability to understand what had happened and why: “How do I respond when I see that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic hatred for America? I’ll tell you how I respond: I’m amazed. I’m amazed that there’s such misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us. I am – like most Americans, I just can’t believe it, because I know how good we are.” The rest of the mind set that was needed to gain public support for the War against Terrorism was due to pure automatism: outrage at violence was replaced by outrage at the enemy, literally anyone could be suspected of anti-Americanism, any negotiations with the Taliban could be rejected, and higher-order rights could be denied: Any state which did not cooperate with the USA would be a legitimate target. Any sort of peaceful settlement of the conflict had to be rejected, and the entire mind-set turned into a zero-sum game where warfare was the only acceptable option. Naturally, these are all traditional propaganda contents, and the media were saturated with them. Targeted propaganda measures were not needed to plant them in the public mind. All that was needed was a lack of understanding of the terror attack of 11 September and its pseudo-explanation in terms of completely groundless hate, through which the initially still unknown enemy was demonized, the US idealized, and the search for possible conflict causes became taboo. Nonetheless, it can be assumed that George W. Bush’s statement was not a deliberate propaganda message. It sounds like the honest words of a somewhat simple- minded man facing an unbelievable excess of violence against his own people, expressing what millions of people felt at this moment. People who never gave much thought to other people in some distant corner of the world, to whom our wealth and abundance is their poverty and starvation, our liberties destroy their culture, and our way of life is an insult to their concept of honor. Nonetheless, these words were destined to set the world on fire. They declared total war, rejected an analysis of the sources of conflict, ruled out any resolution other than the elimination of the enemy and even denied his most essential human rights. That the US government later decided that thousands of imprisoned suspected or actual Al-Qaeda terrorists were neither combatants (otherwise they would have been entitled to the protection of the Geneva Conventions) nor criminals (otherwise they would have been entitled to the protection of American criminal law), but rather belonged to a third category without rights or claims to respect for their human dignity, was merely the logical consequence. For words like these are also words suitable to destroy the so- called “civilized world” from within. – And all this, without calls for revenge, without enthusiasm for war in the true sense of the word and out of the pure necessity of dealing with the emotional burden imposed by the terror of September 11. Even if President Bush is right, and there is this vitriolic hatred against the US and Western civilization in some corners of the world, fighting terrorism exclusively by military means bears the danger that the values of democracy will gradually be reduced to a pure facade. The US concentration camp at Guantanamo and the torture of Iraqi prisoners of war offer alarming signals that point in this direction. And the more Western democracy loses its credibility, the more hatred will increase. Wiping out the roots of hatred can only be accomplished on the basis of cultural change, and it is not only those societies where this hatred is present, it is our own societies as well that need to progress in the direction of more respect for others. How W. Kempf / September 11 and the Need for a Social Science Research Agenda 19 this cultural change can be stimulated by an open intra- and intercultural discourse, what sort of input the media can provide in order to stimulate such a discourse and how the media can offer a platform for this discourse are among the questions that urgently need to be put on the research agenda. There is no need to say that the aim of such an agenda cannot be to justify terrorism. The aim must be to understand the roots of terrorism. And these roots cannot be found in the Islamic culture per se. They need to be searched for in the Western world as well, and particularly in the interaction between the two.

References

[1] Lasswell, H.D. (1927). Propaganda technique in the World War. London: Kegan Paul. [2] Kempf, W. (2002). Conflict coverage and conflict escalation. In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen, H.(eds.). Journalism and the New World Order. Volume II: Studying war and the media. Göteborg: Nordicom, 59-72. [3] Luostarinen, H. (2002). Propaganda analysis. In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen, H.(eds.). Journalism and the New World Order. Volume II: Studying war and the media. Göteborg: Nordicom, 17-38. [4] Reimann, M. (2002). Communication disorders in conflict coverage. In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen, H.(eds.). Journalism and the New World Order. Volume II: Studying war and the media. Göteborg: Nordicom. [5] Kempf, W., Reimann, M., Luostarinen, H (2001). New World Order rhetoric in American and European media. In: Nohrstedt, S.A., Ottosen, R. (eds.). Journalism and the New World Order. Vol. I. Gulf War, National News Discourses and Globalization. Göteborg: Nordicom, 125-148. [6] Kempf, W. (2002). Escalating and deescalating aspects in the coverage of the Bosnia conflict – A comparative study. In: Kempf, W., Luostarinen, H., (eds.). Journalism and the New World Order. Vol. II. Studying war and the media. Göteborg: Nordicom, 227-258. [7] Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ed.) (2003). Constructive conflict coverage. A social psychological approach. Berlin: regener. [8] Weiner, B. (2001). What Bush should have said. (www.antiwar.com) (23.05.02). 20 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A Collective Action Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim

Eitan Y. ALIMI Department of Political Science at the Hebrew University, Israel

Abstract. An attempt is made to re-contextualize the study of political terrorism by embedding it within the larger phenomenon of Collective Action. It is suggested that a process-sensitive analysis of the interplay among the components of Collective Action (action context, action target, action means and action agent) can be beneficial for gaining insights into the study of group risks for political terrorism. The case of the conflict between the Tanzim and the Israeli forces is used to illustrate how processes within, between and outside the conflict parties affected the Tanzim members’ decision to employ political terrorism. Based on the analysis, several implications for counterterrorism are offered.

Keywords. Tanzim, contentious politics, Intifada, political opportunities, repression

Decision-makers, terrorism specialists and the general public have been forced by recent events to acknowledge the unsettling reality that terrorism is, “always has been, and always will be instrumental: planned, purposeful, and premeditated … a perennial, ceaseless struggle” [1] (pp. 313-4). In the face of the devilishly-planned, horrendous airborne attacks on US targets on September 11, 2001, it is no longer possible, nor is it responsible, to dismiss political terrorism as solely the result of innate human aggressive propensities or of psychopathic, twisted ideas, as some terrorism researchers still argue [2, 3]. Our responsibility, as well as the responsibility of decision-makers, is to ask not, “Why do they hate us?” but rather, “What have we done to provoke such deeds?” Terrorism is here to stay precisely because it is no less the product of human relations and interactions than the product of twisted minds and fanatical obsessions. As argued by Peleg, “… the capacity for violence might be inherent in men. However, the likelihood of an actual outburst of collective violence hinges upon how badly systems violate the socially-derived expectations of certain groups in the populace” [4] (p. 28). The cost of continuing to shut our eyes and cling to the easier question of, “Why do they hate us?” has long been too great to accept. In suggesting such a shift, I am by no means implying that we should seek an answer in self-incrimination or expiation. Rather, I am seeking a deeper understanding of terrorism and ourselves – what Honderich [5] calls a practical moral inquiry, an acknowledgment of our responsibility, whether or not we feel guilty for what has gone wrong. In his illuminating radical treatment of collective violence [6], Charles Tilly picks up on an earlier, brief treatment of the subject [7] and writes the following, “I still think that terror is a recurrent political strategy adopted by a wide variety of actors rather E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 21 than a creed, a separate variety of politics, or the work of a distinctive class of people … The word ‘terror’ appears nowhere in [my] typology … Terror always refers to someone else’s behavior … The roll call makes clear that terror … consists of a single party’s conflict strategy rather than a causally coherent category of collective violence … terror is a strategy not a creed” [6] (pp. xii, 19, 233, 237). I concur with Tilly and suggest an expansion of our epistemology, namely, to incorporate a Collective Action perspective (hereinafter: CA) into the analysis of political terrorism, seen here as an extreme form of CA. Political terrorism develops during episodes of collective action, a radicalization process by a segment within a given movement, claims the Zionist ‘right-wing’ organization Israel Freedom Fighters (Le’HI). The growing attraction to and fascination of the abnormality of the deed and the attempt to treat political terrorism as sui generis has had the unintended consequence of decontextualizing the phenomenon under study. Recontextualizing political terrorism may be beneficial to our endeavor to learn more about this doubtlessly unusual phenomenon. Just as our knowledge and understanding of CA significantly broadened when it was no longer treated as the actions of a “madding crowd,” so is it possible to learn more about the shift to political terrorism when we no longer perceive it as solely the behavior of the psychopath or the fanatical “true believer” [8]. Concomitantly, I would further suggest that an analysis of the shift to political terrorism using the theoretical tools of CA has the potential for generating additional insights into the study of counter-terrorism. In fact, I will argue that we should understand terrorist groups in terms of their location in larger fields of actors: social movements – the agent of CA. For clarity, I perceive collective action as a political phenomenon that involves (1) the agent of CA (a social movement), (2) that engages in contentious politics as the means of CA, (3) targeted always, but not exclusively, against authorities (the target of CA) and, (4) embedded within a structure of conflict, that is, the context of CA. As we will see, the shift towards political terrorism by one actor – a group-at-risk – within a larger movement is usually the result of how the various components interact and mutually affect each other. In proposing the incorporation of the CA perspective into the analysis of the shift to terrorism, this paper draws on Tilly’s recent treatment of political collective violence, which offers a less value-laden approach for understanding variation in the form, salience, and coordination of outright damage to persons and objects. As I shall attempt to show, the shift to terrorism has to do more with developments and processes within, between, and outside the parties involved in the politics of contention than with innate aggression and/or ideological creed – a relational approach to the study of contentious politics. This paper draws also on a recent treatment of Islamic Activism, a collection of essays edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz [9] which adopts a social movement theory approach to the analysis of Islamic-oriented contention, demonstrating how theoretical tools borrowed from the SM perspective repertoire help to de-Orientalize movements such as Hamas or contentious episodes such as the Shi’a uprising in Bahrain in 1994-1998. Finally, in suggesting that a CA framework is an effective tool for providing additional insights into the shift to political terrorism and the study of counter- terrorism, I shall be drawing on my own work on the Palestinian Intifada, specifically the case of the Fatah Tanzim (the organization). The Tanzim is defined by the IDF Spokesperson Department as a terrorist organization. Yet, many other institutions do 22 E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim not see the Tanzim as a terrorist organization, a fact that only pinpoints the relativity in defining terrorism and underscores the problematic aspect of viewing terrorism as a creed or as a separate variety of politics. As I will try to show, the classification of the Tanzim as a terrorist group without an attempt to understand the reasons for the shift from a non-violent mode of action to a violent mode of action is both misleading and detrimental to any genuine effort at countering terrorism. In attempting that, this paper will follow along two interrelated lines. First, I will discuss three aspects in the study of CA, demonstrating the relevancy of these aspects to a better understanding of the Tanzim in general and its shift to terrorism in particular. I will then proceed to specify several implications for countering terrorism that are suggested by the analysis of the Tanzim. In this part of the paper, I will discuss several aspects in the study of Collective Action, showing their usefulness to the study of the Tanzim’s shift to political terrorism. In accordance with Tilly’s relational approach, I will focus on three such aspects: within the agent of collective action, outside the agent of collective action, and between the agent and the target of CA. Two points of clarification are in order. First, while perceiving these three processes as deeply interwoven and mutually affecting each other in pushing a group towards political terrorism, I shall nonetheless treat them as analytically distinct in order to simplify my argument. Second, due to considerations of length, I have decided to incorporate the analysis of the context of CA (“action-context”) into the analysis of each of the three aspects. A systematic analysis of the shift to political terrorism must be attentive to dynamics and changes in the structure of the conflict in which the parties involved are embedded.

Social Movement: The Agent of Collective Action

An ongoing underdeveloped theme in the literature is the tendency to focus on the Social Movement Organization (SMO), instead of viewing a social movement as a field of actors [10, 11, 12]. In line with my suggestion to distinguish between the agent and the phenomenon of Collective Action, I suggest further to avoid treating a social movement, and a terrorist group, for that matter, as a monolithic entity or as a unified whole. In fact, I suggest viewing a terrorist group as part of a social movement: a collective actor, comprising people, beliefs, social locations and actions in pursuit of political goals. This collective actor consists of various actors (individuals and/or organizations) that interact formally and informally with one another and mutually affect each other’s strategy. The extent to which these actors collaborate, and the types of interaction they engage in, depend on social organization, a sense of commitment, shared beliefs and solidarity. A terrorist group is an actor within a social movement. The study of Collective Action has already acknowledged the conceptual and empirical shortcomings in treating a movement as a unified whole – what McCarthy and Zald labeled SMO, rather than as a field of actors. In the second edition of his path- breaking The Strategy of Social Protest, Gamson made reference to this shortcoming, for which he was responsible in part, when discussing the difficulties a social movement faces in achieving standing in mainstream news media. Reflecting on the first edition of ‘Strategy’, Gamson writes, “By using the social movement organization as the unit of analysis, Strategy fails to illuminate the dynamics among a set of E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 23 challengers in the same broad movement. Challengers sometimes complement and sometimes undercut each other’s strategies, but one can understand this process only at a more aggregate level of analysis” [13] (p. 160). To view a social movement as a field of actors that do not necessarily hold the same ideology, strategy, preferable modes of action and goals has considerable implications for the analysis of collective action. Heeding the internal dynamics, balance of power and division of labor within a movement can be beneficial in understanding a movement’s strategy and tactics of contention. For example, how does the mode of action employed by one actor affect other actors within the movement? My analysis of the Intifada [14, 15] describes a complicated sociopolitical setting within which various groups and organizations compete for power within the authoritative setting of the Palestinian Authority and under the overarching Israeli military occupation. The Tanzim became a central player in this complex setting. Focusing exclusively, however, on the Tanzim without examining the dynamics among various arms within the Tanzim, its relationships with other groups and actors in the Palestinian movement, and in isolation from the power structure within which it has evolved and operated, would provide a somewhat artificial analysis and, consequently, an overly simplistic understanding of the group. Essentially, the Tanzim is an integral part of the Palestinian movement as consolidated during the run-up to the 1987 Intifada and as developed thereafter. While not named as such during the 1987 Intifada, the Tanzim actually consists of grassroots activists who played a central role in the initiation and conduct of the 1987 uprising. Its formation was the result of internal relationships within the movement, especially as developed during the aftermath of the 1987 Intifada and the institutionalization of a portion of the movement, i.e., the establishment of a Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in June 1994. Intifada researchers share the argument that the formation of the Tanzim should be seen in the context of Arafat’s attempt to channel and focus the passions of many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip away from Islamist groups during the aftermath of the 1987-1992 Intifada [16]. True, the first half of the 1990s witnessed the growing popularity and political influence of the Islamic camp, primarily of Hamas. The reasons for this are numerous, some of which are rooted in the painstaking achievements made by non-Islamic factions within the Palestinian movement already during, but mainly in the wake of the 1987 cycle of contention. During the first years of the 1987 Intifada, the two rival camps managed to maintain a general consensus vis-à-vis the primary goal of the Palestinians. However, as the first signs of political achievements unfolded (especially the commencement of a dialogue between Arafat and the US), Hamas was quick to reject any recognition and acceptance of what had become the Madrid talks of October 1991. Indeed, the actual process of peace talks and preparation for self-rule generated a renewal of clashes between the respective Hamas and Fatah-led PLO factions. Between July and August 1992, numerous confrontations broke out between the parties, leading the editor of the daily al-Shaab to state, “What is happening … is frightening. It threatens not only the Intifada, but our whole social framework” [17]. The challenge posed by Hamas, for example to the Fatah-led PA, was translated into systematic attempts at undermining the Oslo Accords through the use of numerous suicide bombings, which resulted in dozens of Israeli deaths and hundreds of injuries between early 1994 and 1996. As Arafat’s difficulties in delivering the promise of Oslo 24 E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim increased (difficulties for which Hamas was partly responsible), Hamas’s power increased significantly. The gradually faltering Oslo, as a result, had made the alternative presented by Hamas attractive in the eyes of growing numbers of Palestinians [15]. In that context, Arafat’s decision to form the Tanzim was truly a way to reassert his control over the hearts and minds of the Palestinian populace in the occupied territories. The formation of the Tanzim, then, may have been Arafat’s counterweight to the growing influence of Islamic forces. As it turned out, however, Arafat’s grand scheme did not bear the expected fruits. While originally the Tanzim was designed to counter the Islamic forces, and some even argue that the Tanzim provided Arafat with a tool for combating Israel without risking international condemnation for violating signed agreements, it seems that the Tanzim “turned on its own creator,” developing its own agenda and goals [18]. Thus, instead of countering Hamas, the Tanzim under the leadership of Marwan Barghouti grew closer to Hamas. This was already apparent during late 2000, the first months of the 2000 al-Aqsa Intifada, which was aimed against both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In the case of Hamas, the challenge to the PA is already understandable. An expression of this is found in an interview given by Hamas spokesperson in Hebron Abdel Khaleq al- Natshe to the Palestine Times in April 2000. When asked about Hamas’s relations with the PA, al-Natshe responded, “The Palestinian Authority is our oppressor, but again we don’t like to accentuate this too much, since our conflict is with Israel.” In the case of the Tanzim, the PA was not perceived as an outright oppressor, and Arafat was unequivocally proclaimed to be sacred: the indisputable leader of the Palestinian people. Yet, it seems that the convergence between Hamas and the Tanzim, coupled with the latter’s growing autonomy and influence, raised serious concerns amongst Arafat and PA officials. In an interview with the Israeli daily Ha’aretz, following the conclusion of the Sharm al-Sheikh summit (October 2000), Barghouti contended that “the current Intifada would not stop with an order, as it did not start with an order … insinuating that the ‘street’ might not obey Arafat, should he announce a cease-fire with Israel and a halt to the Intifada” [19] (p. 468). Alarmed by these developments, Arafat made attempts to undermine Barghouti’s power by encouraging rivalries, such as indirectly supporting Barghouti’s rival for the leadership of the Tanzim, Hussein al-Sheikh, or limiting the flow of funds to Barghouti’s grassroots forces [19] (p. 52). Yet, it became clear that the Tanzim and the Islamic forces had gained the upper hand in setting the pace and tone of the situation, enjoying widespread popularity among the Palestinian populace. An expression of the convergence between the Tanzim and Hamas can be found in a statement drafted by the National and Islamic Forces (NIF) to President Arafat on January 13, 2001, during the preparations for what became the Taba Talks. The NIF was a coalition formed by the Tanzim and Hamas and included a vast array of organizations such as the PFLP, DFLP, PIJ, etc. The content of the statement is revealing, demonstrating the firm and bold characteristics of the grassroots forces:

In the Name of God, the Forgiving and Compassionate Our Brother, the President and Struggler Abu Ammar, God save him, The President of the State of Palestine … We express our confidence in your constant position that adheres to the national constants [i.e., freedom, independence and return]; however, we warn of falling into the trap of dealing with these tricky E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 25

scenarios … The consensus of our people to continue with the Intifada until it achieves its goals requires all of us to be prepared for a long battle … which requires reconsidering our internal condition and addressing it in a radical manner to secure the components of steadfastness. Together until victory, until liberating Jerusalem and achieving independence and return. The State of Palestine January 13, 2001

Arafat, while being elevated to a father-like status, is nevertheless warned not to deviate from the constants. He is reminded of his militant past and of his days of armed struggle as a symbol, being addressed as Abu Ammar the Struggler, to indicate the sacredness of the goal, the achievement of which justifies the means taken and, equally important, the organic linkage between himself (not the Tunisian-led PA) and the Palestinian people. Thus, in spite of his symbolic status, Arafat is still constrained by the blessed Intifada and, just as with the NIF members, the legitimacy of Arafat as the leader of the Palestinian people is contingent upon a radical “reconsidering of our internal condition,” seen as essential for the continuation of the Intifada. Thus, instead of undercutting Hamas’s strategy, both the Tanzim and Hamas complemented each other’s agendas and jointly posed a major challenge to the PA. Indications of convergence between the two organizations were expressed, at first, in a division of labor regarding their respective spheres of operation. Beginning in early 2001, it became clear that the Tanzim was concentrating on terrorist attacks against Israeli soldiers and settlers within the territories, whereas Hamas was concentrating on terrorist attacks (including suicide terrorism following the Israeli liquidation of one of the organization’s activists in November 2000) inside Israel. This is not to say, though, that groups and factions within the Tanzim were not calling for an escalation of the struggle, or that competition over Tanzim leadership was absent. In fact, the harsher the Israeli crackdown became, the louder became the voices within the Tanzim calling for it to engage in more lethal tactics. In that context, Hamas’s growing popularity, given its success in inflicting damage on Israel, only amplified these voices. Such was the case, for example, with Abd-al-Karim Awiss, a grassroots leader of the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades” in Jennin, the armed wing of the Tanzim. Escaping an Israeli liquidation attempt, Awiss called for the removal of the taboo of limiting the Tanzim’s operations to within the territories. Despite a lack of approval for his plan by Barghouti, Awiss nonetheless went ahead to initiate a terrorist attack, although an abortive one, in the Golani intersection inside Israel, in late May 2001. Tensions within the Tanzim revolving around the leadership of the organization in the West Bank were also detrimental to Barghouti’s ability to implement the Tanzim’s strategy. His rival for the organization’s leadership was Hussein a-Sheikh, who enjoyed the support of several veteran Fatah members. Israel also acted to undermine Barghouti’s growing political power when during elections to the Fatah general secretariat in summer 2000 it tried to influence the outcomes in favor of a-Sheikh. The tension between Barghouti and a-Sheikh intensified, the more influential Barghouti became. At times, a-Sheikh deliberately acted in opposition to Barghouti’s directives, with the consequence of heavier Israeli crackdowns, as was the case when the former’s supporters continued to fire on the settlement of Psagot, despite Barghouti’s decision to stop the shooting [19]. 26 E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim

The fact of the matter was that Arafat indeed had little control over the spreading clashes. In fact, the Palestinian leadership, according to Mansour [20], acted more as an “overseer” than as the Intifada’s general command, namely, “the PA would sometimes let things happen, sometimes be a spectator, and at other times arbitrate between rival groups, in most cases to avoid taking initiatives” (p. 11). To make things even more complicated, attempts to dissociate himself from the increasing violence vis-à-vis the US and EU seriously damaged Arafat’s status vis-à-vis the Tanzim and Hamas.

Structural Changes and Politics of Contention

Can changes in the structure of political conditions affect the strategy and tactics of contention employed by the parties involved by projecting a sense of opportunity or a sense of threat? Collective action does not develop in a vacuum; social movements act for the fulfillment of political goals and, in turn, the political environment affects their strategy. While students of CA shared this truism from the outset, political factors were nonetheless viewed as limits rather than as engines for contention [21] (p. 201). The view of political factors, developments, and processes as engines for contention has been the cornerstone of the Political Process Model for the study of Collective Action, with its promotion of the concepts of political opportunities and/or threats. In contrast to earlier schools, the Political Process Model deals with changes in political conditions that are above and beyond within-movement issues of shared deprivation, organization and leadership. While acknowledging the importance of internal factors to social movements, proponents of the Political Process Model argue that events and occurrences external to movements are either ignored or seen, at best, as indirectly affecting movement activists. For McAdam, “The point is that any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities … the political process is based on the idea that social processes … promote insurgency only indirectly through a restructuring of existing power relations” [22] (p. 41). These changes, according to political scientist Sidney Tarrow, are consistent, although not necessarily formal, permanent, or national dimensions of the political struggle in a given political setting [23] (p. 83). Changes in political conditions can be institutional (e.g., shifts in political alliances or the strength of social cleavages) or cultural (e.g., legitimacy or public discourse) [12]. Depending on the specific political location and status of a given political actor, changes in political conditions can be perceived as either opportunities or as threats; hence an increase or a decrease in mobilization for action is likely to ensue. Finally, whether perceived opportunities and/or threats will increase or decrease mobilization is contingent on the way both are combined to shape contention [24]. Specifically, instead of treating threats as merely the flip side of opportunities, we should be mindful of (1) the various levels and types of political opportunities/threats (i.e. movement, regional, national, and international levels or current and anticipated threats), (2) asking: “opportunity for what?” – that is, opportunity for or threat to the accumulation of power within a movement or for shaking off an unjust authority, and (3) that we should also think about political actors who make opportunities for E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 27 themselves. What follows is an attempt to demonstrate the relevance of these insights as they operate in the case of the Tanzim. As was already noted above, the aftermath of the 1987 Intifada complicated the structure of the political environment for the Palestinians in the occupied territories. While Israel played a major role in the process of Palestinian politicization of discontent prior to the 1987-1992 cycle of contention, the assumption of power by the Tunisian-based PLO as of 1994 led to a significant change in the sociopolitical setting in the arena of contention. Israel was still perceived as the ultimate source of Palestinian hardship; numerous acts initiated by Israeli administrations and by non-institutional Israeli groups or individuals have certainly contributed to this perception. The decision to place harsh restrictions on work permits for Palestinians working in Israel, the continuation of building new settlements and expanding existing ones, the massacre at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron on February 25, 1994, perpetrated by Baruch Goldstein, or Netanyahu’s decision to open a Jewish holy site – the Western Wall Tunnel – on September 24, 1996 and to expand the Jewish settlements around Jerusalem (e.g., the construction on Har Homa) in March 1997, are only a few examples. Sources of grievance and discontent were also found within the Palestinian polity. The Palestinian Authority under the leadership of Arafat became the target of public unrest and critique. The majority of the Palestinian population and political organizations were willing to put up with the Palestinian Authority’s internal corruption and mismanagement due to the high hopes of implementing the achievements of the 1987 Intifada and the promise of Oslo. Even with Hamas, and despite the clashes between the two camps, the balance of power was clear. Following the heavy Israeli crackdown on Hamas and the imprisonment of many of its key activists and leaders in 1992, the PLO was practically the only well-resourced and well-organized political actor within the territories. Hamas was still a central challenger to the PA and did its best to undermine Oslo through the initiation of suicide terrorism against Israeli targets. Facing such an unfavorable balance of power and being attentive to its popular base, however, Hamas was forced to embrace a pragmatic approach according to which, for example, not recognizing the PA did not mean fighting it. This pragmatic trend was rationalized through reviving cultural themes from Islamic history and the Koran (e.g., sabr/patience and hudna/truce) for framing the possibility of peace with Israel as a tactical, temporary pause in the holy Jihad [25, 26]. What about the Tanzim? A second, no less important, impetus for the formation of the Tanzim was the growing tension within the secular Nationalist camp. The roots of this tension were found in the Tunisian PLO officials’ taking over of the Palestinian Authority upon their return to Gaza. Despite their leading role in the 1987 Intifada, many of the grassroots activists did not enjoy the fruits of its achievements and were pushed aside by the Tunis-based leadership (the “Tunisians”). While carefully refraining from criticizing Arafat personally, given his almost sacred symbolic status, the Palestinian Authority became the target of spreading unrest, the result of corruption, nepotism, and brutal oppression of critical voices. As already noted, for the Tanzim the PA was not perceived as an outright oppressor, and Arafat was unequivocally the indisputable leader of the Palestinian people. Yet, the Tanzim under the leadership of Marwan Barghouti was systematically accumulating power within the Nationalist camp. While carefully refraining from 28 E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim questioning or criticizing Arafat’s domination, Barghouti nonetheless made a harsh critique of the Tunisian-led PA and systematically acted to take over the Fatah’s High Committee and the Palestinian ‘street’. In fact, and as already noted, the Barghouti-led Tanzim became so influential that Arafat made attempts to undermine Barghouti’s power. A demonstration of Barghouti’s political power and influence took place in March 1999. Following a harsh repression of public protests against the corruption inside the PA by the latter’s security forces, Barghouti called for a general strike in the West Bank, a call which was widely obeyed. The clashes that broke out and the subsequent death of a twelve-year-old boy due to security forces’ opening fire pushed Barghouti to initiate the strike without consulting Arafat, and to refuse to end it despite the heavy pressure exerted by Arafat and PA officials [18]. This and other examples of Barghouti’s aspirations caused deep concerns among Fatah and the PA’s high officials, who influenced Arafat to decide to limit Barghouti’s political power (see above). This did not mean, however, that Arafat fully regained control over the situation. Arafat, upon his return from Camp David in late July 2000, had little control over the situation, and his popularity rating was exceptionally low. In attempts to maintain his popularity, Arafat had little choice but to welcome and support the Intifada, going so far as to release many of Hamas’s key political and military activists. The above citation of the blunt warning to Arafat by the NIF can be seen as indicative of who practically set the pace and the tone of what became the 2000 al-Aqsa Intifada. In that context, the sheer prospects of an agreed-upon Final Status Agreement (FSA) at the Camp David Summit of July 2000 could be seen not only as a potential threat to Hamas, but also to the Tanzim, which during the 1990s had created for itself an opportunity to acquire a dominant position within the territories. While a detailed study is warranted, it seems plausible to suggest that as generous as was Barak’s proposal to the Palestinians, and even if it was an opportunity for Arafat to finally deliver on the promise of Oslo, Barak’s (and President Clinton’s for that matter) insistence on concluding an FSA might have triggered the 2000 Intifada. Indeed, an FSA would have thwarted Barghouti’s grand scheme to rekindle another popular struggle, and he stated in March 2000 that, “Anyone who thinks it is possible to reach a final status agreement through negotiation would do better to stop fantasizing. In these matters, we must engage in confrontations. We need tens of battles like the al-Aqsa Tunnel” [18] (p. 48). Indeed, the Tanzim had been trying to mobilize the Palestinian population to action throughout 2000 for the purpose of demonstrating its status and articulating what Barghouti saw as the genuine voice of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. Such was the case with the al-Naqba commemoration day on May 15, 2000, when massive demonstrations initiated by the Tanzim took place with stone throwing and Molotov cocktails and shooting incidents throughout the territories. The confrontations lasted for several days, and as a result eight Palestinians died and hundreds of Palestinians and approximately thirty Israelis were injured. A week after al-Naqba day, a significant development took place outside the arena of contention. Israel decided to unilaterally withdraw from Southern Lebanon on May 22, 2000, after eighteen years of military presence, and this had a lasting effect on both conflict parties. While no Israeli soldier was injured during the three days of withdrawal, a series of unfortunate military incidents resulting from the fighting against Hezbollah in Lebanon, widespread domestic critique in Israel over the ongoing E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 29 presence in what had been called the “security zone,” Hezbollah’s continuing shooting at Israeli forces, the large amounts of military equipment and supplies left behind and the scenes of thousands of the Southern Lebanese Army’s soldiers (Israel’s ally in the region) desperately trying to enter Israel, made Israel’s retreat seem panicky, as though it was yielding to the victorious Hezbollah. On Israel’s part, fear of the withdrawal from Lebanon being perceived as a sign of weakness convinced high-ranking Israeli military officials to prepare a much harsher crackdown should Palestinians in the occupied territories attempt to further escalate the situation. Indeed, as I will try to demonstrate below, the Israeli response to the spreading unrest in late September 2000 was disproportionate, to say the least. An additional factor that caused Israel to overreact was found in growing unrest among Israeli-Palestinians. The deepening frustration and indignation among Israeli Palestinians and signs of rising tensions were already felt during the first half of 2000, when confrontations broke out in the city of Sakhnin during the commemoration of Land Day. Yet, the most severe expression of the cumulative rage among Israeli Palestinians occurred on October 1, 2000. Erupting in the Umm al-Fahm area, the clashes and disturbances quickly spread throughout the Triangle and spilled into Israeli cities, affecting Palestinian and Jewish communities such as Tiberias, Jaffa, and Upper Nazareth. According to Susser and Rekhes [27], the violent clashes lasting for three days came to a halt as a result of an aggressive police response, using tear gas, rubber bullets and even live ammunition. On October 3, 2000, in the course of harsh protest policing, thirteen Israeli Palestinians were killed, and hundreds of protestors and dozens of police officers were injured. On the Palestinian side, the lesson drawn from Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon was that given a sufficient level of pressure and casualties, Israel would withdraw from the territories as well. Indeed, as argued by Harel and Isacharoff, Hezbollah’s leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, became a hero in the eyes of many Palestinians. Cited by the authors, a Tanzim activist from the Balata refugee camp argued that in retrospect, “Their [Hezbollah’s] victory strengthened our faith in the effectiveness of armed struggle and suicide attacks” [18] (p. 65). Indeed, for Barghouti, Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000 was purely instrumental, as it held the potential of demonstrating to the Palestinian public the cost of not acting – what Goldstone and Tilly call “current threat” [24] (p. 185). In a revealing interview with the London-based Arabic daily al-Hayat, Barghouti commented, “[T]he night prior to Sharon’s visit, I participated in a panel on a local television station, and I seized the opportunity to call on the public to go to the al-Aqsa Mosque in the morning … After Sharon left, I remained for two hours in the presence of other people, we discussed the manner of response and how it was possible to react in all the cities and not just in Jerusalem. We contacted all (the Palestinian) factions.” Yet, the Tanzim’s dominant mode of action was not from the outset terrorist activity; it was surely far from engaging in suicide terrorism, the type that Hamas had already been employing in 1993. A major factor in the Tanzim’s shift to terrorism has something to do with developments outside the arena of contention: the effects of the September 11 terror attacks on US and Israeli policy towards the Intifada. Evidently, if Israel had practiced some measure of restraint in its attempts to suppress the Intifada due to US and EU pressure prior to 9/11, the brutal airborne attacks brought about a change in US policy towards the ongoing contention. For Sharon and Bush, the Intifada had become another coordinate on the “axis of evil.” In a way, the White House 30 E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim provided Sharon with a carte blanche to do what he thought best to eradicate terrorism. Indeed, in the wake of 9/11, Israeli crackdowns turned into a battering policy. In a way, the opportunity for Israel acted simultaneously as a threat to the Tanzim, pushing both sides to the extreme in a violent interactive dance.

Contentious Politics: Interactive Contention and Repression

Recently, the study of CA has drawn attention to similarities between different forms of contention. Instead of treating strike-waves, revolutions or terrorism as distinct sub- fields where each phenomenon has its own distinctive properties, the idea is to look for commonalities that cut across the various forms of what has been labeled contentious politics. Contentious politics, according to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, “… begins when people collectively make claims on other people, claims which if realized would affect those others’ interests … claims run from humble supplications to brutal attacks, passing through petitions, chanted demands, and revolutionary manifestos” [28] (p. 17). The social interaction in contentious politics involves “contention: the making of interest-entailing claims on others … and … at least one party to the interaction (including third parties) is a government: an organization controlling the principal concentrated means of coercion within a defined territory” (Ibid.). Collective claims making involves both the authorities, the targets of collective action, and social movements, the agents of collective action. In the case of social movements, I suggest that we name such claims making protest: collective claims making in the name of social justice. In the case of the authorities, the collective claims making is expressed in the demand for public order, hence the centrality of social control and the resort to repressive measures when public order is disrupted. Claims making by a social movement has nothing intrinsically violent or terrorist-like about it. A tango can indeed turn into a lethal war dance, yet the possible shift to lethality should not overshadow the basic commonalities between the various forms of interactive claims making by social movements, or else we will attribute causality to what should otherwise be seen as catalysts, e.g., ideological creeds and/or violent propensities. In that case, protest is a general term, a continuum upon which various forms can be located and along which shifts can, and do, take place. Social movement protests can range from voting or non-voting, mounting barricades, hunger strikes, stone throwing, rallying, promulgating revolutionary manifestos on up to terrorism. Contentious politics can be contained (i.e., where all parties are previously established as constituted actors employing well-established means of claims-making) or transgressive (i.e., at least one party is a newly self-identified political actor, and at least one party employs innovative actions). The shift from contained to transgressive contention depends on three factors. First, the historical specificity of contention: a collective actor may face limitations on its action repertoire [7], a situation that could influence its action strategy and tactics. Second, the given set of values and beliefs within which a movement operates dictates what is legitimate or illegitimate, what is morally right or wrong. Third, and most importantly, it is the relational action-counteraction dynamics between protestors and authorities which not only determine the dominant contentious tactics (conventional, disruptive or violent), but also bring about the emergence or reemergence of new forms of contention: innovative contention [29]. E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 31

I regard the third factor as central, since while the first two factors delimit the baseline conditions for a relational dynamics of contention, it is the actual engagement in and interaction of contention that can bring about a radicalization process like the shift to terrorism, hence an alteration in the contours of the first two factors. We should engage, as Tilly suggests [6], in an analysis of the changing ratio between the extent of coordination between the parties to the conflict and the saliency of the infliction and the reception of violent acts. By now we know that during the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, Israelis and Palestinian Authority officials were the two established constituted actors who employed well-established means of claims making in the form of negotiations for furthering the possibility of a resolution to the conflict (i.e., a Final Status Agreement). I have also referred to the existence of other players in the arena of contention who were not established as constituted players and who employed non-established means of claims making. The Palestinian Islamic forces, namely Hamas and Islamic Jihad, on the one hand, and Jewish settlers, on the other hand, systematically undermined the peace process through the commission of terrorist acts. As a result, the strengthening of ‘right’-wing political forces in Israel and the simultaneous increase in the popularity of militant forces among the Palestinians deepened the tensions between the parties and gradually destroyed the fragile collaborative infrastructure (e.g., Defense Coordination Offices – DCO) which had been established following the Oslo Accords. This consisted of warnings from senior members of the Palestinian negotiating team throughout 2000 that given the lack of satisfactory progress in the negotiations the Palestinians would be forced to resort to another round of violence [19]. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s decisions to open the Western Wall Tunnel and to expand Jewish settlement south to Jerusalem (Har Homa) were unquestionably detrimental to the collaborative infrastructure. The situation “on the street” was no less tense; for example, on various occasions Palestinian security forces pointed their weapons at their Israeli counterparts during joint patrols, and weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip was deliberately ignored. In that context, it is possible to view the formation of the Tanzim as the result of transgressive contention within the PA: as Arafat’s way to simultaneously cope with the growing popularity of the Islamic forces and the rising discontent among Palestinians, in general, and among protagonists of the 1987 Intifada, in particular. As noted, finally, Arafat also intended the Tanzim to act as a non-established means of claims making, thereby exerting pressure on Israel to make further concessions along the way to a Final Status Agreement. Indeed, following the al-Naqba commemoration day clashes in May 2000, initiated and directed by the Tanzim, and during the run-up to the Camp David Summit, Arafat threatened to rekindle the Intifada within the Palestinian territories. Yet, the Tanzim was relatively autonomous in setting its own agenda. In spite of its designated role as disruptor and the fact that other actors within the Palestinian movement were committing terrorist acts, the Tanzim did not employ terrorism from the outset [18]. The interactive violence between Israel and Tanzim activists was what finally pushed the Tanzim down the slippery slope towards terrorism. During the first days of confrontation, Tanzim activists limited their mode of action to a combination of mobilizing the populace for a popular struggle by staging massive demonstrations and open confrontations, mainly employing ‘cold’ weapons such a stones and Molotov Cocktails. This combination of conventional and disruptive 32 E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim modes of action proved futile, given the considerable distance between demonstrators and Israeli forces, the result of the Israeli forces’ location outside the PA’s territories. The fact of the matter was that this mode of action provoked a harsh Israeli crackdown, as a result of which Tanzim activists and other paramilitary activists began to join the crowd and fired on Israeli soldiers from among the demonstrators. As it turned out already during the first few days of confrontation, the shootings were not only as ineffective as stone throwing had been, but also detrimental, as they provoked a harsher Israeli response. In the context of the deteriorating situation between the parties during the run-up to September 29, the Israeli resolve to respond harshly should Palestinians in the occupied territories attempt to further escalate the situation in the context of the withdrawal from Lebanon, and the perceived threat to Israel posed by the imminent possibility of a “fifth column,” that is massive waves of violent clashes initiated by Israeli-Palestinians, Prime Minister Barak decided to employ much harsher repressive measures. This consisted of harassment measures, encirclement of Palestinian towns, bans on travel between the West Bank and Gaza, bombings of buildings and “land exposing” (Hishuf) and the use of military equipment such as helicopter gunships, tanks, cannons, etc. Figure A, below, based on B’Tselem’s report, illustrates the high levels of casualties during the first year of contention.

140

18 120

10 110 100 102

9 60 62 8 12 51 40 45 12 7 Israelis killed in 34 34 the OCT 20 26 24 20 8 15 18 Palestinians killed 12 0 in the OCT S O N D JAN 2001 F MA APR 2001 M J J AU S EP CT OV 2000 EC E AY 20 UN UL EP B 20 R G 20 20 2 2001 200 2001 2 200 00 000 0 001 00 1 01 1 1

Figure 1. Palestinians and Israelis killed in the Occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem) during the first year of the 2000 Intifada Interestingly, at that point in time, and despite Israeli overreaction, Barghouti was still trying to avoid a further escalation of the situation. Attuned to requests by Al-Bire residents, Barghouti decided to stop the shooting from within their apartment buildings towards the bordering settlement of Psagot. Unfortunately, Hussein a-Sheik, Barghouti’s rival for the Tanzim leadership, refused to obey the directive and continued the shooting with his militia supporters. The consequent increase in Palestinian casualties (according to JMCC seventy-five deaths during the first week alone – 9/29 – 10/6) dissuaded many Palestinians from continuing to participate in the confrontations, a fact that deeply frustrated the Tanzim forces for their lack of success in mobilizing the masses. The growing frustration among Tanzim forces was translated into further escalation of their mode of action. This time, Palestinian shooting activities concentrated on the main roads leading to Jewish settlements, while other shooting took place from within Palestinian houses, yet only to provoke an even harsher Israeli response. E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 33

In retrospect, it seems that a major factor in the Tanzim’s willingness to abandon a disruptive mode of action and to shift fully to a violent one was the terrible incident of Muhammad al-Durah’s death, already on September 30, 2000, during intensive shooting between PA forces and an Israeli Defense Force outpost near the Netzarim junction in the Gaza Strip. Although several months later an investigation by the IDF concluded that al-Durrah was not hit by IDF bullets, the incident and the Israeli declaration of a probable hit shortly after the incident triggered massive demonstrations and violent clashes throughout the territories. The death of Muhammad al-Durrah unleashed the rage accumulating for so long; the subsequent response was one of unrestrained fury and vengeance, as later events such as the deadly confrontation at Joseph’s Tomb and, later, the lynchings proved. These developments were also central to the formation of the “Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades” in Jennin in early November 2000. The Brigades, quickly becoming the armed wing of the Tanzim, assumed the role of pacesetter in the struggle, presenting a tougher and more militant strategy. Highly coordinated, leaders of the Brigades such as Raad Karami from Tul-Karem, Awiss from Jenin, Ateff Abiyatt from Bethlehem, and Marwan Zalum from Hebron, took the initiative in the armed struggle against Israel. The shooting on Giloh became the Brigades’ primary mode of action. While far from bringing about any serious damage or injuries on the Israeli side, it nevertheless created an atmosphere of deepening fear and anxiety among Israelis. Thus, amidst the barbaric lynching, the ongoing lack of success in ending the shooting on Giloh, the attacks on Jewish settlements and military targets by Tanzim forces, the joining of Hamas in the struggle employing terrorist attacks within the green-line, the heavy international critique against excessive Israeli use of force (a critique which Israel was willing to put up with, if these measures proved effective), and facing a harsh critique by the Israeli public of its leadership, demanding to “let the army win” (i.e. to loosen the restraints), pushed Israeli Prime Minister Barak to order the use of what was labeled “concentrated baffling/foiling,” namely, liquidations. Towards the end of 2000 and in early 2001, two lethal innovations were introduced in a systematic fashion to the already ferocious dynamics of contention: the Israeli liquidation policy and the Palestinian suicide bombings (Istishad). While early incidents inside the arena of contention had occurred prior to the 2000 Intifada (e.g., the assassination of Izz-al-Din al-Qassam mastermind activist Yihye Ayyash on January 5, 1996, and a Hamas suicide bombing near Beit-El in 1993), this time the two parties resorted to these tactics in a much more frequent and systematic fashion. The liquidation of Hussein Abiyatt, a member of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, (Hamas’s armed wing) on November 9, 2000 in an attempt to end the Palestinian shootings from Bethlehem on the bordering Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo was the start of a series of dozens of liquidations. By the end of 2000, Israel had liquidated ten more grassroots activists using a variety of techniques such as snipers or air strikes. In the wake of September 11, 2001, liquidations turned into a full-fledged policy, given tacit approval by the G.W. Bush-led White House [20]. By early 2002, the Tanzim reached the critical decision to further escalate the fight against Israel using suicide terrorism, initiating a series of suicide bombings inside Israel in which hundreds of Israelis died. According to Moghadam [16], in 2002 the Tanzim initiated more suicide bombing attacks than all the other organizations together, at times in joint collaboration with Hamas or Islamic Jihad. 34 E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim

This decision was made at a time when the chances of a significant truce between the parties were greatest. Following the pressure put on Arafat by the Bush Administration to regain control over the situation in the wake of 9/11, and the speech made by the former in a serious attempt to de-escalate the situation, it seemed that the “carte blanche” tacitly granted by Bush to Sharon permitted the desire for vengeance to outweigh political prudence. Despite a significant decrease in the number of terrorist acts during the four weeks following Arafat’s speech, a “green light” was granted by Sharon to liquidate Raad Karmi, the leader of the Al-Aqsa Brigades in Tul-Karem, as indeed occurred on January 14, 2002. Following the liquidation, Marwan Barghouti made the critical executive decision to employ suicide terrorism. Using a prescheduled press conference, Barghouti began by stating: “Sharon opened the doors of hell to the Israeli public.”

Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I have tried to demonstrate the usefulness of incorporating a Collective Action perspective into the study of political terrorism. I suggested that we should change our mode of thinking by substituting for the question, “Why do they hate us?” the question, “What have we done to provoke such deeds?” In no way have I implied or suggested that we should take the blame. It is not a matter of guilt, but rather of responsibility. I suggested further that such an epistemological shift may be useful for learning more about the processes and developments that motivate a group to shift to political terrorism. Asking, “What have we done to provoke such deeds?” would add a relational mode of explanation to terrorism research, whereas asking, “Why do they hate us?” could tempt us to settle for ideational and/or behavioral explanations for political terrorism. While acknowledging the role played by destructive ideas and aggressive propensities, I have tried to show how variable patterns of social interaction – developments and processes within, between, and outside the parties involved – constitute variations in the politics of contention. In attempting that, I focused on the Tanzim. The analysis of the Tanzim’s shift to terrorism was structured according to three theoretical tools or aspects in the study of Collective Action, paralleling the three aforementioned relational processes respectively. In focusing on social interaction within a movement, I analyzed the internal dynamics, power relations, and division of labor between various actors within the Palestinian movement. I tried to demonstrate, for example, how the Tanzim, although originally founded by Arafat to counter the Islamist groups’ agenda, gradually acquired relative autonomy and developed its own political agenda and strategy, thereby complementing rather than undercutting Hamas. This consisted not only of forming a coalition that practically adopted the Intifada’s pace and tone, but also presented a solid internal front that boldly challenged the Palestinian Authority’s legitimacy. The convergence with Hamas influenced the Tanzim’s trajectory toward terrorism, as both were competing for the same constituents, resources and recruits. Hamas’s growing popularity, given its success in inflicting damage on Israel, made the option of terrorism attractive in the eyes of many Tanzim activists, who went ahead to found the al-Aqsa Brigades and escalated the struggle. E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 35

In analyzing processes and developments that unfolded outside the movement, I have tried to demonstrate how a combination of political opportunities and threats affected the development of the Tanzim’s political agenda and strategy and, simultaneously, affected Israel’s policy towards the Tanzim, in particular, and the Palestinian movement, in general. Within the Palestinian Authority, the Tanzim, under the leadership of Marwan Barghouti, was systematically accumulating power within the Nationalist camp, trying to create opportunities for itself by utilizing the ongoing Israeli repressive policy and the widely spreading discontent and critique among the Palestinian population against the PA. The possibility of concluding an FSA at Camp David in July 2000 acted as a critical event for the Tanzim, in the sense that it threatened to thwart Barghouti’s painstaking efforts at maximizing his political power within the PA. In that context, and vis-à-vis Israel, Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount was used by Barghouti as an opportunity to exploit the Palestinian rage resulting from the provocative act and to initiate the al-Aqsa Intifada. On the Israeli side, the perceived threat caused by the broadening clashes, especially in light of a possible Israeli-Palestinian fifth column, was combined with the opportunity created by the 9/11 attacks. Tacitly granted a “green light” by the Bush Administration to escalate its measures to fight terrorism, Israel employed a much heavier crackdown, pushing the Tanzim to further radicalize its mode of action. Finally, in analyzing the dynamics of contentious politics between the Tanzim and Israeli forces, I demonstrated how the interactive action-counteraction between the two parties influenced the Tanzim’s forces to employ political terrorism. I argued that in the case of the Tanzim the form of contentious politics employed was a transgressive form of contention. Indeed, the claims making by the Tanzim forces involved a mode of action that was not considered a well-established means of claims making, i.e., in the form of negotiations, as had been the case between Israeli and Palestinian representatives from the outset. Still, the Tanzim’s shift to terrorism and then to suicide terrorism was far from predestined. As I have shown, Tanzim forces employed, at first, a restricted violence, a disruptive mode of action (e.g., demonstrations, stone throwing, Molotov cocktails, etc.), before fully resorting to violent modes of contention that involved shooting at Israeli soldiers and, later, at settlers. A lethal tango of interactive violence is what propelled the Tanzim into political terrorism of the most extreme form: suicide terrorism. In that context, it is important to note that I make no claims about which of the three processes is more or less critical in pushing a group down the slippery slope to political terrorism. Rather, I would argue that it is the way the three processes concatenate in a specific historical setting that shapes the trajectory of violent contention; the shift toward political terrorism can begin in each of the processes, while being augmented by the others. It may well be that processes within the actor will influence processes between and outside the parties involved in the politics of contention, yet other scenarios are just as likely to generate radicalization. In that sense, the importance of providing a dynamic analysis of the group risk of political terrorism, rather than check-listing specific variables or factors, is further supported. 36 E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim

Implications for Counter-terrorism

What implications for the study of counter-terrorism can be gleaned from the above analysis? Is it possible to use the analysis of the Tanzim’s trajectory toward terrorism for generalizable lessons? I would like to suggest three implications/lessons: Perceptiveness: As demonstrated in the case of the Tanzim, the study of counter- terrorism would benefit from viewing a terrorist organization as one actor in the overall “field of actors” – a social movement, and from furthering the analysis of the internal dynamics within the movement. Actors within the movement affect each other and are affected by each other’s strategy and modes of action. During episodes of contention, seemingly unrelated actors with differing and at times conflicting ideologies and worldviews can join hands to form ad-hoc coalitions, which can thwart the strategy of the movement as a whole as dictated by the more dominant actor(s). Additionally, it is crucial to bear in mind that no one actor within the movement is a unified whole. Rather, the situation is precarious and incessantly in motion; each actor is prone to factionalism and splitting, leading to the subsequent formation of additional actors and groups, so that new alliances and new rivalries are to be expected. In planning strategies of counter-terrorism, academic and non-academic specialists must move beyond a mere recognition of such complexity, treating each as a possible factor that can increase a group’s proneness to terrorism [30]. An actor within a movement can indeed go through a radicalization process through an alliance with a more militant actor. Yet, this process is not unidirectional and predetermined; there may well be a de-radicalization process, namely, if the more moderate actor exerts a moderating influence on the more radical or militant actor. Such was the case with Hamas, which went through a process of de-radicalization during the second half of the 1990s, leading it to temper its political agenda and strategy [31, 25]. Radicalization may come about because of internal issues of power relations within the movement and the ways they are affected in the face of possible political achievements or during the remnants of a protest cycle, if the ‘last hurrah’ of activism goes awry. Here I am referring to cases where the shift to political terrorism springs from a perceived tempering of a dominant actor within a movement by other actors or by members of the same actor (a.k.a. splinters/splits). Such was the case with the Weathermen breaking away from the SDS or the Red Brigades emerging from the ashes of the Italian Radical movement. Radicalization may also result from an indiscriminate mode of countering terrorism, and the overall historical specificity of shared grievances and discontent – all of which, jointly and separately, has something to do with a lack of discernment. Discernment: Throughout the analysis of the Tanzim, I have paid close attention to the specific historical constellation, factors, and processes, not only those out of which the group was formed, but also those within which it has operated. Counter-terrorism theorizing must have the capacity to provide a broad and deep analytical grasp of the present in light of the past – discernment – a nuanced historical sense for keeping track of and remaining attuned to the ambiguous legacies of politics, writ large [32]. A counter-terrorism strategy in the sense of a “war on terrorism” is precisely a strategy that lacks such a nuanced historical sense, a strategy that seeks to end terrorism instead of seeking to resolve the underlying conflict that gave rise to terrorism in the first place. Seeking to end terrorism through a “just war” perpetuates terrorism, as it self- righteously overlooks the relational dimension of conflict by painting ourselves as E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 37

“romantics at war” [33]. The US’s systematic overlooking of its historical role in the creation of Al-Qaida’s aims and motivations during the USSR-Afghanistan war and its aftermath is a case in point. A deep analytical grasp of the development of the Tanzim, as I have tried to accomplish, would reject arguments such as that the Tanzim was just a tool in the hands of Arafat, that it is inextricably linked to the Fatah, hence the name the Fatah- Tanzim, or that by aligning with Hamas it embraced Hamas’s worldviews and ideologies. Heeding the historical specificity of the group, we must come to realize that the Tanzim has been a genuine expression of the Palestinian people within (and not outside) the occupied territories; Tanzim members are those same grassroots activists who practically initiated the 1987 Intifada, were responsible for its relative success, handed the Intifada over to Arafat and, yet, were pushed aside by the Tunisians. A differentiated historical sense in strategizing counter-terrorism would cast light on the rationale behind the founding of the Tanzim, on the ongoing oppression of the Palestinian people despite the Oslo Accords [34], on the deep tension between the “external” and “internal” PLO, on the fact that the 2000 Intifada was also a challenge to the Tunisian-led PA, on the crucial difference between types of leadership (i.e., symbolic or functional) and the effects of such differences on politics within the challenger’s arena, and on the fact that many terrorist groups are politics-oriented and have a certain degree of pragmatism and an instrumental approach to the use of force and violence. This is true not only of the Tanzim, but also of Hamas. As one incarcerated Hamas terrorist put it, “armed attacks are an integral part of the organization’s struggle against the Zionist occupier … our goal can only be achieved through force, but force is the means, not the end. History shows that without force it will be impossible to achieve independence” [35] (p. 179). This is just as true of the IRA’s willingness to engage in cease-fire arrangements on the way to the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998. Pragmatism: Political processes affect contention above and beyond the ideological imperatives and aggressive propensities of activists and leaders; they might escalate contention by radicalizing the strategy and tactics employed by the parties involved. Changes and developments in the political conditions on various levels (local, national, or international) can be perceived by a group-at-risk for terrorism as either opportunities or threats for a variety of purposes and goals. I specifically refrain from using the concept of “triggering events,” because such a concept implies a direct effect of events on the group-at-risk, whereas, in fact, events influence, if at all, the group only indirectly, as they might occasion changes in the political conditions and, consequently, alter the alignment of contention between the parties involved. A counter-terrorism strategy must embrace pragmatism at any cost. A pragmatic strategy of counter-terrorism warrants attentiveness to how changes in the political conditions would be perceived by the group, as an opportunity or a threat, at what level, and as an opportunity for or a threat to what? The counter-terrorism analyst should look for possible shifts in the structure of the political conditions in order to re/evaluate their effects on the group-at-risk, that is, to assess whether these changes will be perceived as opportunities or as threats, hence an adaptation of policy vis-à-vis the group-at-risk and the movement at large. This is not merely an analytical distinction. Israel had already overreacted in the context of the formation of Hamas during early 1988, misunderstanding Hamas’s decision to join the Intifada as a threat to Israel, whereas in fact the formation of Hamas 38 E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim had been the Muslim Brothers’ way to cope with the threat to their status within the territories vis-à-vis the PLO. In a like manner, it may just as well be the case that Israel overreacted in her response to the widely spreading demonstrations initiated by Barghouti during Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, thereby failing to realize the underlying motivation behind the Tanzim’s decision to increase contention: to further its status within the Palestinian movement. It goes without saying that the broadening contention backfired on Israel. Yet, to my understanding and knowledge, in and of themselves changes in the structure of the political conditions perceived by movement activists as either a threat or an opportunity, while possibly bringing about a broadening of contention, did not cause a shift to terrorism. Because political leaders misread the strategy and agenda of the group-at-risk, they overreacted, thereby provoking the group to resort to terrorism. Finally, the pragmatic counter-terrorism analyst should not forget the obvious: political terrorists are politically-motivated and politics-oriented. Politics is a messy business that involves compromises; many terrorist groups refrain from participating in politics, at least formally, as the compromises involved run counter to their ideological creed and their existential motivation. Yet, this does not mean that political processes and developments go unnoticed and have no bearing on these groups’ strategy and agenda, a fact that implies a certain degree of pragmatism on their part and necessitates pragmatism on our part as well. We should avoid viewing terrorism, and suicide terrorism for that matter, as intrinsically irrational or as a diabolical pathology [36, 37, 38, 39]. Just as in a specific political setting the three political processes can concatenate to shift a group-at-risk from a nonviolent mode of action to a violent one, political processes may generate the opposite result. A pragmatic counter-terrorism specialist must seize any opportunity of that sort to pull a terrorist group back from the edge of the abyss of violence. Otherwise, given such a misreading and/or lack of discernment, political terrorism can transform itself into personal vendettas in which destructive ideas and aggressive propensities dominate.

References

[1] Hoffman, B. (2002). Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism since 9/11. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25:303-316. [2] Merari, A. (1990). The readiness to kill and die: Suicidal terrorism in the Middle East. In: Reich, W. (ed.). Origins of terrorism. New York: Cambridge University Press. [3] Netanyahu, B. (1985). Terrorism: How the West can win. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux. [4] Peleg, S. (2002). Zealotry and vengeance. Lanham, Boulder, NY. Oxford: Lexington Books. [5] Honderich, T. (2002). After the terror. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press. [6] Tilly, C. (2003). The politics of collective violence. Cambridge University Press. [7] Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Mass: Addison-Wesley. [8] Hoffer, E. [1966] (1989). The true believer: Thoughts on the nature of mass movements. New York: HarperPerennial. [9] Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004). Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach. Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. [10] Morris, A.D. (1984). The origins of the civil rights movement. NY: The Free Press. [11] Meyer, D.S. (1990). A winter of discontent. New York, Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger. [12] Gamson, W.A., Meyer, D.S. (1996). Framing political opportunity. In: McAdam, D.J., McCarthy, J.D., Mayer, N.Z. (eds.). Comparative perspectives on social movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 275-90. [13] Gamson, W.A. (1990). The strategy of social protest. 2d ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company. E.Y. Alimi / Reconceptualizing Political Terrorism: A CA Perspective for Analyzing the Tanzim 39

[14] Alimi, E.Y. (2003). The effects of opportunities on insurgencies. Terrorism and Political Violence, 15(3): 111-138. [15] Alimi, E.Y. (2004). The 1987 Intifada – Cracks in the Israeli Second Republic. Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, Boston College, Boston, MA. [16] Moghadam, A. (2003). Palestinian suicide terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and organizational aspects. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26:65-92. [17] Alternative Information Center (1992). The situation in the occupied territories in the wake of the suicide bombings. Jerusalem, Israel: Alternative Information Center. [18] Harel, A., Isacharoff, A. (2004). The seventh war. Tel-Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books. [19] Rekhes, E., Regavim, R. (2000). The Palestinian authority. In: Maddy-Weitzman, B., The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and The Shiloah Institute and Tel Aviv University (eds.). Middle East contemporary survey, Vol. XXIV. Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press. [20] Mansour, C. (2002). The impact of 11 September on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Journal of Palestine Studies, XXXI (2):5-18. [21] Perrow, C. (1979). The Sixties Observed. In: Zald, M.N, McCarthy, J.D. (eds.). The dynamics of social movements. Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers. [22] McAdam, D. (1999). Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930-1970. 2d ed. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. [23] Tarrow, S. (1989). Democracy and disorder. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [24] Goldstone, J.A, Tilly, C. (2001). Threat (and opportunity): Popular action and state repression in the dynamics of contentious action. In: Aminzade, R.R., Goldstone, J.A., McAdam, D., Perry, E.J., Sewell Jr., W.H., Tarrow, S., Tilly, C. (eds.). Silence and voice in the study of contentious politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 179-194. [25] Mishal, S., Sela, A. (1999). Zman Hamas – Alimut Ve’pshara (The Hamas wind – Violence and coexistence). Tel Aviv: Miskal (in Hebrew). [26] Robinson, G. (2004). Hamas as social movement. In: Wikrorowicz, Q. (ed.). Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach. Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, pp. 112-39. [27] Susser, L., Rekhes, E. (2000). Israel. In: Maddy-Weitzman, B., The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and The Shiloah Institute and Tel Aviv University (eds.). Middle East contemporary survey, Vol. XXIV. Boulder, San Francisco, and London: Westview Press. [28] McAdam, D., Tarrow, S, Tilly, C. (1996). To map contentious politics. Mobilization: An International Journal 1(1): 17-34. [29] Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in movement. 2d ed. Cambridge, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press. [30] Post, J.M, Ruby, K.G., Shaw, E.D. (2001). The radical group in context: 1. An integrated framework for the analysis of group risk for terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 25: 73-100. [31] Gunning, J. (2004). Peace with Hamas? The transforming potential of political participation. International Affairs, 80(2):233-255. [32] West, C. (1993). Prophetic thought in postmodern times. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press. [33] Fletcher, G.P. (2002). Romantics at war. NJ: Princeton University Press. [34] Behar, M. (2002). The peace process and Israeli domestic politics in the 1990s. Socialism and Democracy, 16(2): 34-48. [35] Post, J.M, Sprinzak, E., Denny, L.M. (2003). The terrorists in their own words: Interviews with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists. Terrorism and Political Violence, 15(1):171-84. [36] Berman, P. (2003). Terror and liberalism. NY: W. W. Norton & Company [37] Pape, R.A. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. American Political Science Review, 97(3): 343-361. [38] Pedahzur, A. (2004). The new terrorism and the Palestinian scene. In: Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism. Israel: Ministry of Defense Press. [39] Sprinzak, E. (2000). Rational fanatics. Foreign Policy, 120 (Sept/Oct): 66-73. 40 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA

Juan AVILES Instituto Universitario de Investigación sobre Seguridad Interior (IUISI) and Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Madrid, Spain

Abstract. ETA is a terrorist organization that has murdered more than 800 persons since 1968. Its ideological origins are to be found both in the Basque nationalist doctrine of the early XXth century and in the extreme left wing ideology of the sixties. Its goal is the creation of an independent and socialist Basque State that would include Spanish and French territories. Born in the last years of the Franco dictatorship it thrived during the transition to democracy, winning the support of a 15% of the population in the Basque Autonomous Region. The Spanish counter- terrorist strategy, that has nearly achieved the final defeat of ETA, offers valuable experiences for other countries threatened by terrorism.

Keywords. Terrorism, Spain, Basque region, counter-terrorist strategy

Since the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, international terrorism is rightly perceived as a major threat to world peace. Nor should the danger posed by local terrorist organizations be forgotten. Even the Al-Qaeda led global Jihadist network includes many local groups, from Kashmir to Algeria, which have their own agenda, but still cooperate at an international level. It is also true that religiously motivated terrorism is today the most lethal, but the threat from other, differently motivated terrorist organizations, such as the social revolutionary, nationalist and vigilante groups, should be kept in mind. The long Spanish experience of fighting, for more than thirty years, a local nationalist terrorist group, namely ETA, could therefore offer some useful lessons for the many countries that face terrorist threats today. Before describing this experience, two introductory remarks can be useful. The first is a definition of the term ‘terrorism’ as it is used in this essay. The second is a brief introduction to the past and present of the Basque region, whose independence is the declared goal of ETA.

Defining Terrorism

There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. In fact, some would argue that the term is too ideological to be defined in a precise way. I do not agree with this skeptical approach. I subscribe to the opinion that the term terrorism is useful to describe a phenomenon that is not identical to other forms of political violence and should therefore be analyzed separately. A universal definition would be welcome, as it would represent a useful legal instrument in international cooperation against the J. Aviles / Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA 41 terrorist threat. And we as scholars need a definition as an analytical tool for the study of the terrorist phenomenon. A good starting point for defining terrorism is the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 54/109 of 9 December 1999. According to it, a terrorist act is any act “intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” This definition has two important elements: A terrorist act is an act of violence a) perpetrated against civilians or any other people who are not fighters in an armed conflict, b) with the purpose of intimidating a population or forcing the will of a government or international organization. But this is not enough to differentiate terrorism from other forms of political violence. Another commonly quoted definition is the one that is used by the US Department of State in its annual reports on international terrorism. It is included in the US Code, Title 22, Section 2656f, and according to it the term terrorism means, “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” We can assume that this definition includes, albeit in less precise ways, the two elements found in UN Resolution 54/109. It also includes two new elements: terrorism is a) premeditated and b) perpetrated by subnational groups or clandestine agents. The last one is especially important, because it excludes from the definition of terrorism any crimes perpetrated by the regular agents of a State. This is in fact the most common usage of the term. Otherwise, we should conclude that the worst terrorists of the last century were Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot. Certainly, they terrorized more people than any terrorist group, but there are good reasons to exclude their crimes from the scope of the term terrorism. We should remember that the worst crimes committed by a State through its regular agents are well defined in international law as war crimes, crimes against humankind and genocide. If we included all these crimes under the term terrorism, we would need another specific term for the acts we usually consider terrorist. By now, we have almost all the elements necessary for a definition precise enough to differentiate terrorism from other forms of political violence. But there is a final problem. Both the UN and the USA definitions point to the fact that violence against combatants in a situation of armed conflict is not terrorism. Guerrilla warfare is thus not in itself terrorism. But what about the deliberate killing of civilians in a situation of armed conflict? If the killers are regular soldiers, their crimes are war crimes. But what if the killers are irregular fighters – are their acts war crimes, or rather terrorist acts? In my opinion, the best solution to this puzzle is to restrict the concept of terrorism to crimes perpetrated in a situation of peace and to consider crimes against noncombatants committed by whichever party in a situation of armed conflict to be war crimes. In fact, this is the common usage of the term, as killings in the context of war are seldom considered terrorist acts. Of course, this poses the very difficult question of how we can distinguish between a situation of peace and a situation of armed conflict in our age of small wars, low intensity wars and armed insurgency. 42 J. Aviles / Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA

Combining all the elements already considered, we arrive at a useful definition of terrorism intended as an analytical instrument for scholarly research. It might be as follows. Terrorism consists in premeditated violence, perpetrated by subnational groups or clandestine agents of a State, against civilians or other noncombatants, in the absence of a situation of armed conflict, with the purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. In the case of Spain, it is obvious that there has not been a situation of armed conflict for a long time. On the other hand, according to our definition there have been, during the last forty years, four types of terrorism: 1. The terrorism of ETA, aimed at intimidating the Spanish population and especially the Basque population opposed to secession from Spain, in order to compel the Spanish government to grant independence to the Basque Country. ETA has been responsible for 90% or more of the terrorist murders committed during this period. 2. The social revolutionary terrorism of GRAPO, a Marxist-Leninist group which for some years tried to ignite a social revolution. 3. Some acts of vigilante terrorism that during the first years of the democratic transition tried to intimidate the left and put a brake on political change. 4. A campaign of vigilante terrorism perpetrated mainly in the south of France by clandestine agents linked to some Spanish political authorities at the Ministry of the Interior, with the purpose of intimidating the supporters of ETA and possibly forcing the French government to suppress the freedom of action that in the late seventies and early eighties ETA enjoyed on French territory.

Explaining the Basque Conundrum

Like many other terrorist groups formed in the last century, ETA has a nationalist ideology. This means that it considers itself the vanguard of a nation supposedly oppressed by the Spaniards and the French that should fight for its independence. This nation is the Basque nation. As the history of the Basques is almost unknown by most readers outside of Spain, this hinders a better understanding of ETA. Therefore, a brief introduction seems to be necessary. Basque identity is based on the Basque language, a non-Indo-European language spoken in some territories around the western end of the Pyrenees. Traditionally these territories have been regarded as seven in number. Three of them are to the north of the Pyrenees, and four are to the south. The three northern territories are rather smaller and were part of the Kingdom of France since the Middle Ages. Three of the southern territories, Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa and Álava, in the Middle Ages joined the Kingdom of Castile and then the Kingdom of Spain. The seventh territory, Navarre, was an independent kingdom until the early sixteenth century, when it also joined Spain. As was quite common in the old kingdoms of Europe, the four territories that joined the Kingdom of Spain each had its own institutions and laws, called fueros, and they kept them until the nineteenth century, in contrast to the other regions of Spain, which were more integrated into the common institutional framework of the kingdom. The fueros J. Aviles / Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA 43 were abolished during the civil wars of the nineteenth century, as the victorious liberals tried to create a new, modern centralized State, after the French model. The Basque nationalist movement arose at the end of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the loss of the fueros, the erosion of Basque traditions, the spread of the Spanish language and the arrival of Castilian immigrants. As in other cases, it represented a return to the old traditions that seemed to be threatened by the forces of modernity. The nationalist movement was born in Vizcaya, extended to Guipuzcoa and somehow to Álava, but made little progress in Navarre, which had a strong sense of its own identity, and in the northern French territories. Therefore when in 1978, after the long dictatorship of General Franco, a new Spanish Constitution opened the possibility of the creation of autonomous regions, Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa and Álava formed the new Basque Autonomous Region, called in Basque Euskadi, but Navarre opted to become an autonomous region of its own. Since then the Basque nationalist parties have obtained poor results in Navarre, but have won all the elections to the Basque parliament and have headed all the autonomous Basque governments of the last 25 years. As the Basque Autonomous Region has very broad competencies, they have easily engaged in an extensive process of building a separate Basque identity, via the educational system and other instruments controlled by the Basque government. Nevertheless, the non-nationalist parties, those that consider Euskadi to be part of Spain, have strong roots in Euskadi and are well represented in the Basque autonomous parliament. In fact, Euskadi is not divided into two rival communities, as is the case in Northern Ireland. The majority of the population feel themselves to be both Basque and Spanish, and only about 30% consider themselves to be solely Basque. Less than 15% vote for the political wing of ETA, far fewer than those who vote for either the democratic Basque nationalist parties or the non-nationalist parties. ETA itself rejects autonomy within Spain and demands the creation of a new independent Basque State that would include all of the historic seven territories.

The Rise of ETA

ETA is a good example of the general fact that terrorist groups may thrive during a process of transition from dictatorship to democracy. They can obtain broad popular support as a result of indiscriminate repression in the last stages of dictatorship and then use the new freedom brought by democracy to fight against democracy itself. The first murders by ETA were perpetrated in the final years of Franco’s dictatorship, but 95% of its victims were killed after Franco’s death, and ETA was most deadly during the transition to democracy. It seems that ETA considered the democratic transition as the best opportunity to impose its project of a socialist and independent Basque Country by terrorist means and foresaw that the consolidation of Spanish democracy and of Basque autonomy would put an end to that opportunity. Founded in 1958, ETA combined two ideological trends. On one hand, it followed the Basque nationalist doctrine of the early twentieth century, which was based on Catholic fundamentalism, Basque racism, hatred towards Spain and anti-liberalism. On the other hand, it adopted the revolutionary tendencies of the sixties. The founders of ETA were no longer Catholic fundamentalists or racists, even if they inherited the old messianic belief in the Basque Nation. Under the influence of the Chinese and Cuban 44 J. Aviles / Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA revolutions, and of the wars in Vietnam and Algeria, they came to believe that a national liberation war was possible, that the Castroist guerrilla strategy could be implemented in the Basque mountains.

100 92 90 80 76 70 66

60 52 46 50 43 37 37 40 30 32 32 26 30 25 23 19 21 19 16 17 20 14 15 13 15 10 12 6 6 10 5 5 3 2 1 001 0 0 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 Figure 1. Persons murdered by ETA, 1968-2004

A key element of ETA’s first strategy, designed to ignite a popular insurrection, was the action-repression-action dynamics. They hoped that the Spanish State would respond to their attacks with a repressive violence that ETA itself would largely manage to avoid and that would instead chiefly hurt the masses, provoking a popular uprising. In fact, this dynamics did not work as expected, in the sense that ETA did not manage to avoid repression, but worked quite well in making the repression resented by the population at large. The indiscriminate repression and the Franco regime’s hostility to any expression of Basque nationalism generated a wave of sympathy for ETA. When Franco died in 1975, ETA had been almost completely dismantled, but had won popular support that would enable it to recruit a large number of militants and to launch a great terrorist offensive after 1978, when their imprisoned members were released due to the 1977 amnesty. According to a 1980 survey, 47% of all Basques agreed that the violence of the Spanish State was worse than the terrorist attacks, and only 18% disagreed. The structure designed by ETA during the democratic transition turned out to be quite effective. It only kept underground its deadly commandos, whilst a large part of its political wing and support groups operated openly.

Counter-Terrorist Mistakes

The Spanish experience provides two important lessons. Firstly, that the use of illegal repressive means is counterproductive for a democratic State, and secondly that is dangerous to allow the free operation of the apparently peaceful elements of a terrorist network. Successive Spanish governments made different mistakes in the struggle against ETA. During the dictatorship and in the first years of the democratic transition, when J. Aviles / Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA 45

Spain lacked security forces prepared for the struggle against terrorism, a common recourse was to indiscriminately arrest people linked to ETA, to be released thereafter. The benefits of this policy in terms of collecting intelligence were less than the negative reactions it produced in terms of the radicalization of the detained persons themselves and their relatives and friends, especially in cases involving mistreatment. Subsequently, the development of efficient information gathering services led to a reduction in the number of detentions, which began to focus on the real terrorists. A later and opposite mistake, which was not corrected until very recently, was to consider that ETA was merely an armed organization. This misconception allowed ETA’s political wing, called Batasuna, and other ETA-linked groups to act openly and without restrictions. It was hoped that if radical nationalism had legal action opportunities, ETA would stop the terrorism. But the results were different: ETA’s fellow organizations contributed to increasing the intimidating effects of the terrorist attacks, which inflicted a climate of fear on the Basque Country. A change began in 1998, when magistrate Baltasar Garzón stated for the first time that ETA was not just an armed organization, but was rather a complex movement with different elements acting in a coordinated way. The most severe moral and political mistake, however, was committed when sectors of the State administration promoted counter-terrorist terrorism in a “dirty war.” Most of the counter-terrorist attacks took place in the French Basque territory that was used by ETA as a base of operations. It seems that its main objective was to pressure the French government to stop tolerating ETA activity on its territory. In fact, the French government changed its policy in the mid eighties, and the “dirty war,” which started in 1975, ended definitively in 1987.

ETA’s Changing Strategy

ETA has used most of the strategies that a nationalist-separatist terrorist group can possibly use against a democratic state: namely, the revolutionary war strategy, the attrition strategy and the national front strategy. During the period in which the revolutionary war strategy was implemented, approximately from 1968 to 1978, ETA hoped that its terrorist actions would spark an armed insurrection that would lead the Basque people towards independence from the Spanish State. But this was no longer conceivable, not even by the most fanatic ideologists, after the consolidation of democracy and the establishment of the Basque autonomous region. Therefore, ETA had to switch to another strategy. The new attrition strategy was based on the assumption that prolonged terrorist pressure would succeed in forcing Spain to yield to ETA’s demands. A key element of the attrition strategy was negotiation with the Spanish government. By offering negotiations, ETA achieved a propaganda success, since it seemed disposed to dialogue. Should the government agree to discussions, ETA would achieve a second propaganda success, since it would prove that the Spanish State recognized the power of ETA. But negotiations came to naught, since ETA was not likely to renounce to its main objective, namely independence. This strategy required some level of popular support, and ETA has been able to obtain this. In elections to the Basque parliament, ETA’s political wing, Batasuna, 46 J. Aviles / Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA typically receives almost 15% of the vote. And support has been greater among youth. A 1990 survey revealed that 27% of Basque youth considered terrorism justified under certain circumstances. The percentage rose to 46% among those who did not consider themselves Spaniards but only Basques, and to 61% among those who regularly smoke cannabis, which shows that both the nationalist and the anti-establishment components of the youth sector are sympathetic to ETA. Nevertheless, in the last years there has been a marked loss of support for ETA’s terrorist actions. According to surveys, the percentage of those who support or justify ETA has decreased from 12% in 1981 to less than 1% in 2003. In fact, ETA itself has suffered attrition, due firstly to the increasing efficacy of security forces, who increasingly focus on the terrorist core, avoiding indiscriminate repression, and secondly due to increasing counter-terrorism cooperation between France and Spain since the mid-eighties. The consolidation of Basque autonomy, ruled by democratic Basque nationalists, has had an ambiguous effect on ETA. On one hand, the success of democratic nationalism in reducing ETA’s support is unquestionable, since it proved that it was possible to preserve the differentiated Basque identity inside an increasingly decentralized Spanish State. On the other hand, by defining Euskadi as a completely different nation from Spain, despite their obvious and very ancient ties, democratic nationalists tended to reinforce the ideology that nourishes ETA. ETA’s wearing-down and the ambiguity of democratic nationalism led to a new strategy in the mid-nineties: the national front. This strategy implied that the Spanish State should accept Basque Country self-determination. In order to achieve this, ETA aimed at a union of all nationalist forces, including the democratic parties. Since it was no longer a matter of forcing the State to negotiate, but rather of obtaining independence by an agreement among the Basques themselves, the non-nationalist Basques, who account for half the population of the Basque Autonomous Community, became the main enemy. Several non-nationalist Basque politicians were consequently murdered by ETA in the mid-nineties. The kidnapping and assassination of one of them, a young Basque town councilor, in 1997, provoked massive anti-terrorist demonstrations in the Basque country, as well as in the whole of Spain. This worried the ruling democratic nationalists, who feared an antinationalist backlash. As a result, democratic nationalists considered that it was necessary to reach an agreement with ETA, which should forsake terrorism and integrate itself into a nationalist union that would endeavor to reach independence in the short-term. The new strategy materialized in a 1998 secret agreement between the democratic nationalists and ETA, followed by an ETA truce. But the agreement did not last very long, for reasons common in the dynamics of terrorist groups. In a peaceful struggle for independence, political circumstances would compel slow progress, and the effective leadership would belong to the democratic parties, whilst ETA would gradually become irrelevant. Therefore, ETA broke the truce and resumed its terrorist attacks in 2000. Apparently, the attrition strategy was coming back. The loss of support, international counter-terrorism cooperation and the efficacy of police measures have greatly curtailed the operative capacity of ETA. It has also lost the support of various organizations integrated in its terrorist network that have been outlawed after long years in which they were allowed to operate freely. ETA’s political wing, Batasuna, was banned in 2002, after a new law on political parties stated that parties that J. Aviles / Experiencing Terrorism in Spain: The Case of ETA 47 supported the activity of terrorist organizations were to be banned. And hegemony in the nationalist camp has clearly passed from ETA to the democratic nationalist parties, which after ruling the Basque autonomous region for more than twenty years are trying to achieve a new step towards independence.

Conclusions

The Spanish experience reveals that once a terrorist movement has taken roots, the way a democratic State can defeat it is through resolute and prolonged effort in which any departure from democratic principles is counter-productive. Spain has defeated terrorism without curtailing the political freedom of its citizens, including the right to defend the nationalist thesis on the independence of the Basque country, and without violating the human rights of suspected terrorists. A key element in the Spanish counter-terrorism strategy of the last years has been the realization that a developed terrorist network consists not only in the commandos that actually commit violence, but also includes logistical, financial and propaganda organizations that are no less part of the network than the commandos themselves. After more than thirty years of Spanish counter-terrorism efforts, we are now entering the last stage. As ETA is at its weakest point ever, the key question is how to force its dissolution without paying a political price. 48 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Combating Terrorism through International Law

Barry A. FEINSTEIN* School of Law at Netanya College, Israel

Abstract. Apologists for terrorism frequently refer to “root causes” in an attempt to “explain away” despicable atrocities perpetrated by terrorists. Portrayed typically as “understandable acts of desperation”, these acts of terrorism “in the name of addressing alleged injustices” are none other than appalling human rights violations. While countless attempts have been made to pinpoint alleged “root causes” of terrorism, with the supposition being that if its cause is eradicated then terrorism itself will disappear, in reality the facts do not support the allegations. Yet, even if there did exist “root causes” of terrorism, until those issues are adequately addressed and finally resolved in an effective manner, a State which is the target of terrorist attacks is in the meantime permitted to exercise its legitimate, inherent right to employ force in defense of its citizens, and in order to forestall serious injury it is fully justified in engaging in anticipatory measures of self-defense in an abetting State. Actions thus taken in self- defense by the target State may be considered the legitimate direct response to the unwillingness or inability of an abetting State to fulfill its international legal obligations to halt terrorist attacks, or the imminent threat of terrorist attacks, which originate within its borders, and are directed against the target State.

Keywords. Use of armed force, self-defense, armed attack, War on Terror, terrorism, root causes of terrorism

Terrorism poses an ominous threat to humanity1 and to the peace and security of the world.2 It knows no international border, nor does it distinguish between civilians and 3 combatants. Terrorists, by definition, are characterized by their lack of adherence to the self-imposed restraints of moral standards.4 Instead, they place “the cause” above all in the belief that the end justifies the means used to achieve it. The inherent eclectic, unpredictable, and indiscriminate nature of terrorism has turned what some excuse as acts of desperation by “victims of oppression” into one of the greatest threats to the free world and modern civilization. Recent events, particularly and unquestionably the horrifying suicide terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, have finally brought the world to the realization that nothing can justify the murder of innocent civilians, and political and social grievances of any particular group do

* The author is grateful to Naomi Kessler-Feinstein for her keen and indispensable perceptions as well as her unceasing encouragement and support. B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 49 not entitle that group to violate the basic right to life of civilians.5 Regardless of its alleged objectives or who perpetrates it, terrorism can never be legitimized. Terrorists claim that they fight in the name of freedom and justice and that they represent those suffering from subjugation and exploitation. However, it is the free democratic societies that serve as prime and vulnerable targets for terrorism.6 Ironically, it is the very moral strength of these societies’ openness, tolerance, and respect for human rights that makes them so susceptible to harm by those driven by their antipathy to these Western moral standards. As a result, the world today is often viewed as a dichotomy, with civilization on one end and terrorism on the other.7 Apologists for terrorism, and particularly for the acts committed by suicide terrorists, frequently refer to “root causes” in an attempt to “explain away” despicable atrocities perpetrated by terrorists. Portrayed typically as “understandable,” acts of terrorism “in the name of addressing alleged injustices”8 are none other than appalling human rights violations,9 and they are wrong, and they are evil; “Those who practice terrorism - murdering or victimizing innocent civilians - lose any right to have their cause understood by decent people and lawful nations,”10 explains New York City’s former Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani It may seem natural at first glance though to try to identify “root causes” in an attempt to correct them, since “[r]oot causes ‘have’ to be there ….”11 Consequently, countless attempts have been made to pinpoint the alleged “root causes” of terrorism,12 with the supposition being that if its cause is eradicated, then terrorism itself will disappear.13 Those who advocate this approach typically assume that terrorism’s root causes generally fall into three basic sorts: poverty, oppression, and revolutionary nationalism.14 In the specific case of Palestinian terrorism, for instance, “all three ‘root causes’ are said to come into play: Israeli control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is always assumed to be the root cause of terrorism directed against both Israel and the United States. Palestinian terror is assumed to be rooted in frustrated nationalism aggravated by relative immiseration.”15 Thus, terrorism is typically described as the “legitimate” response to “oppression,” or, regarding some anti-American terrorism, the response to “imagined American complicity in Israel’s alleged crimes, i.e. maintaining [the U.S.’s] alliance with Israel.”16 But in reality the facts do not support the allegations, as an examination and comparison will demonstrate, for example, of the true and genuine motivation of Osama bin Laden vis-à-vis his bogus and fake excuses for orchestrating the horrific and catastrophic September 11, 2001 suicide terrorist hijackings and bombings in the United States. In a February 1998 religious decree, or fatwa, Osama bin Laden called for among other things the liberation of Muslim holy places in Israel as well as in Saudi Arabia,17 and claimed he viewed the U.S. as assisting the Jews in their conquest of Palestine.18 Earlier, in July 1996, bin Laden warned that the terrorists who bombed American soldiers in Saudi Arabia will also attack the French and the British, and explicated in addition that a June 1996 bomb in Dhahran “was the result of American behavior against Muslims, its support 19 of Jews in Palestine, and the massacre of Muslims in Palestine and Lebanon.” 50 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law

By means of these and similar pretexts attempting to tie his actions to the plight of the Palestinians, bin Laden was trying to “justify” his cause and at the same time fuel anti- American sentiments. His actual vendetta, though, is ridding the Holy Cities of Medina and Mecca, and all of Saudi Arabia, of the infidel, the crusading Americans, who he alleges are satanically profaning his motherland. Bin Laden’s rage and personal vendetta against the United States is based on the United States military presence in Saudi Arabia.20 Bin Laden has declared that the Saudis have a “legitimate right” to attack the thousands of United States military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia: “The presence of the American crusader armed forces in the countries of the Islamic Gulf is the greatest danger and the biggest harm that threatens the world’s largest oil reserves . . . . The infidels must be thrown out of the Arabian Peninsula.”21 The objective of al-Qa’ida (Arabic for the Military Base) is in essence to “unite all Muslims and to establish a government which follows the rule of the Caliph,” and the only way to do that, according to bin Laden, is to establish the Caliphate by force.22 Simply put, al-Qa’ida’s and bin Laden’s “goal is to liberate the land of Islam from the infidels and establish the law of Allah.”23 Al-Qa’ida is thus intensely anti-Western, and views the United States in particular as the prime enemy of Islam.24 Through the invention of ostensible service to the Palestinian cause, bin Laden hence unsuccessfully tried to adopt the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as his own “crusade” in the form of a farfetched attachment to his fanatical obsession with any American presence in general and U.S. military personnel and bases in particular in Saudi Arabia,25 and this obsession of his would have existed irrespective of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Bin Laden’s attempts to link Palestinian aspirations to his cause were rejected outright by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, in her former role as National Security Adviser, when she explained that the war against terrorism was a war against “evil people who would hijack the Palestinian cause.”26 The suggestion that the Israeli-Palestinian issue is an excuse for the terrorist suicide attacks on the U.S. is a “tortured thought,” explains U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. “It is not good thinking,” he said.27 Dr. Abd Al-Hamid Al-Ansari, Dean of Shar’ia and Law at Qatar University in fact also found fault with bin Laden’s attempts to distort reality in this regard: “In their hypocrisy, many of the [Arab] intellectuals linked September 11 with the Palestinian problem — something that completely contradicts seven years of Al-Qaida literature. Al-Qaida never linked anything to Palestine.”28 Suffice it to mention that bin Laden was implicated in the U.S. for his role in the first terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, in which hundreds were killed and injured, a terrorist bombing which had occurred in 1993, the same year that the Palestinians and the Israelis signed the first stage of the Oslo Accords in an attempt to put a final end to the countless decades of bloodshed between them.29 The 1995 and 1996 bombings that killed and injured Americans and others in Saudi Arabia occurred while the Israelis and Palestinians were in the midst of implementing the second stage of the Oslo Accords designed to further enhance peace and long-hoped for cordial relations between 30 Israelis and Palestinians. Bin Laden’s malicious1996 and 1998 statements referred to B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 51 earlier were made while Palestinians and Israelis were continuing in their attempts to shore up their peace accords through among other things engaging in numerous productive joint enterprises. By 1998, the year when bin Laden and his associates were busy blowing up U.S. embassies and killing and injuring thousands in Africa, Israelis and Palestinians could show that cooperation between them was enormous and beneficial to the people on both sides.31 By the close of 1998, the Palestinian Authority and Israel had agreed to work together to eventually employ 140,000 documented workers in Israel.32 The income earned by Palestinian laborers in Israel was, at the time, significantly contributing to Palestinian income.33 This earned income for Palestinians working in Israel amounted to between 30- 40% of the entire income of the Palestinian labor force in 1998.34 In monetary terms it translated to US$1 billion annually by the third quarter of 2000.35 All told, the economic relations framework between Israel and the Palestinians by mid-September 2000 was valued at some US $4 billion.36 This same period when bin Laden was incessantly hurling vicious diatribes against both Israel and the U.S. was, as a matter of fact, a time when examples of positive Palestinian-Israeli cooperation abounded. Even though at times throughout some of these years the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians moved more slowly than many might have desired, cooperative activities between Israelis and Palestinians nevertheless continued to flourish through the end of the twentieth century.37 For instance, in addition to cooperative security efforts,38 both sides were often assisting each other with road accidents, Palestinian and Israeli firefighters and rescue units were working together in extinguishing fires,39 and specialized Israeli army units were, at the request of Palestinian authorities, cooperating with Palestinian rescue teams and Palestinian Red Crescent units in rescuing Palestinians trapped under fallen buildings in the Palestinian Authority.40 Also, Palestinian and Israeli police were cooperating in criminal investigations.41 Control of agricultural disease was being jointly considered,42 and cooperative commercial relations were flourishing.43 The prevalence of commercial interaction between the Palestinians and the Israelis during this time period44 was demonstrated further by the tremendous flow of business profits. In particular, Israeli citizens typically used to spend on average some ten million New Israeli Shekels in shopping sprees on a normal Saturday in the Palestinian cities of Nablus, Jenin, and Qalqilya, which was equivalent to more than US$100 million annually on Saturdays alone.45 A total of 100,000 Israelis ordinarily used to shop on the other side of the green line each week, translating to a yearly income for Palestinians of half a billion dollars, from which 10,000 Palestinians directly were earning a living, while the Palestinian Authority itself was purchasing annually US $1.8 billion of goods from 46 Israel. Palestinian and Israeli executives and business persons also were meeting during this time to promote doing business in times of peace.47 This was a time also when Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, and others were also working together and enjoying considerable professional and social contact.48 52 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law

For instance, in the health care field alone, a joint three-year investigation conducted by the Brookdale Institute of the Joint Distribution Committee and al-Quds University of joint Israeli-Palestinian health care projects for the period 1994-98, published in May 2000, 49 found 148 examples of such cooperation. Approximately one-half of the Palestinian participants and approximately one-third of the Israeli participants reported that the joint activities positively influenced their attitudes toward coexistence.50 Moreover, the report indicated that after five years of activities, 99 percent of the Israelis and 88 percent of the Palestinians suggested a desire to continue working together.51 This positive and beneficial Palestinian-Israeli interaction was all occurring, to reiterate, during bin Laden’s busiest years of spewing forth anti-Israel and anti-U.S. diatribe and hatred at the same time he was implementing those sentiments with terrorist bombings, clearly belying his futile attempts to muddle reality and distortedly present the plight of the Palestinian people, according to him, as a major source of his animosity towards the U.S. and Israel. Moreover, lest bin Laden’s groping attempts to unnaturally attach the Palestinian issue in a distorted manner as a rider unto his own personal vendetta against Western civilization still be falling on attentive ears, it bears mention once more that up until autumn of 2000, the Israelis and the Palestinians were slogging away at their negotiations and attempting in a peaceful fashion to draw up a final settlement to their outstanding dispute. At that time Yasser Arafat, then head of the Palestinian Authority, was offered a deal during peace negotiations with the Israelis to finally end the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel, a deal, according to Ambassador Dennis Ross, in charge of Middle East peace process negotiations for the first President Bush and President Clinton, that would have given the Palestinians a state “with territory in over 97 percent of the West Bank, Gaza, and 52 Jerusalem,” with the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem as its capital, and with the unlimited right of return to it for Palestinian refugees.53 Before the onset of the recent unrelenting violence against Israel, observes Ambassador Ross, not only was then-Israel Prime Minister Ehud Barak54 prepared to give up most of the West Bank and Gaza, as well as Arab East Jerusalem, but there was wide support across the political spectrum in Israel for a solution like this, assuming of course that the Palestinians would give up violence and their claim of a right of return to Israel.55 Arafat’s response to this generous offer was, regrettably, to exchange war for negotiations, thereby denying the Palestinian people an opportunity for peace, dignity, and prosperity while instigating and stimulating them to become living bombs.56 Thus, the truth of the Israeli-Palestinian matter, despite bin Laden’s unsuccessful attempts to distort reality, is that during the years and even days immediately prior to the September 2000 outbreak of Palestinian violence, the two sides had been involved in meaningful negotiations aimed at a peaceful settlement to their dispute in parallel to ongoing worthwhile and constructive, as well as profitable, interaction between peoples on both sides.57 In actuality, points out Alan Dershowitz, “the Palestinians have been victimized more by their own leaders than by any external country B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 53

Further dispelling the myth that terrorism against Israeli targets is the consequence of Israel’s “occupation” of the West Bank and Gaza58 is the fact that terrorists in actuality had already been targeting Israel and Israelis for decades before Israel acquired control over the disputed territories in self-defense in June 1967. From 1920 through 1966, a total of 1,513 residents of Mandatory Palestine and, since 1948, of the State of Israel, were victims of hostile enemy action, most in the form of terrorist attacks.59 In fact, before the State of Israel was established in 1948, Arab terrorism was rife, particularly during the anti-Jewish riots in 1920–1921, during the year 1929 when among other terrorist atrocities a pogrom was carried out in Hebron against the Jews living there, as well as between the years 1936 and 1939.60 From May 1948 when Israel became a State, through June 1967, Arab terrorists murdered some 1,000 Israelis, most of them civilians, and wounded numerous others. In 1952 alone, for example, terrorists carried out roughly 3,000 attacks across Israel’s borders, many resulting in civilian casualties and the destruction of property.61 Another of the most talked-about alleged reasons for terrorism is poverty.62 Yet, “based on the data, the only conclusion one can draw is that while many people in the world are poor, few of the poor are terrorists, and relatively few terrorists are poor. In other words, while convictions about economic injustice can fuel terrorism, poverty itself has no such effect. And it is not economic hopelessness that fuels terror, but hope of a very specific and irrational variety, hope that terror will significantly improve the situation.”63 Thus, the facts do not fit the allegations. “Even leaving aside multimillionaire Osama bin Laden, the backgrounds of the September 11 killers indicates that they were without exception scions of privilege: all were either affluent Saudis and Egyptians, citizens of the wealthy Gulf statelets, or rich sons of Lebanon, trained in and familiar with the ways of the West -- not exactly the victims of poverty in Muslim dictatorships.”64 Historically, terrorism in fact “has been a virtual monopoly of the relatively privileged” ever since “the Russian intellectuals ‘invented’ modern terrorism in the 19th century ….”65 Always educated, terrorists have come from the middle and upper classes, and were “never poor. The South American Tupamaros and Montoneros of the 1970s were all middle class, starting as cafe Jacobins and graduating into urban terrorism, as were their followers among the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Italian Red Brigades, France's Action Directe, the Sandinista leadership in Nicaragua and, before it, Fidel Castro's Cuban revolutionaries.”66 Thus terrorism, explains Alan Dershowitz, is not “caused by frustration, disenfranchisement or poverty. That is the big lie of terrorism. That may help explain how terrorist leaders can recruit people to blow themselves up, but it doesn't explain why the terrorist leaders who are wealthy, well-educated and calculating opt for the tactic of terrorism. And the reason they opt for the tactic of terrorism is because it has a proven track record of success ….”67 While “the poor in Muslim states may be the popular base of terrorist support, … they have neither the money nor the votes … the privileged do. Ultimately, Islamic terrorism, just as its Marxist or secessionist version in the West and Latin America was, is a matter of power -- who has it and how to get it -- not of poverty.”68 Finally, anyone taking the time to examine the statistics, will be readily enlightened by the fact that recently there has been a significant reduction in terrorist incidents perpetrated 54 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law against Israel and Israelis69 in comparison to the more than 22,400 terrorist attacks70 that have been carried out against Israelis over the past five years , while there has been no discernable improvement recently, however unfortunate, in the Palestinians’ misery and poverty level, and which if anything may actually be getting worse.71 This further belies the alleged relationship between “root causes” and terrorism. Anger and hatred, though, even were they justified, are certainly no excuse for committing acts of terror.72 Neither of course are poverty, misery, humiliation, or oppression legitimate pretexts for perpetrating terrorist atrocities. No “poverty” or “misery” or “humiliation” or “oppression” exemptions exist to the moral and legal proscriptions against premeditated murdering of aged people and young children. In fact, over at least the last two decades, resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council have repeatedly condemned “as criminal all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed.”73 Not only did United Nations Security Council Resolution 1269 of October 19, 1999, for instance, explicitly condemn “all acts of terrorism, irrespective of motive, wherever and by whomever committed,”74 but it furthermore unequivocally condemned “all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, in particular those which could threaten international peace and security.”75 Obviously though, there are certainly important reasons -- independent of their alleged affect on of terrorism -- to address and indeed effectively deal with issues such as poverty, oppression, humiliation, misery, and injustice of any kind throughout the world. In fact some countries -- especially many in the Middle East -- that have the financial resources that could help alleviate these maladies, actually use their resources to promote and finance terrorism rather than to eradicate what they claim to be its main “root causes.”76 In any respect, while the genuine hope of all is that the task of eliminating poverty, oppression, humiliation, and misery throughout the world will be accomplished sooner rather than later, to adequately deal with such crucial yet gargantuan global matters will in reality most likely take years, decades, or even longer, however unfortunate. The question then still remains, even if there did exist “root causes” of terrorism, until those issues are adequately addressed and finally resolved in an effective manner, what is a State permitted to do under international law in the meantime, if it and its citizens are attacked by armed groups or individuals? The ominous threat posed by terrorism to international peace, security, and global stability77 has resulted in a mounting awareness of its danger and extent. When combined with the obvious responsibility and duty of every State to protect its citizens,78 this awareness has helped bring at least some of the free world79 to the simple realization that in order to ensure the fundamental values of democracy, freedom, liberty, and security for future generations, it is not only prudent but also necessary to declare war on terrorism.80 The war on terror, however, is unlike any other war the world has experienced.81 Even though the threat and actions of the terrorist enemy emanate from within a State, this is a war against an enemy that does not operate within clearly defined borders. In fact, this is B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 55 not necessarily a war against a given sovereign State. There is no clearly identified legitimate combatant that adheres to international customs, laws, and rules of war. Moreover, rarely does one know when, where, or how terrorists will next strike, or who or 82 what their target will be at any given time. How then, can Western democracies that do adhere to the rule of law engage in timely and effective defensive action against such an amorphous83 and dreadful menace as terrorism? What protective actions may be justified under international law? Terrorists demonstrate brazen disregard for rules of international behavior and accepted moral codes, while at the same time hiding behind these very rules and moral codes to prevent the free world from protecting itself. Hence, one of the most serious challenges facing the world today is the application of existing international rules to the fight against terror. However, existing rules did not envisage situations like an enemy using his or her body as a living bomb or a democratic state fighting against a network of terrorist organizations and cells, intent on disrupting civilian life. Clearly, this new reality requires interpretation and application of the existing rules in an innovative and dynamic fashion to effectively confront this modern phenomenon.84 Those fighting this new type of war must be given the legal tools with which to do it, so as to enable them to conduct the fight against terrorism in a manner that will allow them to carry out their mission successfully. Surely, the best and possibly only way to successfully combat such terrorism is to seek out the terrorists wherever they are and destroy their infrastructure before they wreak more devastating havoc.85 Certainly, in this modern technological age, international law cannot require a State to sit back and wait while unfathomable terror threats crystallize and the risks and dangers materialize86 portending inconceivable and unimaginable consequences.87 “[T]he war on terror will not be won on the defensive,” reasoned the President of the United States. “We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”88 Hence, it is necessary to engage in “preemptive action when necessary.”89 As The National Security Strategy of the United States of September 2002 expounds, “[t]he greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”90 The use of armed force in or against a State harboring, sheltering, supporting, aiding or abetting terrorists, in response to tragedy and devastation perpetrated in another State by terrorists employing either “conventional” means or “unconventional” methods such as suicide attacks and/or nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, raises far-reaching issues that transcend any particular circumstance. One of the significant issues raised in this context is the legality of the use of armed force by a State to counter terrorists directing their attacks against its citizens from within the territory of another State. States are obligated by Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter to refrain “from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 91 or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Thus, according to E. S. Fawcett, “[a] state will be using such force in so far as it sends these . . . bands across, or encourages or tolerates their crossing the frontier, or assists them 56 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law when they are already in the territory, of the other state.”92 States are consequently prohibited from sheltering and providing aid and support to terrorists, because such assistance is exploited by the terrorists in furthering their threats and use of force against the territorial integrity of the target State, and if a State sanctions terrorist activity emanating from it against another State and/or its citizens, and/or fails to prevent such terrorist activity, and/or tolerates such terrorist activity, and/or does not eliminate this terrorist presence from its territory, it will be in violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 748 of March 31, 1992, made this clear by explicitly linking a State's involvement with terrorism to its obligations under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter when it re-affirmed that, “in accordance with the principle in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when such acts involve a threat 93 or use of force. . . .” Already some thirty years before Resolution 748, Ian Brownlie correctly concludes that no State can claim that complicity in or toleration of the activities of armed bands directed against another State is lawful, and this illegality, he explains, may 94 be expressed in terms of a violation of UN Charter Article 2(4). The use of such indirect force, then, is clearly prohibited by this article.95 Every State is furthermore bound by customary international law concerning non- intervention96 and has the responsibility of insuring that its territory is not used as a base from which to carry out acts that are injurious and hostile to other States:97 no State may knowingly “allow … its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States,” held the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case.98 Traditionally, “each state was responsible for all activity within its borders,” explains W. Michael Reisman, “and if military action emanated from its boundaries into the territory of another state, it remained liable to that other state for the actual and constructive violations of the other’s sovereignty.”99 The concept of attributability to a State, then, applies if the State was “reluctant to impede these acts.”100 Beyond the responsibility of a State for all acts conducted within its territory which violate the rights of another State as well as for any resulting violations of the other State’s sovereignty, it moreover must actively prevent such acts and violations. “[A] State is bound to use due diligence to prevent the commission within its dominions of criminal acts against another nation or its people,”101 explains Judge John Moore in the S. S. Lotus Case. Such acts the prevention of which by the State is required under international law include, according to Hans Kelsen, “hostile expeditions organized in [its] territory … and directed against the territorial integrity of …[the] foreign state . . . .”102 Not only is a State obligated “not to allow its territory to be used for such hostile expeditions,” but, conclude Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, it “must suppress and prevent them.”103 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 57

When a State fails, whether as a result of carelessness or devise, to exercise due diligence to prevent the carrying out of injurious acts against other States, its failure is consequently considered an offense under customary international law.104 Moreover, the failure to prevent such activities from taking place may result in the State being considered as acting in complicity with the perpetrators of the activities illegal under customary international law. Such “state tolerance,” which “raises a presumption of governmental complicity … amounts to an international delinquency,” reasoned Manuel R. Garcia- Mora.105 Rules of customary international law governing the obligation of a State to ensure that terrorists do not use its territory as a base from which to direct attacks against another State are reflected in multilateral conventions and in resolutions of international organizations. Already some seventy years ago, included in various international conventions defining the phrase “aggression by a State” was the “[p]rovision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to 106 deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.” Likewise, on December 10, 1934, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution that reiterated the same basic tenants of customary international law, specifically that a State is responsible to ensure that its territory is not used for terrorist acts against other States and that a State must furthermore actively prevent its territory from being used for such terrorist acts. Article II of the resolution stipulated that “it is the duty of every State neither to encourage nor tolerate on its territory any terrorist activity with a political purpose, [and] every State must do all in its power to prevent and repress acts of this nature and must for this purpose lend its assistance to Governments which request it.”107 The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism of 1937, also reaffirmed “the principle of international law in virtue of which it is the duty of every State to refrain from any act designed to encourage terrorist activities directed against another State and to prevent the acts in which such activities take shape . . . .”108 In similar fashion, enumerated among the offenses in the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind of 1954, are “[t]he organization, or the encouragement of the organization, by the authorities of a State, of armed bands within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the territory of another State, or the toleration of the organization of such bands in its own territory, or the toleration of the use by such armed bands of its territory as a base of operations or as a point of departure for incursions into the territory of another State, as well as direct participation in or support of such incursions.”109 Specifically relating to terrorism, the Draft Code of 1954 also includes as an offense against the peace and security of mankind “[t]he undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a State of terrorist activities in another State, or the toleration by the authorities of a State of organized activities calculated to carry out terrorist acts in another State.”110 58 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law

In its Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty of December 21, 1965, the United Nations General Assembly also condemns the toleration by a State of terrorist or armed activity on its territory aimed against another State: “[N]o State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.”111 On October 24, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly, in its Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, forbade even the acquiescence of a State in organized activities in its territory directed at committing acts of terrorism in another State: “Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State.”112 Moreover, “[e]very State has a duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to . . . involve a threat or use of force.”113 A plethora of other resolutions of international organizations abounds that reflects the rules of customary international law requiring a State to ensure that its territory is not used by terrorists as a base from which to direct attacks against another State, such as United 114 Nations General Assembly Resolution 40/61 of December 9, 1985, United Nations 115 General Assembly Resolution 42/22 of November 18, 1987, United Nations Security Council Resolution 748 of March 31, 1992,116 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 of December 9, 1994, which approved the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,117 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1189 of August 13, 1998,118 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001.119 Furthermore, the United Nations General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression, adopted on December 14, 1974, lists among the acts considered aggression “[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts [of 120 aggression] listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.” Certainly, the last portion of this designation, “or its substantial involvement therein,” may comprise “involvement in the sending of armed bands by or on behalf of a State,” as Julius Stone rightly indicates, even though the delinquent State may not in point of fact be the one that is launching the bands attacking the target State.121 Consequently, in accordance with the law under the United Nations Charter, with customary international law, with international conventions, as well as with numerous resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, a State is categorically responsible for all acts carried out within its territory which are contrary to the rights of other States, and is liable for any resulting violations of the B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 59 sovereignty of another State. Furthermore, the delinquent State must actively prevent such acts and violations. Hence, the failure by a State to prevent attacks by terrorists against the target State constitutes a violation of the rights of the target State.122 Moreover, if a State does nothing to stop terrorist actions aimed at the target State, its inaction in and of itself constitutes complicity in the acts of terrorism: “[G]overnmental inactivity in preventing the organization of a military expedition amounts to complicity in the hostile attack and can logically be regarded as actual governmental participation in the conflict,” explains Garcia- Mora.123 Even “if a state has obviously used all the means at its disposal to prevent a hostile act of a person against a foreign nation but is physically unable to suppress it, it certainly has not discharged its international duty.”124 The international obligations of a State flow from its sovereign status, and its responsibilities as a State are unrelated to its ability to control the carrying out of acts which emanate from its territory and which are injurious to others beyond its borders. Accordingly, any claimed inability to control the terrorists may not relieve a State of its international obligation to curb use of its soil by terrorists to launch activities against other States.125 Examined in this fashion, a State’s failure to prevent assaults by terrorists against another State constitutes a violation of the rights of the other State.126 When a State is unwilling, or unable, to prevent terrorists from using its territory as a base from which to attack another State, what recourse exists for the victim State? A non- military solution, it is superfluous to say, is by far the preferable one. As Alan Dershowitz correctly observes, “military options are always a terrible, last resort. They are a particularly terrible last resort when terrorists deliberately hide among the civilian population.”127 It cannot be stressed enough that the use of armed force can only be part of the solution, and it can only be used as a last resort.128 For instance, if an appeal is possible by a target or victim State to a State hosting terrorists – an appeal that would be heeded and effectively acted upon in an expeditious manner to remove a danger presented by armed groups being formed on the territory of the host State for the purpose of a raid into the target State – the target or victim State is not permitted to enter the host State and use armed force to deal with the terrorists.129 In other words, if an effective and expeditious alternative to the use of force is available, under international law that alternative should be employed. But the question of course naturally arises: What if there exists no alternative, no expeditious and effective alternative to the use of force to protect the target State from acts of terrorism? What then? Is the use of armed force ever permissible under international law? When a State is unwilling, or unable, to prevent terrorists from using its territory as a base from which to attack another State, the State thereby attacked is indeed permitted to exercise force to protect itself pursuant to its inherent right of self-defense. The operative section of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed 60 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security . . . .” Attacks against one State by terrorists emanating from the territory of another State certainly constitute “an armed attack” and are deemed perpetrated not only by the terrorists and their organizations themselves, but also by the State from which they are operating. As far as the attacks perpetrated by the terrorists themselves, J. E. S. Fawcett explains that “the intrusion of armed bands may . . . constitute an armed attack for purposes of Article 51 of the Charter.”130 Nothing contained in the United Nations Charter specifies that “an armed attack” may only be perpetrated by a State, and Article 51 was drafted in a broad enough manner to permit the use of force in self-defense to counter non-state actors. 131 Thus, “[i]t 132 is accepted today that attacks of private terrorist groups may qualify as ‘armed attacks,’” concludes Carsten Stahn. In regard to the State from which the terrorist attacks originated, it too definitely may be considered to have committed “an armed attack.” “[T]he undertaking or encouragement by a state of terrorist activities in another state or the toleration by a state of organized activities calculated to result in terrorist acts in another state,” indicated Hans Kelsen, “may be interpreted as constituting an armed attack . . . .”133 Ian Brownlie as well, made clear that “it is conceivable that a coordinated and general campaign by powerful bands of irregulars, with obvious or easily proven complicity of the government of a state from which they operate, would constitute an ‘armed attack’.”134 The toleration or encouragement by a State of the organization of hostile expeditions on its territory aimed against another State is at the very least a “constructive attack” by the State in which these preparations occur, and as a consequence, “it becomes responsible for the illicit acts which it has failed to prevent,” summarized Ellery C. Stowell.135 “[F]or the attribution to a State of acts of . . . groups” such as armed bands of irregulars or rebels, according to the judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, “it is sufficient to require that the group as a whole be under the overall control of the State.”136 As the International Criminal Tribunal held: “Under international law it is by no means necessary that the controlling authorities should plan all the operations of the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or give specific instructions concerning the conduct of military operations and any alleged violations of international humanitarian law. The control required by international law may be deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in organising,, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group. Acts performed by the group or members thereof may be regarded as acts of de facto State organs regardless of any specific instruction by the controlling State concerning the commission of each of those acts.”137 Thus, the “overall control test” adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal “relieves the defending state from the (unrealistic) obligation to provide evidence about B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 61 specific instructions or directions of the host state relating to the terrorist act, triggering the right to self-defence.”138 Accordingly, “what is required for criminal responsibility to arise is some measure of control by a Party to the conflict over the perpetrators.”139 Besides, “[a]ny suggestion that there are any acts of unlawful force between states that international law forbids a state from defending against by proportionate force, by the means and to the extent reasonably necessary to protect itself, degrades the concept of international law, and diminishes the inducement for a responsible political leader to take its constraints seriously into account in conflict situations in the actual planning and conduct of that state's affairs.”140 Moreover, deduced Carsten Stahn, “there may be cases in which [an accumulation] of several acts of support to a terrorist group causes much greater harm to the defending state than the mere sending of it. To exclude these cases from the scope of application of Art. 51 would deprive states of their protection against indirect aggression.”141 Further, it should be pointed out that while Article 51 does not specifically indicate the way in which “an armed attack occurs,”142 it could not be logically contended, for example, that using airplanes loaded with fuel to crash into buildings on September 11th was anything but “an armed attack” under Article 51; at the very least, their damage capability was far greater than many military weapons purposely calculated to bring about vast loss of life and enormous property devastation. Certainly the consequences of the suicide attacks were tantamount to those of a military operation. Moreover, even where an attack takes place against citizens of the target State who were at the time located abroad, Article 51 would still be applicable.143 Likewise, the scale of the attack, whether large or small, is irrelevant to it being considered “an armed attack:”144 “[T]he plain language of Article 51 . . . in no way limits itself to especially large, direct or important armed attacks,” explains John L. Hargrove.145 Therefore, “[i]f ‘armed attack’ means illegal armed attack it means, on the other hand, any illegal armed attack, even a small border incident,” writes Josef L. Kunz.146 Certainly, then, “[s]maller terrorist attacks which form part of a consistent pattern of violent terrorist action may constitute an armed attack. . . .”147 In decisive fashion, previously mentioned United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368, adopted on September 12, 2001, specifically recognized “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter” in light of “the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania.” The Security Council in this resolution also regarded “such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security, [and stressed] that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.”148 The Security Council also determined “to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts . . . .”149 Some two weeks later, the United Nations Security Council, in Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, reaffirmed “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations” in view of “the terrorist attacks which took place in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, . . . [that] like any act of international terrorism, 62 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law constitute a threat to international peace and security . . . .” The resolution further reaffirmed “the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” as well as “the principle established . . . that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts . . . .”150 Consequently, while it is incontrovertible that the activities of terrorists against a target State and its citizens would in and of themselves constitute “an armed attack,” within even the most restrictive reading of United Nations Charter Article 51, the actions, or inactions, of States that aid and abet terrorists may also constitute “an armed attack” within the narrow meaning of the article. Thus, concludes J. E. S. Fawcett: “[W]here incursion of armed bands is a precursor to an armed attack, or itself constitutes an attack, and the authorities in the territory, from which the armed bands came, are either unable or unwilling to control and restrain them then armed intervention, having as its sole object the removal or destruction of their bases, would—it is believed—be 151 justifiable under Article 51.” Furthermore, as Albrecht Randelzhofer aptly pointed out, even “if a State gives shelter to terrorists after they have committed an act of terrorism within another State,” the “terrorist acts . . . [amounting] to an armed attack . . . are attributable to [it]. . . .”152 Hence, although a State may not have been used as a staging base for the terrorists, but rather, that State gave sanctuary to terrorists who had perpetrated an attack, “the defending state would also be entitled to take military measures against [it]. . . . Why should a terrorist actor, who simply changes jurisdiction, benefit from the ‘shield of sovereignty’ of another host state which fails to fulfil its duty to suppress terrorist activities emanating from its soil?”153 As Albrecht Randelzhofer correctly concludes, even if a State were “incapable of impeding acts of terrorism committed by making use of its territory . . . the State victim of the acts is not precluded from reacting by military means against the terrorists within the territory of the other State. Otherwise, a so-called failed State would turn out to be a safe haven for terrorists, certainly not what [Articles] 2(4) and 51 of the Charter are aiming at.”154 Under customary international law, the right of self-defense has furthermore always been “anticipatory” and could be exercised against dangers and attacks that are imminent as well as actual.155 As Ellery C. Stowell explains, “[a] state may . . . defend itself, by preventive means if . . . necessary, against attack by another state, threat of attack, or preparations or other conduct from which an intention to attack may reasonably be 156 apprehended.” Consequently, writes C. H. M. Waldock, the inherent right of self- defense may be exercised against an imminent threat of armed attack.157 The language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter itself in fact preserves “the inherent right of . . . self-defence:” “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 63 maintain international peace and security . . . .”158 To adopt an unrealistic approach to Article 51 of the Charter, an approach that does not comport with reality, would be irreconcilable with the reasonable interests of States, since circumstances “may arise prior to an actual attack and call for self-defence immediately if it is to be of any avail at all,” explains Derek W. Bowett.159 Besides, “[i]t is hardly likely that those who drafted Article 51,” elucidates D. W. Greig, “would have been prepared to disregard the lessons of recent history and to insist that a state should wait for the aggressor’s blow to fall before taking positive measures for its own protection. There is no need to read Article 51 in such a way, and it would be totally unrealistic to do so.”160 Thus, Article 51 did not restrict the traditional right of a State to respond in self-defense in a manner that would exclude the right to take action against an imminent danger that had not yet taken the form of an actual “armed attack.”161 Therefore, as Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts point out, if an appeal by the target State to the host State to remove a danger, presented by armed groups being formed on the territory of the host State for the purpose of a raid into the target State, were “fruitless or not possible, or if there is danger in delay, a case of necessity arises,” which permits the threatened State to enter the host State and eradicate the “intending raiders.”162 The principle is simple, according to Carsten Stahn. “The defending state is . . . under a duty to resort initially to diplomatic means in requesting the government in whose territory the terrorist acts have been planned or trained to take suppressive measures. If it becomes evident that the host state is unable or unwilling to act, the injured may, as an ultima ratio measure, take military action to stop the persisting threat.”163 The “necessity,” which would thus comprise a “necessity for the purpose of self- defense,” has been characterized as “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”164 Accordingly, if a State does not, or cannot control the inhabitants in the territory over which it is sovereign, or police its borders, and if the target State is faced with an imminent danger as a direct consequence of this unwillingness or incapacity, the target State is justified in engaging in its own efforts to quell the threatened hostile actions from within the abetting State165 when peaceful attempts to eliminate the danger to the target State are to no avail. In circumstances such as these, a “case of necessity” will consequently have arisen leaving the target State no choice but to exercise its legitimate right of self-defense by entering the abetting State to subdue the terrorists and destroy the terrorist bases and 166 apparatus poised against the target State. A “strong probability of armed attack,” that is, “an imminent threat of armed attack,” is therefore sufficient to trigger a State’s right to self- defense.167 Thus, in addition to the legitimate exercise of self-defense directed against an actual “armed attack” of terrorists, anticipatory action, aimed at preventing serious injury, may also be taken against the abetting State. In any case, according to Peter Rowe, “[i]t may be that . . . the only realistic options available to a state to deal with [the] ‘new breed of apocalyptic terrorist’” are approaches that “involve a state using military force to bring 168 terrorists ‘to justice.’” 64 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law

Furthermore, and even more far-reaching in specific reference to terrorism as such, according to Rainer Grote, is that “the right to intervention against terrorist groups does not only apply in situations where the threat is imminent, but also in those cases where the danger is more remote but nevertheless real. This wide interpretation of the time limits for intervention corresponds to the specific nature of terrorism, which does not manifest itself in sustained operations, but rather in intermittent acts of violence the times and places of which are difficult, if not impossible to predict. In practice, this allows states to strike at terrorist groups independent of any imminent threat in the narrow sense . . . where a terrorist group has already demonstrated by past acts its capacity to wreak havoc upon foreign nations….”169 Yet, there still remains the important issue as to how to determine whether or not a risk of considerable consequences indeed exists, a risk such as will trigger the right to exercise armed force in self-defense.170 Certainly the right of self-defense can always be abused, but this is just to state the obvious. Self-defense can even be abused by an individual claiming that a personal attack against him had occurred. All legal doctrines can be abused, but that does not make them all suspect. The potential for abuse is reduced though if the events are carefully scrutinized, evaluated, and analyzed in a reasonable and evenhanded manner.171 “It seems perfectly evident,” according to Roberto Ago, “that a State which considers itself the victim of an armed attack or, in more general terms, of conduct entitling it to react in self-defence against the author of that conduct, should not have to seek anybody’s permission beforehand to do so; to maintain the opposite would be to contradict the very 172 essence of the notion of self-defence.” Thus, as Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts point out, “[i]n practice it is for every state to judge for itself, in the first instance, whether a case of necessity in self-defence has arisen.”173 Even in the specific context of NATO, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) determined that it was necessary “to adopt a robust anti-terrorist posture:”174 “[D]efence against terrorism may include activities by NATO’s military force (…) to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks, or threat of attacks, directed from abroad, against populations, territory, infrastructure and forces of any 175 member state, including by acting against these terrorists and those who harbour them.” When a State does not perform legal obligations incumbent upon it vis-à-vis another State, it moreover cannot justifiably claim that its own rights, including sovereignty, should be respected: “The duty of every state itself to abstain, and to prevent its agents and, in certain cases, nationals, from committing any violation of another state’s independence or territorial or personal authority is correlative to the corresponding right possessed by other states,”176 expound Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts. In the words of Judge Max Huber, the consequent duty of the right of territorial sovereignty is “the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war.”177 States cannot set themselves above international law, but rather, they are subject to it, and clearly the sovereignty of a State is limited. A State that will not, or cannot, act in accordance with its obligations pursuant to international law cannot B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 65 reasonably anticipate that it will be able to retain the right of sovereign decision-making identified as independence.178 Thus, a State may not simultaneously allege that it is unable “to perform its undoubted legal obligations,” and that it has a “right to be immune from responsibility in respect of such defaults,” elucidates Yehuda Z. Blum.179 Territorial integrity is not an absolute.180 It must give way to the threatened State’s stronger right of self-defense, since it is considered an abuse of rights for a State to tolerate activities within it that are detrimental to another State.181 As Derek W. Bowett astutely pointed out, “a right of absolute inviolability is not conferred by [Article 2(4)] and the right of territorial integrity remains, under the Charter, subject to the rights of other states to exercise self-defence within the conditions prescribed by general international law and the Charter.”182 Accordingly, “the unspoken premise of the 11 September attacks,” writes Carsten Stahn, “is that terrorist groups shall not receive an ‘unwitting shield’ from the territorial integrity of a state which is unable or unwilling to put an end to terrorist activity giving rise to an armed attack.” Stahn continued and explains that ”[t]he normative corollary of this hypothesis is the emergence of a principle, which posits that the right to territorial integrity must, in some instances, yield to the exercise of another state’s right to protect itself and its citizens under the right to self-defence.”183 Thus, use of force, which ordinarily may be illegal is, under such circumstances, in accord with international law.184 “For it is the abuse of the rights of the territorial sovereign, in allowing his territory to harbour a danger to the security of a . . . state,” explains Bowett, “that justifies the . . . state in resorting to measures prima facie unlawful.”185 A State, which does not prevent the use of its territory for terrorist activities directed against and injurious to another State, cannot justifiably complain if the target State uses force in order to quell the danger that threatens it.186 Actions taken by the target State, which are aimed at curbing hostile activities of terrorist groups originating in and emanating from the abetting State, therefore may be correctly described as actions not against the territorial integrity of the abetting State, but rather as actions against terrorists operating in the abetting State.187 In addition to the conditions established regarding the “necessity for the purpose of self-defense,” the exercise of a State’s inherent right of self-defense must involve “nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.”188 The action taken in self-defense must be proportionate, both in scale and disposition, to the previous illegal act or imminent attack that required such measures.189 Action engaged in self-defense must be restricted to the aim of thwarting or avoiding the injury, and must be reasonably proportionate to that necessity in order to achieve this outcome.190 Yet, according to Roberto Ago, it would be a mistake “to think that there must be proportionality between the conduct constituting the armed attack and the opposing conduct. The action needed to halt and repulse the attack may well have to assume dimensions disproportionate to those of the attack suffered. What matters in 66 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law this respect is the result to be achieved by the “defensive” action, and not the forms, substance and strength of the action itself…. [A] State which is the victim of an attack cannot really be expected to adopt measures that in no way exceed the limits of what might just suffice to prevent the attack from succeeding and bring it to an end. If, for example, a State suffers a series of successive and different acts of armed attack from another State, the requirement of proportionality will certainly not mean that the victim State is not free to undertake a single armed action on a much larger scale in order to put an end to this escalating succession of attacks.”191 Indeed, and especially considering the circumstances of constant terrorist attacks, “it is notoriously difficult to maintain an adequate defensive system which relies upon meeting attacks incident by incident,” explains Derek W. Bowett. “Even more important, a series of small-scale defensive measures will not have the same deterrent capacity as a large-scale 192 strike and may even be more costly to the defending state.” As a consequence, if a State is constantly threatened and harassed by terrorists, it may legitimately seek out and destroy the center of organization of the attacks, even if the action taken in self-defense is of a much greater scale than each individual harassment, or is greater than the entirety of the infringements; the desired goal of the self-defense action is to avert future attacks or to 193 reduce their effectiveness and frequency. Hence, Oscar Schachter concludes, “it does not seem unreasonable, as a rule, to allow a state to retaliate beyond the immediate area of attack, when that state has sufficient reason to expect a continuation of attacks . . . from the same source.”194 Consequently, “self-defence . . . may carry the combat to the source of the aggression, whether direct or indirect,” opines Judge Stephen Schwebel in the Nicaragua case.195 Any action limited to warding off peril may lose its objective if conditions were to allow the recurrence of that danger; “[t]he argument is not without merit,” writes Robert W. Tucker, that “given the circumstances attending the exercise of self-defense by nations, it is only reasonable that the requirement of proportionality should be interpreted as permitting the removal of the danger which initially justified the resort to measures of self- defense.”196 There is, therefore, “a strong case for measures taken to remove the source of the threat . . . to the security of the state generally,” Tucker explains, “provided that these measures do not result in disproportionate death and destruction. Given the persistently avowed purposes of the [terrorists], and the activities undertaken in pursuit of those purposes, [their] destruction is a legitimate end in itself.”197 While self-defense is basically designed to thwart an illegitimate armed attack, it does allow a State to engage beyond this illegal attack in a legitimate war until victory and the aggressor’s total defeat.198 Ultimately, “the purpose of war,” explains Lassa Oppenheim, “is . . . the overpowering and utter defeat of the opponent,” and therefore, “no moral or legal duty exists for a belligerent to stop the war when his opponent is ready to concede the object for which war was made.”199 In the end, it seems fair and reasonable to conclude that states “exposed to constant violence may have legitimate reasons to respond differently to acts of terrorism than states B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 67 which are not under permanent threat.”200 After all, maintains Hans Kelsen, “severe restriction of measures taken in self-defense may prove unreasonable in that it may defeat the essential purpose for which measures of self-defense are permitted in the first place.”201 While September 11th and its aftermath have reinforced for everyone the reality of terrorism as a tragic part of daily life, a realization of the clear and present danger to the security of today’s international environment,202 the war on international terror is considered by far the most critical test confronting Western civilization. Any legal analysis regarding the use of armed force against terrorists and States that aid and abet them must take into consideration an abetting State’s official sanctioning of, or acquiescence in, the freedom of action of terrorists operating from within the State, against the target State. By not preventing terrorist attacks originating in, and emanating from, the territory of an abetting State against the target State, the abetting State violates its international legal obligation to curb the execution of such injurious acts against other sovereign States. Even if an abetting State were incapable of preventing the terrorists from using its territory to carry out attacks on the target State, or as sanctuary after the attacks, it is not relieved of this international legal obligation. The failure of an abetting State to prevent the training and organization of terrorists, or the providing of a safe haven or shelter for them on its territory, and the perpetration of terrorist attacks against the target State by terrorists using the abetting State’s territory to carry them out, raises a presumption of complicity with the terrorists. Consequently, not only do such terrorist activities constitute an “armed attack” against the target State, but the complicity of an abetting State in these actions may also be considered an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Both trigger the target State’s legitimate, inherent right to employ force in self-defense. Furthermore, in order to forestall serious injury to the target State and its citizens, the target State is fully justified in engaging in anticipatory measures of self- defense in an abetting State. Actions thus taken in self-defense by the target State may be considered the legitimate direct response to the unwillingness or inability of the abetting State to fulfill its international legal obligations to halt terrorist attacks, or the imminent threat of terrorist attacks, which originate within its borders, and are directed against the target State. Consequently, any attempt to examine supposed “root causes” of terrorism is irrelevant in a discussion on the manner in which a State is permitted under international law to defend itself against acts perpetrated by armed groups or individuals. In fact, “[b]ased on history and logic,” the “root causes” of terrorism “are not what most people assume; poverty, revolutionary nationalism and oppression. Instead, there is a brutal simplicity to terrorism: Terrorism is often seen as an effective tactic. That leads to the conclusion that de-legitimizing terrorism, crushing terrorist organizations and, in general, making certain that terrorism invariably fails are the only ways to seriously address the ‘root causes’ of terrorism. By the same token, careless assumptions about ‘root causes’ which serve as justifications for terrorism, must themselves be seen as root causes of terrorism because they make terrorism seem less outrageous — which makes terrorism seem more rational, more likely to succeed and, most significantly, more likely to be utilized again and 68 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law again.”203 Terrorism can never be rewarded, concludes Alan Dershowitz; rather, steps taken to eradicate terrorism must always be rewarded. 204

Endnotes

1 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians, 45-46 (Oct. 2002), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrlpa/ISRAELPA1002.pdf (visited Oct. 18, 2003), also available at http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:ZbN7R3TT0psJ:www.hrw.org/reports/2002/ isrlpa/ ISRAELPA1002.pdf+site:hrw.org+suicide+terrorism&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 (visited Oct. 18, 2003). 2 See, e.g., Int’l Law Commission, Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Draft), art. 2(4) and art. 2(6), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/offences.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003). 3 See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Addressing the opening session of the 53rd United Nations General Assembly, partially cited in Judy Aita, Clinton Opens UN General Assembly with Call to Combat Terrorism, United States Information Agency, Sept. 21, 1998, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/ 98092102.htm (visited Sept. 5, 2003). 4 See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address at the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/13434.htm (visited Sept. 5, 2003). 5 See, e.g., Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Opening Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Terrorism (Oct. 1, 2001), at http://www.un.org/terrorism/statements/giuliani.html (visited Sept. 5, 2003). 6 See, e.g., President William J. Clinton, Addressing the opening session of the 53rd United Nations General Assembly, partially cited in Judy Aita, Clinton Opens UN General Assembly with Call to Combat Terrorism, United States Information Agency, Sept. 21, 1998, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/ 98092102.htm (visited Sept. 5, 2003). 7 See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to United Nations General Assembly, USUN PRESS RELEASE # 162 (01) (Nov. 10, 2001), at http://www. un.int/usa/01_162.htm (visited Sept. 5, 2003); see also White House press secretary Scott McClellan, in Sarah el Deeb, Bin Laden Said to Warn of Attacks in U.S. (Oct. 18, 2003), at http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story &cid=514&e=1&u=/ ap/20031018/ap_on_re_mi_ea/bin_laden_tpe_17 (visited Oct. 19, 2003); Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Opening Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Terrorism (Oct. 1, 2001), at http://www.un.org/terrorism/statements/giuliani.html (visited Sept. 5, 2003). 8 Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Opening Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Terrorism (Oct. 1, 2001), at http://www.un.org/terrorism/statements/giuliani.html (visited Sept. 5, 2003). 9 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians, 45-46 (Oct. 2002), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2002/isrl-pa/ISRAELPA1002.pdf (visited Oct. 18, 2003), also available at http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:ZbN7R3TT0psJ:www.hrw.org/reports/2002/ isrlpa/ISRAELPA1002.pdf+site:hrw.org+suicide+terrorism&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 (visited Oct. 18, 2003). 10 Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Opening Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Terrorism (Oct. 1, 2001), at http://www.un.org/terrorism/statements/giuliani.html (visited Sept. 5, 2003). 11 Michael Radu , The Futile Search for “Root Causes” of Terrorism (May 6, 2002), http://www.hnn.us/articles/712.html. 12 See, e.g., William Christison (Former CIA Director, Office of Regional and Political Analysis), Globalization and The Root Causes of Terrorism (Apr. 10, 2002), http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/02/nation_christison0410.htm. 13 See., e.g., Fredric Smoler, The Root Causes of Terrorism, Dispelling the Myths 1, 3, www.defenddemocracy.org (visited Apr. 25, 2005). 14 See Fredric Smoler, The Root Causes of Terrorism, Dispelling the Myths 1, 3, www.defenddemocracy.org (visited Apr. 25, 2005). 15 Fredric Smoler, The Root Causes of Terrorism, Dispelling the Myths 1, 3, www.defenddemocracy.org (visited Apr. 25, 2005). B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 69

16 Fredric Smoler, The Root Causes of Terrorism, Dispelling the Myths 1, 3, www.defenddemocracy.org (visited Apr. 25, 2005). 17 Walter Pincus, Anti-U.S. Calls For Attacks are Seen as Serious, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1998, at A21 18 See Yoram Schweitzer, Osama bin Ladin: Wealth Plus Extremism Equals Terrorism (July 27, 1998), at http://www.ict.org.il/articles/bin-ladin.htm. 19 Youssef M. Ibrahim, Saudi Exile Warns More Attacks Are Planned, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1996, at A6. 20 Report by CNN’s U.S. State Department Correspondent Andrea Koppel (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 23, 2001) (recording on file with Author). This report was repeated a number of times over the course of the morning of September 23, 2001: “After all, Bin Laden’s Holy War against the U.S. began over the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia.” Id. 21 Saudi Militant is Said to Urge Forced Ouster of U.S. Troops, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1996, at 2 (citing the London-published newspaper, al-Quds al-Arabi); Saudi Dissident Reportedly Calls for War on U.S. Troops, Wash. Post, Aug. 31, 1996, at A32 (citing the London-published newspaper, al-Quds al-Arabi), available at 1996 WL 10728997. 22 Al-Qa’ida (the Base), Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK - Services [Recruiting] Office) International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, at http://www.intellnet.org/documents/200/060/269.html (visited Sept. 30, 2001); see also Press Release, Anti-Defamation League, Osama bin Laden, at http://www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l.asp (Aug. 20, 1998); Anti-Defamation League, Osama bin Laden, at http://www.adl.org/terrorism_america/bin_l.asp (visited Sept. 30, 2001). 23 Abu-Nasr, Bin Laden’s Past Words Revisited, at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/ 20010928/wl/bin_laden_s_words.html (Sept. 28, 2001). 24 Al-Qa’ida (the Base), Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK - Services [Recruiting] Office) International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, at http://www.intellnet.org/documents/200/060/269.html (visited Sept. 30, 2001). 25 See, e.g., U.S. Troops Reportedly Targeted, Wash. Post, May 11, 1997, at A26. 26 Randall Mikkelsen, U.S. Tells Arab TV War on Terror Not Against Islam, at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20011015/pl/attack_rice_dc_3.html (Oct. 15, 2001); National Security Advisor Briefs the Press, Press Briefing By National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://navigation.helper.realnames.com/framer/1/262/default.asp?realname=white+house%2Ecom&url=http%3A %2F%2Fwww%2Ewhitehouse%2Egov&frameid=1&providerid=262&uid=30116543. 27 Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Al Jezeera (Oct. 16, 2001), at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t10172001_t1016sd.html; see also Ze’ev Schiff, All of a Sudden Everything is Related to the Palestinian Problem, Ha’Aretz, Oct. 22, 2001, at 1B (in Hebrew, on file with author); Ann Leslie, The Hypocrisy of Islam, Daily Mail (London), Nov. 3, 2001, at 12-13. 28 Mitchell G. Bard, Myths & Facts Online, Current Controversies, Jewish Virtual Library (emphasis added), available at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/myths/mf24.html#58 (visited June 12, 2002) (citing Al-Raya (Qatar), Jan. 6, 2002). 29 See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Isr.-P.L.O. Team, 32 I.L.M. 1525. 30 See Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.- P.L.O., 36 I.L.M. 551. 31 See Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 122-27 (2000). 32 Amos Harel, Israel and the Authority Agreed to Increase the Number of Documented Palestinian Workers to 140 Thousand, Ha’aretz, Nov. 19, 1998, at 5A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 141-42 (2000). As of September 2000, the number of Palestinians who were coming daily to work in Israel had reached 120,000. Amos Harel, The Chairman Prefers Business Before Independence, Ha’Aretz, Sept. 13, 2000, at 2A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors:

70 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law

Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 143 (2000). 33 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Aff. & Ministry of Defense, Israeli-Palestinian Economic Relations August 1998, available at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH07sc0 (visited Aug. 27, 2000); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 85 (2000). 34 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Aff., Economic Relations Between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, Update: May 25, 1998, at 1 (1999), at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH01vn0; Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 143 (2000). 35 Amos Harel, The Chairman Prefers Business Before Independence, Ha’Aretz, Sept. 13, 2000, at 2A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 85 (2000). 36 Amos Harel, The Chairman Prefers Business Before Independence, Ha’Aretz, Sept. 13, 2000, at 2A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 87 (2000). 37 See, e.g., Lily Galili, We Are All One Epidemiological Family, Ha’Aretz, Nov. 1, 1999, at 3B (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 122 (2000). 38 See, e. g., Amos Harel et al., In the Security Services it is Assessed: Hamas is Planning a Number of Parallel Attacks, Ha’Aretz, Oct. 4, 1998, at 2A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 122 (2000); see also Amos Harel, Arafat: The Period Close at Hand is Especially Sensitive, I Will Work to Prevent Attacks, Ha’Aretz, Jan. 24, 1999, at 5A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Israel and the Palestine Authority, Memorandum of Security Understandings, 17 December 1997, 27 J. Palestine Stud. 147-48 (1998). 39 Margot Dudkevitch, Palestinian Firemen Fight Blaze at Settlement, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 14, 1998, at 4; Amos Harel, Firefighters From the Palestinian Authority Extinguished a Blaze That Threatened Elon Moreh, Ha’Aretz, May 24, 1999, at 7A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 122 (2000). 40 Amira Hass, Two Construction Workers Were Killed and 7 Were Injured in a Roof Collapse in El Bireh, Ha’Aretz, July 9, 1999, at 6A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 122 (2000). 41 See, e.g., Shimon Azulai, Israeli Palestinian Cooperation in the Investigation of Counterfeiting, Kol Ha’Ir, Sept. 17, 1999, at 25 (in Hebrew, on file with author); Anat Cygielman, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority Will Cooperate in the War Against Drug Traffickers, Ha’Aretz, Feb. 18, 1999, at 9A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Amira Hass, The Body of a Palestinian Woman Who Was Murdered by Stone Hits Was Found Near the Settlement Elezar, Ha’Aretz, Nov. 24, 1998, at 4A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 122 (2000). 42 See, e.g., Hillal Adiri, in Gershon Baskin & Zakaria al Qaq eds., Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Trade: Present Issues, Future possibilities 20 (1998); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 122-23 (2000). 43 See, e.g., Samir Hazboun, Politics and Economics, Closure and Separation, 3 Palestine-Isr. J. Pol., Econ. & Culture 86, 88 (1996); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 71

Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 123 (2000). 44 Amos Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, Ha’Aretz, Aug. 30, 1999, at 6A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 124 (2000). 45 Amos Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, Ha’Aretz, Aug. 30, 1999, at 6A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 124 (2000). 46 Amos Harel, The Chairman Prefers Business Before Independence, Ha’Aretz, Sept. 13, 2000, at 2A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 124 (2000). 47 See, e.g., Ha’Aretz, June 21, 1999, at 10A (in Hebrew, on file with author) (in which a newpaper advertisement publicized a conference to be held six days later for Israeli and Palestinian business persons and executives on the subject of “Doing Business in Peace”); Ha’Aretz, Sept. 25, 2000, at 11A (in Hebrew, on file with author) (advertising a “Conference on Legal Aspects of Doing Business in the Palestinian Authority” sponsored by the Israel Ministry of Regional Cooperation); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani- Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 124 (2000). 48 Paul Scham, Arab-Israeli Research Cooperation, 1995-1999: An Analytical Study, Middle E. Rev. Int’l Aff., Sept. 2000, at 4, available at http://www.biu.ac.il.SOC/besa/meria/journal/2000/issue3/jv4n3a1.html. Israelis also sought out local Palestinian dentists whose work would not force them to break into their personal savings accounts. Amos Harel, The Israeli-Palestinian Common Market, Ha’Aretz, Aug. 30, 1999, at 6A (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 124 (2000). 49 Id. (citing Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in the Health Field, 1994-1998, JDC-Brookdale Inst., JDC- Israel & Al Quds Univ. (2000)). 50 Lily Galili, We Are All One Epidemiological Family, Ha’Aretz, Nov. 1, 1999, at 3B (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 37 (2000). 51 Lily Galili, We Are All One Epidemiological Family, Ha’Aretz, Nov. 1, 1999, at 3B (in Hebrew, on file with author); Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 37-38 (2000). 52 Dennis B. Ross, Think Again: Yasir Arafat, Foreign Pol’y, July/Aug. 2002, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=179&page=0 (visited Mar. 6, 2005); Barry A. Feinstein, Terror Forces Israel to Act in Self-Defense, Balt. Sun, July 9, 2004, at 13A. 53 See Dennis B. Ross, Think Again: Yasir Arafat, Foreign Pol’y, July/Aug. 2002, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=179&page=0 (visited Mar. 6, 2005); Barry A. Feinstein, Terror Forces Israel to Act in Self-Defense, Balt. Sun, July 9, 2004, at 13A. In a disclosure by the former-Foreign Minister of Israel, Shlomo Ben-Ami, who was at the time in charge of Israel’s peace negotiations with the Palestinians, he personally verified that in the summer and fall of 2000, Israel, during the peace negotiations with the Palestinians, and in the framework of a final resolution to the conflict between them, had agreed to relinquish its control over virtually 100 percent of the West Bank in favor of the Palestinians. See Ari Shavit, The Day the Peace Died, Mosaf, Ha’Aretz, Sept. 14, 2001, at 20, 22, 24 (Ha’Aretz weekend magazine Supp.) (in Hebrew, on file with author). As a matter of fact, the Palestinians and Israel had years before agreed to the establishment of an elected Palestinian Authority, which pursuant to ensuing agreements with Israel had already by the autumn of 2000 expanded Palestinian control, authority, and jurisdiction over a significant amount of the territory in dispute 72 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law and more importantly, over 97 percent of the West Bank’s and Gaza’s Palestinian population. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions:Palestinian Violence and Terrorism, The International War against Terrorism (Updated - January 2002), at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0i9o0#usa. 54 In the fall of 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and his wife Nava in fact even hosted Yasser Arafat as a guest at their dining table in their home in Kochav Yair in Israel. 55 See Dennis B. Ross, Think Again: Yasir Arafat, Foreign Pol’y, July/Aug. 2002, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=179&page=0 (visited Mar. 6, 2005); Barry A. Feinstein, Terror Forces Israel to Act in Self-Defense, Balt. Sun, July 9, 2004, at 13A. 56 See Barry A. Feinstein, Terror Forces Israel to Act in Self-Defense, Balt. Sun, July 9, 2004, at 13A; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Reasons Behind the Fence: Palestinian Terror Assault, http://securityfence.mfa.gov.il/mfm/web/main/document.asp?SubjectID=45212&MissionID=45187&LanguageID =0&StatusID=0&DocumentID=-1 (visited Mar. 6, 2005) 57 Dr. Barry A. Feinstein & Dr. Mohammed S. Dajani-Daoudi, Permeable Fences Make Good Neighbors: Improving a Seemingly Intractable Border Conflict Between Israelis and Palestinians, 16 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 3 et seq. (2000). 58 See, e.g., Opinion, Terrorism is a Result of Israel’s Denying a People its Rights, July 22, 2002, http://www.acj.org/Daily%20News/July%20'02/July%2022.htm#4(visited Mar. 10, 2005). 59 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Terror Deaths in Israel: 1920–1999 (1999), http://mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0o7f0(visited Mar. 10, 2005). 60 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Aff., Which Came First - Terrorism or “Occupation” - Major Arab Terrorist Attacks Against Israelis Prior to the 1967 Six-Day War (2002), http://www.israel- mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ldc0 (visited Mar. 6, 2005). 61 See id. 62 See, e.g., William Christison (Former CIA Director, Office of Regional and Political Analysis), Globalization and The Root Causes of Terrorism (Apr. 10, 2002), http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/02/nation_christison0410.htm. 63 Fredric Smoler, The Root Causes of Terrorism, Dispelling the Myths 1, 3, www.defenddemocracy.org (visited Apr. 25, 2005). 64 Michael Radu , The Futile Search for “Root Causes” of Terrorism (May 6, 2002), http://www.hnn.us/articles/712.html. 65 Michael Radu , The Futile Search for “Root Causes” of Terrorism (May 6, 2002), http://www.hnn.us/articles/712.html. 66 Michael Radu , The Futile Search for “Root Causes” of Terrorism (May 6, 2002), http://www.hnn.us/articles/712.html. 67 Suzy Hansen, Why terrorism works, (Sept. 12, 2002), http://archive.salon.com/books/ int/2002/09/12/dershowitz/print.html. 68 Michael Radu , The Futile Search for “Root Causes” of Terrorism (May 6, 2002), http://www.hnn.us/articles/712.html. 69 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since September 2000 (2005), http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/terrorism-%20obstacle%20to%20peace/palestinian%20terror%20since% 202000/Victims%20of%20Palestinian%20Violence%20and%20Terrorism%20sinc (visited May 12, 2005). 70 See Israel Defense Forces, Total of Attacks in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Home Front Since September 2000 (2004), http://www1.idf.il/SIP_STORAGE/DOVER/files/9/21829.doc (visited Nov. 18, 2005). 71 See, e.g., Agence France-Presse (AFP), Endemic Palestinian poverty poses huge hurdle for Abbas (Jan. 11, 2005), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/274354bed4249b2085256f86006663bd (visited May 12, 2005); Greg Myre, Israeli and Palestinian Poverty Rising, Reports Say, The New York Times (Nov. 23, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/23/international/middleeast/23cnd- mideast.html?ex=1258952400&en=c70c21d51891419e&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt (visited May 12, 2005); Agence France-Presse (AFP), Most Palestinians live in poverty, on two dollars a day (Sept. 7, 2004), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/30e755578262856049256f09000eb4ea (visited May 12, 2005). B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 73

72 See, e.g., William Christison (Former CIA Director, Office of Regional and Political Analysis), Globalization and The Root Causes of Terrorism (Apr. 10, 2002), http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/zforum/02/nation_christison0410.htm. 73 E.g., G.A. Res. 40/61, 108th plen. mtg. (1985) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/ documents/ga/res/40/a40r061.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003), Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, 84th plen. mtg., at art. 1 (1994), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/ 49/a49r060.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003); Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 51/210, 88th plen. mtg., at art. 1 (1996), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ ga/res/51/a51r210.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003); S.C. Res. 1269, 4053d mtg. (1999), available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/sc/committees/1373/Sres1269(1999).htm (visited Mar.24, 2003). 74 S.C. Res. 1269, 4053d mtg. (1999) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/sc/committees/1373/Sres1269(1999).htm (visited Mar.24, 2003). 75 S.C. Res. 1269, 4053d mtg. (1999), available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/sc/committees/ 1373/Sres1269(1999).htm (visited Mar.24, 2003). 76 See, e.g., Steven Stalinsky, Saudi Royal Family's Financial Support to the Palestinians 1998-2003: More than 15 Billion Riyals ($4 Billion U.S.) Given to “Mujahideen Fighters” and ”Families of Martyrs,” (July 3, 2003), Special Report No. 17, The Middle East Media Research Institute, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sr&ID=SR1703 (visited Nov. 25, 2005); Dore Gold, Saudi Arabia’s Dubious Denials of Involvement in International Terrorism (Oct. 1, 2003), Jerusalem Viewpoints, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp504.htm (visited Nov. 25, 2005). 77 See, e.g., Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism: Motivations and Causes, Terrorism Research Center (Jan. 1995), at http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=5693&mode= thread&order=0&thold=0 (visited Aug. 31, 2003). 78 See, e.g., NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Sec. Donald Rumsfeld: Part 2, (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 4, 2002), transcript at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june02/rumsfeld_parttwo_2-4.html (visited Oct. 3, 2003). 79 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism: Motivations and Causes, Terrorism Research Center (Jan. 1995), at http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=5693&mode= thread&order=0&thold=0 ( visited Aug. 31, 2003). 80 See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to United Nations General Assembly, USUN PRESS RELEASE # 162 (01) (Nov. 10, 2001), at http://www. un.int/usa/01_162.htm (visited Sept. 5, 2003). 81 See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address of the President to the Nation (Sept. 7, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html (visited Sept. 9, 2003). 82 See, e.g., The National Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (visited Oct. 16, 2003); see also NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Sec. Donald Rumsfeld: Part 2, (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 4, 2002), transcript at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ bb/military/jan-june02/rumsfeld_parttwo_2-4.html (visited Oct. 3, 2003). 83 See, e.g., Bruce Hoffman, Dealing with Asymmetric Threats, World Economic Forum, Annual Meeting Jan. 24, 2003, at http://www.weforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/Dealing%20with% 20Asymmetric%20Threats_2003?open&country_id= (visited Oct. 13, 2003). 84See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY. (June 1, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2002/06/20020601-3.html (visited Oct. 3, 2003). 85See, e.g., id.; NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Sec. Donald Rumsfeld: Part 2, (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 4, 2002), transcript at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june02/rumsfeld_parttwo_2-4.html (visited Oct. 3, 2003); see also President George W. Bush, Address of the President to the Nation (Sept. 7, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html (visited Sept. 9, 2003). 86 See The National Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (visited Oct. 16, 2003). 87 See, e.g., President George W. Bush, The President's State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (visited Oct. 3, 2003). 74 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law

88 President George W. Bush, Address of the President to the Nation (Sept. 7, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html (visited Sept. 9, 2003); President George W. Bush, Address by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY. (June 1, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2002/06/20020601-3.html (visited Oct. 3, 2003). 89 Id.; The National Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (visited Oct. 16, 2003). 90 The National Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (visited Oct. 16, 2003). 91 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, available at www.UN.org/aboutun/charter/ (visited March, 24, 2004). 92 J. E. S. Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, A Study of Some Recent Cases, 103 Recueil des Cours 343, 358-59 (1961-II) (emphasis added). 93 S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 3063rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm (visited Sept. 29, 2003). 94 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 712, 734 (1958) (emphasis added). 95See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in Bruno Simma (ed.), I The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 112, 119-20 (2d ed. 2002).. 96 See, e.g., John C. Novogrod, Indirect Aggression, in I A Treatise on International Criminal Law: Crime and Punishment 198, 214-15 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973). 97 See, e.g., id. 98Corfu Channel Case (Gr. Brit. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Reports 3, 22 (emphasis added); see Ann Van Wynen Thomas & A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the Americas 134 (1956). 99 W. Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 Va. J. Int’l L. 1, 3 (1973) (emphasis added). For instance, as then-acting U.S. Secretary of State Kenneth Rush writes in 1974, “it is the established policy of the United States that a State is responsible for the international armed force originating from its territory, whether that force be direct and overt or indirect and covert.” Arthur W. Rovine, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 68 Am. J. Int’l L. 720, 736 (1974) (citing Letter to Eugene Rostow of the Yale Law School from Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush (May 29, 1974)) (emphasis added). 100 Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in Bruno Simma (ed.), I The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 788, 802 (2d ed. 2002). 101 S. S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Fr. v. Turk) (ser. A) No. 10, at 88 (Sept. 7, 1927) (Moore, J., dissenting), cited in II World Court Reports, A Collection of the Judgments Orders and Opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice 1927-1932, at 65, 80 (Manley O. Hudson ed., 1935) (emphasis added). “[W]hat a State claims the right exclusively to control, such as its own territory,” reasoned Charles C. Hyde, “it must possess the power and accept the obligation to endeavor so to control as to prevent occurrences therein from becoming by any process the immediate cause of such injury to a foreign State as the latter, in consequence of the propriety of its own conduct, should not be subjected to at the hands of a neighbor.” Charles C. Hyde, I International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States 723 (2d rev. ed. 1947) (emphasis added). 102 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law 205-06 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. rev. 1966). 103 I Oppenheim’s International Law 394 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996) (emphasis added). “States are under a duty to prevent and suppress such subversive activity against foreign Governments as assumes the form of armed hostile expeditions or attempts to commit common crimes against life or property.” L. Oppenheim, I International Law: A Treatise 292-93 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (emphasis added).

104See John C. Novogrod, Indirect Aggression, in I A Treatise on International Criminal Law: Crime and Punishment 198, 215 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973); Ann Van Wynen Thomas & A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the Americas 217 (1956); J. E. S. Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, A Study of Some Recent Cases, 103 Recueil des Cours 343, 356-57 (1961-II); L. Oppenheim, I International Law: A Treatise 365 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); I Oppenheim’s International Law 549-50 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996). B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 75

105 Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against Foreign States 51 (1962). Certainly in those instances in which a State actually “encourages and even promotes the organization of [armed groups and] . . . provides them with financial assistance, training, and weapons” these groups may be considered “de facto organs” of the State. “When such groups carry out the activities planned, those activities are attributed to the State and constitute internationally wrongful acts of the State . . . .” Roberto Ago, Fourth report on State responsibility, A/CN.4/264 and Add.1, II Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1972, at 71, 120 (1974) (emphasis supplied). Whenever individuals or groups do in deed in fact act on behalf of a State, their conduct is attributed to that State and is “considered as an act of the State under international law. . . .” Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-sixth session, A/9610/Rev.1, II(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1974, at 157, 277 (1975). 106See, e.g., VI International Legislation, A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite International Instruments of General Interest: 1932-1934, at 413, 418 (Manley O. Hudson, ed., 1937). Garcia-Mora, writing in 1962, also concisely articulated “[t]he general conviction . . . that support to, and toleration of, armed bands likely to make incursions into foreign territory engage the international responsibility of the state amounting to an act of aggression.” Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against Foreign States 114 (1962) (emphasis added). Quincy Wright, as well, believed that “failure of a government to prevent armed bands or insurgents from organizing within its territory to engage in hostilities across a frontier, will make it responsible for aggression, if such hostilities actually occur.” Quincy Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 Am. J. Int’l L. 514, 527 (1956) (emphasis added). 107 League of Nations Doc. C. 543. 1934.VII, art II, 15 League of Nations O.J. (No. 12, Part II) 1759, 1760 (1934) (emphasis added). 108 Robert A. Friedlander, I Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control 253 (1979); VII International Legislation, A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite International Instruments of General Interest: 1935-1937, at 862, 865 (Manley O. Hudson ed., 1941) (citing Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, art. 1(1) (1937)) (emphasis added). 109 Int’l Law Commission, Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Draft), art. 2(4) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/offences.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003). A 1996 draft version of the Code does not contain this clause. See id. 110Id. at art. 2(6) (emphasis added). This clause does not appear in the 1996 draft version of the Code. See id. 111 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U. N. GAOR 1st Comm., 20th Sess., 1408th plen. mtg., at 12 (1965) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ ga/res/20/ares20.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003). 112 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U. N. GAOR 6th Comm., 25th Sess., 1883rd plen. mtg., at 123 (1970) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ ga/res/25/ares25.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003). 113 Id. (emphasis added). 114 G.A. Res. 40/61, 108th plen. mtg. (1985) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/ documents/ga/res/40/a40r061.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003). 115. G.A. Res. 42/22, 73rd plen. mtg. (1987) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/ documents/ga/res/42/a42r022.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003). 116 S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 3063rd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1992/scres92.htm (visited Sept. 29, 2003). 117 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, 84th plen. mtg., at art. 1 (1994), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/ 49/a49r060.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003). 118 S.C. Res. 1189, 3915th mtg. (1998), available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003). 119 Id. 120 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2319th plen. mtg., at art. 3(g) (1974) (emphasis added), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/29/ares29.htm (visited Sept. 30, 2003). 121 Julius Stone, Conflict through Consensus: United Nations Approaches to Aggression 74 (1977). 76 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law

122 See Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against Foreign States 51 (1962). 123 Id. (emphasis added). After all, “when a state is under a legal duty to act or under a legal duty not to act and it breaches that duty with knowledge that the consequences of that breach of duty will interfere in the affairs of another state by altering or maintaining the condition of things without its consent, the state which breached its duty intends the consequences just as truly as it intended to do or to omit the thing done. And in intending the consequences, it has thereby imposed its will upon another state. In such a case actual intent to alter or maintain the condition of things or to compel action or inaction becomes unimportant; intervention occurs, so that interference comes close to being synonymous with intervention.” Ann Van Wynen Thomas & A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the Americas 73 (1956). 124 Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against Foreign States 30 (1962) (emphasis added). 125 Cf. Barry Levenfeld, Israel’s Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International Law, 21 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 12 (1982). 126 Cf. id. at 45-46. 127 Alan Dershowitz Speaks on His “The Case for Israel,” (Oct. 21, 2003) UCLA Ronald W. Burkle Center for international Relations, available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/bcir/article.asp?parentid=5071 (Oct. 29, 2003). In the specific context of Israel’s defence against Palestinian terrorists, it is “a point that …is often missed in this debate. The reason that Israel has killed more than 3,000 Palestinians in the past three years, most of whom, by the way, who were combatants -- the number of civilians actually killed has been greater among the Israelis than among the Palestinians -- is because the terrorists quite deliberately hide among civilians, putting Israel to the choice of either letting them go and letting them continue their terrorism or risking the death of civilians. It's a terrible choice. The Iraqi's did the same thing and it forced the United States too often to kill civilians.”Alan Dershowitz Speaks on His “The Case for Israel,” (Oct. 21, 2003) UCLA Ronald W. Burkle Center for international Relations, available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/bcir/article.asp?parentid=5071 (Oct. 29, 2003). 128 See, e.g., PBS Online NewsHour, Pres. Bush says Iraq must work with U.N., Calls War Lawt Resort (Nov. 20, 2002), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/iraq_11-20-02.html; Joel D. Cusker, Charles H. Hash, Mary E., Landry, and Dallas D. Owens, Disengaging from Consequence Management, 35 JFQ 42 available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1035.pdf#search='last%20resort%20rumsfeld%20use%20of%20force', (visited Apr. 30, 2005); remarks of French President Jacques Chirac appearing in Chirac and Schroeder on US ultimatum, BBCNEWS World Edition (March 18, 2003) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2860715.stm; Paris pact urges inspection boost, BBC News (Feb. 11, 2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2746459.stm. “[T]he military can only be part of the solution and it is always the last resort,” explains U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld. David Rising, Rumsfeld calls for unity in fight against terrorism at security conference, The Canadian Press, 2005, available at http://www.cp.org/premium/online/commercial/elxn_en/050212/ p021202A.html (visited Apr. 30, 2005). 129 See I Oppenheim’s International Law 421 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996); L. Oppenheim, I International Law: A Treatise 298 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). 130 J. E. S. Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, A Study of Some Recent Cases, 103 Recueil des Cours 343, 388 (1961-II) (emphasis added). 131 See Carsten Stahn,“Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua” - The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 24, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003). 132 Id. at 33. 133 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law 62-63 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. rev. 1966) (emphasis added). 134 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 279 (1963); Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 712, 731 (1958) (emphasis added). 135 Ellery C. Stowell, International Law: A Restatement of Principles in Conformity with Actual Practice 89- 91 (1931). B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 77

136Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgement (1999), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ¶ 120, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/index.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003) (emphasis added). “This kind of State control over a military group and the fact that the State is held responsible for acts performed by a group independently of any State instructions, or even contrary to instructions, to some extent equates the group with State organs proper.” Id. ¶ 121. “Under the rules of State responsibility, as restated in Article 10 of the Draft on State Responsibility as provisionally adopted by the International Law Commission, a State . . . incurs responsibility even for acts committed by its officials outside their remit or contrary to its behest. The rationale behind this provision is that a State must be held accountable for acts of its organs whether or not these organs complied with instructions, if any, from the higher authorities.” Id. ¶ 121. 137 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgement (1999), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ¶ 137, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/index.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003), available at http://www.un.org (emphasis supplied). “If, for example, a State knows that a private group is willing to commit acts of military force against another State and [it] places its territory at the disposal of this group to train its members and to offer them a safe haven after they have committed these acts and additionally provides them with weapons and logistical support, it is hardly to be understood why this should be a lesser participation in the acts of the group than the mere sending of it. It is not adequate to exclude generally certain types of supporting terrorism from being qualified as ‘substantial involvement’ and consequently ‘armed attack’.” Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in Bruno Simma (ed.), I The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 788, 801 (2d ed. 2002). In other words, as Judge Sir Robert Jennings observes in his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case, “to say that the provision of arms, coupled with ‘logistical or other support’ is not armed attack is going much too far.” Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 528, 543, available at http://www. icj- cij.org/icjwww/Icases/iNus/inusframe.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003) available at http://www.icj- cij.org/icjwww/Icases/iNus/inusframe.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003). Furthermore, Judge Stephen Schwebel in his dissent in the Nicaragua case rejects the “construction of the United Nations Charter which would read Article 51 as if it were worded . . .‘if, and only if, an armed attack occurs . . .’” Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 259, 347, available at http://www. icj-cij.org/icjwww/Icases/iNus/inusframe.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003). 138 Carsten Stahn,“Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua” - The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 41, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003). 139 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgement (1999), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ¶ 96, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/index.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003). 140 John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense, 81 Am. J. Int’l L. 135, 139 (1987). 141 Carsten Stahn,“Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua” - The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 49, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003) (emphasis supplied). 142 See Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. of Int’l L. 25, 42 (1987). 143 See, e.g., Carsten Stahn,“Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua” - The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 33, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003); see also Antonio Cassese, The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism, 38 Int’l & Comp. L. Q., 589, 596 (1989); Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense 197 (2d ed. 1994). “[A]n armed attack can be perpetrated against a State’s nationals abroad. The act would be tantamount to an armed attack against the State itself, if the nationals are attacked deliberately because of the specific bound of nationality . . . . If so, the attack against those nationals constitutes an armed attack . . . under Article 51.” Yoram Dinstein, Comment, at 4, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and 78 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law

International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003). 144 See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense 192 (2d ed. 1994); Yoram Dinstein, Comment, at 4, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on- terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003). “[I]n reality, there is no cause to remove small-scale armed attacks from the spectrum of armed attacks.” Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense 192 (2d ed. 1994). 145 John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self-Defense, 81 Am. J. Int’l L. 135, 139 (1987). “The Charter does not specify the means by which an armed attack must occur, nor does it set a minimum level of attack which must be surpassed. Terrorist acts carried out by armed bands with the support or encouragement of a foreign state is (sic), in a literal sense, an armed attack.” Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. of Int’l L. 25, 42 (1987). But see id. 146 Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 Am.J.Int’l L. 872, 878 (1947). 147 Carsten Stahn,“Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua”—The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 38, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003); cf. Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. of Int’l L. 25, 43 (1987). But see Antonio Cassese, The International Community’s “Legal” Response to Terrorism, 38 Int’l & Comp. L. Q., 589, 596 (1989); Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in Bruno Simma (ed.), I The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 788, 802 (2d ed. 2002); James P. Rowles, Military Responses to Terrorism: Substantive and Procedural Constraints in International Law, 81 Proc. Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 307, 314 (1987). 148 S.C. Res. 1368, 4370th mtg. (2001), available at http://www.un.org/ Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm (visited Oct. 1, 2003) (emphasis added). 149 Id. 150 S.C. Res. 1373, 4385th mtg. (2001), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/ scres/2001/sc2001.htm (visited Oct. 1, 2003) (emphasis added). 151 J. E. S. Fawcett, Intervention in International Law, A Study of Some Recent Cases, 103 Recueil des Cours 343, 363 (1961-II) (emphasis added); see also Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 Recueil des Cours 5, 173 (1957-II); Edward Miller, Self-Defence, International Law and the Six-Day War, 20 Israel L.R. 49, 57-58 (1985); Barry Feinstein, Self- Defence and Israel in International Law: A Reappraisal, 11 Israel. L.R. 516, 539-40 (1976); Barry A. Feinstein, The Legality of the Use of Armed Force by Israel in Lebanon - June 1982, 20 Israel L. Rev. 362 (1985), reprinted in Terrorism 93, 117 (Conor Gearty ed., 1996) (a title in the series The International Library of Criminology, Criminal Justice and Penology (Gerald Mars & David Nelken eds.)). 152 Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in Bruno Simma (ed.), I The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 788, 802 (2d ed. 2002) (emphasis added). 153 Carsten Stahn,“Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua” - The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 44, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003). 154 Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in Bruno Simma (ed.), I The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 788, 802 (2d ed. 2002). 155 See D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 188-89 (1958). 156 Ellery C. Stowell, International Law: A Restatement of Principles in Conformity with Actual Practice 113-114 (1931) (emphasis added). 157 See C. H. M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 Recueil des Cours 451, 500-01 (1952-II). B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 79

158 U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added), available at www.UN.org/aboutun/charter/ (visited March, 24, 2004). 159 D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 191 (1958). 160 D. W. Greig, International Law 682 (1970). 161 D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 191 (1958). 162 I Oppenheim’s International Law 421 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996); see L. Oppenheim, I International Law: A Treatise 298 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). A State is definitely allowed to employ measures of force in anticipatory self-defense if, as Rosalyn Higgins observes, it “has been subjected, over a period of time, to border raids by nationals of another state, which are openly supported by the government of that state; to threats of a future, and possibly imminent, large-scale attack, and to the harassments of alleged belligerent rights.” Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations 201(1963); see also Yehuda Blum, State Response to Acts of Terrorism, 19 Jahrbuch fur Internationales Recht 223, 234 (1976). By analogy, the international law of neutrality may be of help to analyze the obligations of a State that has failed to stop the perpetration of injurious acts emanating from its territory against other States. See Hersch Lauterpacht, Revolutionary Activities by Private Persons Against Foreign States, 22 Am. J. Int’l L. 105, 127 (1928); Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 712, 723 (1958); Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against Foreign States 50 (1962). “[I]t is well established in customary international law,” writes John N. Moore, “that a belligerent Power may take action to end serious violations of neutral territory by an opposing belligerent when the neutral Power is unable to prevent belligerent use of its territory and when the action is necessary and proportional to lawful defensive objectives.” John Norton Moore, Legal Dimensions of the Decision to Intercede in Cambodia, in III The Vietnam War and International Law: The Widening Context 58, 71 (Richard Falk ed., 1972) [hereinafter Falk, The Widening Context]; see also John C. Bender, Self-Defense and Cambodia: A Critical Appraisal, in Falk, The Widening Context, supra, at 138, 146. As Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano explain, “[w]here a non-participant is unable or unwilling to prevent one belligerent from carrying on hostile activities within neutral territory, or from utilizing such territory as a ‘base of operations,’ the opposing belligerent, seriously disadvantaged by neutral failure or weakness, becomes authorized to enter neutral territory and there to take the necessary measures to counter and stop the hostile activities.” Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion 568 (1961); see, e.g., Note, International Law and Military Operations against Insurgents in Neutral Territory, 68 Colum. L.R. 1127, 1129 (1968). 163 Carsten Stahn,“Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua” - The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 42, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003); see Roberto Ago, Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility, A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7, II(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1980, at 13, 69 (1982). 164 This criterion appears in former U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster’s August 6, 1842 communiqué to British official representative Lord Ashburton regarding the Caroline incident, as cited in John B. Moore, II A Digest of International Law 412 (1906). 165Cf. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations 220 (1977); Julius Stone, Conflict through Consensus: United Nations Approaches to Aggression 79 (1977). 166See I Oppenheim’s International Law 42 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996); L. Oppenheim, I International Law: A Treatise 298 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). 167 C. H. M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 Recueil des Cours 451, 500 (1952-II); D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 189 (1958). 168 Peter Rowe, Responses to Terror: The New ‘War’, 3 Melb. J Int’l Law 321 (2002), available at www.law.unimelb.edu.au/mjil/issues/archive/2002(2)/04Rowe.pdf (visited Oct. 17, 2003). 169 Rainer Grote, Between Crime Prevention and the Laws of War: Are the Traditional Categories of International Law adequate for Assessing the Use of Force against International Terrorism?, at 31-32, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative 80 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law

Public Law and International Law (Jan. 2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on- terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003). 170See, e.g., id. at 32. Rainer Grote believes that it is incumbent upon the State that acts to demonstrate significant verification of the terrorist threat and its immediacy. See id. 171 Cf. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense 191 (2d ed. 1994). 172 Roberto Ago, Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility, A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7, II(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1980, at 13, 70 (1982). 173 I Oppenheim’s International Law 422 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996); see L. Oppenheim, I International Law: A Treatise 299 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). 174 Bert Koenders, General Rapporteur, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO and the Use of Force, Draft General Report, (Oct. 25, 2004), http://www.atlcom.nl/verslag.Koenders.htm (visited May 7, 2005). 175 Bert Koenders, General Rapporteur, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO and the Use of Force, Draft General Report, (Oct. 25, 2004) (emphasis added), http://www.atlcom.nl/verslag.Koenders.htm (visited May 7, 2005). However, the September 2002 US National Security Strategy [The National Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (visited Oct. 16, 2003)] “foresees pre-emptive use of military force only as a means of last resort. Naturally, any act of self-defence, including the pre-emptive use of force, must comply with three criteria: necessity, proportionality and immediacy. Necessity requires that defensive force only be employed when no other reasonable options exist to frustrate an attack. This entails exhaustion of all viable diplomatic, political, economic, or other means available. The principle of proportionality entails limiting defensive action to those needed to defeat the attack. According to Professor Yoram Dinstein [Yoram Dinstein, War Agression, and Self Defense (Cambridge: 3rd ed. 2001)], imminence of the attack is not assessed against the time remaining before it is launched, but instead with regard to the viability of the defensive action at a particular point in time. In the context of a terrorist or WMD attack the last window of opportunity may well lie before the attack occurs.” Bert Koenders, General Rapporteur, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, NATO and the Use of Force, Draft General Report, (Oct. 25, 2004), http://www.atlcom.nl/verslag.Koenders.htm (visited May 7, 2005). 176 I Oppenheim’s International Law 385 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996); see L. Oppenheim, I International Law: A Treatise 288 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). 177 Judge Max Huber, Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.) (1928), II Reports of International Arbitral Awards 829, 839 (1949). 178 See Ann Van Wynen Thomas & A. J. Thomas, Jr., Non-Intervention: The Law and Its Import in the Americas 77 (1956). A State that breaches its international law obligations is likely to face intervention on the part of the State against which it has committed the offense or on the part of other States that view this unlawful behavior as an assault on the underlying principles needed for the proper functioning of international society. See id. at 78. 179 Yehuda Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard: A Reply to Professor Richard A. Falk, 64 AM. J. Int’l L. 73, 85 (1970). 180See, e.g., Carsten Stahn,“Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua”—The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 42, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003). 181 See Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against Foreign States 27 (1962); Rainer Grote, Between Crime Prevention and the Laws of War: Are the Traditional Categories of International Law adequate for Assessing the Use of Force against International Terrorism?, at 31, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (Jan. 2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on- terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003). 182 D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 34 (1958). 183 Carsten Stahn,“Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua” - The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 33, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003). B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law 81

184See Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of Private Persons Against Foreign States 27 (1962). 185 D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law 40 (1958). 186 See Clyde Eagleton, International Government 82 (3rd ed. 1957). 187 See Roy Curtis, The Law of Hostile Military Expeditions as Applied by the United States, 8 Am. J. Int’l L. 224, 236 (1914). 188 See, e.g., Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 261 (1963). 189 See Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations 201 (1963). 190 See C. H. M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 Recueil des Cours 451, 464 (1952-II). 191 Roberto Ago, Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility, A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7, II(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1980, at 13, 69-70 (1982) (emphasis added). 192 Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 9 (1972). When a particular terrorist attack is merely one in a long series, it would only be reasonable to consider all the terrorist attacks (or “needle pricks”) as one. The whole range and extent of terrorist activity perpetrated against the target State ought to be taken into account when evaluating the State’s reactions to the acts of terrorism, since the target State may be forced into circumstances of an even bigger risk by the extensive string of terrorist actions than by a single conventional attack. See Yehuda Blum, State Response to Acts of Terrorism, 19 Jahrbuch fur Internationales Recht 223, 235 (1976); see also Laurence M. Gross, Comment, The Legal Implications of Israel’s 1982 Invasion into Lebanon, 13 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 458, 486-87 (1983). 193 See D. W. Greig, International Law 678 (1970). 194 Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620, 1638 (1984). Obviously, then, to use armed force against the State from which the terrorists are emanating if, say, the host State’s forces link up with the terrorists and/or protect them or the State hosting the terrorists impedes the target State’s defensive actions, may be acceptable. See Carsten Stahn,“Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua” - The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 48, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003). 195 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 259, 371, available at http://www. icj- cij.org/icjwww/Icases/iNus/inusframe.htm (visited Oct. 16, 2003). 196 See Robert W. Tucker, A Reply To Critics: Morality And The War, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1982, at A15 (emphasis added). 197 Robert W. Tucker, The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine 130 (1960). 198 See Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 Am.J.Int’l L. 872, 876-77 (1947). 199 L. Oppenheim, II International Law: A Treatise 225 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). After all, according to A. V. Levontin, war “is unlimited in object in the sense that every war may be regarded, potentially, as undertaken with a view to the total subjugation or debellatio of the enemy.” A. V. Levontin, The Myth of International Security: A Juridical and Critical Analysis 63-64 (1957) (emphasis supplied). 200 Carsten Stahn,“Nicaragua is dead, long live Nicaragua” - The Right to Self-Defense under Art. 51 UN Charter and International Terrorism (sic), at 51, Conference “Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law,” Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (2003), available at http://edoc.mpil.de/conference-on-terrorism/presentation.cfm (visited Oct. 14, 2003). 201 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law 83 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. rev. 1966). 202 Even prior to September 11, 2001, the “clear and present danger” of international terrorism was obvious, as President William J. Clinton announced to the United Nations General Assembly in 1998: “[T]errorism . . . is a clear and present danger to tolerant and open societies and innocent people everywhere. No one . . . [is] immune.” President William J. Clinton, Addressing the opening session of the 53rd United Nations General Assembly, partially cited in Judy Aita, Clinton Opens UN General Assembly with Call to Combat Terrorism, United States 82 B.A. Feinstein / Combating Terrorism Through International Law

Information Agency, Sept. 21, 1998, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/ 98092102.htm (visited Sept. 5, 2003). 203 Fredric Smoler, The Root Causes of Terrorism, Dispelling the Myths 1, www.defenddemocracy.org (visited Apr. 25, 2005). 204 See Alan Dershowitz Speaks on His “The Case for Israel,” (Oct. 21, 2003) UCLA Ronald W. Burkle Center for international Relations, available at http://www.isop.ucla.edu/bcir/article.asp?parentid=5071 (Oct. 29,

2003). As Tom Friedman aptly and perceptively observes, “‘[i]f you reward Palestinian terrorism over there, it's coming to a theater near you.’” Id. Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State 83 S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Violence and Terrorism: The Sense and its Names

Mokhtar BENABDALLAOUI Department of Philosophy at Hassan II University, Casablanca

Abstract. Islam and terrorism / Violence and terrorism / Violence and the post- national State

Keywords. Islam, interpretation of Koran, violence, terrorism, globalization, identity crisis

Islam and Terrorism

Many media in the West try to establish a direct link between the propagation of Islam and the rise of terrorist acts throughout the World, without making a distinction between Islam as a religion and the various interpretations given to its texts by people who do not necessarily represent it. Generally, these media responses are based on reactions that emanate from cultural, economic and political sources, and limit themselves to interpreting them in a hypothetical religious context. Western researchers raise the bar even higher; they point to a violent essence of Islam and go to the extreme of claiming that the Koran openly encourages acts of terrorism, taking as a foundation for their argument the use of the term “Irhab,” which appears in several verses of this book. This hasty and simplistic deduction is the consequence of a wrong translation of the Arabic word “Irhab” with the notion of terrorism in its Western connotation. A short etymological analysis of the word shows that the Koranic sense is completely different. The root of the word “Rahaba” means in Arabic: “to have extreme fear.” It occurs twelve times in the Koran, with diversified derivatives, and we can extract four semiological contexts that generally express the word. None of them corresponds to the contemporary sense of terrorism: x First meaning: The extreme fear of God, which can reach extravagant proportions in the life of a believer, and which incites him to do acts of divine kindness. This fear generates pious behavior in a believer. In the Koranic context, anger is in opposition to piety; it is for that reason that only after having gotten rid of his anger was Moses able to receive the texts addressed by God to believers. From the root “Rahaba” we derive the term “Râhib,” which means a monk. A “Rahib” is a person motivated by piety, worship of God, to be detached from the material world, and to devote himself to God alone. x Second meaning: Total psychological distress, facing a demonstration of swiftness of supernatural proportions like that which magicians possessed and 84 M. Benabdallaoui / Violence and Terrorism: The Sense and Its Names

performed before Moses, Pharaoh and those who were present at that time period. x Third meaning: Show of force with a dissuasive aim. x Fourth meaning: Divine Requirement, exhorting Moslems to fear God, in the sense of respect and worship, and of an incentive to act according to its injunctions. This analysis enables us to refute any relationship between the contemporary concept of terrorism and that of “Irhab” as used in the Koran. Even if the choice of this term can be tolerated because of constraints of translation, since the meaning of the words is dynamic and changes with time, it would be completely erroneous to derive this meaning from the term’s direction and to generalize it in a retroactive way.

Violence and Terrorism

Terrorism is one of the qualifications of violence; it can take very different forms, which any man, or entity, can resort to in order to solve his problems in the way that best serves his interests. The intensity and the use of violence change according to the situation, time or political and social structures concerned. The terms which describe each violent act are deliberately chosen by the actors, with justifiable goals: Djihad, crusades, return to the promised land, defense, resistance, revolution, ethnic and cleansing religious, release, pacification … , etc., to respond to various situations. Since Antiquity, hegemony and the quest for power have been instigators of violence; the justifications were: the illusion of ethnic superiority in Antiquity, the detection of a supreme truth during the Middle Ages, and the worship of the nation state in modern times; violence has never been a goal in itself, but rather a means; a definitive target. In each context, it changed its name and its legal or moral status. Initially, with the Romans, war took the form of a civilizing mission directed at the barbarians. In the Middle Ages, war was dissimulated behind faith, before raising the Standard of legal and moral status. The contents of speech that legitimize violence are variable; what is regarded as legitimate today will not be so tomorrow; this legitimacy is also relative, it is often a direct consequence of the present balance of forces. With the emergence of the nation state, the space and the means, the status and the direction of violence changed. The State has become the abstract ogre and has remained omnipresent, controlling all individuals and all goods. Thanks to the new ideas of the Enlightenment, individuals have stopped being the monarch’s subjects. They are supposed to be free and independent, but the status of the monarch was replaced by that of the State, which hides awkwardly in major complicities with the interests of peoples, groups or communities. The constraint only changed its name! During the first years of the Age of Enlightenment and at the time when political doctrines spoke in praise of the freedom of Man and raised Man to the level of a divinity, this freedom became corrosive with the nation State. In the majority of cases, avant-garde intellectuals were the ones who promoted the capacity, in the name of freedom, to spread terror and constraint. Isn’t it true that it was Robespierre who in 1794 ordered the Convention to institute the worship of the State as a supreme being. Wasn’t it he who made terror a condition of morals! In fact, worship of the State and violence are only two sides of the same coin. With the advent of modern times, the use M. Benabdallaoui / Violence and Terrorism: The Sense and Its Names 85 of violence became an exclusive monopoly of the State, which enjoys almost total impunity. Therefore, public forms of violence made their appearance: x Wars between nations seeking to defend or widen their interests (this form of war replaced the religious one). x Civil wars between social communities or categories seeking to seize power to defend their own interests, as we saw after the French and Russian revolutions, and after America gained its independence from England. x The spontaneous insurrections, the occasional riots which express a strong anger with regard to the State; they are sometimes unconscious reactions, individuals or communities vis-à-vis the pressure exerted by the State; the events of May 1968 are the perfect model. These forms of violence developed in a way adapted to the model of the modern State, or have been a direct consequence of its structures. The nation state has geographically delimited borders, a population defined according to legal and geographical standards, and the action of this new State is centered on the sacrosanct principle of sovereignty. The declaration of a state of siege, emergency or of war follows a completely new process. In this new context, acts of violence are better rationalized and better regulated, the right of war is codified; the rights of prisoners, casualties, civilians and people under occupation administrations are recognized.

Violence and the Post-National State

Two great changes transformed the World towards the end of the last century: the rapid and near complete disintegration of the East bloc and the unleashing of the process of globalization. These two elements had a determining effect on the concept of violence and the legitimacy of its use. The collapse and the dislocation of the face of the East involved not only a total imbalance of forces, but also all the depleted morals on which Third-World thinking was based. Movements of liberation were seen as based on degraded idols being glorified, on the level of bands of mercenaries, or worse, terrorist networks to track down. The insulation of these organizations, the lack of external support and the drying up of available resources have strengthened the ties between them. Globalization has changed the face of the World; the nation state is being profoundly and irrevocably transformed: trade, law, communication and culture are more and more removed from their local bases; in most countries, modernity is moving at a faster pace than mentality. This has led to a crisis of identity. Globalization has weakened the role of the nation state, but this has not been completely abolished. Large companies are not simply actors in the State, but real partners, with equal roles. These companies are the source of the wealth of the State; on the other hand, the State intervenes to open up new markets to them, to guarantee a better economic environment and conditions that can enable them to be more competitive. This situation transposes the existing ambivalence between the remainders of a “revised” nationalism and the possibility of delocalization offered by globalization in the contrary case! In this new globalized scheme, the form of violence which we call “terrorism” is no longer limited to a form with a place or with an aspect; it can take the form of a 86 M. Benabdallaoui / Violence and Terrorism: The Sense and Its Names hijacking, or a virus sprayed into a subway station or of computer viruses introduced into a data-processing network. It can also be the work of a State, a group or an individual. Because of the interference of the State with other actors, who are quite as important, and which takes part in strategic decision-making, it has also become more difficult to distinguish between military objectives and non-military ones. The sole objective is to strike hardest where it is least expected. Globalization is the process that made terrorism possible in the sense that the lowering of the barriers to the transactions of men, goods and capital allowed the emergence of supranational societies. The development of data processing and satellite communications allowed the transmission of information almost in real time. Space, in the physical sense, has lost its continuity, and interests have become so interwoven that a strike in Nairobi could have anticipated results in London or Washington. If globalization is the situation in which terrorism was born and developed, other factors, bound directly or indirectly to globalization, have a determining impact on the development of this phenomenon: x The astronomical disparities between people in the Northern Hemisphere and those in the Southern; never before have the gaps been so wide. The gigantic differences relate not only to the level, or the quality of life, or to the level of illiteracy, but also to the capacity to harm in the case of conflict. But let us not forget that violence is a political tool that can be used to redress, alter or revise the imbalance in progress. If we take the last century as an example, the prevalent situation allowed belligerents, in the event of disputes, to have a minimum of mutual capacity to harm. Vietnam was a traditional war, as conducted by America, answered by a different form of war adapted, moderated, and limited in space: the guerrilla war. The Afghans applied the same technique and achieved their goals; by no means did they need to seek more atrocious and expensive means. There are astronomical disproportions in the capacities for war that we have recently seen in the Afghan war, in Iraq, the zero-option victim. The surgical war, spoken of as clean, has not left any choice to the weaker party; it can establish a minimum of balance only by the implementation of new techniques. x The incapacity of the United Nations to play a neutral and effective role and to enforce its resolutions has spread a feeling of frustration: When conflicts, as in Palestine, last for more than half a century, when generations are born and die under occupation, and when refugees who live in precarious situations lose all hope, it is very difficult to contain the spirit of revenge. x Large contrasts in the Middle East. This is one of the richest areas in the World in terms of natural resources, but most of its population is among the poorest on the planet. The civilization of these nations is ancient. Notwithstanding, it is permeated by modernity; the political regimes in place are among the most criticized in the world because of their antiquated and authoritarian governance, but remain on constant terms with the West. Terrorism is not only the consequence of globalization, or of objective factors related to this process; it reflects, especially in its Islamist version, the landscape of the wreckage of the Cold War. It is manifestly known today that since 1976 the secret services of Arab countries joined their coordination efforts with Western services in the recruitment and orientation of Islamist activists, with the goal to counter and to weaken M. Benabdallaoui / Violence and Terrorism: The Sense and Its Names 87

Communism. The responsibility assumed by the assumption of these Islamist organizations by these services enabled them: x To gain very advanced military training and modern and sophisticated weapons. x To have a solid background to organize, involve, and project their operations. x To have access to the local and international media, and to present themselves as a movement of resistance acting with the aim to free their country from Russian influence/occupation, that allows them to gain the sympathy and the solidarity of the Moslem World. x To allow them to cast a broad potential net of recruitment everywhere in the World; almost all the terrorists who took part in terrorist acts are veterans of Afghanistan. Terrorism is not a sequence of globalization in its historical sense. Nor is it, either, the product of progress or advanced technology, but a consequence of the unbalanced widening of the world sphere. The world is changing more quickly than the judicial institutions needed to articulate it and the principles and the laws intended to control it. Terrorism cannot be treated in isolation or in a partial manner; all its forms are reprehensible. State terrorism is as reprehensible as that of individuals and organized groups; it is even more serious, because the State is supposed to be under the influence of the law. It is true that security measures can reduce terrorist acts in number and intensity. However, the anticipated results can be effective only on a short-lived basis. Each time the terrorists have proved that they lacked neither imagination nor audacity. Technological progress is a weapon with a double edge. The West is powerful thanks to its technology, but it remains vulnerable in facing these threats. In this sense, the first duty of a liberal State is to not transform itself into a terrorist State. Terrorism is a world-wide phenomenon; it must be treated as such; its defeat should not be sought by pointing a finger at a religion or a culture, nor by invoking cultural Darwinism. The best response is a common attachment to a just and more interdependent World based on moderate, autonomous authorities that have the appropriate means to enforce new values. 88 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws: A Tightrope Walk between Protecting Security and Losing Liberty*

Berthold MEYER Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and Center for Conflict Research, Philipps University Marburg, Germany

Abstract. This contribution examines the legislative responses to terrorism in Germany after 9/11 in regard to the question of whether and to what extent averting dangers to state security can be counterproductive when the price is the imposition of major restrictions on the civil rights and liberties of those whose freedom ought to be protected by the government. Tensions between striving for freedom and trying to increase security arise in principle wherever democratic states ruled by law try to guarantee both to their citizens. Anti-terror laws only serve their purpose if they improve the state’s ability to defend itself against terrorist attacks without excessively restricting the civil rights of citizens, because the value that should be protected is the continuity of the liberal lifestyle of the state’s sovereign, the people. It may not be possible to foresee all of the consequences of the tightrope walk between increasing security and reducing liberty that may result from any proposed legislation. But to prevent a quasi-state of emergency from becoming a normal state of affairs, and to prevent civil rights from being permanently restricted, it would be wise to provisionally limit the duration of proposed new security laws to two years and to require that any prolongation beyond that same period should depend upon an evaluation of its usefulness.

Keywords. Civil rights, security, risk assessment, US patriot act

Human Striving for Security and the Problems of Risk Assessment

Democracies find it hard to protect both security and liberty when fighting terrorism by tightening national laws. This contribution will show this in a case study on Germany. But first, it is necessary to make some remarks on the human striving for security as a principle. Striving for security is a universal human tendency [1]. In the sense of seeking safety measures against hazardous natural environments, as well as against unfriendly neighbors, security efforts have given important stimulation to the whole “process of civilization” [2]. But only during the 20th century has “security” become a symbol of a societal value, especially in the wealthy states of the North, which are mostly democracies.

* This contribution is an updated version of Berthold Meyer, “Fighting Terrorism – A Narrow Path Between Saving Security and Losing Liberty,” in: Alessandro Gobbicchi (ed.), Globalization, Armed Conflicts and Security, CeMiSS, Roma 2004, pp. 227-238. B. Meyer / Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws 89

In this connection, there is a special aspect of the German societal and political situation which may derive from the German language, in which the word “Sicherheit” means not merely security, but also “safety, reliability, certainty, trustworthiness and confidence.” [1] (p.149). Each of these components of its meaning is connected to the others. The loss of any one of these elements of meaning has the consequence that the remaining sense of “Sicherheit” will be perceived as spurious and risky. It is, therefore, obvious that transient phenomena of insecurity are rooted in diverse causes. The simultaneity of a “seemingly evident unambiguity” and of “vagueness of the informative content” gives the term “security” an enormous potential for “emotional appeals.” [1] (p. 32). The term has thereby become the “point of crystallization for extremely different associations.” [3] (pp. 13f). The perception of a relatively secure situation deteriorating, or mere uncertainty about this, produces fear. Against these feelings, promising security has the effect of a drug, but this effect wears off when new uncertainties come into view. In the course of our constantly changing everyday lives, as well as due to the numerous catastrophes constantly being reported in the media, we are exposed to a steady stream of new uncertainties. This being the case, anyone who promises increased security can count on an expanding audience. Promising greater security is a good way for politicians to win votes. Frei [3] has drawn attention to the difference between subjective and objective uncertainty. He defined four different levels of security and insecurity: Subjective uncertainty is caused by the fact that the future behavior of others can only be predicted, but not precisely calculated. Objective uncertainty results from current, and much more from future possibilities of action by other subjects. Dividing both dimensions of uncertainty into high and low levels, Frei obtains the four types “real security,” “false security,” “insecurity” and “obsession.” [3] (pp. 20ff)

Figure 1. Four Types of Perception of Security

subjective uncertainty high low objective uncertainty high insecurity false security low obsession real security

Real security is present in the case in which the chance of a negative event is both objectively and subjectively low, and the event seems very improbable. In contrast, insecurity prevails in the case of a very uncertain subjective chance of realistic expectation and an objectively very ambiguous situation. In our context of fighting terrorism, the two asymmetric types of security perception are the most interesting: Someone who only believes he is secure, but is actually experiencing “false security” is either misjudging an objective danger or has chosen the wrong measures for self-protection. In terms of insurance, such a person is under-insured. Someone who, on the contrary, is obsessed by fear reacts excessively either to minor or to improbable risks. He tends to invest in over-insurance, i.e., his efforts to increase his security cost more than his potential losses if he were uninsured. But individual persons, as well as whole societies and states, can get into trouble with the question of what and how many security measures are sufficient to meet the risks they actually face. Correct risk assessments claim to predict if, when, and with 90 B. Meyer / Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws what consequences a negative event might occur in the future. To reach such an assessment it is necessary to examine past information on comparable events and their prevailing conditions, bearing in mind whether it is possible to draw conclusions for the future and what measures are best for the assumed danger. The probability of winning or losing a coin toss is fifty-fifty. But societal, technological or international risk assessments depend on a vast number of risk factors with different degrees of potential damage. This can be illustrated with an example from everyday life: When crowds assemble, crimes can be committed, and accidents can happen. Some risks, such as those involving pickpockets or hooligans, are realized relatively often; but it is also possible that less common risks will be realized, e.g., a panic might break out after a fire alarm. Therefore, at large sport events there are always large numbers of policemen, firemen and ambulance attendants on duty who are prepared to go into action if such an incident occurs. Still there was from the start some possibility that during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta a terrorist bomb would be detonated and cause death and injury to visitors, or that members of Islamist terrorist groups would plant bombs on three trains in Madrid on March 11th, 2004 or that on July, 7th, 2005 bombs would be detonated on three London subway trains and a bus, in both cases with large numbers of victims. To reduce such risks as far as possible, some additional thousands of policemen would be needed for strictly controlling all entrances to stadia, amusement parks, discos or subway-stations, or it would be necessary to reduce the number of mass events, as well as of subway-stations, which would impose restrictions on the freedom of Western lifestyles and public mobility. I will mention still another example: In the 1990s the U.S. began a very ambitious anti-missile program with a budget of billions of dollars to secure the country against air-raids by “rogue-states.” It was hardly possible to judge how effective this system would be against an actual threat, because only a few tests were made before 2001. But then “9/11” occurred, whereby 19 terrorists captured four civilian passenger aircraft taking off from U.S. airports, overwhelmed the crews with carpet knives and steered two of the planes into the Twin Towers of the New York World Trade Center and a third into the Pentagon in Washington. They might have caused another disaster with the fourth, which crashed (perhaps due to passenger resistance) before reaching a target. The terror attack proved the need to reflect on the vulnerability of U.S. territory, but it also showed that experts had focused their attention on attacks from far abroad while ignoring potential dangers closer at hand. Only after terrorists had employed methods they could just as easily have used years or decades earlier did politicians and experts begin to reflect on how to prevent terror attacks made using the simple, but very effective tactics of 9/11 – for instance by reinforcing cockpit doors to prevent hijackers from gaining access to them.

Terrorism: Attacks on People’s Security and Liberty Needs

The U.S. government was not alone in reacting to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In the following I will examine the legislative reactions of the German national government and the Bundestag (federal parliament) to terrorism, asking in particular whether and to what extent efforts to ward off dangers to state security can be counterproductive when B. Meyer / Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws 91 the price is a reduction of the civil rights and liberties of those whose freedom the government is expected to protect. Tensions between striving for freedom and for security arise in principle wherever democratic states under the rule of law try to guarantee both values to their citizens. However, there are important differences between the political cultures of the states: In the U.S., the tradition of freedom has deep roots and is associated with the firm conviction that individuals themselves are responsible for their personal security. That is the reason why Amendment II to the U.S. Constitution is often interpreted as protecting the rights of private persons to possess and bear firearms. This current of American political culture does not take into consideration that the history of European states and constitutions has shown the security-promoting effects of a state monopoly on the use of force. Elias describes the development of this monopoly as a path from continuous insecurity for the individual caused by violence during earlier phases of civilization “to a characteristic form of security.” [2] (p. 325). But because the monopoly on the use of force is not acceptable without control by the rule of law, it is necessary for the constitutional state to combine the two principles [4]. Therefore, the constitutional state has to solve the problem of how to balance liberty and security, as every additional security measure necessarily narrows individual free space, and, conversely, freedom itself entails risks and creates insecurities. Terrorist attacks against democratic states upset the state monopoly of power. Thereby they are meant to seriously disrupt the precarious balance of security and freedom: All terrorist actions are intended to achieve great publicity effects. They are not only meant to spread fear and anxiety, but also to gain the sympathy of a particular segment of the public [5]. With this intention, revolutionary leftist terrorist groups like the “Rote Armee Fraktion” (Red Army Fraction) in West Germany or the “Brigate Rosso” in Italy in the 1970s used violence against representatives of the states in which they lived. They argued that these persons were responsible for economic exploitation and political repression, but they acted selectively and tried to avoid harming innocent bystanders. They wanted to undermine and eventually overthrow the political and social order which until then had been secured by the state, including – in the view of the majority of the people – reliability and therefore security, as well as the guarantee of their civil rights. The terrorists expected the state to try to fulfill its responsibility for maintaining public order by taking drastic measures after an attack, so that the political class would “unmask” the state as illiberal and repressive, resulting in people losing confidence in its ability to guarantee their civil rights. In the next phase, further spectacular actions would demonstrate to the public that despite the growing restrictions on their liberties and civil rights, no increase in security was being gained. In this way, terrorists hoped to alienate citizens from the state, to gain sympathizers among the citizenry and to find potential accomplices for their revolutionary aims. As terrorist attacks are mostly characterized by an element of surprise that intensifies the anxiety and the fear of follow-up actions, they directly influence the security needs of the public. Important for this is not so much the actual dimensions of the attack itself, but rather the sudden disruption of a situation previously perceived as calm and safe and the uncertainty of the risk of further attacks in the near future. Therefore, such a situation of “political insecurity” seems more dangerous than others [1] (p. 19). Whatever purpose terrorists intend with their acts, they force the directly or indirectly concerned government to react quickly and actively. Were a government to 92 B. Meyer / Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws take a wait-and-see approach, it would risk that its own people, foreign states and, last but not least, the terrorists themselves would interpret this as weakness. Therefore, a government firstly has to try to prevent further attacks. Consequently, the immediate reactions of states are to increase controls for gaining more information and early warning to prevent the preparation of new terrorist actions. Such security measures are aimed at enabling people to return as soon as possible to a normal everyday life free of fear. But because absolute security cannot be attained, politicians worry about leaving gaps in the defenses, because such gaps could have the side-effect of forcing them to take responsibility for the harm inflicted by the next attack. Therefore, politicians tend to maximize their security preparations at the price of more restrictions on citizens’ liberties and civil rights than are necessary for effective prevention.

German Reactions to 9/11

The first reactions to the attacks on the U.S. by Germany and other countries were to increase air traffic safety by increasing controls on passengers and baggage at airports and introducing measures to protect airplanes against hijacking. This was understandable, because airlines had to regain the confidence of their now extremely insecure customers. Meanwhile, several independent tests of airport security measures showed that it was nevertheless possible to smuggle knives and other weapons into the cabins of airplanes in handbags or prepared shoe soles. Additionally, the ministers in charge reacted very quickly by putting together legislative provisions – so-called security packets – of laws against terrorism and trying to implement them by administrative regulation, if possible, or by parliamentary legislation, if necessary. On that occasion, the starting positions of the countries concerned were quite different, as a sidelong glance at the U.S. shows. Because of its deep-rooted tradition of personal freedom, there is no obligation in the U.S. to register one’s residence with the police or to carry a personal identity card. In reaction to 9/11, such a card is being tested for the first time for a couple of years by the army and concerned parts of the administration, and may subsequently become obligatory for all U.S. citizens. Even this was criticized by civil-rights campaigners in 2001, as they see “big brother” lurking behind such proposals. The particular facts recorded on a magnetic strip of the identity card can be stored in a central data bank, making possible continuous surveillance of the bearer’s permanent place of residence and temporary lodgings. In Germany, in contrast, for generations there has been an obligation to register one’s residence and to carry identity papers (identity cards as well as passports), which have been more or less safe against counterfeiting for more than a decade. The Bundestag already started restricting constitutional rights in connection with the emergency constitution in the 1960s. In the 1970s, the relevant laws were amended to help fight terrorism and extremism. Even more recently, some civil rights were restricted to better combat organized crime. The climate was ripe for the legitimation of infringements on people’s right to privacy by undermining the Basic Law of the inviolability of private dwellings to eavesdropping by the police and secret services (“Großer Lauschangriff”),1 and three months before September 11th the powers of the

1 This law was overturned by the German Constitutional Court in March 2004. Its decision called intrusion into people’s private sphere an infringement of Article 1 of the German Basic Law (constitution), which B. Meyer / Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws 93

Federal Intelligence Agency to monitor private telephone calls were also extended. Therefore, it could have been expected that Germany – unlike the U.S. – would have no deficiencies in its legal provisions for internal security. But far from it! Together, the Federal Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily (SPD), and the responsible ministries of most of the federal states reactivated the method of locating suspects by means of computer data analysis involving many people (“Rasterfahndung”), which was added to the code of criminal procedure in the period of RAF terrorism. At the same time, the federal states prepared to enlarge their police services. Exactly one month after 9/11, the Bundestag debated the so-called “Sicherheitspaket 1” (first security packet). On the one hand, this included reducing the privileges of religious groups, which had been protected by the law of associations, with the intention to withdraw legal protection from organizations conducting extremist activities under the cover of religion. On the other hand, it contained an addition to the criminal code (§129 b) to make it possible to punish people for mere membership in a foreign criminal organization, and at least an extension of the possibility to gather information from telecommunication firms on telecommunication links. All these measures were supported by a very broad majority of the Bundestag, with the exception of a few members of the Green Party and the PDS (Left Socialists). Immediately after this the Minister of the Interior presented a “Sicherheitspaket II” (second security packet) to change many other laws and regulations2 with the aims of x giving more competencies to all offices responsible for internal security, x improving the exchange of data between the offices and services, x preventing the entry of terrorists into Germany, x improving the measures of personal identification on visa documents, x improving the possibilities of control at the borders, and x improving the ability to identify extremists residing in Germany. Some other laws like those on passports and identity cards were to be changed, especially to x improve the security examination of persons in professions and positions with relevance for domestic or external security, x achieve a legal basis for the placement of biometric data on passports and identity cards, x stop the activities of extremist organizations of foreigners in Germany, and x improve the possibility of using social data for “Rasterfahndung.” Both lists show the priority attached by the Federal Ministry of the Interior to providing more competencies to the security offices and services and to improving their co-operation, especially to improving their ability to exchange information. The main focus was placed on the control of foreigners who either wanted to travel to or immigrate to Germany or who were already residing there. But many measures in “Sicherheitspaket II” concern all persons living in Germany. In this connection it was planned to put fingerprints, three pieces of biometric data and a holograph on a chip on the passports and identity cards of all citizens in order to protect these documents against falsification, counterfeiting or misuse by persons who protects human dignity; but the Red-Green government and the CDU/CSU opposition agreed on June 15, 2005, to reintroduce this law in a version which seems to conform to the Basic Law. 2 Namely the Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz, the MAD-Gesetz, the BND-Gesetz, the Bundesgrenzschutzgesetz, the Bundeskriminalamtsgesetz, the Ausländergesetz and some laws affecting foreign citizens residing in Germany. 94 B. Meyer / Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws resemble the owner. The Bundestag agreed on December 14th, 2001 to this plan only in principle and postponed the details of procedure until a later law. Meanwhile, under pressure from the U.S. government regulation that starting in autumn 2006 European tourists will only be allowed to enter the U.S. with passports containing chips with biometric data, Interior Minister Schily presented such a passport, which will be introduced gradually and will replace the current ones during the next few years. The security legislation also allows the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Interior Secret Service) and the Federal Intelligence Agency to gather information from banks and other financial institutions on accounts, account-holders, and other authorized persons, as well as on transfers of money and financial investments. These services are also empowered to collect data on the use of the telecommunication links of telecommunication services. In addition, the Interior Secret Service is allowed to obtain information from airlines and the mails. Finally, it was planned to prevent money laundering and to investigate the financial transactions of potential terrorists by collecting and storing all bank account data in Germany in a central register (“Kontoevidenzzentrale”). This would have been a deep infringement on the banks’ duty to maintain confidentiality, even if the transfer of money itself would not have been registered in detail. Therefore, the Bundestag rejected this part of the legislation in December 2001. But half a year later, a similar regulation was accepted by parliament, as it was hidden in a complicated law on financial markets.3 The oppositional conservative Christian parties, the CDU and CSU, were concerned about the public acknowledgement of their competence in questions of domestic security. Concurrently to the governmental security packet, they filed an application to amend the constitution to legalize domestic operations by the German armed forces (Bundeswehr) for the protection of property. In 2001, they could not mobilize sufficient support for this proposal in the Bundestag, but persisted in this aim. And indeed, in May 2003 the new Federal Minister of Defense, Peter Struck (SPD), expressed sympathy when he presented his first Defense Policy Guidelines with some remarks on new ways of cooperation between the Bundeswehr and police in cases of terrorist threats. Moreover, on June 18th, 2004, a majority of the Bundestag passed a new “air security law” (Luftsicherheitsgesetz) which authorized the Bundeswehr to shoot down any civilian airplane hijacked by terrorists and steered in the direction of a skyscraper or a nuclear power plant. But the President of the Federal Republic, who has to sign and to publish the law, objected that using this law would violate the human rights of affected airplane passengers. Therefore, he asked the Federal Constitutional Court to review the law. Nevertheless, up until the terrorist attacks on the London subway, there were no real chances for any amendment to the constitution legalizing domestic operations by the Bundeswehr, because an application would not have received the necessary two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. But after this incident, the conservative parties, the CDU and CSU, will try again.

3 The “Viertes Finanzförderungsgesetz” of June 2002 creates a new § 24c in the “Kreditwesengesetz,” which legitimates a new control institution, the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht to obtain account information from all banks using an automated system which makes it impossible for banks to follow this [6] (pp. 11f). B. Meyer / Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws 95

Does security Protect Liberty?

Anti-terror laws in a democratic state ruled by law only serve their purpose if they improve the ability of the state to defend itself against terrorist attacks without excessively restricting the civil rights of citizens. According to political theory, in an act of sovereignty the people delegate the right to use force to the state, thereby creating a state monopoly on the use of force and asserting a claim to protection by the state. This protection, as intended by the people, is not restricted to sustaining their lives and therefore does not depend on the continuity of just any kind of functioning state, but rather on a democratic state under the rule of law. The value that is worth being protected is the continuity of the free and liberal lifestyle of the state’s sovereign, the people. In the case of protection against terrorist attacks, the question already discussed earlier concerning internal security is, “How to defend the republic without violating the idea of liberty, without suspending civil rights: Liberality and efficiency must be balanced in a way suitable to democracy. The defense of freedom is a pre- conditioned task: Success is predetermined by the means, which must be chosen very scrupulously.” [7] (p. 16) Neither the German Minister of the Interior, nor the U.S. Attorney General, who is responsible for the corresponding “U.S. PATRIOTIC Act,”4 nor their counterparts in other countries have satisfied this need. Moreover, they have displayed behavior typical of politicians in charge of domestic security, as described by Preuss already in 1989: “Whenever new problems arise, they first think of more severe punishment and enlarged police powers.” [8] (p. 488)5 The very broad majority that the first security packet received in parliament was not given to the second. First, when the Federal Minister of the Interior tried to introduce drastic measures like the planned changes in passports and identity cards by administrative regulation, representatives of the Green party spoiled this in a “coalition talk” at the end of October. Only then was this intention introduced through regular legislative channels. After heated debates over the law on data protection, the details of changing passports and identity cards were revised when the entire second security packet passed the Bundestag on December 14th, 2001. Additionally, the intention of authorizing the Federal Criminal Investigation Agency to start investigations without a suspicion expressed by a public prosecutor’s office, as well as the plan to refuse foreigners entry into Germany when there is a first moment of suspicion against them, found no Green support in the governing coalition. Other rejections were revised by the Greens after they got a promise that some of the measures would be effective for only five years. Minister Schily’s draft of Security Packet II was criticized in the Bundestag by some members of his own SPD faction, as well as by the Greens, the liberal FDP and the leftist PDS, and outside parliament by lawyers, judges, and last but not least by the data protection officers of the Federal Republic and of the Federal States. The main reason for these criticisms was the fear of creating a “man of glass” with these laws (i.e., that citizens would no longer have any secrets vis-à-vis the state). They see in this tendency a violation of the basic law of the self-determination of citizens concerning personal data (“informationelle Selbstbestimmung”), which was derived from Articles

4 The “PATRIOT Act” is an acronym for: Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. 5 Translated by the author. 96 B. Meyer / Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws

1 and 2 of the German Constitution by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1983. On the other hand, the draft of Security Packet II received praise from the right wing of the Bundestag, especially from the CDU/CSU faction. This came as no surprise: whenever there is a choice between the values of security and freedom, conservatives of all factions vote for security, while only a handful of Liberals (independently of the name of their political party) are prepared to adopt a motto which was proposed by former Federal Minister of the Interior Werner Maihofer (FDP): “In dubio pro libertate!” (In doubt for liberty!). [9] (pp. 83ff). At that time, in the 1970s, his task had been to formulate the first anti-terror law, including a new case, the “formation of a terrorist association,” which meant that a group of persons would be subject to punishment not for criminal actions, but simply for making plans to commit crimes in the future. Maihofer had doubts about the preemptive character of this law. Therefore, he vehemently argued against a “security policy that produces stockpiles of paragraphs on suspicion as being deeply in opposition to liberal principles.” [9] (p. 88)6 Security Packet II, as it passed the Bundestag on December 14th, 2001, is meant to be exactly such a stockpile of paragraphs to be ready for all eventualities. This intention is not least of all connected to the attempts of conservative politicians and lawyers to introduce the fiction of a basic law of security into the German discussion on constitutional law. They argue that the Grundgesetz (German constitution) implies such a basic law [10]. But if it were possible for the individual to take legal action against the state in order to gain security in the same way as to gain rights of freedom, the state would be obliged to take unlimited precautions against all kinds of insecurity. What consequences this could have, “can be shown quite clearly in the right of protection against danger: in the police law danger is defined as a situation in which one of the goods which are to be protected by the police (life, health, property, public security, etc.) would suffer with ‘sufficient probability’ without any intervention. According to textbooks on police law, ‘sufficient probability’ can only be presumed if and when the ‘fear that the danger will become a reality is caused by life experience.” [8] (p. 489)7 Working on the basis of “sufficient probability” and “life experience” is treading on shaky ground, as the events of 9/11 show: Before this, there seemed to be no grounds for the presumption that a civilian airplane would ever be steered into a skyscraper with a terrorist intention. Since that day, “life experience” has had to consider the risk of a repetition of such attacks, but this experience gives us no hints as to either the probability or the possible targets. Therefore, it is completely impossible to judge whether it is necessary for the police or military to continuously secure all buildings above a certain height or whether it is sufficient to forbid flights over certain parts of big cities and to control this to protect the supposed basic law of security for everyone living or working in a skyscraper. If the existence of this basic right is accepted, the door will be opened to enormous enlargements of security regulations and systems. In contrast, three examinations would have been necessary in autumn 2001 before passing legislation in order to prevent regulations in security laws which are superfluous, nonsensical or ineffective: first, an exact examination of already existing security laws. This would have shown that it would have been more important to remedy deficiencies in the execution of these laws than to try to close supposed gaps in

6 Translated by the author. 7 Translated by the author. B. Meyer / Fighting Terrorism by Tightening Laws 97 the laws themselves. Secondly, it would have been necessary to examine each single measure of Security Packet II before it was introduced in the Bundestag as to whether it was suitable to prevent attacks like those of 9/11 or to arrest terrorists living inconspicuously in Germany as so-called “sleepers” before they hijacked the airplanes. The third would have been to try to find an answer to the question of whether such preventive laws are suitable to deter potential terrorists with the threatened punishment. This is obviously not the case vis-à-vis persons who have decided to sacrifice their own lives in a planned attack. In their view, assuring their own death as a “martyr” is probably more important than the lives of their victims. And therefore, they cannot be influenced by measures of deterrence. It is possible that not all of the consequences of the tightrope walk between protecting security and losing liberty, as implied in proposed legislation, can be foreseen. But to prevent a quasi-state of emergency from becoming a normal one, and to prevent civil rights from being permanently limited, the Bundestag would be wise to limit the duration of the security laws provisionally to two years and to provide that any prolongation beyond the same period depend upon an evaluation of its usefulness. After the purpose of a law has ceased to exist, or after coming to realize that some measures are ineffective, civil rights can then be restored. This would prevent civil rights from being limited longer than is absolutely necessary.

References

[1] Kaufmann, F.X. (1973). Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke. [2] Elias, N. (1977). Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. [3] Frei, D. (1977). Sicherheit. Grundfragen der Weltpolitik. Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln/Mainz: Kohlhammer. [4] Senghaas, D. (1997). Frieden – ein mehrfaches Komplexprogramm. In: Senghaas, D. (ed.). Frieden machen. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 560-575. [5] Hoffman, V. (1998). Inside Terrorism. London: Victor Gollancz. [6] Meyer, B. (2005). Der Schutz des Individuums im Spannungsfeld von Sicherheit und Privatheit. In: Knop, J.v., Zilkens, M. (eds.). Datenschutz im Spannungsfeld zwischen Sicherheit und Privatheit. Bielefeld: Bertelsmann, 11-29. [7] Leggewie, C., Meier, H. (1995). Republikschutz. Maßstäbe für die Verteidigung der Demokratie. Reinbek: Rowohlt. [8] Preuss, UK. (1989). Vorsicht Sicherheit. Am Ende staatlicher Neutralisierung? Merkur, 6/1989, 487- 498. [9] Maihofer, W. (1976). Innen- und Rechtspolitik: Im Zweifel für die Freiheit. In: Genscher, H.D. (ed.): Liberale in der Verantwortung. München/Wien: Hanser, 83-98. [10] Isensee, J. (1984). Das Grundrecht auf Sicherheit. Zu den Schutzpflichten des freiheitlichen Verfassungsstaates. Berlin - New York: Springer. 98 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents: Modular Infrastructure for Adaptive Distributed Intelligent Systems

Eitan HADAR Department of Computer Science at Netanya College, Israel

Abstract. This paper suggests a framework for initiating the construction of an adaptive global intelligent system for the detection of terrorist activities. The proposed system’s main features are based on already known recommendations and emerging technologies. However, this research concentrates on the missing elements of collaboration. The paper presents the technologies and principles on which this framework will be based, while describing its relevant vision. The discussion is divided into the following categories: distributed information and data gathering while preserving privacy constraints; adaptive collaboration of software agents and domain- specific language; and secured network topology based on modular peer-to-peer and web services.

Keywords. Artificial intelligence, terrorism, distributed information, software agents, domain specific language, topology, peer-2-peer

Introduction

Today’s scientific community is developing knowledge and technologies for meeting security-related challenges, as well as distributed network aspects required for collaboration among international peer-entities. However, the intelligence community and international governments, even when tightly linked, are constrained in their work by several aspects. The quantity and complexity of information that must be processed and handled by the intelligence community is increasing exponentially over time. Thus, new adaptive means are needed to successfully cope with changing data structures, as well as with flexible analysis constraints. Any intelligent software that must support such constraints should be highly modular, while preserving both its local implementations and its distributed network capabilities. Such effective collaborations across intelligence agencies must enable efficient knowledge sharing, in order to detect, classify and identify terrorist threats [1]. However, conventional collaboration technologies do not provide enough flexibility to achieve these ambitious goals. These systems must adapt to rapid changes within a dynamic environment. Due to the required size and dynamic behavior, current centralized systems are inadequate. E. Hadar / Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents 99

However, peer networks of adaptive systems can provide a feasible solution. According to [1, 2, 3, 4], long-term systems should provide: 1. Scalable, robust and interoperable services. 2. “Plug and play” infrastructure. 3. Secured, cross-enterprise information sharing. 4. Role-based access control. 5. Autonomous, decentralized community in order to prevent the accumulation of power and knowledge. On-going technology development efforts are usually conducted within a specific scope of knowledge, utilizing its own domain language. When linking miscellaneous domains, one can only wonder what transformation activities are required in order to integrate these different perspectives? Are there means to establish common adaptive technological rules that can provide the basis for legislative collaboration? Can we define a unified adaptive language that elegantly provides a mechanism for the combination of such technologies, driven by a what-if analysis of the intelligence community? Can we construct a published, unified repository structure that can assist in querying distributed systems? This paper presents our vision, intended to define a framework for a peer network of collaborating entities, while addressing these questions in a structured manner. The next sections describe five main topics and our relevant perspectives, followed by a summary of our proposed vision for the research framework.

Existing Technologies and Their Possible Contribution

In order to understand the steps required for establishing a collaboration network of software agents, consider an exemplary case in which a terrorist threat is evaluated by an analyst. The basic steps can be the extraction of personal and demographic information about the potential terrorist from a variety of data repositories. This will be followed by obtaining a psychological profile, if possible, and concluded by establishing assessment criteria based on the analyst’s personal experience, thus, estimating the threat level. The infrastructure required for such activities includes: (1) the ability to access distributed information, (2) collaborative network topologies, (3) software agents that can actually perform the complex search, (4) security and privacy constraints that are adapted to each data repository and agent and (5) a unified language used in order to allow agents to access each other’s services without revealing their inner structure, transparent to the analyst’s language. This section details each of these elements and their possible contribution to our research vision. It concludes with the current status of related collaborative research.

Distributed Information and Data Structures

Relevant information needed by an analyst for an investigation includes intelligence transcripts, government agency records, financial information, psychological observations and so on [5]. Such information repositories are constantly changing, both in dimensions 100 E. Hadar / Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents and in contents. Moreover, they are distributed and controlled by different access restrictions, as detailed below. Two basic models can be defined: Threat (what is a risk, what are the logistics), and Combatant (mindset, cultural belief systems and objectives) [5]. The first represents an actual target, while the latter encapsulates beliefs and objectives in the intellectual contribution of the terrorist mindset. These definitions naturally need to be enlarged for a full descriptive language, encapsulated in such data structures. In our vision, we suggest to define and construct the standardization of such configurable information that will enable smart agents to adapt to changing needs. The need to provide adaptive systems is a primary consideration in our ability to predict threats. As an example, adaptation can be considered as a “time” element in the information gathered: (i) the time of the information actually generated, i.e., the actual event, (ii) the time when the information was published, (iii) the time when the query was generated and the information was taken from the repository [5]. The connections among autonomous, decentralized community communication systems are presented in Figure F-1 (from [3]), which offers an efficient information dissemination infrastructure with a decentralized architecture. Our proposed system should support the same concepts; however, with appropriate constraints applied due to legislation, as well as to the accumulation of power and knowledge.

Figure 1 (from [3]). An efficient information dissemination infrastructure with a decentralized architecture. E. Hadar / Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents 101

Network Topologies

One of the recent technologies for providing dynamic linkages among peer elements is service-oriented architecture. Such architecture types rely on the XML markup language and web service technology such as: (i) SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol); (ii) UDDI (Universal Description, Discovery and Integration); and (iii) WSDL (World Service Description Language) [6, 7, 8], as presented in Figure F-2 (from [9]). These known technologies are based on discovering the requested and provided information within real- time constraints. The discovery services are needed for revealing the actual service provided by each node (agent). The interoperability of platforms is needed in order to enable execution on any provider and with any available technology. The high availability of the overall response of the system is maintained by making sure that a result will be provided according to the actual participants in the specific investigation. In order to maintain the constrained services, an entity should reveal its services only upon real-time request due to legal limitations and internal restrictions. Therefore, dynamic maintenance of the available services must be defined, and adjustable structures must be applied accordingly. Consequently, there is a need for a system that can provide an underlying adaptable mechanism based on a domain-specific language [4] to be applied for this type of problem. Moreover, applying an adaptable workflow of message-passing can enable a more secure dynamic infrastructure for authentication and authorization [2].

Figure 2. The basic structure of webDG services, which resembles a common interaction flow (from [9]). 102 E. Hadar / Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents

To date, net-centric technologies are negatively affected by cultural and policy issues which impose barriers on information gathering. There is a need to combine these capabilities and limitations into a single set of standardizations that can enable a dynamic query within the boundaries of law [1]. Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks can solve these problems by their basic nature. P2P networks and grids [10] are distributed computing models that enable decentralized collaboration by integrating computers into networks in which each node can both use and offer services [11]. P2P is a class of self-organizing systems or applications that takes advantage of distributed resources (storage, processing, information and human presence) available at the Internet’s edges. A grid is a geographically-distributed computation platform comprising a set of heterogeneous machines that users can access through a single interface. The potential benefits of P2P networks can be examined in the Internet’s three fundamental assets: information, bandwidth and computing resources [7]. Finding useful information in real-time is increasingly difficult. An example is the lack of a single search engine or portal that can locate and catalogue the ever-increasing amount of information on the Web in a timely fashion. Therefore, providing a search solution must rely on collaborative P2P search engines which facilitate P2P communication, such as described in [7] and [12]. This type pf query routing protocol promotes structured, lightweight and efficient query message exchange. It is expressed in XML syntax: registration, request and response, and can enable flexible queries using partial keywords, wildcards and ranges. The concept of this proposed research exists in the query space, aimed to coordinate consumers from the intelligence community and providers such as information sources and governmental agencies.

Intelligent Software Agents

A typical example of gleaning data from a variety of databases is using an expert systems mining approach, such as blackboard architecture. This type of architecture is based on incremental knowledge acquisition that is designed to extract a maximum amount of relevant information and filter out irrelevant information [8, 13]. As demonstrated by Rubin et al. [13], a complex query can be derived through multi-layered tree structures. The query initialization is generated by the analyst, and the remaining sub-segments of the tree can be automatically selected using automated artificial intelligence (AI) agents. Therefore, a need to define the possible segments and terminology is crucial for automated agents that create and construct these complex trees. AI tools that support rapid configuration must take into account dynamically changing multiple viewpoints and objectives. Such considerations can be preserving privacy constraints [14] while evaluating the correctness of the query. The AI goal is to accurately assess the meaning of multiple terabytes of confusing, misleading and inconsistent information while using adaptive models based on intelligent agents. There are several solutions for providing data mining activities that can conceal the actual implementation, and for preventing the disclosure of information. However, they occupy a certain space that is limited to the actual database being inspected. Knowledge can be acquired after running automated methods and creating additional information repositories. E. Hadar / Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents 103

Therefore, in order to maintain privacy, we argue that these systems must be governed by adaptable external roles that can prohibit the automatic exploitation of the system. Such constraints need to be constructed on at least three levels: public, protected and secured. Each has increasing levels of security that can make possible the iterative, efficient retrieval of data based on authorization and information transparency.

Security

The main concepts of security [14] encapsulate both the encryption of information, authentication and authorization, as well as dynamic business linkage according to predefined schemes. Such systems can be considered as the one provided by IBM Matchbox hardware and software technology [15]. This addresses the needs of users who must both protect data and make it available in a distributed, insecure public setting. One of the basic notions for establishing collaboration among peer elements is the ability to control access, as suggested by [2]. This research presented an XML Role-Based Access Control (X-RBAC) specification language that addresses multi-domain environment policy-specification needs. It allows the specification of policies and facilitates the specification of timing constraints on roles and access requirements. As illustrated in Figure F-3 (from [2]), the systems agree to share information for a specified amount of time in a tight manner in a controlled environment.

Figure 3 (from [2]. The Access Control (X-RBAC) specification language workflow. 104 E. Hadar / Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents

Unlike these systems, our vision will need to define a dynamic workflow protocol that can provide services on demand without compromising the handshake security protocol among collaborators. Model-driven trust negotiation for web services [16] can use predefined frameworks that assist in dynamic access control, whereby access is granted based on trust established in negotiation between the service requestor and the service provider. These systems can maintain, among other things, the policy lifecycle management of a specific query. Naturally, it should be defined in the terminology of the analysts. Our proposed framework should maintain dynamic constraints on such lifecycle properties according to ad hoc decisions made autonomously by the specific node which provides a service, and not just by the service requestor, as usually conducted.

Domain-specific Languages

Research activities that combine natural language analysis based on exploring information are presented in [4]. The success of such systems depends on understanding the automatic system and on the nature of their users, in our case the analyst. They must use dialect, terminology and cognitive patterns that resemble those of the target audience. The need for domain-specific search follows from the unsolvability of randomization problems. Therefore, our research must define a correct bidirectional language that can integrate the scientific community, on one hand, and the intelligence community, on the other. This language should encapsulate requests and constraints and act as the main mediator among these different perspectives.

Existing Collaborative Research

Many collaborative research programs were started post-September 11, 2001. One of them is the US Department of Defense Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) program [17]. The TIA program aims to address the problem of “connecting the dots” – improving US authorities’ ability to analyze, understand, share and act on the information they have. TIA is designed to create a system and network of integrated computer tools that the intelligence community can use in order to help predict and eliminate potential terrorist threats. The TIA program’s major goals are: (1) to develop and test solutions that provide secure collaborative problem solving, (2) structured discovery with sources and methods security, (3) group understanding and context-aware visualization and, finally, (4) efficient decision- making with corporate memory. According to its May 20, 2004 Report, the main project goal is “to have a hardened and matured fragile TIA system technology with a corresponding concept of operations.” The US government’s executive and legislative branches have quickly heeded recommendations from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the “9/11 Commission”) to improve information-sharing capabilities among federal agencies and among federal, state and local officials. Both the legislative and executive branches have for the first time established firm deadlines for agency heads to submit plans for architectures and procedures that will enhance data sharing. US President George W. E. Hadar / Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents 105

Bush signed an executive order establishing a timetable within which agency heads must begin planning for such a network [18]. Two weeks later, Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman introduced a 281-page omnibus antiterrorism bill [19] with 17 pages dedicated to establishing a new information-sharing network and stipulating deadlines. This bill was followed by recommendations for shared intelligence, specifically the need to establish information sharing and intelligence reporting guidelines that maximize the dissemination of information while protecting intelligence sources and methods. Starting from this incentive, our research vision can be considered as a gap-filling one. As noted, most of the research and recommendations concentrate on the technology to solve direct links and is intended for internal use by the US government. Our vision concentrates on the network language and on the interface definition of the systems boundaries and architecture. Thus, our research results can enable technical teams to employ their solutions according to global national perspectives and not just the US one.

The Proposed Vision and Research Framework

As detailed above, our research goals and architecture are divided into several aspects in terms of internal and external views. Basically, the internal architecture can be better understood when examining the WebDG system as presented in Figure F-4 (from [9]), which describes governmental providing web services. However, our vision of the system definition will describe the interfaces of the system externally, including privacy polices and interactions. Thus, it will maintain the maximal freedom of internal design for the miscellaneous scientific teams. The proposed system model will be based on a peer network of autonomous entities aligned in a grid format. The nations are modeled as similar hierarchies with internal connections. Every nation has several operational entities, with parallel ones in neighboring collaborating elements. The grid topology enables vertical (in-state) relations and horizontal (out-of-state) links among similar entities. Using this grid, a documentation and search mechanism will be possible for exploring international terror-related events. Each nation will documenst its domestic terrorist activities, as well as additional information depending on its legislation and limitations (governmental and political limitation), or its domestic entity (such as military, intelligence agency, and so on). In order to provide such collaboration and tools for future research, we will need to investigate several aspects. These aspects can be divided into: 1. The information perspective: x Define a standardization of a terror-related database structure that will enable an adaptable structure for present and future terror-related events. x Gather information into these systems with different levels of access based on public, protected and private services. This repository is based on investigating past occurrences of terrorist acts. x Define configurable information schemes that can enable smart agents to adapt to changing needs. 106 E. Hadar / Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents

2. The software agents’ collaboration and network topology perspective: x Provide an assertion mechanism for legislation and privacy constraints and perspectives for the prevention of power and knowledge accumulation. x Utilize collaborative Peer-to-Peer network and search engines, while using open services such as SOAP. x Define an adaptive framework that can provide ad hoc collaboration and dynamic services based on the reflection of actual conflicts and agreements among their human initiators. x Define the underlying mechanism and the domain-specific language notation for applying an adaptable workflow of message passing among these software agents, and among their human operators. x Apply model-driven trust negotiation for web services to predefined frameworks.

Figure 4 (from [9]). The WebDG architecture, as implemented for social government services. The WebDG manager and privacy preserving processors compose and preserve privacy in e-government Web services

Conclusion

This paper presented our vision of research that is needed in order to enhance the collaboration among the governmental and the intelligence communities with the aid of technological means. In our perspective, the missing elements are to be found mainly in two perspectives: E. Hadar / Peer Networks of Collaborating Intelligent Software Agents 107

1. The need to define a flexible information structure in order to achieve faster collaboration and data collection, as well as management of access control. 2. The need to define a topology and domain-specific language based on peer-to-peer networks which can provide a real-time negotiation framework as part of the automatic collaboration among software agents. In doing so, we can advance our global perspective on terrorist activities, thereby increasing the probability to pre-identify and locate terrorist events (either global or local). We believe that our vision will enable the technological community to better understand and interlink with the intelligence one, providing a more accurate response to terror-related threats.

References

[1] Cohen, B., Medairy, B., Wenzel, G. (2004). Cross organization intelligence analysis enabled using net- centric architectures. Aerospace Conference Proceedings, Volume 5, 6-13. [2] Joshi, J.B.D. (2004). Access-control language for multi-domain environments. Internet Computing, IEEE, Vol8, Iss 6. [3] Ragab, K. Horikoshi, N.Y., Kuriyama, H., Mori, K. (2004). Autonomous decentralized community communication for information dissemination. Internet Computing, IEEE, Volume 8, Issue 3, 29–36. [4] Rubin, S.H., Lee, G.K., (2003). A natural language interface for an intelligent universal situational awareness (USA) system. The 12th IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy Systems, Volume 2, 1261-1267. [5] Kargupta, H., Kun Liu, Datta, S., Ryan, J., Sivakumar, K. (2003). Homeland security and privacy sensitive data mining from multi-party distributed resources. The 12th IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy Systems, Volume 2, 1257–1260. [6] Curbera, F., Duftler, M., Khalaf, R., Nagy, W., Mukhi, N., Weerawarana, S. (2002). Unraveling the web services web: an introduction to SOAP, WSDL, and UDDI. Internet Computing, IEEE, Volume 6, Issue 2, 86–93. [7] Li, G. (2002). Peer-to-peer networks in action. Internet Computing, IEEE, Volume 6, Issue 1, 37-39. [8] Petrie, C., Bussler, C. (2003). Service agents and virtual enterprises: A survey. Internet Computing, IEEE, Volume 7, Issue 4, 40–50. [9] Medjahed, B., Rezgui, A., Bouguettaya, A., Ouzzani, M. (2003). Infrastructure for e-government web services,” Internet Computing, IEEE, Volume 7, Issue 1, 58-65. [10] Talia, D., Trunflo, P., (2003). Toward a synergy between P2P and grids. Internet Computing, IEEE, Volume 7, Issue 4, 94–96. [11] Waterhouse, S., Doolin, D.M., Kan, G., Faybishenko, A. (2002). Distributed search in P2P networks,” Internet Computing, IEEE, Volume 6, Issue 1, 68-72. [12] Schmidt, C., Parashar, M., (2004). Enabling flexible queries with guarantees in P2P systems,” Internet Computing, IEEE, Volume 8, Issue 3, 19-26. [13] Rubin, S.H., Smith, M.H., Trajkovic, L. (2003). A blackboard architecture for countering terrorism. International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, IEEE , Volume 2 , 1550–1553. [14] Krause, L., Lehman, L., Wheeler, A. (2003). A family of agent based models. International Conference on Integration of Knowledge Intensive Multi-Agent Systems, 312-317. [15] Goldman, K., Valdez, E. (2004). Matchbox: secure data sharing,” Internet Computing, IEEE, Volume 8, Issue 6, 18-24. [16] Skogsrud, H., Benatallah, B., Casati, F. (2003). Model-driven trust negotiation for Web services. Internet Computing, IEEE, Volume 7, Issue 6, 45-52. [17] Voth, D. (2003). TIA program researches terrorism patterns. Intelligent Systems, IEEE, Volume 18, Issue 4, 4-6. [18] http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/ 20040827-4.html [19] http://govt-aff.senate.gov/files/ 090704bill911 commission. pdf) 108 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

The Impact of the Human Aspects in Designing Collaborative Information Technology Systems

Irit HADAR Department of Management Information Systems,University of Haifa, Israel

Abstract. Human aspects have lately been found to have a significant effect on software and information systems development projects. There are various cognitive as well as social aspects that are important in the context of system design and implementation that consequently need to be well understood prior to the project’s execution. In this paper, we describe in short the possible impacts of human aspects. We illustrate several possible aspects relevant specifically to designing collaborative information technology systems and suggest our vision for managing this issue within the planned research frame.

Keywords: Human aspects, cognition, sociology, design, collaborative, IT systems

Introduction

The issue of human aspects in the context of software development has recently been addressed in the software engineering and information systems communities. This is due to the high level of software project failures observed: 75% of software projects are considered a failure when completed, and only 2% of software systems delivered to customers fully meet their requirements. Research studies have recently discovered that many of these failures are due to the impacts of various human aspects throughout the development process [1]. As a result, lately a human-oriented perspective of systems development has been studied and discussed. For example, this perspective includes comparing the nature of software development to art [2] and acknowledges the unique people-dependent nature of its processes [3]. To this end, human aspects in the context of software and information systems development analyzes the perspective of those involved in the process: individuals, teams, customers and organizations. [3], in their book, refer to both social topics and to cognitive aspects. Social topics can be considered as teamwork, the customer’s perspective, code of ethics and international perspective. Cognitive aspects are more related to program comprehension and learning processes in software development. When considering the unique nature of the designated collaborative information technology system we need to attend to several more person-related aspects, for example, cognitive processes in analysis and decision-making in counter-terrorism activities, intelligence teamwork, legislative areas of different governments, invasion of privacy, international collaboration, and cultural gaps. When designing this system it is I. Hadar / The Impact of the Human Aspects in Designing Collaborative IT Systems 109 essential to understand the human aspects that may impact the process of building and using the system, the challenges and risks derived from them, and possible solutions. The human aspects’ impact may contribute either to the success or failure of this project. Thoroughly studying certain aspects may make a significant contribution to the system’s design. These aspects can include understanding the cognitive processes of analysts during decision-making. This may lead to a better understanding as to which processes the system should support and how. Even more important, learning and analyzing certain human aspects may prevent negative impacts on the system’s requirements, design, and usage. For example, if certain stakeholders of the system are not committed to the principle of information sharing as defined, they may withhold information during requirements analysis. This will lead to a low quality of the designed system, as well as low usage of the system after its implementation. In this paper, we deal with the richness and complexities of the human aspects that need to be taken into consideration during information system design. Specifically, we address these issues in relation to the collaborating information system’s framework. In the next section, we review several human aspects we find relevant to the discussed system from cognitive and social points of view. In section three, we suggest our vision for dealing with the challenges presented.

Human Aspects in Designing Collaborative Information Technology Systems

We will refer to the human aspects that may impact the project from several points of view. First, we need to identify the stakeholders of this system, i.e., its development contributors and its potential users. Second, in order to design the system to best support intelligence processes, we need to deeply understand cognitive processes during decision-making in this context. Third, for the same aim we need to investigate the social and distributed cognitive aspect of teamwork in intelligence related activities.

Identifying the Human Factor

In order to understand the human aspects that may impact the system’s comprehension, an inspection of the human factor involved is needed. That is, we need to identify and study each of the roles that will take part in the processes of requirements specification and system design. The investigation will be of both potential users and other stakeholders from the governmental and intelligence communities, as well as technologists who influence the design of the supporting technologies. For instance, the stakeholders can include experts from the following disciplines: intelligence analysis, international law, homeland security, negotiations, conflict resolution, artificial intelligence, networks, distributed and temporal databases, ontology, cognitive psychology and organizational and international sociology.

Cognitive Aspects

As recalled, our goal is to establish a framework for a system that will simulate and support counter-terrorism activities. In order to accomplish that, we wish to understand the relevant cognitive processes that take place in this respect. [4] describes general anti-terrorism activities structured in two phases. The artifacts of the first phase are: (1) 110 I. Hadar / The Impact of the Human Aspects in Designing Collaborative IT Systems expectancies that prescribe what is to be observed next as the situation continues to evolve, (2) relevant cues to which the decision-maker needs to pay attention, (3) plausible goals, and (4) courses of action to apply in this type of situation. The main task in the second phase is to carry out singular evaluation by imagining how the course of action will evolve. The decision-maker may need to adjust the course of action, or reject it and look for another option. A support system for counter-terrorism activities will need to simulate these types of products and present them to the users during decision-making processes. Consequently, we will need to identify and understand the cognitive processes of potential users of this system during counter-terrorism activities. The identification and analysis of cognitive processes will enable us to specify in detail all the elements needed for contributing to counter-terrorism decision-making and define the system’s requirements accordingly. For instance, in a process of identifying terror threats by intelligence agents we will need to (1) define the needed information for this process, (2) present the information in a structure that will contribute to a correct perception and comprehension by the user, (3) prioritize activities in a structured and contributing manner which may assist the cognitive process throughout the analysis workflow. Moreover, in this context, identifying cognitive perspectives that do not contribute to the goal at hand when practiced by the participants may have its own impact as well. Such phenomena can be distracting, due to dealing with non-relevant information, vague or dual-meaning presentation of information, cognitive processes and a decision- making process which generates conflicts with intuitive thinking, etc. In order to achieve inter-connected levels of understanding, we can refer to a mathematical model of learning in the context of Aristotelian Forms. Aristotle proposed that people begin with a set of forms or models that are adapted through learning to more closely resemble specific concepts [5]. Therefore, our vision of the system must encapsulate the current actions performed by the specialists and evaluate their actions accordingly, in order to provide an evolved mechanism.

Social Aspects

We find two types of social aspect relevant to our context. One is related to the intelligence teamwork needed to analyze complex situations, and the other is the conflicting social processes. Intelligence teamwork is required when the cognitive demands are too complex, dynamic and time-pressured to be dealt with by a single individual. To enable early detection and successful processing of potential terrorist threats, teams must effectively work together to quickly process and combine information from multiple sources [4]. One of biggest challenges for teamwork is information overload [6], namely the volume of information relevant to a required analysis. In order to cope with this challenge, the information is distributed across persons, objects, tools and environments [4], leading to a situation called distributed cognition [7]. It is important in our research to analyze distributed cognition, in addition to individual cognition, in order to fully understand the intelligence analysis of complex situations. This will lead us to explore the effects that social aspects have on an individual’s cognitive processes, how distributed cognition is constructed and how it operates. Moreover, we will need to explore relevant issues derived from the concept of distributed cognition, such as information access needed to the different participating parts. I. Hadar / The Impact of the Human Aspects in Designing Collaborative IT Systems 111

Research studies have been presented in the literature with regard to team cognition, decision-making and collaborative technology, as is practiced in the real world [4]. Moreover, [8] implemented a team-oriented agent architecture which realized a computational shared mental model which allows agents in a team, whether they are software or human agents, to anticipate the potential information needs of teammates and proactively assist them. Allocating and learning such existing technologies may be the basis for the technological framework of our research. The second type of social aspect consists in the social processes that may contradict or give rise to conflicts with respect to the research vision. These processes may be encountered due to personal or political interests. These conflicts of individuals or groups within the general research vision may reduce the project’s success. Such issues can be domination over information in order to gain control, whether the motive is of a political or ideological nature. Such actions can harm the basic nature of the research, i.e., information sharing. Trust relations among peoples and nations usually involve responsibilities, both for success, but even more, for accountability for failures. Using our proposed system framework, by implementing information sharing and mutual assistance in crisis situations, the system can contribute to trust building measures and sharing responsibilities.

The Vision

Our general approach will be to identify dependencies and triggers that initiate complex sub-queries and automatic selections applied to collaborative information systems. Eventually, these selections will enable us to establish the adaptable nature of that query which fits the cognitive process of its human operator. In order to achieve this goal, we will need to define a domain-specific language that can support cognitive processes and communication among different participants. The language and its definition need to support a common terminology which is accepted by the stakeholders involved in this research and, eventually, the system. Accordingly, we will study associations that emerge from analyzing such cases in two perspectives: (1) how the intelligence analyst or analysis teams operate and conceive the dynamic vision of investigation, and (2) how the technological and scientific community, with their terminology, can adapt existing technology and mechanisms to our aim. In doing so, we hope that we can support the ability to distribute tactical information rapidly to the people who are in the best position to evaluate the relevant terror threats.

References

[1] Hutchinss, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [2] Knuth, D,E. (1997). The art of computer programming (3rd Edition). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. [3] Brooks, P.F. (1975). The mythical man month: Essays on software engineering. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. [4] Yen, J., Fan, X., Sun, S., McNeese, M, and Hall, D. (2004). Supporting anti-terrorist analyst teams using agents with shared RPD process." In Proceedings of CIHSPS2004 – IEEE International Conference on Computational Intelligence for Homeland Security and Personal Safety, Venice, Italy, July 2004. 112 I. Hadar / The Impact of the Human Aspects in Designing Collaborative IT Systems

[5] Krause, L.; Lehman, L.; Wheeler, A. (2003). A family of agent based models. International Conference on Integration of Knowledge Intensive Multi-Agent Systems, 30 Sept.-4 Oct. 2003, 312 – 317. [6] Woods, D.D, Patterson, E.S., Roth, E.M. (1998). Aiding the intelligence analyst in situations of data overload: A diagnosis of data overload". Ohio State University: Institute for Ergonomics/Cognitive Systems Engineering Lab Report, ERGO-CSEL 98-TR-03. [7] Hazzan, O., Tomayko, J. (2004). Human aspects of software engineering. Charles River Media. [8] Yen, J., Yin, J., Ioerger, T.R., Miller, M., Xu, D., Volz, R.A. (2001). CAST: Collaborative agents for simulating teamwork. In: Proceedings of the 7th IJCAI 2001, 1135-1142. Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State 113 S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

A Practitioner’s Thoughts about Terrorism

Mansour ABU RASHID ACPD, Jordan

Abstract. How should terrorism be defined? / The concept of terrorism / Genesis of terrorism / Individual terrorism / Group terrorism / International terrorism / Islam and terrorism / Terrorism and self-defense / The response: What can be done about it? / What contributions can be made by collective security mechanisms such as the UN?

Keywords. Terrorism, Islam, self-defense, counter-terrorism, collective security mechanisms

How Should Terrorism Be Defined?

x Terrorism is predominantly, but not solely, a by-product of profound and prolonged socio-economic, political and religious discontent. When such aspirations and grievances of marginalized communities are not addressed, either by their governments or the international community, they produce deep-seated frustration and a profound sense of humiliation. The net result is dangerous and intolerant ideologies of hate and violence. Nonetheless, terrorism is actively supported only by a narrow segment of any population suffering a sense of injustice and is committed by smaller groups of people willing to sacrifice their own lives. Terrorist groups do not require large-scale support to sustain their campaigns of violence. Violence is only a small part of their activities, which include propaganda, recruiting, fund-raising, procurement, training, surveillance and welfare for perpetrator- and supporter families. x It is harder for political analysts, economists and ideologists to discuss terrorism than ordinary issues. The criteria for this kind of discussion include absolute objectivity and complete openness, accompanied by thorough examination, accurate scientific research and analysis intended to reach solutions to the phenomenon of terrorism, instead of simply reaffirming misleading political representations that serve the purposes of a particular country.

The Concept of Terrorism

x There is more than one definition of terrorism; unfortunately, each differs according to the political, military, economic and social circumstances of the defining nation. Besides that, the interests of nations influence the acceptance of new connotations and preclude a single, inclusive definition. However, 114 M. Abu Rashid / A Practitioner’s Thoughts About Terrorism

these difficulties and obstacles should not obstruct us from reviewing the historical development of terrorism, explaining its dimensions and identifying its indicators and connotations. x One of the best definitions of terrorism is found in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, which defines terrorism as “the systematic use of terror or unpredictable violence against governments, publics, or individuals to attain a political objective. Terrorism has been used by political organizations with both rightist and leftist objectives, by nationalistic and ethnic groups, by revolutionaries, and by the armies and secret police of governments themselves.” x In the 20th century, the world witnessed the most dreadful kinds of military occupation and the worst forms of colonialism. It also witnessed the greatest liberation and freedom movements. The meaning of occupation has also changed: it no longer necessitates the occupation of a territory by military means, but has become the intentional control over the world’s economic and trade resources. In addition, in the middle of the 20th century the world was divided into superpowers and disadvantaged and oppressed countries, based on the possession of nuclear weapons and the utilization of knowledge and information to divide the world into consumer and producer states. The world also witnessed cultural and ideological occupation. Besides that, the world was divided into Western and Eastern parts and a Third World segment that is nameless but described as the developing world.

Genesis of Terrorism

x Humans differ not only in their basic genetic dispositions, but also because of the social, economic and political systems in which they live. Today, as has been true throughout history, humans are faced with conflicts resulting from a scarcity of resources, social injustice, and ideological or religious rivalries.

Individual Terrorism

x When two persons differ on any matter, the normal behavior is that each will try to convince the other of his/her point of view. It is also natural that in the end they may agree or disagree. The sad thing is that one of them may feel that he/she is more powerful and will try to impose his/her point of view on the weaker side by force and intimidation. This attitude is considered as bullying and aggression. This occurs between individuals. But when a person disagrees with some other group on political, religious, or ethnic matters, and instead of trying to understand or tolerate the differences, he/she resorts to an act of aggression against one or more members of the group in an attempt to impose his/her ideas on the other side or to express disagreement, this is called terrorism. This aggression could include killing, and this crime may involve one or more persons. x History has witnessed many acts such as the murder of Caliph Omar, more than 1500 years ago, the killing of General Kleber during the French invasion M. Abu Rashid / A Practitioner’s Thoughts About Terrorism 115

of Egypt about 200 years ago, and more recently the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. All these incidents were acts of terrorism that were conceived, planned and carried out by lone terrorists who were expressing their different opinions or disagreements by aggression and criminal acts that were deplorable and solved no problem. Individuals who commit such acts are fanatics, mentally unstable or insane. They usually suffer from psychiatric and socio-economic problems and find relief in the release of the instinct of aggression. x This type of individual terrorism is very dangerous, because it is unpredictable and impossible to prevent, regardless of any security measures. An example of this type is the attempt on the life of US President Ronald Reagan by a mentally-deranged loner, which was not prevented by an extensive security system and numerous guards.

Group Terrorism

x When a group of people have common beliefs or ideas, whether political, social or religious, and instead of trying to promote its ideas through legitimate and accepted ways, resorts to aggressive means to impose its ideas or to try to change a lawful system by force, such a group, regardless of the possible nobility, legitimacy or morality of its cause, is nothing more than a terrorist group. These groups usually develop in countries ruled by dictators or oppressive regimes that are corrupt and/or do not respect human rights. But sometimes such groups may develop in countries that enjoy democratic regimes, organized by individuals who believe in fanatic religious ideas or social or economic theories that they want to impose by force. Such an environment makes it easier to attract recruits among young, underprivileged or unemployed men/women who are dissatisfied with their status in society. x In the past, killing a head of state might constitute success or the achievement of the goal of such a group. Nowadays, this is practically impossible. Killing the heads of states or prominent leaders of regimes has proved inadequate to achieve the goals of terrorist groups. Therefore, terrorist groups resort to acts that could create a state of instability and unrest or destroy a country’s economy. Furthermore, it is logically obvious how wrong fanatic groups are that claim to promote certain radical religious ideas by force or by killing those who do not believe or accept their ideas, and their claims are also clearly contrary to the texts and the spirit of all world religions, which reject aggression, ask us to love our enemies and to never try to force our beliefs on others.

International Terrorism

x It is often mentioned that the roots of international terrorism originated in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion of that country. The United States, in its attempt to force the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, promoted the idea of Jihad or holy war in support of Muslim Afghanistan against the 116 M. Abu Rashid / A Practitioner’s Thoughts About Terrorism

infidel Soviet invaders. Thousands of young men from many Muslim countries rushed to Afghanistan to help its people in their fight for liberation. x The Americans supported this activity by establishing training centers in Pakistan and supplying arms, equipment and logistics to volunteers, who were called by the American media Mujahadeen. Their training was not confined to military aspects and the use of weapons, but also involved brainwashing and indoctrination in the ideas of reviving the radical themes and principles of Islam and the glory of fighting and even dying to raise the banner of the faith, and that this is the quickest way to Paradise. Those young men, who came originally to fight the infidel Soviets, began to believe that the real cause of the weakness, poverty, humiliation and backwardness of the Muslims is that their countries are run by corrupt and oppressive regimes that do not rule according to Islamic principles. x These Mujahadeen were organized under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden in what was known as the notorious terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden and his supporters succeeded in the indoctrination of their ideas in the minds of a great number of young volunteers. Their ideas were based on Jihad against the enemies of Islam, mainly the United States and its stooges: the rulers of the Islamic countries who do not rule according to Islam. Al-Qaeda took advantage of the well-trained and indoctrinated young Mujahadeen who returned to their own countries or were sent to other parts of the world and established terrorists cells waiting for orders to carry out attacks. The sad aspect is that a goodly number of those involved were highly-educated young men who could have contributed positively to their countries and to themselves, instead of destroying themselves and others. x The terrorist actions organized by Al-Qaeda have caused great material destruction and the killing of innocent people, but have not and could not ever solve any problem or achieve any rational goal. The most serious aspect of the activity of this organization is its claim that it is acting to defend Islam and to promote its principles. Nothing could be farther from the truth than this great lie. But the most alarming consequence of this allegation is that it has created unjustified general misunderstanding, animosity and hostility towards all Muslims and Islam all over the world. It is not fair to hold more than a billion innocent Muslims who have lived peacefully with others throughout history to be responsible for the crimes of a few hundred or few thousand twisted minds or extreme fanatics who claim to be Muslims but in reality have never understood the true principles and spirit of Islam.

Islam and Terrorism

x Terrorism is an abhorrent, vicious crime by all standards, as it usually involves killing innocent people who have nothing to do with any dispute and may not even know that such disputes exist. There is no conflict that cannot be solved around a negotiation table. Some terrorist groups claim to be Muslims and that their actions aim to defend Muslims or to achieve Muslim goals. This false claim has created a general misunderstanding of Islam and a tendency to hostility towards Muslims. Therefore, it is important to clear up this matter M. Abu Rashid / A Practitioner’s Thoughts About Terrorism 117

and to try to explain the doctrines and principles of Islam, which invariably reject aggression, violence or the killing of innocent people and the destruction of their property and calls for peaceful co-existence with people of different faiths or ethnic backgrounds. x Islam does not tolerate the irresponsible destructiveness that is terrorism. Such irreligious acts run counter to Islamic practices, just as they run counter to the practices of Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and indeed all other faiths of mankind. Muslims have been emphatic in their condemnation of terrorism, arguing that terrorist acts violate Islamic law. The Islamic scholar Shaykh Zaki Badawi argues that the atrocities of September 11, 2001 are a violation of Islamic law and ethics. Neither the people killed or injured, nor the property destroyed qualified as legitimate targets in any system of law, especially Islamic law. Sayyed Abdel-Majid Al-Khoei has described the attacks as “a criminal and barbaric act removed from every moral code and from every religious and humanitarian principle.” x In his farewell sermon, the Prophet Muhammad, addressing thousands of pilgrims at the foot of the Mount of Mercy, said: “God has made inviolable for you each other’s blood and each other’s property until you meet your Lord.” He was reminding them of the Quantico decree that to destroy the life of one individual amounts to destroying the entire human race (5:32). The Quran emphasizes that those who disturb the peace of society and spread fear and disorder deserve the severest punishment that can be imposed (5:33). x Islam prohibits any form of aggression, as well as destruction of life and property, and hence it is impossible that it permits or accepts terrorist acts. At the same time, it allows legitimate defense of life, property and national interests against aggression. Nowadays, we are witnessing what we may call the bandwagon of Islamic Terrorism. Many liberation movements, or struggles for self-determination that were once accepted as legitimate are now, after the attacks of September 11, considered terrorist simply because the actors are Muslims. This is what we are now seeing in Chechnya, Kashmir and other Islamic parts of the world where people are striving for independence or self-determination.

Terrorism and Self-Defense

x There has been a lot of disagreement concerning the definition of terrorism. A terrorist act involves two main aspects: first, the use of force and aggression against individuals, organizations or governmental establishments, second, the aim to achieve political or ideological objectives with this force. It is important to differentiate between terrorism and legitimate defense against invasion or occupation. Similarly, struggles for self-determination or liberation movements should not be classified as terrorist activities. x The contemporary definition of terrorism suffers from double standards and changes in positions with changing situations. Most Western officials, academics and media people differentiate between legitimate popular liberation movements and terrorism, depending on whether they agree or disagree with the objectives of these movements. For example, the struggle of 118 M. Abu Rashid / A Practitioner’s Thoughts About Terrorism

the Afghans against the Soviet invasion was classified as a legitimate liberation movement and enjoyed the full support of the Americans, but later it was branded a terrorist movement. Similarly, the Irish Republican Army is considered a terrorist organization in Britain, yet its leaders are often welcomed in the USA. Contributions have been collected for it, and its meetings in Boston have been attended by Senator Edward Kennedy, who was never considered to be pro-terrorist. x Another example of double standards according to changing situations is the case of the South African National Congress, which was considered an outlaw terrorist organization till it achieved its objective and brought about the downfall of the Apartheid regime. x The most effective and practical way to eliminate terrorism would be to eliminate injustice in international relations, to uphold the rule of International Law and respect the role of the United Nations in solving disputes, to devote more efforts and resources to fighting poverty and disease around the World, instead of supplying weapons to conflict parties. Democracy and respect for human rights are noble ideals, but they should be considered along with special social, religious and moral values in each particular situation. x We must differentiate between resistance and freedom fighting, on the one hand, and terrorism, on the other hand. To clarify our point, the following are some examples: in the history of the modern world, Nazi Germany saw the French Resistance as a terrorist movement, whereas the Allies and French regarded it as a liberation movement. Let us also remember the way the French themselves looked at the Algerian liberation movement, which was considered by the French as an armed terrorist movement, whereas the rest of the world identified it as a popular liberation movement. x I must emphasize that terrorism is dynamic, and its means develop and change constantly. It resorts to premeditated planning before the execution of any operation. Terrorism is a means for spreading fear and horror and resorts to murder, assassination, deprivation of individual freedoms and taking the lives of civilians and other innocent persons. x There is terrorism based on compulsion, force and coercion; terrorism based on spreading chaos, obstruction of justice and disobedience to conventional laws; and there is terrorism oriented to principles, values, psychological elements, demoralization, degradation, loss of confidence, frustration and depression. x We have to differentiate between two kinds of terrorism. There is national terrorism inside a nation, which aims to destroy the national government with a hostile organization that is funded internally. Thus, terrorist actions will only be committed within the boundaries of the nation itself. On the other hand, there is external terrorism: training, arming and financing are carried out by a different, hostile nation that executes terrorist actions through killing, bombing, airplane hijacking, threatening public buildings and spaces, assassinating government employees or their representatives, attacking and destroying infrastructures and strategic resources such as oil refineries, electric power stations, water supplies, and networks of bridges and tunnels. M. Abu Rashid / A Practitioner’s Thoughts About Terrorism 119

The Response: What Can Be Done About It?

x Understanding and responding to a series of challenges to good governance (restoring the rule of law, ensuring justice, and fighting corruption), the provision of basic amenities, e.g., clean water supplies, the eradication of poverty, lack of education, unemployment, the lack of political representation and economic opportunities throughout the world are the biggest challenges facing the Western world today. As the gulf between North and South widens, restoring the strategic balance will take many years of hard work. Until then, terrorism will have to be dealt with simultaneously at both the strategic and tactical levels. x Unlike the groups of the 1970s and 1980s, contemporary terrorist groups are multi-dimensional. They challenge governments and societies violently and through elections, financial systems and information services. Therefore, the responses of states must go beyond mere law enforcement. Nonetheless, the actions of intelligence services, police and law enforcement agencies, and the military have proved to be effective in the short term. If it is to win in the long term, the international community must develop a mix of responses, political, economic, and ideological. Even as targeting terrorist financial infrastructures can weaken terrorist capabilities, an ideological response is paramount for defeating misguided beliefs. As long as governments – especially Western liberal democracies – permit terrorist propaganda and tolerate hate speech, recruiting and support for terrorist groups will continue, and may even increase. x As contemporary groups operate across the ideological divide, cooperating across geographical borders, fighting the contemporary wave of terrorism requires a multi-branched, multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional response. Although the traditional instruments – police and intelligence services – are the most critical, they are inadequate to meet the extent and emerging challenge of terrorism. In addition to other law enforcement services – customs, immigration, coast guard, port security, airport services, and surface transportation security –, new actors should include the emergency services, the military – army, navy, and air force –, private security professionals, the mass media, educational, and religious institutions. More must be done in the areas of government security, joint training, joint and combined operations, the transfer of resources and expertise, and most of all the sharing of experience. x In addition, raising national capabilities is not just a matter of transferring funding and know-how. Instead, it also requires permanently changing the priorities of the international community to ensure that individual governments uphold their responsibilities. This will require the creation of a system of incentives and sanctions keyed to performance in such areas as terrorism financing, policing borders, and ensuring that countries deny terrorists a safe haven. Before 2001, this was done largely on a bilateral basis – or occasionally through joint efforts by a small group of nations – on an ad hoc basis. Countries that needed urgent attention because of terrorism problems got it, but the overall level of concern was limited. Despite the negotiation of a dozen international conventions relating to counter-terrorism, 120 M. Abu Rashid / A Practitioner’s Thoughts About Terrorism

monitoring compliance was done by the very few national governments with strong counter-terrorism policies. No international system for enforcing the conventions exists.

What Contributions Can Be Made by Collective Security Mechanisms Such as the UN?

x In the past the United Nations and other international organizations have had relatively little to do with counter-terrorism issues. One reason was the disagreement of most organizations as to a definition. The problem symbolized by the saying that ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ effectively kept serious movement on counter-terrorism issues from ever occurring. There is no international agency devoted exclusively to dealing with issues of counter-terrorism. This is rather astonishing, when one considers that there are multilateral organizations that deal with chemical weapons, nuclear matters of all kinds, international aviation, financial corruption, missile technology exports, etc. It is worth adding that all these various agencies have begun working on terrorism-related issues within their mandated areas of activity. Still, there is a need for an institution to do the fundamental work of ensuring that the norms of behavior regarding counter- terrorism are raised globally. x The responses of the United Nations and international organizations have had partial successes and failures. To change the strategic environment, to make it harder for terrorist groups to operate, the United Nations has played a significant role in developing twelve international conventions. In regional conflicts, notably in Palestine and Kashmir, an internationally disputed area, the United Nations has failed. In Bosnia and Afghanistan, two conflicts worsened by international neglect, the United Nations failed again. The United Nations, a white elephant that wants to be politically correct, lacks the organization and the doctrines to effectively fulfill its responsibilities. To be more relevant in the 21st century, the United Nations needs to be restructured, with greater representation in the Security Council and more power given to the Secretary General. x Without further delay, the United Nations should adopt a working definition of terrorism – the threat or the act of politically motivated violence that deliberately targets non-combatants. Also, the United Nations should launch a worldwide program to build a norm and an ethic against groups that target non-combatants. As a prelude, the UN should concentrate its efforts, exploiting its multi-lateral structure as a strength, and take a leadership role in ending conflicts and ensuring that the resulting peace processes become long- term realities. In addition, the UN should concern itself not only with international terrorism or acts of terrorism that involve citizens from more than one country, but also with terrorism within individual states. As almost all major terrorist groups have developed an external presence, the distinction between domestic and international violence has become blurred. International terrorism accounts for only 8-12% of all acts of political violence and largely affects the Western world. Often governments’ failure to effectively manage M. Abu Rashid / A Practitioner’s Thoughts About Terrorism 121

domestic violence spills over into the international arena. The UN has designated as terrorist groups only Islamic extremist groups and supporting entities, thereby angering the Muslim world. The UN must also designate as terrorist the non-Islamist groups that deliberately target non-combatants to achieve political change, thereby demonstrating a more even-handed approach in its determination to free the world of terrorism. The UN must serve to bring together those states that have offered assistance and training in capacity- building with those states that have requested assistance in their efforts to combat terrorism. x Two closing points: first, an effort to institutionalize the war on terror should avoid trying to achieve greater intelligence sharing. This oft-cited goal is best handled through bilateral intelligence channels. When national leaders try to force intelligence agencies to open their files more than the services wish to, they typically fail. Trying to yoke this goal to any other ones involving multilateral efforts will only sink the entire project. Second, the way forward for the UN and other international organizations in strategic counter-terrorism remains unclear. Large-scale initiatives will be required in such areas as (gradual) democratization, economic liberalization, economic assistance and educational reform and support. UN agencies such as UNDP and other institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and IFC may play an important role in reorienting policies to deal with these issues. A multilateral counter- terrorism organization may provide an important forum for discussion and strategy formulation. But the road is dimly lit, and it seems a fair wager that only a bold, coordinated initiative by the U.S. or, perhaps, the EU can reorient policy to address these issues on the broad basis that is required. x Ultimately, it is the member states that must combat terrorism under the aegis of the United Nations, the latter providing the necessary encouragement for them to fulfill their obligations, particularly in regard to measures stipulated under Chapter VII resolutions. 122 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

The Role of Business in the UK Policing Counter-Terrorist Effort

Jeff FOUHY Metropolitan Police Service, Scotland Yard, London, UK

Abstract. Organized terrorist groups such as the IRA require extensive networks of financial support to sustain their activities. As the nature of the terrorist threat becomes ever more serious, the recent development of legislation requiring financial institutions to positively assist in the detection of terrorist financial networks is likely to become more demanding and more sophisticated.

Keywords. Irish Republican Army, international terrorism, terrorist financial networks, law enforcement agencies

The United Kingdom has been the target of terrorist attacks since the 1970s. The primary cause has been the campaign fought by the so-called Irish Republican Army and its Unionist counterparts, which together have been responsible for the deaths of over 3800 people and the serious injury of many more. The UK has also periodically been subjected to international terrorism, such as that experienced during the Iranian Embassy Siege in 1980 or the bombing of an airplane at Lockerbie in 1988. As the level and skills of the terrorist have increased, law enforcement agencies have responded to the threat by using criminal law to counter terrorist crimes. The Metropolitan Police Service, based at New Scotland Yard in London, has been the UK leader in counter-terrorism throughout this period. It has developed a series of measures to counter terrorist activity, depending upon the level and nature of the threat, the assessment of which is reviewed continually. Police culture in the UK has traditionally depended upon an informal “contract” between the general public and the police to ensure public safety. There is an expectation that citizens will report suspicious activity to the police and that the police will undertake an investigation to determine the truth of the suspicion. Many successes against the IRA in London were achieved as a result of the vigilance of citizens reporting suspicious activities to the police. It was recognized that terrorist campaigns directed against commercial targets could not be countered by the police alone. It was necessary to engage the business community to, in effect, police itself using its own security resources. The police have assisted this process by training and briefing the business community on the nature of terrorist threats and how businesses should respond. For instance – during the early 1990s the IRA used very large Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDS) to cause maximum material loss to large commercial buildings in the financial quarter of London. In response, businesses were encouraged to harden their physical infrastructure, as well as train their staff in contingency planning and to design systems to ensure resilience to the business should a terrorist attack occur. This strategy was accompanied by a rapid increase in the use of closed circuit television cameras to J. Fouhy / The Role of Business in the UK Policing Counter-Terrorist Effort 123 increase surveillance and provide vital evidence in the event of a terrorist attack. Private security agencies have continued to expand to meet the needs of the business community which the police, due to a lack of resources and competing demands, have been unable to meet.

The Future: In recent times businesses have been subjected to intimidation and low- level attacks by single-issue campaign groups such as the so-called Animal Liberation Front which have attempted to prevent animal / medical research and dissuade companies and their employees from engaging in commercial research activities. Although law enforcement agencies have been successful in detecting such activity, it is possible that a more determined strain of single-issue group might use more violent methods in an attempt to achieve their campaign aims. It has long been recognized that organized terrorist groups such as the IRA require extensive networks of financial support to sustain their activities. The recent development of legislation requiring financial institutions to positively assist in the detection of terrorist financial networks is likely to become more demanding and more sophisticated as the nature of the terrorist threat becomes ever more serious – e.g., the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. As companies become more dependent upon technology, the effects of terrorism on such technology may have more drastic effects than have already been seen. Viral infection of the Internet is commonplace, as is the hacking of Internet sites. The use of the Internet to cause loss of life through terrorism may be a further step in the development of modern terrorism and a further risk businesses will have to overcome through continued partnership with law enforcement agencies. 124 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross- Border Cooperation

Alexander BLIGH Department of Politics of Israel and the Middle East at the College of Judea and Samaria, Israel

Abstract. The need / Computerized platforms / The original cross-border model / Dimensions / Sources / Conclusions.

Keywords. Global terrorism, linked operational intelligence centers, artificial intelligence

“We categorically reject terrorism, whatever its motivations, forms or manifestations. We are resolved to fight together, for as long as necessary, this scourge, which challenges the values that unite us, most particularly freedom founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” [1] Looking at the world through the prism of combating terrorism, three apparently unrelated processes have stood out since the beginning of the 21st century. The first is the continuing dramatic increases in computing capabilities going beyond anything previously dreamt of and, consequently, the increased use of sophisticated communications systems with rapidly decreasing costs. Put differently, at the same time that costs have decreased, the speed and quality of data transfer have increased. Second is the wave of terror committed against major centers in the West and elsewhere (New York, Madrid, London, Asia and the sub-continent of India, Sinai, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, etc.). Third is the closing of the ranks among a large number of countries to fight against a new “evil empire” of groups committing terror based on a radical interpretation of Islam. Against this background, it is of major significance to read the words of Guenther K. Weisse, a well-known German expert in the field of electronic intelligence: “The daily increasing threat posed by international terrorist groups to the United States and its allies will require future common efforts within the intelligence communities of all countries concerned with the global war against terrorism in order to collect intelligence and distribute finished intelligence throughout in a timely manner.” [2] Indeed, in spite of the ongoing attacks on existing governments and on human and civic values and ways of life, no single, universally accepted definition of terror has yet emerged. The connection between the lack of such a definition and interstate political disputes is perhaps the primary explanation for the absence of a large-scale and relatively open dialogue among all potential victim countries. Consequently, issues of political orientation and the operation of the exchange of intelligence information and the coordination of intelligence efforts should be separated. Combatants of terrorism do not usually make policy decisions; their exclusive responsibility is to give A. Bligh / An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation 125 policymakers a political stage free of the need to make critical decisions under the threat of terror. Hence, the definition of terror for operational purposes, as well as for the purposes of this paper, should be based on the assumption that terrorists use force so that victimized countries will be forced to take a policy line that they would not otherwise take. In the words of a recent article: “Global terrorism is an act including, but not limited to, the use of force or violence committed by any person or persons acting on behalf of, or in connection with any organization causing serious harm to a person or serious damage to property or a serious risk to the health or safety of the public, undertaken to influence a government or civilian populace for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.” [3] Clearly, this definition does not in any way condone the acts of particular organizations, nor does it give credibility to their political agenda. Adopting this approach would bring into the scope of the current study criminal organizations, as well as questionable bounty hunters of all persuasions, avoiding the issue of political orientation. Perhaps an economic dimension should also be added, since some of the organizations aspire to influence existing regimes by inflicting an economic catastrophe on them. The most recent and notorious example of the latter is the terrorist activities aimed at the Egyptian tourism industry in October 2004 and July 2005.

The Need

Recent terrorist activities in a score of liberal and liberalizing nation states have once again highlighted the need to share intelligence and to create a comprehensive framework to combat terrorism. This network should overcome the difficulties that countries have in talking to each other on issues of terrorism, as well as the almost impossible sharing of intelligence among agencies of the same country. The need is obvious, but it is equally evident that the growing number of threatened countries cannot, for many good reasons, develop a system acceptable to all. This study attempts to map the needs and major hurdles and offer possible solutions based on the integration of an analytical model with the most advanced technical hardware and software presently available to national entities. The approach to be adopted is that of integrating an existing computerized platform used by the US and NATO for somewhat different purposes with an original analytical model, proposed here, that could be used by all member countries of regional or supra-regional security organizations. The war against terror necessitates clear, detailed and timely intelligence. All these are basic elements of the NATO battlefield digitization process that was introduced in the late 1990s. [4] However, in those far-away pre-9/11 days, the process was intended for a somewhat old-fashioned theater of operations, such as the Balkans. Today, the collection of data and its dissemination are not just tools to be used by armed forces. The likely consumers today are security services, police forces, national banks, and last but not least armed forces. Fighting terror has, in recent years, become the first priority of all peace and freedom loving countries. However, with the growing need for a concerted effort, it is evident that there is much to be desired in terms of cooperation among these nations. The lack of common terminology, no agreed upon standards or operating models and different legal systems have made this war on terror a difficult undertaking. The 126 A. Bligh / An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation counter-terrorism effort in recent years has become a focal point for governments, NGOs, international organizations, (the most notable of them being NATO), the academic community and the media. Clearly, the US and the EU are reluctant to enlist countries that do not conform to widely accepted norms of political behavior into this war. Such countries at times label as terrorists groups and individuals that would be considered legitimate political participants in Western societies. Regardless of the fundamental differences in political philosophy among many nations threatened by terror, they all need to cooperate in the face of current terrorism and potential attacks. It is not inconceivable that Israel and Egypt, for instance, two former enemies now at peace, would cooperate through this model, very much in the way that there is now British-Russian cooperation against terror. [5] Regrettably, this is neither the time nor the forum to discuss issues relating to the legitimacy of various regimes. As long as they are willing and able to engage in anti-terrorist efforts, they should be welcome. A time of war is no time to discriminate between democracies and dictatorships. This was the case during WWII, and it should be the case now. Admission of a country to the ad hoc coalition against terror cannot and should not lead to the acceptance of non-democratic regimes in the EU. These countries should enjoy some degree of tolerance for their practices only in the framework of the war against terror. Moreover, incumbent regimes can only cooperate with their respective numbers and not with any of the opposition organizations to them.

Computerized Platforms

Attempts to share intelligence by means of computerized models have been made in recent years using three main platforms: LOCE (Linked Operational Intelligence Centers Europe), COPLINK, and R-DEx. The first links the US and its NATO allies, and the other two are used within the borders of the US. Using a combination of these three and the lessons of their application may provide a viable starting point for the model proposed here. Indeed, the difference between an academic model and a usable one lies in the ability to convert the basic features of the model into a working computerized system. In this context, one of the tools that might be studied first is that of LOCE, a system that supports intelligence operations by allowing all decision-makers to be online in near real time. This is just one of a large variety of computer-related capabilities that allow connectivity and interoperability with intelligence systems that support forces. [6] LOCE is a system operated since the early 1990s by the US European Command (USEUCOM) for imagery and information sharing between the US and its NATO allies. It includes communication resources and information systems and provides email connectivity and web access between a number of active (feeding data into the system) and passive (customers) users. All participants of the LOCE system are from NATO countries. Such a platform may serve as a paradigm to be used in a LOCE-like model of intelligence gathering, sharing and disseminating. Obviously, considering that this structure would be operated by NATO but be open to all concerned countries, it would need to be operated and administered in total isolation from the original LOCE. COPLINK [7] was developed by the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the University of Arizona in Tucson and is used by criminal justice agencies. The system is marketed commercially and includes several modules, among them: A. Bligh / An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation 127

1. A notification and collaboration tool that allows investigators to set an automatic query on a specific database object. With the inclusion of any new information, the individual user is notified. Investigators seeking the same information are notified of each other unless they request not to be notified. 2. Another component displays the links and associations found by COPLINK in a graphic display and can be adjusted to search up to eight levels for hidden links. COPLINK Visualizer can also find links between specific database objects. This feature is extremely significant if a detailed model of a terrorist attack exists (see the model discussion below). 3. An additional add-on allows temporary consolidation of data from sources that are not part of an individual COPLINK node. This feature permits sophisticated analysis of data from multiple COPLINK nodes or other data sources, such as motor vehicle records, drivers license records or even private databases. The consolidation is temporary and lasts only for the duration of the individual query. Finally, the most recent addition to the computerized solutions to the issue of collecting, disseminating and developing intelligence is R-DEx. This is a system used by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) since February 2005 in order to improve the sharing and use of data. [8] R-DEx aims to give state, local, and tribal law enforcement a degree of access to federal investigative and intelligence information. R- DEx gives detectives, investigators and analysts the ability to view linkages across multiple cases and jurisdictions. These links include individuals, vehicles, weapons, addresses, phone numbers or other types of links. The program also allows cases to be plotted onto maps in order to identify geographic patterns or links.

The Original Cross-Border Model

Building on accumulated experience in the computerized approach to the issue of intelligence collection and sharing, as well as the particular needs of the war against terror, an integrated theoretical model has been developed by this author. The following discussion will provide a common ground for the anti-terrorist effort by connecting two ostensibly opposite poles of the struggle: the need to identify all elements of the terror infrastructure and the imperative of working within the boundaries of current civil and human rights laws. When implemented, the model would provide all involved countries and their respective anti-terror agencies with a standardized model that would enable them all to use identical terminology. In essence, the concept is not very different from the ISO approach,1 only in this case it is not intended as a safeguard on a production line, but rather as a means to create an accepted standard for the exchange of intelligence and the assessment of the stages of a planned or executed terrorist act. The methodology proposed is both preemptive and punitive. It aims to identify terrorists and to stop their activities, and failing that, the model should provide a framework for attempting to capture them. The proposed method aims to break down each terrorist incident into its smallest elements, endeavoring through appropriate

1 The ISO (International Standards Organization) does not produce standards, but provides a means of verifying that a proposed standard has met certain requirements for due process, consensus, and other criteria by those developing the standard. The use of ISO has become widespread in the fields of production, consulting, etc. In the current model a “reverse engineering” approach is used. 128 A. Bligh / An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation software to find associations and commonalities among certain actions and their stages. Each piece of information is categorized, and a warrant is issued for the next stage. The model is the result of the initial work with, and ongoing updating by, a team of practitioners and academicians. The model follows the idea of a terrorist action from a mere idea to its completion – apprehension and prosecution of the perpetrators. Each stage leaves a typical trail – paper trail, stolen cars, money transfers and people found where they do not belong, etc. All these would be followed and reported in order to keep the model updated and to issue warnings when the accumulated data point toward a tangible indication of terrorist activity. The model assumes full cooperation by local/national law enforcement agencies along with international agencies. It is also built on the assumption that all agencies share the same information, at times the gist of the information, but not scenarios and tactics. To allow a central distribution center to follow the model, it is to be established by an international security organization. This model endeavors to operate on three interwoven dimensions:

Dimension One:

1. Goal: Identify as many elements as possible of the terrorist infrastructure and its operation: from the mere idea to the detonation of the bomb, the hijacking or the suicide bombing. 2. Characterization of personnel: This comparative study will be carried out by teams and sub-teams composed of academicians and terror experts. 3. Methodology: This part will be based upon the accumulated experience of foiled terrorist attacks and the unfortunate cases that were studied post mortem. The team will also collect data from existing literature and will conduct field research consisting of interviews with apprehended and convicted terrorists, and with anti-terror experts. This body of evidence will be tabulated, compared and analyzed, including all early warning signs that were ignored in the past. This will produce a master matrix of a flow chart of a terrorist event. 4. End product: The main outcome of this part will be a generic model of a terrorist attack, along with its early warning signals, i.e., we will try to break the terrorist puzzle into the smallest components, so that once transmitted to law enforcement agencies each would have the means to identify the degree of threat and the level of preparations from each piece of information. Put together, this step may be regarded as the creation of a manual on terrorism intended to serve each combatant, from the commander-in-chief almost down to the individual fighter.

Dimension Two:

Sources – airport, bank and other surveillance camera images should be automatically compared to images in existing databases of known and suspected terrorists. A successful model is based on a thorough analysis of the records of border control posts, private aircraft movements, reports relating to large transfers of money, interrogation records of captured terrorists, etc. A. Bligh / An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation 129

1. Goal: Assigning responsibilities. The detailed model described in part 1 will be followed by a list of law enforcement and other governmental agencies responsible for each stage and each information-gathering effort and every measure to prevent terrorist attacks. 2. Characterization of personnel: Anti-terror experts, our own and others, representing existing agencies from NATO countries, and political science personnel specializing in public administration, joined by legal experts who will carefully examine the legality of each of the above-mentioned efforts. 3. Methodology: This part will be based upon the accumulated experience of experts responsible for setting up intelligence units and other applicable agencies. The team will also collect data from the existing literature and conduct field research consisting of interviews with members of similar units in governmental agencies in NATO member countries, present and future. All organizations currently engaged in anti-terror activities, along with their assigned and actual responsibilities, will be listed, and their current contribution to the effort will be assessed in terms of their compatibility with other agencies within NATO. Documents proposing the creation of new agencies that never materialized will also be studied. This body of evidence will be compared and integrated into the model presented in Dimension One. 4. End product: A model of a division of responsibilities reflecting the current needs of anti-terrorist agencies based on the model, and a model of information gathering, including targets, methods, sources and a permanent and changing list of information priorities. One of the by-products of this stage should be a categorized list of required pertinent information relating to international terrorism. This may in turn lead to the compilation of a world dictionary of relevant terms and expressions required for the counter-terrorism effort. The model will map likely targets and integrate their data with that coming from all security systems employed by regulated institutions like banks. Applying this stage will contribute to the development of the means to stop terrorist operations from taking place at any stage, with attention obviously being given to the early stages.

Dimension Three:

1. Goal: Providing the legal basis for the anti-terrorist effort. 2. Characterization of personnel: Joint teams of legal and anti-terror experts will collect all pertinent pieces of legislation, laws and regulations from current and future NATO members. 3. Methodology: The efforts described in Dimension One and Two need to operate hand-in-hand with current legislation relating to civil and human rights in NATO countries. These will be analyzed from the viewpoint of the models previously presented. Additionally, agreements and discrepancies among the relevant countries will be highlighted in terms of their contribution to helping or hampering the joint effort to fight terrorism. The models detailed will be followed by the legal basis for their implementation. This will provide the legal basis for any action taken along the way, from the collection of data to the actual apprehension of suspects and the seizure of material, using current civil and human rights imperatives prevailing in NATO countries. 130 A. Bligh / An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation

4. End product: A legal manual detailing for all anti-terrorist elements the legal environment in which they operate. The manual will elaborate on the safe steps that can be taken, broken down by individual countries, and the cases in which legal advice is necessary. All three dimensions will together produce an ANTI-TERRORIST TOOLBOX consisting of: 1. a terror manual (to include: a generic model of the operation of a terrorist network and a list of early-warning indicators); 2. an information-gathering model (including: responsible bodies, a generic list of essential information, a glossary of terminology); and finally: 3. a legal handbook including the breakdown of the legal basis of operations by countries.

Sources

The overall end product of this model would be the establishment of a NATO clearing house of information that would enable law enforcement agencies, on a regular basis, to classify the degree of risk and operate within the imperatives of all pertinent laws while enjoying the best available information. The model will also require a team of communications and computer experts as advisors on all three dimensions, as well as computing all collected data and drawing computerized conclusions. Transforming the model into a working solution that could respond to the growing need for coordinated efforts against terror would require setting up a central intelligence operations room (CIOR). One of the main responsibilities of the CIOR would be to detect any attempt to infiltrate the system; its staff would have access to all systems through “back doors” in order to be able to shut down the system if any hostile attempt were detected. The intelligence operations center would work in tandem with the dynamic manual of the anti-terror model. That manual would enable the distribution of data, along with its initial analysis and recommendations for action. The CIOR would operate the system on a 24/7 basis. Staff would come from all countries involved in the project. The CIOR would distribute each piece of information to the member countries with its standing in relation to the model and indicating what data should be collected by the members in order to develop the initial data into a workable piece of intelligence. Concurrently, each member country would be allowed, with no strings attached, to access the data, raw or processed, and attempt to fit it into its own national intelligence picture. Each country would have the right, or rather the obligation, to actively participate in entering information into the system. Over time, it should be determined if a minimal volume of contributed data should be required in order for a country to keep full-member status. Each country would also have to undergo a periodical evaluation process in order to assess the credibility of its information. In time, this criterion would determine the success or failure of the system. A decision that should eventually be made is whether the identity of a contributing country should be made available to all other members, or whether there should be a certain pre-defined relationship between a security classification and the identity of the contributing country. In any case, subscribing to the system would entail full adherence to a strict code of secrecy. A. Bligh / An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation 131

The model is to be operated on commercial workstations and notebook computers. The software, based on a popular operating system, should run on each of these, along with handheld computers. Consequently, the hardware and the software, including common browsers, should be easy to operate and not require a long learning process. These specifications are vital if the system is to be used in real time and during hot pursuit. Still, it should be made clear that under no circumstances can the ground operatives merge national intelligence networks with the network proposed here. The task of entering information into the system should be assigned to a single unit qualified for this responsibility. Setting up such a system is far less complicated today than it would have been in the past. Today it can and should build on the use of communication satellites, broadband and cellular communications. All these combined can provide even the smallest team on the ground with real time, or near real time, intelligence, even if its source is thousands of miles away. Obviously, as already noted, the one and only prerequisite is an acceptable level of skill in reading, writing and conversing in English. Applying a cross-border model involves a number of hurdles; overcoming them is the key to the smooth application of the model. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these is the issue of a common language. Even before discussing common terminology and associations, the basic issue of a lingua franca should be raised. A model such as the one proposed here should be used mainly by countries committed directly or indirectly to the Western concept of combating terrorism. Consequently, the obvious conclusion is that all countries involved should cooperate in putting together a basic course in “anti-terror English.” Participation by representatives of a given country in this basic course will constitute a prerequisite for participation in the program based on the model. A second set of future obstacles in implementing the model has to do with the various, at times conflicting, laws of privacy and banking in the participating countries. Additionally, each national security service has its own classification system, which at times would render some pieces of information unsuitable for use in a multi-national security system. At times, even the same piece of information, when passed through several agencies within the same country, would receive a different security classification. One possible approach to resolving this issue is by an agreement that each country would contribute data in accord with its own national laws and security classifications, while it would be allowed to obtain any information available from the cross-national pool. All information stored in the system would be accessible to all and could be transformed into operational orders by all without the need to obtain further consent from any of the other participants. This depends on the understanding that all countries would contribute accurate information and not use the model as still another sophisticated tool of subversion and intelligence warfare against any other country within or outside of the system. In time, it would become evident if some countries enjoyed benefits disproportional to their contributions, and that could necessitate some modifications of the system. Another concern has to do with the net assessment of the information contributed to and drawn from the general pool. Each country has its own way of evaluating data that may differ from that of other participating countries. Thus, no single assessment would be imposed upon any member country. Each country would integrate the pieces into its own intelligence jigsaw in any way it saw fit. 132 A. Bligh / An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation

Essentially, the success or failure of any model depends to a large degree on the extent of cooperation among the parties. There is no question that the existence of hundreds of agencies worldwide that do not talk to each other makes some of the intelligence gathered useless. Still, there is no point in complaining about national governments, since the US itself took a full two years after 9/11 to consolidate all the “watch lists” of suspects of all governmental agencies into a single authoritative list to be used by all cleared personnel. [9] Intelligence sharing is perhaps the one issue that stands out as a possible major stumbling block for the approach proposed here. Only now, in the post 9/11 era, is the United States beginning to develop ways of communication among its 15 existing intelligence agencies, so that they will start sharing their information on a regular basis. [10] Another significant issue is that of human rights. The model should be consistent with the strictest norms of human and civil rights. Concurrent with the technological revolution, many countries have adopted stricter privacy laws, recognizing the right to privacy as a constitutional right. Even Israel, which has not been able to create a comprehensive constitution, has recognized this right as constitutional in a basic law (to be integrated into the constitution in the future) and adopted a privacy law. The conflict between the right of the citizen to security, on one hand, and the need to give up some civil liberties, on the other, goes back centuries. One of the notable writers on this conflict is the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes in the late 16th -early 17th century. However, since no single universally accepted solution has ever been found, the model need not aspire to develop one. It should simply make a decision on a case- by-case basis. An elaborate anti-terrorist model might, given the right circumstances, be used against any citizen of any country. Moreover, the European Union, a major member of NATO, has in recent years led the global trend toward stricter checks and balances on the use of force and guarding individual rights. However, it should be made clear to all participants that non-citizens found illegally on the sovereign territory of any of the countries are not eligible to invoke all constitutional rights enjoyed by full citizens and legal aliens. The problem of dealing with the issue of the constitutionality of collecting data and sharing it with allies touches upon another sensitive area: should the system be limited to data collected outside the country and on foreigners only? It is understandable that no country wants to exchange information on its own citizens; however, as the July 2005 incidents in London teach us, there is no way of escaping this issue. The system will integrate law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies, putting issues of domestic and international terror on the same footing. Thus, the attempt to make the system as tight as possible requires the inclusion of all pertinent agencies and their own intelligence. Clearly, intelligence acquired from a bank surveillance camera in country A may provide the missing piece of the terrorism puzzle for country B. The model proposed here is indeed a major undertaking in itself. Nevertheless, it cannot provide perfect security and can only supplement other methods and approaches used by a variety of anti-terrorist organizations. Moreover, it is evident that over- dependence on computer capabilities may lead to over-exposure to hackers and cyber- terrorists. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that the system be protected on the webmaster level, as well as on the individual-user level. It is imperative that system security not be compromised, since it contains the anti-terror secrets of many different nations, and not just those of a single organization or nation. A. Bligh / An Analytical Model of Anti-Terror Cross-Border Cooperation 133

Conclusion

The war against terror cannot be won by a single means. Victory will be the outcome of a concerted effort that overcomes political divisions and emphasizes a common denominator: no government should be forced to make decisions under the threat of terror. This model is perhaps another tool to enable all concerned countries to share intelligence, some of its operational conclusions and the ongoing study of lessons for the future. Simply put, this is perhaps the first attempt ever to conceptualize the war against terror along standardized lines through the introduction of a dynamic model of assessment and action. “Integration works” is the lesson of the US since 9/11; it should be studied and developed by the international community as well.

References

[1] NATO (2004). Declaration on terrorism issued at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council Foreign Ministers Session held in Brussels. M2 Presswire. Coventry: April 2, 2004, 1. [2] Weisse, G. (2003). War on Global Terrorism – Will Europe Require a Common Intelligence Structure? World Security Network. December 5, 2003, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/ showArticle3.cfm?article_id=8793. [3] Player Jr., T.A., Skipper, H.D., Lambert, J. (2002). A global definition of terrorism. Risk Management 49, no. 9 (September 2002), 60. [4] Pengelley, R. (1998). Beating the bandwidth bugbear. Jane’s Defence Weekly. (June 10, 1998), 1. [5] Hoge, W. (2001). Blair and Putin Agree to Begin Exchange of Intelligence Data. New York Times (Late Edition, East Coast). December 23, 2001, 1A.11. [6] http://www.fas.org/irp/program/process/jdiss.htm; Updated January 26, 2000. [7] http://www.coplink.net/products.htm; Atabakhsh, H., Larson, C., Petersen, T., Violette, C., Chen, H. (2005). Information Sharing and Collaboration Policies within Government Agencies, unpublished paper. [8] FBI Announces Operational Status of its National Information Sharing System, FBI Press release, June 27, 2005; http://www.fbi.gov./pressrel/ pressrel05/niss062705.htm. [9] Database will unite agencies’ terrorist lists, USA Today, September 17, 2003, News, 5A. [10] Thompson, L.D. (2003). Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing within the United States. Testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, December 8, 2003, http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/ thompson/20031208.htm. 134 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies

Olga A. VORKUNOVA & David HOVHANNESIAN Center for Development and Peace Studies FORUM and Russian Academy of Peace, Russia

Abstract. Introduction / What is terrorism? / Towards a definition of terrorism / On the problem of co-operation and collaboration in the South Caucasus region in the struggle against international terrorism / Conclusions.

Keywords. Caucasus, Chechnya, fundamentalism, Russia, Terrorism

Introduction

The early years of the twenty-first century were violently shaken by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA. Societies around the world must now learn to cope with the challenge of terrorism. The end of the Cold War, the globalization process, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent transition from command-driven to capitalist economies in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have transformed the structures of international politics. These changes have coincided with an acceleration of the movement towards regional integration and with the internal collapse of many countries. Almost everywhere in the world they have revealed a crisis of national sovereignty and called into question the very mechanisms of international regulation. The break-up of the former Soviet Union awakened hopes of a new international order, which were linked with plans to reform United Nations organizations and establish new institutional mechanisms. The enormous challenges of worldwide violence and criminality as driving forces of disruption have been a major factor in the resurgence of political chaos, civil wars and humanitarian disasters in the former Yugoslavia and many ex-republics of the former Soviet Union. The classical geopolitical representations of international relations – strategic competition between the Soviet Union and the USA – the ‘East- West’ or even ‘North-South’ divides – are now obsolescent. The Cold War has been replaced by a ‘network war’ between the rich West, symbolized by the ‘gold billion’, and those who regard themselves as being excluded from the benefits of international development. The start of the ‘network war’ has clearly increased the willingness of governments to face international terrorism with different forms of co-ordination in an effort to stop the spread of international anarchy. Despite this more cooperative environment, however, the number of terrorist acts around the world has not decreased. Terrorist activity has heightened the awareness that simply ending Cold War hostility is not the same as building a secure post-Cold War peace. O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 135

Terrorist acts at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries have produced ever greater numbers of victims, unprecedented catastrophes and enormous human suffering worldwide. In response to the new terrorist attacks, the international community has demonstrated its will to suppress violence through enforcement mechanisms such as the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the support of democracy in turbulent zones. But these efforts have largely failed to counteract terror and steer the complex systems of organized networks from outside. They have facilitated the production and utilization of knowledge on how terrorism affects the current functioning of international relations in a context that has changed enormously since the end of the bipolar world. However, the notion of terrorism as a manifestation of violence has its limitations and has a high potential for mythification. The resurgence of the demons of terror and the spread of hatred and violence in Europe and the USA against immigrants from the Muslim/Arab world and in Russia against immigrants from the Caucasus underline the need to reexamine modern terrorism and to trace its social and political roots. The prevention of terrorism has become an urgent issue and has made it essential to precisely define this phenomenon. International agreement on a definition of modern terrorism as a threat to security and democracy would be of considerable value to policy-makers. It would help in formulating policy recommendations for counter-terror measures.

What Is Terrorism?

Terrorism is ultimately about destabilization and disruption causing chaotic, disorganized conditions. It is conceived to include systems of disorder at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of deterrence and intimidation has transnational repercussions and affects the many unstable political systems that have been caught up in the proliferating networks of an increasingly interdependent world. Reviews of the literature generally conclude that the term ‘terrorism’ is used in a wide variety of ways and has many different meanings. There is, however, a baseline agreement that terror refers to something horrifying, and its dictionary entry defines it as a term for intense, overpowering fear. It can be seen as a threat to, or an act of violence against, civilians. Even if one does not accept the pessimistic views of some analysts that virtually all the unstable regions of the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and the Caucasus are rapidly drifting toward chaos, the destabilizing effects of post-Cold War international trends – increasing economic competition and the resulting national dislocations, a fundamental shift in the relations linking states, markets and societies, declining state authority and legitimacy, rising pressures for political participation, the dramatic increase in societal complexity which results from the growing functional differentiation of institutional orders, spreading terrorism and the like – will continue to heighten the danger of violence in many countries and regions. The spread and escalation of terrorism and its self-regulation of complex systems in turbulent environments makes it problematic for major countries outside these regions to expect that they will be able to avoid facing the issue of terrorism. Ever since the French Bourgeois revolution, the term ‘terrorism’ has been widely, if not exclusively, associated with political violence. Although the literature devoted to terrorism as a phenomenon often equates the term with violence within individual 136 O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies states, it is clearly part of a broader attempt to find new ways of characterizing global trends in international relations. The essence of terrorism is its focus on mechanisms of deterrence that do not depend on recourse to the authority and sanctions of the state, with its monopoly of legitimate coercive power. Those who committed terrorist violence in the nineteenth century avoided using the term and quite often claimed that they were fighting for justice and freedom. In the 1970s, terrorist organizations stressed the political content of their actions rather than the terrorist content [1] (p. 138). When studying terrorism it is impossible to ignore the psychological and emotional factors that play a major role in this context. A common justification for terrorism is, for example, the argument that it can promote social justice and the general welfare. What distinguishes conventional terrorism from the modern sort of terrorist attacks is the mass character of terrorist acts. The difference between these two types resides in the way their respective victims are conceptualized – whether they are conceived of as naturally inhuman targets, as civilians, or as their ideological and political opponents, be it a state, an empire or a commonwealth. Political terrorism legitimates the practice of violence. It constitutes an ideology that ‘naturalizes’ and thereby aims to neutralize specific patterns of modernity. According to Richard Falk, in American and Israeli political discourse terrorism has been associated with anti-state forms of violence that are regarded as so criminally reprehensible that any method of enforcement and retaliation is viewed as acceptable and beyond criticism. [2] (p. 18). The danger of terrorism lies in its domestic consequences: from violence committed against a foreign ruler, it has become violence committed against one’s own people. Terrorists resort to the use of violence when their goals cannot be realized by other means. The concept of terrorism refers to a complex set of tools and actors. Its variety cannot be reduced to specific types or ways of committing terrorist attacks. In a world undergoing many national transitions from one economic and political system to another, for example, change, tensions and political turmoil can have positive as well as negative results. The complexity of the problem also results from the ambiguity of different persons’ perceptions of legitimacy, the variety of their estimations of social, economic, political factors and ways of development in human society. Persons who choose the strategy of terror start with rather original representations of the necessity of change in existing society and, not recognizing any other methods, try to achieve their aims by sowing violence and death. The main problem for policymakers is the lack of a set of interpretive categories in terms of which reports of emerging terrorist attacks can be assessed and judged. There is a psychological tendency to either interpret terror in familiar terms, or to filter out its unfamiliar or unconventional aspects. Terrorism is ultimately concerned with threats or acts of violence, but it can also be seen as a reaction to oppression and injustice. In cases where the majority of the population lives in constant threat of regimes guilty of torture, execution, disappearances and brutal prison treatment of suspected dissidents, terrorist attacks tend to be a response to state violence. Throughout the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century, we have witnessed a process of mythification of warfare which has justified an unprecedented unleashing of state violence and its civil-society counterpart, indiscriminate killing. Acts of terrorism of both state and civil origin draw inspiration from an ideology in which such deeds acquire a quasi-mythical dimension. Another dimension is the purely technological factor of the new military and communication O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 137 resources that greatly enhance both the human capacity for destruction and its resultant terrorist effects. Analysis of the problem of terrorism cannot be restricted to legal frameworks. It demands taking into account psychological, social, political and other factors in order to understand the incentives, motives, organizational/technical skills or financial support of terrorists. Terrorism is a form of political violence exacerbated by structural deficiencies such as a lack of democracy and an unjust distribution of national wealth, and it is legitimized by religious convictions. It is governed by an instrumental logic. Terror is increasingly becoming one of the chief means of struggle for political ends, whether it is intended to disrupt and undermine the political system of a certain country or to create a worldwide empire. However, its chief characteristic is the destruction of the established legal order and the sowing of chaos with the aim of establishing a new order. If we start from a given definition of terrorism as a phenomenon essentially connected with criminality, instead of with various forms of opposition, liberation movements and revolts, then the fight against this phenomenon should be based in the field of international criminal law. The spread of terrorism as an international threat is linked to the process of globalization. Indeed, globalization has given terrorism its international character. As we have seen, the network character of international interdependence in a world marked by increasingly extended and rapidly changing patterns of interaction makes it susceptible to the traditional network structures of terrorist organizations. This complicates the development of countermeasures that meet the requirements of well- timed action. Modern terrorism is international in scope; it differs in terms of the resources that terrorists can mobilize, the terror training camps, the weapons suppliers and the perpetrators of terrorist acts. Modern terrorists practice a division of labor across many organizations and at many levels within their heterarchic mode of coordination. They are organized in the form of cells, the modern units that become a matter of cultural-ideological identity for their incorporated members. The main difference between modern terrorism and other conventional forms is its truly mass character, hi-tech forms and operational methods. The problem of modern terrorism is connected with challenges to ‘world cities’ and with major urban change that is hierarchical in nature. The city is arguably the prime target for terrorist attacks. Larger cities are commercial centers where corporate headquarters and leading banks are located. They are key nodes in a ‘global network’. Globalization takes place in cities, and cities embody and symbolize globalization. Contemporary urban dynamics are the spatial expression of globalization [3] (p.9). The ‘city civilization’, with major cities becoming the ‘command and control centers of the global economy’ [4], is also becoming the target of acts of terrorism. Information about terrorist operations is increasingly becoming worldwide in scope as the mass media widely report on it. Exerting psychological influence is becoming the central goal of terrorist attacks. Every exercise in terrorization is multiplied by the mass media. Gradually terrorism and criminality are becoming professional and highly-paid activities, and simultaneously effective means of exerting pressure to gain power. Terrorism takes several forms: state terrorism, religious and national intolerance, political terrorism. Terrorists express themselves through violent attacks against the armed forces and police, and against anyone whom they regard as betraying their ideals. Militarism is becoming their chief raison d’être. They view themselves as guerrilla fighters openly challenging federal power (as in Chechnya, Ingushetia, 138 O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies

Daghestan) or the State (as in Sri Lanka). They are becoming the men and women of the hour in the mass media, especially in television reportage. The more militant the group is, the more effective the terrorists seem to be in performing their vital function of advancing their goals. The conception of extreme violence justifies “a certain form of nihilism, the exaltation of sacrifice by perpetrators who see themselves as the chosen ones who are insensitive to and even scornful of the victims” [5] (p. 475). Johan Galtung describes this particular feature as the Chosenness-Glory-Trauma syndrome (CGT). He writes: “At the level of the individual this would be a person with a mandate from God, with glory waiting in the future, deeply marked and marred by trauma, real or imagined, inflicted by Others. There is a certain inner logic in this: he who has God’s markings on his forehead is predestined to something Great. But he will also evoke enormous Envy in evil others, wanting to get him” [6] (p. 23). Thus, a high degree of militancy is the keynote of the organization of terrorist movements, although the underground character of the movement, the cell type of organization and the ban on their activities make such movements immensely attractive to youth. Idealistic youth are challenging many of the established norms of modern society. Extreme violence is a form of revolt against the principal assets of the capitalist system and its ability to stimulate desires and needs for material consumption. “Violence then becomes an instrument of communion with the higher principle invoked in justifying it, a higher principle that effectively transcends the vulgar world.” Terrorists “see themselves as the chosen ones and are insensitive to and even scornful of the victims” [5] (p. 475). When citizens become increasingly dependent on them, terrorists become a more open political force with clear-cut political targets. Socially and institutionally, they look forward to establishing themselves as representatives of a cultural identity. Not socio-political needs alone are the forces that increasingly integrate terrorist groups into the social life of populations. It should be understood that a mythopolitics based on international terrorism as a phenomenon, rather than a certain form of international organization, is a social radicalism/revolt that is calling into question many of the ideological foundations of postmodern society. The “archetype of total violence is the violence unleashed by radical religious groups” such as, for example, radical Islam [5] (p. 475). These radical religious groups differ from violent secular groups on several counts: their violence is termed ‘a sacramental act or divine duty’ and an end, while that of secular groups is a means. Extreme state violence has provoked its counterpart, oppositional violence. Thus, we see a mythification of the war against international terrorism, which is viewed as the major threat to the modern state. After the wars in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, it is difficult to distinguish state warfare from terrorism by claiming that the latter disregards the rules and conventions of warfare, targets civilians and is always indiscriminate and arbitrary. For these characteristics can also be found in many different forms of contemporary state violence. The modern Western mass media, oriented to the passions of the individual person, to everything out of the ordinary, to events that rarely occur in mundane daily life, to violence, to sensationalism, provide a favorable environment for the spread of terrorism, for constantly drawing attention to it. The flood of violence is being absorbed into the consciousnesses of millions of people, creating enduring stereotypes. As a result, the stereotype of terrorism is becoming a commonplace phenomenon for civilian populations. Thus the mass media are guided by the aim to win as much O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 139 support as possible from most of the population and to justify the emphasis on violence and methods of reporting news with a basic stress on conflicts, wars, disasters and destruction. This “journalism of war” in the press, on TV and radio is itself creating a demand for violence, insinuating itself into the public consciousness and gratifying its hunger for sensationalism. Terrorism is being transformed into a marketable commodity. As Isabelle Sommier argues, “the exercise of violence feeds on an ideology lending such acts a quasi-mystical dimension” [5] (p. 475). The social background of modern terrorism is anomie, which is the deactivation of a society’s laws and basic moral norms. Thus, while the legal order continues to exist, it acquires a mythical character. Formally everything continues to operate in accordance with the established laws: the police continue to perform their duties, the judicial system functions as before, the government still carries on its tasks; yet the population is no longer orientated to official law and order, but instead to game rules which deviate greatly from those of formal legality. Describing the conditions of modern (post-modern society), Johan Galtung argues that, “political violence, today referred to as ‘terrorism’, may be a problem of structures/cultures partly of the past. Today the problem may be that there is no structure/culture at all and that violence, hurting and harming, is erupting everywhere as a consequence of social disorganization” [7] (p. 17). The actions of power-holders, bureaucrats or administrations are invested with a ritual character, and their behavior is subordinated to the developed state of affairs. The social disorganization of a society is expressed in a breakdown of functional interactions between people [8] (p. 19). Terrorism and criminality are symptoms of social disorganization, a breakdown of social relations resulting from the discrepancy between common cultural expectations and the socially legitimate ways and means to achieve them [9] (p. 134). Opportunities for the satisfaction of essential needs are limited in a world characterized by perversity, criminality and anomie resulting from the humiliation of one pole of the social structure by the perversity, criminality and anomie rooted in the luxury and wastefulness of its other pole [10] (p. 403). As centuries-old practice shows, illegal means of achieving ends often seem the most effective. An economy based on the principles of free competition, that is on the efforts of individuals to profit by exploiting the mistakes of others, gives rise to a need for massive disasters, destruction and, as a consequence, acts of extreme violence. In the social reality of a modern, heterogeneous society, favorable conditions arise for the suspension of laws and moral norms, for criminal behavior, for terrorism as a method of effecting change, instability and conflicts. Thus, the increasing segmentation of society, the decline of basic social communication, the growing complexity of society, the poverty of general customs, traditions and beliefs, generate disrespect for the existing norms of morals and laws, and legal nihilism becomes a norm and a major regulator of behavior. Anomie is a breeding ground for terrorism. A person experiencing anomie is spiritually sterile, cares only for himself and has no sense of obligations. He exists on a thin dividing line between disbelief in the future and the oblivion of the past [11] (p. 84, 85). The parallel archetype is the suitable environment for the development of criminality. Therefore, if it is a question of ways to contain and prevent terrorism, it would be naive to think that the simple isolation of perpetrators, including terrorists, or their 140 O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies physical destruction, could eradicate this phenomenon. Modern society reproduces criminals and terrorists on a growing scale and in an infinite sequence. Perpetrators always have an ultimate goal and an addressee for their actions. The ultimate goal of political terrorism is to influence either a government’s domestic policy (to secure the release of imprisoned activists, to prevent a law from being passed, to promote secession) or its foreign policy, in the interest of a ‘sponsoring’ state. Moreover, the victims of terrorism are subdivided into ‘targets’: innocent victims and those to whom the mass destruction of people is addressed. Democracy creates an extremely favorable environment for terrorism to flourish, because in the majority of states it represents another form of political domination, with dominant elites supported by financial and industrial magnates or, drawing on Max Weber’s terminology, ‘plebiscitary dictatorship’. The attacks of 7 July 2005 in London provoked a wave of Islamophobia as an aspect of xenophobia in Great Britain, with increased dislike and distrust of immigrants from Muslim countries. In combination with the fear of terrorist attacks committed by radical Islamists, this dehumanizes Islam. “The term ‘fundamentalism’ has conventionally been reserved for describing anti-modern, neotraditionalist religious phenomena and movements interpreted as a reaction to socio-economic and cultural modernization” [12] (p. 27). “Like ‘terrorism’, ‘fundamentalism’ is a term usually reserved for Other ... Fundamentalism polarizes, dehumanizes, verminizes Other and bolsters Self. Fundamentalism provides ideal legitimation for employment of even extreme violence, say, against defenseless civilians by bombing from above (state terrorism) or from below (terrorism), thereby numbing both terrorists to the suffering of Other” [6] (p. 25). The rise of Islamophobia in the USA and Europe is a manifestation of the fear of potential terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists and extremists. Modernity, with its growing mobility, has spread this problem more widely than ever before. A similar process is unfolding in Russia. A new type of specter now haunts Russian politics: ‘Caucasophobia’. A latent resentment or ‘feeling’, an attitude that underlies pervasive hostility and distrust of Chechens and other strangers from the South and North Caucasus can prepare the ground for pogroms. But in itself, this hostile approach, based on the fear of potential terrorist attacks by Chechen insurgents, does not fall within the purview of the law and legal prevention. The police now regularly require all persons of Caucasian appearance to present their identity documents.

Towards a Definition of Terrorism

The first normative definition of ‘terrorism’ was adopted in international law by the League of Nations in 1937. It concluded that it consisted of “all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public” [5] (p. 473). Russian political theory uses the term terrorism to refer to political violence. Russian legal experts on terrorism are of the opinion that only the state, with its formal institutions, possesses a monopoly of legitimate coercive power, including violent actions. The most detailed review of attempts to define terrorism in Russia was undertaken by V. Emeljanov in his book Terrorism and Crimes with Patterns of O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 141

Terrorism. Rightly pointing to the significant difficulties in the construction of a universal definition of terrorism, he lists four distinctive characteristics of terrorism: the creation of a real danger menacing a non-specified number of victims; the public character of its commission; the deliberate inducement of states of fear, depression and stress not for the sake of producing fear, but rather for other purposes; and lastly, it is performed in such a way that socially harmful violence is directed against a certain person or property, but produces a psychological effect intended to influence another target’s behavior in its interest. Terrorism consists in publicly committed, socially harmful actions or threats meant to terrorize the civilian population or social groups. It is intended to influence, directly or indirectly, the target’s decisions/policies or to prevent a decision from being adopted. However, there are several inconsistencies in this definition [13]. Morozov, a Russian legal scholar stresses that according to Emeljanov’s definition the preparation for war in Chechnya was not an act of terrorism, and he points as well to the contrary thesis that this activity has a public character, although it could also occur behind closed doors [14] (p. 42). When terrorism has a domestic character and refers to the practice of violence directed against the civilian population or the state authority within a certain country, it is subject to the criminal laws of the state. Thus, the Russian Criminal Code contains Article 205, ‘Terrorism’, which specifies that terrorist acts include: detonating explosions, committing arson or other actions resulting in a danger of serious physical harm to other people, causing significant property damage or aiming at other socially dangerous consequences, if these actions are performed with an intent to infringe on public safety, intimidate the population or exert influence on decision-making, and also the threat to commit the specified actions for the same purposes, which will be punished by imprisonment for a term of from five to ten years. A list of circumstances follows qualifying the commission of the given crime, among which aggravating factors (especially severe consequences) can increase the punishment by imprisonment for between ten and twenty additional years [14] (p. 42). In the Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On the Fight Against Terrorism,” adopted on June 25, 1998, the list of types of terrorist acts is more extensive than in the Criminal Code: Causing explosions, committing arson, or the use of or threat to use nuclear explosive devices, radioactive, chemical, biological explosives, toxic, noxious, aggressive or poisonous substances; the destruction, damaging, or seizure of vehicles or other facilities; the attempt on the life of a statesman or public figure or representative of national, ethnic, religious or other population groups; the seizure of hostages and kidnapping; the creation of a danger of harm to the life, health or property of an nonspecific range of people by creating the conditions for accidents and man-made disasters or the real threat of the creation of such a danger; the dissemination of threats in any form and by any means; other actions creating a danger of loss of life, significant damage to property, or other socially dangerous consequences. [14] (p. 64- 65). The concept of terrorism in a legal expert community is considered as a certain class of crimes committed at any time in a given place (in a country, region or city). We shall address the definition of the Russian scholar I.A. Kirillov, who argues that terrorism is a class of crimes of terrorist character committed within a specific period. The characteristic of terrorism is violence against persons or groups of people intended for the intimidation of the population or of a group of persons in order to induce or maintain a social-psychological atmosphere of fear with a view toward influencing the 142 O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies state, organizations, or a group of persons to accept or reject any given decision. A terrorist organization (community) is an organization serving the purposes of terrorism or recognizing the opportunity for its use in carrying out crimes of a terrorist character [15] (p. 11-12). Usually the term is used to refer to criminality. Terrorism is applied as a qualitative category for the designation of a criminal condition in a society as a whole or its parts, together with an evaluation of public morals and a sense of justice, a condition of civil security. The growth of criminality, the growth of terrorism characterize first of all a condition of a society, the attitude of a society as a whole to offenses committed within it, whether it is indifferent to or intolerant of them. International terrorism is a complex phenomenon of a political-legal character. The broad applicability of the term, its reference to basic problems of political violence (including efficiency and legitimacy), and its lack of a rational explanation for why civilian victims, not directly involved in conflicts, are attacked, have made it useful to a growing number of participants in the expert debate. International terrorism, although receiving increasing attention, remains a by no means transparent phenomenon; it has not been explained, and there is no adequate joint action against and control of it. At the same time, many people around the world are shocked and frightened by terrorism, since it can strike anyone at any time or place. Governments in turn are not in a position to work out effective means of fighting this threat and reaching agreement on its nature. There is an extensive literature devoted to terrorism, but the innumerable scholarly studies have not led to international agreement on the definition of this concept. Despite the recent currency of the concept of international terrorism, an operational definition of the term has not been easy to specify. Analysts disagree on a definition, since there are different understandings of national security in many states, and there are various forms of international terrorism (state – carried out by its institutions or sponsored by them, non-governmental, transnational, individual). The process of developing a universal concept of terrorism is also complicated by subjective factors: the unwillingness of some states to adopt a fixed formula suited to constructing a barrier against terrorist activity, and they are related to terrorists in ways concealed from the world and their own people. Russian author E. Ljahov, in his book Terrorism and the Interstate Approach, argues that international terrorism represents a complex phenomenon of a political-legal character and as a crime possesses various attributes and organizational structures (terrorist organizations and “terrorist” ideologies and doctrines). In this connection, E. Ljahov emphasizes that the traditional manner of assessment in studies of international law is a form of description of a crime that contributes little to the theory and practice of fighting this crime. An identification of its patterns is needed. In the literature, terror, terrorism and acts of terrorism are understood as intimidation using violent methods against the political opponent, that is the concrete physical person (persons) exercising state, political or other public duties. As to the concept of international terrorism, state terrorism, we shall note that there is still no public treatment [16] (p. 15). The Russian legal scholar A. Trajnin considered terrorism to be a form of indirect aggression. This definition affected the Soviet draft of the concept of aggression proposed by the USSR to the League of Nations in 1933 [17] (p. 118-129). Professor I. Karpets, a legal expert and criminologist in the USSR, former Director of the Institute under the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the USSR and the Management of the O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 143

Criminal Investigation Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, offered the following definition: International or interstate terrorism, with international patterns (that is involving two or more states), is an organized activity intended for the formation of particular organizations and groups for the commission of murder and attempted murder, causing physical injury, the employment of violence and the kidnapping of persons as hostages for the purpose of extorting ransom, violent deprivation of human freedom, interfaced to violations of the person, the perpetration of torture, extortion, etc. Terrorism can be accompanied by the destruction and looting of buildings, premises and other facilities. The purpose of terrorism – causing harm to democratic and progressive social transformations, the property of organizations, establishments, private persons, the intimidation of people, committing violence against them and physical destruction in the name of the ideologies of fascism, racism, anarchism, chauvinism or in military-bureaucratic senses, and also receiving material or other benefits from criminal elements or the organizations supporting them, groups and persons [18] (p. 64-98). In his work Terrorism and Interstate Attitudes, E. Ljahov concludes that international terrorism is not only regarded as an international crime by the criminal law of the states, but also threatens international opinion and international law ... The act of terrorism of a person (even if it is not organized by the state) against one or several components of the system of values protected by international law is directed against interstate opinion. The list of proposed definitions can be expanded. However, as the same E. Ljahov rightly specifies, in each case they “do not provide an opportunity for full and precise representation of it, as about the criminal action of an individual, mentioning interstate attitudes.” The conflation in the law and the criminal code of interstate and international terrorism is characteristic of the criminal legislation of many countries. Sanctions against international terrorism should be stipulated in national law. At the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to the stipulation of the Russian Federation, which notes that international terrorism occurs when terrorist activity is committed “on the territory of more than one state or detrimental to the interests of more than one state.” This stipulation is superficial, since international terrorism can also be committed within the territory of a single state. In fact, Arabian, Pakistani and other mercenaries of the Chechen insurgents commit acts of terrorism in Russia – a single state. Especially a formal interpretation of this law can give terrorists a certain degree of impunity, can make their acts seem less dangerous to society. This definition in the Law of the Russian Federation “On the Fight Against Terrorism” requires a criminal law addition. Despite the widespread use of word combinations, and even though international terrorism is already considered among the main threats to international security and stability, the conventional treatment of this concept is still unclear. Some authors use definitions of international terrorism as violence having as its objective to cause political changes which will destabilize international attitudes and which the international community considers incompatible with desirable norms of behavior. These actions are directed at destabilizing the international political system of communications and are contrary to international norms of morals and rights [19] (p. 51). On the other hand, modern history shows that in the global opposition of two super-states, both parties used the activities of terrorist organizations against their opponents. And after the break-up of the Soviet Union, these organizations have become independent and started to develop their own trajectory, threatening to 144 O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies international security and stability. Therefore, with the use of terrorist groups in a world policy for the achievement of the purposes of the construction of new world empires, international terrorism will expand, encroaching on all new spaces. There are also structural causes that give rise to terrorism, and under special circumstances attacks could be removed from the competence of territorial national courts. The danger of international complications resulted in the international norm calling for something broader in scope than judicial investigation, which adds only an insignificant element of value in such complex and important political crises. Most fruitful, in our opinion, is the notion of international criminal law developed by Kudryavtsev in his book International Criminal Law. He concludes that international criminal law is a set of norms created through the coordination of states. There is also a point of view according to which international criminal law represents an independent branch of law which enters into neither international public law nor domestic law. Norms of international criminal law, as a rule, are realized through norms of interstate criminal law and process. Therefore, measures of punishment (sanction) are defined in the criminal laws of states after incorporating them into domestic legislation. International criminal law can be defined as the branch of law including the principles and norms, the protection of international law and order created for the purpose of preventing criminal encroachments by the subjects of international law through the establishment of the criminal liability of guilty physical persons and the responsibility of the state for the commission of international crimes and crimes of an international character. On the whole, the subjects of international crimes are states, their organs, transnational corporations, and also physical, private persons or officials, particularly the perpetrators of these crimes. Thus there is a description of nine international crimes, one of which is terrorism (in addition, crimes against the world and the security of mankind, war crimes, genocide, ecocide, apartheid, slavery). It is necessary to emphasize that Islamist terrorist organizations deviate from the rigid structures of organizations characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s. Today they are, as a rule, decentralized organizations with functional specialization. Those who dominate them possess their own banks, enterprises and landed property. Modern technologies allow leaders to control the hierarchical structures of terrorist organizations and their networks from a distance. Thus the administrative pyramid becomes flatter, separate groups entering into it can operate more independently, can exist separately and, in some cases, only general ideas unite them. Such terrorist formations differ more in comparison with earlier groups due to their flexibility, survival skills and ability to adapt to changing conditions. Terrorist formations are born and function outside a field of legal regulation and are able to penetrate all parts of society. They can develop and function in any – neutral, friendly or hostile – environment and create a trans-territorial infrastructure as a basis, depending on modern communication technologies, legal and illegal methods of mobilization and the use of human resources. They are firmly linked by a comprehensive ideology that portrays terror as just, eliminates the problem of justifying the sacrifice of human victims, promotes a disciplined internal organization and increases the conspiratorial level. A number of terrorist organizations have acquired new military capacities in the field of ‘network war’. Organizational structures as ‘pacesetters’ have started to build ‘networks’ possessing increased resistance to external influences and greater flexibility, O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 145 shifting from a strategy of hand-to-hand combat to terrorist tactics of an indiscriminate mass character. Thus the elements of network structures have become both independent groups and separate individuals. Elements of network structures can be united for the pursuit of specific goals and temporarily interrupt their activity after their operation, thus not endangering the existence of the overall network. In recent times, the poorly interconnected structures of a network with all its elements are being joined by a common ideology, religion, nationalist or ethnic aspirations. This system has enjoyed the greatest adoption by the terrorist and militarized structures of Islamists. The action strategy of these organizations is based on principles formulated over time by one of the leaders of the Egyptian “Jihad Islami,” who defined them as follows: it is necessary to create small groups, which are the most suitable in the struggle against the enemy; as one of the most effective instruments it is necessary to use the ‘readiness of the Mujahadeen for self-sacrifice’; each region and the country demands the development of an adequate strategy of conducting jihad [20]. The groups making up modern terrorist movements are independent. Each group, party, structure, in turn, is also an atomie-destructuration process. The members of the cell, consisting of from three to five persons, know only the head. The last member communicates only with his immediate superior. Very often regrouping, a party is a complex, ‘versatile’ association including political and economic (financial) components and a unit of ‘direct action’, in other words, a direct executor of acts of terrorism. The structure of the latter is changeable [21] (p. 12). The possession by a terrorist grouping of own financial assets reduces its dependence on external sponsors. In particular, it reduces its dependence on certain states of the Persian Gulf, especially on Saudi Arabia, so that terrorist acts become even more unpredictable. Organizations of the “Al-Qaeda” type have a weak organizational hierarchy. Their “spider-web” form includes self-organizing interpersonal networks, negotiated inter-organizational coordination and decentralized, context-mediated inter-systemic steering. These organizations are operationally autonomous from one another and structurally decoupled due to their mutual interdependence. The lack of a precisely defined, uniform center creates greater complexities for power structures trying to prevent or counteract the attacks of Islamic radical groups. “Al-Qaeda” is, most likely, the patrimonial name of any extreme Islamist group that advocates anti-American or anti- Western attitudes. Political terrorism in Russia is based on a mixture of religious, ethnic, separatist and nationalist motives. Political terrorism is caused by both internal and external factors. In a modern Russia experiencing a systemic crisis, a process of property stratification, ideological delimitation, and the registration of new political movements or parties, various sorts of political unions and organizations are arising, professing various political views and fighting for authority. Consequently, the population is becoming polarized. The power of any politically stable state, to be sure, consists in the ability to resolutely and automatically resist even hints of a threat of terrorism, irrespective of their source. Even the threat of acts of terrorism should not escape punishment by a state that is stable and legitimate. Therefore, in Russia there are a number of internal problems in the transition period, including the struggle for the repartition of property and for political authority, attempts to change the state and to give legal status to separate regions, inter-ethnic clashes and conflicts, ideological differences and the increase of criminality in society, the rise and spread of organized crime and corruption, and a growing mistrust of authority and law. According to the 146 O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies latest polls (August, 2005) by Yuri Levada’s Center, respondents have named as among the most corrupt professions: militia (police) (38 %), Members of the State Duma and ministers (19 %), businessmen (14 %), actual criminals (14 %) and lawyers (7 %) (according to the TV program ‘25 Hours’, broadcast on August 11, 2005). Islamic terrorism in Southern Russia is inspired by traditional archaic forms of social behavior in the North Caucasus, a specific system of social institutions: “naezdnichestvo” (foray system), “ZekIye” (special mechanisms of high military preparedness, used especially by the Adygei people), “abrechestvo” (specific terrorist form of liberation movement in the North Caucasus as a result of the military defeat of the mountain peoples), “blood revenge” [22] (p. 328-329). An acquaintance with the historical roots of traditional social mobilization is indispensable to understanding the mental frameworks within which terrorist motivations emerge. Terrorist attacks in Southern Russia are seen by Chechens as acts of revenge for the historical humiliation of the Chechens during the Caucasus Wars (1818-1864) and the forced deportation of Chechens (1944 – 1957). As Valerij Tishkov, a Russian specialist in history and anthropology, explains, the Chechen crisis is reinforcing a rich pseudo-scientific mythology about the history and modern aspects of the people. The myth of the freedom-loving and noble character of the Chechens, who celebrated their 200-year long resistance to Russian colonialism, is joined with another myth of the Chechens as the most ancient people in the Caucasus [23] (p. 186-187). This Chosen People syndrome, that the Chechens were chosen to play the role of leader for all of the Caucasus, is part of the Chechens’ archetype. The main political goal beyond the tactical use of terrorism was to bring justice to Chechnya and to separate the Republic of Ichkeria from the Russian Federation. The Chechen war has provoked Russia to engage in terror, severing all the bonds of moral restraint. The political exertion in the terrorization of Chechnya has reproduced the breviary of religious radicalism. Since the military campaign of 1994-1996, the situation in the so-called Republic of Ichkeria has been affected by the growing influence of radical Islamists, more often called “Wahhabis.” In 1996, Z. Yandarbiyev, the former nationalist leader, promulgated a decree that invalidated Federal Laws in Chechnya and proclaimed a system of law in accord with the traditions of the Prophet. A system of ‘Shari’a’ courts was created. Later, in 1999, A. Maskhadov, a former president of Chechnya, introduced the ‘Shari’a Board’ [22] (p. 326-329, 336). During the counter-terrorist operation in early autumn 1999, the process of Islamicizing the underground movements considerably intensified, while the ‘secular’ opposition rapidly collapsed. This process ended with the acceptance in 2002 of quasi- ’Wahhabi’ amendments to the so-called Constitution of Ichkeria, which was proclaimed the supreme source of Islamist authority, led by an “amir” (leader), and also authorized foreign fighters to lead Chechen paramilitary groups. By the spring of 2002, only S. Basaev, one of 11 field commanders – members of the Shura (consultative council of warriors) – was Chechen, while all the others were of Arab origin. Strengthening the positions of radical Islamists in command of Chechen guerrillas has promoted the transfer to the Chechen Republic of the organizational and political forms of radical Islamic movements that have already had solid developmental experience. It is a question, firstly, of the decentralization of extremist groupings that began to be constructed on the principle of “Ummah” (community of believers in a divine plan). These consist of small cells scattered in different areas of the republic. Each cell has a leader, who is free in taking organizational and political decisions. O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 147

Under conditions of effective action by federal forces and the Chechen militia against underground groups in the Chechen Republic, they, as in other parts of the Muslim world, became as much as possible independent and decentralized. Analysis of messages received during successful operations against criminal groups and the liquidations of so-called “amirs” has confirmed that the majority of paramilitary organizations are small groups operating within the limits of a few settlements, seldom crossing the boundaries of an area. The skeletons of gangs consist of criminals, for whom it is difficult to count on indulgence by the law. Incorporated mutual relations play a significant role in the preservation of underground movements, often dominated by a person who is authoritative in the traditional social structure. Besides this, each group includes foreign mercenaries who supervise the activities of the insurgents, Chechens, carry on communications with the leaders and give them weapons, money and training. Thus, each similarly constructed group is independently able to make tactical decisions. Under similar conditions, the role of Chechen nationals in the top leadership of the underground movement has steadily decreased, as the key channels for the supply of weapons and financial assets are controlled by the representatives of foreign Islamic organizations. In the course of time, such persons have included the Jordanian Emir Hattab, then the Arab Abu Valid, etc., who have become the most influential figures in the illegal armed formations of the Chechen Republic. Their authority is actually greater than that of the Chechen field commanders. Fundamentalist Islam in the North Caucasus has emerged from and operates in specific contexts. The terrorists are called Wahhabis (Wahhabites), but in Chechnya Wahhabism (austere form of Islam that insists on a literal interpretation of the Koran) was a specific form of Islamic ideological modernization and a transformation of youth protest against traditional forms of social organization. For Caucasian youth Wahhabism means self-reliance within the framework of new forms of social solidarity. Wahhabi communities could provide safety under conditions of unleashing criminality and anarchy. Radical Islam here corresponds to the ideology of the Arabian ultra-radical Islamist groups, but in a way adapted to the mentality of the Chechen or of any other North Caucasian ethnos. In this connection, it is possible to prove that in the Northern Caucasus Russia was confronted by a specific form of modern terrorism which is based on the ideology of Radical Islam, including the religious, ethnic and criminal elements of terrorism and supported by similar international structures. It is, therefore, possible to conclude that this “movement” is a branch of international terrorism. This “ideology” has a dual nature. On the one hand, it is a particular distorted understanding of patriotism or of religious dogmas, the tactical employment of terrorism for “noble” political purposes (from their point of view) using criminal methods. On the other hand, these “ideologies” become an instrument of recruitment, tools for the justification of mercenary ideas, in the opinion of the perpetrators and their financial sponsors (which was clearly shown in South Russia, when S. Basayev and Hattab used violence against civilians in the name of Islamic fundamentalism), though it is well known that no major world religion endorses terror. But in both cases, terrorists use ideology to justify their own personal orientation. People who commit violence against civilians in the form of terrorist acts could be ordinary men or women. They are not necessarily persons with pathological or hysterical character traits. But they kill in the name of Islam in a world fighting a war 148 O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies without innocent victims, and they find internal subconscious justifications to legitimize violence. Ideologists are followed by experts who provide training for terrorist operations in various areas or by persons who have received special instruction in terrorist training camps. For material reasons, this group is employed for the sake of a cost-benefit approach. Russia has played a role in creating “the Afghan syndrome” – human life has depreciated in value, many people have become accustomed to killing, and when returning to civilian life have experienced psychological stress. All this is rather typical of the destiny of Chechen terrorists and citizens of other countries: mercenaries or volunteers. Naturally, it is a question not only of the perpetrators of crimes, but also of all those who are involved in the organization, financing and partnership in crime. Russia has repeatedly declared that it highly values giving new impulses to international cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, and it regularly proposes constructive initiatives, including the implementation of achieved and mature arrangements. Emphasizing the importance of complete consensus on the responsibility of all citizens in fighting terrorists, Russia supports further steps to discourage countries from granting refuge to terrorists. During the latest period, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has done useful work in the crafting of interstate cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. In this area, it is necessary to establish working contacts with corresponding regional structures in a number of positive aspects of the development of cooperation by the Russian Federation with Western states. Consultations by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with the EU took place for the first time in February 1996 on the problematic aspects of counteracting terrorism. The Russian delegation suggested developing a concrete program of cooperation between Russia and the EU in the field. Negotiations with a security management service of NATO took place in June 1996 in Moscow concerning possible joint actions on these problems. Special attention is deserved for the development of cooperation by Russia in the struggle against terrorism at a bilateral level, in particular, with the USA and Great Britain. Russia has signed intergovernmental memoranda of mutual understanding and cooperation in the field of civil aviation, in which forms of bilateral operative interaction are provided in the crisis situations caused by terrorist operations against civilian airlines. Also, fruitful dialogues concerning the struggle against terrorism were developed with Turkey, Italy, France, Germany, Portugal and other countries. Russia insists that tactical policy strategies be developed that reconcile future and current objectives by indicating what amounts and kinds of measures are acceptable at a given moment in light of the need to prevent terrorist actions. A recent Russian priority has been to prevent terrorist acts using nuclear weapons. The challenge is to cut across the boundaries that divide governments, their agencies and organizations with different functional mandates in order to focus their respective energies on the common goals of anti-terrorist strategy. The bureaucratic hierarchies of governments and international bodies are not well suited to dealing with spider-web organizational structures. But a full range of policy tools, including economic, diplomatic and military ones, should be considered at certain decision-making levels, and a unified apparatus should be constructed with which potential terrorist acts can be anticipated and combated. There is a need for all partnerships to declare terrorism subject to severe penalty, especially the financial sponsors of terrorism and organized crime, the suppliers of weapons to organized criminals, including traitors in the armed forces. There can be no O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 149 exceptions. There is a need for the extradition (handing over) of mercenaries from foreign states, aside from those that have special agreements with Russia on legal assistance, or in cases where acts of terrorism are committed on the territory of other states. The problem of encouraging political will and effective responses to the terrorist threat stems from the difficulty in reaching a consensus on the definition of terrorism and discovering the root causes of terrorism, determining what conditions are more favorable for the spread of terrorism and why certain underground organizations and groups are driven by such a strategy and, as a counter-strategy, deciding how to deter the use of the strategy of terror. We can identify some generic factors that appear to be conducive to suppressing the growth of organized crime and extreme violence. First of all, there are the natural factors of the socio-cultural context: a homogeneous structure of the population, that is lower heterogeneity, restrictions on the inflow of immigrants over long periods and the specificity of socio-cultural factors, including traditional mutual relations in the civilian population – “interactive human togetherness, guided by mutual rights and obligations” [7] (p.4), emphasis on feelings of shame and advantage, binding norms, value orientations assuming tolerance in a society, sympathy, compassion and a strong consciousness of solidarity within the family, local society, high educational levels, traditional diligence. Obtaining support from members of the traditional family must be based on its protection against abuse, providing benefits and supporting family welfare. These features and qualities are more typical of rural, small cities that can preserve their community spirit. The preservation and cultivation of traditional communal, collectivist moral values and customs, the creation of an approximation of community by building enterprises in which a consciousness of belonging to the company as to the family is cultivated, are major factors in the prevention of terrorism. The construction of a society on communitarian principles is a positive counter-structure, as terrorist organizations are also constructed using the principle of micro-groups in which each member adheres to an accepted code of conduct, and its infringement is considered a more serious crime than the infringement of official laws. Commitment to a radical terrorist group “means that the activist’s own death and sacrifice is always seen as a possible outcome, serving as an example to others” [5] (p. 479).

On the Problem of Co-Operation and Collaboration in the South Caucasus Region in the Struggle against International Terrorism

By reason of its geographical proximity to the countries of both the Middle and Far East, and to Russia’s North Caucasus republics, where advocates and agents of various Islamic extremist organizations have been working very actively since the 1980s, the South Caucasus region has, to a significant degree, been drawn into a system of multilateral relations, the establishment of which has, of course, been hastened by the war on terrorism which is already being waged worldwide. While giving priority to developing principles for the participation of the region’s countries in this new confrontation, it is, at the same time, necessary to note that whereas the war on terror and participation in the many forces and resources of the international anti-terrorist coalition are important and highly significant, this is still just one of quite a large number of elements that make up the concept of “regional security.” It is evident that 150 O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies for the peoples inhabiting the South Caucasus region, a great many other aspects of security – including such aspects as “economic security,” “environmental security,” “genetic security,” the breakdown of the traditional system of values, the traditional way of life, and many others – are very pressing. However, in the light of the development of well-known tendencies that are determining the principal trends in world politics, it is probable that the most pressing current issues are those connected with combining the world community’s efforts in the war against international terrorism. This task is very important, especially for the South Caucasus region, which has been used as a conduit for combatants and weapons and where there is the additional risk of the spread of various types of fundamentalist ideologies that are hostile to traditional forms of Islam. It has become customary for all publications dedicated to the problems of international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism to begin by pointing to the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. It is quite clear that changes in the way American society relates to the realia of the modern world are linked to 11 September, as a result of which Americans have started a very serious process of re-evaluating their system of values and, in particular, of bidding farewell to the last remnants of their isolationist approach to determining relations between America and the rest of the world. On the other hand, the actions of the shahids1 have raised a number of questions in American intellectual circles relating to the universality of the values being advocated by them. In this way, both of the dominant principles have been called into question which have, up till now, taken turns to determine American society’s approaches to the “United States – rest of the world” system of relations. Of course, an event that provoked such processes could not but be reflected in both the internal situation of the United States and its foreign policy. Some American researchers (for example, Ann Applebaum in an article dedicated to what US President George Bush refers to as the “New World Order”) have pointed out that the USA’s war on international terrorism, like the “Cold War” before it, has given the American administration those practical and ideological reference points that it lost when the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain were dismantled. The new challenge posed by a concept as difficult to define as world or international terrorism has been personified by the Bush administration in the shape of an imagined “Al-Qaeda” organization (the real Al-Qaeda differs in its real characteristics from the myth that has been created around the name of “Al-Qaeda”) – and its “number one terrorist,” identified as Osama bin Laden (the real person named Osama bin Laden, of course, differs from the constructed myth), thus producing a goal and at the same time a target for its policies. In our opinion, the reason why the US adopted precisely this approach in a situation that demanded a quick response and a demonstration of the new administration’s readiness to respond to any type of challenge – apart from specific reasons connected with the time, place and participants in the operation – was a fundamental difference between the system, structure and function of the State and the system, the structure and functions of the so-called “all-embracing systems,” which include the system defined as “Islamic fundamentalism,” “Wahhabism,” “Muslim extremism,” etc. This system’s “all-embracing,” universal character can be inferred from the list of names given to the system by its ideologues at various stages of its development – from the “Muslim Brotherhood” and “Green Internationale”2 to the

1 The Arabic word for witnesses, the term is used in Islam to refer to “martyrs” — tr. 2 This term appears to be restricted to the Russian media and is used to refer to a “loose international collective of Islamic terrorist movements” – tr. O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 151

“World Islamic Congress” and “World Islamic Front.” All these organizations adopt as their goal the restoration of “pure Islam,” of which the “ummah” (Muslim “community” or ideal state worldwide) of the Prophet Mohammed is the ideal, and the modern concept of civil society – which is based on the system of liberalism and democracy that was constructed in the process of developing Western civilization – as their the antithesis. The principal characteristics of the “all-embracing systems” – their universality; their reliance on mystical, religious principles of community and their rejection of national [principles]; and the branched and “borderless” nature of their structure, which has no center and, therefore, has very flexible leadership and is well protected against external threats – are fundamentally different from the system and structure of the State. The functions of these two systems are also directly opposed: the State is called upon first and foremost to protect its borders, territory, society and citizens, while the “all-embracing system” has as its goal the infiltration and undermining of borders and of those principles upon which borders rest. One should note that following the end of the Cold War, the first President George Bush proclaimed several basic principles of the “new world order” – the affirmation of democratic values; the primacy of human rights (human rights has been one of the main principles of American foreign policy since Jimmy Carter’s time); the transparency and permeability of borders to goods and capital; the standardization of tariffs and taxes – as well as other measures also aimed at strengthening the USA’s role as the single center [of the world] and affirming the universal democratic values upon which this role was intended to rest. This orienting of US foreign and domestic policy would inevitably have weakened those State institutions that were by their very logic opposed to “transparency and permeability,” i.e., which contradicted the stated principles of the new American policy. However, immediately after September 11 President George W. Bush assigned his top experts the task of reviewing domestic policy with a view to strengthening US national security, which automatically led to the imposition of major restrictions on democratic institutions and human rights. In the area of foreign policy, the US president intensified bi-lateral – i.e., intergovernmental – links, entirely forgetting about international organizations (the fact that, in those first days [following September 11] the US president apparently forgot about the existence of such figures in international politics as, for example, Kofi Annan and Javier Solana, did not escape analysts). At the same time, it is patently evident that illegitimate international systems can only be effectively combated by legitimate systems of the same quality and niveau, committed to protecting the norms of international law3 and the rules of social intercourse in the world community. A system that has the same characteristics and attributes, [but] which relies on the laws and support of the states and organizations that established it, can vie with an underground “all-embracing” system. It would appear that reinterpreting the tasks and functions of international and regional organizations is going to be one of the determining principles of modern politics. To some extent this is already happening in relation to NATO; next, [it will also take place in relation to] other international structures. In light of the above, the need for all the countries of the South Caucasus region to collaborate in the anti- terrorist struggle – which should naturally lead to a serious re-evaluation of values in the region – becomes apparent. Co-operation and collaboration should not be limited to bi-lateral relations with the leaders of the anti-terrorist coalition. They are necessary in

3 There appears to have been a misprint or misspelling at this point in the original text; prava (law) makes rather better sense than nrava (disposition). — tr. 152 O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies the region, first and foremost because there is a very serious threat to its stability and security.

Conclusions

Terrorism, as a form of violence (political, structural, cultural, etc.), arises in response to injustice at both the local and global levels. A foundation for the transformation of structural violence is found not only in the imperative in the fight against injustice in the world. It is also present in the possibility to address the deep culture potential, including community values. When we try to understand terrorism as a rational phenomenon and engage in discussing how it is justified and condemned, we can consider alternatives to terrorism and think about how injustice can be corrected. In conclusion, the notion of terrorism suffers from the same inadequacies as the widely accepted understanding of criminality. These include: an inability to understand the nature of effective anti-terror systems and a clear underestimation of the role of myth in politics. In order to account for the real problems facing democracies and the ways open to them for emerging from cultural and structural crises, account must be taken of the social institutions and norms in which they are embedded. These point to the possible paths towards action that would genuinely bring about the transformation and elimination of terrorism and insurgency. Anti-terrorist policy has to be designed and applied more deliberately and consistently. It is one thing to employ anti-terrorist or preventive actions on a case-to- case basis (post factum); it is quite another to be prepared on an ongoing basis to anticipate and respond to potential terrorist attacks. To gain the maximum benefit from scarce resources, all the actors engaged in anti-terrorist policy have to be better focused, supported, and coordinated, and the lessons of the past must be incorporated into present and future policy. Anti-terrorist policy must be replaced by more systematic and regularized strategies, and the institutional resources for implementing them have to be strengthened. To implement a more deliberate, informed and coherent approach, several main issues and related tasks regarding policy and operations have to be addressed, whatever the particular circumstances facing specific interventions.

References

[1] Gunaratna, R. (1993). Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka. The Role of India’s Intelligence. Agencies.Colombo: SANCOR. [2] Falk, R. (2003). The Great Terror War. New York, Northampton: Olive Branch Press. [3] Short, J.R., Kim, Y.H. (1999). Globalisation and the city. London: Longman. [4] Friedman, J. (1995). Where we stand: A decade of world city research. In: Knox, P.L., Taylor, P.J. (eds.). World cities in a world-system. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [5] Sommier, I. (2002) Terrorism as total violence?. International Social Science Journal, No. 174. [6] Galtung, J. (2002). Rethinking conflict: The cultural approach”. A Paper prepared for the Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Council of Europe, Strasbourg. [7] Galtung, J. (1995). On the social costs of modernization. Social disintegration, atomie/anomie and social development. Geneva: UNRISD. [8] Faris, R. (1948). Social disorganization. New York. [9] Merton, R. K. (1957). Social theory and social structure. Glencoe, Illinois. [10] Pozdnjakov, E. (2001). Philosophy of criminality. Moscow. [11] MacIver R.M. (1950). The ramparts we guard. New York. O.A. Vorkunova and D. Hovhannesian / Terrorism: Myth Conceptions and Conceptual Inadequacies 153

[12] Stolcke, V. (1999). New rhetorics of exclusion in Europe. International Social Science Journal, No. 159. [13] Emeljanov, V.P. (2000). Terrorism and crime with patterns of terrorism. Moscow. [14] Morozov, G.I. (2001). Terrorism – A crime against humanity. Moscow: IMEMO. [15] Kirillov, I.A. (1999). Criminally-legal measures of struggle of law-enforcement bodies with terrorism. Moscow. [16] Ljakhov, E.G. (1987). Policy of terrorism – Policy of violence and agression. Moscow. [17] Trajnin, A.N. (1956). Peace defense and struggle against crimes against humanity. Moscow. [18] Karpets, I.I. (1979). Crimes of international character. Moscow. [19] Revin, V.P. (2002). The international terrorism and conceptual problems of perfection of the international cooperation. In: Response to terrorism and insurgent movements in the Central Asia. Moscow: Center of Strategic and Political Studies. Royal Institute of International Affairs. [20] Razhbadinov, M.Z.(2003). Radical Islamism in Europe. Moscow. [21] Malashenko, A.B. (2004). Does a ghost of Islamic threat roam?” Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . Working Papers No. 2. [22] Dobaev, I.P. (2003). Islamic radicalism: Genesis, evolution, practice. Rostov: Northern Caucasus Academy of State Service. [23] Tishkov, V. (1997). Ethnicity, nationalism and conflict in and after the Soviet Union. Oslo. 154 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

The War Against State Terrorism: Reframing the Debate on Global Terrorism

Lubna NADVI School of Politics at the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal.

Abstract. The War on Terrorism (WOT) that has been unleashed by the United States government and its alliance partners over the last few years has ironically resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties globally. This has occurred through state sponsored military strikes in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, where noncombatant civilians usually became victims of such military action. Such acts have incited the emergence of many more non-state militant groupings that are intent on pursuing violence as a means of responding to the War on Terror. Inevitably, civilians have become caught between state and non-state actors who are both advancing militant violence in order to achieve political objectives. This chapter attempts to unpack the complex dynamics of the WOT, by arguing that it is critical for civil society to become more pro-actively engaged in challenging both governments and non-state militants as regards their involvement in this war, as well as to reframe the paradigm within which terrorism is understood and ultimately perpetrated. In essence, civil society needs to demand accountability from governments whose policies are arguably the root cause of much of the contemporary terrorism that we see unfolding before us.

Keywords. Terrorism, civil society, War on Terror, state terrorism

The recent terrorist attacks in London have once again forced the issue of global terrorism firmly back onto the core political agenda of nations. While the so-called “war on terrorism” has, since September 11, 2001, been waged by the United States government and its allies on a variety of militant organizations, ironically resulting in more civilian deaths than military fatalities, the July 2005 incident has prompted in its wake a far more sinister version of the detention-without-trial policy, a drastic shoot-to- kill policy, regardless of whether the intended target may actually be guilty of terrorism, which is currently being enforced by the British government as a way of responding to terrorist attacks on its soil. This has already led to the shooting death of a Brazilian man who was not a terrorist. The ensuing paranoia in the aftermath of these attacks may indeed result in increasing numbers of civilian deaths at the hands of authorities, simply because of the color of their skin or the way they dress. In responding to the outrageous nature of these acts, one is forced to reflect on whether the war against terrorism that has been unleashed by a range of governments against “militant insurgents” is actually curtailing terrorist activity, or whether government actions simply inflame further violent militancy, such as that of the attacks on the London underground. Many analysts, anti-war activists and intellectuals have argued vociferously and consistently that it is indeed the case that the foreign policy agendas of nations such as the United States and Britain have resulted in the emergence of networks of militant dissidents who are deeply resentful of the injustices that such L. Nadvi / The War Against State Terrorism: Reframing the Debate on Global Terrorism 155 policies have wreaked on the communities from which they come and, as such, have sought to express this rage through acts of resistance. What has remained controversial is the manner in which this resistance has manifested itself. Very often it has been in the form of indiscriminate violence targeted at civilians. In addition, the call to violence has often been located within a religious framework, which has been an unfortunate abuse of the Islamic faith and has called into question the very foundation on which the global Muslim community bases itself, i.e., peaceful co-existence with its fellow humanity. Furthermore, the subsequent actions of governments in response to these “insurgent” acts has been to further curb civil liberties and introduce anti-terror legislation which has had and continues to have disastrous consequences. The effects of the “resistance” campaign and the commensurate “war against terrorism” have resulted in the heaviest price being paid by civilians, who have inevitably become caught between ongoing state-sponsored violence and non-state militancy carried out by armed insurgents. These civilian victims have become part of what is ironically referred to by both state and non-state perpetrators of violent activities as ‘collateral damage’. The debates on how to manage what has become an increasingly chaotic global security situation, with both armed militants and governments intent on pursuing their respective agendas, has been fraught with controversy and a fair measure of political posturing from all sides. It is unfortunate that rational and reasoned engagement, particularly on the part of governments, has been sorely lacking. A clear example of this is the unilateral and illegal invasion of a sovereign nation, Iraq, by the United States and its coalition partners. The consequences of this action have been disastrous, and the policy has neither managed to curb any violence and terrorism, nor has it really “liberated” Iraqis from dictatorship, given that they are currently forced to live under a military occupation. The strategy of the militants who are opposing unilateral government actions has been similarly problematic, given that they have not managed to successfully evict occupation armies from territories where they have been operating. In fact, the violent nature of their engagement against civilians has often detracted from the legitimate and necessary resistance against imperialist occupation, conflating a liberation struggle with a terrorist modus operandi. While an armed struggle that directs its militancy against state oppression has often been seen as acceptable and indeed necessary, it has, however, in a contemporary context, found an uncomfortable home in terrorism, which arguably can not be sustainable, given that it is often met with further repression from governments, which use the full force of their state apparatus to clamp down on such militancy. The question of whether it is justifiable to direct violence against civilians in order to achieve political objectives has always remained a deeply divisive issue, and the killing of innocent people, whether it is on a train in Madrid or in the London underground, or the streets of Baghdad and Kabul, should surely be unacceptable, regardless of who perpetrates these murders. Given the almost intractable nature of the phenomenon of modern terrorism, it becomes necessary that we tackle this crisis at the point at which it arguably originates and is given momentum. This is effectively at the level of state-sponsored terrorism, which has been seen as the root cause of reactionary militancy by non-state actors, and has given rise to a global network that can at any given point unleash violence against a civilian population. Governments are, given these circumstances, virtually unable to 156 L. Nadvi / The War Against State Terrorism: Reframing the Debate on Global Terrorism protect their citizens, nor do they seem to understand their own complicity in the creation of such terrorist networks. The onus, then, to find sustainable ways of addressing this issue, would ostensibly fall on global civil society to create a space for constructive engagement where the public can demand accountability from both governments and non-state militants who are essentially responsible for the chaos that is being unleashed on civilian populations. The question remains of where one should begin this critical process? In the aftermath of the declaration of war by the United States and its coalition partners on Iraq, the global anti-war movement embarked on unprecedented mass action to protest against this illegal war. Clearly, the determination by civil society to express its discontent at governments and their unilateral actions was overwhelming. Unfortunately, that did not stop the war from actually being waged, nor the huge loss of civilian life. What an analysis of this set of circumstances essentially demands is that civil society needs to re-assess the way in which it has sought to engage and the outcomes that it has managed to effect. While lobbying and advocacy are a useful part of the overall process of addressing what has now become institutionalized terrorism, it becomes necessary for civil society to begin to engage differently. There must be a deeper understanding of the relationship between government policy, which forces people into extreme and repressive situations, and the corporate infrastructure that supports these policies. The idea that governments are exempt from being held accountable by the people who elect them needs to be seriously contested by virtue of sustained forms of pressure by civil society networks. In the same way, the relationship between the financing of state-sponsored terrorism by corporate entities has to be challenged, not simply by encouraging consumer boycotts of certain brand names, but by educating people about the ways in which their support of these financial networks is creating poverty and exploitation and leads to inevitable violence whose political trajectory often ends up manifesting itself as resistance in the guise of terrorism. In the final analysis, the task of addressing terrorism must arguably be assumed by citizens, given that they often pay the greatest price when terrorism is unleashed. The reality is that governments no longer have the capacity to fight this so-called war on terrorism. They, together with corporations, have become proverbial creators of the Frankenstein monster that has now come back to haunt them. The best that they are able to come up with is clamping down on civil liberties, which creates further paranoia and deeper resentment, and inevitably ends up killing more people. In order that the civil society project to tackle terrorism becomes sustainable and practically viable, a call for a global peoples’ summit on terrorism needs to be effected. This must be a task undertaken by civic networks and driven by grassroots movements. To assume that one is safe from terrorism would be naive at best, given that it has often reared its ugly head where least expected. As citizens, we cannot afford to remain complacent about the phenomenon of terrorism, whether it is perpetrated by states or non-state actors. Nor must it be understood as simply a problem to be tackled by “Muslims.” The reality is that it has become a crisis that demands a holistic solution. We cannot romanticize it, nor can we ignore it, as it has become an entrenched phenomenon in our times. The call for peoples’ action must be one that is well thought through and essentially sustainable. While engagements with governments are clearly going to be L. Nadvi / The War Against State Terrorism: Reframing the Debate on Global Terrorism 157 inevitable as part of this process, it is arguably essential that such a project remain firmly within the grasp of peoples’ movements. The time to act is now. The most controversial aspect of the detention-without-trial policy has been the Guantanamo military base in Cuba, which has continued to operate despite worldwide condemnation. In addition, other similar actions by state authorities in various countries that have been profiling individuals has been a cause for concern. Various intellectuals such as Tariq Ali and activists such as Arundhati Roy have expressed these sentiments very articulately in a range of anti-war essays and writings. There has to be a reframing of the debate around who should take charge of the situation. Where governments are failing, citizens have to essentially assume responsibility for their own security. 158 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders1

Anne SPECKHARD Georgetown University Medical School and Vesalius College at the Free University of Brussels, Belgium

Abstract. The nature of suicide terror / The organizational component / The psycho-social component / The individual component / Choosing to become a suicide bomber: Trauma & ideology / The role of personal traumatization / Secondary traumatization and hidden traumas / Self-sacrifice: The interaction among social awareness, desire for change and a lack of legitimate outlets / Factors that facilitate the decision to become a suicide bomber / The role of religion / Cult of martyrdom and popular support for suicide terrorism / Dissociation / Acts of defense and the expressive quality of suicide terrorism / Gender differences: Women and suicide terror / Europe and suicide terrorism / Motivational sets for human bombs / Nationalistic, community defense, expressive, trauma and revenge based motivations / Alienation, marginalization, loss of identity, desire for meaningfulness and adventure, secondary traumatization and desire for redemption / Better understanding the threat and addressing root causes / Supporting key research and making use of our existing knowledge / Providing alternative views and outlets / A balanced approach.

Keywords. Motivation, suicide terrorism, free speech, human rights, trauma, ideology

Suicidal terrorism is one of the fastest growing and least understood threats to peace in modern-day democracies. Currently there is only an extremely small empirical research literature that policymakers can draw on to understand suicide terrorism, its genesis and prevention. Yet, there has been an exponential growth in suicide terrorism in recent years. Peacekeeping and coalition forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan are finding suicide terrorism to be a major factor in undermining rebuilding efforts and in bringing peace to the region. Israel and Russia have been plagued by an increase in suicide terrorism, which has been a major security threat to both countries and their regions in recent years. Although yet untouched by suicide terrorism, Western Europe was the staging ground for many of the 9/11 bombers, and the United Kingdom has generated three suicide bombers (two acting in Israel, the third carrying a bomb in his shoe on an international flight).

1 Reference for this work: Speckhard, Anne. “Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders” in Topics in Terrorism: Toward a Transatlantic Consensus on the Nature of the Threat" (Volume I) Eds. Jason S. Purcell & Joshua D. Weintraub Atlantic Council Publication 2005. A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders 159

The Nature of Suicide Terror

Modern day suicide terrorism began in Lebanon in 1983, but it has not remained limited to the Middle East. Suicide terrorism as a tactic has migrated around the world: it is used in Sri Lanka by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (or ltte, which perfected the suicide belt), the Kurdistan Workers Party (pkk) in Turkey, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (pij), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (pflp), Al-Asqa Martyrs Brigade in Israel, Al-Qaeda around the world, numerous groups in Iraq, and the Chechen rebels in Russia. The organizational goals of these groups are not necessarily linked to one another, yet across the entire spectrum, the use of human bombs has proven to be a powerful tactic in the hands of terrorists, who are thus able to force concessions from occupying forces – even to the point of expelling them – to wreak havoc on peace processes, gain international recognition in the media for both the sponsoring group and its cause, disrupt daily lives and create widespread dread and horror. Recognition of the effectiveness of this tactic in achieving terror organizations’ short-term goals seems to be lending momentum to, and indeed fostering, an exponential increase in the use of suicide attacks. Yet, despite this recent increase, suicide terror remains the least utilized – if most lethal – means of terrorism. Human bombs are in essence “smart bombs” that go unerringly to their target with the ability to detect surveillance and alter their course to maximize damage. Unlike other forms of terrorism, these require no escape plans for the perpetrators. Suicide terror, when successful, also leaves little trace of the perpetrator. He or she is no longer alive to be tracked down, incarcerated and interrogated. Only the organizers can be caught – though even this is difficult once the suicide mission is accomplished. Suicide terrorism is a complex, individual, psycho-social and organizational phenomenon. To research it properly, one must consider all its aspects, asking: what motivates the individual to move into a self-sacrificial mode (to be willing to die in order to kill others); how do societies come to embrace this tactic, and what role(s) do organizational goals, methods, planning, recruitment, training/indoctrination and execution play vis-à-vis suicide terrorism? When we consider both the individual and organizational motivations, we cannot forget that both are embedded within a psycho- social context, and that neither individual nor organizational inputs are likely to take off in any strong and consistent form without real daily-life psycho-social issues causing the message and possibility of this option to reverberate on both sides of the equation.

The Organizational Component

According to Ariel Merari, to date no suicide bomber has acted entirely on his or her own – that is, assembling a bomb, picking a target and detonating – without the aid and support of an organization. However, recent interviews by Nichole Argo update Merari’s claim – providing data on at least one bomber who acted independently of organizational backing. In any event, it is a myth to believe that a lengthy and in-depth period of training and indoctrination is necessary. Some suicide terrorists receive all their training and carry out their attacks in less than two weeks’ time. And not all suicide terrorists are recruited by the organizations that send them; many individuals recruit themselves, approaching an organization and volunteering to be human bombs. 160 A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders

From the point of view of the organization, it is clear that suicide bombing has a powerful effect. It is a combination of an extremely lethal tactic – in terms of numbers wounded and killed – and devastating psychological effects. It has the potential to create widespread changes in mentality, awareness and lifestyle. For example, suicide terrorism has shown itself able to derail sensitive negotiations (such as the Oslo Accords), strongly impact the political process (Madrid train bombings), disrupt military, humanitarian and rebuilding efforts (Afghanistan and Iraq) and draw world attention and concern to political issues (Chechnya). Moreover, it is appealing partially because it is “cheap,” requiring only minimal equipment and the loss of the bombers themselves. Whether it is effective in achieving any real political gains outside of the community in which it originates – i.e., whether it creates any real power base for those who employ suicide terrorism – is yet to be seen. Thus while it is still open to debate whether this tactic manifests itself in real status quo gains, we do know that its perpetrators and their communities often feel empowered by it. The expressive nature of the act – expressing one’s desperation and making another feel one’s pain – as well as its shared meaning as an act of defense in behalf of the community, brings both the organization and individual perpetrating it recognition and status within that community. This, despite all else, is a real gain to both parties.

The Psycho-Social Component

While organizations that make use of human bombs often consciously and purposefully promulgate ideologies supporting this tactic, it is crucial to note that to be successful their message must provoke the right response within both the individuals and the society that ultimately embraces these ideologies. Without a leadership promoting the utility and even morality of suicide terrorism as a tactic, widespread acceptance and use of it might never occur. Yet, we must also acknowledge that this is not entirely a top- down phenomenon. Social indoctrination of perpetrators with ideologies that support suicide terrorism need not always occur in an intentional mission pursued on behalf of an organization or religion, but can simply be a social phenomenon which results from community and individual responses to the circumstances in which they find themselves. Consider, for instance, that in the Palestinian experience the idea of embracing martyrdom (shudada – the death of innocents) had to gain prominence – from repeated unfortunate experiences – before Palestinian culture reached the point where it could embrace and nurture the concept of self-martydom (istich’hadin). Similarly, suicide terrorism had no place in Chechen history, but during the last two wars Chechen individuals and Chechen society as a whole increasingly found themselves devastated by meaningless traumas. In response to this, many sought out, embraced and constructed, individually and as groups, ideologies that empowered, derived meaning from and expressed their pain while fighting back against enemies much more powerful than themselves. Indeed, the entire phenomenon of suicide terrorism in Chechnya, as in all the places it has migrated to since its modern-day appearance in Beirut, began as a psycho-social phenomena in reaction to traumatic stress, a besieged mentality, social marginalization, alienation, or other perceived or real suffering – and in this response, some segment of society has embraced and promoted the ideologies that breathed life into it as tactic for fighting back. A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders 161

Organizations and ideologies find prominence in communities when they meet the psycho-social needs of individuals and groups within those communities. As Maslow showed with his hierarchy of individual needs, individuals first strive to meet their basic needs, and then continue on up to trying to achieve a sense of self-actualization which includes a sense of dignity and meaning in life. When under duress, communities and individuals are drawn to groups and ideologies that resonant with their own needs and that are empowering and capable to defend their community, and give them a sense of dignity and expression for their pain and a way to meet their desire to strike back.

The Individual Component

On the individual level, motivations are multi-faceted and multi-leveled. They can include political/nationalistic, religious, ideological, economic, community, sociological, psychological, personal and familial motivations. Other factors that can potentially operate within the matrix of a suicide terrorist’s motivations are: The individual’s psycho-social history, including his or her indoctrination or embracing over time of whatever religious and ideological justifications are given; the individual’s personal and familial life experiences, including issues of personal and secondary traumatization (e.g., history of incarceration, torture, trauma, etc.); cultural identification with the concept of revenge and the need for it; community affiliations; identifications with the sponsoring group; notions of sacrifice for the group; and the use of psychological defenses, including the dissociative defense, which appears possibly necessary to carry out the act. These are examined more fully here.

Choosing to Become a Suicide Bomber: Trauma & Ideology

The Role of Personal Traumatization

It is clear that the ideologies promoted by the organizations supporting suicide terrorism often resonate with the experiences and psycho-social needs of many young people within their societies. Witness Hamas’s claim to have thousands of self- recruited individual bombers (most of whom it allegedly has to turn away) or the fact that Chechen suicide terrorists also appear to be self-recruited. In both Palestine and Chechnya, experiences of deep personal traumatization and bereavement create in some a vulnerability that leads them to seek out the ideological message of those promoting violent and Jihadist methods. This message helps traumatized individuals to find a framework for dealing with their shattered world assumptions and to address their emotional suffering, survivor guilt and sense of a foreshortened future. But the psychological “first aid” offered by these organizations is short-lived for the individual, as it quickly progresses from the traumatized individual needing an answer to psychic pain to becoming a radicalized bomber willing to give his or her life for the cause. While objectively the psychological “first aid” is short-lived, in that the bomber gives up his life in exchange for what he gains by taking on the role of martyr, in his view he may see it as an exchange of an earthly life for greater eternal rewards, so that even after death he will live on as a hero in the memories of his community and 162 A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders so that he will achieve peace and strength in their estimation of him as a defender of the community. Thus, the rationality of the choice must be considered from the actor’s perspective, taking into account his valuing of acting on behalf of his community, being recalled forever as heroic, and potentially gaining eternal life and the spiritual rewards that he expects to be bestowed upon him as a martyr. While the severity of the human rights abuses occurring in the Palestinian territories is difficult to compare with that of the abuses in Chechnya, which are far worse, Palestinian bombers also are motivated by a sense of personal traumatization. Many claim that they have personally felt their lives threatened by the Israeli Defense Forces; many were incarcerated and began their involvement with terror groups with deep impressions and friendships made while in Israeli prisons; and a large number identify with, or are grappling with a stress overload from the daily humiliations and trials that face Palestinians at checkpoints, at work, in unemployment and in the difficulties and limitations of daily life. Traumatic stress or stress overload is, however, insufficient in itself to cause an individual to consider suicide terrorism. Clearly, the majority of Palestinian and Chechen society has been deeply traumatized, and yet most individuals in both societies are remarkably resilient, carrying on with daily life in the face of enduring emotional pain. Indeed, it appears rather that traumatic experience – that is – life- threatening, emotionally overwhelming experiences that are inescapable and cause deep psychic pain and for which there is little redress can form the psychological basis within the individual as well as the society to be receptive to and to even produce ideologies and groups that promote the tactic of suicide terrorism. The one must be present, in a sense to marry the other, as together they form a union that empowers, provides a method of redress, expresses pain in a manner that causes the “enemy other” to feel it as well, and creates meaning and honor in an individual who has been deeply dehumanized and shamed. But neither traumatic stress nor an ideology promoting suicide terrorism is likely to be able to support this tactic on its own; the one resonates within the other. Of course, this raises the issue of the Al-Qaeda suicide terrorism that has sprung out of societies in which there is little apparent traumatization. This issue is addressed later. Thus, the ideas contained within Jihadist ideologies and martyrdom that resonate with individual trauma are clear: the individual has been deeply hurt and desires social redress, but the circumstances deny this to him. The ideology and organization provide the individual with a means of empowering him to strike back, to defend his community, to express his pain and be sure that the generalized enemy “other” will feel his pain as well, to find meaning in his suffering, to end his own suffering in an honorable way – exiting the community while becoming a hero in it, and to ultimately enact justice (from his point of view) in a situation in which he rightly or wrongly perceives no other pathway to seek justice. And all of this occurs in a manner that is justified by the group, the wider community that supports the group and often by aspects of the community’s religion as well. Each of these aspects will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections.

Secondary Traumatization & Hidden Traumas

Identification with the traumas of others and secondary traumatization occurring by “witnessing,” over the Internet or on television, vivid images of injustices committed A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders 163 against others with whom one identifies as fictive kin (e.g., the brotherhood of Muslims) may also resonate with individual feelings of disaffection. Trauma psychologists have known for years that witnessing or learning of the deaths or traumas of others can in themselves engender powerful feelings of traumatization. Indeed terrorism researcher Nichole Argo reports the following statement by a Palestinian militant leader, “The difference between the first Intifada and the second is television. Before, I knew when we were attacked here, or in a nearby camp, but the reality of the attacks everywhere else was not so clear. Now, I cannot get away from Israeli attacks –TV brings them into my living room. When they are not in my camp, they are in Rafah, Gaza City, Ramallah, Jenin. … And you can’t turn the TV off. How could you live with yourself? At the same time, you can’t ignore the problem – what are you doing to protect your people? We live in an internal struggle. Whether you choose to fight or not, every day is this internal struggle.” – PFLP leader, Khan Yunis, June 2004. Furthermore, it is likely that the security services and societies trying to fight terrorism underestimate the negative psychological effects – and even traumatization – that can occur in young people who are profiled as terrorists simply by race or creed, who are arrested or incarcerated, or who undergo interrogation and breaking methods that many argue are neither illegal nor torture, yet are often referred to as “torture-lite.”

Self-Sacrifice: The Interaction Among Social Awareness, Desire for Change and a Lack of Legitimate Outlets

Group dynamics, including that of self-sacrifice for the community, are likewise powerful individual motivators. In general, suicide bombers have been found to be socio-economically better off, and at least as well educated (though often better educated) than their peers. As a result, they are likely to be more socially-aware and potentially more sensitive to the plights of their communities. Persons whose education would otherwise prompt them to contribute to their society as leaders frequently find themselves disaffected in their community and blocked from pursuing legitimate ways to fight injustice – a scenario which makes them potentially more vulnerable to being attracted to using the tactic of suicide terrorism. In essence, feelings of being qualified to serve as a leader and yet unable to find legitimate ways to bring about change, coupled with sensitivity to the shared pain of one’s community, may powerfully contribute to seeking other available outlets for expression. Likewise, when a cult of martyrdom has sprung up strongly in a society, these vulnerable yet talented individuals may feel that it is a burden not to act: that to fail to take on the martyr role – when no other means of effecting change seems available – is in itself a failure. This phenomenon is more strongly in evidence the closer that traumatization hits one’s family, community or home, especially if the culture in question has embedded within itself a duty to avenge the loss of loved ones. 164 A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders

Factors that Facilitate the Decision to Become a Suicide Bomber

The Role of Religion

Religion is not a cause of suicide terrorism, but it can be a powerful mobilizer on behalf of this terror tactic. Jihadist Islamic ideologies promote the idea of self-sacrifice to benefit the larger community in exchange for other-worldly rewards – including forgiveness of sins, salvation and instant entry into “paradise.” For a troubled, bereaved and guilt-ridden individual, the vision of these rewards can constitute strong motivation. The promise that in paradise one will be reunited with those who have gone on before – especially other martyrs – is a particularly powerful draw to those caught up in traumatic bereavement. Moreover, the promise that a martyr will be able to intercede on behalf of seventy relatives – securing, for them, as well, entry into paradise – helps to assuage guilt and grief over leaving loved ones behind. Survivor guilt and a sense of a foreshortened future also make martyrdom an attractive option; one is freed of guilt by giving up a life that was not going to be long anyway. Because suicide is forbidden, but martyrdom is not, suicide terrorism presents a seemingly honorable way to escape from psychic pain – it an honored choice. And having a choice in regard to one’s own death has proven alluring to many, especially the fugitive who believes that he or she is facing imminent capture, torture, death or imprisonment.

Cult of Martyrdom & Popular Support for Suicide Terrorism

In the Palestinian territories, there currently exists a “cult of martyrdom.” From a very young age children are socialized into a group consciousness that honors “martyrs,” including human bombers who have given up their lives in the fight against what is perceived by Palestinians to be the unjust occupation of their lands. Young children are told stories of “martyrs.” Many young people wear necklaces venerating particular “martyrs,” posters decorate the walls of towns, and rock and music videos extol the virtues of suicide bombers. Each act of suicide terrorism is also commemorated by a last testament and video, which are prepared ahead of time by the “martyr,” who can later achieve great popularity when the video is shown on television. Despite the very deep and real grief of the family and friends left behind, the funerals of “martyrs” are generally the occasion for much fanfare by the community and the sponsoring organization. Often, the effect of this is confusing to outsiders, as it can disrupt, delay and even circumvent the family’s ability to focus on its grief over the loss of a family member, and it may even support family members in proclaiming to outsiders their joy over the loss of the loved one. This “cult of martyrdom,” which has a strong underpinning in longstanding cultural roots (the honoring of martyrs), appears to have developed principally over the last decade, as the first act of suicide terrorism occurred in Israel only twelve years ago. In Chechnya, suicide terrorism first appeared in the year 2000, and widespread popular support for suicide terrorism does not yet exist, although the first pop song venerating a female bomber has now made its appearance and is very popular with Chechen youth. Moreover, at least two Chechen suicide attacks have included pre- prepared videos, one of which was aired over Al-Jazeera during the Dubrovka siege. It is possible that over time, with continued societal traumatization, these and other A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders 165 means will be able to popularize support for suicide terrorism among the general public in Chechnya – a development that should be watched carefully and curbed, if possible.

Dissociation

Dissociative defenses are commonly found in the survivors of psychological traumas (those with acute and posttraumatic stress disorder), and also in individuals who grow up under frequently traumatic circumstances, such as those that characterize the lives of many suicide bombers. Dissociation – that is the disruption of the normally integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity or perception of the environment, as well as the ability to enter and make use of a dissociative trance state – is frequently observed in trauma survivors. Traumatized individuals, especially those who have suffered multiple and repeated traumas particularly in childhood, have often learned to utilize this defense to detach themselves from overwhelming horrifying, terrifying and life-threatening circumstances. This dissociative function – that is the ability to enter into a trance state and separate oneself from fear, dread, and grief – seems to be both a facilitator and a commonly spoken-about characteristic of those who commit acts of suicide terrorism. Almost universally, the putative bombers describe their psychological state (with their bombs strapped on) as one of “floating” or “bliss,” or they report having “felt nothing,” etc. Such descriptions are consistent with dissociative trance states and feature prominently and repeatedly in accounts given by failed suicide terrorists to journalists and researchers. Such accounts are common in Israel, where at the peak of the second Intifada one Palestinian suicide bomber a day was stopped before detonating his bomb and was subsequently incarcerated. This has created a pool of detainees whom researchers can ask about their experiences with bombs actually strapped to their bodies. Arin, for example, a twenty-four-year-old woman interviewed in an Israeli prison by the author, was arrested after she had worn her explosive belt for six hours but decided against detonating it. She recalls her mental state while wearing the belt, “I was not conscious. When I meet bad things, I, Arin, move away. I collect the bad things and work out of myself.” She looks back, “I felt very nervous. I felt my mind stopped. For six hours I cannot think. Just at the last moment, I looked at the people. I looked at the babies. I saw babies. I thought, if he dies, what should I tell God? What should I tell Him? If he wants to cut off my life and take my soul, okay, but I don’t have the right.” Clearly, we can see in Arin’s description a dissociative mode that was only in the last moments disrupted. Arin’s motivation for violence began first with the constant humiliations at checkpoints, threatening encounters with security officials on the road and in her community and finally culminated in a desire to be a bomber when her boyfriend was killed two months previous to her action. Arin is still so distressed by his death that she cannot discuss it, but she states that when he was killed, “My mind was stopped. My life was stopped. My thought was everything is black.” She describes going to ask for a bomb: “I wasn’t asked. I asked to get the belt.” Here we see a person who reached her own point of traumatic stress overload and, as a result of too much psychic pain, chose to end her life by becoming a human bomb. It is important to note though that her decision was not simple suicide, but rather sacrificial giving of herself in behalf of her community. “I gave my life just to say, no!” After listing many threats and humiliations that she and her community had endured, culminating in her boyfriend’s killing, Arin states, “I thought that my home will come 166 A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders in danger, that they (Israelis) can come and fight us. I have nothing to do as a girl. I haven’t any weapon. I have to save my world. I have to play my role. I thought this was the only way to play my role, to carry out my responsibility to my nation, my family …” She describes her mental state in the four days she waited between requesting the mission and receiving the belt, “I was not talking to anyone, just in my imagination, looking at my aunts, saying goodbye to everything. I was not in a normal frame of mind. I felt disconnected from them and they felt it. They asked, ‘What is going on with you?’ and I said I was sick. I wrote a letter to them asking ‘forgive me, and I’m really sorry – this is my life and I want to end it in my own way.’” Fortunately, Arin’s dissociative mode was somehow disrupted by seeing babies, and she shifted suddenly back into her normal moral consciousness, which prevented her from going ahead with the mission. In the case of Chechen bombers, we find similar observations made by the bombers’ hostages and family members – those who observed the bombers just prior to, or while wearing, suicide bombs. For example, a Chechen respondent recalls how her cousin became withdrawn and depressed following the killing of her brother by Russians, but just before going on her suicide mission this girl became euphoric, falsely announcing her need to travel to Moscow in order to prepare for marriage. A cousin recalls, “I believed her, because she really was very much excited in those days, and a gleam appeared in her eyes.” Indeed, just as with normal suicides who have committed themselves to die, her depression likely lifted as she began contemplating release from psychic pain, and she unconsciously activated the dissociative defense necessary to carry out her wish. Given that it is so commonly reported and observed in human bombers, it appears that the dissociative defense is unconsciously activated by suicide terrorists to enable them to overcome the overwhelmingly negative emotions likely to be engendered by contemplating blowing oneself up, as well as murdering others while doing so. In all likelihood this defense engenders a release of endorphins – given that it is commonly observed and recalled as either a highly emotionally distanced, drugged, or euphoric state. Interestingly, this dissociative state has also been observed by researchers studying conventional suicide. It seems that a fair number of suicidal persons video- and audiotape their last moments, enabling researchers to observe them as they prepare to take their own lives. Many are reported to enter a highly dissociative trance state before pulling the trigger, hanging themselves or otherwise taking their own lives. Presently in many arenas where suicide terrorism is being used there is no need for groups to use any period of indoctrination, as individuals come in droves volunteering as human bombs. However, it is also clear that those sponsoring groups that use (or in the past used) indoctrination periods do so by inculcating hypnotic trance and/or dissociative modes. This is done by manipulating religious symbols, rituala, practices and/or ideologies, which can induce trance even in the course of their normal or intended usage. The rich tradition of religious ritual contained in nearly all mainstream religions is capable of inducing trance, and often does so as a means of coping with and even transcending the suffering endured in this life. Organizations which use these same trance-inducing methods to induce a state that enables an individual person to strap on explosives and detonate himself among civilians make a travesty of the religion from which this ability was derived. By making use of religious ideology and practices to induce and strengthen dissociative and trance states, and by failing to address in any other way than A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders 167 encouraging death among the traumatized populations which they draw upon, many sponsoring groups take advantage of, and reinforce, the dissociative tendencies of traumatized youth who wish to become human bombs. Such groups lower the barriers to becoming a suicide terrorist and greatly reduce the chances of the bomber backing out due to fear. That dissociation is likely a necessary or at least highly likely aspect of the suicide terrorist’s ability to move forward toward his own death was also born out in an unusual study. In a Brussels University study of “normal” students from varied international backgrounds, researchers were able to induce this same defense mechanism simply by asking subjects to take part in a thought experiment in which the students briefly took on the role of bombers who had been stopped just before detonating. Nearly all of the subjects described their fantasized “memory” of having the bomb strapped to their bodies in a highly dissociative manner. It is telling that even individuals with no intent to carry out such an act seemed to find it necessary to use a dissociative defense mechanism in order to confront imagining their own deaths through the strapping to their bodies (and eventual detonation) of lethal explosives. When Zacharia Zubeidi, the leader of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Jenin, spoke to the author about the mental states of those he sends out as bombers, he explained that even he frequently experienced this type of dissociative state. Recalling a stand-off in which he was surrounded by Israeli soldiers, and sure that he could not bear to return to the torments of torture and imprisonment which he calls “a piece of hell,” he decided it was better to die shooting as many soldiers as he could. Describing his mental state at the time he was facing his decision to “martyr” himself, he recalls, “I took a look out the window. I decided I wanted to die. But when I got my weapon ready and jumped on them, I decided not to die. It was, for a moment, a feeling like – death is mercy. I felt the feeling of being a martyr when I jumped on them, but it changed just when I opened the door. In the blink of an eye, my feelings changed from asking to be martyred to cursing.” Zubeidi explains that his experiences of psychological torture and imprisonment were so unbearable that he preferred death to arrest. “Prison, even if only a cage with no torture – it takes away all your achievements. In one moment, it all disappears. You always keep remembering – the outside, the outside … you start to hallucinate.” In freedom, he still suffers traumatic flashbacks. He explains, “I get the whole tape rewound, the whole prison, flashbacks of the prison.” Like many trauma survivors, Zubeidi often involuntarily moves into a dissociative mode. Yet, he argues that he is still flexible in his response to stress and that this is the difference between himself and those he sends out as martyrs. “They are completely different from us (fighters). They have only one decision. We have many options. The thought of running away is always available. We can go out and shoot.” In contrast, he describes the martyrs as locked into an inflexible dissociative mode caused by traumatic stress and the one decision that comes from it, “Of course they get flashbacks all the time, and for them death is a mercy.” While a normal person moves between a fight or flight response to stress and only into dissocative defenses when the threat becomes overwhelmingly horrific, terrifying and life-threatening, the individuals he equips to become suicide terrorists are, according to his observations, caught inflexibly over long periods of time in this dissociative mode. Explaining his own mode in comparison to theirs, he explains, “For the martyr all the cells in his mind are dead 168 A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders except for one.” According to Zubeidi, these individuals are in too much pain to find another way to cope and become totally fixated on carrying out what they view as acts of community defense, expressions of pain and enacting justice in response to “all that he has seen.” Explaining their inflexibility, he states, “When I feel this way I stay there one or two hours, but that one, after all that he has observed, there is only that one thing (i.e., to end their lives in behalf of the community).”

Acts of Defense and the Expressive Quality of Suicide Terrorism

When one considers that human bombs may be individuals who have reached their individual breaking point due to traumatic stress – who have become so filled with grief, trauma and guilt over surviving when others have not, and so convinced of the futility and shortness of life, and so dissociative that they feel “already dead,” death can be understood as the leader of the Al-Asqa Martyr’s Brigade described his own dissociative response – as “mercy” for them. When religion expressly forbids suicide, and the dissociative individual is able to separate himself enough from his psychic pain to avoid suicide, which is often the case with this defense – moving to this act of human bombing is not seen by the individual as suicidal, but rather as sacrificial. Despite this self-perception, there are parallels in choosing to become a human bomb to choosing conventional suicide. The traumatized and dissociative individual who becomes a bomber has lost his ability to see other options for acting and is severely constricted in his responses, as his dissociative defense increasingly causes him to simply stay numb and distanced from the many options he might otherwise see as available. This is similar to the cognitive restriction frequently observed in conventional suicides, who see taking their own lives as their only viable option for dealing with their psychic pain. Likewise, when society has embraced an ideology that permits and even promotes human bombs, then death in this manner can become a door through which one walks to escape psychic pain, as well as all the closed-off options that traumatic dissociation now contains, and a heroic way to act in defense of one’s community. Human bombs generally believe that they are defending their communities by acting in this manner, they generally cite serious grievances as their motivations for acting, and they value highly the fact that they are acting. It is in a sense a great move out of traumatic depression into action, which is highly significant for the person who makes it. In doing so, they are taking their last bit of psychic energy to act and by doing so expressing their own pain and that of their community and making their enemy “other” experience and feel their pain. Especially when the enemy has been able to conduct a war at a distance – from helicopters, using smart bombs and guided missiles, losing few soldiers – taking a bomb into the heart of the enemy’s territory can greatly even the odds and fulfill a desire to make the other feel one’s pain. Unfortunately, this solution for the individual ends in his own death, but generally he knows that this embracing of his own death will be seen as a sacrifice by his community, and he will be honored for it.

Gender Differences: Women & Suicide Terror

Gender differences can certainly be observed between men and women suicide bombers, and these are important to understand. That being said, however, we have A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders 169 found that gender is rarely the central factor in the individual or organizational motivation for choosing to become or send a bomber. Certainly, Palestinian terror organizations began to open this option to women, as it became more and more difficult to send male bombers across increasingly secure checkpoints. Women could more easily hide explosives by feigning pregnancy, and respect for the cultural mores of modesty at first prevented vigorous searches of women, and their use created a spectacular element of surprise (though with the increase in female bombers this has changed). There is some evidence that some sending organizations view women as expendable and that they find it expedient to exploit the particular vulnerabilities of women in certain societies. There have been suggestions that the pkk used women as bombers more often than in other capacities because the terror cells need to relocate fairly frequently, and women were observed to be slower at hiking and less useful for carrying equipment over long distances. Additionally, in rare cases there is evidence that both men and women have been exploited by senders who use blackmail or outright coercion – threatening to expose a sexual secret or drug habit, etc., which, if exposed, would cause the would-be bomber to be killed or severely socially ostracized, or explicitly threatening women with death. Blackmail is generally a more powerful tactic when used against women in conservative societies, because women are often constrained to live with more numerous and more rigid moral strictures than are men. In her interviews with family members of female Palestinian bombers, Barbara Victor concluded that strict and narrow role assignments in a tightly controlled society made the choice of martyrdom seem more attractive to those women who were unable or unwilling to fulfill their prescribed social roles (due to infertility, discovery of an illicit sexual relationship or pregnancy, etc.). Certainly, this was true of Tamil Tiger female suicide bombers who were raped at checkpoints by their enemies and thus rendered unable to return to the normal roles of becoming wives and mothers. The result of this practice was to leave the affected women the choice of becoming prostitutes, militants or bombers, although these cases were not representative of the majority of Tamil female bombers. We also found the problem of inability to fulfill “normal” roles because of cancer, infertility, etc. in the cases of a few female Chechen bombers, though this set of issues was always far less important in the main motivating effect than deep personal traumatization. Recent interviews with “would be” Palestinian women bombers in Israeli prison also dispelled this myth – each bomber denying the validity of Victor’s theories. One respondent frankly laughed when asked about Victor’s theories, saying they were implausible, “For this you want to explode yourself? For infertility? This is stupidity. For having had illicit sexual relations? You will die for this? No I can speak to God and He will forgive me.” She went on to say that people always search for such explanations, especially for female bombers, because females don’t have to give their lives this way. Yet she explains, “Every girl can decide for herself … If you want to die and you know you want to die – this is what is going on with blowing ourselves up.” Although this discussion has focused on self-recruited suicide bombers, rumors abound of instances of coercion, especially in regard to the so-called Chechen “Black Widows.” Zarema Mujukhoeva, the only Chechen bomber to abandon her suicide mission, and someone who, unlike all the others, agreed to do so in the first place for money, claimed after arrest that the “Black Widows” are forced to carry out their missions by a phantom figure she called “Black Fatima.” According to Mujukhoeva, 170 A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders

“Black Fatima” follows the bombers to make sure they detonate – and triggers the detonation by remote control if they do not. If this story has any truth to it, one wonders how Mujukhoeva could have lived to tell her story, given that she put her fully- charged, bomb-filled backpack down on the streets of Moscow while trying to abandon her mission. Why would “Black Fatima” not have detonated Mujukhoeva’s bomb by remote control? It seems more likely this is merely a rumor that originated with Mujukhoeva (wanting to deny all responsibility for her criminal actions and later admitting to many lies), which was then amplified by a Russian press unable to grasp the reality of the motivations leading Chechen women to suicide terrorism – women who are not coerced, but are in fact willing volunteers. What is certainly a serious difference between men and women bombers is that men who want to fight back against a powerful enemy or who are trying to take flight from the same have many more options than their female counterparts in conservative societies. Militant organizations in conservative societies are often not willing to arm women to fight in battles or even to “martyr” themselves in a shoot-out in which they will ultimately be killed, nor can women act as easily in the many other fighting or evasive roles that are open to men. Likewise, when equally traumatized there is some evidence that females are often more dissociative in response to their traumatic experience than males, who often act out their traumatic stress in behavioral disorders and hyperactivity. Hence the human bomb option of fighting back can be a result of the less flexible options of women in conservative societies, not in terms of life in general, but in response to traumatic stress – they may much more easily get caught in a dissociative mode that can make them vulnerable to opting to act as human bombs. Zacharia Zubeidi, leader of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Jenin, reports, “Girls come begging for such operations (human bombings) much more than boys. Twice as many girls ask.” When asked why he thought this was so, he answers, “The emotions of girls are stronger than those of boys. Their feelings are much deeper than boys. God made girls more sensitive.” Then reflecting a bit more, he adds, “We decided, no girls. No one took them since the Intifada began, so this pool increased. A guy can let a little of what’s inside out by going out on an operation to shoot, to shoot and come back. A girl has few choices. She cannot go and shoot. Every girl has just one way – a (bombing) operation.” Indeed, we met a young Palestinian woman who told us she had asked for a mission but was repeatedly rejected. Yet her desire grew, as did her traumatic stress and frustration each time another of her friends self-martyred or was killed by Israelis, and she felt powerless to do anything. Certainly, a woman who chooses to become a bomber briefly attains a sense of power in life – and taking on the traditionally male role of warrior is a great equalizer. But both of these feelings are quite short-lived, given the short career path that characterizes this role. Hence, these are likely only secondary motivations following traumatic stress. Likewise, in some societies a woman can attain “rock star status” only after death; a status that is very difficult for a woman to attain in life in most traditional societies. A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders 171

Europe and Suicide Terrorism

Though it has thus far been relatively free of suicide terrorism, Europe is no stranger to this phenomenon. Germany and Spain served as staging grounds for 9/11, with Mohammed Atta’s cell originating in Germany and many relevant financial transactions made in Spain. Likewise, three suicide bombers have originated in the United Kingdom, two of whom carried out their attacks in Israel, while a third would have blown up an entire planeload of passengers had he not been stopped. Furthermore, at least two groups have been caught using what could be characterized as “weapons of mass destruction” – that is, planning to carry out ricin attacks in London and Paris. Important to note is that, in Paris, the so-called Chechen cell was made up of North Africans who so strongly identified with the traumas of their Chechen “brothers” that they risked their own lives plotting to poison the staff at the Russian embassy. This is chilling evidence of the possibility that growing numbers of disaffected and socially alienated Muslims living in Europe will identify with the traumas of their “fictive kin” living outside of the continent and therefore act as terrorists within Europe on behalf of these others. The Madrid bombings might be seen as supporting this theory. One of the current concerns in Europe is the widespread radicalization of Muslim youth living there. A growing number of European cities have high concentrations of Muslim youth, many of whom are poorly integrated into local society. Brussels, for example, is 20 percent Moroccan. Given the impressive cyber-infrastructure in Europe and in the United States, it is not hard to imagine that al-Qaeda – which is no longer a coherent organization but more of a movement – could radicalize large numbers of disaffected and socially alienated young Muslims and then mobilize them to support suicide terrorism by disseminating its ideas over the Internet to target groups living on either side of the Atlantic. This would constitute the first step in a nascent movement to mobilize individuals who might be willing to carry bombs outside of the already active zones of conflict. If this threat were to be realized on a large scale, it would likely create deep changes in the way that Europeans and Americans currently go about and enjoy their lives. To understand the phenomenon of European-based suicide terrorism, we know with certainty that these individuals at least claim to be motivated on behalf of traumas suffered by their fictive kin – their Muslim brothers. But is this enough to motivate a Muslim living in Europe to become a human bomb? Our view is no, that there is an entirely different mechanism operating in this arena than in those in which daily humiliations and traumatic stress are part of everyday life, that there are basically two separate motivational sets for suicide terrorism that operate in differing arenas and according to different psychological and psycho-social circumstances.

Motivational Sets for Human Bombs

Nationalistic, Community Defense, Expressive, Trauma and Revenge based Motivations As stated above, there appear to be two primary groups of motivations or motivational sets for suicide terrorism – the first of which emanates from societies which see themselves rightly or wrongly as under occupation or engaged in warfare. In many ways these individuals, societies, and sponsoring organizations often have the mentality of insurgents. Their primary motivations are often nationalistic, and their 172 A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders personal motivations are trauma and revenge driven. They often rely on dissociation as a defense. These bombers generally see themselves as acting in defense of their communities, acting in an expressive manner and wishing to cause pain to their enemy “other” in order to make them feel “our pain”. They have frequently but not always adopted a religious ideology which allows them to act as cosmic warriors – dispensing with the normal limitations on carrying out violence, seeing it as an all or nothing battle, and demonizing their enemies. In this group we find that men and women’s motivations and the psychological processes leading them to become human bombers are nearly identical. Leadership and organizations play a role in promoting this option as a viable and morally approved choice. Societies and individuals enduring too much traumatic stress and in too much psychic pain respond positively to this message, contribute to it and act accordingly.

Alienation, Marginalization, Loss of Identity, Desire for Meaningfulness and Adventure, Secondary Traumatization and Desire for Redemption The second group of motivations or motivational sets is entirely different from the first and emanates from cultures in which immigration, migration and a clash of cultures are a primary issue. We see these bombers making up the group of radicalized Muslims in Europe who have acted as human bombs – Mohammed Atta and his 9/11 cell originating in Hamburg, Germany and finding much of their support in Europe; the 9/11 bombers who came from Saudi Arabia; the two nightclub bombers originating in the UK who acted in Israel; Richard Reid also from the UK – who was the would-be shoe bomber – was a Muslim convert and nearly took down a passenger plane heading for the U.S.; the Casa Blanca bombers in Morocco; the Moroccan train station bombers in Madrid; and lastly the Muslim Europeans and Arabs who have gone to Iraq as bombers. In this group, to date, we find few women. This second group have motivations that appear to us to be made up of a lethal cocktail of a sense of societal alienation and marginalization for those temporarily or for generations transplanted from their original cultures; a loss of positive self- concept/identity, (both of which are met by group dynamics, loyalty and a sense of belonging to the group); a desire for adventure; and life meaningfulness; a resonance to secondary traumatization occurring in the first group (i.e., identifying with traumas and injustices done for instance to Muslims in Chechnya and Palestinian territories) and indirect traumatization by viewing images of these populations’ hardships on television and the Internet; and lastly a desire for personal redemption from moral dissipation. These last two items are perhaps the most important, as marginalization, alienation, a search for adventure and a positive identity are all strong motivators, but when combined with strong identification with the traumas of others (which is easily accomplished these days by the use of videotapes, graphic Internet footage, television coverage, etc.), along with the frequent history of having been corrupted by the host society, the individual often feels a very strong need to redeem himself. In psychological terms, the Muslim immigrant who has let himself go “wild” in the West – drinking, using drugs, chasing women – and decides finally that he has had enough dissipation enough often goes through a process in which he returns to Islam and embraces a very conservative and militant form of religion. In this move he begins to feel real sympathy for the sufferings of others, but at the same time cannot come to terms with his own “bad boy” self. Instead, in re-embracing Islam and choosing a militant fundamentalist form of it, he subsequently splits off and disowns the “bad boy A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders 173 parts of himself” and projects this “bad boy” self onto Western society, concluding that the West must now be punished or destroyed. In joining a close-knit group of militants, this person replaces his negative self- image with a positive, adventurous and heroic self-image that is reinforced by belonging to the group. Loyalty, belonging and group dynamics begin to fill the need for belonging and positive self-image, even at the final cost of losing the “good” self on behalf of the group’s ultimate goal. Hence a sudden transformation can occur in what seemed to be a “normal,” somewhat integrated Muslim man who can suddenly transform into a virulent human bomb – giving rise to the cries of horror about how Muslims living and being educated in Europe and the U.S. could suddenly turn against the West and commit crimes such as the 9/11 attacks. This second motivational set is far less likely to be active in women for a number of reasons. First of all, women in conservative cultures are used to playing secondary roles in society – the immigrant secondary role is similar to the one they played at home. They do not suffer a huge drop in status when immigrating as men do. Women are often far more adaptable as immigrants than men. Likewise, they are often carefully supervised by their families in their home and new cultures and are not allowed to go about freely without careful safeguards or to integrate into the host culture as readily. When living as immigrants, their families often impose many safeguards on their behavior – so a sense of internal dissipation is less likely in women – they aren’t allowed, as their brothers, to “run wild” in the West. Likewise, those who travel from Arab and European countries to Iraq as bombers are more likely to be men, because Muslim women are far less likely to be allowed to travel freely, although the Chechen case deviates from this rule. Chechen women traveled long distances, although always with caretakers – to commit their acts of suicide terrorism.

Better Understanding the Threat & Addressing Root Causes

Supporting Key Research and Making Use of Our Existing Knowledge

Those who wish to fight suicide terrorism and combat popular support for it need to understand the phenomenon as it exists today in the many settings in which it is occurring. The first step toward doing so is to support solid research aimed at learning as much as possible about organizational and individual motivations – and the communities that support them – as well as the modes of interaction or intersection among them. In achieving such understanding, it becomes possible to begin to design interventions based on solid empirical evidence which might then help to curb this very lethal and exponentially growing global threat. Likewise, it is important to put into use what we already know. Suicide terrorism is not the result of poverty or illiteracy alone. Simply reading the statements of terror groups makes clear that many are attempting to address failed political processes and that a number of these are legitimately concerned with social injustices – some of which are easier than others to begin to address. Survey data collected by researcher Khalil Shiqaqi show that popular support for suicide terrorism among Palestinians can be seen to increase or decrease depending upon how threatened the society feels or how confident it is in the political process at any given time. 174 A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders

Providing Alternative Views and Outlets

It is also clear that suicide terrorists make use of willingly manipulated mass media. It might be wise to investigate the possibility of voluntary self-censorship on the part of the most sensational reporting organizations. Israel already does this successfully, whereas Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has threatened to achieve similar ends by state decree – a move that could well prompt the Chechen terrorists to attack more often inside of Moscow or other major cities, where complete state control of the media would be nearly impossible. But more fundamentally, the terrorist ideologies that so successfully address feelings of social alienation, victimization and trauma – and that manipulate the dissociative states occurring among many Muslim youth as a result of traumatization – must also find competition from societies that are willing and able to address, in constructive ways, these same issues of trauma, alienation and the need for social justice. Organized or informal groups, both within and outside affected societies, must begin to offer roles and hope to young people, so that they will not turn to suicide terrorism for want of alternative ways to change their lives and communities. Religious leaders must begin to stand up to the manipulation of Islam by Jihadist militants, and those who do speak out ought to be supported (if quietly) by the West, However, not many are likely to want this role, so long as the West continues to be seen by large numbers of their supporters as tainted by the abuses at Abu Ghraib, seemingly extralegal detentions or practices considered as “torture-lite” in places such as Guantanamo Bay, and continued reports of soldiers failing to act honorably in Iraq and elsewhere. By extension, it can be argued that preserving cherished “Western” freedoms will require finding means to deal with the conflict zones that inflame Jihadist mentalities in ways that uphold democratic ideals. This no easy task, but it is necessary to prevent the spread of suicide terror as a tactic. Already, the ideas and culture of suicide terrorism have made significant inroads among many groups and can be seen to have migrated successfully from conflict area to conflict area. This is unlikely to stop if the West does not begin to address the root causes of suicide terrorism – including the ideologies as well as the individual’s psychosocial motivations.

A Balanced Approach

This is not to say that intelligence operations aimed at infiltrating terror groups or military operations aimed at decapitating their leadership cannot make a difference. Israel has shown dramatic short-term success in this regard, although it could be argued that this success is bought at the cost of motivating future terrorists. As U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld lamented in 2004, it is not enough simply to kill terrorists, if these are able to replace their ranks faster than they can be killed. Especially within conflict zones, individual psychology and traumatic experiences play a major role in the individual’s decision to become a bomber. Other key factors include the failure of the political process to address individual grievances and sponsoring organizations’ willingness to exploit such failure. Community support for suicide terrorism increases when threats to its well-being are perceived as high, and political processes are viewed as failing to meet those threats. A. Speckhard / Understanding Suicide Terrorism: Countering Human Bombs and Their Senders 175

The prevention and gradual reduction of the threat posed by suicide terrorism thus requires that we address root causes. Repressive governments must be encouraged and pressured to reform, so as to open the way for economic growth and increased opportunities for the frustrated, disillusioned and often well-educated youth who constitute the most explosive sector of the societies from which suicide terrorism comes. All sectors of society – both at home and abroad – must be given a voice, and all ethnic, gender and religious groups must be attended to with respect, so these do not find solace in the ideologies and activities of radical groups. Human rights abuses, whether at home or abroad, must be neither tolerated nor seem to be tolerated, even in the name of fighting terrorism. To do so abandons democratic values and exchanges freedom for security, and this, in the end, brings neither. 176 Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game

Samuel PELEG Department of Political Science and Strategic Dialogue Center at Netanya College, Israel

Abstract. The concluding chapter picks up the themes of the book, namely the rational and calculated character of terrorism and the open society it operates in, and it introduces to this setting the relevance of religiously motivated terrorism. This article focuses on the revitalized identity group as the new actor on the terrorist scene in the aftermath of 9-11. Ignorance of the motivation and sacrifice of this new and powerful actor will impede the sacred task of counterterrorism. These, in turn, prosper on grievances and deprivation, which are, in the final analysis, the real breeders of political violence.

Keywords. Al-Quaeda, September 11, international conflict, revitalized identity groups, globalism, populism

Intrinsic changes in the character of social and political conflicts are happening all over the world. These developments are not being adequately explained, because research is still trapped within the neat and parsimonious paradigm of political realism, in which states or governments are the major actors of global politics, and thus, the main perpetrators of conflict and violence [1, 2]. The recent rise to prominence of the Islamic militant organization al-Qaeda on the global agenda undermines the conventional wisdom of the realist approach. But who are those people, and how are they organized? What are their motivations and stimulations? These questions must be asked in light of the September 11th trauma and the terrorist events that have plagued the world since then. A new emphasis should be sought. Instead of the customary symptom treatment of anti-terrorist methods and military counter-measures, the focus should be put on the motivation and inspiration of the perpetrators, which is the foundation for a root treatment of terrorism. The spotlight should be cast on who initiates political conflicts, who ignites the flames, and when and how are they are ignited. In short, who are the agents of socio-political change and what makes them tick.

The Game: International Conflict

This chapter portrays a certain operative mode of socio-political conflicts, in which the participants are not merely governments and some vague elements that violate social codes, but specific organized, non-governmental actors, in particular revitalized identity groups. These groups are tenacious and ambitious, because they represent real grievances, real constituencies and unresolved problems incorrectly treated or ignored by the establishment. Characterized by their defiance of political norms and the rules of S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game 177 the game, such groups dramatically influence the course and intensity of conflict. In order to establish themselves as worthy opponents to the mechanisms of government and social control, revitalized identity groups must invest in mobilization, solidarity and group cohesion processes. A reexamination of the dynamics of conflict undermines the general concept which determines that political conflicts are fought between formal groups and within normal political confines. The idea presented here will show that these explanations fail to take into account the identity groups that dispute the state’s authority in their search for the fulfillment of their aspirations.1 The conflicting interests between identity groups and the state, or the international hierarchy of states, cause and incite protracted conflicts, which are most difficult to resolve. Owing to their complex nature, these conflicts have a tendency to deteriorate into violence and, in extreme circumstances, even to terrorism. An identity group perspective can elucidate the phenomenal emergence of Bin Laden and al-Qaeda on the international stage and their soaring popularity in many parts of the globe.

The Actor: The Revitalized Movement

A revival or revitalized movement is an extremist group motivated by the force of a desire to rebuild the whole complex of social and political relations around it, holding onto a holistic point of view of a better future, in contrast to the oppressive present situation. It is a modern phenomenon, despite the reverence for old symbolism and ancient rhetoric. They continue to wait for signs and wonders that will foreshadow the doom of modernity. At the same time, it is an active, aggressive political group, with a clear plan of action as to how to expedite its agenda. Accordingly, Charles Tilly sketches the image of the revitalized identity group as a challenger and as a pro-activist group. He claims that rapid change is improbable, except by the formation of a new identity group, which comes into being in a drastic process of revitalization [3] (p. 507). In addition to its being a pro-activist group coveting change, Tilly identifies the revitalized identity group as a non-organizational communal entity, (pp. 508-510). Tilly’s analysis describes them as small communal groups of local extent, whose organizational structure is primary lacking any departmentalization. In most cases, this is a traditional group with outmoded principles and aspirations. The number of its supporters is quite limited; thus, the means for growth of such a group are limited. Nevertheless, those members who have aligned themselves with the group are as a rule loyal. The source of its ruling authority is either traditional or charismatic, not legal or rational, and no laws constrain its leadership. On the other hand, says Tilly, an organizational group is modern, large and more efficient in the advancement of society as a whole. Its organization is intelligent and departmental, and its ability to mobilize resources is well developed and much more efficient. Boulding [4] (pp. 107-108) uses other words to describe the same distinction between the types of groups. He proposes a dichotomy between volitional and non-volitional to differentiate between communal

1 The analytical dilemma in this work focuses on the question of what is the most appropriate angle to review and understand socio-political conflicts. As an axiom, most existing theories of socio-political conflicts ignore a whole category of players, their distresses, their wishes and their capabilities. The revitalized identity group is worthy of theoretical attention. 178 S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game and organizational groups. The differentiating criteria are the freedom of choice open to the individual to join or choose his identity group. According to this explanation, communality means a choice-less ascription, because ties of heredity and clannish cohesion bind the members to their group. I agree that a revitalized identity group is indeed of a communal character, but only in the characteristics that concern the loyalty of its members and their stubborn irrational adherence to the aims and fantasies of a charismatic leadership. However, scope-wise, revitalized identity movements can match or even eclipse any associative group while simultaneously boasting of a commitment, ardor and devotion of adherents unparalleled by any other mobilization endeavor. Thus, modern movements of revitalized identity groups have the power to sweep with them enormous populations, crossing national boundaries, positioning themselves as central powers all over the world. By combining structural features of associative groups with the soul of communal groups, such movements establish themselves as a formidable power to reckon with. What are the reasons for the renewed growth of communal identity groups, and what has ignited the revitalization phenomenon? Largely, it was a reaction against the world’s increased interdependence and the tendency towards global affiliation and integration on various economic collateral and political frontiers. These tendencies of rapprochement in the international system constitute a warning signal to national, religious and ethnic entities, which became anxious lest they might be swallowed up by this new “global village.” Thus, paradoxically, global developments characterized by the emergence of a world culture and the crystallization of new regional arrangements and contacts gave birth to its antithesis: the revitalized identity groups and their quest for segregation and separation. In a spiral process of mutual fertilization, the two opposing orientations feed on each other: globalism has inspired localism and localism has spurred globalism. The system has bred sub-systems, which in turn aim at the annihilation of that system. Furthermore, modernization and industrialization have caused a sharp competition over raw materials and resources, thus finally causing their overuse and increasing scarcity. The economic shortage in a shrinking world creates a discriminating advantage for those who have, causing distress and frustration in those who have not. Distress is an accelerator for the development of revitalized identity groups, no matter whether the distress is economic, political, educational or cultural. The aim of the revitalized identity group is significant political change: a structural change in the source of authority and in patterns of behavior. Therefore, the clear target of their activity is the state: the governmental structure, its authority and its existing socio- political patterns of action. The revolt of the revitalized identity groups is directed against the authority of the political establishment in an effort to undermine its ruling capacity. The final aim is a political upheaval by toppling the regime or by causing a fundamental change in its policy. In any case, the initiators and challengers are the identity groups. The inevitable tension between existing power structures, either of the international system or the state, and the identity group prevails because of the utterly opposing interests of the two sides: organization, order and hierarchy in contrast to separation, seclusion and uniqueness. These differences come to the fore in particular when attempts to impose loyalty to the system cause the development of deprivation S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game 179 and injustice towards the sub-system, thus threatening its basic values and needs. This is the preliminary condition to the formation of a protracted conflict. The main motivation to embark on a total system conversion is fear. The fears of all minorities are a shared and common experience describing an existing or impending unbearable situation that must be entirely and rapidly replaced or eliminated. The distress that identity groups experience is the fear of liquidation [5], which means that the small entity might be absorbed by the dominant authority. More distinctly, such foreboding can be classified as concern about potential shifts in group boundaries. The blurring of affiliation can occur either by assimilation – loss of distinctive identity through merger with a larger entity, or by differentiation – the drifting apart of smaller subgroups. The two types of fear provoke different action strategies. Fear of assimilation is countered by a greater emphasis “… on recalling the ancient glories of the culture that binds group members, resuscitating all that distinguishes them from others, destroying all that links them to others” [6] (p. 9). Fear of differentiation, on the other hand, is met with attempts to reconstruct history by emphasizing myths of common origins, and especially “… a single ancestor” (p. 9). Another important property of revitalized groups is the urge to build a whole new cultural system, specifying new sets of relationships between man and society and between man and government. In an identity group approach, relationships are given saliency as a vital variable in the sequence of socio-political behavior. Problem-solving and conflict resolution may be observed in the group members’ conscious and deliberate efforts to construct a more satisfying system as a solution to the emerging grievances and tensions of a deplorable status quo. Lastly, the grievances and despair that spur the members of revitalized groups to radical activism emerge from the pursuit of human needs not met by the prevailing structure. As Wallace noted long ago, the rationale for any human association is finding and elaborating culturally recognized techniques for satisfying needs [7] (p. 268). Al-Qaeda is a revitalized fundamentalist movement that is religiously motivated to meet its unfulfilled human needs in a better and imminent future. The return to basic tenets as a source of eternal bliss is a firmly established principle. Fundamentalism has been a formidable sustaining force, and it has given rise to a multitude of popular movements. Al-Qaeda epitomizes active fundamentalism, which envisages the advent as the culmination of a preparatory stage in which the members themselves must assiduously achieve purity and salvation from a degenerate present in the spirit of a glorified past. The anticipation of the imminence of redemption galvanizes Al-Qaeda into action. The confidence in an ultimate triumph and the conviction of an indubitable rescue stimulate intense endeavors to promote these goals. Activists are encouraged to be steadfast and risk everything, because the goal is ultimate salvation, and no compromises are admissible. It is a relentless movement that acts on its beliefs and successfully mobilizes devoted followers for its deeds. Al-Qaeda thrives on the charisma and self-assurance of its leaders, who manage to implant in their adherents enthusiasm and faith in the future – the two indispensable features of the devout identity group. 180 S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game

The Nature of the Fundamentalist Identity Group

The revitalized fundamentalist movement accumulates strength as more and more adherents choose it as their primary identity group. Such a decision means that those who believe in the movement’s message have committed themselves to a total change of society as a goal and to the ideology of the organization as the blueprint or formula for action. Prior to joining the group, activists experience or are aware of grievances and hardships in their larger human association – the nation, the state or the community. These grievances, and the urge to remedy them, push new recruits into the unified and cohesive identity group, in which others desire the same goals. This mutual sense of deprivation and ultimate concern reinforces the activists’ extremist state-of- mind. It cultivates their readiness to deviate from prevailing social norms and their predisposition to violate the political rules of the game by adhering to a stubborn ideology and an unyielding goal of total change. This section explores the unique character of the revitalized identity group by underscoring the contribution of extremist propensities and the significance of ideology to the spirit of the activists. A revitalization movement must discredit the prevailing system in the most fundamental manner. Its leaders should discount and denounce every aspect of the current regime, focusing chiefly on the issues pertaining to the group’s predicament. To gain the support and loyalty of their followers, the challengers’ leaders endeavor to fan a spirit of extremism in their disciples. Extremism might be seen as the tendency to go to the poles of an ideological axis, or it can be the attempt to attain a goal beyond the limits of legal-normative procedures [8]. Such an understanding of the idea implies both a concept and behavior. For a group of determined activists who aspire to all- embracing change, extremism is an invaluable disposition that makes a fanatic ideology and the resulting excessive deeds easier to assimilate. Extremism and radicalism are often used synonymously, but in fact they are different. Radicalism refers to a profound questioning of the system. Political radicals are those who call for the reinterpretation of the central concepts and principles of the system and those who call into doubt the established practices of the status quo. Naturally, radicals become a nuisance to incumbents or conservatives, who wish to minimize any activity that might challenge their power position. Thus, authorities often portray radicals as threatening the very foundations of society. This depiction contributes to the popular notion that radicals and extremists are indistinguishable. This obfuscation is detrimental not only to accurate analyses, but also to policy- making. Radicals who invoke fundamental “truths” and thereby undermine orthodoxy are an asset in any society. They rejuvenate and sustain the values upon which human communities are founded. Extremism is the real danger to a political system, particularly a democratic one. Although similar to radicals in their craving for ultimate change, extremists adopt militant, aggressive tactics to bring this about. Thus, extremists not only contest ideas and concepts, they also repudiate behavioral norms and order. As a result, instead of constructing a more just or equal society, they wreak havoc and drive the people to revolt. Abcarian concisely sums up the distinction between radicals and extremists: “A radical may or may not be an extremist, depending upon the political style, not the ideas, he adopts. Radicalism refers to insistence on basic policy changes. Extremism, on the other hand, implies rejection or destruction of accepted mechanisms and processes through which such policies are made.” [9] (p. 18) S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game 181

Though radicals can certainly threaten political stability with their demands, the threat of anarchy and chaos arises more from the conduct of extremists. The members of Al-Qaeda are extremists. They adopt both goals and means that defy existing norms and jeopardize the stability of the international system. Extremism, then, is a state of mind that pits activists against the socio-political order and facilitates their resort to unconventional means to achieve their objectives. But, while regarded as meritorious by the revitalized identity group, extremism spells social irresponsibility toward society as a whole. Extremist perceptions and ambitions compare what is with what should be, but they do not accurately perceive their impact on society; they only conjecture as to the end effects. Hence, their scenario of change is absolute and unmitigated, regardless of how society adapts to it. Indifference to the fate of others who happen to disagree with their drastic solutions is what Mannheim calls a ‘utopian mentality’: “Certain oppressed groups are intellectually so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it. Their thinking is incapable of correctly diagnosing an existing condition of society. They are not at all concerned with what really exists; rather in their thinking they already seek to change the situation that exists. Their thought is never a diagnosis of the situation; it can be used only as a direction for action.” [10] (p. 36) What distinguishes extremist groups is their cognitive style, the manner in which they think, plan and see the world. The deterministic, irresponsible cognitive style unites extremists of all political hues, whether from the left or from the right. Lipset and Raab reiterate the interchangeability among extremists, although they initially analyze right-wing groups in America [8]. In their elaborate study, the authors discern five major traits of the extremist cognitive style, or state of mind: monism, or anti- pluralism, simplism, moralism, populism and the assumption of conspiracy:2 Monism is a unified, organic, and conformist position that does not tolerate other opinions and abhors any kind of dissent. Simplism is an uncomplicated and plain interpretation of the socio-political environment, using banal and unsophisticated rhetoric to appeal to the lowest common denominator. Moralism is the tendency to relate human history to the ongoing struggle between good and evil and to judge reality through normative, value-laden lenses. Populism is the presumption of representing and fighting for the common man and the underdog against exploiters. Finally, the assumption of conspiracy means a sense of isolation and deprivation despite being just and the desperate feeling of being malevolently plotted against. Extremists claim that they have sole possession of the truth, or at least, that they are closer to it than most other people [14]. On this basis, new recruits are persuaded to join the group, and alternative views are flatly rejected. In fact, any sort of opposition, disagreement, compromise, or negotiation – which is part and parcel of politics – is foreign to the revitalized identity group. In other words, extremism rejects the essence of politics. Hence, extremism is essentially anti-politics. Instead, the identity group

2 This classification resembles similar attempts by Mead [11] and Abcarian [9], but Lipset and Raab’s [8]is more descriptive and useful, in my opinion. Notice, however, that one of Abcarian’s extremist tendencies is revitalization, which is described as: the demand for social reconstruction through a spirit of insurgency, through acts of disruption and detachment from practices or institutions deemed corruptive of one’s normative commitments. Another body of literature that discusses extremist and doctrinarian characteristics is the personality traits and the political psychological field [12, 13]. 182 S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game demands unity and self-sacrifice from its adherents. The group is the safe haven which bundles together the frustrations and anxieties of individuals who dread the status quo or an impending change in it. The group is a great cauldron in which discrete grievances and complaints are transmuted into a concerted and powerful effort. The impact of the revitalized identity group is appraised by its capacity to generate collective action from the disparate potencies and strengths of its recruits. Charismatic leaders who can channel the extremist élan of their followers by inculcating in them a guiding ideology and a fervent faith are the components of an effective revitalization movement. In his provocative seminal analysis of mass movements, Eric Hoffer attributes the vigor of extremist groups to their skill in united action and capacity for self-sacrifice. The author proclaims that to know the processes by which such a capacity is engendered is to grasp the inner logic of most of the characteristic attitudes and practices of an active mass movement [15] (p. 57). His book is a brilliant attempt to link together grievances, the extremist state of mind, ideology and collective action. Thus, Hoffer points out that “[t]he technique of an active mass movement consists basically in the inculcation and cultivation of proclivities and responses indigenous to the frustrated mind.” (p. 59) Readiness to sacrifice oneself for the cause is fostered by the complete absorption of the individual into the collective body of the group. To be associated with something bigger, more honorable and just confers on the extremist a source of strength and faith. Hoffer contends, in this regard, that faith here is primarily a process of identification of the single personality with the collective being of the group (p. 62). Detached from their disaffected and egoistical selves, true believers find it easier to immolate themselves on the altar of sacred intentions. The entire horrifying and appalling ritual of suicide bombing is based upon this premise.

Religion as a Fountainhead for Revitalization

The purpose of this section is to elucidate why religious motivation and inspiration characterize today’s militant and active revitalized movements, rather than ethnic or national-separatist groups, which are just as committed. Their intention is to demonstrate that in the intrinsic nature of religion lies a propensity to extremism and disruption, together with the craving for leadership and unity, the yearning for redemption and harmony, conjointly with a penchant for contention and violence. It is this Janus-faced character of religion – the joiner and the divider –that makes it a fertile ground for the burgeoning of revitalization movements. The phenomena of religion and revitalization are in many respects entwined. They both imply a transformation of the human condition from dissatisfaction to fulfillment, or at least an attempt to bring about such a transformation. Wallace suggests that the historical origin of most religious movements has actually been in revitalization movements torn or split off from their parent religion after failing to invigorate it from within. Thus, religion is a very appropriate backdrop for introducing revitalized identity groups. In Wallace’s own illustrative formulation, all religions are “relics of old revitalization movements, surviving in reutilized forms in stabilized cultures, and that religious phenomena per se originated … in the revitalization process – i.e., in visions of a new way of life by individuals under extreme stress”. [7] (p. 268) S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game 183

The entire transformation a person undergoes from an inactive observer of politics to an ardent participant is more cogently appreciated in a religious explanatory framework. Isaacs asserts that religion provides the means by which the religious person “... satisfies some otherwise unappeasable needs” [16] (p. 143), but once these needs are threatened, the whole chain of extremism, ideology, and action is activated. The threat at issue here arises in modernity and the challenge it represents to the familiar truths of religion. Instead of grappling with a radically new and unpredictable present, many prefer to retreat to the sheltering and comforting haven of faith. Furthermore, this self-reassurance is performed with great intensity: creeds are passionately reasserted and reinterpreted in letter and in spirit. This is how religious fundamentalism – a return to the bedrock of faith [17] – is nurtured. The crisis that modernity has caused for religion is signified by secularism or heresy, but more frighteningly, by pluralism. Plurality of thought undermines the monistic authority of orthodoxy and challenges the validity of its mores. Under these dire circumstances, there are three options for the guardians of faith: reaffirmation of tradition in defiance of change; secularization of religion in admitting change; or carefully and prudently adjusting tradition to meet the challenges of the times. Berger vehemently supports the third option, which he calls the inductive possibility, as the best way to combat the heretical imperative of modernity. This alternative is described as inductive, because the justifications and explanations for being religious are “aggregated” and argued from experience, by reexamining basic questions. This trial and error procedure reconciles the abiding the precepts of faith with the inconstant social environment. It takes prudent and discerning spiritual leaders to forego some of their basic convictions for the advantage of their people. In the same vein, Pipes introduces the term medieval synthesis to denote the policy compromise Muslim leaders formulated between the religious Shari’a law and changing human realities. This blend has come to be known as traditionalist Islam, as opposed to strict and implacable fundamentalism. The synthesis worked well as “an immensely stable and attractive combination of ideal goals and pragmatic actions which held in several continents and over many centuries.” [18] (p. 57). Unfortunately, it is the first alternative – the reaffirmation of tradition, or the deductive possibility in Berger’s terms, that revitalized identity groups adopt. Changes of a lesser magnitude may yield compromises and incremental acclimation, but the acute and excruciating peril of modernity does not permit such a propitiatory response from the defenders of faith. Hence, the deductive option means that believers “reassert the authority of a religious tradition in the face of modern secularity. The tradition thus having been restored to the status of datum, of something given a priori, it is then possible to deduce religious affirmations from it at least more or less as was the norm in premodern times”. [19] (p. 61) This means that religious revitalization movements arise with a vengeance: the historical interval in which tradition was not established, but was taken for granted, must be suppressed. The most appropriate and efficient milieu in which to categorically eschew the pluralist threat is the identity group. A complete set of alternative values must be cultivated in an insulated and protected ambience. Believers must be detached from a confusing reality and from contending versions of the truth. The leaders of the identity group must try to “interpose a fact-proof screen” between their followers and the actual world [15] (p. 60). They do that by imbuing their adherents with strong in-group 184 S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game feelings and by reinforcing a spirit of cohesion and solidarity. Religion becomes the bond that secures the attachment of the followers to a framework that rearranges and realigns their thoughts, attitudes, and beliefs. The confirmation of faith is achieved by emphasizing the righteousness of fellow-members. Appropriately, Coleman describes the religious identity group as a mutual admiration society [20] (p. 53). In sum, the religious identity group is a zone of retreat for individuals in need of solace, a sanctuary for those who are threatened by uncertainty and who desire reassurance in an era of tumult. Isaacs convincingly portrays this mood when he writes that, “Life cannot be lived on earth by man standing on his own two feet alone. Confused enough, fearful enough, threatened enough, every man, even the most Enlightened, will find his way back to his knees and to his God”. [16] (p. 166) But as much as religion unifies its own members, in the modern world it divides society as a whole. Thus, it has a dual nature: a focus of integration and loyalty and a source of societal cleavages and implacable opposition. The encouragement of in-group feelings coincidently fosters distinctions and cleavages among groups. This separateness is augmented, because traditionally meaningful symbols develop within historically designated communities of believers. Hence, shared values are localized in particular affiliation groups, which render the religious experience and commitment of each group unique and exclusive. This fragile pluralism is marred by perpetual suspicion and tensions. The tone of self-assurance of religious identity groups establishes a “we” versus “them” mentality and the conviction that the ideology of one’s group is the only route to redemption. The leaders of the religious identity group implant in their disciples what I call the chosen people complex. Such a vision inherently excludes any alternative scenarios of salvation. The feeling of superiority is profoundly entrenched. The more firmly these notions are held, the greater the animosity toward different religious views. Here is where the extremist state of mind converges upon the character of the revitalized religious identity group: the arbitrariness of thought, the intolerance of compromise and dissidence, and the denigration of alternative identity groups further monism, simplism, moralism, populism and the feeling that everybody else is conspiring against you. Extremism sets a challenger’s sequence in motion by tapping the radical ideology that already exists as the group’s mobilizing power.3 An ideology requires controversy or conflict to strengthen and sharpen its message vis-à-vis alternative solutions. Once the intrinsic antagonism among identity groups is exposed and the parties concentrate on their incompatibilities, conflict is inescapable. In order to spur believers to action – the third component of the challengers’ sequence – a detailed strategy must be present, and an acute sense of there being “no other choice” must prevail. In other words, an operational trigger arises when activists are convinced that they must do something lest the situation deteriorate. Writing about the sanctuary movements in the U.S., Yarnold suggests an example of such a trigger: “[I]dentity groups call for fundamental change in the positive law, when the positive law does not coincide with natural law precepts, and members of identity groups are willing to engage in unconventional tactics to achieve their goals, even if this means that they must violate positive law.” [22] (p. 3)

3 A challengers’ sequence is a process of transformation from silent or latent opposition to active, and sometimes radical, protest and struggle against the power wielders and agents of social control. The sequence is composed of psychological, sociological and rational components, which together combine to create a powerful mechanism of mobilization and collective behavior [21]. S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game 185

The incongruity between the law of God (natural law) and the law of the land (positive law) also prompts Al-Qaeda militants to action. The movement regards the secular law as temporary and expedient until it collides with their faith; then it must be transgressed. But must collective action in the name of faith be violent? Not necessarily, but frequently it is. The spirit and rhetoric of religion is fierce. It emphatically differentiates believers from infidels, the chosen from the rejected, and the saved from the damned. Hence “the need, the duty, indeed the divine command to slay the Amalekites, to stone the sinner, to put heretics to the torch, nonbelievers to the sword. From these passions, from the wounds of these severances, great streams of blood have flowed”. [16] (p. 153) Action, and specifically violent action, operates as a unifying agent. The stress, the sense of a common kismet, and the confidence that you are right help overcome moral inhibitions against violence, and as Hoffer recognizes, these are admirable qualifications for resolute and ruthless action in any field [15] (p. 113). Mark Juergensmeyer has undertaken a more profound inquiry into the logic of religious violence [23, 24]. He defines religion as a constant tension between order and disorder, or a conflict between more profound and more superficial realities. Many religions are bursting with violent images and myths that provide their followers with a sense of chaos. But the violence of disorder must be confronted with violence, because the perpetrators of anarchy will not voluntarily capitulate. Some religions are more prone to violence than others. These are usually the traditions that uphold the image of an eternal cosmic struggle [23] (p. 61) between good and evil. These traditions incite their believers to act, because the present is the decisive moment in the great cosmic war, in order to tip the scales one way or another, so that a small intervention of dedicated persons could make all the difference. Violence is likely to intensify when religious identity groups are prone to identify mundane socio-political conflicts with the eternal cosmic struggle. The publications of Al-Qaeda are fraught with inferences and idioms pertaining to Armageddon. The adversaries – the United States, its allies, Israel and other representatives of modernity, secularism and the West – are the heretics and the symptoms of chaos. The American government frustrates order and justice with its imprudent and prejudiced policies, whereas the true believers of Al-Qaeda sacrifice themselves to precipitate redemption. Since their violence is necessary in light of the larger cosmic battle, they will be exonerated for the results of their deeds. Establishing that religious identity groups display extremist tendencies, follow radical ideologies and are prone to violence is not sufficient to understand why some members of such groups resort to terrorist activities while others do not. Strategically, the frustrated and concerned activists find no channel in which to redeem their grievances or put their fears to rest. They do not have the military capacity to wage a full-scale war, or the economic capabilities to pressure other groups or the unsympathetic world order. The indigenous features that associate religion with violence are augmented by desperation and ultimate defiance of the intolerable status quo in the turn to terrorism. The phenomenon of political terrorism, as presented in the next section, is, indeed, one of the most explosive challenges to the governability of a state or a world order in the modern era. 186 S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game

Political Terrorism

Terrorism has become a frequent, if not an accepted, form of political behavior on the level of both national and international politics. As such, terrorism is just another form of political conduct: exerting influence and competing for power or resources. Hence, paraphrasing Clausewitz, the great 18th century historian of war, and replacing “war” with “terrorism,” we can say that in the modern world, in light of the growing improbability of conventional war, terrorism has become politics by other means. Nevertheless, beyond the political and strategic dimensions, the vexing question still remains of what propels young zealots to hijack civilian airliners and crash them into skyscrapers or blow themselves up in restaurants and buses. Political terror is just one facet of the wider spectrum of political violence. Hence, to better comprehend the sources of terrorism, we must put it within the broader context of violence. The idea of violence has been approached from various directions. The famous anthropologist Margaret Mead saw violence as a violation of the norms of society [11] (p. 270), while sociologist Alan Greeson [25] perceived violence as a criterion and instrument of social change. Furthermore, he maintained, violence is the opposite of apathy, as it demonstrates that the organism [the nation, the minority group, society] is alive and demanding. Thus, violence cannot simply subside, but needs to be faced and taken heed of. For H.L. Nieburg, political violence is a continuation of bargaining begun by other means ... the threat of force becomes action ... [and] a direct test of relative power by actual mutual attack and defense [26] (p. 12). In these disparate accounts, political violence is elucidated as both harmful and constructive: the destroyer of order and the rejuvenator of a stagnant status quo. Like terrorism, violence is either detested or supported, but it can never be ignored. There is no single concept of violence in the political context. It depends on who defines it and on the circumstances of the definition. As long as there are grievances and discontent in human societies, there will be political violence: the capacity for violence might be inherent in men. However, the likelihood of an actual outburst of collective violence hinges upon how badly systems violate the socially derived expectations of certain groups in the populace. The appeal of political violence increases in direct relation with the ideological pluralism and fragmentation of identity that are so characteristic of modern nation states. The nation state itself is a rarity: there are very few countries today that shelter only one single nation within their borders. Economic interdependence, mass-communication systems and increased mobility across borders in the industrialized countries, coupled with a colonial legacy of imposed arbitrary boundaries which cut across tribal and primordial identities in the Third World, have created a multitude of societies in a permanent state of flux. Prominent mainstream political scientists like Dahl, Lipset and Almond regard variation and plurality as stabilizing and promoting tranquility, primarily in liberal- democracies. Cleavages in society, they argue, whether political, ethnic, religious or socio-economic contribute to integration and to the “free market of ideas” that nurtures democracy. It keeps opposition viable and reminds incumbents that alternative views exist and are ready to replace them. Furthermore, because individuals simultaneously belong to several different identity groups (political party, church, labor union, Salvation Army, bridge club, etc.) with concurrent loyalties they are prevented from being detached from society by affiliating with an alienated identity group which opposes the system. But these “cross-cutting cleavages” might turn out to be S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game 187

“reinforcing cleavages” if the cleavages are not accommodated and mitigated from time to time by a sensitive government. In societies where ethnic, cultural or religious affiliations coalesce with socio-economic status, and deprivation is identified with race or faith, cleavages hamper, rather than fortify, the delicate texture of the community. A fragmented society is one where political violence is more likely to erupt. In a similar fashion, a fragmented world in which the same ethnic or religious affiliations persistently occupy the lower echelons of the global socioeconomic order might spur frustration and anger and ultimately violence on a global scale. Paul Wilkinson [27] presents an escalation ladder of political violence and classifies types of violence in terms of general aims and purposes: His scheme starts with inter-communal conflict between rival ethno-religious groups, then remonstrative violence as protest against policy-makers, then praetorian violence – a more severe violence used to coerce changes in leadership and policies, next repression, violence from above to quell protest from below. The clash between the two opposing forces fans a more vehement type of violence – resistance, with an all-out alternative to the political establishment. One step further on the ladder of violence brings us to terrorism, which feeds on the frustrations and animosities between the protagonists. This is the harshest stage of violence short of all-out war. While there are numerous debates about a precise and yet all-encompassing definition of political terrorism, there is substantial agreement that: 1. There is a clear distinction between terrorism employed by national governments (terrorism from above) and terrorism waged by identifiable groups against the government (terrorism from below) [28]. 2. The increase in political terrorism in recent years is directly related to changing political and technological conditions in the world. 3. Political terrorism is essentially arbitrary and unpredictable with regard to whom, when and where it strikes [29]. 4. It is a ruthless and destructive form of violence which violates the most deeply-rooted moral and legal codes of society. (Of course, if one does not agree with the moral-legal code of the land, one would have fewer moral inhibitions about terrorism, but this important point will be dealt with later.) 5. Terrorism elicits different reactions than do other forms of political influence: it sparks a sense of vulnerability, weakness and fear which is far out of proportion to the act or the long-term power of the perpetrators [30]. 6. Political terrorism is not mindless violence. It is a pre-meditated, goal-oriented activity that purports to achieve concrete political objectives. 7. Terrorists distinguish between two types of targets: the ultimate victim, usually a political or an influential figure whose behavior needs to be changed; and the immediate victim, who is innocent and unconnected to the original goal. The latter is attacked in order to convince the former to alter their decisions. The intermediate victim is used when the ultimate target is heavily guarded and the chances of reaching him or her directly are slim. These common symptomatic features of political terrorism alleviate the task of formulating a viable and broad definition: political terrorism is an act of violence against an intermediate (innocent) victim, intended to elicit fear and submission in an ultimate victim, thereby fostering political change. Such a definition embraces all the premises of terrorism: violence, two types of victim, fear, and psychological impact, influence and change – the goal of radicalism. This definition elucidates some 188 S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game interesting insights regarding the special trademarks of terrorism, which distinguish it from other modes of violence. Since terrorism is not directly aimed at the ultimate target, but at a wider group – the intermediate victim – it is inherently indiscriminate and impersonal. The perpetrators do not know their designated prey, and they are evidently indifferent as to whether innocent bystanders live or die. Terrorists hope that the act of violence will convey their message of dissatisfaction and grievance, through the media and the reactions of the public, to intransigent policy-makers [31]. The Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin called this strategy propaganda by the deed, adding that to voice discontent one bomb speaks louder than a thousand words. Thus, terrorism is underpinned by a profound concern with the status quo or an impending change (which is the classic distinction between left-wing and right-wing terrorism); by cruelty and lack of moral inhibitions; by psychological impact on public opinion (the mere physical damage terrorism inflicts is inconsiderable), and by the crucial role the media assumes as the potential source of information about the terrorists’ plight. These are unique characteristics of terrorism. Unlike the soldier, the guerrilla fighter or the revolutionary, the terrorist is always in the paradoxical position of undertaking actions with no particular immediate aims. In a conventional war, guerrilla campaign or revolution activists fight their direct opponents: the enemy armed forces, the authorities, the Old Regime. Terrorists callously attack people who have done them no wrong. In warfare, the destruction of people and property is a goal in itself; terrorism uses this destruction as a means to a higher goal. Accordingly, if the ultimate target – the government, the party or the multinational corporation – does not change its political behavior, the terrorists’ efforts will fail regardless of the fate of the hostages taken or property captured. The irony of political terrorism is that its actual success depends not on the performance of the perpetrators, but on the reaction of its target, again unlike the case in conventional war or guerrilla insurgency. Political terrorism is not a single act or a spontaneous one, as the meticulous planning of the September 11th attackers has shown. It is an organized, pre-meditated action aimed at very tangible ends. Terrorists do not seek remedies for personal grievances or injuries. They are not lone actors, but tend to work in groups. They identify with and act in the names of organizations. They adopt the group’s plan or ideology and recognize its rules and hierarchy. From the group they gain encouragement, devotion and a spirit of camaraderie that enhance their determination, although some of the initial stimulation to join the group in the first place might be personal: e.g., self-redemption, emancipation, excitement, frustration, etc. Weinberg and Davis [32] distinguish between terrorists’ strategies and their tactics, referring to goals versus purposes. The authors stress a significant factor: exposing the government as a terrorist in certain political systems. Then the goals of “terrorism from above” are twofold: repression of dissidents while maintaining stability and mobilization of the masses to implement the ideologies and priorities of the government. Note the circularity between the purposes of terrorism from below – to agitate and provoke decision-makers to repression – and the goal of terrorism from above – repression to save a regime. The proximity between the two types of terrorism creates a “chicken and egg” problem, which can be stated as a question of what comes first: the insurgency of aggrieved segments of the population that trigger, as a result, the harsh counter-measures of the authorities? Perhaps it is an inflexible government, impervious to calls for reform and blind to the suffering of its people, which compels desperate people to extremism? The dilemma, in short, is as follows: does the S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game 189 government’s draconian policies provoke terrorism, or does terrorism necessitate a government’s “strong hand”? To be sure, there are justifications as well as recriminations from each side. This perceived symmetry accounts for Bin Laden’s “explanations” that Al-Qaeda acts merely in response to U.S. world terrorism against the “have-nots.” Terrorism is a specific form of political violence. It is an extreme form of violating norms, causing physical harm and using illegitimate force. People decide to undertake terrorist activities when their protest is ignored and when their challenge to the status quo is suppressed. In order to bring about radical political change, dissidents must mobilize the masses behind them. Once the guardians of the status quo suppress the challengers’ endeavors, no other channel for their frustration remains open. At this point, the most defiant dissidents go underground and burn all their bridges to society: they become terrorists. This overview of political terrorism was advanced to underline one of the major shortcomings in contemporary theories of political conflict: most theories disregard the role revitalized identity groups play in making conflicts more complex. The idea of identity groups struggling for basic needs and defying the socio-political order to obtain their goals turns the spotlight (and responsibility) from social control to collective action [33] as the focal perspective to comprehend the essence of conflict. One of the identity groups’ initial bases of strength is also a source of weakness. Identity is nurtured by close ties, the sharing of faith and, consequently, by some pattern of proximity (geographical, physical, historical, etc.). But this quality can also be a predicament that might hamper the effectiveness of identity groups and shrink their growth potential by rendering them sectarian. By being isolated mentally and spiritually, identity groups are limited in their ability to command mass support for their struggle. Such comprehensive support could under certain conditions cause drastic and even total changes in the social and political system. However, the exclusive nature of identity groups prevents them from gaining broad-based support in their struggle, which might terminate conflict by demonstrating massive support for the group’s claims. Instead, the restrictedness of the identity group steers conflict away from swift resolution and towards an unstable process of gradual escalation, protracted conflict and terrorism. This explains why Al-Qaeda finds it difficult to gain the support of other underprivileged groups in the world that are not Muslim or Arab. Had it gained such support, its protest would have gained much more momentum, and perhaps the resort to vicious terrorism would not have been necessary. In sum, to better understand phenomena of protracted conflict and terror, it is necessary to shift the analysis from the state level to that of the group level. The focus should be turned to the identity group, the primary social group to which people belong by primordial and ancient ties. In contrast to the state, which consists of a number of separate collective entities that enforce loyalty by legal sanctions and law enforcement, the identity group thrives on collective values and understandings. The state’s social supervision and legal system may goad identity groups to accelerate their impulse to throw off the yoke of law and order, instead of guiding them towards discipline and integration. Such a scenario is imminent when the moral code of the state contradicts and endangers the group’s own. 190 S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game

Conclusion

In an effort to figure out the much condemned but little understood Al-Qaeda movement, I have concentrated on elucidating the growing function of identity groups in social struggles and their unfulfilled needs as a source of aggression. Such an understanding rests on shifting our attention from the associative organization – the state or society as a whole – to that of the communal organization, the religious, ethnic or national group. Conventionally, a communal organization is classified as only of local and limited power, in contrast to the associative organization, possessor of all resources, as well as of sovereignty and power. However, I disagree with the conventional wisdom, which is rapidly becoming obsolete and irrelevant: identity groups are capable of bundling resources and capabilities together and launching an impressive attack on the political “business-as-usual.” By adopting a position of returning to the study of community power, this investigation suggests that community groups, while adhering to emotional and non-utilitarian criteria of affiliation and, despite being limited in scope, are nevertheless capable of augmenting their power and bolstering their motivation and resolve. Thus, carried on the wings of renewal and rejuvenation, these groups develop a new and comprehensive way of understanding reality [7]. At the turn of the 21st century, communal revival is flourishing all over the world, marked by bloody ethnic riots, as for example in the Southern and Eastern Republics of the former USSR; intertribal massacres in Africa, the latest of which were in Burundi and Rwanda; the bitter and drawn-out confrontations on the Indian sub-continent from Kashmir to Sri-Lanka; and of course the violent and unrelenting struggle among the fragments of former Yugoslavia, where Serbs, Croats and Muslims tore at each other’s throats. We live in a stormy and dramatic era of developments in the world arena, characterized by the reduction in the scope of interstate conflicts, while at the same time there is a sharp rise in internal distresses. At the center of these conflicts are extremist identity groups. They are classified as extremists because their aims and means deviate markedly from normative standards determined by the state. A direct outgrowth of such fragmentary processes in the world is the phenomenon of international terrorism on an unprecedented level of scope and intensity. The revitalized Islamic movement Al-Qaeda is spearheading an assault on the contemporary global order. This is a movement charged with religious ardor which has escalated into terror under great duress. In its struggle, the movement is defying the code of international behavior dictated, they claim, by Western interests and principles. In Al- Qaeda, as in other revitalized identity groups, there lurks the potential for the destruction of the delicate fabric of mutual existence. All four criteria mentioned earlier for the intensification of their struggle coexist: Its members experience a sincere and profound fear of a degeneration of the national Islamic identity. They vehemently oppose expanding Western, and mainly American, cultural and economic influence worldwide. These misgivings drive the movement to dominate and institutionalize their grip on its domains of influence. For this purpose, it has mounted a massive campaign aimed at controlling resources as well as organizational operations, causing the immediate counter-mobilization by the US and its Western allies banding together in an attempt at curbing Al-Qaeda’s growing challenge. In summation, the nature of modern global conflict is undergoing a tremendous shake up: the crystallization of the identity group and its defiance against authorities S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game 191 and conventional political norms and regulations are at the center of it. These changes are expressed in the type of the conflict and its participants (from formal confrontation between states to worldwide subversive activity, set in motion by actors from within the state); in the intensity and frequency (from organized and planned conflict according to accepted rules to unpredictable and unrestrained terrorism) and in its duration (from the clear boundaries of beginning and termination, to a protracted conflict with no end in sight.) Four possible sources might prod and sustain the inspiration and commitment required for such defiance: religion, culture, ethnicity, and nationalism. All four are influential in intensifying and aggravating protracted conflicts. They are also active in the creation of hostilities and the division of societies. The world’s current attention is concentrated on the religious factor, which gained momentum in the last two decades of the previous century and continued into the new one. But terrorism is far too elusive and sustainable to rely on a single source of strength. Like a parasite, it will always find a new host to nurture it. Thus, not religions, cultures, ethnicities or nationalities should be the target of counter-terrorism, but grievances, afflictions and injustices, which are the real incubators and breeders of the curse of terrorism.

References

[1] Keohane, R. (2003). Power and governance in a partially globalized war. New York: Routledge. [2] Kaldor, M. (2003). New and old wars: Organized violence in a global area. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. [3] Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. [4] Boulding, K. (1962). Conflict and defense: A General Theory. New York: Harper Torchbooks. [5] Crighton, E., McIver, M. (1991). The evolution of protracted ethnic conflict. Comparative Politics, 23(2), 127-142. [6] Horowitz, D. (1985). Ethnic groups in conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. [7] Wallace, A. (1956). Revitalization movements. American Anthropologist, 58, 264-281. [8] Lipset, S., Raab, E. (1970). The politics of unreason. New York: Harper and Row. [9] Abcarian, G. (ed.) (1971). American political radicalism. Waltham, Mass.: Xerox College Publishing. [10] Mannheim, K. (1936). Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harcourt, Brace& Co. [11] Mead, M. (1968). Warfare is only an invention, not a biological necessity. In Bramson, Goethals (eds.). War: Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology. New York: Basic Books. [12] Rokeach, M. (1960). The open and closed mind. New York: Basic Books. [13] de Rivera, J. (1968). The psychological dimension of foreign policy. Columbus, OH: Charles Merrill. [14] Breton, A., Galeotti, G., Salmon, P., Wintrobe, R. (eds.) (2002). Political extremism and rationality. New York: Cambridge University Press. [15] Hoffer, E. (1951). The true believer. New York: Harper and Row. [16] Isaacs, H. (1975). Idols of the tribe. New York: Harper and Row. [17] Stemple, J. (1990). Religious fundamentalism: A growing threat to political stability in South and West Asia? Unpublished paper presented at the Indiana Center on Global Change and World Peace. [18] Pipes, D. (1983). In the path of God: Islam and political power. New York: Basic Books. [19] Berger, P. (1979). The heretical imperative. New York: Anchor Press. [20] Coleman, J. (1957). Community conflict. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. [21] Peleg, S. (2002). Zealotry and vengeance: Quest of a religious identity group. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. [22] Yarnold, B. (1990) The role of religious organizations in the U.S. Sanctuary Movement. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco. [23] Juergensmeyer, M. (1990). What the Bhikkhu said: Reflections on the rise of militant religious nationalism. Religion, 20, 53-75. [24] Juergensmeyer, M. (1993). The Third World War? Berkeley: University of California Press. [25] Greeson, A. (1969). What is violence? A 16mm movie for Viacom. [26] Nieburg, H.L. (1969). Political violence: The behavioral process. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 192 S. Peleg / The World After 9/11: New Actors, New Game

[27] Wilkinson, P. (1986). Terrorism and the liberal state. New York: NYU Press. [28] Combs, C. (2003). Terrorism in the 21st century (3rd edition). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. [29] Horgan, J., Taylor, M. (eds.) (2002). The psychology of terrorism. Portland, OR: Frank Cass. [30] Kegley, C. (2003). The new global terrorism. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. [31] Nacos, B. (2003). Mass-mediated terrorism: The central role of the media in terrorism and counter- terrorism. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. [32] Weinberg, L., Davis, P. (1989). Introduction to political terrorism. New York: McGraw-Hill. [33] Rule, J. (1988). Theories of civil violence. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State 193 S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Subject Index

Afghan War 17,86 Clash of civilizations 12 Afghani syndrome 148 Cognition 17,108,110,111 Afghanistan xii,9,10,37,87,115,116, Cognitive factors 14 120,135,138,154,158,160 Cold War 86,134,135,150,151 Air security law 94 Collaborative 31,99,102,104,106, Al-Qaeda xii,18,40,116,145,150,159, 108,109,111,112 162,171,176,177,179,181,185,189,190 Contentious politics 20,21,30,35,39 America x,7,9,18,85,86,150,151,181 Counter-terrorism vi–x,xii,8,12,21, American policy 91,151 36–39,46,47,108–110,113,119–122, Anarchism 143 126,129,191,192 Anomie 139,152 Counter-terrorist strategy 40 Anti-terrorist coalition 149,151 Criminality 134,137,139,142,145, Appeasement policy 15 147,152 Arabian 50,143,147 Crisis 83,85,111,134,145,146,148, Arabs vii,12,50,52,53,86,135,146, 155,156,183 147,172,173,189 Croatia 16 Armed attack 37,48,59–67 Dehumanization 16 Armed force viii,x,17,48,50,55,58,59, Delinquency 57 64,67,94,125,137,148,188 Democracy vi,ix–xii,1,14,15,18,39, Artificial intelligence xi,98,102,109, 40,43,45,54,95,118,124,135,137,140, 124,126 151,186 Authoritarian state 8,9 Deprivation 1,6,26,118,143,176,178, Basque region 40 180,181,187 Biometric data 93,94 Deterrence 97 Bosnia 16,120 Dialogue vii,8,9,12,45,124,148,152 Bosnia Conflict 14–16,19 Disintegration 85,134,152 Brigate Rosso 91 Distributed information 98,99 Bundestag 90,92–97 Domain specific language 98 Capitalist economies 134 Double standards 117,118 Caucasus ix,134,135,140,146,147, Double-bind communication 15 149–151,153 Eastern Europe 134 Caucasusphobia 140 EU (European Union) 10,16,26,29, Central Asia 135,153 121,126,132,148 Chaos ix,xi,118,134,135,137,156, Eurocentrism 11 181,185 Europe 9,11–13,133,135,140,158, Chauvinism 143 171–173 Chechnya 134,137,141,146,147 Extremism 69,92,150,180–184,188, Chemical weapons 15,55 191 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent Fascism 11,143 States) 134 Fear ix,xii,5,8,14,29,33,45,83,84,89, Civil rights x,38,88,91,92,95,97,132 91,92,95,96,117,118,135,140,141, Civil society xi,10,12,151,154,156 165,167,179,185,187,190 Civil wars 9,43,85,134 Financial networks 122,123,156 194

France 10,42,46,53,148 Justice vi,6,7,9,15,30,49,63,118,119, Free speech 158 136,142,146,162,168,174,185 Frustration 9–11,29,32,53,86,113, Koran 27,83 118,170,178,182,187–189 Law enforcement xii,119,122,123, Fundamentalism 5,8,12,13,43,134, 127–130,132,189 140,147,150,179,183,191 Liberal state v–vii,xi,7,9,12,87 Germany vi,12,88,92–95,97,118,148, Liberalism 39,43,151 171,172 Liberation 44,49,114,116 Global War 8,74,124 Liberation movement 10,85,117,118, Globalism 176,178 137,146 Globalization 8,9,13,19,72,83,85–88, Liberties vi,vii,ix,x,18,88,91,92,132, 134,137 155,156 Great Britain 140,148 Localism 178 Gulf War 14,15,19 Mediation 17 Harmonization 15 Middle East 5,38,39,52,54,135 Hegemony 8,9,11,12,47,84 Military intervention 17,135 Human dignity 14,18 Military logic 14,16 Human rights vi,9,11,12,14,16–18, Monism 181,184 47–49,94,115,118,127,129,132,151, Moralism 181,184 158,162,175 Motivational logic 15,16 Humanitarian disasters 134 Motivation vii,viii,xii,1,4,11,37–39, Identification suggestions 15 49,54,124,146,158,159,161,164,165, Identity 3,4,6,42,43,46,83,130,137, 168–174,176,179,182,190 138,158,165,172,186,189,190 Movements of liberation 85 Ideology 1,4,7,23,40,42,46,136,139, NATO vi,9,12,64,125,126,129,130, 144,145,147,158,161,162,166,168, 132,133,148,151 172,180,182–184,188,191 New World Order 9,10,15,16,19, Immunization 15 150,151 Insurgency 26,39,41,152,188 Nuclear weapons 10,15,114,148 International conflict 176 Open society v,vi,ix,1,176 International law vii,ix,x,17,41,48, Oppression 10,27,37,48,49,54,67, 54–62,64,65,67,109,118,140, 136,155 142–144,151 Pakistan 116 Intifada vii,20,21,23–29,31–35,37,39, Palestine 9,10,24,39,49,50,53,86,120, 163,165,170 159,161 IRA (Irish Republican Army) 3,118, Palestinian v,viii,11,21,23–29,31–35, 122 37–39,49–52,54,159,160,162–165, Iran 10,16 169,170,172,173 Iraq 9,11,15,16,76,135,138,158, Participation 1,3,4–6,39,57,59,131, 172–174 135,149 Islam viii,11,83,113,116,117,138, Peace enforcement 17 147,172,174,191 Peace logic 14,16 Islamophobia 140 Peacemaking 17 Israel 9–11,21,24,25,27–33,35,37,38, Peer-2-peer 98 49,51–54,126,158,164,174,185 Pentagon 17,90 IT systems 108 Persian Gulf 15,135,145 Italy 12,91 Political opportunities 20,26,35 Jihad v,11,27,69,115,116,145,159 Populism 176,181,184 195

Portugal 148 Sri Lanka 138,152 Post-fundamentalism 13 State terrorism vii,xi,5,8,10,11,87, Propaganda 14–19,45,47,113,119,188 137,140,142,143,154 Racism 11,43,143 Subjectivity 12 RAF (Rote Armee Fraktion) 91,93 Sudan 10 Rasterfahndung 93 Suicide terrorism viii,25,27,29,33–35, Redemption 158,172 38,39,158–166,168,170,171, Regional conflicts 120 173–175 Regional co-operation 8,13 Syria 10 Regional integration 134 Tanzim viii,20–38 Repression 20,28,30,39,43,44,46,91, Topology 98,105–107 155,187,188 Trauma 138,158,160–163,165,167, Resistance vii,8,10,11,14,84,87,90, 168,171,172,174,176 118,144,146,155,156,187 Turkey 148,159 Risk assessment 88–90 Two-sided messages 15 Root causes of terrorism 48,67 UN (United Nations) 9,10,15,41, Russia 134,135,140,143,145–149 54–56,58–62,67,86,113,118,120, Saudi Arabia 49,50,145,172 121,134 Second World War 15 Uni-polar system 10 Security vi,ix–xi,4,9,31,48,54,57, US patriot act 88 60–63,65–67,88–97,99,103,104,107, USA x,9,10,12,17,18,23,26,29,37, 109,111,119,131,132,135,142–144, 41,104,105,118,125,126,132–135, 149–152,175 140,148,150,151,190 Self-defence 61–66,113 Victim 9 September 11 x,14,17,18,20,29,33,40, Violence vii,viii,2,7–9,11,12,15,18, 48–50,53,61,67,92,104,117, 20,21,26,31,35,37–42,44,47,52,64, 151,154,176,188 66,83–86,91,113,114,117,120,121, Serbia 16 125,134–138,149,152–156,165,172, Simplism 181,184 176,177,182,185,191,192 Slovenia 16 War on Terror 15,48,69,154 Sociology 108,109 World Trade Center 17,50,90 Software agents 98,99,102,106,107 Yugoslavia 16,60,77,134,138,190 Soviet Union 115,134,143,153 Zero-Sum orientation 14 Spain 9,12,40,42,43,45–47,171 This page intentionally left blank Fighting Terrorism in the Liberal State 197 S. Peleg and W. Kempf (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Author Index

Abu Rashid, M. 113 Hanafi, H. 8 Alimi, E.Y. 20 Hovhannesian, D. 134 Aviles, J. 40 Kempf, W. 14 Benabdallaoui, M. 83 Meyer, B. 88 Bligh, A. 124 Nadvi, L. 154 Feinstein, B.A. 48 Peleg, S. v, 1, 176 Fouhy, J. 122 Speckhard, A. 158 Hadar, E. 98 Vorkunova, O.A. 134 Hadar, I. 108 This page intentionally left blank