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Contain, Degrade, and Defeat a Defense Strategy for a Troubled Middle East

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Contain, Degrade, and Defeat a Defense Strategy for a Troubled Middle East CONTAIN, DEGRADE, AND DEFEAT A DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR A TROUBLED MIDDLE EAST ERIC S. EDELMAN WHITNEY MORGAN McNAMARA CONTAIN, DEGRADE, AND DEFEAT A DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR A TROUBLED MIDDLE EAST ERIC S. EDELMAN WHITNEY MORGAN McNAMARA 2017 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2017 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Eric S. Edelman is Counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He retired as a career minister from the U.S. Foreign Service on May 1, 2009. He has served in senior positions at the Departments of State and Defense as well as the White House, where he led organizations providing analysis, strategy, policy development, security services, trade advocacy, public outreach, citizen services, and congressional relations. As undersecretary of defense for policy (August 2005–January 2009), he was DoD’s senior policy official, overseeing strategy development with global responsibility for bilateral defense relations, war plans, special opera- tions forces, homeland defense, missile defense, nuclear weapons and arms control policies, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, arms sales, and defense trade controls. He served as U.S. ambassador to Finland in the Clinton administration and Turkey in the Bush administration and was Vice President Cheney’s principal deputy assistant for national security affairs. He was chief of staff to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, special assistant to Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt, and special assistant to Secretary of State George Shultz. His other assignments included the State Department Operations Center, Prague, Moscow, and Tel Aviv, where he was a member of the U.S. Middle East delegation to the West Bank/Gaza autonomy talks. Ambassador Edelman has been awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award, the Presidential Distinguished Service Award, and several Department of State Superior Honor Awards. In 2010, he was named a knight of the French National Order of the Legion of Honor. Ambassador Edelman serves on the National Defense Panel, on the bipartisan board of directors of the United States Institute of Peace, and on the board of the Foreign Policy Initiative. He received a B.A. in History and Government from Cornell University and a Ph.D. in U.S. Diplomatic History from Yale University. Whitney McNamara is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Ms. McNamara was a National Security Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and worked in the Political-Military Bureau at the Department of State and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy. Prior to that, she spent four years working in the Middle East as a project manager and consultant. She received a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Pittsburgh and an M.A. in Strategic Studies and International Economics from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors are grateful to Michael Eisenstadt, Tom Mahnken, and Andrew Krepinevich for their comments on earlier drafts of this report; to Mark Gunzinger, Evan Montgomery, and David Johnson, from whose path-breaking work on regional security the authors have drawn; to Kamilla Gunzinger for her patience and editorial expertise; and to Michelle Shevin-Coetzee for her produc- tion assistance. The opinions and analysis in this study are those of the authors; any shortcomings are solely the responsibility of the authors. CSBA receives funding from a broad and diverse group of funders, including private foundations, government agencies, and corporations. A complete list of these organizations can be found on our website at www.csbaonline.org/about/contributors. Cover: 1) Aviators provide air support for ground forces during a training exercise held at COB Speicher. U.S. Army Photo by Specialist Bryanna Poulin. 2) An F/A-18E Super Hornet taxis across the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Arabian Gulf. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Nathan T. Beard. Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................... i INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST, POST-WORLD WAR II TO PRESENT ...... 3 Post-War Period and the Northern Tier Strategy ................................. 4 British Retreat and American Ascendancy in the Middle East ....................... 7 The Nixon Doctrine and the Twin Pillars Strategy ................................ 9 The Carter Doctrine .................................................... 11 Maintaining the Balance of Power between Iran and Iraq ......................... 12 Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield .................................. 13 Dual Containment ..................................................... 14 Conclusion .......................................................... 17 CHAPTER 2: THE ENDURING IMPORTANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST ........................... 21 Vital Energy Resources ................................................. 21 Instability in the Middle East Reverberates Around the World ...................... 22 Return of Great Power Competition. 23 Conclusion .......................................................... 24 CHAPTER 3: IRAN AS THE FOREMOST THREAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST ........................ 25 Iranian Strategic Culture ................................................. 26 The Iranian Nuclear Program and Challenge. 28 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ..................................... 31 Iran’s Emerging A2/AD Bubble ............................................ 33 Supporting Proxy Forces and Opposition Across the Region ....................... 42 How Should the United States Respond? .................................... 44 CHAPTER 4: A STRATEGY TO DEFEAT THE ISLAMIC STATE, AL QAEDA, AND OTHER JIHADIST GROUPS ................................................................ 51 The Islamic State Emerges ............................................... 52 U.S Response 2014–2016 .............................................. 53 A Fresh Look at U.S. Strategy for the Counter-ISIS Fight .......................... 56 Managing Outside Powers ............................................... 59 Broad Effects Outside of Syria and Iraq ..................................... 61 The Future of Syria. 62 Other Jihadist Threats .................................................. 62 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................... 65 LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................... 68 www.csbaonline.org i Executive Summary The decade and a half the United States has spent fighting the “long war” in the Middle East has yielded many tactical successes but left a lasting victory elusive. The inconclusive nature of these struggles has sapped support for the U.S. policy of shouldering the burden of providing security and stability in the region. Although many believed U.S. involvement in the region resulted in more violence, disorder, and radicalization of local Arab populations, the current situation in the Middle East illustrates that inaction has been highly destabilizing. The United States must contend with two intertwined challenges in the region: Iranian aspirations for mastery in the Middle East and the Muslim world and often related violent jihadist terrorism. Both threaten the security of the broader Middle East and the U.S. homeland. The Middle East, and specifically the Persian Gulf, first emerged as a strategically impor- tant region at the end of the World War II. The Marshall Plan spurred major shifts in energy production and consumption, leaving both the United States and European nations dependent on the region for oil. As the nascent stages of the Cold War in the Middle East emerged, the political orientation of the resource-rich region became a growing concern. Soviet expansion compelled Washington to take a clear stand on its political and military commitments in the region. The withdrawal of British assistance to Greece and Turkey in 1947 provided the neces- sary catalyst for the Truman administration to reorient American foreign policy decisively in sharp contrast to previous U.S. policy, which had largely avoided foreign commitments beyond the Western Hemisphere during peacetime. The U.S. assumption of a preeminent role in Iran after 1953 marked the beginning of Britain’s long retreat from the Middle East; it extended over the better part of two decades before the British decision to cede the prime security role in the region to the United States in the late 1960s. The decision marked the beginning of America’s ascendancy and transformed U.S. security policy in the Middle East. The Nixon Doctrine paved the way for significant increases in U.S. military aid to allies in
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