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L’Entente Frugale: an Analysis of the International and National Factors Shaping Franco- British Defense Cooperation since 2010

by Guillaume Simard-Morissette

B.A. in International Affairs, May 2009, The George Washington University

A Thesis submitted to

The Faculty of The Elliot School of International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of Master of Arts

May 19, 2013

Thesis directed by

Michael J. Sodaro Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

© Copyright 2013 by Guillaume Simard-Morissette All rights reserved

ii

Abstract of Thesis

L’Entente Frugale: an Analysis of the International and National Factors Shaping Franco- British Defense Cooperation since 2010

In November 2010, and the signed two defense agreements in Lancaster

House, London, marking the most significant rapprochement between the two countries since the 1956 . The two agreed to pool key military capabilities and cooperate in defense procurement, as well as build two joint nuclear research facilities. As the two leading military powers in the (EU), France and the United Kingdom set the pace of

European defense cooperation. A deepening defense relationship between London and may herald deeper European cooperation in this most fundamental element of national sovereignty. This essay examines two alternative hypotheses to explain Franco-British defense cooperation since 2010. The first holds that the changing international landscape, which is marked by factors like the international financial crisis, changes in the global arms market, and shifts in US priorities, is encouraging cooperation. The other hypothesis posits that national factors, such as concerns about job security and differences over NATO and EU policies, are hampering cooperation. It concludes that international forces are dominant, but warns that certain factors, such as legacy commitments and rising euroscepticism in the United Kingdom, may derail Franco-British and thus European defense integration.

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Table of Contents

Abstract of Thesis…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..… iii

List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. v

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1

Part I: Historical Background…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 8

Part II: Research Hypothesis – International…………………………………………………………………………………………... 44

Chapter One: Global Financial Crisis and Austerity……………………………………………………………………. 44

Chapter Two: Threats……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 68

Chapter Three: Capabilities Desired………………………………………………………………………………………….. 80

Chapter Four: European Defense Firms………………………………………………………………………………….. 104

Chapter Five: US Pressure on ……………………………………………………………………………………... 126

Chapter Six: NATO and the European Union…………………………………………………………………………... 138

Research Hypothesis Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 152

Part III: Alternative Hypothesis – National……………………………………………………………………………………………. 154

Chapter Seven: Different Security Interests……………………………………………………………………………. 154

Chapter Eight: Joint Deployments…………………………………………………………………………………………… 174

Chapter Nine: US Role in European Defense…………………………………………………………………………… 183

Chapter Ten: NATO or European Union?...... 195

Chapter Eleven: Different Industrial Defense Policies……………………………………………………………... 213

Chapter Twelve: Job Security and European Defense Integration…………………………………………… 228

Chapter Thirteen: Domestic Political Parties…………………………………………………………………………... 237

Chapter Fourteen: Public Opinion…………………………………………………………………………………………... 245

Alternative Hypothesis Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….... 254

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 257

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….… 260

iv

List of Tables

Top 10 Biggest Military Spenders in 2012…………………………………………………………………………………………..…… 52

France – Binding Orders on Prominent Arms Deals………………………………………………………………………………... 66

Priority Risks to France – 2008 Defense White Paper……………………………………………………………………………... 71

Priority Risks to the United Kingdom – 2010 National Security Strategy……………………………………………….… 72

Prepositioned French Forces – 2013………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 74

French Sovereignty Forces – 2013…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 75

British Military Tasks – French Military Tasks………………………………………………………………………………………….. 81

“Future Force 2020” Missions………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 82

French Military Objectives – 2008 White Paper………………………………………………………………………………………. 84

SIPRI – Top 20 Defense Firms 2011……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 105

SIPRI – Top 20 European Defense Firms 2011……………………………………………………………………………………….. 108

SIPRI – Top French and British Defense Firms 2011………………………………………………………………………………. 121

Major French Overseas Operations…………………………………………………………………………………………………….… 159

Poll – Sharing Military Assets………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 250

Poll – Defense Cuts: Good or Bad…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 251

Poll – Budget Deficits and the Welfare State………………………………………………………………………………………… 251

v

Introduction

In September 2011, British Prime Minister and then French President

Nicolas Sarkozy enjoyed a rare perk for contemporary European leaders: a victory lap.1 Under the cover of fighter jets and combat helicopters, the two leaders traveled to Tripoli, where cheering crowds welcomed them, grateful for British and French support against former Libyan strongman Muammar Gadhafi.2 It was British and French diplomats that spurred efforts to secure a (UN) no-fly zone over in March of that year.3 In the ensuing NATO air campaign, Britain and France carried out the bulk of the offensive air sorties. 4 5 6 Franco-

British cooperation over Libya came in the midst of a defense rapprochement between the erstwhile rivals. Signed in London’s historic Lancaster House in November 2010, the Treaty for

Defense and Security Co-operation (TDSC) called on the two countries to pool key military capabilities and cooperate in defense procurement at a time of austerity.7 Its sister treaty, the

Treaty relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamic Facilities (TJRHF), lay the groundwork for

1 Scott Peterson, “Sarkozy, Cameron visit Libya for victory lap, pep talk,” Christian Science Monitor, 15 September 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0915/Sarkozy-Cameron-visit- Libya-for-victory-lap-pep-talk (accessed 14 October 2012). 2 Simon Denyer, “Sarkozy, Cameron vow to support Libya, help find Gaddafi,” Washington Post, 15 September 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/sarkozy-cameron-vow-to-support- libya-help-find-gaddafi/2011/09/15/gIQA2VGhUK_story.html (accessed 14 October 2011). 3 Associated Press, “France and UK spearhead ‘no fly zone’ in Libya,” France 24, 18 March 2011, http://www.france24.com/en/20110318-cameron-sarkozy-lead-no-fly-zone-effort-libya-benghazi (accessed 14 October 2012). 4 Simon Rogers, “Nato operations in Libya: data journalism breaks down which country does what,” The Guardian, 31 October 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/may/22/-libya-data- journalism-operations-country# (accessed 14 October 2012). 5 “Libye: point de situation n° 50 – bilan de l’opération Unified Protector,” Ministère de la Défense et des anciens combattants, 8 November 2011, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/autres- operations/operation-harmattan-libye/actualites/libye-point-de-situation-n-50-bilan-de-l-operation- unified-protector (14 October 2012). 6 “The UK’s contribution to freeing Libya,” Ministry of Defence, 5 January 2012, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/TheUksContributionToFreeingLib ya.htm (accessed 14 October 2012). 7 James Kirkup, “David Cameron hails ‘new chapter’ in Britain-France military co-operation,” The Telegraph, 2 November 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/8105006/UK-France-defence- David-Cameron-hails-new-military-co-operation-between-Britain-and-France.html (accessed 14 October 2012).

1 joint testing facilities for the two countries’ nuclear deterrent. Dubbed the “Entente Frugale” by wry commentators in the United Kingdom,8 these treaties presaged allied operations in Libya and a series of military industrial cooperation efforts. The marked a significant step for European defense cooperation as London and Paris are the two leading diplomatic and military powers on the continent. The two are the only European Union

(EU) member states that occupy permanent seats on the UN Security Council (UNSC), maintain nuclear arsenals, and retain the capability to rapidly project force outside Europe. Since the St-

Malo Declaration of 1998, Franco-British cooperation has been at the heart of efforts to improve

Europe’s defense capabilities. Although could serve as a partner for Britain and France in deepening European defense capabilities, the legacy of the Second World War has made

Berlin reluctant to deploy combat forces. This reluctance limits Franco-German defense to symbolic measures, such as the Franco-German Brigade, which has never been deployed as a whole.9 Thus, it is when Britain and France join forces that European defense integration advances. A changing global landscape is making such integration increasingly urgent as the

United States pivots away from Europe, developing and emerging nations boost their defense spending, and European states face dire economic climes and ageing populations, limiting their defense budgets.

This essay aims to identify the primary factors affecting Franco-British defense cooperation in the lead up to the Lancaster House treaties and in the years that followed. It also seeks to determine whether these factors are encouraging or hampering deeper Franco-British cooperation. This investigation may help shed light on the factors spurring or ailing European defense integration. The author considers two rival hypotheses: one focused on international

8 Nick Robinson, “The entente frugale,” BBC News, 2 November 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/nickrobinson/2010/11/the_entente_fru.html (accessed 14 October 2012). 9 Andreas Noll, “Franco-German troops still wait for deployment,” Deutsche Welle, 22 January 2013, http://www.dw.de/franco-german-troops-still-wait-for-deployment/a-16513256 (accessed 3 May 2013).

2 factors and the other, on national factors. It concludes that the preponderance of evidence identify international factors as the dominant forces behind Franco-British defense cooperation.

Although it singles out national policies and political forces that will slow down the pace of cooperation.

The research hypothesis of this paper holds that international factors are dominant in determining French and British policy on defense cooperation and integration. These factors include (1) the global financial and eurozone crises and their impacts on defense budgets; (2) common threats and geographical trouble spots; (3) convergence on the means required to meet these challenges; (4) US pressure for closer European defense cooperation; (5) changes in the international arms market that threaten the future of European defense firms; and (6) multinational (i.e. NATO) and supranational (i.e. EU) pressure for European defense.

The alternative hypothesis of this paper is that national factors threaten the implementation of the 2010 Lancaster House treaties and hamper deeper Franco-British defense cooperation. These factors include (1) legacy commitments that are not shared by the partner nation, (2) differences on when to send forces into combat, (3) divergence over the role of the in European defense, (4) disagreement on the best multinational framework for European defense cooperation, NATO or the EU, (5) different defense industrial policies, (6) political concerns for job security overriding the creation of a viable European defense market, (7) differences among political parties over defense cooperation, and (8) public opposition to defense cooperation.

Thus the research hypothesis centers on the international-system level of analysis, while the alternative hypothesis focuses on the national levels of analysis. This essay’s model is based on the framework offered by Princeton University Professor Andrew Moravcsik in his The Choice

For Europe. By providing a research and an alternative hypothesis and examining both in turn,

3 one hopes to consider both hypothesis, outline the evidence provided for each, and offer the reader a look at data incongruous with the author’s preferred hypothesis.10 Levels of analysis, meanwhile, are long-standing abstractions for political scientists interested in international relations and include individual, state, and international levels. The individual level of analysis is considered in the discussion of the possible role played by British and French parties and politicians on defense cooperation.

The development of viable European military cooperation outside the transatlantic framework in the 1990s sparked significant scholarship on defense convergence and cooperation. Realists, with their emphasis on states striving to maintain their security in an anarchic world, initially played a dominant role by explaining why greater defense cooperation within Europe faltered during the .11 The realist school, however, failed to predict that the end of the Cold War would lead to deeper military integration.12 Noted realist John

Mearsheimer, for example, predicted that the end of the bipolar Cold War would lead to the break-up of the EU and the resurgence of intra-European security conflicts.13 When such predictions failed to materialize, “neo-realists” drew on balance-of-power theory to explain the new reality. Faced with US hegemony and the rise of future great powers in the developing world, second-ranked European powers allegedly decided to band together to aggregate their forces and improve their common standing and leverage in the world system.14 15 For its part, the liberal school, with its emphasis on rules-based international order and cooperation for

10 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 77-78. 11 Michael Merlingen, EU Security Policy: What It Is, How It Works, Why It Matters (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), 13. 12 Ibid. 13 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War” International Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 6. 14 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 31. 15 Seth G. Jones, The Rise of European Security Cooperation (New York; Cambridge University Press, 2007): 9-10.

4 mutual gains, also influenced the study of .16 Of particular prominence is liberal intergovernmentalism, which agrees with realism that states dominate international organizations, but dispenses with the unitary theory of the state to examine the domestic coalitions – and their economic interests – behind policies.17 The liberal school’s interdependence theory holds that modern states face new threats in an age of globalization that go beyond one state’s ability to confront, prompting them to take collective actions.18

However, in the field of European defense cooperation, both the realists and liberals have had to contend with the constructivist school.19 The latter holds that political leaders act in accordance with what they perceive to be just behavior, which is socially constructed and institutionalized.

The constructivist school offers powerful insight with regard to the convergence of

“strategic cultures,” including the frameworks that govern the decision to send troops into combat. Constructivists, however, may not adequately explain why Britain and France elected to cooperate outside the context of the EU in 2010. Constructivism also does not account for the determination with which European states seek to retain their independent military structures in spite of a general agreement within the EU and NATO that cooperation is necessary. Here, the realist school offers significant insights. Fears of losing key military capabilities to budget cuts can better explain Franco-British cooperation. Yet, realists may not adequately address why

Germany elected to block the merger of BAE Systems and EADS in October 2012. Any German national security concern in that agreement could have been addressed by a “golden share.” A liberal intergovernmentalist focus on the domestic forces pressuring the German government

16 Merlingen, 17. 17 Moravcsik, 3. 18 Jonathan Kirshner, Globalization and National Security (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), 6. 19 Merlingen, 9.

5 during the merger negotiations, however, would point to the activism of German labor unions, which feared the merger would lead to job losses. This essay draws from the three schools when appropriate.

The 2010 Lancaster House treaties have yielded only limited scholarship. In a policy paper published two months before the Lancaster House signing ceremony, Etienne de Durand calls on Britain and France to increase their defense cooperation.20 In line with realist theory, de

Durand claims deeper collaboration is necessary if London and Paris are to retain their military capabilities and international standings at a time of changing geopolitical realities. De Durand also claims that the US shift away from Europe and the French failure to build up the EU as an alternative center of power to US-led NATO facilitates agreement between the two parties.21

The 2010 treaty on nuclear cooperation, meanwhile, is at the center of a 2012 article by

Matthew Harries: “Britain and France as Nuclear Partners.”22 Harries claims that the treaty, while “modest in scope and product,” represents “significant strategic shifts” in Franco-British nuclear relations.23 These shifts include the end of key obstacles to cooperation, such as a rapprochement on EU defense cooperation and US willingness to cooperate with France on nuclear issues; the arrival of new areas of easy cooperation; and the confluence of economic concerns and long-term financial constraints.24

As this article focuses on recent and contemporary events, it is limited to documents made available to the public. These include government white papers on defense, white papers on defense procurement, parliamentary reports, defense budget audits, statements from public

20 Etienne de Durand, “Entente or Oblivion: Prospects and Pitfalls of Franco-British Co-operation on Defence,” Royal United Services Institute – Future Defence Review no. 8 (2010): 1. 21 Ibid., 7-8. 22 Matthew Harries, “Britain and France as Nuclear Partners,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 54, no. 1 (2012): 7. 23 Ibid., 7. 24 Ibid., 7-8.

6 officials, and data from international organizations (such as the World Bank) and NGOs (such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). News articles are used to point to recent developments, while journal articles are also cited. The latter form the bulk of the “Historical

Background” section of this essay. Because the author cannot access confidential government records, this essay’s findings are provisional and likely to be revised as time yields more information on the Lancaster House treaties. The author is also subject to the vagaries of bureaucrats. When this project began in the fall of 2012, the French Ministry of Defense expected to release the 2013 white paper on defense “before the end of 2012.”25 It was ultimately released to the public on 29 April 2013.26 This means that this essay largely draws from the previous white paper, which was published in 2008. The 2013 white paper, however, does not significantly deviate from its 2008 counterpart. Where it does, the changes are noted in this essay. All translations from French or Spanish found in this text were made by the author and he takes responsibility for mistakes or inaccuracies.

25 Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Livre blanc: pas avant la fin février,” : Secret Défense, 29 November 2012, http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefense/Livre-blanc-pas-avant-la-fin- fevrier_a854.html (accessed 1 May 2013). 26 “Livre blanc 2013 de la défense et de la sécurité nationale,” Portail du Gouvernement, 29 April 2013, http://www.gouvernement.fr/gouvernement/livre-blanc-2013-de-la-defense-et-de-la-securite-nationale (accessed 3 May 2013).

7

Part I: Historical Background

The Second World War punctuated radical changes in the international balance of power. The established powers – the United Kingdom and France – were humbled by five years of fighting, while the revisionist ambitions of Germany, Japan, and were decidedly crushed.27 In a vindication for , the world was now dominated by two continental powers: the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).28 In this new environment,

Britain and France shared common ground on which to cooperate.29 Domestically, the two countries were liberal democracies with capitalist systems, but after five years of war their populations demanded radical economic and social reforms. Internationally, both were overburdened by imperial commitments, yet keen to retain their international standings.30

Britain and France were also concerned with Soviet power and possible German revanchism. In the postwar period, efforts to bring the two former rivals together, however, were hampered by significant differences over European integration, the transatlantic alliance, détente with the

Eastern Bloc, and interests in the colonial and developing world. When cooperation was achieved, it was largely spurred by short-term convergences of interests, as in the Suez Crisis of

1956. With the end of the Cold War and dawn of a multipolar international system, many of the issues that previously divided Britain and France were resolved, opening the way for greater

27 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 357. 28 “There are now two great nations in the world, which starting from different points, seem to be advancing toward the same goal: the Russians and the Anglo-Americans... Their point of departure is different and their paths diverse; nevertheless, each seems called by some secret design of Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world.” Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J.P. Mayer trans. George Lawrence (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1969), 412-413. 29 Peter Catterall, “The Singularity of Suez in post-war Anglo-French Relations: Une Entente mal entendue,” in Britain, France and the Entente Cordiale since 1904, ed. Antoine Capet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 125. 30 John Young, “The failure of the new entente cordiale, 1947-1950,” in Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and cooperation, ed. Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (New York: Routledge, 2000), 264.

8 cooperation between two powers once again keen to cooperate to retain their standing in world affairs.

1945-1949: Postwar Outreach

In the period between Victory in Europe (VE) Day in May 1945 and the creation of the North

Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the British and French considered anchoring their mutual defense on a bilateral agreement or European multinational arrangement they would dominate.

Ultimately, key differences and the weight of the Soviet threat spurred London and Paris to seek a transatlantic security guarantor.

Britain emerged from the Second World War as the only state to have resisted and outlasted Nazi Germany from 1939 to 1945. Unlike its continental counterparts, Britain never suffered the humiliation of foreign occupation and emerged from the conflict with the second-largest navy and strategic air force in the world.31 Although its imperial prestige was dashed by the fall of Singapore, the legend of the Battle of Britain and the broadcasts of the

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) earned Britain the admiration of populations across

Europe, the Commonwealth, and the United States. Britain’s government, monarchy, and institutions survived the war intact and by the end of the conflict, British troops had regained all prewar British possessions. These factors led the British governing elites to continue – well into the 1950s – to believe that their country was a great power, in spite of the decline in British economic strength and British dependence on US economic support. This belief would shape

British policies until 1956.

France’s experience in the Second World War was radically different and did not imbue its postwar politicians with a sense of great power status. The ignominious defeat of May and

June 1940 destroyed the , broke French martial prestige, and laid the

31 Kennedy, 367.

9 ground for a violent occupation and the shameful collaboration of a Fascist regime. Meanwhile, the defeat of the métropole and loss of French Indochina damaged French standing in and

Asia. Yet, ’s efforts in the war prepared a revival of French spirits.32 The myths associated with the Appeal of 18 June, Battle of Bir Hakeim, and Maquis des Glières would become the basis of a nationalist revival in the 1950s. In the immediate postwar environment, however, the (PCF) benefited from their partisan’s resistance from

1941 onward and competed with Gaullist and centrist formations for the loyalty of the . In the October 1945 elections, the PCF won 26.1% of the vote to the socialist French

Section of the Workers’ International’s (SFIO) 24.6%, and the Christian Democratic Popular

Republican Movement’s (MRP) 25.6%.33 Until De Gaulle’s return to power in 1958, French leaders were wrapped up in internal power struggles and were less inclined to act on the world stage as a great power, except to retain French colonial interests.

In spite of France’s postwar weakness, the country remained critical to British strategy on the continent. Winston Churchill’s government was keen to restore French standing and power as a continental counterweight to Germany and the USSR.34 The British advocated for a

French permanent seat on the UN Security Council, supported French efforts to gain zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, and helped restore the French empire. For example,

General Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque and his French expeditionary force sailed to French

Indochina in 1945 onboard British ships.35 All the while, the British faced off against US skepticism or outright opposition to resurrecting French power.

32 Ibid., 366. 33 Jacques Marseille, Nouvelle histoire de la France, vol. 2 (Paris: Éditions Perrin, 2002), 357. 34 Kennedy, 366. 35 Marc Michel, “France and Britain Decolonize,” in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglas Johnson, and Robert Tombs (New York: Routledge, 2004), 146.

10

The arrival of a Labour government in the “khaki elections” of July 1945 brought a foreign secretary keen to pursue closer collaboration with France. Ernest Bevin proposed the creation of an economic and political association of Britain and Western European countries.36

In this arrangement, France would be Britain’s most important continental partner.37 This partnership, however, would not have been one of equals. Bevin was keen to magnify British power on the world stage and believed this alliance would prop up Britain’s declining economic base and enable it to maintain is global ambitions.38 The United Kingdom and its continental allies would form a “third pole” between the United States and Soviet Union.39

Outreach to the French, however, was marked by concerns about French political instability, the prominence of the PCF, and colonial disputes.40 In 1946, De Gaulle resigned and his provisional government was replaced by the parliamentary Fourth Republic, which would become a byword for instability.41 Its National Assembly was marked by a large contingent of

PCF delegates and 20 separate cabinets from 1947 to 1958.42 Furthermore, Bevin’s plan for a third pole was premised on colonial cooperation to maintain and exploit their empires.43 While the two countries sought to cooperate in sub-Saharan Africa and joined forces in the UN against efforts to dismantle colonial empires, significant differences arose in the Levant.44 De Gaulle clashed with the British in his ambition to restore French rule to Syria and .45 The French leader claimed that the dispute over Syria in 1945 was an “alliance between ‘the frenzy of Arab

36 François Crouzet, “L’Entente cordiale: réalités et mythes d’un siècle de relations franco-britanniques,” Études Anglaises 57, no. 3 (2004): 314. 37 Ibid. 38 Sean Greenwood, “The most important of the Western nations: France’s place in Britain’s post-war foreign policy, 1945-1949,” in Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and cooperation, ed. Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (New York: Routledge, 2000), 253. 39 Ibid., 244. 40 Catterall, 125. 41 Marseille, 357-358. 42 Ibid., 359. 43 Greenwood, 253. 44 Michel, 144. 45 Greenwood, 247.

11 nationalists and the desire of the British… to dominate the Orient.’”46 The would remain a bone of contention between the two countries into the 1960s. Ultimately, significant colonial cooperation proved impossible as Britain and France had different colonial models. The

British ran a decentralized empire, while the French were used to governing their colonies from the métropole. 47 Finally, the two countries had different security priorities shaped in large part by their geographies and colonial policies. The United Kingdom focused on the protection of sea lanes and access to Middle East oil, not the continental land that were at the heart of

French security concerns.48

In spite of these divergences, London negotiated with their fluctuating counterparts in

Paris to obtain a defense agreement. These efforts led in 1947 to the , a mutual defense pact aimed solely at the possibility of a resurgent Germany.49 Concerns about

Communist infiltration of the , however, led the British military staff to limit top-level cooperation with their French counterparts.50 Furthermore, geopolitical developments made the Treaty of Dunkirk and its Germanic focus outdated.51 The Soviet Union’s military preeminence on the European continent, dominance of Eastern and Central Europe, and pressure on Persia and led some to fear Soviet expansion. These concerns were exacerbated by the failed 1947 talks on Germany’s future coupled with the 1948 coup d’état in

Czechoslovakia that brought a Communist-dominated government to power in Prague.52 Great

Britain and the United States in particular came to fear the USSR over a resurgent Germany and

46 Qtd. Michel, 144. 47 Young, “The failure of the new entente,” 272. 48 Ibid., 267-269. 49 Greenwood, 252-253. 50 Young, “The failure of the new entente,” 266. 51 Claire Taylor, “Franco-British Defence Co-operation,” House of Commons Library, 8 November 2010, http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05750 (accessed 1 May 2013). 52 Young, “The failure of the new entente,” 267.

12 abandoned plans to impose a draconian peace on that country.53 Under pressure from the

United Kingdom and United States, the narrowly agreed in 1948 to the principle of a unified Germany.54 Finally, it became clear to both London and Paris that Britain lacked the force to be the security guarantor that Western European states desired.55

Both France and the United Kingdom were thus keen to obtain security guarantees from the United States, but US Secretary of State George Marshall told Bevin that Washington wanted Europeans to show their willingness to defend themselves before it would join.56 To that end, the United Kingdom, France, and the countries (, , and the

Netherlands) signed the Brussels Treaty in 1948, which set up the “ Defense

Organization.”57 The treaty featured a mutual protection clause as well as social, cultural, and financial mechanisms.58 In September 1948, the signatories agreed to pool their resources and create a military committee.59 The Western Union, however, was crippled from the start by

Britain’s reluctance to cede authority to a supranational body.60 While the French increasingly thought in terms of European integration, Bevin sought to lead Europe but did not wish to surrender sovereignty or weaken economic ties to the Commonwealth.61 Bevin’s proposals for cooperation with France were premised on expanding British power, not compromising on

British independence.62 In spite of the union’s problems, it facilitated US domestic approval for a

US defense commitment to the continent.63 In June 1948, the USSR began its blockade of Berlin,

53 Ibid., 266. 54 Ibid., 274. 55 Greenwood, 256-257. 56 “Origins of the ,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 6 December 2001, http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm (accessed 1 May 2013). 57 Greenwood, 255. 58 Young, “The failure of the new entente,” 267. 59 Ibid., 267. 60 Robert Cooper, “Britain and Europe,” International Affairs 88, no. 6 (2012): 1191. 61 Ibid. 62 Young, “The failure of the new entente,” 269. 63 “Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty.”

13 which would last until May 1949. It was against the background of this crisis that the Brussels signatories, along with the United States, Canada, , Italy, , , and

Iceland, negotiated a new military alliance in Washington. The North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) became the dominant security mechanism in postwar Europe because it included the United States.

1950-1957: Suez and the EEC

Franco-British relations in the 1950s were marked by what Queen Mary, University of London

Professor Peter Catterall has called mutual “dissonance.”64 The British generally failed to appreciate French concerns about German rearmament, while the French did not share Britain’s

“global view” of the Cold War, focusing instead on the continent and key colonial possessions.65

France was keen to pursue European integration as a mechanism for economic growth and political security. The British, however, were wedded to their great power ambitions and

Commonwealth privileges and did not participate in such schemes.66 Furthermore, the British continued to view the politically-unstable French with a measure of disdain.67 , both as Churchill’s foreign minister and successor in 10 Downing Street, broke the cross-channel

“dissonance” in 1954 by helping bring the Geneva Talks on Indochina to fruition and shepherding West German rearmament.68 Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 led to the largest Franco-British military operation since the Second World War. The Suez Crisis was a rare convergence of British and French interests in the developing world, but the US decision not to support its European allies marked

64 Catterall, 124. 65 Ibid., 132 and 136. 66 Jean-René Bernard, “Britain into Europe,” in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglass Johnson, and Robert Tombs (New York: Routledge, 2004), 166. 67 Catterall, 128. 68 Kevin Ruane, “Anthony Eden, the Foreign Office and Anglo-French Relations, 1951-1954,” in Anglo- French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and cooperation, ed. Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (New York: Routledge, 2000), 287.

14 a significant turning point in Franco-British relations. British historian Hugh Thomas, writing in

1967, concluded that that the Suez Crisis ended the Entente Cordiale, “which thus died, as it was born, over .”69 In 1957, the marked another point of divergence between the two countries.

Unable to enact punitive measures on Germany or integrate the French and British economies, French policy on Germany made an about-turn in the early 1950s.70 Paris came to see economic cooperation with Germany as a means to bind its century-old rival. Two prominent French politicians, Jean Monnet and , embodied this change. The two initially supported the 1945-47 “Monnet Plan,” which would have rebuilt France by exploiting Rhineland coal and steel.71 By 1950, however, Schuman was proposing the creation of a common market in steel and coal between the two countries.72 His call to arms led to the 1951

Treaty of Paris between France, , Italy, and the Benelux countries, which set up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a precursor to the modern European Union

(EU). For his part, Jean Monnet became the first president of the ECSC High Authority, the

ECSC’s supranational executive branch.73

While France acquiesced to German reunification and reindustrialization, it remained fearful of German rearmament. This fear was a source of tension with Britain and the United

States, which sought to raise West German soldiers to contribute to continental defense against the USSR. In an effort to exercise control over the West German military, French Foreign

Minister René Pleven proposed the creation of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1950.

69 Hugh Thomas, Suez (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 154. 70 Young, “The failure of the new entente,” 274. 71 Alan S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2000), 16-17. 72 “EUROPA – The – 9 May 1950,” European Union, http://europa.eu/about- eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm (accessed 1 May 2013). 73 Sherrill Brown Wells, Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011): 155.

15

While the treaty establishing the EDC was signed in 1952, the French parliament refused to ratify it unless the number of German divisions matched those of French divisions in Europe. The war in Indochina made this impossible. While Churchill complained of French intransigence,

Foreign Minister Eden – a Francophile voice in the British government – eased French concerns by permanently committing British troops to the continent.74 A grateful French Foreign Minister

René Massigli claimed Eden’s commitment was the concession France has sought from “Britain in vain for the last twenty years.”75 Eden also helped negotiate the Geneva Accords that ended the Indochina War, salvaging French prestige and enabling a return of French troops to

Europe.76 Eden’s diplomatic efforts enabled the EDC project to proceed, although it was shut down by communist and Gaullist elements in the French National Assembly.77 Yet again, Eden offered the solution: France would allow West Germany into NATO and the Modified Treaty of

Brussels in 1954. The agreement marked the birth of the , which included the original Brussels Treaty partners plus Italy and West Germany. 78 British governments supported continental efforts to integrate, but did not believe that Britain should participate. In 1950, Churchill called for the creation of a European , but did not imagine that Britain would participate in such an effort.79 He thought that surrendering British sovereignty was beneath the United Kingdom as a world power.80 These sentiments, coupled

74 Ruane, 287. 75 Ibid., 297. 76 Martin Thomas, “From Dien Bien Phu to Evian: Anglo-French imperial relations, 1954-1962,” in Anglo- French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and cooperation, ed. Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (New York: Routledge, 2000), 305. 77 Ruane, 290. 78 Sven Biscop, “The UK and European defence: leading or leaving?” International Affairs 88, no. 6 (2012): 1298. 79 André Fontaine, “Four’s a Crowd,” in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglass Johnson, and Robert Tombs (New York: Routledge, 2004), 196. 80 Ibid.

16 with Britain’s “special relationship” with the United States and Commonwealth preferences, led

Britain not to join the ECSC in 1951 or the EDC project in 1952.81

Three months after the Indochina War came to an end, Algerian nationalists launched a series of coordinated attacks on French security forces and civilians inaugurating the Algerian

War of Independence.82 The war in was marked by atrocities on both sides and poisoned

French standing in the Middle East. The British, who were keen to preserve their oil interests in the Middle East by backing Arab monarchies, distanced themselves from the French effort to retain Algeria and arm .83 84 The colonial conflicts in the Middle East that dogged Franco-

British relations in the late 1940s remained active at the time, with the French supporting the

Israelis, while the British backed pro-Western monarchies in Jordan, , and Libya.85 The

French also pressured the Syrians not to join the British defense project in the wider Middle

East: the Baghdad Pact, which they believed was militarily useless.86 The Egyptian leader and

Arab nationalist Gamal Abdul Nasser, however, would manage to unite the British and French in this one area of the world in which they had their greatest disputes.87 In July 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which had heretofore been under British control and closed the sea lane to Israeli shipping.88 Nasser claimed the revenue from the canal could be used to fund the

Aswan Dam after the United Kingdom and United States withdrew their offer to fund the project earlier that month. To the British, Nasser’s activities threatened to undermine pro-British Arab

81 Bernard, 166. 82 Marseille, 370. 83 Keith Kyle, “Suez,” in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglass Johnson, and Robert Tombs (New York: Routledge, 2004), 154. 84 Thomas, “From Dien Bien Phu,” 316-317. 85 Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2003): 112. 86 Ibid., 111. 87 Kyle, “Suez,” in Cross Channel Currents, 154. 88 Jonathan Pearson, Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 20.

17 monarchies.89 The French, meanwhile, suspected Nasser of aiding the Algerian insurgency.90

Both countries feared that Nasser was moving closer to the Soviet Union, which after the death of Stalin appeared keen to raise its profile in the developing world. London and Paris also feared that Nasser’s nationalist rhetoric might undermine their allies in North Africa and the Middle

East.91

This alignment was facilitated by British and French prime ministers who were

“temperamentally attracted to a revival of the Entente Cordiale.”92 During his time as Churchill’s wartime foreign secretary, Eden called for France to be treated as a victorious power. French

Prime Minister , meanwhile, was a former English-language teacher. In the midst of cross-channel consultations over the Suez Crisis and tensions between French-backed Israel and

British-allied Jordan, the two sides briefly considered a political union.93 In a meeting with his British counterpart in London, Mollet proposed the two countries revive the

1940 proposal to create a Franco-British Union.94 The British government, however, brushed off the offer.”95 Eighteen days later, however, Mollet proposed that France join the British

Commonwealth, with Eden suggesting his government investigate the idea.

Meeting in Sèvres in , Britain and France agreed to enlist Israel to provide a pretext for a Franco-British invasion of Egypt. On October 29th, Israeli forces invaded the Sinai

Peninsula and the British and French called on the two sides to withdraw from the Canal Zone, which would be defended by the allies. Israel immediately agreed, while Egypt predictably refused. This pretext, however, failed to convince the Soviet Union or the United States, with

89 Michel, 146. 90 Thomas, “From Dien Bien Phu,” 312. 91 Michel, 146. 92 Kyle, “Suez,” in Cross Channel Currents, 154. 93 Mike Thomson, “When Britain and France nearly married,” BBC News, 15 January 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6261885.stm (accessed 2 February 2013). 94 Fontaine, 193. 95 Kyle, “Suez,” in Cross Channel Currents, 156.

18 the former threatening military action and the latter publicly denouncing the military operation.

Ahead of the invasion, British and French appear to have seriously misinterpreted statements by

US leaders and failed to inform Washington about their intentions.96 US President Dwight D.

Eisenhower, who was in the midst of a reelection campaign, was enraged by the operation, which coincided with the heightened tensions surrounding the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.97

Keen to avoid the taint of colonialism in the rapidly decolonizing Third World and punish its wayward allies, Washington refused to deliver oil to Britain and France after Arab states declared an embargo.98 Washington also refused to loan US dollars to the United Kingdom as the pound sterling collapsed on international markets. Under financial and diplomatic pressure, the British called for an end to the operation in November 1956. The French, who believed that the allies were on the brink of toppling Nasser, felt betrayed by the British ceasefire.99 The Suez

Crisis brought the two European powers closer than at any point since the Second World War, but its aftermath only pushed them further apart. Mollet’s idea of French membership in the

Commonwealth died in the aftermath of the Suez debacle.100 The British and French drew different conclusions from the conflict. The British came to believe that they would only retain influence on world affairs by coming closer to the United States through the “special relationship.”101 France, however, concluded that the United States and United Kingdom were

96 Michael K. Carroll, Pearson’s Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 17. 97 Ibid., 25. 98 Klaus W. Larres, “A Complex Alliance: The Explosive Chemistry of Franco-British Relations in the Post- Cold War World,” in Britain, France and the Entente Cordiale since 1904, ed. Antoine Capet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 206. 99 Thomas, “From Dien Bien Phu,” 313. 100 Thomson, “When Britain and France nearly married.” 101 Larres, 206.

19 unreliable allies and that France needed to focus on bolstering its independent strength by, among other things, forging an autonomous nuclear deterrent.102

The Suez Crisis also led some French leaders to conclude that Britain would always prefer unity with the other Anglo-Saxon powers – the United States and “White Dominions” – to unity with continental Europe.103 The crisis came as the six ECSC member states negotiated on a customs union. Although it was invited to join the negotiations, the British government opted not to participate and was generally derisive of the project. British envoys to negotiations surrounding the future Treaty of Rome said, “I leave happy because even if you continue meeting you will not agree; even if you agree, nothing will result; and even if something results, it will be disaster.”104 Instead of the customs union envisaged by the continentals, Britain proposed a free trade agreement (FTA) that would be compatible with continued

Commonwealth preferences.105 The French feared an FTA would harm its farming sector and rejected the British proposal. In March 1957, the six signed the Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC would bolster French power in Western

Europe and dash Britain’s preeminence in the region. Speaking in November 1956 after Eden agreed to a ceasefire, West German Chancellor told Mollet that “Europe will be your revenge.”106

1958-1973: De Gaulle and Britain

Charles de Gaulle’s return to power in France transformed Franco-British relations. The period was marked by tensions over the transatlantic relationship and European integration, which led

102 John Newhouse, “Paris, London and Washington,” in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglass Johnson, and Robert Tombs (New York: Routledge, 2004), 185. 103 Larres, 207. 104 Newhouse, 184. 105 James Ellison, “De Gaulle and Anglo-French Mésentente, 1958-67,” in Britain, France and the Entente Cordiale since 1904, ed. Antoine Capet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 146. 106 Kyle, “Suez,” in Cross Channel Currents, 157.

20 the British Foreign Office to identify De Gaulle as the “bête noire” of British foreign policy.107 De

Gaulle sought greater independence from the United States, an autonomous nuclear deterrent, and détente with the Eastern Bloc.108 For their part, successive British governments favored intimate collaboration with the United States on nuclear weapons, intelligence sharing, and monetary concerns. Although it was a period of high-profile tensions between London and Paris, the Gaullist years also laid the groundwork for rapprochement in the 1970s. By the time the general resigned, the collapse of British and French empires coupled with the rise of West

Germany would bring the two countries closer.

Undermined by the controversial war in Algeria and divided by perennial political infighting, the Fourth French Republic faced in 1958 the threat of widespread unrest at home and mutiny in .109 In June of that year, embattled President René Coty called on de Gaulle to form a government and write a new constitution.110 The new political system set up by de

Gaulle, the Fifth French Republic, was approved in a referendum in September 1958, while de

Gaulle was elected its first president in December of that year.111 De Gaulle’s return to power provided London with a stable counterpart in Paris, but one with “une certaine idée de la

France” and the rank it should hold in world affairs.112 De Gaulle’s ambitions came in the midst of resurgent French economic strength and a comparative decline in British power. While the

British lost their markets to US competition, the pound sterling seized to be a global currency,

107 Crouzet, 316. 108 John W. Young, “Franco-British Relations during the Wilson Years, 1964-70,” in Britain, France and the Entente Cordiale since 1904, ed. Antoine Capet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 167. 109 Marseille, 374. 110 Ibid., 375. 111 Ibid., 393. 112 “A certain idea of France” – Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires, ed. Marius-Francois Guyard (Paris : Gallimard, 2000), 6.

21 and their empire withered, France experienced “les trentes glorieuses,” a period of strong economic growth from 1945 to 1974.113

De Gaulle was keen to maintain French sovereignty and return France to great power status.114He thus looked askance at what he perceived to be a US-dominated NATO and proposed in 1958 that a tripartite arrangement between London, Paris, and Washington lead the alliance.115 Britain and the United States rejected this proposal outright, reinforcing the anti-

US sentiments De Gaulle picked up in the Second World War.116 In spite of his disagreements with Washington, De Gaulle faithfully supported the United States during the 1962 Cuban

Missile Crisis.117 Concerns about US dominance of NATO, however, led De Gaulle to steadily withdraw French forces from NATO command. He removed the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO in February 1959, the French Atlantic fleet in June 1963, and the French naval staff in April 1964.118 Finally, De Gaulle informed US President Lyndon Johnson in March 1966 that he intended to withdraw France from NATO’s integrated military command structures and to demand that NATO personnel and equipment depart from French territory.119 After the withdrawal, however, France remained a NATO signatory and participated in the alliance’s political structures.120 In the years that followed, De Gaulle continued to mistrust his “Anglo-

113 Pierre Messner, “Two Colonial Powers,” in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglass Johnson, and Robert Tombs (New York: Routledge, 2004), 142. 114 Marseille, 396. 115 Young, “Franco-British Relations,” 167. 116 Joanne Wright, “The Cold War, European Community and Anglo-French relations, 1958-1998,” in Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and cooperation, ed. Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (New York: Routledge, 2000), 325. 117 Maurice Vaisse, “La France et la Crise de Cuba,” Histoire, économie et société 13, no. 1 (1994): 185. 118 Institute for National Strategic Studies, Allied Command Structures in the New NATO (Fort McNair, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 50. 119 Ellison, 149. 120 Young, “Franco-British Relations,” 169.

22

Saxon” allies. According to a 1966 British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) report, the United

Kingdom was the second leading intelligence target for French spies after the United States.121

The transatlantic dispute also included the dominant international issue of the era: nuclear weapons. The British began work in 1950 on their own gaseous diffusion plant for nuclear technology with no US assistance. Two years later, Washington did not permit the

United Kingdom to test its atom bomb in the United States, so London tested it at Monte Bello

Island in Australia.122 In the years that followed, US policy on the British deterrent mellowed and the two countries cooperated. In 1957, Eisenhower and Macmillan signed agreements on nuclear defense that established their unique collaboration and prevented cooperation with other states.123 In the mid-1950s, the Fourth Republic decided to pursue a French deterrent.124

The Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations were torn from 1958 to 1963 on whether to aid the French nuclear program by providing inertial guidance systems, assistance on isotope separation, and warhead technology.125 Some officials worried that a French deterrent would lead to a nuclear arms race in Western Europe or spark a nuclear war. 126 Others held that the

French would have nuclear weapons eventually and that the US should cooperate in exchange from some French concessions.127 De Gaulle held that an independent force de frappe would reinforce European independence from the United States. The general feared that the United

States would seek to preserve its homeland, but sacrifice Europe in any confrontation with the

121 Ibid. 122 Newhouse, 187. 123 Ellison, 147. 124 Marseille, 397. 125 Newhouse, 187. 126 William Burr, “U.S. Secret Assistance to the French Nuclear Program, 1969-1975: From “Fourth Country” to Strategic Partner,” Wilson Center, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/us-secret- assistance-to-the-french-nuclear-program-1969-1975-fourth-country-to-strategic#1 (accessed 26 January 2012). 127 Newhouse, 187.

23

USSR.128 These concerns were fueled by US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s proposed

“flexible response” doctrine.129 De Gaulle was thus open to nuclear cooperation with the British or technology transfers from the United States as long as these did not leave France dependent on a foreign power. No progress on either front was made and France pursued its independent nuclear deterrent.130

In 1960, the British government canceled its plan to develop an autonomous deterrent based on the “Blue Streak” missile in favor of the air-launched and US-built Skybolt missile.131

Two years later, however, the Kennedy administration canceled the costly Skybolt program, threatening the future of the British nuclear deterrent.132 Seizing the chance to bind London to the continent and gain British nuclear cooperation, De Gaulle suggested at a meeting with

Macmillan in Rambouillet that the two countries cooperate on new missile program.133

However, the offer was – in Kennedy’s words – “Delphic and cryptic” to the British.134 Later that year, Macmillan met Kennedy in Nassau, Bahamas, for talks on the British deterrent. Kennedy agreed to provide the British with the submarine-launched Polaris ballistic missile.135 The Nassau discussions set up the future of the two deterrents: the British deterrent would be closely tied to the United States, while the future French deterrent would be ostensibly homegrown and autonomous.136 137 Then US Under-Secretary of State for Europe George Ball wrote at the end of

128 Hubert Védrine, “Rapport pour le Président de la République française sur les conséquences du retour de la France dans le Commandement intégré de l’OTAN, sur l’avenir de la relation transatlantique et les perspective de l’Europe de la défense,” 14 Novembre 2012, 4. 129 Ibid. 130 Catterall, 130. 131 “Public Information Films – 1951-1964 – The Blue Streak Rocket,” The National Archives, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/films/1951to1964/filmpage_rocket.htm (accessed 1 May 2013). 132 Fontaine, 195. 133 Ibid. 134 Qtd. Ibid. 135 Harries, 9. 136 Ibid., 8. 137 US government documents declassified in the 2000s indicate that the Nixon administration provided the French with ballistic missile technology beginning in 1970, about one year after De Gaulle resigned

24 the 1960s that Nassau was a mistake because it encouraged the United Kingdom to continue to believe it was a great power and fail to realize that its future lay with the European project.138

The Nassau agreement reinforced De Gaulle’s conclusion about “Anglo-Saxon” unity; a conclusion that impacted British efforts to join the EEC.139 140 The agreement also spurred De

Gaulle’s aspirations to forge an independent European foreign policy. To that end, De Gaulle signed the Elysée Treaty with Adenauer in January 1963, which laid the foundations of the

Franco-German axis that would come to dominate the European integration project.141 The possibility of Franco-British nuclear cooperation briefly returned to fore in 1970, when British

Conservative leader Edward Heath arrived at 10 Downing Street. Heath had advocated for a joint British-French nuclear force while on the opposition bench. His outreach, however, was dashed by French nationalism and the realization that close nuclear cooperation with the United

States provided significant technological and strategic advantages.142

The European Economic Community (EEC) lay at the heart of Franco-British tensions during De Gaulle’s time in office. In the years following its inception, the EEC bucked British predictions and thrived. In response to the EEC, the British set up an alternative organization in

1960, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal,

Sweden, and Switzerland. The EFTA offered a different vision of European integration – an inter- state FTA – that Paris feared might attract Germany.143 144 The EFTA, however, failed to draw

from office. The US provided “negative guidance” on ballistic missiles and operational nuclear safety, circumventing Atomic Energy Act restrictions in the process. The information provided to France pertained to multiple reentry vehicles, hardening these vehicles, and the development of underground nuclear test facilities. – Burr. 138 George W. Ball, The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern World Structure (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 107. 139 Harries, 11. 140 Wright, 327. 141 Fontaine, 196. 142 Harries, 11. 143 Thomas, “From Dien Bien Phu,” 309. 144 Wright, 325.

25 the largest continental economies and remained peripheral. Members of the EEC had superior economic growth rates than the United Kingdom.145 While the EEC benefited from the good economic climate of the 1950s and 1960s, Britain’s Commonwealth preferences withered and

London business circles grew favorable to British membership in the EEC.146 In the early 1950s,

Commonwealth countries took more than half of British exports, while by 1967, they took less than one-third.147 De Gaulle’s emphasis on intergovernmentalism over supranationalism in the

EEC, as shown in the 1961 , made the EEC all the more attractive to London.148

Finally, British Prime Minister realized that the EEC was increasingly at the center of European affairs and thus at the center of US attention.149 This posed a threat to

Britain’s “special relationship” and efforts to serve as a bridge between the United States and

Europe. Britain first applied for EEC membership in 1961, but De Gaulle exercised France’s veto in January 1963. The veto prompted Macmillan to write in his diary, “all our policies at home and abroad are in ruins…”150 De Gaulle famously claimed that British membership of the EEC would serve as a US “Trojan horse” in Europe, pointing to the Nassau Agreement as evidence that the United Kingdom “owed allegiance outside Europe.”151 De Gaulle also feared that Britain would sabotage the EEC from within and turn it into an FTA damaging the nascent common agricultural policy (CAP) that was so beneficial to French farmers. “In 1963, we were obliged to call a halt to the Brussels negotiations on Britain’s on Britain’s accession to the organizations…

But the fact is that it was not then able to accept the common rules…”152 Finally, Paris feared UK

145 Ellison, 145. 146 Bernard, 167. 147 Ibid., 168. 148 Wright, 326. 149 Cooper, 1192. 150 Qtd. Ellison, 147. 151 Qtd. Bernard, 167. 152 Qtd. Ibid.

26 membership would dilute French power in the EEC.153 French Minister of Agriculture M. Pisani said during talks with his British counterpart in Brussels, “Mon cher. C’est très simple.

Maintenant, avec les six, il y a cinq poules et un coq. Si vous vous joignez, (avec des autres pays) il y aura peut-être sept ou huit poules. Mais il y aura deux coqs. Alors – c’est pas aussi agréables.”154 Although initially opposed to EEC membership, the Labour government of Prime

Minister Harold Wilson applied in May 1967 as Britain’s economy and political influence continued to decline and US President Lyndon Johnson told Wilson he favored British membership of the EEC.155 156 De Gaulle, however, vetoed this application as well, in spite of a

British pledged to abide by the acquis communautaire, including CAP.157 158

In spite of tensions over the transatlantic relationship and NATO and EEC membership, the 1960s and early 1970s lay the groundwork for cooperation between France and the United

Kingdom.159 A 1962 Foreign Office memorandum held that “French and British interests in the world of today are becoming more and more similar.” This was in part due to convergence in the makeup of their economies and the British turn to economic planning.160 Britain’s global position continued to decline in the 1960s, culminating in the July 1967 Defense White Paper that announced Britain’s withdrawal from its bases “East of Suez.”161 Declining British strength forced British prime ministers to confront their European future. While it remained wedded to the “special relationship,” Britain sometimes seconded French criticism of US policies. De Gaulle and Wilson both opposed US plan to create a Multilateral Force (MLF) in the mid-60s, fearing

153 Crouzet, 316. 154 “My dear, it’s very simple. Now, with the six, there are five hens and one rooster. If you join, (with other countries) there may be seven or eight hens. But, there will be two roosters. So – this would not be as pleasant.” Qtd. Catterall, 131. 155 Cooper, 1193. 156 Bernard, 168. 157 Wright, 328. 158 Ellison, 154. 159 Qtd. Young, “Franco-British Relations,” 165. 160 Ibid., 174. 161 Ibid.

27 the deal would grant Germany a share of the alliance’s nuclear weapons and restrict the independence of the British and French atomic arsenals.162 The two leaders were also critical of

US policy in Southeast Asia, with De Gaulle publicly denouncing the Vietnam War and Wilson refusing to send British troops.163 The 1960s and early 1970s also saw the end of the British and

French colonial empires, reducing a point of contention. After the Suez Crisis, the United

Kingdom began to abandon its colonial holdings, with the exception of “fortress colonies,” such as Aden.164 In 1960, De Gaulle formally dismantled the French empire, with the exception of the

Somali coast and some territories in the Indian and Pacific oceans.165 Two years later, Algeria formally gained independence.166 Although Britain and France continued to jostle for influence in Africa into the 1990s, the intensity of their disputes cooled with the end of the Biafra conflict in 1970.167 By then, the last source of colonial tension was the Franco-British condominium of the New Hebrides, which itself gained independence as Vanuatu in July 1980.168 Finally, the

British and French cooperated on a number of industrial projects as they feared falling under the technological dominance of the United States. In 1962, the UK and France signed a draft treaty to jointly develop a supersonic airliner, the Concorde,169 while in 1965, the two governments agreed to work on a jet fighter that would become the SEPECAT Jaguar.170 Two years later, the two governments agreed to cooperate on a series of helicopters that would yield the Lynx,

Gazelle, and Puma.171

162 Ibid., 170. 163 Fontaine, 195. 164 Michel, 151. 165 Ibid. 166 Marseille, 376. 167 Young, “Franco-British Relations,” 178. 168 Ibid., 179. 169 “Timeline: Concorde’s career,” BBC News, 19 October 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3200802.stm (accessed 14 October 2012). 170 “Jaguar,” , http://www.dassault-aviation.com/en/passion/aircraft/military-dassault- aircraft/jaguar.html?L=1 (accessed 14 October 2012). 171 Taylor.

28

Furthermore, French grandeur began to erode in the twilight years of De Gaulle’s time in office.172 The Empty Chair Crisis of 1965 spurred other EEC member states to seek to dilute

French power by trying to expand the community’s membership.173 The French decision to repeatedly veto British accession to the EEC only served to anger the five other member states.

The unrest of May 1968, meanwhile, highlighted the internal instability and economic troubles growing under the Gaullist myth. The United States’ decision to follow France in détente and

German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s ostpolitik made Gaullist France less relevance to Russian and

Chinese leaders. The rise of West Germany, currency instability, and need for greater technology cooperation led the French government to reconsider the United Kingdom as a possible partner in the EEC.174 The British were able to exploit the fallout from De Gaulle’s nationalist policies in the EEC and NATO to improve their standing among the five other members of the EEC and place themselves in a stronger position to obtain membership.175

While de Gaulle held on to power in the violent unrest of May 1968, his standing was severely damaged and he resigned in 1969 after losing a referendum on decentralizing powers to regional governments.176 De Gaulle’s departure from politics made it possible for Great

Britain to reapply for EEC membership. His successor, , was more concerned with rising German economic and diplomatic power, maintaining US interest in Europe, and securing permanent funding for CAP than the threat of a US “Trojan horse.”177 178 The other EEC member states, meanwhile, would only acquiesce to permanently fund CAP if Britain was

172 Young, “Franco-British Relations,” 176. 173 Ellison, 157. 174 Young, “Franco-British Relations,” 180. 175 Ellison, 144. 176 Marseille, 404. 177 Wright, 331. 178 Crouzet, 316.

29 allowed to apply for membership.179 Pompidou was furthermore dependent on the support of ministers who favored British membership in the common market, such as Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.180 The UK adhesion treaty was signed on January 1972 and the United Kingdom entered the Union in 1973.181 Heath lost the 1974 elections and was replaced by leader Harold Wilson, who held a referendum on British membership in 1975. The British accession negotiations failed to address London’s concerns with the CAP, Britain’s budgetary contributions to the community, and economic monetary union (EMU).182 These issues remain bones of contention between Britain and the EU.

1975-1990: Thatcher and Mitterrand

British accession to the EEC introduced a new field for cooperation and competition between

Britain and France. This was particularly the case from 1979 to 1990, when Margaret Thatcher occupied 10 Downing Street. Although her government was ostensibly pro-European, she was keen to renegotiate Britain’s relationship with the EEC. A free-market warrior suspicious of continentals, Thatcher forged an unlikely partnership with French Socialist President François

Mitterrand. This unlikely partnership weathered the Falkland Wars, Thatcher’s “handbagging,”

German reunification, and the collapse of Soviet power.

The late 1970s, a period of political instability in Britain, saw limited progress in Franco-

British relations.183 In 1976, the United Kingdom and France signed a Memorandum of

Understanding on the Placing of Services and Facilities of the Government of the French

Republic at the Disposal of British Forces.184 This agreement enabled British forces to use French

179 Wright, 331. 180 Bernard, 170. 181 Crouzet, 317. 182 Cooper, 1194. 183 Wright, 332. 184 Taylor.

30 military bases in a military emergency, such as the 1997 evacuation of civilians from Zaïre.185 The

1970s and 1980s saw further defense procurement cooperation. The , for example, adopted the French-built and the two countries joined in 1982 an international project to develop a new military cargo aircraft, which would eventually become the A-400M program in

2003.186 187 In 1985, however, France withdrew from the Joint European fighter project, which led to the , in favor of an indigenous fighter project, which led to the

Rafale.188

Shortly after taking office in 1979, Thatcher began efforts to renegotiate Britain’s relationship with the EEC. She had a poor working relationship with center-right French

President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and failed to make progress during his time in office. In 1980, however, Mitterrand arrived at the Elysée Palace. Thatcher admired Mitterrand for his role as a resistance fighter, vigorous support for the force de frappe, and patriotic socialism.189

Mitterrand, meanwhile, brought his full charms to bear on the British prime minister; he is said to have declared that Thatcher had “les yeux de Caligula et la bouche de Marilyn Monroe.”190

During the , Mitterrand earned Thatcher’s respect by opposing his Quai d’Orsay, which favored , and offering full diplomatic support to Britain.191 Mitterrand also blocked the supply of spare parts and new arms to Argentina, allowed British forces to use

French port facilities in Dakar, and provided information on French-built exocet missiles and

185 Ibid. 186 Jean Rannou, “Defence,” in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglass Johnson, and Robert Tombs (New York: Routledge, 2004), 242. 187 Taylor. 188 Rannou, 242. 189 John Campbell, “From Heath to Thatcher, 1970-90,” in Britain, France and the Entente Cordiale since 1904, ed. Antoine Capet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 189. 190 “The eyes of Caligula and the mouth of Marilyn Monroe.” – Qtd. Ibid., 190. 191 Wright, 333.

31 warplanes sold to the Argentine junta.192 This important relationship helped lead in 1984 to a deal on the EEC budget dispute in Fontainebleau, although disagreements remained over agriculture. Thatcher and Mitterrand also cooperated on the (SEA), the appointment of as president of the , the presence of US

Pershing missiles in West Germany, the defense of nuclear weapons in NATO, and the construction of the Channel Tunnel.193 194 In spite of these successes, Thatcher’s euroscepticism became even more pronounced in the last years of her premiership, damaging her relationship with Mitterrand.195 In September 1988, Thatcher delivered an iconic speech in Bruges in which she voiced her distaste for European supranationalism. “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a

European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels,” the “Iron Lady” said.196 In

October 1989, the collapse of the Berlin Wall heralded the downfall of the East German regime, prompting West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to unveil a 10-point program for German reunification the next month.197 Thatcher and Mitterrand resumed their partnership in an attempt to prevent German reunification, although Mitterrand recognized before Thatcher that reunification was inevitable.198 This realization may have encouraged Mitterrand to push for

192 Formerly secret papers, which surfaced in 2012, indicate that a French team stayed in Argentina throughout the Falklands War and provided technical support to Argentine crews operating air-launched exocet missiles. According to the BBC, the documents do not provide evidence that Mitterrand, himself, was duplicitous in the conflict, but that the French government was divided and elements of it were aware of this collaboration. – Mike Thomson, “How France helped both sides in the Falklands War,” BBC News, 5 March 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17256975 (accessed 3 February 2013). – “BBC Radio 4 – Document, 05/03/2012,” BBC, 5 March 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01cvkg4 (accessed 3 February 2013). 193 Wright, 335-336. 194 Campbell, 190-191. 195 Ibid., 192. 196 Margaret Thatcher, “Speech to the College of Europe (‘The Bruges Speech’),” Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 2013, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107332 (accessed 3 February 2013). 197 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 119-120. 198 Larres, 201.

32 tighter European integration as exemplified by the Treaty of Maastricht, which was negotiated in the midst of German reunification and signed in 1992.199 Thatcher felt betrayed by

Mitterrand’s shift on German reunification and plans for a tighter union.200 In November 1990, however, members of Thatcher’s own cabinet ousted her from office, backing John Major for the premiership.201

1990-2010: European Defense Cooperation

German reunification, the collapse of Communist rule in Eastern Europe, and the breakup of the

Soviet Union marked another radical shift in world affairs. The United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower, while the future of the transatlantic relationship was hazy. Once again, the United Kingdom and France found themselves in similar international positions. As nuclear- armed permanent members of the UN Security Council and G-7 powers with extensive diplomatic and trade networks, Britain and France both sought to punch above their weight and retain their global reach.202 These factors prepared the ground for closer Franco-British defense cooperation, both within and outside the EU.

In France, the end of the Cold War accelerated the decline of Gaullism’s hold on French foreign policy.203 During the Cold War, a consensus developed on the advantages of France’s middle ground position in the transatlantic alliance; Pompidou, Giscard d’Estaing, and

Mitterrand did not reconsider De Gaulle’s pullout from NATO’s military command.204 The end of the Cold War, however, prompted Mitterrand to reconsider this position.205 He allowed French

199 Ibid. 200 Zelikow and Rice, 207. 201 Védrine, 235. 202 Larres, 198. 203 Newhouse, 189. 204 Védrine, 4. 205 Ibid.

33 officials to participate in certain military bodies within NATO during operations in the .206

In 1993, for example, the head of the French military mission to NATO was allowed to sit on the

NATO military committee.207 In December 1995, one day after NATO intervened in Bosnia-

Herzegovina, Chirac announces that France would reintegrate NATO.208 This effort however failed after NATO leaders rejected the French proposal to set up a double chain of command that would have allowed the Europeans to activate the alliance if the US did not want to participate in an operation and the US refused to grant the French control of a Naples-based command.209

In spite of these differences, France joined the United Kingdom in contributing to US-led operations in the Persian in 1990-91 and the Balkan Wars of the 1990s.210 Early on in the Balkans, France and the UK made common front against Germany’s decision to recognize

Slovenian and Croatian independence in November 1991.211 In June 1992, British troops joined

French forces in the former Yugoslavia as part of a UN peacekeeping force.212 The mission enabled the two sides to cooperate closely. A former British Foreign Secretary and co-chair of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia said of the experience, “Britain’s defense partnership on the ground with France in Bosnia, as I witnessed, has left both armed forces with considerable mutual respect. The far closer working relationship between the Foreign Office and the Quai d’Orsay established in 1991 with the break-up of Yugoslavia has meant that the old scars from the failed collaboration over Suez in 1956 have largely healed. The French are readier

206 Ibid. 207 Ibid. 208 Ibid., 4-5. 209 Ibid., 5. 210 Larres, 201. 211 Ibid., 201-202. 212 Rannou, 242.

34 than ever before to act together on security matters.”213 In 1996, as the Balkan Wars created a demand for peacekeeping cooperation, London and Paris created the Franco-British Joint

Commission on Peacekeeping.214 Disagreements did surface over the US-led airstrikes in Kosovo in 1999 as the French showed greater sympathy for Russian attempts at mediation with Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic, while Britain sided with the US.215 In spite of these differences, a

Royal Navy warship was placed under the operational control of the French aero- during the NATO bombing operation.216 The RAF, meanwhile, operated from a French air base on .

In addition to joint operations in the Balkans, the 1990s saw British and French cooperate in other parts of the world. The two countries took part in military operations not under US leadership in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998 and East Timor in

1999.217 Beginning in 1994, the British provided professional training help and interchange services intensified.218 To facilitate cooperation, the two sides signed a series of Letters of Intent

(LOI) between 1995 and 1997 that outlined cooperation between their respective services.219 In

1995, this collaboration led to creation of a Franco-British (FBEAG), which became the European Air Group (EAG) in January 2008.220

As the only two European nuclear powers in NATO, Britain and France jointly opposed revisions to NATO doctrines that would have called nuclear devices “weapons of last resort.”221

In October 1992, the two countries set up the Joint Nuclear Weapons Commission (JNWC),

213 Qtd. Wright, 339. 214 Taylor. 215 Larres, 202. 216 Rannou, 243. 217 Taylor. 218 Rannou, 243. 219 Taylor. 220 “History,” European Air Group/Groupe Aérien Européen, 2009, http://www.euroairgroup.org/eag/history/ (accessed 15 February 2013). 221 Wright, 337.

35 which was made permanent in the July 1993 Franco-British . It is tasked with coordinating positions on strategic concepts and discussions of arms control and disarmament.222 223 These talks helped the two countries converge on nuclear issues, enabling

UK Secretary of State for Defense Malcolm Rifkind to say in February 1993 that “there are no differences between France and the United Kingdom on fundamental nuclear issues.”224 In 1995,

Prime Minister John Major did not join in the international criticism of French nuclear testing in the Pacific Ocean and supported Paris in talks with Commonwealth leaders from the Pacific.225 In

October of that year, Major and Chirac agreed, in Major’s words, that “the vital interest of one could not be threatened without the vital interests of the other equally being at risk.”226 In 1998,

France and the United Kingdom both signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (CNTB).227 228

The 1990s were also marked by a revival of European defense cooperation, a process led by Britain and France, the continent’s preeminent military powers. The , which came into effect in 1993, transformed the EEC into the EU and was meant to promote greater foreign policy coordination through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).229

This “second pillar” was purely inter-governmental and based on unanimity.230 In an effort to offer the EU a military capability, the (TEU) referred to the Western

European Union (WEU) as the mechanism EU member states could use for military

222 Ibid. 223 Harries, 12. 224 Ibid., 13. 225 Wright, 338. 226 Harries, 13. 227 “Country Profiles – France,” CTBTO Preparatory Commission, http://www.ctbto.org/member- states/country-profiles/?country=62&cHash=188f9b6af47e2dc838b671bdb8244783 (accessed 15 February 2013). 228 “Country Profiles – United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,” CTBTO Preparatory Commission, http://www.ctbto.org/member-states/country- profiles/?country=182&cHash=e429988885f2c0ef314443f101377085 (accessed 15 February 2013). 229 Biscop, 1299. 230 Fraser Cameron, An Introduction to European Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 35.

36 operations.231 In 1992, the WEU member states agreed to the “Petersburg Tasks,” which identified the kinds of operations the WEU could undertake, including humanitarian operation, civilian evacuations, peacekeeping, and “peacemaking” or fighting.232 The 1997 Amsterdam

Treaty subordinated the WEU to the EU, although the UK joined four other EU countries in vetoing French-backed plans to abolish the body.233 234 Tony Blair’s arrival at 10 Downing Street in May 1997 brought a British prime minister keen to deepen British participation in the

European project, including European defense cooperation.235 In December 1998, Blair, Chirac, and French Prime Minister met in St-Malo to discuss European defense policy.236

The leaders were motivated in part by the lackluster European performance in the Balkan Wars.

In the 1999 Kosovo Conflict, for example, the United States flew some 90% of bombing missions.237 The development of greater European defense cooperation was also seen by many on both sides of the Channel as the best way to preserve US interest in NATO.238 The St-Malo

Declaration calls for the EU to develop the “capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces.” It was not meant, however, to threaten either NATO or the neutrality of some member states. The agreement emphasizes that European military cooperation is instead meant to “contribut[e] to the vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defense of its members.”239 The two governments also agreed to cooperate to ensure they could better plan and coordinate their response to crises outside the

231 Biscop, 1299. 232 Ibid. 233 Ibid. 234 Wright, 339-340. 235 Larres, 208. 236 “Anglo-French military pact,” BBC News, 4 December 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/227598.stm (accessed 15 February 2013). 237 Cameron, An Introduction, 96. 238 Larres, 208. 239 “Franco-British St. Malo Declaration (4 December 1998),” cvce, 7 September 2012, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52- 936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html (accessed 15 February 2013).

37 scope of NATO.240 The St-Malo Declaration marked the de facto birth of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and signaled the end of British opposition to the incorporation of the

WEU into the EU.241 In its aftermath, EU leaders agreed to the Helsinki Headline Goals, which called for the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) that was meant to deploy some 60,000 soldiers within 60 days and be ready in 2001.242 The 2001 provided the legal basis for the ESDP as the civilian-military arm of the CFSP.243 In February 2003, Chirac and Blair met at Le Touquet to refine their defense cooperation.244 The two countries proposed that the EU assume responsibility for the NATO-led operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that EU countries set up an inter-governmental body to promote joint research and procurement.245

This body would become the European Defense Agency (EDA). In 2004, the EU demonstrated its nascent military capability when it took over command of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-

Herzegovina from NATO.246 The , which came into force in December 2009, rendered the WEU obsolete as it included a mutual protection clause.247 The treaty also extended the scope of the ESDP, now renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP); abolished the three pillar structure that had defined the EU since the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht; and allowed “willing and able” member states to deepen their military cooperation.248

240 “Anglo-French military Pact,” BBC News. 241 Larres, 208. 242 Taylor. 243 Biscop, 1302. 244 Taylor. 245 Ibid. 246 Ibid. 247 “Statement of the Presidency of the Permanent Council of the WEU on behalf of the High Contracting Parties to the Modified Brussels Treaty – Belgium, France, Germany, , Italy, Luxembourg, The , Portugal, and the United Kingdom,” WEU, 31 March 2010, http://www.weu.int/Declaration_E.pdf (accessed 15 February 2013). 248 Merlingen, 37-38.

38

In spite of these efforts, greater defense cooperation was hampered by the decision to limit defense and mechanisms to enhance European capabilities within NATO.249 250 European countries also deprioritized defense after the Cold War as they sought to benefit from a “peace dividend.” This delayed efforts to transform European from conscript armies defending the national territory from a Warsaw Pact attack to professional forces able to undertake complex operations overseas.251 Compounding these problems were divergences in national interests between the three leading European military powers: the United Kingdom,

France, and Germany.252 The most important sticking point was the transatlantic relationship, with Britain remaining decidedly atlanticist and France and Germany favoring pro-European policies.253 254 The dispute has its origins in different interpretations of the St-Malo Declaration.

For the British, the declaration was a means to bolster European defense capabilities “without

[the] unnecessary duplication” of NATO capabilities or responsibilities.255 Since 1998, Britain has blocked all attempts to make the EU responsible for European territorial defense or create an

EU headquarters for military operations.256 France, meanwhile, interpreted the St-Malo

Declaration as a step towards the creation of an autonomous European defense identity.257

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States, London favored the creation of a “Global NATO” capable of fighting , while the EU would be delegated “softer roles,” such as reconstruction and peacekeeping.258 Chirac, however, did not accept NATO’s transformation into a global police force and the limitations on possible EU hard

249 Biscop, 1300. 250 Taylor. 251 Biscop, 1300. 252 Taylor. 253 Ibid. 254 Wright, 338. 255 “Franco-British St. Malo Declaration.” 256 Cooper, 1198. 257 Cameron, An Introduction, 96. 258 Larres, 209.

39 power.259 Two years later, the would demonstrate the limits of Blair’s commitment to

Europe and the British commitment to the “special relationship” with the United States.260 The diplomatic exchanges in the lead up to the war in 2003 marked the most serious test of the transatlantic alliance in decades.261 As the US administration drummed up support for an invasion of Iraq in 2002 and 2003, two camps formed in Europe. While France, Germany, and the Benelux countries voiced their opposition to the US administration’s march for war, the

United Kingdom, Mediterranean countries, and Eastern Europeans joined Washington.262 The dispute turned particularly acrimonious after Paris announced it would veto any UN Security

Council resolution authorizing an invasion. Blair’s government is said to have held the French and Chirac with disdain after the announcement and to have encouraged anti-French sentiments in the British press.263

Chirac opted not to support the United States in part because Paris favored a multipolar world order and opposed plans to use military force to alter the international order.264 Drawing on the legacy of the Suez Crisis, Paris also felt it was best to influence the US from without.265

Blair, for his part, believed that the “special relationship” could enhance British standing in

Europe, keep the US interested in Europe, and enable Britain to shape US policy.266 267 While

Blair managed to maneuver Bush into seeking a multilateral approach to the Iraq crisis in the fall of 2002, his influence had its limits and Bush elected to go to war without a UN mandate or

259 Ibid. 260 Philip M. H. Bell, “The Narrowing Channel?” in Cross Channel Currents: 100 Years of the Entente Cordiale, ed. Richard Mayne, Douglass Johnson, and Robert Tombs (New York: Routledge, 2004), 250. 261 Larres, 203. 262 Ibid. 263 Crouzet, 318. 264 Larres, 205. 265 Fontaine, 200. 266 Newhouse, 189. 267 Crouzet, 317.

40

NATO support.268 In spite of this failure, Blair followed the US into Iraq in part because of the legacy of the Suez Crisis: the belief that the UK could remain influential only through close cooperation with the US.269 Bush, however, reportedly offered Blair an “escape clause” allowing him not to contribute British troops to the operation if domestic political reasons prevented him from doing so.270 Blair nevertheless chose to commit British soldiers to the fight.

As early as late 2003, the US and British governments sought to rebuild ties with France and Germany upon realizing they would need international support to rebuild Iraq and deal with the humanitarian crisis the war unleashed.271 The continental powers, meanwhile, realized they could not achieve European defense without the British. In April 2003, Belgium invited Germany,

France, and Luxembourg to a defense summit to establish an independent European force; this effort was widely derided.272 The meeting was seen as ludicrous because the United Kingdom had the most powerful military and military budget in the EU at the time.273 The Blair government, meanwhile, realized that it needed to emancipate itself from some of

Washington’s policies to retain its international standing and the support of the British public.274

In spite of close British relationship, Blair’s real influence on US policymaking proved limited, and Britain did not reap the expected economic and diplomatic benefits from supporting the US invasion.275

In September 2003, the three leading European military powers – Britain, France, and

Germany – met in Berlin for their first gathering since the start of the Iraq War. They agreed to the creation of an EU strategic document on defense, which later European Security Strategy,

268 Newhouse, 189. 269 Larres, 205. 270 Ibid., 207. 271 Ibid. 272 Ibid., 212. 273 Fontaine, 192. 274 Larres, 214. 275 Ibid.

41 which spells out European security concerns and strategies. The document was in part meant to demonstrate to the United States that it cared about the same issues as Washington, but would address them differently.276 In 2003, the EU made its first autonomous ESDP deployment:

Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The deployment influenced the creation of the “Battlegroups,” a Franco-British initiative meant to provide the EU with two battalions for rapid response deployments. One year after Artemis, the EU set up the European

Defense Agency (EDA) to promote joint capability development, procurement, research, and market integration.277 These projects, however, suffered from continued emphasis on questions of member state sovereignty and national priorities, as well as the promotion of national defense markets. With planning made at the national level, limited defense funds were spent on redundant capabilities.278

At the end of the 2000s, the British and French converged in a number of areas. The failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the poor postwar planning, and public opposition to the war weakened the post-Suez British consensus on the primacy of the “special relationship.”279 Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, who came to power in 2010, was keen to uphold strong UK-US ties without becoming subservient to the US. In an interview with a U.S. magazine in 2010, Cameron said “I think that we should deal with things as they are rather than trying to be too needy.”280 This left Britain open to look for defense cooperation elsewhere. In France, the strength of Gaullist ideology and opposition to the United States had run its course by the late 2000s and the election of to the Elysée Palace in 2007

276 Biscop, 1302. 277 Ibid. 278 Ibid., 1303. 279 Catherine Mayer, “Why Britain’s Affair with the U.S. Is Over,” Time, 29 March 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1976102,00.html (accessed 14 October 2012). 280 George Parker and Alex Barker, “Cameron admits ‘special relationship’ unequal,” Financial Times, 16 July 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2436b4a4-9107-11df-b297- 00144feab49a.html#axzz1gX8nKyeA (accessed 14 October 2012).

42 brought a staunch atlanticist to power.281 Sarkozy, who was keen to “break” with the legacies of past French presidents claimed that full French membership in NATO would help disarm the allies towards European defense plans.282 In March 2009, France announced its return to NATO’s integrated command, with Sarkozy claiming the move was in the “interest of France, of

Europe.”283 The UK welcomed France’s “participation in the NATO military structure which provide[d] an opportunity for reforming NATO and strengthening our alliance.”284 The limited progress made in European defense integration, meanwhile, led the French to reconsider their commitment to greater defense integration at the EU-level. With the European project stalled,

Britain and France could against bilateral defense cooperation.285

281 Sophie Pedder, “Atypically French: Sarkozy’s Bid to be a Different Kind of President,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62628/sophie-pedder/atypically-french-sarkozys- bid-to-be-a-different-kind-of-preside (accessed 14 October 2012). 282 Védrine, 5. 283 Toby Vogel, “France to re-join NATO core,” European Voice, 11 March 2009, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/03/france-to-re-join-nato-core/64252.aspx (accessed 14 October 2012). 284 “Country Profile: France,” Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 25 August 2010, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country- profile/europe/france?profile=intRelations (accessed 14 October 2012). 285 Harries, 16.

43

Part II: Research Hypothesis – International

The research hypothesis holds that international factors spurred France and the United Kingdom to deepen their military cooperation in 2010. It also claims that as long as these forces remain in place, London and Paris will continue to deepen their cooperation. The factors include (1) the global financial and eurozone crises, which spurred defense budget cuts; (2) common threats and geographical trouble spots; (3) convergence on the means required to meet these challenges; (4) US pressure for closer European defense cooperation; (5) changes in the international arms market that threaten the future of European defense firms; and (6) multinational (i.e. NATO) and supranational (i.e. EU) pressure to pool and share military assets.

Chapter One: Global Financial Crisis and Austerity

“So let me tell you what the UK-France Defense Treaty is about. It is about defending our national interest. It is about practical, hard-headed cooperation between sovereign countries. It is about sharing development and equipment costs, eliminating unnecessary duplication, coordinating logistics, and aligning our research programs. If we do all these things, then we can expand our sovereign capability even at a time when resources are tight.”286

Prime Minister David Cameron, November 2010

Defense budgets fell across Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union as states were left with no definite enemy, publics demanded a “peace dividend,” and the United States remained as security guarantor. The global financial crisis of the late 2000s and the ensuing European sovereign-debt crisis, however, spurred deeper budget cuts as governments looked to reduce their deficits by cutting defense spending. This essay’s research hypothesis holds that the poor

286 “UK-France Summit press conference,” GOV.UK, 2 November 2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-france-summit-press-conference--2 (accessed 1 April 2013).

44 economic conditions wrought by the financial crisis and eurozone debt crisis spurred France and the United Kingdom to cut their defense budgets. This drop in defense spending weakened or eliminated certain capabilities, prompting the two countries to consider deeper cross-channel cooperation.

Global Financial Crisis and European Sovereign-Debt Crisis

In 2008, a financial crisis with its roots in a US housing bubble, complex financial products, and inadequate regulations struck the integrated global economy.287 So-called “toxic” assets on the rolls of some of the world’s largest banking and investment institutions threatened to bring down the financial system, forcing national governments to fund expensive bailouts or nationalizations.288 289 290 291 At first, the crisis particularly affected the economies most deeply integrated into the trans-Atlantic financial market: the United States, United Kingdom, Ireland, and . The economies of continental European Union (EU) states, however, appeared comparatively shielded by their large public sectors and more conservative financial firms. This sense of security, however, proved illusory. The financial crisis translated into a drop in demand worldwide, triggering an EU-wide recession in 2009 and bursting housing bubbles in Spain and elsewhere.292 The financial crisis also lifted the veil on a balance of payment and debt crisis on the fringes of the eurozone project. In the early 2000s, the creation of the common currency

287 U.S. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 12. 288 “Bailout Recipients,” Pro Publica, 21 February 2013, http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list (accessed 23 February 2013). 289 House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, The Nationalization of Northern Rock, HC 394, 2008- 09 sess. (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2009), 3. 290 “Government Decision to Safeguard Irish Banking System,” Houses of the Oireachtas, 30 September 2008, http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/committees30thdail/pac/reports/DocumentsReGruarantee/docum ent1.pdf (accessed 23 February 2013). 291 “Address to the Nation by H.E. Geir H. Haarde, Prime Minister of Iceland,” Prime Minister’s Office, 6 October 2008, http://eng.forsaetisraduneyti.is/news-and-articles/nr/3035 (accessed 23 February 2013). 292 Justin Yifu Lin and Volker Treichel, “The Crisis in the Zone: Did the Euro contribute to the Evolution of the Crisis?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 6127 (2012): 3.

45 spurred a convergence in interest rates that enabled peripheral economies to borrow more cheaply.293 These loans fueled public- and private-sector debts, including real estate bubbles, in

“non-core” economies on the periphery of the eurozone.294 This tightened of credit markets in the aftermath of the economic crisis, however, raised borrowing costs for these economies at a time of declining revenues and rising public debts. Investors, meanwhile, began to fear possible sovereign debt crises in peripheral EU economies, raising bond yields. A change of government in Greece in 2009 revealed that successive Greek administrations hid the country’s true deficit; a revelation that led to an unsustainable climb in bond yields. In Ireland and Spain, the cost of bailing out banking sectors crippled by housing bubbles, coupled with declining tax revenues, threatened state finances.295 296 Portuguese finances, meanwhile, suffered from a collapse in the country’s competitiveness, which reduced tax revenues and left the Portugal with unsustainable debt levels.297 Beginning in May 2010, EU leaders started to bail out the Greek government in an effort to prevent a debt default that could spark a chain reaction across the eurozone, threatening the future of the single currency and the EU. Other bailouts and financial assistance packages followed for Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.298 299 300 EU leaders, however, failed to take decisive action, favoring half-measures they believed would be acceptable to electorates

293 Jacob Goldstein, “The Crisis in Europe, Explained,” NPR, 4 June 2012, http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2012/06/04/154282337/the-crisis-in-europe-explained (accessed 29 April 2013). 294 Lin and Treichel, 7. 295 Ibid., 17-18. 296 Ibid., 22. 297 Ibid., 24. 298 “Irish Republic 85bn euro bail-out agreed,” BBC News, 29 April 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11855990 (accessed 29 April 2013). 299 James G. Neuger and Anabela Reis, “Portugal’s $111 Billion Bailout Approved as EU Prods Greece to Sell Assets,” Bloomberg, 17 May 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-16/portugal-bailout- approved-as-eu-prods-greece-to-sell-assets.html (accessed 29 April 2013). 300 Mark Thompson, “Spanish bank bailout gets go-ahead,” CNN, 28 November 2012, http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/28/news/economy/spain-banks-bailout/index.html (accessed 29 April 2013).

46 reluctant to bail out allegedly profligate southern economies.301 “Core” EU economies, such as

Germany and France, were also keenly aware that many of their banks held significant “non- core” debt and would be at risk in any large debt haircut.302 This dithering, however, only exacerbated the crisis, with the risk of contagion to Italy leading to hikes in bond yields and the collapse of Silvio Berlusconi’s government in 2011.303 Northern European economies, which had comparatively better finances, demanded that the troubled states institute severe austerity measures in exchange for financial assistance.304 Unable to manipulate their currencies or trade policies, the peripheral economies were forced to accept these austerity demands and they attempted to boost their competitiveness by restructuring their labor markets to the detriment of living standards. By 2012, EU leaders agreed to write down Greek debt, bind their banking sectors, and facilitate European Central Bank assistance to troubled governments.305 306 307 These measures led some to hope the crisis would ease, although a troubled bailout of Cyprus and political instability in Italy raised the specter of further instability in 2013.308 309 Meanwhile, the

301 Vivien A. Schmidt, “Saving the Euro Will Mean Worse Trouble for Europe,” Foreign Affairs, 28 November 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136694/vivien-a-schmidt/saving-the-euro-will- mean-worse-trouble-for-europe (accessed 29 April 2013). 302 Lin and Treichel, 5. 303 Graeme Wearden and Alex Hawkes, “Eurozone debt crisis: Berlusconi to resign after austerity budget passed,” The Guardian, 8 November 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/blog/2011/nov/08/berlusconi-debt-greece (accessed 29 April 2013). 304 Holly Ellyatt, “Italy’s New Leader Throws Down Gauntlet on Austerity,” CNBC, 25 April 2013, http://www.cnbc.com/id/100671368 (accessed 29 April 2013). 305 Brian Blackstone and Marcus Walker, “How ECB Chief Outflanked German Foe in Fight for Euro,” Wall Street Journal, 2 October 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443507204578020323544183926.html (accessed 29 April 2013). 306 Jan Strupczewski and Annika Breidthardt, “Euro zone, IMF reach deal on long-term Greek debt,” Reuters, 26 November 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/26/us-eurogroup-greece- idUSBRE8AP05820121126 (accessed 29 April 2013). 307 “Eurozone banking supervision deal boosts EU summit,” BBC News, 13 December 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20718311 (accessed 29 April 2013). 308 Graeme Wearden, “Eurozone crisis: deadlock in Italy as Grillo rejects center-left,” The Guardian, 27 February 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/feb/27/eurozone-crisis-italy-elections-bond- auction (accessed 29 April 2013). 309 “The Cyprus bailout: Unfair, short-sighted and self-defeating,” The Economist, 16 March 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/03/cyprus-bail-out (accessed 29 April 2013).

47 fall in consumer spending in southern and some eastern European economies began to slow or negate economic growth in northern European countries.310

The economic crisis exacerbated tensions between the northern and southern European economies, threatened to damage the Franco-German “motor” at the heart of European integration, and hardened the divide between the eurozone economies and those EU states outside the currency zone. Austerity measures, meanwhile, led to deeply unpopular cuts in social services. These measures threatened the hard-earned political stability of European countries and helped fuel the rise of unemployment, youth emigration, “brain drain,” euroscepticism, and political extremism. Although they were not part of the “non-core” economies most affected by the crisis, France and the United Kingdom suffered economic losses and both instituted austerity measures that affected defense budgets.

After recording gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 3.4 percent in 2000, the French economy witnessed sluggish growth through the decade, culminating in a 2008 GDP of over

US$2.8 trillion.311 The economic crisis, however, brought GDP down by 0.1 percent in 2008 and

3.1 percent the following year.312 Although growth resumed in 2010, with 1.7 percent recorded in both 2010 and 2011, the slowing European economy left the French economy at a standstill in

2012.313 314 The financial crisis placed significant pressure on the French state’s budget, as

310 Jack Ewing, “Southern Europe’s Recession Threatens to Spread North,” New York Times, 25 April 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/business/southern-europes-recession-threatens-to-spread- north.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 30 April 2013). 311 World Development Indicators, The World Bank. 312 Ibid. 313 Ibid. 314 “La France en panne de croissance en 2012,” Le Point, 14 February 2013, http://www.lepoint.fr/economie/croissance-la-france-attend-les-chiffres-de-la-fin-2012-14-02-2013- 1627190_28.php (accessed 29 April 2013).

48 revenues declined, welfare payments increased, and the state instituted stimulus spending.315

316 In 2008, France’s public deficit stood at 3.3 percent of GDP, while its public debt to GDP ratio reached 67.5 percent.317 In the aftermath of the crisis, however, the public deficit grew to 7.5 percent of GDP in 2009, before falling to 7.1 in 2010, 5.3 in 2011, and 4.8 in 2012.318 The ratio of public debt to GDP, meanwhile, grew to 79.2 percent of GDP in 2009 and to 90.2 by 2012.319

Fresh from their experiences in the peripheral eurozone economies, some investors began to see France as the next domino to fall.320 Concerns about rising bond yields and a credit rating downgrade prompted center-right President Nicolas Sarkozy to announce the end of stimulus policy in 2010 and a series of budget cuts the following year.321 322 Two months after Sarkozy’s center-left successor, François Hollande, came into office in May 2012, the French national auditing body, the Cour des comptes, warned that France’s budget deficit was twice the level necessary to stabilize the national debt.323 The agency claimed Hollande’s government would need to find between six billion and €10 billion in spending cuts or additional revenue by

315 Katrin Bennhold, “France Introduces a $33 Billion Economic Stimulus Plan,” New York Times, 4 December 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/05/world/europe/05stimulus.html?_r=0 (accessed 29 April 2013). 316 Cécile Crouzel, “Les dépenses publiques se sont envolées en 2009,” Le Figaro, 17 May 2010, http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2010/05/16/04016-20100516ARTFIG00198-les-depenses-publiques- se-sont-envolees-en-2009.php (accessed 29 April 2013). 317 “En 2009, le déficit atteint 7,5 % du PIB, la dette notifiée 77,6 % du PIB,” Insee, 31 March 2010, http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=37&date=20100331 (accessed 29 April 2013). 318 “En 2012, le déficit public notifié s’élève à 4,8 % du PIB, la dette notifiée à 90,2 % du PIB,” Insee, 29 March 2013, http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/info-rapide.asp?id=37 (accessed 29 April 2013). 319 Ibid. 320 Philip Inman, “Eurozone crisis threatens to spread to France as Paris is warned over its debts,” The Guardian, 30 April 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/nov/10/eurozone-crisis-threat-to- france (accessed 30 April 2013). 321 Mark Deen and Helene Fouquet, “Sarkozy Proposes Biggest French Deficit Cut in Two Decades,” Bloomberg, 28 November 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-28/sarkozy-readies-france-s- biggest-budget-deficit-reduction-in-two-decades.html (accessed 29 April 2013). 322 Mark Deen and Helene Fouquet, “Sarkozy Sees More Budget Cuts to Save France’s AAA Rating as Growth Slows,” Bloomberg, 27 October 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-27/sarkozy- sees-more-budget-cuts-to-save-france-s-aaa-rating-as-growth-slows.html (accessed 29 April 2013). 323 Court des comptes, La situation et les perspectives des finances publiques (Paris: Cour des comptes, 2012), 15.

49 the end of 2012 and an additional €33 billion the following year.324 In September 2012,

Hollande’s government unveiled its 2013 blueprint, with €20 billion in tax increases and plans to reduce spending by €10 billion.325 The slowing French and European economies, however, prompted Hollande in February 2013 to postpone his drive to lower the budget deficit until

2014.326 Poor economic prospects prompted both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the French government in April 2013 to slash growth forecasts for 2013 and 2014, a warning of the bleak years ahead for the French economy and state budget.327

With its economy strongly enmeshed in the international financial system, the United

Kingdom was particularly affected by the financial crisis. From 1993 to 2007, the British economy experienced annual GDP growth greater than two percent, culminating in a 2007 GDP of nearly US$2.83 trillion.328 With the economic crisis in 2008, however, GDP fell by one percent that year and four percent in 2009.329 Although economic growth resumed in the following years, it was largely anemic, with 1.8 percent GDP growth in 2010, 0.8 in 2011, and 0.2 in

2012.330 331 Falling tax revenues, rising dole payments, and the cost of a bank rescue package all contributed to a significant rise in British deficit spending. While in fiscal year 2007-08 the general government deficit stood at £40.5 billion or 2.8 percent of GDP, it climbed to £100.1

324 Ibid., 120. 325 Mark Deen and Helene Fouquet, “Hollande Raises Tax on Rich, Companies to Cut French Debt,” Bloomberg, 28 September 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-27/hollande-readies-tax- raising-budget-in-bid-to-cut-french-deficit.html (accessed 29 April 2013). 326 Geert De Clercq, “France to pause austerity, cut spending next year instead: Hollande,” Reuters, 23 February 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/23/us-france-budget-idUSBRE91M07T20130223 (accessed 29 April 2013). 327 “France follows IMF and slashes growth forecasts,” Associated Press, 17 April 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/france-follows-imf-slashes-growth-forecasts-105957097--finance.html (accessed 30 April 2013). 328 World Development Indicators, The World Bank. 329 Ibid. 330 Ibid. 331 “GDP: UK economy grew more than thought in 2012,” BBC News, 27 February 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21598509 (accessed 29 April 2013).

50 billion or 7.0 percent in 2008-09 and £163.0 billion or 11.5 percent in 2009-10.332 That fiscal year, general government debt to GDP ratio reached 74.1 percent from the 2007-08 figure of

43.4 percent.333 The rising British deficit was at the heart of the Conservative Party’s platform for the 2010 general elections, with the party claiming the deficit threatened Britain’s interest rate and credit rating. Its manifesto reads, “Urgent action is needed if we are to avoid the higher borrowing costs that would inevitably follow from a credit rating downgrade. So we will cut wasteful to bring the deficit down and restore stability.”334 Upon coming to power in a coalition government with the centrist Liberal Democrats (LibDem), Conservative

Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne unveiled a series of tax increases and budget cuts.335 These measures helped reduce the government deficit to £141.7 billion or 9.6 percent of GDP in 2010-11 and £117.5 billion or 7.7 percent in 2011-12.336 The country, however, continued to experience weak or negative growth per quarter, prompting ratings agencies to downgrade Britain’s credit and both the IMF and British government to cut their growth forecasts for the UK.337 338 339

332 Office for National Statistics, Government Deficit and Debt Under the Maastricht Treaty, September 2012, 2. 333 Ibid. 334 Conservative Party, Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 2010 (Uckfield, East Sussex: Pureprint Group, 2010), 7. 335 “FACTBOX – British austerity measures,” Reuters, 15 October 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/15/britain-government-reform-spending- idUSLDE69D1S820101015 (accessed 29 April 2013). 336 Office for National Statistics. 337 “Fitch downgrades UK credit rating to AA+,” BBC News, 29 April 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22219382 (accessed 29 April 2013). 338 “IMF lowers UK growth forecast for 2013 again,” BBC News, 16 April 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22164028 (accessed 30 April 2013). 339 Jill Treanor, “Budget 2013: Osborne downgrades UK growth forecasts,” The Guardian, 20 March 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/mar/20/budget-2013-uk-economic-growth-downgraded (accessed 30 April 2013)

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Impact of Austerity on Defense Spending

Faced with budgetary deficits and calls for fiscal austerity, a number of European governments elected to freeze or reduce defense spending. These decisions were in large part motivated by the belief that at a time of relative peace on the European continent, cuts in military spending would generate less public opposition than cuts to popular entitlement programs. According to

Top 10 Biggest Military Spenders in 2012 Rank Country Spending Change Change Spending as Spending as (US$ (%) in (%) Share of GDP Share of GDP billions) 2011-12 2003-12 (%) - 2003 (%) - 2012 1 USA 682 -6 32 4.4 3.7 2 China 166* 7.8 175 2.0* 2.1* 3 Russia 90.7* 16 113 4.4* 4.3* 4 UK 60.8 -0.8 4.9 2.5 2.5 5 Japan 59.3 -0.6 -3.6 1 1 6 France 58.9 -0.3 -3.3 2.3 2.6 7 56.7 12 111 8.9 8.7 8 India 46.1 -0.8 65 2.5 2.8 9 Germany 45.8* 0.9 -1.5 1.4* 1.4 10 Italy 34* -5.2 -19 1.7 2 [*] = SIPRI estimate Source: Sam Perlo-Freeman, Elisabeth Sköns, Carina Solmirano, and Helen Wilandh, “SIPRI Fact Sheet: Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2012,” 15 April 2013, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1304.pdf (accessed 29 April 2013).

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 20 out of the 37 countries in

Western and Central Europe decreased their military spending by more than 10 percent in real terms between 2008 and 2012.340 During that period, Britain cut spending by 5.2 percent and

340 Sam Perlo-Freeman and others, “SIPRI Fact Sheet: Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2012,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 15 April 2013, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1304.pdf (accessed 29 April 2013).

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France by 3.8 percent.341 As the crisis continued, cuts to military spending intensified across the continent, particularly in countries implementing the strictest austerity measures. Italy cut military spending by 10 percent for 2012, or 0.84 percent of GDP, while Spain planned to spend

0.65 percent of GDP or €6.3 billion on defense in 2012.342 One exception to this rule was Greece, which managed to spend €4.6 billion in 2011 and slightly increase its military budget in 2012.343

344 The only EU member state that did not fall into recession during the financial crisis, , was also one of the few countries to maintain or increase defense spending. In 2011, it announced plans to spend 1.95 percent of GDP on defense or €6.7 billion in 2012.345

The United States also did not prove immune to the new financial reality, with US military spending falling by six percent in real terms in 2012.346 These cuts were due to the end of US combat operations in Iraq and the winding down of US activity in , coupled with budget cuts unveiled the previous year.347 In August 2011, the administration of US

President reached an agreement with the US Congress to cut defense spending by US$350 billion over 10 years, according to estimates made at the time.348 That amount, however, was subject to changes depending on the size of various annual budgets.349 It is important to note, however, that these cuts were unlikely to displace the United States as the

341 Ibid. 342 Védrine, 19. 343 Georgios Christidis, “Solving the Euro Crisis: How Greece Could Save on Defense Spending,” Spiegel Online International, 26 July 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-greek-military- budget-offers-plenty-of-room-for-cuts-a-846607.html (accessed 29 April 2013). 344 Perlo-Freeman and others. 345 Ibid. 346 Perlo-Freeman and others. 347 Ibid. 348 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “White House seeks more Pentagon budget cuts,” Reuters, 28 September 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/29/pentagon-budget-idUSS1E78R1I120110929 (accessed 29 April 2013). 349 Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Panetta to Offer Strategy for Cutting Military Budget,” New York Times, 2 January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/03/us/pentagon-to-present-vision-of- reduced-military.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 29 April 2013).

53 world’s top military spender. In 2012, the US represented 39 percent of global spending on defense. Its nearest rival, China, represented 9.5 percent, while Russia came third with 5.2 percent.350 US defense spending in 2012 was also 69 percent higher than in 2001.351 More significant for the future of US military spending is the financial impact of the “sequester” and the associated political uncertainty. The Budget Control Act of 2011 included a mechanism that would automatically trigger across-the-board cuts or “sequestrations” should Congress fail to agree to significant spending cuts. The measures called for US$454 billion in cuts to discretionary spending from 2013 to 2021 according to a September 2011 Congressional Budget

Office estimate.352 “Sequestration” duly came into effect in March 2013 after last-minute negotiations failed to secure the necessary austerity, with US$85 billion in spending cuts for

2013 split evenly between military and domestic programs.353 However, the Department of

Defense obtained some flexibility in allocating these cuts after Obama signed a continuing resolution later that month.354 These “sequestration,” coupled with the uncertainty surrounding the political struggle over the budgets, already limited US deployments in early 2013 and raised the specter of furloughs for Pentagon civilian employees.355

350 Perlo-Freeman and others. 351 Ibid. 352 “Estimated Impact of Automatic Budget Enforcement Procedures Specified in the Budget Control Act,” Congressional Budget Office, 12 September 2011, http://www.cbo.gov/publication/42754 (accessed 30 April 2013). 353 David Uberti and Tracy Jan, “Sequester goes into effect as both sides trade blame,” Boston Globe, 2 March 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/03/02/sequester-goes-into-effect- president-obama-and-republicans-trade-blame/sBaw2si3zxTBz6vOnEMjkK/story.html (accessed 30 April 2013). 354 Jim Snyder and James Rowley, “Budget Deal Opens ‘Age of Austerity’ for Federal Agencies,” Bloomberg, 23 March 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-22/congress-quick-fix-budget- only-dulls-pain-of-85-billion-in-cuts.html (accessed 30 April 2013). 355 “Defence cuts: The enemy within,” The Economist, 23 February 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21572190-ships-lie-uselessly-anchor-and-lay-offs-loom- deep-congress-imposed-spending-cuts-look (accessed 30 April 2013).

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These European and US budget cuts came as the global balance of defense spending changed, with emerging and developing countries representing an increasingly important share of global military expenditures. According to SIPRI, while defense spending fell across North

America, Western and Central Europe, and Australia in 2012, it increased in Russia, Asia, and the

Middle East.356 Although US defense spending remained dominant, it fell below the 40 percent of global defense spending mark for the first time since the end of the Cold War.357 China increased its military budget by 7.8 percent in real terms to US$166 billion in 2012 or 9.5 percent of global defense spending.358 From 2003 to 2012, Beijing increased its military spending some 175 percent in real terms, the largest increase in defense outlays in the world for that period.359 This flurry of spending contributed to the acquisition of new capabilities, such as stealth fighters and aircraft carriers.360 361 In 2012, Russian military spending rose by 16 percent in real terms to 4.4 percent of GDP or 5.2 percent of global defense spending.362 This was part of

Russia’s ambitious “State Armaments Program 2020,” which aims to modernize 70 percent of

Russian military equipment by 2020 by spending nearly 20 trillion rubles on defense.363 Other emerging or developing countries with significant increases in military spending in the 2003-12 period included Algeria (189 percent), Vietnam (130 percent), and Indonesia (73 percent).364

356 Perlo-Freeman and others. 357 Ibid. 358 Ibid. 359 Ibid. 360 Associated Press, “Second Chinese stealth fighter makes test flight,” The Guardian, 1 November 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/01/second-chinese-stealth-fighter-test (accessed 30 April 2013). 361 Reuters, “China builds second aircraft carrier,” The Guardian, 24 April 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/24/china-builds-second-aircraft-carrier (accessed 30 April 2013). 362 Perlo-Freeman and others. 363 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia Will Spend 20 Trillion Rubles on New Weapons,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 7, no. 141 (2010). 364 Perlo-Freeman and others.

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While Western budget cuts and rising defense spending in emerging and developing countries may not pose an immediate threat to European security, they threaten to change the global balance of power, increase the relative weight of emerging countries in international affairs, and narrow the technological gap between the West and the rest.365 Cuts in defense spending have both short-term and long-term ramifications. In the short-term, falling defense spending leads to cuts in personnel, equipment maintenance, and readiness. Equipment may be mothballed and their operators sacked or furloughed. Officials may also opt to reduce training time, although this lowers soldiers’ capabilities and morale. In the medium-term, budget cuts may limit procurement and force the military to continue using outdated equipment. In the long-term, cuts in research and development may damage a country’s domestic defense industry, forcing it to rely on foreign suppliers.

United Kingdom: Defense Cuts

Postwar British defense spending declined first with the end of empire and second with the end of the Cold War. In 1955, Britain spent some seven percent of its GDP on defense.366 This figure fell to about five percent of GDP in 1985 and to an estimated 2.2 percent of GDP in early

2013.367 The cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, coupled with large expenditures on procurement programs, strained the British exchequer in the late 2000s. In 2009, British defense spending reached a post-Cold War height of US$64.3 billion at constant 2011 US dollars.368 It was this troubled state of affairs that the government of British Prime Minister David Cameron

365 Assemblée Nationale, N°254: Avis Présenté Au Nom De La Commission Des Affaires Étrangères Sur Le Projet de loi de finances pour 2013 (n° 235), Tome IV: Défense par M. Guy Teissier, Député, 11. 366 House of Commons Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition: Vol. 1, HC 9, 2012-13 sess. (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2013), 8. 367 Ibid. 368 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012, http://milexdata.sipri.org.

56 and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg inherited in May 2010.369 This disparity led the Ministry of

Defense (MOD) to postpone projects and cut down on equipment numbers, leading to significant delays and contractual penalties.370 Determined to tackle a budget deficit it claimed was a threat to national security, the center-right coalition government launched an aggressive review of defense spending.371 The 2010 Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR), the government’s white paper on defense, claimed it provided “relative protection” to national security and shielded active operations in Afghanistan from cuts.372 However, it also claimed that “restoring a strong economy is critical to sustaining the effectiveness of our national security institutions. It is therefore right that those institutions contribute to tackling the deficit.”373 The government sought a 7.5 percent cut in overall defense spending over a ten-year period from 2010 to 2020, compared to the average 19 percent in other ministries.374

To meet these targets, the SDSR announced cuts to the MOD’s personnel rolls. The SDSR states the is to lose 17,000 service personnel by 2015.375 The is to lose 7,000 personnel and fall to 95,000 by 2015, the Royal Navy 5,000 and fall to 30,000, and the (RAF) 5,000 and fall to 33,000.376 By 2020, the army is to have 94,000 personnel, the navy 29,000, and the RAF 31,500.377 These changes were revised in 2011, when it

369 The MOD raised its early estimate of £38 billion in 2013 to an estimated £74 billion. - National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Equipment Plan 2012 to 2022, HC 886, 2012-13 sess. (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2013), 8. 370 Ibid., 8. 371 HM Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Cm 7953 (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010), 4. 372 HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948 (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010), 9 and 15. 373 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 9. 374 House of Commons Defence Committee, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1639, 2010-12 sess. (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2011), 14. 375 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 32. 376 Ibid. 377 Ibid.

57 was announced the army would fall to 82,000 personnel by 2020.378 The Territorial Army,

Britain’s reserves, would increase to about 30,000.379 In addition to personnel cuts, the SDSR called for far-reaching cuts in equipment and procurement, in some cases removing entire capabilities from the British armed forces. The government admitted that some of these cuts would lead to “temporarily risks and vulnerabilities, particularly where we are withdrawing one capability in advance of its successor’s entry into service.”380 Among the capabilities lost were

Britain’s aircraft carriers, Harrier jump jets, and maritime patrol aircraft. The cuts also forced the government to reduce the capability goals for the British armed forces. In its response to the

House of Commons Defense Committee’s 2012 report on the 2011 Libyan conflict, the government said, “The Committee is right to recognize that our Armed Forces are only able to do so many things at the same time. We do not expect that after 2015 our Armed Forces will be operating routinely at the level of intensity they have sustained in recent years.”381

If the planned one percent increases in real term to the defense budget from 2015-16 to

2020-21 are not made, there is a real concern that the UK will not meet its “Future Force 2020” plan and that capabilities will degrade further.382 According to the House of Commons Defense

Committee, such a failure would “represent a fall below ‘critical mass’ and a reduction in the influence [of the United Kingdom in world affairs] that the NSS [National Security Strategy] and

SDSR set out as desirable.”383 In its December 2012 Autumnal Statement, however, the government announced it would cut all departmental budgets by one percent in 2013-14 and

378 Louisa Brooke-Holland, “Armed Forces Redundancies,” House of Commons Library, 31 January 2013, http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05951 (accessed 12 May 2013). 379 Ibid. 380 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 34. 381 House of Commons Defence Committee, Operations in Libya: Vol. 1, HC 950, 2010-12 sess. (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2012), 12. 382 House of Commons Defence Committee, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy: Vol. 1, HC 761, 2010-12 sess. (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2011), 9. 383 Ibid.

58 two percent in 2014-15 because of the poor economic climate.384 A report by the Royal United

Services Institute (RUSI) think tank estimated that the MOD would have to reduce its 2015-16 budget by £1.1 billion from previous spending plans.385 The additional budget cuts sparked criticism from Tory backbenchers and led Cameron to suggest that the foreign aid budget, which was spared earlier cuts, could be used to support the defense budget.386 Secretary of State for

Defense Philip Hammond, a possible rival for the Tory leadership, announced he would resist additional cuts to defense, claiming these threatened the planned real-term increase in defense procurement spending deemed essential to reach the capability goals outlined in the SDSR.387

United Kingdom: Procurement Prospects

Military procurement spending is one of the most farsighted budgetary decisions made by modern governments. It can take decades for weapon systems dreamed up in research and development to take shape on the battlefield. Many of the weapon systems currently entering service in France and the United Kingdom were first imagined in the last years of the Cold War.

For example, the and the Eurofighter Typhoon can trace their roots to planning decisions made in the 1980s.388 Procurement is a growing part of Western defense budgets as their militaries favor ever smaller professional armies with increasingly sophisticated equipment. In choosing to equip their forces with the most advanced weapons, however, states

384 “Autumn Statement 2012 policy decisions table,” HM Treasury, 5 December 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/autumn-statement-2012-policy-decisions-table/autumn- statement-2012-policy-decisions-table (accessed 30 April 2013). 385 Malcolm Chalmers, “Mid-Term Blues? Defence and the 2013 Spending Review,” Royal United Services Institute – Briefing Paper (2013): 1. 386 “Aid money could go to defence – David Cameron,” BBC News, 21 February 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21528464 (accessed 30 April 2013). 387 Nick Hopkins, Patrick Wintour, and Martin Williams, “Defence secretary: I will resist further cuts,” The Guardian, 1 March 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/mar/02/defence-secretary-resist-cuts (accessed 30 April 2013). 388 Paul Lewis, “3 European Countries Plan Jet Fighter Project,” New York Times, 3 August 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/03/business/3-european-countries-plan-jet-fighter-project.html (accessed 7 March 2013).

59 are constrained by the ever-rising costs for new technology. The price of fighter jets, for example, tends to increase tenfold every generation.389 Defense projects are also frequently marked by cost overruns. A 2009 report found that British defense projects overran on average by 80 percent, or five years, and cost more than 40 percent or £300 million more than expected.390 This leaves states purchasing fewer advanced weapons systems operated by fewer soldiers. Per-soldier spending in 37 European countries has increased from above €73,000 to more than €91,000 between 2001 and 2009 at a time when defense spending fell from €251 billion to €218 billion.391 These factors make procurement spending plans an important indicator of future defense spending and future capabilities.

In May 2012, Defense Secretary Hammond announced that the defense budget was brought into balance, with the British government planning to spend about £160 billion on procurement and supporting new systems over a 10-year period from April 2012 to March

2022.392 Some £152 billion would be spent on core equipment programs already committed to, while £8 billion would remain unallocated.393 An additional £4 billion would be a separate contingency reserve.394 The expenditure was based on agreement from the Treasury that the equipment and support budget would rise in line with inflation from 2012-13 to 2014-15.395 In

389 Cour des comptes, Le bilan à mi-parcours de la loi de programmation militaire: Rapport public thématique (Paris: Cour des comptes, 2012), 16. 390 Bernard Gray, “Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of State for Defence: An independent report by Bernard Gray,” October 2009, http://www.metasums.co.uk/uploads/asset_file/ReviewAcquisitionGrayreport.pdf (accessed 24 February 2013). 391 Stephen J. Flanagan and others, A Diminishing Transatlantic Partnership? The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defense and Foreign Assistance Capabilities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2011), viii. 392 Ministry of Defence, The Defence Equipment Plan 2012 (London: Ministry of Defence UK, 2013), 5. 393 Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition, 10. 394 Ibid. 395 Ministry of Defence, Equipment Plan, 5.

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2014-2015, however, procurement is meant to rise by one percent in real terms.396 As the British

National Audit Office (NAO) warns in its January 2013 evaluation of the plane, “the overall affordability of the equipment plan is highly sensitive to changes in the assumptions about funding, which could be affected by changes to economic or political priorities.”397 Furthermore, the NAO concluded that the MOD’s pricing of risk and uncertainty was marked by “systemic over-optimism.”398 Until 2017-18, the MOD equipment plan is nearly entirely allocated, meaning that a contingency requiring new spending would eat into support for existing equipment or lead to delays in procurement.399 It also means that any budget cuts, like those unveiled in

December 2012, will likely consume the limited contingency funds, threaten procurement projects, and thus impact Britain’s future military capabilities.

France: Defense Cuts

The French military budget has also come under pressure in recent years. Although written before the full onslaught of the financial crisis, the 2008 French white paper on defense was released after years of defense overspending and it calls for spending cuts. From 1997 to 2002, the difference between allocated defense spending and actual expenditures totaled €13 billion.400 This discrepancy was often offset by raiding the procurement budget, leading to canceled programs, reduced orders, and postponed deliveries.401 It also forced officials to spend less on maintaining existing equipment, infrastructure, and munitions procurement. In the 2003-

396 Ibid. 397 National Audit Office, 20. 398 Ibid., 17. 399 Ibid., 23-24. 400 Défense et Sécurité Nationale: Le Livre Blanc (Paris: Odile Jacob/La Documentation française, 2008), 286. 401 Ibid.

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08 period, meanwhile, the budgetary discrepancy was reduced to one billion euro in part due to the decision to partially fund overseas operations through supplementary budgets.402

A product of the nascent Sarkozy administration, the 2008 white paper calls for defense spending, except for pensions, to remain in line with inflation from 2009 to 2011.403 Beginning in

2012 however, the white paper calls for the defense budget to increase in real term by one percent per annum.404 From 2009 to 2020, the white paper expects France to spend some

€376.6 billion on defense.405 The 2009-14 defense spending law, meanwhile, allocated some

€180 billion for 2009-14.406 This meant the French defense budget was to be immune from a government-wide plan to peg spending without accounting for inflation. To meet the cost of weapon procurement and other investments within this comparatively constrained budget, the

2008 white paper calls for cost savings measures, including personnel cuts, base closings, real estate and radio frequency sales, a recalibration of overseas deployments, and equipment cuts.407 Other cost-saving measures would include a reduction in the French military’s personnel from about 271,000 in 2008 to some 225,000 in 2014-15.408 The army would have 131,000 personnel, the navy 44,000, and the air force 50,000. The 2008 white paper also calls for 7,500 job cuts in the MOD civilian and military staffs.409 In July 2012, the Cour des comptes reported that these cuts were on track, with 22,801 jobs cut in the 2009-11 period.410 The government aimed to use these savings to boost procurement spending. In the 1997-2002 period, the

402 Ibid. 403 Ibid., 290. 404 Ibid. 405 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 16. 406 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 25. 407 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 46. 408 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 228. 409 Ibid., 291. 410 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 32.

62 government allocated some €13.8 billion for procurement, while for the 2003-2008 it allocated some €15.5 billion. The government hoped to spend €18 billion on procurement for 2009-12.411

In spite of the financial crisis, the French government maintained defense budgets in line with inflation from 2009 to 2011.412 This meant the French MOD matched its spending program by 98 percent.413 The MOD’s procurement fund even benefited from the 2008 fiscal stimulus plan, with 28-defense-related projects manufactured in France receiving additional orders.414 As previously discussed, however, the French government felt obliged in 2011 to institute spending cuts over fears that the country could face rising borrowing costs. In spite of pledges made in the 2008 white paper, defense spending was not immune as the MOD strayed

€0.7 billion from the programming laws.415 The government, meanwhile, broke with plans to increase defense spending in 2012 by one percent, instead announcing the budget would remain in line with inflation.416 Thus, the defense budget for 2012 was to be €30.35 billion compared to €30.01 billion in 2011, less than the €32.14 billion that was expected.417 An estimate carried out in 2012 found that if the budget was kept in line with inflation for the 2013-

2020 period, France would spend some €361.6 billion (2008) on defense, €15 billion (2008) short of the figure sought in the 2008 white paper.418 Should poor economic conditions prompt the

French government to shift to a “zero value” formula for defense spending, the difference would rise to €30 billion (2008). This difference could harm the goals set out in the 2008 white paper and lead to further cuts in procurement, research and technology, or personnel. During budgetary arbitration in late 2011, officials broke further with the 2008 white paper plan. They

411 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 291. 412 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 19. 413 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 25. 414 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 57. 415 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 26. 416 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 57. 417 Ibid., 35. 418 Ibid., 20.

63 limited defense spending for 2011-13 to €91.70 billion.419 During the vote on financing defense in 2012, meanwhile, officials announced an additional €280 million in cuts.420 These cuts broke the pledge to maintain defense spending in line with inflation and further threatened the 2008 white paper goals. The government, however, promised to return to “zero volume” in 2013; a claim the Cour des comptes questioned in its analysis.421

In early 2013, Hollande announced that the defense budget would not be immune from efforts to reduce the deficit, although he vowed to protect the nuclear deterrent from any cuts.422 In the months that followed, the French MOD and the Ministry of Finance clashed over the size of the cuts as officials prepared the 2013 white paper on defense and the 2014-19 defense spending law. In 2012, the French military budget stood at €31.4 billion, or 1.56 percent of GDP, with this figure including the income from the sale of certain state assets.423 The percentage rises to 1.76 percent of GDP in NATO’s calculations as these include spending on pensions. 424 The Ministry of Finance called for cuts that would reduce the budget to €28 billion, while the MOD called for spending to remain about constant.425 Ultimately, the French president elected to maintain €31.4 billion figure into 2014.426 In 2014 and 2015 spending, meanwhile, is

419 Ibid., 43. 420 Ibid. 421 Ibid., 45. 422 Jamey Keaten, “France affirms nuclear arms despite military cuts,” Associated Press, 9 January 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/france-affirms-nuclear-arms-despite-military-cuts-161816266.html (accessed 30 April 2013). 423 Pierre Tran, “France Discussing GDP-based Defense Budget,” Defense News, 24 March 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130325/DEFREG01/303250009 (accessed 30 April 2013). 424 “Défense: les cinq éléments marquants du livre blanc,” Le Figaro, 29 April 2013, http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2013/04/29/20002-20130429ARTFIG00357-defense-les-cinq- elements-marquants-du-livre-blanc.php (accessed 30 April 2013). 425 Jean-Dominique Merchet, “31,5 ou 28 milliards? C’est tout l’enjeu du Livre blanc,” Marianne: Secret Défense, 7 March 2013, http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefense/315-ou-28-milliards-C-est-tout-l- enjeu-du-Livre-blanc_a979.html (accessed 30 April 2013). 426 “Livre blanc 2013,” Portail du Gouvernement.

64 to be retained at “zero value” or without accounting for inflation.427 In 2016 and 2017, however, France will return to “zero volume,” or 31.4 billion with increases for inflation.428 In

2018 and 2019, the defense budget is to increase by one percent a year plus inflation.429 For the total 2014-19 period, France is to spend €179.2 billion on defense.430 To receive this full amount, however, the MOD will have to fight during negotiations on the 2014-2019 military budget law as the full figure includes the sale of state assets, which the Ministry of Finance could redirect from defense to another part of the budget.431 In line with these spending decisions, which marked a cut in defense spending compared to the ambitions laid in the 2008 white paper, the

2013 white paper calls for 24,000 additional cuts from the MOD rolls and for cuts in the number of Rafale fighters (286 to 225), A-400M Atlas cargo planes (50 to between 35 and 40), and

FREMM frigates (11 to eight) to be ordered.432 433 434 The MOD, however, said it would strive to preserve the research and development budget at €750 million.435

427 Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Il n'y aura pas de baisse de crédits militaires, annonce François Hollande,” Marianne: Secret Défense, 28 March 2013, http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefense/Il-n-y-aura-pas- de-baisse-de-credits-militaires-annonce-Francois-Hollande_a997.html (accessed 30 April 2013). 428 Ibid. 429 Ibid. 430 “Défense: les cinq éléments,” Le Figaro. 431 Ibid. 432 Ibid. 433 Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Marine: ce sera 8 Fremm au lieu de 11,” Marianne: Secret Défense, 30 April 2013, http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefense/Marine-ce-sera-8-Fremm-au-lieu-de-11_a1028.html (accessed 30 April 2013). 434 Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Armée de l'air : moins d'une quarantaine d' A400 M devrait être commandée,” Marianne: Secret Défense, 30 April 2013, http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefense/Armee-de-l-air-moins-d-une-quarantaine-d-A400-M- devrait-etre-commandee_a1026.html (accessed 30 April 2013). 435 Nathalie Guibert, “Livre blanc de la défense: la France prépare les guerres de demain avec des ambitions réduites,” Le Monde, 29 April 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2013/04/29/defense-la-france-prepare-les-guerres-de-demain- avec-des-ambitions-reduites_3168164_823448.html (accessed 30 April 2013).

65

France: Procurement Prospects

France – Binding Orders on Prominent Arms Deals 2008 White Program Binding Order Paper A-400M Cargo Plane 50 50 Rafale Fighter Jet 286 190 Barracuda SSM 6 3 FREMM Frigate 11 11 Aster Missile 575 535 Naval Cruise Missile 200 200 NH90 Helicopter 160 61 Tiger Attack Helicopter 80 80 FÉLIN Kit 22,588 22,588 VBCI APC 630 630 Source: Coup des comptes, 74 Like its British counterpart, the French MOD made a series of binding procurement orders, whose costs will dominate procurement budgets for years to come.436 The Cour des comptes found that more than half of funds budgeted for 2012 were used to deal with costs from preexisting engagements.437 This limited the government’s ability to initiate new projects. Cuts to budget plans for 2012-13 forced the MOD to postpone defense procurement projects for that year.438 Spending on procurement and maintenance for equipment fell 14.4 percent from

€11.78 billion in 2012 to €10.09 billion in provisional spending plans released in October 2012.439

This prompted the government to postpone some €4.5 billion in orders. Among these were a fourth Barracuda attack submarine, steps to upgrade armored vehicles (program “Scorpion”), and delays to upgrade the Mirage 2000D and Atlantique 2 fleets.440 The budgetary constraints announced in the 2013 white paper led to additional delays and reduced orders. Meanwhile, the

436 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 75. 437 Ibid. 438 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 24. 439 Ibid., 31. 440 Ibid., 31-33.

66

Cour des comptes has warned that France faces a bulge in procurement spending from 2015 to

2020, with no guarantees that the state of public finances will recover by then.441

Budget Cuts and Cooperation

To offset these spending cuts, both the British and the French governments emphasize the importance of collaboration with close allies to maintain their military capabilities at a time of budget cuts. The British SDSR claims the United Kingdom aims to preserve a “full spectrum of

[military] capabilities” in spite of significant cuts, which could be achieved in part by

“strengthening our key defense partnerships.”442 It also says that Britain would “maintain our ability to act alone where we cannot expect others to help. But we will also work more with our allies and partners to share the burden of securing international stability and ensure that collective resources can go further.”443 The 2012 French Cour des comptes report holds that

France and the United Kingdom “are confronted by a similar problem: aligning the desire to preserve a first class military and the need to face budgetary shortages. Cooperation on certain programs… could allow the two countries to maintain knowhow and capabilities, while sharing the costs.”444

The same budget cuts bringing France and the UK together, however, can divide them.

The French preliminary defense budget for 2013 did not mention the light anti-ship missile agreed to in a Franco-British industrial accord linked to the Lancaster House treaties.445 The project was not abandoned, but only provisionally delayed due to planning difficulties. British officials, however, warned that a French failure to honor their commitments to the missile

441 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 77. 442 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 16. 443 Ibid., 17. 444 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 83. 445 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 39.

67 would force Britain “to reassess the level of ambition of the co-operation between France and the UK.”446 France reiterated its commitment to the project in the 2013 white paper.447

Furthermore, the British and French budgets have limited rooms for maneuver with regard to procurement due to commitments already made and new budget cuts. This inflexibility could hamper cooperation on future development projects. Finally, Franco-British cooperation is unlikely to offer significant cost savings in the short-term. It will take time for the two countries to begin to reap the benefits from joint procurement and research and development. In the short-term, cooperation may serve as political cover for cuts to capabilities and defense spending.

Conclusion

The research hypothesis is correct in its claim that the global financial and European debt crises hobbled the British and French finances, prompting the two countries to cut defense spending and consider defense cooperation to maintain their capabilities. The possibility for cooperation, however, may be limited by the two countries’ preexisting procurement commitments. This limited flexibility may prevent the two countries from signing up to new collaborative efforts.

Chapter Two: Threats

“Now, obviously we are doing this [cooperation treaty], it’s because we agree on the major issues pertaining to international security.”448

President Nicolas Sarkozy, November 2010

446 Andrew Chuter, “MBDA Focusing on Contracted U.K. Weapons,” Defense News, 21 March 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130321/DEFREG01/303210015 (accessed 30 April 2013). 447 “Défense: les cinq éléments,” Le Figaro. 448 “UK-France Summit press conference.”

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For France and the United Kingdom to jointly deploy forces and share assets in operations, the two countries must agree that they are confronted with the threats. This essay’s research hypothesis holds that the two countries share similar assessments of the threats that confront them in the international system. Britain and France should also agree on where in the world to concentrate their limited assets.

Twenty-first Century Threats

France and the United Kingdom broadly share the same assessment on the threats they are most likely to face in the twenty-first century. In their respective defense white papers, the two countries describe the globalized world as a possible source of both benefits and threats.449 450

The integrated global economy provides new trading and investment opportunities, but also makes it harder to isolate a state from international risks.451 452 While they both emphasize that there is no foreign government currently threatening their national existences, France and the

UK warn that such a threat could arise in the future.453 454 The predominant threats of this era, however, are terrorism, cyber warfare, organized crime, and attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons, as well as natural disasters and pandemics.455 456 Exacerbating these threats are the rise of nuclear proliferation, the growing international competition for resources, and the impact of climate change. The differences in military capabilities between state and non-state actors are also increasingly blurred.457 458 Some

449 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 23. 450 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 3. 451 Ibid., 16. 452 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 19. 453 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 15. 454 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 64. 455 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 3. 456 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 16. 457 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 17. 458 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 24.

69 states are willing to use asymmetric tactics and proxies, while some non-state actors have acquired capabilities historically held only by state armies.459 France and the UK recognize that globalization is raising the economic power of emerging and developing economies in Asia, the

Persian Gulf, and Latin America.460 461 This rise is bringing the relative decline of the West.462 463

The United States, meanwhile, is expected to remain the leading global power in an increasingly multipolar world.464 465 Technology transfers and investment in research and development in emerging and developing countries will likely erode the technology dominance enjoyed by

Western countries.466 467 New technologies and ideologies, meanwhile, could spawn new threats to Western countries.468 469 Rapid population growth in the developing world is expected to outstrip infrastructure and local political systems, raising the risk of instability.470 471 This population growth, coupled with higher standards of living in developing societies, is expected to increase competition for resources.472 473 Finally, climate change is expected to exacerbate the risk of conflict.474 475 This shared image of the world leads the two countries to conclude their national security postures must emphasize intelligence gathering, preventive action abroad, flexible security services and bureaucracies, and greater resilience at home.476 477

459 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 17. 460 Ibid., 15. 461 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 13. 462 Ibid., 34. 463 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 15. 464 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 36. 465 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 15. 466 Ibid., 16. 467 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 25. 468 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 16-17. 469 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 35. 470 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 17. 471 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 46. 472 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 17. 473 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 25. 474 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 17. 475 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 25. 476 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 18 and 25.

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To prioritize the work of their respective militaries and security establishments, both

France and the United Kingdom rank the risks facing the two countries. The French assessment appears in the 2008 white paper and ranks terror attacks, cyber-attacks, ballistic missile, pandemic diseases, natural or industrial catastrophes, and organized crime as the leading threats to metropolitan France.

Priority Risks to France – 2008 Defense White Paper Metropolitan France and its Overseas Departments and Collectivities (DOM-COM):  Terror Attack (simultaneous and/or major): high probability, medium to severe impact; real CBRN risk.  Cyber-Attack: high probability; weak to strong impact.  Ballistic Threat: from major power or from rising powers now equipped with such weapons; low to medium probability; possibly severe impact.  Pandemic Disease: medium probability; medium to severe impact.  Natural or Industrial Catastrophes (especially flooding in metropolitan France): medium to strong probability; medium to severe impact  Organized Crime (Increase in the trafficking of drugs, counterfeited goods, and weapons, as well as rise in money-laundering); elevated probability

Specific Risks for French DOM-COMs:  Caribbean Zone (earthquakes and cyclones): strong probability.  French Guyana and Oceania (earthquakes and cyclones): weak probability. Source: Défense et Sécurité nationale, 59. The British assessment was presented in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), another coalition government white paper. While it ranks International terrorism, cyber-attacks, major accidents or natural hazards, and international military crises as the top risks to British national security, the NSS holds that all the risks enumerated in the report are considered

478 “important.”

There is significant overlap between the British and French threat priorities. Both countries rank terrorist attacks and cyber-attacks as the top two security threats. Natural disasters, pandemics, and organized crime also rank as top concerns. One prominent difference

477 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 63-65. 478 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 28.

71 between the two threat analyses is the French emphasis on the danger posed by ballistic and cruise missiles. The French 2008 white paper highlights the proliferation of short- and medium- range ballistic and cruise missiles as a major concern.479 Of particular interest to Europe, the

French claim, is the growing ballistic arsenal of countries on the European periphery, such as

Egypt, Iran, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.480 The British SDSR only mentions ballistic

Priority Risks to the United Kingdom – 2010 National Security Strategy Tier One: Highest priority for British national security.  An international terrorist attack on British territory, including the use of CBRN weapons; and/or an increase in terrorist attacks related to Northern Ireland.  A cyber-attack on British interests by states or cybercrime cells.  A major accident or natural hazard requiring a national response, including severe flooding or a pandemic.  International military crisis drawing the United Kingdom, its allies, and others. Tier Two: Second-highest priority for British national security.  CBRN attack on the United Kingdom or its overseas territories.  Risk of major instability or civil war overseas that terrorists could exploit to threaten the United Kingdom.  A significant increase in organized crime in the United Kingdom.  A serious breakdown in links to satellites, including due to the actions of rival states. Tier Three: Third-highest priority for British national security.  A large scale conventional military attack on the United Kingdom by another state.  A significant increase in the number of terrorists, organized criminals, illegal immigrants, and illicit goods attempts to enter the United Kingdom.  Disruptions to energy supplies, such as oil and gas, to the United Kingdom.  A major release of radioactive materials from a civil nuclear site within the United Kingdom.  A conventional attack on another NATO or EU member state, which would require a British response.  An attack on a British overseas territory as a result of a sovereignty dispute.  Short- to medium-term disruptions to resources critical to the United Kingdom. Source: HM Government, National Security Strategy, 27. missiles as part of a discussion of Britain’s commitment to the US and NATO-led ballistic missile defense technology.481 The particular French emphasis on ballistic and cruise missiles may be

479 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 50. 480 Ibid., 51. 481 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 28.

72 due to the country’s relative proximity to North African and Middle Eastern countries with such capabilities. Another difference is that the British rank an “international military crisis” that draws in the UK and its allies as one of the most important risks to the country. The French 2008 white paper does not, although it establishes that the French military must be ready for such a conflict.482

Geographical Focus

With the French and British in agreement on the general threats facing their countries in the twenty-first century, the next question is whether the share the same assessment of geographic trouble spots.

France

The French 2008 white paper begins with an overview of geopolitical developments in the first decades of the twenty-first century, with particular consideration for unresolved territorial disputes in Asia,483 the economic rise of China and India,484 US relative decline,485 and Russian efforts to return to great power status.486 Although not explicitly stated, the 2008 white paper’s focus on the rising economic power of East and South Asia highlight the importance of maritime routes between Europe and Asia. The French also emphasize the problems associated with failed states, particularly the ungoverned spaces of the Sahel region and the Afghan-Pakistan border.487 These areas have been used by terrorist groups to plot attacks against the West or to train radicalized US and European Muslims. Finally, the 2008 white paper focuses on sub-

482 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 211. 483 Ibid., 35. 484 Ibid., 68. 485 Ibid., 36. 486 Ibid., 38. 487 Ibid., 38-39.

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Saharan Africa, where demographic growth, poor state governance, climate change, and inadequate governance raise the risk of conflict.488 France maintains extensive military and economic links to its former colonies in Africa, where thousands of French nationals reside. It is for these reasons that the 2008 white paper names Africa as the top priority for French efforts to prevent conflicts.489

In light of these geopolitical Prepositioned French Forces - 2013 (total forces deployed) interests, the 2008 white paper calls on State 2010 2013 Difference the government to focus the country’s 2,876 1,900 -976 Gabon 876 900 -24 defense assets on a so-called “Arc of Crisis” Senegal 1,135 350 -785 UAE 360 700 340 that runs from the Atlantic Ocean through Total 5,247 3,850 -1,397 North Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East, Source: 2010 figures from Assemblée Nationale. N° 254, 13. 2013 figures from "Forces prépositionnées," Ministère de la Défenses, 1 490 March 2013, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces- Central Asia, and into the Indian Ocean. prepositionnees (accessed 5 March 2013). This axis straddles some of the world’s most intractable disputes, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the tensions between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region. 491 It also includes ungoverned spaces that have harbored transnational terrorists, such as the Sahel, the Afghan-Pakistan border, the Horn of Africa, and

Yemen. The axis passes through areas of ethnic strife, such as Lebanon and the Great Lakes region of East Africa, as well as areas of geopolitical tensions, such as the Persian Gulf. Finally, the axis touches on critical trade routes for Western states, including the Mediterranean Sea,

Suez Canal, Red Sea, Sea of Aden, Persian Gulf, Straits of Hormuz, and Indian Ocean. The 2008 white paper holds that this arc represents the most critical area of the world for French

488 Ibid., 44. 489 Défense et Sécurité Nationale, 154. 490 Ibid., 43. 491 Ibid., 30-33.

74 security.492 While it prioritizes the “arc of crisis,” the 2008 white paper nevertheless emphasizes that France will need to keep limited forces in the Caribbean, West Africa, and Mediterranean to combat drug trafficking, and maintain certain security commitments.493 The French are also keen to defend their overseas territories, known as overseas departments and collectivities

(DOM-COM).494 The 2013 white paper retains the 2008 white paper’s focus on these areas of the world, although it also highlights risks to the wider EU from the former Soviet Union.495

The 2008 white paper calls for significant changes to France’s large overseas military deployments, which were in 2008 primarily in former African colonies and French DOM-COMs.

In accordance with the “arc of crisis,” the French government decided to concentrate its permanent African bases to two poles at each end of the continent.496 One group would be based in an Atlantic country (Senegal or Gabon), French Sovereignty Forces – 2013 while the other would be based in Djibouti.497 DOM-COM Permanent Total Antilles 900 1,250 These forces, however, would be able to intervene French Guyana 1,600 2,200 800 1,000 in the Sahel region, Gulf of Guinea, and Horn of New Caledonia 1,000 1,500 Africa as needed.498 By 2012, the French La Réunion/Mayotte 140 1,900 government had met some of these goals. Gabon Total 4440 7,850 Source: "Forces prépositionnées," Ministere de la Defense, 1 March 2013, was chosen as France’s leading Atlantic base of http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/forces- prepositionnees (accessed 5 March 2013). operations, replacing Senegal as the French base

492 Ibid., 72. 493 Ibid., 159. 494 Ibid., 61. 495 Guibert, “Livre blanc de la défense.” 496 Ibid., 72-73. 497 Ibid., 156. 498 Ibid., 156-157.

75 for amphibious operations in West Africa.499 Senegal, meanwhile, was reduced to a “support base” for French forces transiting to other parts of Africa or cooperating with Senegalese forces.500 Djibouti remained a French military base, although it lost one unit to a new base in the

United Arab Emirates (UAE).501 The 2008 white paper also calls for cuts in the number of troops serving in Africa, both to reduce costs and free forces for other regions. This recalibration of

French forces in Africa is part of a long-running French drawdown from Africa. In the 1960s, about 30,000 French soldiers were deployed across the continent.502 By the end of the Cold War, that number had fallen to 15,000 servicemen and women.503 In 2008, some 10,000 French troops were deployed in four support points (Djibouti, Senegal, Gabon, and Côte d’Ivoire), one longstanding deployment (Chad), and three ongoing operations (Côte d’Ivoire, the Central

African Republic, and along the Chadian border with Sudan’s Darfur.504 By 2013, French troops figures were cut for Djibouti, Gabon, and Senegal, although significant French forces remained deployed in Côte d’Ivoire, Chad, and the Central African Republic (CAR). The 2008 white paper calls for the rationalization in “sovereignty forces,” or units based in French DOM-COMs, in line with the “arc of crisis.” The white paper calls for a reduction in troops based in French Polynesia,

New Caledonia, and the Caribbean islands.505 In line with these decisions, the government closed three air bases and dissolved three regiments in these DOM-COMs.506 The 2008 white paper, however, calls for large troop commitments to remain in French Guyana and Réunion.507

The former’s Kourou rocket launch center is considered a strategic asset as it is the only

European rocket launch site. French Guyana is also subject to border trafficking and cross-

499 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 13. 500 Ibid. 501 Ibid., 12. 502 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 152 and 156. 503 Ibid., 156. 504 Ibid. 505 Ibid., 211. 506 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 15. 507 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 211.

76 border crimes. Réunion, meanwhile, is on the “arc of crisis” and is France’s leading base in the

Indian Ocean. In 2012, some 7,850 French troops were deployed in the DOM-COM.508 Finally, in accordance with the “arc of crisis,” the 2008 white paper calls on the French government to set up a base in Abu Dhabi, the largest emirate of the UAE. 509 This facility was to become France’s permanent base in the strategic Persian Gulf. In 2012, the French base in the UAE became fully operational and is home to an inter-arms force that includes the 13th demi-brigade of the French

Foreign Legion, a number of Rafale fighters, and one naval support center.510

United Kingdom

Unlike their French counterpart, the British defense white papers do not outline a strategic axis upon which to focus British defense planning. The NSS and SDSR do not single out international actors that could threaten British security, with the exception of al-Qaida, its regional affiliates, and Iran. Reading between the lines of the NSS and the SDSR, however, it is possible to single out areas considered strategic by London. The NSS identifies Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, and

Iraq as possible bases of operations for al-Qaida, its affiliates, and radicalized British nationals seeking training abroad.511 It warns that “fragile, failing, and failed states around the world provide the environment for terrorist to operate as they look to exploit ungoverned or ill- governed space.”512 This would seem to indicate continued British interest in the Middle East,

Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa. Unlike the French, who ended their Afghan combat operations in late 2012, the British are slated to continue such missions until the end of 2014.513

508 Ibid. 509 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 157. 510 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 12 and 14. 511 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 14 and 28. 512 Ibid., 28. 513 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 16.

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514 Beginning in 2015, British forces will remain in the country to provide long-term training assistance to the Afghan military.515 The end of NATO combat operations in Afghanistan, however, will likely lead British interest in the region to diminish over time. The NSS, meanwhile, highlights the possible threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and singles out Iran as a particular concern.516 It also recognizes that the rise of Chinese and Indian economic power will increase the ability of these two countries to “affect global issues.”517 The NSS emphasizes that economic gains will not be spread evenly across the developing world, with countries marked by conflict and instability likely to benefit less from future growth.518 Of particularly concern is

Africa. “The world’s poorest people live on less than US$1,000 a year. Around half currently live in Asia and half in Africa but by 2030 the clear majority of those living on less than three US dollars a day will be in Africa. Compounded by other drivers such as climate change and resources scarcity, this increases the likelihood of conflict, instability, and state failure.”519

The SDSR calls for the government to maintain Britain’s string of overseas bases, claiming these facilities “give us and in some cases our allies wide geographical reach and logistic support hubs for deployed forces.”520 Three of these bases are along the French strategic axis: , the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus (Akrotiri and Dhekelia), and Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory.521 The facilities in Cyprus proved useful for NATO during the

2011 Libyan operation, with the island serving as a staging ground for support aircraft, including

514 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 15. 515 Ibid. 516 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 14. 517 Ibid., 15. 518 Ibid., 16. 519 Ibid. 520 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 28. 521 Ibid.

78 drones, aerial refueling planes, and airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft.522

The other bases are located in the South Atlantic and include Ascension Island, the Falkland

Islands, and the South Georgia and South Sandwich islands. The UK also maintains training facilities in Brunei, Canada, and Kenya, as well as a significant presence in Germany, a relic of the

Cold War. Outside the French axis, however, the British retain significant defense commitments to its South Atlantic territories. The SDSR calls on Britain to maintain “an independent ability to defend the Overseas Territories militarily.”523 This statement is likely a reference to the Falkland

Islands and the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, which are claimed by Argentina.524

Britain’s commitments in the South Atlantic are discussed in greater length in this essay’s

“different security interests” section.

The British white papers call for only one major troop recalibration. Nearly 20 years after the end of the Cold War, some 20,000 British personnel and their families continued to live in Germany.525 The SDSR calls on the government to repatriate these nationals to the United

Kingdom by 2020, with about half to return to the United Kingdom by 2015.526 In March 2013,

London announced plans to accelerate the withdrawal, with 11,000 to return to the UK by 2016 and the last troops to leave Germany by 2019.527 Although not included in the SDSR, British

522 “Updated: Second UK Strike against Libyan defence assets,” Ministry of Defence, 21 March 2011, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/UpdatedSecondUkStrikeAgainstL ibyanDefenceAssets.htm (accessed 12 May 2013). 523 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 12. 524 Ibid., 21. 525 Ibid., 28. 526 Ibid., 32. 527 Nick Hopkins, “UK to withdraw 11,000 troops from Germany by 2016,” The Guardian, 4 March 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/mar/05/uk-withdraw-troops-germany-2016 (accessed 28 April 2013).

79 security commitments to the Persian Gulf and activity at Al-Minhad air base in may mark a growing British presence in the Gulf.528

Conclusion

As anticipated by the research hypothesis, there is significant overlap in the threats and geographic priorities mentioned in the British and French strategy papers. The two countries agree that the most pressing threats they face include terrorism, cyber warfare, and natural catastrophes. They also agree on the risks posed by developments in Africa, the Greater Middle

East and ungoverned spaces. When the two countries perceive threats in these areas, they are likely to cooperate. The French redeployment of its African bases would seem to indicate that the country is focusing less on sub-Saharan Africa and more on its “arc of crisis.” Events since the 2008 white paper, however, indicate that France may find it harder to reduce its presence in

Africa than it anticipated. The United Kingdom, meanwhile, does not share France continued commitments to the African continent, while France is not bound to defend Britain’s South

Atlantic territories. These concerns are likely to tamper cooperation and are addressed in greater depth in the “different security interests” section of this essay.

Chapter Three: Capabilities Desired

“I thank David Cameron for having agreed to put catapults and arresting gear on British aircraft carriers, because this is going to enable us to have a truly integrated aircraft carrier group. It’s a very important decision that our British friends have taken there.” 529

President Nicolas Sarkozy, November 2010

528 Gareth Stansfield and Saul Kelly, “A Return to East of Suez? UK Military Deployment to the Gulf,” Royal United Services Institute – Briefing Paper (2013): 4. 529 “UK-France Summit press conference.”

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As previously shown, France and the United Kingdom share similar budgetary constraints and a common assessment of the threats they face on the international stage. The two countries, however, also share these points with other European countries. What sets Britain and France apart is the desire to maintain certain capabilities not sought by their neighbors, such as global reach and nuclear weapons. The two countries view these capabilities as essential to defend their national sovereignties from the global threats previously discussed. This essay’s research hypothesis posits that Britain and France do share similar requirements for their armed forces and that these capabilities can only be preserved or obtained through cooperation.

Capabilities Sought

In line with their convergent threat assessments, British and French white papers set similar goals for their armed forces (see chart below). Both militaries are to identify threats, protect the state and its people, maintain a nuclear deterrent, boost the country’s resilience to disasters and attacks, carry out peacekeeping and stabilization missions, and retain the power to project

British Military Tasks French Military Tasks “defending the United Kingdom and its “protect the French people and national Overseas Territories” territory and boost resiliency” “supporting civil emergency organizations in times of crisis” “providing strategic intelligence” “assess risks and threats” “providing nuclear deterrence” “maintain the nuclear deterrent” “defending our interest by projecting power “face a major conflict outside the national strategically through expeditionary territory” interventions “providing security for stabilization” “contribute to global peace and stability” Providing a defense contribution to UK “retain the capability to carry out an influence autonomous operation or participate in a multilateral operation” Source: SDSR, 18-19. Source: Défense et Sécurité nationale, 222. force abroad. The white papers translate these broad tasks into a series of hypothetical missions the militaries are to be able to carry out. Both the British and French would remain one of the

81 few European countries capable of rapidly deploying a brigade-sized force together with its air and maritime enablers.530 531

The British 2010 SDSR outlines a “Future Force 2020” or the kind of armed forces the government hopes the United Kingdom can field in 2020.532 This force is to be able to carry out three different combinations of missions. One combination would see the British military take part in one “enduring stabilization operation” (a mostly land-based operation to stabilize and resolve a conflict that would last more than six months) involving up to 6,500 personnel.

“Future Force 2020” Missions Operation Duration Troops Required Comparable UK Operation Enduring Stabilization More than Six Months 6,500 Smaller than UK Operation Mission in Afghanistan Non-enduring Complex Less than Six Months 2,000 “Operation Ellamy” Intervention (2011 Libya) Non-enduring Simple Less than Six Months 1,000 Evacuate Civilians Intervention from Conflict Zone Or Three Non-enduring Less than Six Months Up to 6,000 Operations Or One-off Intervention – “For a Limited Time” 30,000 (two-thirds of Smaller than 2003 Three Brigades with Air the British force Invasion of Iraq and Maritime Support deployed to Iraq in 2003) Source: HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 19 and Defence Committee, The SDSR and the NSS, 43.

Simultaneously it would be able to undertake a non-enduring complex intervention (a high- impact military deployment lasting less than six months) involving up to 2,000 personnel and a non-enduring simple intervention (a high-impact military deployment lasting less than six months) involving up to 1,000 personnel. Another combination would see the British military

530 Defence Committee, Government Response, 11. 531 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 224. 532 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 19.

82 take part in three non-enduring operations (less than six-months-long, with a maximum total of about 6,000 troops) if not taking part in an enduring operation. Another combination would be a one-off intervention of up to three brigades with air and maritime support, about 30,000 personnel. Planners would require “sufficient warning” to put together such an operation.533

The Royal Navy is tasked with maintaining Britain’s deterrent, defending the UK and its South

Atlantic territories, serving as a “conventional deterrence and containment” force, carrying out attacks on land and sea targets, and deploying forces by helicopter and specialist ships.534 The

RAF, meanwhile, is to defend the air space of the United Kingdom and the South Atlantic territories, deter potential opponents, provide air support for deployed forces, carry out strategic and tactical airlift, and provide other specialist services, such as intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR).535

The French 2008 white paper calls on the military to be able to carry out a wide range of missions, including “special” operations (autonomously or multilaterally), “medium” operations

(autonomously, such as evacuating civilians or carrying out a rapid retaliatory strike),

“significant” operations (either bilaterally or multilaterally), and “major” operations (alliance or coalition operations far from French territory).536 The military is to be able to carry out a series of these operations at the same time. The 2008 white paper focuses on the most high-intensity operation each of the branches of the armed forces is to be able to carry out. The army is to be ready to deploy, within six months, about 30,000 soldiers some 7,000 to 8,000km from metropolitan France for up to one year, with the capacity to operate autonomously and a

533 Ibid., 19. 534 Ibid., 21. 535 Ibid., 25. 536 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 200.

83 command structure to direct an even larger allied operation.537 The army must also permanently maintain a 5,000-strong rapid reaction force and 10,000 soldiers on French soil to assist with internal security and resiliency.538 539 The navy is to be able to deploy an aircraft carrier task force, which includes its protective ring of frigates, nuclear attack submarines, and full aircraft and helicopter complement, some 7,000 to 8,000km from metropolitan France.540 The navy must simultaneously be able to deploy one or two naval action groups, centered either on a

Mistral-class BPC, landing platform, or frigate, to carry out an amphibious operation or protect

French Military Objectives – 2008 White Paper Branch Capability Make-Up Duration Distance Army Deploy Inter-arms 30,000 with One Year, Does 7,000 to Force With Six command Not Need to be 8,000km Months’ Notice capabilities Renewed Rapid Reaction 5,000 Force Internal Security 10,000 Permanent Metropolitan and Resiliency France Stabilization and Peacekeeping Missions Navy Aircraft Carrier Aircraft Carrier, 7,000 to Task Force (when Surface and 8,000km carrier not in refit) Submarine Escorts One or Two Naval Mistral-class BPCs 7,000 to Action Groups and Escorts 8,000km Air Force Deploy Combat 70 Fighters and 7,000 to Aircraft Aerial Enablers 8,000km Project 1,500 Strategic Airlift 7,000 to soldiers and Aerial 8,000km Enablers Source: Défense et Sécurité nationale, 211-213.

537 Ibid., 211. 538 Ibid. 539 Ibid., 223. 540 Ibid., 213.

84 maritime traffic.541 The air force, meanwhile, is to maintain the capability to deploy and maintain a fleet of 70 combat aircraft – Rafales or Mirage 2000s – and project some 1,500 soldiers some 7,000 to 8,000km from metropolitan France within a few days’ notice. Both operations must include strategic enablers, such as air-to-air refueling and command structures.542 Throughout these operations, the armed forces should maintain their prepositioned and “sovereignty” forces in Africa, the Middle East, and the DOM-COMs.543

These objectives represent a decline in the kind of capabilities the British and French believe their militaries can achieve. The most extensive military deployment imagined in the

British SDSR, a 30,000-strong operation, represents two-thirds of the British force deployed in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.544 545 The previous French planning document on defense, the

“Army 2015” plan, calls for a larger French armed forces than the 2008 white paper.546 This

1997-2002 defense plan calls on the army to be able to deploy some 50,000 troops as part of an alliance operation as opposed to 30,000 in the 2008 white paper.547 The “Army 2015” plan also calls on the navy to have two carriers, enabling at least one carrier to be available at all times.548

It also calls on the air force to deploy 100 combat aircraft as opposed to the 70 in the white paper.549 The 2013 white paper further reduce the capabilities outlined in the 2008 white paper.

541 Ibid. 542 Ibid. 543 Ibid., 224. 544 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 19. 545 “Iraq war in figures,” BBC News, 14 December 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 11107739 (accessed 9 March 2013). 546 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 16. 547 Ibid., 18. 548 Ibid. 549 Ibid.

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The inter-arm force was reduced from 30,000 soldiers to 15,000, while the number of fighter jets to be deployed fell from 70 to 45.550

Even these reduced capability objectives are currently out of reach for both the British and French militaries. This reality led both white papers to call for greater bilateral and multilateral cooperation to obtain or retain key capabilities.551 552 Five capability categories are particularly important: aircraft carriers, air-to-air refueling tankers, strategic and tactical airlifters, signals and intelligence aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and nuclear deterrents.

Aircraft Carriers

Until recently, the British and French navies operated the two most important carrier fleets in

Europe. The does maintain two small vertical and/or short-takeoff (V/STOL) carriers, the Giuseppe Garibaldi and Cavour, while the maintains one V/STOL carrier, the

Principe de Asturias, and one Landing Helicopter Deck (LDH) capable of deploying V/STOL planes, the Rey Juan Carlos I.553 Neither Italy nor Spain, however, fielded carrier air fleets larger than 18 Harriers, their only fixed-wing carrier-borne aircraft.554 In 2010, the operated 26 Rafales, 41 Super Étendards, and three Hawkeyes, while the British navy operated

40 Harriers.555 As the most potent carrier forces in Europe, the British and French navies were at the heart of every European carrier battle group concept since Blair and Chirac agreed to the idea at Le Touquet in 2003. In spite of repeated calls for the creation of such a carrier group at

550 Guibert, “Livre blanc de la défense.” 551 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 16. 552 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 209. 553 Stephen Saunders, Jane’s Fighting Ships 2010-2011 (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, Inc., 2010), 392-394, 742, and 752. 554 Ibid., 400 and 746. 555 Ibid., 257 and 881.

86 the European-level, this vision never materialized. Nevertheless, the need to cooperate on carrier groups grew in the late 2000s, when both France and the UK found themselves with limited carrier capabilities.

French doctrine calls for the navy to operate two aircraft carriers so that one ship is available at all times.556 Carriers, like other ships, must occasionally return to port to undergo maintenance or to recover from operations. Without two carriers and its requisite escorts, the

French navy cannot meet its mandate to have one aircraft carrier task force ready to be deployed at all times.557 France, however, has not operated two carriers since 1997. That year, the navy decommissioned one of its two conventional-powered, catapult assisted take off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) carriers, the Clemenceau.558 Its sister ship, the Foch, was decommissioned in 2000 and sold to Brazil. France’s only carrier, the nuclear-powered and

CATOBAR Charles de Gaulle, was commissioned in 2001. The French 2008 white paper, however, claims the Charles de Gaulle is on average operational some 65 percent of the time.559

Budgetary constraints and technical issues prompted the French government to postpone in

2008 its decision on whether to build a new carrier to 2011-12.560 In 2009, however, the government canceled its evaluation of a second carrier program, citing the project’s high cost.561

The French government thus indefinitely suspended plans to procure another carrier. Pending the construction of a new carrier, the 2008 white paper calls on the government to consider cooperating with the British, using overflight rights or allied bases, and investing in long-range

556 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 214. 557 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 62. 558 “Praise for ‘toxic’ ship scrapping,” BBC News, 4 January 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/tees/8439308.stm (accessed 30 April 2013). 559 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 214. 560 Ibid. 561 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 54.

87 cruise missiles.562 Another concern compounding the need to cooperate on carrier task forces is the shortage of operational French escort frigates and attack submarines until 2020. By that year, the new FREMM frigates and Barracudas SSNs are to be built or ordered.563

Until 2010, the British Navy operated two aircraft carriers, the V/STOL HMS Ark Royal and HMS Illustrious, with their complement of Harriers and helicopters.564 Budgetary pressures, however, prompted the British government to dispose of its carrier fleet and Harriers in the

2010 SDSR. 565 The HMS Ark Royal was decommissioned in March 2011 and sold for scrap in

September 2012.566 567 HMS Illustrious, meanwhile, was converted into a helicopter carrier and is to remain in service until 2014, when HMS Ocean, a dedicated helicopter platform, is expected to return to service after a planned refit.568 Thus, the 2010 SDSR left Britain without any operational carriers until 2020.569 That year, the Queen Elizabeth-class carrier was slated to enter service with a complement of fighter jets. The government claimed that flight operations in Afghanistan and acquiring new carriers should take priority over retaining aircraft carrier capability in the intervening 10 years.570 To fill the gap, the government claimed it could secure overflight rights, use allied bases, or share allied carriers. The government also decided to postpone until 2015 the decision whether to keep a second aircraft carrier of this class – to be named HMS Prince of Wales – in service, place it in “extended readiness” (capability to be

562 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 214. 563 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 54. 564 Saunders, 872. 565 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 22. 566 “Final farewell for decommissioned warship HMS Ark Royal,” BBC News, 11 March 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hampshire-12706441 (accessed 9 March 2013). 567 “MOD sets out future of Invincible Class carriers,” Ministry of Defence, 10 September 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/mod-sets-out-future-of-invincible-class-carriers (accessed 9 March 2013). 568 Defence Committee, The SDSR and the NSS, 45. 569 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 23. 570 Ibid.

88 restored if sufficient warning given), or sell it abroad.571 Thus, even after the construction of its two carriers, Britain might end up with only one operational carrier.

The limitations faced by France and the United Kingdom culminated in the November

2010 Lancaster House agreement on conventional cooperation, the Treaty for Defence and

Security Co-operation (TDSC), which calls on the two countries to forge “close co-operation in contributing to and pooling forces and capabilities for military operations and employment of forces.”572 Cameron said the treaty would enable the two countries to cooperate on aircraft carriers. “As a result of the decisions we have taken, we will adapt our new carrier capability so we’re able to operate with France and the United States,” said Cameron. “And as our new carrier comes into service towards the end of the decade, we will develop the ability to deploy a

UK-French integrated carrier strike group, ensuring that either a British or a French carrier is always available for operations.”573

Two problems, however, cloud this vision. First, the British government will be dependent on France or the United States to provide carrier capability until the entry of the first

Queen Elizabeth-class carrier. This seriously limits British autonomy of action and means the partnership is one-sided. As Sir Jonathan Band, a former first sea lord, told the House of

Commons Defence Committee, “The challenge will be how high in intensity they can be without an aircraft carrier of your own, or without relying on the French or Americans to do it for you. If the members of the right partnership all agree on the mission, we can probably still do quite a lot, and what we provide, will be high quality. When it comes to doing something that only

571 Ibid. 572 France No. 1 (2010): Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation, CM7976 (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010), 2, sec. 1. 573 “UK-France Summit press conference.”

89 worries Britain, then we are badly placed.”574 Band also said, “for the period that we do not have any carrier capability, you could not do a rerun of something like Sierra Leone. We can’t do anything by ourselves where there is serious risk, because you would not do that without a carrier.”575 The ambitions of the 2010 Lancaster House treaties could be scuttled should France refuse to assist the carrier-less British in a crisis.

Second, British and French aircraft will not be able to operate on one another’s carriers as planned in 2010. As originally envisioned, the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers would operate

V/STOL aircraft, such as the Harriers and their expected replacements, the Lockheed-Martin F-

35B, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).576 The Cameron government, however, was keen to make sure that Britain’s carriers and carrier-borne aircraft could interoperate with

French and the US equipment.577 These two countries’ carriers, however, are equipped with

CATOBAR aircraft, such as the Rafale and the Boeing F/A-18 Hornet.578 In its 2010 SDSR, the

British government announced plans to install catapult and arrestor gear on at least one Queen

Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier and to purchase the CATOBAR variant of the Joint Strike Fighter

(JSF), the F-35C.579 The government pointed out that the F-35C has a greater payload and longer range than its V/STOL counterpart, while the F-35C’s through-life costs are 25 percent cheaper.580 The government, however, reversed the decision in May 2012, when it became clear that converting the carriers would prove more costly and time-consuming than anticipated.581

Defense officials admitted that a CATOBAR HMS Queen Elizabeth would not enter service until

574 Qtd. Defence Committee, The SDSR and the NSS, 49. 575 Ibid. 576 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 23. 577 Ibid. 578 Saunders, 257 and 931. 579 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 23. 580 Ibid. 581 “Defence Secretary Announces Decision on Jets for Navy’s Future Carriers,” Royal Navy, 10 May 2012, http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/News-and-Events/Latest-News/2012/May/10/120509-F35B (accessed 24 February 2013).

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2023 at the earliest and that converting both carriers to “cats and traps” would cost some £5 billion.582 The cost overruns were such that the MOD was warned it would have to mothball

HMS Queen Elizabeth as soon as it was built.583 By the time the government decided to reverse its 2010 decision, the MOD said it had already spent £40 to £50 million to convert the carriers.584

The House of Commons Defence Committee, however, claimed that these policy changes may have cost some £100 million in lost expenditures.585 Perhaps more damaging, however, was the realization that the F-35C would not improve interoperability with the French carrier as anticipated in the 2010 conventional Lancaster House treaty and the SDSR. A fully-laden F-35C is simply too heavy to operate off the Charles de Gaulle.586 In its January 2013 assessment of the

2010 carrier decision, the House of Commons Defence Committee claimed “it is clear that the decision was rushed and based upon incomplete and inaccurate policy development.”587 In light of the British carrier fiasco, Franco-British cooperation on carriers will be limited to deploying joint carrier task forces.

Air-to-Air Refueling Tankers

Both the British and French white papers recognize that their air forces lack sufficient air-to-air refueling capabilities and call for common procurement and shared logistical support.588 589 The war in Libya demonstrated the limited European refueling capabilities, with European NATO

582 Nick Hopkins, “Philip Hammond defends aircraft carrier U-turn,” The Guardian, 10 May 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/may/10/hammond-aircraft-carrier-u-turn (accessed 24 February 2013). 583 Ibid. 584 Ibid. 585 Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition, 12. 586 Defence Committee, The SDSR and the NSS, 47. 587 Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition, 3. 588 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 209. 589 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 27.

91 allies reliant on US tankers.590 The 2013 French operations in also highlighted France’s dependence on US tankers to carry out long-range operations.591 The absence of adequate tankers prevents the French from meeting their 2008 white paper goal of projecting force some

7,000 to 8,000km from metropolitan France and limits Britain’s ability to project force.

In 2012, the French air force’s fleet of aerial tankers was made up of three ageing

Boeing KC-135s and 11 Boeing C-135s, both well-passed their primes, with the KC-135s averaging 49 years of age.592 593 The air force also operated 15 Transall C-160s equipped to refuel helicopters and other tactical transport aircraft.594 The British air force, meanwhile, relied on 12 Cold War-era Vickers VC-10 transport/tanker aircraft and eight Lockheed TriStars.595 The

British and French opted to procure the same tanker, the Airbus A330 MRTT, with 14 aircraft each.596 The RAF planned to withdraw its VC-10s from service in 2013, when the first A330 MRTT is to enter service.597 The French, for their part, anticipated receiving their MRTT between 2017 and 2024.598 599 This delay in procurement is in part due to French budget cuts in 2011-13 and will force the military to extend the life of its ageing tankers.600

The decision to procure MRTTs offers Britain and France the chance to cooperate on maintenance and crew training. The new tankers will boost their individual refueling capabilities, as well as those of Europe should they agree to share their aircraft. Two problems, however, may hamper cooperation in tanker operations. First, the French budget will delay the entry of

590 Defence Committee, Operations in Libya, 8. 591 Agence France-Presse, “U.S. Agrees to Refuel French Warplanes on Mali Mission,” Defense News, 27 January 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130127/DEFREG04/301270016/U-S-Agrees- Refuel-French-Warplanes-Mali-Mission (accessed 9 March 2013). 592 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 35. 593 “The Military Balance,” International Institute for Strategic Studies 112, no. 1 (2012): 11. 594 Ibid., 114. 595 Ibid., 171. 596 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 25. 597 Ibid., 27. 598 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 63. 599 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 35. 600 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 53.

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French MRTTs and thus delay operational cooperation. Second, the French maintain an airborne nuclear deterrent around nuclear-tipped cruise missiles launched from fighter jets.601 This deterrent requires dedicated aerial refueling planes, which may not be available for cooperation with the United Kingdom.

Strategic and Tactical Airlifters

As with air-to-air refueling, the British and French have limited strategic and tactical airlift capabilities due in part to the Cold War decision to focus on territorial defense. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, European militaries have undertaken a series of long- distance deployments with limited assets.602. In 2012, the British cargo fleet included seven

Boeing C-17A Globemaster III and 32 Lockheed C-130 Hercules of various models.603 The eight

TriStars and 12 VC-10s also served in a dual airlift role.604 The French air force, meanwhile, operated 57 C-160s and 14 C-130s.605 Three Airbus A310-300s and two Airbus A340-22s offered a strategic airlift capability.606 These figures mean the only strategic aircraft operated by both countries are their C-17s and converted Airbus airliners. The British and French are thus forced to rely on US aircraft and leased private-sector heavy cargo planes, such as Ukrainian-operated

Antonovs, to deploy significant forces to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa. 607 This reality was made apparent in early 2013, when France scrambled for international assistance to deploy its forces to Mali.608

601 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 173. 602 Ibid., 199. 603 “The Military Balance,” 112, no. 1: 171. 604 Ibid. 605 Ibid., 114. 606 Ibid. 607 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 53. 608 Gareth Jennings, “Analysis: Mali intervention highlights France’s strategic airlift gap,” IHS Jane’s, 21 January 2013, http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?id=1065975360 (accessed 28 April 2013).

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To rectify their lack of strategic airlift, the British and French joined five other European countries in 2003 to participate in the A-400M program.609 This project, however, has suffered from significant delays, forcing the British and French to acquire other planes and stretch ageing airframes. The British leased seven C-17s, while the French extended the life of their ageing C-

160s and C-130s and purchased eight Casa 235s.610 611 With the delays in the A-400M program continuing into 2012, the British earmarked funds that year to purchase an eighth C-17.612 The first A-400M is slated to enter service with the French Air Force in 2013, with eight to be in

French service by 2014.613 614 The 2013 white paper, however, cut the number of A-400Ms to be ordered to between 35 and 40, less than the number deemed necessary to fulfill the requirements set out by the previous white paper.615 616 Meanwhile, the 14 French MRTTs are to replace the air force’s converted Airbus airliners. 617 The British “Future Force 2020” plan aims for a British airlift capability centered on its C-17s and 22 A-400M, as well as the 14 A330

MRTTS.618

Although fraught with delays, the A-400M program offers Britain and France the opportunity to cooperate closely on maintenance, training, and interoperability. In his joint press conference with Sarkozy in November 2010, Cameron announced plans for the two

609 “A400M The Versatile Airlifter,” Airbus Military, http://www.airbusmilitary.com/Aircraft/A400M/A400MAbout.aspx (accessed 9 March 2013). 610 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 52. 611 Roland Gribben, “MoD ‘embarassed’ at cost of Boeing C-17 lease deal,” Telegraph, 31 July 2000, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/4460454/MoD-embarrassed-at-cost-of-Boeing-C-17-lease-deal.html (accessed 9 March 2013). 612 Ministry of Defence, Equipment Plan, 10. 613 Jean Guisnel, “Le premier A400M français volera en mars,” Le Point, 19 February 2013, http://www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/jean-guisnel/le-premier-a400m-francais-volera-en-mars-19-02- 2013-1629547_53.php (accessed 9 March 2013). 614 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 51. 615 Merchet, “Armée de l'air.” 616 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 63. 617 Ibid. 618 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 25.

94 countries to integrate their logistical support for the aircraft.619 One factor that could disrupt this cooperation, however, is the airplane’s uneven delivery schedule. Some countries will receive the plane before the others and the others may be reluctant to pay their share of the joint maintenance system if they do not yet field the aircraft.620 So France, who will receive the first airplane, will sign the first contract to support its A-400Ms for 18 months by itself. After this period, the UK and France plan to set up a common solution to support and maintenance.

Signals and Intelligence Aircraft—Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Another area of possible cooperation between the British and the French is in intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). ISTAR is just one of a series of “joint enablers” that are increasingly important in combat.621 These include command, control, and communications (C3), logistics, air-to-air refueling, and cargo lift. While both countries’ white papers call for additional investment in ISTAR capabilities, including drones, these capacities remain limited.622 623 The war in Libya further demonstrated the importance of ISTAR equipment – much of which was provided by the United States – as these systems helped minimize possible casualties.624

The war prompted the British government to reconsider decisions made in the 2010

SDSR regarding two signals and intelligence platforms: the Nimrod R1 and Sentinel. The Nimrod

R1 was to be withdrawn from service in early 2011, while the Sentinels would be decommissioned after the end of British combat operations in Afghanistan. 625 British Military

619 “UK-France Summit press conference.” 620 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 34. 621 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 27. 622 Ibid., 11-12. 623 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 227. 624 Defence Committee, Operations in Libya, 8 and 48. 625 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 27.

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Representative to NATO, Air Marshall Sir Christopher Harper, told the House of Commons

Defence Committee that “without that [ISTAR} capability I do not think that we would have seen the rapid success that has been achieved.”626 Ultimately, the government decided to retire the

Nimrod R1 in late 2011 and to replace the planes with four Boeing RC-135 Rivet Joints beginning in 2014.627 It postponed any decision on the Sentinels.628 In the meantime, the air force’s

Sentinels and E-3 Sentry would provide some limited coverage. The RAF also operates at least five MQ-9 Reaper drones in the more limited ISR role, with five more on order.629 These aircraft are also capable of carrying out attacks and operate solely in Afghanistan. For its part, the British

Army operates ISTAR Watchkeeper WK450s and an assortment of smaller ISR drones. The

French military also suffers from limited ISTAR capabilities. Unlike the British, however, the

French operate an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) satellite system: three

Helios satellites.630 631 The French government also unveiled plans for a space-based ballistic missile tracking system.632 The French air force operates 29 aging Mirage F-1C and four EADS/IAI

Harfangs in the ISR role and two C-160C in the ELINT role.633 634 The army, meanwhile, operates a number of ISR drones, including SDTI Sperwers.635 In the medium-term, the British and French appear intent on continuing to purchase and modify US- or Israeli-built drones.636 637 In the long-

626 Defence Committee, Operations in Libya, 48. 627 “Nimrod R1 retires from service,” Ministry of Defence, 7 July 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/nimrod-r1-retires-from-service (accessed 9 March 2013). 628 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 27. 629 “RAF – Reaper,” Royal Air Force, 9 March 2013, http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/reaper.cfm (accessed 9 March 2013). 630 “The Military Balance,” 112, no. 1: 85. 631 Ibid.,111. 632 Védrine, 8. 633 “The Military Balance,” 112, no. 1: 114. 634 “Drones,” Armée de l’Air, 20 June 2011, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/technologies/aeronefs/drones/drones (accessed 9 March 2013). 635 “The Military Balance,” 112, no. 1: 112. 636 Andrew Chuter, “Thales Covers ISTAR Tab Amid Watchkeeper Wait,” Defense News, 10 December 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121210/DEFREG01/312100002/Thales-Covers-ISTAR-Tab- Amid-Watchkeeper-Wait (accessed 12 March 2013).

96 term, however, they have announced plans to cooperate on forging a European drone capability, including armed drones.638 In his November 2010 joint press conference with

Cameron, Sarkozy said “Now, on the unmanned air systems, apart from the small tactical air systems there is no such thing as a European unmanned air system and we’re going to have, in the next 10 years, a surveillance unmanned air system.”639

In the 2010 SDSR, the British government canceled the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft, scrapping Britain’s fixed-wing anti-submarine capability.640 In its evaluation of the SDSR, the House of Commons Defence Committee claimed the decision to dispense of the Nimrod

MRA4 was “a clear example of the need to make large savings overriding the strategic security of the UK and the capability requirements of the Armed Forces.”641 The planes played an important role in the Falklands War, with one witness to the Defence Committee claiming, “we only retook the Falklands, arguably, because we had the Nimrod and we had the Victor with its radar in front that could sweep everywhere around the Falklands and South Georgia to make sure there were no naval vessels in the area. That capability is gone.”642 The government has yet to provide a replacement capability for the Nimrod MRA4, other than claim that existing ships and helicopters can serve a similar role.643 Pending a replacement, the British government said it could ask France to loan its Atlantique patrol planes if the need arose.644

637 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 37. 638 “Britain, France working on military drones – Cameron,” Reuters, 17 February 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/17/france-britain-drones-idUSP6E8CT00720120217 (accessed 2 May 2013). 639 “UK-France Summit press conference.” 640 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 27. 641 Defence Committee, The SDSR and the NSS, 7. 642 Ibid., 53. 643 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 27. 644 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Compte rendu n° 20: Audition, ouverte à la presse, de S. Exc. Sir Peter Ricketts, ambassadeur du Royaume-Uni à Paris, sur le livre blanc sur la défense

97

Amphibious Assault

In their November 2010 joint press conference, Sarkozy and Cameron unveiled plans for a

Franco-British joint expeditionary task force capable of carrying out amphibious operations.645 In

October 2012, elements of this future force, including the Second Regiment of the

French and the 3 Brigade of the , took part in their first amphibious exercise in Corsica, codenamed “Corsican Lion.”646 The exercise involved 5,000 soldiers, one submarine, and 11 warships, including the Charles de Gaulle, Mistral BPC, and HMS

Bulwark.647 The exercise marked an important step in the evolution of a task force, which beginning in 2016, could be deployed on a short notice to a trouble spot and remain on station for up to three months.648 In March 2013, a Mistral-class BPC, the Tonnerre, sailed with a French anti-submarine destroyer, the , to Portsmouth to take part in another Franco-

British amphibious exercise, codenamed “Jeanne d’Arc.”649

These joint exercises demonstrated how the British military can benefit from France’s recently bolstered amphibious capabilities as budgets cuts forced the British to constrain their own capabilities. The 2010 SDSR preserves HMS Ocean, the United Kingdom’s helicopter platform, and selects HMS Illustrious to serve as a temporary helicopter carrier as HMS Ocean

et la sécurité nationale,” Assemblée Nationale, 13 November 2012, http://www.assemblee- nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/12-13/c1213020.asp#P6_327 (accessed 28 April 2013). 645 “UK-France Summit press conference.” 646 “Corsican Lion: l’amphibie au Cœur de la coopération franco-britannique,” Marine nationale, 26 October 2012, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/a-la-une/corsican-lion-l-amphibie-au-coeur-de-la- cooperation-franco-britannique (accessed 9 March 2013). 647 “Corsican Lion 2012: manœuvre amphibie,” Ministère de la Défense: Actualités, 22 October 2012, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/international/corsican-lion-2012-manaeuvre-amphibie (accessed 9 March 2013). 648 “‘This is just the beginning…’ Major Anglo-French naval exercise ends in the Med,” Royal Navy, 26 October 2012, http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/News-and-Events/Latest-News/2012/October/26/121026- Cougar-Anglo-French (accessed 12 May 2013). 649 “French ‘invasion force’ lands at Gosport,” BBC News, 8 March 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk- england-hampshire-21711244 (accessed 9 March 2013).

98 undergoes refits until 2014.650 The white paper also protects the Royal Marines, with the 1,800- strong 3 Commando Brigade to remain at high readiness.651 The fleet would also have six roll-on, roll-off ferries for strategic transport.652 The government, however, announced plans to mothball one of its two Albion-class landing platform docks (LPDs).653 It selected HMS Albion for

“extended readiness,” while keeping HMS Bulwark active.654 The SDSR also removed one of

Britain’s four Bay-class dock landing ships, RFA Lagrs Bay, which was sold to the Royal Australian

Navy.655 France, meanwhile, acquired three Mistral-class BPCs in the 2000s and kept one of its

Foudre-class LPDs, the Sirocco.656 The new Mistral-class warships are both helicopter carriers and landing docks, as well as a floating command posts and medical hospitals.657 The ships can carry between 450 and 700 soldiers, 16 helicopters, and four landing craft or two heavy hovercrafts.658

Nuclear Deterrents

Neither France nor the United Kingdom has abandoned its commitment to nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantee of national independence.659 660 This commitment, however, is particularly costly at a time of austerity. Both the British and French governments have come

650 Defence Committee, The SDSR and the NSS, 45. 651 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 21. 652 Ibid., 22. 653 Ibid., 20. 654 Julian Glover, “Mothballing ships makes little sense. We need these armed forces,” The Guardian, 17 July 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/17/royal-navy-defence-cuts-waste (accessed 28 April 2013). 655 “Australia buys RFA Largs Bay for £65m,” Defence Management, 6 April 2011, http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=15989 (accessed 28 April 2013). 656 “Liste des bâtiments de combat de la Marine nationale par unité,” Marine Nationale, 4 March 2013, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/decouverte/equipements-moyens-materiel-militaire/batiments-de- combat/liste-des-batiments-de-combat-de-la-marine-nationale-par-unite (accessed 28 April 2013). 657 “Mistral (L 9013),” Marine Nationale, 2 August 2011, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/decouverte/equipements-moyens-materiel-militaire/batiments-de- combat/bpc-type-mistral/mistral-l-9013/presentation (accessed 9 March 2013). 658 Ibid. 659 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 69. 660 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 5.

99 under pressure from politicians and segments of public opinion to reconsider the deterrent.661

662 One of the two defense cooperation treaties signed in Lancaster House in November 2010 seeks to alleviate the cost of the British and French deterrent. In his November 2010 joint press conference with Sarkozy, Cameron said of this agreement, “… while we will always retain an independent nuclear deterrent, it is right that we look for efficiencies in the infrastructure required to develop and sustain our separate deterrents. So rather than both countries building identical and expensive facilities to ensure the safety of our nuclear weapons, we will build together a joint facility, jointly owned and jointly managed, sharing our knowledge and expertise and saving millions of pounds.”663 This treaty calls for the creation of two radiographic/hydrodynamic facilities, one in the United Kingdom and the other in France, which are to be shared by the two parties.664 Because the treaty pertains to one of the most sensitive elements of national sovereignty, the agreement includes stringent clauses to make sure no technology is shared without express authorization of the parties involved. All technology, research, transit of material, and even the physical sections of the research center will remain strictly under the control of the national governments in question.665 As national sovereignty is

661 “Sea-based nuclear deterrent expensive and ‘insane’ – ex-defense minister,” The Guardian, 13 December 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/dec/13/sea-nuclear-deterrent-trident-expensive- insanity (accessed 9 March 2013). 662 Nathalie Guibert, “M. Hollande sur ‘Le Terrible’, pour defender la dissuasion nucléaire,” Le Monde, 5 July 2012, http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2012/07/05/m-hollande-sur-le-terrible-pour- defendre-la-dissuasion-nucleaire_1729250_823448.html (accessed 9 March 2013). 663 “UK-France Summit press conference.” 664 France No. 2 (2010): Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities, CM7975 (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010), 1, sec. 2. 665 Ibid., 2, sec. 5.

100 closely protected by the treaty, it has proven the least contentious part of the Lancaster House agreements, with work on the two planned facilities progressing through 2011 and 2012.666 667

The 2010 treaty on nuclear cooperation embodied the tension at the heart of Franco-

British nuclear cooperation: financial pressures against the desire to protect national sovereignty. Maintaining a nuclear deterrent is particularly costly as it includes not only complex nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, but associated capabilities, such as ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), attack submarines (SSNs), maritime patrol ships, and secure communication networks. The nature of the deterrent is such that these capabilities are generally developed and maintained autonomously. The British, for example, earmarked some

£35.8 billion for their nuclear deterrent for the period lasting from 2012-22.668 These funds covered plans to acquire seven Astute SSNs, pay for the maintenance of existing weapons systems, and cover the costs of designing, developing, and producing a replacement for the

Vanguard-class SSBNs if the MOD obtains final approval for the project in 2016. These costs are not as high as they could be, however, because the British, unlike the French, elected to purchase missiles developed and manufactured by the United States. This US role in the British deterrent means the US has a say in British nuclear cooperation with France. US-UK cooperation on nuclear issue may stymie closer cross-channel cooperation on nuclear issues, such as the possibility of a Franco-British ballistic missile or nuclear submarine design.

In spite of the British links to the United States, the cost of maintaining a nuclear deterrent is likely to weigh more heavily on the British budget than on its French counterpart in

666 Jean-Dominique Merchet, “L'Europe de la défense est vraiment en panne,” Marianne: Secret défense, 4 December 2011, http://www.marianne2.fr/blogsecretdefense/L-Europe-de-la-defense-est-vraiment-en- panne_a443.html (accessed 14 March 2013). 667 “Avion de combat, missiles, drones : les premiers fruits du Traité franco-britannique,” Les Échos, 16 February 2012, http://www.lesechos.fr/16/02/2012/lesechos.fr/0201903852480_avion-de-combat-- missiles--drones---les-premiers-fruits-du-traite-franco-britannique.htm (accessed 14 March 2013). 668 Ministry of Defence, Equipment Plan, 16.

101 the coming years. This is because the French already upgraded their deterrent in the late 1990s and 2000s. In the 2009-11 budgetary period, the French navy received the fourth and last SSBN of the new Triomphant class, ships capable of carrying the latest intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the M51s.669 These developments brought up to date the submarine-launched component of France’s deterrent, something neither the United Kingdom nor Russia had yet undertaken.670 France’s airborne deterrent, meanwhile, was modernized starting in 2009, when delivers of the new ASMPA missiles began.671 The British, for their part, no longer maintain an airborne deterrent and have yet to decide on a replacement for the aging Vanguard SSBNs.672

The 2010 SDSR postponed until 2016 the second investment decision on whether to replace the

Vanguards SSBNs.673 Past 2016, the British will begin to run out of time to decide on the future of their deterrent as it will no longer be safe to operate the Vanguards in the 2030s.674 The contention surrounding the deterrent is in part due to the coalition politics at the heart of the

Cameron-Clegg government.675 In an effort to cut costs, the 2010 SDSR called for each submarine to carry eight fewer warheads (or 40 warheads) and to reduce the stockpile of operationally-available warheads by 40, or to no more than 120.676 The overall British nuclear warhead stockpile, meanwhile, was to be capped at 180.

Any cooperation on the nuclear deterrent beyond the 2010 treaty will again revive the tension between cost-saving and sovereignty. Nevertheless, there is a foundation on which the two countries could build deeper nuclear cooperation. For one, Britain and France have

669 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 50. 670 Ibid. 671 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 170. 672 David Cameron, “We need a nuclear deterrent more than ever,” The Telegraph, 3 April 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron/9969596/David-Cameron-We-need-a-nuclear- deterrent-more-than-ever.html (accessed 28 April 2013). 673 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 38. 674 Ibid., 39. 675 “Sea-based nuclear deterrent expensive,” The Guardian. 676 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 38.

102 converged on their nuclear strategies and voiced mutual commitments. The 2008 French white paper reads, “With the other European nuclear power, the United Kingdom, France states that there are no situations in which the vital interests of one would be threatened without the interest of the other being equally threatened.”677 Another reason for closer cooperation is the desire to keep the other’s deterrent going. French officials are concerned that a British nuclear disarmament would leave France as the only European nuclear power. This could lead to greater pressure, both internal and external, for France to disarm. Some commentators in both countries have even raised the possibility of joint patrols, which would mean pooling the country’s SSBNs.678 However, such a step would mean politicians in either London or Paris trusting their counterpart with the ultimate defense. Both France and the UK place such emphasis on retaining a sovereign nuclear deterrent they will likely give up sovereignty on the nuclear deterrent last, if they ever do.679 680

Conclusion

The evidence supports the research hypothesis’ claim that Britain and France share similar capability requirements for their militaries. At a time of budgetary constraints, however, neither country can achieve these goals autonomously. Cooperation, however, will suffer from technical problems and questions of sovereignty. It will also take time for the two countries to procure common equipment and improve interoperability. In the meantime, tensions may arise between the partners because of unequal capabilities. For example, the absence of a British carrier until

2020 means that, France will have to shoulder a significantly larger burden in any Franco-British

677 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 70. 678 Jonathan Marcus, “France’s enduring nuclear deterrent,” BBC News, 28 March 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-radio-and-tv-17512596 (accessed 9 March 2013). 679 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 5. 680 Défense et Sécurité Nationale, 2-3, 69.

103 amphibious effort. Already in the Libyan operations, French officials grumbled about the strain placed on their aircraft carrier and other naval assets by the absence of a British carrier.681

Chapter Four: European Defense Firms

“The two Parties undertake to develop and to preserve key industrial capabilities and defense technologies so as to improve their independence…”682

Treaty for Defence and Security Cooperation, November 2010

The future is dark for the European defense industry. Reduced procurement at home, a decline in state research funding, continued national protectionism, competition from emerging powers, and US technological hegemony threaten to overwhelm these firms. This essay’s primary hypothesis posits that these changes in the international arms market threaten the future of European defense firms, prompting these to advocate for deeper European cooperation to their state patrons. These firms require the cooperation of their associated member states because European firms retain enough shares or special voting rights to block any merger.

Overview of Global Defense Market

The late 2000s and early 2010s have seen the continued prominence of US defense firms and the growing global clout of corporations from emerging economies. According to SIPRI, global

681 Jean Guisnel, “Quand le chef d’état-major de la marine se lâche,” Le Point, 16 June 2011, http://www.lepoint.fr/chroniqueurs-du-point/jean-guisnel/quand-le-chef-d-etat-major-de-la-marine-se- lache-16-06-2011-1342870_53.php (accessed 2 May 2013). 682 France No. 1 (2010), 9, sec. 1.

104 arms sales reached an estimated US$410 billion in 2011.683 Its data did not include Chinese firms due to the absence of reliable data on their sales. Out of SIPRI’s top 100 defense companies

SIPRI – Top 20 Defense Firms 2011 (Figures in millions of US dollars. Graph does not include Chinese firms.) Arms Arms Arms Sales as 2011 Rank Percent Company Country Sales Sales Percentage of Rank 2010 Change 2011 2010 Total Sales, 2011 1 1 USA 36,720 35,730 2.8% 78 2 3 Boeing USA 31,830 31,360 1.5% 46 3 2 BAE Systems UK 29,150 32,880 -11.3% 95 4 5 General Dynamics USA 23,760 23,940 -0.8% 73 5 6 Raytheon USA 22,470 22,980 -2.2% 90 6 4 Northrop Grumman USA 21,390 28,150 -24.0% 81 7 7 EADS EU 16,390 16,360 0.2% 24 8 8 Finmeccanica Italy 14,560 14,410 1.0% 60 9 9 L-3 Communications USA 12,520 13,070 -4.2% 83 10 10 United Technologies USA 11,640 11,410 2.0% 20 11 11 Thales France 9,480 9,950 -4.7% 52 12 12 SAIC USA 7,940 8,230 -3.5% 75 13 NA Huntington Ingalls Ind. USA 6,380 NA NA 97 14 15 Honeywell USA 5,280 5,400 -2.2% 14 15 16 Safran France 5,240 4,800 9.2% 32 16 14 Computer Sciences Corp. USA 4,860 5,940 -18.2% 31 17 17 Rolls-Royce UK 4,670 4,330 7.9% 26 18 21 United Aircraft Corp. Russia 4,440 3,440 29.1% 80 19 13 Oshkosh Truck USA 4,370 7,080 -38.3% 58 20 18 General Electric USA 4,100 4,300 -4.7% 3 Source: "The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies in the world excluding China, 2011," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 18 February 2013, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/Top100/2011 (accessed 29 March 2013). ranking, 44 were based in the United States and these accounted for 60 percent of global arms sales. The 30 firms based in Western Europe made up another 29 percent of global arms sales, down from 32 percent in 2008.684 685 Among the top 10 firms in 2011, eight were headquartered

683 “18 Feb. 2013: SIPRI Top 100 arms sales decreased in 2011: companies pursue diverse strategies in response to austerity measures,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 18 February 2013, http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2013/AP_PR (accessed 27 March 2013). 684 Ibid.

105 in the United States, while the other two were London-based BAE Systems and Leiden-based

European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS).686

In March 2013, SIPRI announced that, for the first time since the end of the Cold War,

China was among the top five arms exporters in the world. 687 For the period 2008-2012, the think tank estimated that the US represented 30 percent of global arms exports, Russia 26 percent, Germany seven percent, France six percent, and China five percent.688 The United

Kingdom fell from the top five lineup for the first time since SIPRI began its ranking in 1950.689

The announcement punctuated the rise of new defense manufacturers, such as China, Israel

(tenth in the world), South Africa (17th) South Korea (16th), and (ninth), as well as changes in consumption patterns.690 For the same period examined by SIPRI – 2008-2012 – Asia and Oceania made up 47 percent of global imports of conventional weapons.691 This marked a

35 percent increase in imports by Asia and Oceania.692 The Middle East came second (17 percent), followed by Europe (15 percent), the Americas (11 percent), and Africa (nine percent).693 Deliveries to European countries, meanwhile, fell by 20 percent between 2003-2007

685 Susan T. Jackson, “SIPRI Fact Sheet – The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-Producing Companies, 2008,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, April 2010, http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1004.pdf (29 March 2013). 686 "The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies in the world excluding China, 2011," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 18 February 2013, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/Top100/2011 (accessed 29 March 2013). 687 “18 Mar.: China replaces UK as world’s fifth largest arms exporter, says SIPRI,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 18 March 2013, http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2013/ATlaunch (accessed 27 March 2013). 688 Ibid. 689 Ibid. 690 “The Top 20 Arms Exporters, 2008-2012,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2012, http://www.sipri.org/googlemaps/2013_of_at_top_20_exp_map.html (accessed 2 May 2013). 691 “18 Mar.: China,” SIPRI. 692 Paul Holtom, Mark Bromley, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman, “SIPRI Fact Sheet – Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2012,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2013, http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=455 (accessed 29 March 2013). 693 Ibid.

106 and 2008-12.694 It is in this increasingly competitive global economy that European firms must struggle for sales.

State of European Defense Industry

The EU has forged an ever more integrated common market, facilitating cross-border operations for European and foreign firms alike, leading to trans-national mergers and acquisitions. While other industries have undergone different degrees of integration at the European-level, the

European defense sector remains generally fragmented along national lines.695 This is in part due to national sovereignty concerns and the desire to protect jobs. This means that the

European defense sector is marked by “over-capacity and redundancies in its interior market at a time when European public orders are falling over the long-run.”696 This is an unsustainable model, particularly at a time when austerity is prompting governments to cut defense spending.

As the French 2008 white paper said, “No nation in Europe – not even France or the United

Kingdom – still retains the ability to support on its own a defense industry capable of providing for all the needs of its armed forces.”697 Unless they integrate or cooperate European firms may lose the ability to manufacture certain capabilities and fall behind foreign competitors.

In the naval field, there are at least six major European firms competing for dwindling naval procurement contracts: Britain’s BAE Systems and Babcock International Group, France’s

DCNS, Germany’s Thyssenkrupp, Italy’s Fincantieri, and Spain’s Navantia.698 These firms provide contracts to some 20 naval works across Europe.699 This compares to the United States, where a

694 “18 Mar.: China,” SIPRI. 695 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 263. 696 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 79. 697 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 264. 698 "The SIPRI Top 100,” SIPRI. 699 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 263.

107 post-Cold War restructuring reduced the number of major naval firms to two – General

Dynamics and Huntington Ingalls Industries – and the number of military shipyards to six.700 701

SIPRI – Top 20 European Defense Firms 2011 (Figures in millions of US dollars. Graph does not include Russian firms.) Arms Sales as 2011 Rank Arms Arms Percent Company Country Percentage of Rank 2010 Sales 2011 Sales 2010 Change Total Sales, 2011 3 2 BAE Systems UK 29,150 32,880 -11.3% 95 7 7 EADS EU 16,390 16,360 0.2% 24 8 8 Finmeccanica Italy 14,560 14,410 1.0% 60 15 16 Safran France 5,240 4,800 9.2% 32 17 17 Rolls-Royce UK 4,670 4,330 7.9% 26 24 22 DCNS France 3,610 3,320 8.7% 100 25 29 Saab Sweden 3,080 2,780 10.8% 85 26 32 Rheinmetall Germany 2,980 2,660 12.0% 48 30 30 Babcock Int. Group UK 2,850 2,770 2.9% 58 43 41 CEA France 2,300 2,200 4.5% 40 45 43 Serco UK 2,230 2,130 4.7% 30 47 38 Cobham UK 2,160 2,260 -4.4% 73 49 57 ThyssenKrupp Germany 2,080 1,340 55.2% 3 54 54 Krauss-Maffei Wegmann Germany 1,740 1,590 9.4% 96 55 44 Navantia Spain 1,650 2,010 -17.9% 95 59 55 Kongsberg Gruppen Norway 1,440 1,500 -4.0% 53 60 63 Diehl Germany 1,380 1,210 14.0% 34 62 61 Group Dassault France 1,240 1,270 -2.4% 27 63 73 Fincantieri Italy 1,220 940 29.8% 37 66 56 Nexter France 1,120 1,430 -21.7% 95 Source: "The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies in the world excluding China, 2011," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 18 February 2013, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/Top100/2011 (accessed 29 March 2013).

The European land defense sector is dominated by 10 major firms in five countries:

Britain’s BAE Systems; France’s Thales, Renault Trucks Defense, and Nexter; Finland’s Patria;

Germany’s Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, and Italy’s Finmeccanica and Iveco

Defence.702 703 The land market, however, is in reality further divided, as a host of smaller firms

700 Ibid. 701 "The SIPRI Top 100,” SIPRI. 702 Ibid.

108 also operate across Europe.704 Many of these companies serve particularly niches or their national governments.705 The United States, meanwhile, has four major firms involved in manufacturing land vehicles and heavy equipment: General Dynamics, Oshkosh Defense,

Navistar, and AM General, with the Pentagon also procuring from BAE Systems’ US division.706

In the aviation sector, the competing firms include the European consortium EADS, as well as Britain’s BAE Systems, France’s Dassault Group, Italy’s Finmeccanica, Finland’s Patria, and Sweden’s Saab. Five firms share three prominent jet fighter programs in Europe: Saab with the Gripen, Dassault with the Rafale, and a consortium of EADS’ Cassidian division, Alenia

Aeronautica, and BAE Systems with the Eurofighter Typhoon.707 708 709 The US, meanwhile, has four major aviation manufacturers: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and United

Technologies.710 Three smaller firms include Textron, Triumph Group, and Hawker Beechcraft.

Some integration has taken place in the European aerospace and electronics sector, particularly with the creation of EADS and the merger of two helicopter subsidiaries –

Finmeccanica’s Augusta and GKN’s Westland Helicopters – to create a Finmeccanica wholly-

703 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Compte rendu n° 20: Audition, ouverte à la presse, de M. Gérard Amiel, PDG de Renault Trucks Défense, sur la dimension industrielle du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale,” Assemblée Nationale, 14 November 2012, http://www.assemblee- nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/12-13/c1213021.asp#P5_295 (accessed 12 May 2013). 704 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Compte rendu n° 30: Audition, de M. Philippe Burtin, PDG du groupe Nexter, sur la dimension industrielle du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale,” Assemblée Nationale, 4 December 2012, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr- cdef/12-13/c1213030.asp#P5_264 (accessed 23 April 2013). 705 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 263. 706 "The SIPRI Top 100,” SIPRI. 707 “Consortium Structure,” Eurofighter Typhoon, http://www.eurofighter.com/eurofighter- typhoon/programme-organisation/consortium-structure.html (accessed 6 April 2013). 708 “Rafale – Introduction,” Dassault Aviation, http://www.dassault- aviation.com/en/defense/rafale/introduction.html?L=1 (accessed 6 April 2013). 709 “Gripen – a multirole fighter of the latest generation,” SAAB, http://www.saabgroup.com/Air/Gripen- Fighter-System/ (accessed 6 April 2013). 710 "The SIPRI Top 100,” SIPRI.

109 owned subsidiary: AgustaWestland.711 Another success was the creation of MBDA, a consortium of the missile-development units of BAE Systems, EADS, and Finmeccanica forged in December

2001.712 In the years that followed, MBDA became the second-leading missile manufacturer in the world.713 In spite of these efforts, the European defense market remains marked by

“national logics” or struggles to retain national oversight over research and development, strategic manufacturing decisions, and job security.714 The European programs that are launched are generally multilateral or bilateral projects coordinated by the Organization for Joint

Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), an inter-governmental body that brings governments and firms together on individual projects.715 Previous European multilateral projects include the A-

400M, FREMM frigate, and the Tiger helicopter.716 Although multilateral projects help participants secure economies of scale and share research and technology, they suffer from frequent delays and cost increases due to the difficulties of coordinating between more than two governments. Furthermore, participating governments are keen to make sure their national firms obtain a percentage of the contracts – i.e. jobs – regardless of the resulting inefficiencies.

Some European defense firms are thus more favorable to mergers or bilateral projects, such as the Lancaster House agreements. Tom Enders, the CEO of EADS, said in 2012 that “programs

711 “Our heritage,” AgustaWestland, 2012, http://www.agustawestland.com/content/our-heritage-0 (accessed 30 March 2013). 712 “MBDA – A WORLD LEADER – AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN COMPANY,”MBDA Missile Systems, http://www.mbda-systems.com/about-mbda/mbda-at-a-glance/ (accessed 30 March 2013). 713 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Compte rendu n°22: Audition de M. Louis Gallois, Commissaire général a l’investissement, au titre de ses fonctions passes de PDG d’EADS et d’Airbus, sur le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale.” Assemblée Nationale, 20 November 2012, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/pdf/cr-cdef/12-13/c1213022.pdf (accessed 4 April 2012). 714 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 263. 715 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 80. 716 “OCCAR Programmes,” OCCAR, http://www.occar.int/programmes (accessed 14 March 2013).

110 involving many countries are often nightmares. It is better to have a bilateral alliance or a leading nation.”717

US Competition - Market

The most important competitors to the divided European defense sector are US firms as these can match or surpass European firms on technology, benefit from the largest defense market in the world, and, due to NATO common standards, manufacture weapons that can easily be incorporated into European armies. US defense firms are the largest in the world in large part due to enormous US defense market. In 2011, the United States spent some US$739.3 billion on defense, including US$131.2 on procurement.718 The large orders placed by the Pentagon translate into significant economies of scale, which lower costs and make US defense firms competitive internationally, particularly in a deeply divided European market.719 Additionally, US firms benefit from the fact that the majority of European states are now consumers and not producers of military hardware. Efforts to standardize defense procurement in NATO, including the Smart Defence initiative, may boost US defense sales in Europe as countries find it easier to buy off-the-shelf US capabilities rather than develop industries of their own.720 US equipment may be cheaper, but this leads to losses in European jobs, industries, and autonomy. Two key

NATO projects, the Alliance Grand Surveillance (AGS) and missile defense systems, are both oriented towards US industries, boosting US firms in Europe.721 The US technological dominance and willingness to sell advanced equipment to European countries threaten Europe’s ability to generate these capabilities in the future. Another concern is the significant gap in research and development on both sides of the Atlantic. In fiscal year 2011, the US government spent some

717 “Avion de combat, missiles, drones,” Les Échos. 718 “The Military Balance,” 112, no. 1: 44. 719 Védrine, 21. 720 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 45. 721 Ibid.

111

55 percent of its total research and development spending on defense, some US$81.4 billion.722

Geopolitical calculations also favor US firms as some European countries are keen to purchase

US military technology in an effort to tighten bilateral links with Washington.723 Finally, US firms may look to Europe to offset US budget cuts. In his November 2012 testimony to two French

National Assembly commissions, French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian warned that cuts in US defense spending will likely lead US firms to aggressively seek contracts in Europe, threatening European defense firms.724

British firms are particularly involved in the lucrative US defense market and many continental European firms are keen to follow their lead. In spite of claims to the contrary, however, US procurement is marked by protectionist measures, such as “Buy American” provisions, strict security requirements, and active lobbying on the part of US-based companies.725 The British Royal Aeronautical Society, an air industry advocacy group, told the

Defence Committee for its 2013 report that “The US, while more open to inward investment, also takes care to ensure that major contracts are sourced from within the US and major programs led by American prime contractors.”726 In its testimony to the House of Commons

Defence Community, the British Aerospace, Defence, Security, and Space Industries (ADS) trade organization claimed the United States’ KC-X program to secure a next-generation aerial tanker

722 Binyamin Appelbaum, “A Shrinking Military Budget May Take Neighbors With It,” New York Times, 6 January 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/us/a-hidden-cost-of-military-cuts-could-be- invention-and-its-industries.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 6 April 2013). 723 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Comptes rendu n° 33: Audition, ouverte à la presse, conjointe avec les commissions des affaires étrangères et des affaires européennes, de M. Jean- Yves Le Drian, ministre de la défense, sur la politique européenne de défense,” Assemblée Nationale, 5 December 2012, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/12-13/c1213025.asp (accessed 4 April 2013). 724 Ibid. 725 Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition, 28. 726 Ibid., 63.

112 was an example of US protectionism.727 The US Air Force first selected the EADS/Northrop

Grumman bid, which involved a variant of the A330 MRTT to be assembled in Alabama, in

February 2008.728 Boeing, however, challenged the US Air Force’s decision on technical grounds.729 The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) upheld Boeing’s challenge, prompting US Defense Secretary Robert Gates to cancel the competition and order the air force to start afresh.730 731 In March 2010, Northrop Grumman dropped from the bid, claiming the air force proposal request was biased in favor of Boeing; EADS went ahead with a solo bid.732 In

February 2011, the Pentagon awarded the initial US$3.5 billion contract to Boeing, claiming it offered a cheaper bid.733

Exports

In an effort to offset the drop in domestic consumption, European firms are engaged in a violent competition with each other and foreign competitors for sales in emerging economies. Both the

British and French white papers place great importance on overseas arms sales as means to preserve their defense industries and research base in times of austerity.734 735 In 2008-12,

727 Ibid., 28. 728 Leslie Wayne, “Northrop and EADS Win Refueling Tanker Deal,” New York Times, 29 February 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/29/business/29cnd-tanker.html?_r=0 (accessed 24 February 2013). 729 Boeing Protests U.S. Air Force Tanker Contract Award,” Boeing, 11 March 2008, http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2008/q1/080311b_nr.html (accessed 24 February 2013). 730 “Statement Regarding the Bid Protest Decision Resolving the Aerial Refueling Tanker Protest by the Boeing Company,” United States Government Accountability Office, 18 June 2008, http://web.archive.org/web/20080625201918/http://www.king5.com/sharedcontent/northwest/pdf/gao _boeing.pdf (accessed 24 February 2013). 731 John J. Kruzel, “Pentagon Reopens Bidding on Tanker Contract,” U.S. Department of Defense, 9 July 2008, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50453 (accessed 24 February 2013). 732 Jon Ostrower, “Northrop Grumman declines to bid on latest KC-X RFP,” Flightglobal, 9 March 2010, http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/northrop-grumman-declines-to-bid-on-latest-kc-x-rfp- 339205/ (accessed 24 February 2013). 733 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Boeing bests EADS with aerial tanker win,” Reuters, 25 February 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/25/us-usa-tanker-idUSTRE71N0YA20110225 (accessed 24 February 2013). 734 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 30. 735 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 279.

113

France was the fourth-largest arms supplier in the world, representing some six percent of world deliveries. The Asia and Oceania region received 54 percent of French defense exports, followed by Europe (14 percent), Africa (13 percent), and the Middle East (11 percent).736 In its November

2012 testimony to the French national assembly, the defense industry lobby group CIDEF claimed that 35 percent of French defense products are exported and that exports make up to

50 percent of French defense firms’ turnovers.737 The United Kingdom, meanwhile, fell to sixth place for 2008-12, representing some four percent of world deliveries.738 Its sales were largely focused on the Middle East and the Asia and Oceania region, particularly Saudi Arabia, India, and Oman.739 Although both Britain and France rank in the top ten, they are both behind the leading two actors – the United States and Russia – and are threatened by rising players in a global market place oversaturated by foreign competition. French arms exports fell by 18 percent between SIPRI’s 2003-07 and 2008-12 periods of analysis in spite of a global rise in arms sales.740 Britain, meanwhile, fell out of SIPRI’s top-five ranking for the first time since it began measuring international arms sales in 1950.741 The UK also became the largest arms importer in

Europe, with an 18 percent increase in arms purchases between 2003-07 and 2008-12.742

Competition from new actors is particularly fierce in the land defense market, where barriers to entry are smaller than the aerospace sector.743 Previously consumers of western military

736 Holtom, Bromley, Wezeman, and Wezeman, “SIPRI Fact Sheet.” 737 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Compte rendu n° 23: Audition, ouverte à la presse, de M. Christian Mons, PDG de Panhard, président du Groupement des industries françaises de défense terrestre (GIGAT), et de M. Eric Trappier, directeur général international de Dassault Aviation, représentant du Conseil des industries de défense françaises (CIDEF), sur la dimension industrielle du livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale,” Assemblée Nationale, 21 November 2012, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/12-13/c1213023.asp (accessed 6 April 2013). 738 “The Top 20 Arms Exporters, 2008-2012,” SIPRI. 739 “Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by supplier. Deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 2008 to 2012,” SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, 30 March 2013. 740 Holtom, Bromley, Wezeman, and Wezeman, “SIPRI Fact Sheet.” 741 Ibid. 742 Ibid. 743 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 23.”

114 hardware, Brazil, Israel, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey are now competitors in the development of armored vehicles and artillery systems.744 The large number of suppliers eager for sales enables consumers to demand low costs, political favors, and technology transfers, with the aim of jumpstarting defense industries of their own.745 In agreeing to these technology transfers at a time of inadequate research and development, British and French firms risk creating future rivals.746 This counterproductive competition has helped convince some

European firms of the need for greater integration.

Perhaps the most aggressive competition has pitted the Rafale, built by a France’s

Dassault Aviation, and the Eurofighter Typhoon, the product of a consortium of firms including

Britain’s BAE Systems. While the Eurofighter was successfully exported to Austria, Oman, and

Saudi Arabia, the Rafale stumbled on the international stage.747 748 Cuts to procurement orders in the Eurofighter’s home base – Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain – and French efforts to offset the budgetary burden imposed by the Rafale spurred an aggressive search for contracts by both sides. The contest between the two programs culminated in India’s tender for 126 multi-role combat aircraft, a contract estimated at US$15 billion. The “contract of the century” pitted the two European fighters against the US-built Lockheed Martin F-16 and Boeing F/A-18, the

Swedish Saab Gripen, and the Russian Mig-35. In April 2011, India narrowed its choice down to two possible fighters: the Eurofighter and the Rafale. Ultimately, Indian officials announced in

744 Ibid. 745 Pierre Tran, “Gulf States Squeeze Suppliers,” Defense News, 23 February 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130223/DEFREG01/302230013/Gulf-States-Squeeze-Suppliers (accessed 27 March 2013). 746 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.” 747 BAE Systems, “Press Release – BAE Systems Welcomes Oman Order for Typhoon and Hawk Aircraft,” Eurofighter, 21 December 2012, http://www.eurofighter.com/media/news0/news-detail/article/info-bae- systems-welcomes-oman-order-for-typhoon-and-hawk-aircraft.html (accessed 26 March 2013). 748 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 79.

115

January 2012 that it would open exclusive talks with Dassault.749 British Prime Minister David

Cameron, however, sought to revive Indian interest in the Eurofighter in two state visits: one in

February 2012 and another a year later.750 751 Cameron’s charms, however, failed to sway Indian hearts; it also coincided with a corruption scandal engulfing the US$750 million sale of a dozen helicopters by AgustaWestland, an Anglo-Italian subsidiary of Finmeccanica, over charges of bribery.752 As of March 2013, talks continued between Dassault, Paris, and New Delhi, with reports that the Indians might order an additional 63 planes.753

While the Rafale pulled ahead of the Eurofighter in India, the Typhoon appeared to make a comeback in the Persian Gulf, where the (UAE) was also weighing the two planes.754 The deal was particularly important for Dassault as reports surfaced in

January 2012 that Kuwait and Qatar would likely follow the UAE’s decision on the Rafale.755 Both

Sarkozy and his successor, Francois Hollande, traveled to the UAE to support the Rafale’s bid.756

749 Hasnain Kazim, “EADS Loses Massive Contract: India Opts for French Fighter Jets,” Spiegel Online International, 1 February 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/eads-loses-massive- contract-india-opts-for-french-fighter-jets-a-812714.html (accessed 12 May 2013). 750 Patrick Wintour, “Cameron looks to persuade India to rethink Eurofighter Typhoon deal,” The Guardian, 1 February 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/feb/01/cameron-india- eurofighter-typhoon-deal (accessed 26 March 2013). 751 George Parker and Victor Mallet, “PM in last-ditch bid for Indian fighter deal,” Financial Times, 15 February 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2dad53d8-7775-11e2-9ebc- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Og0U6WpD (accessed 26 March 2013). 752 Andrew Osborn, “Cameron on India trade trip as graft scandal erupts,” Reuters, 18 February 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/cameron-pushes-mumbai-bangalore-development-corridor-063515021.html (accessed 7 April 2013). 753 “Rafale jets top agenda on Hollande’s India trip,” France 24, 14 February 2013, http://www.france24.com/en/20130213-hollande-india-rafale-fighter-jets-contract-france (accessed 26 March 2013). 754 UAE close to deciding between British and French fighters,” Reuters, 20 February 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/20/emirates-jets-idUSL6N0BJA1Y20130220 (accessed 26 March 2013). 755 “Qatar, Kuwait interested in Rafale warplanes,” Agence France-Presse, 9 January 2012, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5imd3IJIoFo19DbHXYHrEDTzCN9_Q?docId=CNG. 31c12903e07b213ec73b6a75b737ab08.731 (accessed 26 March 2013). 756 “AIRSHOW-UPDATE 1-Rafale warplane deal stalled, UAE says proposal 'unworkable,'” Reuters, 16 November 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/uae-warplanes-idUSL5E7MG2H620111116 (accessed 27 March 2013).

116

757 For his part, Cameron also traveled to the UAE in an effort to secure a contract estimated at six billion pounds.758 Cameron, however, proved more successful in Abu Dhabi than in New

Delhi, obtaining a joint defense partnership in November 2012 that No. 10 claimed represented a “marker of their interest” in the Typhoon.759 Securing the UAE contract, however, may prove a

Pyrrhic victory. The UAE, exploiting the plethora of would be providers, has a history of demanding costly upgrades and maintenance contracts, as well as technology transfers, from would-be suppliers. These requirements can be so onerous that they leave a provider recouping losses from sales to the UAE, as was the case of the sale of Leclerc tanks by France’s GIAT (now

Nexter) in 1991.760 Defense sales to autocratic monarchies in the Persian Gulf also raised human rights questions, which were embarrassing to Western countries in the aftermath of the Arab

Spring.761 762 Particularly troubling were sales to Saudi Arabia, whose forces crushed popular unrest in Bahrain in 2011.763 Cameron, however, was clear that he would make “absolutely no

757 Agence France-Presse, “Hollande to Maintain Gulf Trip; Defense Minister To Stay Home,” Defense News, 14 January 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130114/DEFREG01/301140010/Hollande-Maintain-Gulf-Trip-59- Defense-Minister-Stay-Home?odyssey=tab%7Ctopnews%7Ctext%7CFRONTPAGE (accessed 7 April 2013). 758 Nicholas Watt and Ian Black, “David Cameron arrives in Gulf on arms trade trip,” The Guardian, 5 November 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/nov/05/david-cameron-gulf-arms-trip (accessed 27 March 2013). 759 “Joint defence partnership between UK and the UAE announced,” BBC News, 6 November 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20216028 (accessed 7 April 2013). 760 Jean Guisnel, “Les Émiratis attendant le départ de Charles Edelstenne,” Le Point, 20 November 2012, http://www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/jean-guisnel/les-emiratis-attendent-le-depart-de-charles- edelstenne-20-11-2012-1531283_53.php (accessed 7 April 2013). 761 “David Cameron in the Gulf: Defence sales ‘legitimate,’” BBC News, 5 November 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20202058 (accessed 7 April 2013). 762 Judy Dempsey, “Europe Deals Arms While Defending Rights,” New York Times, 5 March 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/world/europe/06iht-letter06.html?_r=2&ref=judydempsey& (accessed 7 April 2013). 763 David S. Cloud and Neela Banerjee, “Saudi Arabian, gulf forces enter Bahrain,” Los Angeles Times, 15 March 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/15/world/la-fg-bahrain-troops-20110315 (accessed 7 April 2013).

117 apologies,” for building defense ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, claiming their security “is important for our security and this is vital for British jobs.”764

The Rafale and Eurofighters are expected to face off in other markets, including Canada and Malaysia.765 766 Rafale, meanwhile, faces off with Saab’s Gripen in Switzerland and Brazil.767

768 The Eurofighter, meanwhile, faces the Gripen in Denmark.769 This fratricidal conflict between

European fighter projects diminished possible returns for the European firms involved and divided European lobbying efforts before those of the US, which is involved in nearly all these contests.770

UK and French Firms’ Support for Defense Cooperation

Faced with a deeply divided European defense market, falling domestic spending, US dominance, and rising competition in export markets, British and French firms have called on their governments to foster closer defense industrial cooperation.

In the lead up to the release of France’s 2013 white paper on defense, the French parliament invited French defense firms and their associated advocacy groups to voice their

764 “Joint defence partnership,” BBC News. 765 Michael Den Tandt, “New jet-fighter process reportedly meant to prevent favouritism,” O Canada, 14 December 2012, http://o.canada.com/2012/12/14/1215-f-35-dentandt/ (accessed 27 March 2013). 766 “Rafale: Dassault prêt à installer une chaîne d’assemblage en Malaisie,” La Tribune, 26 March 2013, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1262538/1/.html (accessed 12 May 2013). 767 Gerard O’Dwyer, “Will Exit Clause Doom ‘Super’ Gripen?” Defense News, 30 September 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120930/DEFREG01/309300001/Will-Exit-Clause-Doom-8216- Super-8217-Gripen (accessed 7 April 2013). 768 Joe Leahy, “Foreign defence groups drawn to Brazil,” Financial Times, 28 January 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c7e8e636-5f1c-11e2-8250-00144feab49a.html#axzz2Pnh6hdxV (accessed 7 April 2013). 769 Andrew Chuter, “Denmark Relaunches Fighter Jet Competition,” Defense News, 14 March 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130314/DEFREG01/303140009/Denmark-Relaunches-Fighter- Jet-Competition (accessed 7 April 2013). 770 Tim Hepher, “U.S. budget cuts sharpen battle for fighter jet exports,” Chicago Tribune, 10 September 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-10/news/sns-rt-us-arms-fightersbre88906f- 20120909_1_fighter-jet-gripen-jets-sweden-s-saab (accessed 7 April 2013).

118 interests in parliamentary hearings. Many of the participants voiced their support for “l’Europe de la défense” or European defense cooperation. The French defense industry advocacy group

CIDEF called on the EU and French government to facilitate defense industrial cooperation and avoid the nationalist practices that undermined previous multinational cooperation.771 For his part, the CEO of state-owned Nexter, Philippe Burtin, told the National Assembly that he sought closer cooperation with other firms at the EU level to remain competitive in the land defense sector.772 Perhaps reflecting the foreign policy ambitions of his state bosses, Burtin said his firm sought the “preservation of an industrial capacity in Europe, autonomous in its conception.”773

The CEO of Renault Trucks Defense, Gérard Amiel, claimed that the centralization of the different French firms in the land defense sector was “highly desirable.”774 He also pointed out that RTD already belonged to an international conglomerate: Volvo Group. In his testimony, the former CEO of EADS and Airbus Louis Gallois called on the French government to consider defense industrial restructuring within France as well as at the European level.775 He lamented the slow pace of European-level industrial consolidation, pointing to the failure of DCNS and

ThyssenKrupp to cooperate on submarines as the German firm feared being absorbed into a

French entity.776 For its part, French state-owned DCNS warned in December 2012 that

European countries no longer have the “luxury of simultaneously developing six frigate programs, four submarine programs, and three torpedo programs.”777 Whether through cooperation or market failure, DCNS CEO Patrick Boissier said that “rationalization will impose

771 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 23.” 772 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 30.” 773 Ibid. 774 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 21.” 775 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 22.” 776 Ibid. 777 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Compte rendu n° 31: Audition, ouverte à la presse, de M. Patrick Boissier, PDG du groupe DCNS, sur la dimension industrielle du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale,” Assemblée Nationale, 5 December 2012, http://www.assemblee- nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/12-13/c1213031.asp (accessed 4 April 2013).

119 itself.”778 Thales CEO Luc Vigneron, meanwhile, said his firm saw greater European defense industrial integration as necessary and that the firm had sought to foster links with other firms across the continent by “sectors, products, and niches” in a “bottom-up” cooperation effort.779

The CEO of EADS, Thomas Enders, claimed EADS was “particularly concerned with European defense…”780 Enders claimed that at a time of decreasing defense spending in Europe and growing international competition, “it is the right time to forge cooperation.”781 To preserve the

European defense industry, Enders said it was necessary to “consolidate our industrial capacities at the European level: what was achieved with Airbus and MBDA must be applied to the whole of the defense industry.”782 For its part, Dassault Aviation, which previously opposed European cooperation in favor of a one-company approach, has become a supporter of industrial cooperation as demonstrated by its leadership in the multinational Neuron drone project.783

Perhaps reflecting the euroscepticism of many members of parliament, British defense firms did not focus on European defense integration in their testimonies to the House of

Commons. Nonetheless, many witnesses emphasized the importance of international cooperation if Britain is to protect its defense sector. In his September 2010 testimony to the

House of Commons Defence Committee, BAE Systems CEO Ian King claimed there were

778 Ibid. 779 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Compte rendu n° 32: Audition, ouverte à la presse, de M. Luc Vigneron, PDG du groupe Thales, sur la dimension industrielle du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale,” Assemblée Nationale, 5 December 2012, http://www.assemblee- nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/12-13/c1213032.asp (accessed 4 April 2013). 780 Commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense, et des forces armées, “Audition de M. Thomas Enders, président exécutif d’EADS,” Sénat, 20 February 2013, http://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu- commissions/20130218/etr.html#toc2 (accessed 6 April 2013). 781 Ibid. 782 Ibid. 783 Valérie Lion, “Dassault joue son avenir en 2013,” L’Expansion, 9 January 2013, http://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/entreprise/dassault-joue-son-avenir-en-2013_367545.html (accessed 26 April 2013).

120 numerous benefits to be gained from partnerships and partnering agreements between British firms and those in continental Europe.784 Rear Admiral Rees Ward, the heads of defense trade

SIPRI – Top French and British Defense Firms 2011 (Figures in millions of US dollars) Arms Sales as 2011 Rank Arms Sales Arms Sales Percent Company Country Percentage of Rank 2010 2011 2010 Change Total Sales, 2011 3 2 BAE Systems UK 29,150 32,880 -11.3% 95 7 7 EADS EU 16,390 16,360 0.2% 24 11 11 Thales France 9,480 9,950 -4.7% 52 15 16 Safran France 5,240 4,800 9.2% 32 17 17 Rolls-Royce UK 4,670 4,330 7.9% 26 24 22 DCNS France 3,610 3,320 8.7% 100 30 30 Babcock Int. Group UK 2,850 2,770 2.9% 58 43 41 CEA France 2,300 2,200 4.5% 40 45 43 Serco UK 2,230 2,130 4.7% 30 47 38 Cobham UK 2,160 2,260 -4.4% 73 62 61 Group Dassault France 1,240 1,270 -2.4% 27 66 56 Nexter France 1,120 1,430 -21.7% 95 68 75 Chemring Group UK 1,080 890 21.3% 90 72 66 GKN UK 970 1,050 -7.6% 11 74 83 Meggitt UK 940 780 20.5% 40 90 76 Ultra Electronics UK 760 880 -13.6% 65 Source: "The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies in the world excluding China, 2011," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 18 February 2013, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/Top100/2011 (accessed 29 March 2013). association ADS, told the same committee that partnerships were particularly rewarding when undertaken with a state with similar research and development budgets.785 In an April 2012 written testimony to the committee, ADS claimed “collaborative programs” offer opportunities for the UK to maintain its defense industry.786 In its written testimony, EADS UK claimed that “bi-

784 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-81),” Parliament, 15 September 2010, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmdfence/451/10090802.htm (accessed 6 April 2013). 785 Ibid. 786 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Written evidence from ADS,” Parliament, 6 February 2013, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/9/9vw02.htm (accessed 6 April 2013).

121 lateral and multi-lateral acquisition presents the only way that many capabilities will be realized in the future.”787 In an October 2012 written testimony to the Defence Committee, the Royal

Aeronautical Society, an advocacy group for the aerospace industry, voiced support for the failed 2012 merger between BAE Systems and EADS, claiming it made “commercial sense” and would mark “an important and arguably long overdue step towards rationalization of the

European Defence Industrial Base (EDIB).”788

In spite of these calls for defense cooperation, greater defense rapprochement has been slow to materialize. A 2012 report by the French Cour des comptes claimed there was no

“significant rapprochement” between French firms and its European counterparts from 2009 to

2012.789 It blamed the divergent interests of states in the political industrial sector and the need to protect jobs for this reality. In the absence of structured integration, British and French firms have cooperated with one another at the national, binational, and multinational levels. BAE

Systems and Nexter, for example, began cooperating on a 40mm telescopic cannon before the

Lancaster House agreements.790 These agreements paved the way for greater cooperation.

MBDA is slated to benefit from the Franco-British agreement to develop a light anti-ship missile.791 The same firm also benefited from the British decision to sign on to a French anti-tank missile project.792 Dassault and BAE Systems, meanwhile, are to cooperate on developing new combat drones.793 In September 2012, EADS and BAE Systems demonstrated their support for

787 Ibid. 788 House of Commons Defence Committee, “The impact on UK Defence of the proposed merger of BAE Systems and EADS – Written Evidence,” Parliament, 23 October 2012, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/writev/bae/bae.pdf (accessed 6 April 2013). 789 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 80. 790 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 30.” 791 “Avion de combat, missiles, drones,” Les Échos. 792 Ibid. 793 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 23.”

122

European defense integration by announcing plans for a US$48 billion merger that would have created the world’s largest defense firm.794

BAE Systems-EADS Merger

In explaining the move, executives at BAE Systems and EADS claimed the merger was driven by strategic rationale. In 2006, BAE Systems sold its shares in EADS to concentrate solely on the defense industry and deepen its involvement in the US defense sector. It made this decision at a time when Airbus was embattled from delays with its flagship A380 project, while US defense spending reached new post-Cold War heights.795 By 2011, BAE derived some 95 percent of its revenue from the defense sector and was vulnerable to the cuts in defense spending that wracked developed countries in the wake of the global financial crisis.796 The British and US spending cuts particularly affected BAE Systems, with the firm reporting a drop in profit of six percent in 2012 or £1.89 billion (US$2.9 billion).797 For its part, EADS benefited from the continued strength of the civilian passenger aircraft sector, which benefited from growth in emerging markets. In 2011, EADS generated only 24 percent of its revenue from the defense sector.798 The following year, EADS profits rose by 19 percent to €1.2 billion (US$1.6 billion).799

EADS, however, remained keen to build-up its defense wing and to increase its presence in the

794 Dan Milmo, “BAE and EADS announce plans for £29.8bn merger,” The Guardian, 12 September 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/sep/12/bae-eads-announce-plans-merger (accessed 4 April 2013). 795 David Gow, “BAE agrees sale of stake in ailing Airbus,” The Guardian, 7 September 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/sep/07/theairlineindustry.travelnews1 (accessed 7 April 2013). 796 "The SIPRI Top 100,” SIPRI. 797 “BAE Systems’ Profit Falls Amid Defence Cuts,” Sky News, 21 February 2013, http://news.sky.com/story/1054939/bae-systems-profit-falls-amid-defence-cuts (accessed 6 April 2013). 798 "The SIPRI Top 100,” SIPRI. 799 Nicola Clark, “EADS Profit Soars 19 Percent for 2012,” New York Times, 27 February 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/business/global/eads-profit-soars-19-percent.html (accessed 6 April 2013).

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United States as demonstrated by its pursuit of the US “KC-X” tender.800 It sought to expand into the defense sector to make sure that it could benefit from future defense spending increases and maintain a balanced portfolio.801 Therefore, BAE Systems and EADS viewed the merger as the chance to forge “a large European business – well balanced between the civilian and military and open to the US market” with the market share to compete against the US titans.802 In explaining the logic behind the proposed merger, Marwan Lahoud, the president of EADS

France, told the French National Assembly Defense Commission that the two firms had

“complementary” portfolios: while BAE is focused on defense and has a foothold in the US market, EADS is a largely civilian enterprise. 803 For his part, EADS CEO Thomas Enders said the merger was “part of a long-term industrial strategy to confront an increasingly global competition.”804 The accord was also meant to expand on EADS’ efforts to enter into the US market, which, in spite of the looming budget cuts, EADS expected to remain the leading market for aerospace and defense issues. Furthermore, the two firms would have benefited from cross- product learning, general economies of scale, and a stronger negotiating position with clients.805

The creation of a so-called “BEADS,” would have built a European titan with defense revenues on par or greater than the largest defense firm in the world in 2011: Lockheed

Martin.806 A “BEADS” would have assets in terrestrial, naval, and aerospace sectors and could

800 Stephen Trimble, “KC-X win would shift A330 Freighter assembly to US,” Flightglobal, 14 January 2008, http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/kc-x-win-would-shift-a330-freighter-assembly-to-us-220816/ (accessed 6 April 2013). 801 Commission des affaires étrangères, “Audition de M. Thomas Enders.” 802 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 22.” 803 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Compte rendu n°34: Audition, ouverte à la presse, de M. Marwan Lahoud, directeur général délégué du groupe EADS et président d’EADS France, sur la dimension industrielle du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale,” Assemblée Nationale, 11 December 2012, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/12-13/c1213034.asp (accessed 4 April 2013). 804 Commission des affaires étrangères, “Audition de M. Thomas Enders.” 805 Defence Committee, “The impact on UK Defence.” 806 "The SIPRI Top 100,” SIPRI.

124 have spurred greater European defense integration.807 Fearing they could be left in the cold,

Dassault, Finmeccanica, and others may have formed strategic alliances of their own to remain relevant.808 “BEADS” would also have united key elements of the British, French, and German defense industries, thus bringing together the three largest European defense powers. The merger, however, collapsed less than one month after it was unveiled due to political objections from Germany, although Britain and France also voiced concerns.809 The failure of the BAE

Systems and EADS merger is discussed in greater length in the “economic concerns” section of this essay.

Conclusion

Faced with dwindling domestic sales, growing competition from emerging powers, a difficult export market, and US technological dominance, a number of European defense firms have sought to merge or cooperate with each other. As anticipated by the research hypothesis, these factors encourage firms to promote greater European cooperation before their respective governments. The proposed merger of BAE Systems with EADS demonstrates that European firms are realizing they must unite or slowly wither away.

807 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 48. 808 Defence Committee, “The impact on UK Defence.” 809 “BAE-EADS Merger cancelled amid political impasse,” BBC News, 10 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19897699 (accessed 4 April 2013).

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Chapter Five: US Pressure on Europe

“I think in terms of the relationship we have with Washington… they want European countries like France and Britain to come together and share defense resources so we actually have greater capabilities.”810

Prime Minister David Cameron, November 2010

Although separated from Europe by the Atlantic Ocean, the United States remains the leading security actor on the continent. US military dominance makes the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) a powerful guarantee of national sovereignty for its European members.

The alliance provides the US with significant influence in Europe and on the development of

European defense integration. In the aftermath of the Franco-British St-Malo agreement on

European defense cooperation, for example, US Secretary Madeleine Albright warned the

Europeans against the so-called “three D’s, which is no diminution of NATO, no discrimination, and no duplication.”811 Albright’s words and other US warnings prompted atlanticist Europeans to look skeptically upon any European military cooperation outside NATO. Most prominent among these was the United Kingdom. In the late 2000s, however the US stance on European defense cooperation changed. The troubled US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan sapped US funds, tied down US forces, and undermined US resolve on the international stage, while the financial crisis accelerated the comparative rise of emerging economies. These developments prompted significant strategic reconsiderations in Washington. Among these was the decision to encourage European military cooperation to facilitate transatlantic burden sharing. If this

810 “UK-France Summit press conference.” 811 “Transcript: Albright Press Conference at NATO HDQS December 8,” Federation of American Scientists, 9 December 1998, http://www.fas.org/man/nato/news/1998/98120904_tlt.html (accessed 12 May 2013).

126 paper’s research hypothesis is correct, then this section should demonstrate that the US has encouraged closer European defense cooperation.

“Lead from Behind”

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the United States, Washington increased its defense spending and deployed military forces to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflict zones around the world. In 2001, the base US defense budget was a US$287 billion, while this figure climbed to about US$530 billion in 2013.812 This figure, however, does not include spending on combat operations, nuclear weapons, benefits, and other defense-related spending. The total figure reached US$739.3 billion in the 2011 continuing resolution for defense spending.813 The US increase in defense spending increased the disparity between the

US and its European allies. While the United States shouldered about half of alliance military spending in the Cold War, this figure reached 68 percent in 2007 and 72 percent in 2012.814 This is not merely a reflection of rising US defense spending; in 2012, only three non-US member states met NATO’s defense spending goal – two percent of GDP – down from four in 2007.815

The US, meanwhile, spent over 4.5 percent of its GDP on defense in 2012.816 These trends have prompted US officials to criticize European countries for allegedly free-riding on US security guarantees. In February 2010, Former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned against the

“pacification of Europe,” claiming it threatened the ability of NATO allies to cooperate in

812 Brad Plumer, “America’s staggering defense budget, in charts,” Washington Post, 7 January 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/07/everything-chuck-hagel-needs-to- know-about-the-defense-budget-in-charts/ (accessed 13 April 2013). 813 “The Military Balance,” 112, no. 1: 44. 814 “Secretary General’s Annual Report 2012,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 31 January 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_94220.htm (accessed 25 March 2013). 815 Ibid. 816 Ibid.

127 battle.817 For her part, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for an “honest discussion” of European defense spending and warned the alliance was at risk of becoming a

“talking shop.”818 Gates reiterated his concerns in his farewell address in Brussels in June

2011.819 In it, Gates voiced his fears about NATO becoming a “two-tier alliance” divided between member states focused on peacekeeping and those able to carry out combat missions.820 He also warned that US enthusiasm for the transatlantic alliance may fade if its European members did not increase their share of the burden.

“The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the

U.S. Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend

increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to

devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious

and capable partners in their own defense. Nations apparently willing and eager

for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by

reductions in European defense budgets. Indeed, if current trends in the decline

of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, Future U.S.

political leaders– those for whom the Cold War was not the formative

experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on America’s

investment in NATO worth the cost.”821

817 Ian Traynor, “’Pacification of Europe is threat to security, US tells NATO,” The Guardian, 23 February 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/23/pacification-europe-security-threat-us-nato (accessed 13 April 2013). 818 Ibid. 819 “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO) As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Brussels, Belgium, Friday, June 10, 2011,” U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581 (accessed 13 April 2013). 820 Ibid. 821 Ibid.

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So long as the United States shouldered global security, however, Europeans could pay homage to transatlantic solidarity while slashing their defense budgets. The US elite and public appetite for foreign operations however weakened after a decade-long commitment to

Afghanistan and Iraq, meanwhile.822 823 This reality has led the Obama administration to reconsider the conditions upon which the United States will enter a conflict. In matters deemed critical to Europeans, but not to Washington, the United States will be more willing to “pass the buck” on security matters to the Europeans. This was the case in the 2011 operations in Libya, when the phrase “lead from behind” emerged.824 While the administration shunned the term after its opponents claimed it was indicative of a presidency weak on national security, “lead from behind” embodies the desire to push Europeans to shoulder a greater burden of international security matters. In Libya, it was Britain and France, not the United States, which led the drive to secure UN authorization for a no-fly zone over Libya.825 French forces, meanwhile, initiated the first combat operations over Libya.826 The US was keen to avoid another entanglement in the Muslim world and sought to “pass the buck” to European countries.827

822 “United States Military Academy (West Point, NY) As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, West Point, NY, Friday, February 25, 2011,” U.S. Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539 (accessed 13 April 2013). 823 Paul Richter, “Most Americans want less foreign involvement, polls show,” Los Angeles Times, 25 October 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/25/nation/la-na-foreign-policy-isolation-20121025 (accessed 14 April 2013). 824 Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s foreign policy,” New Yorker, 2 May 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/02/110502fa_fact_lizza (accessed 2 May 2013). 825 Pierre-Antoine Donnet, “Britain, France ready Libya no-fly zone resolution,” Agence France-Presse, 7 March 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gjK- uTaUi4eIZffTsS13LCaFVYQw?docId=CNG.49104d077a72cbffeafe9d3689e92793.af1 (accessed 28 April 2013). 826 Defence Committee, Operations in Libya, 35. 827 Martha Raddatz, Jim Sciutto, and Alexander Marquardt, “U.S. Ready to Hand Over Libya Lead, But Who Will Take It?,” ABC News, 23 March 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International/gadhafi-defiant-libyan- coast-attacked/story?id=13200009#.UX2RUr7D_IU (accessed 28 April 2013).

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In spite of this ambition, the US ended up participating heavily in the Libyan operation because its Europeans lacked key capabilities. In the opening hours of the war, US cruise missiles and long-range bombers decimated Libyan air defenses, enabling European fighters to operate safely in the skies of Libya.828 In the days that followed, the US scaled down its armed participation, but remained critical to the operation. The United States provided badly needed command-and-control capabilities, air-to-air refueling tankers, cargo planes, UAVs, ISTAR platforms, and precision munitions.829 A report by the RUSI think tank on the Libyan operations claims the US provided 27 percent of dedicated surveillance assets used in Libya.830

The US decision to “lead from behind” in Libya brought to the fore the capability discrepancies between the US And its European allies In his farewell speech, Gates pointed out that few of the European NATO allies were able to take part in operations in Libya. “However, while every alliance member voted for Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission,” Gates said.831 “Frankly, many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can’t. The military capabilities simply aren’t there.”832 NATO Secretary

General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in September 2011, “European Allies and Canada led the effort [in Libya]. But this mission could not have been done without capabilities which only the

United States can offer. For example: drones, intelligence, and refueling aircraft. Let me put it

828 Dan De Luce, “US says fighters still bombing Libya air defense,” Agence France-Presse, 13 April 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hM3VyhXoC_FSqRRycYTOeByAn6tg?docId=CNG .02e59dd6cb2c6353408522f79d0dd27f.31 (accessed 2 May 2013). 829 House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, First review of the National Security Strategy 2010, HL Paper 265, HC 1384, 2010-12 sess. (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2012), 20. 830 “Accidental Heroes: Britain, France and the Libya Operation.” Royal United Services Institute (2011): 6. 831 “The Security and Defense Agenda,” U.S. Department of Defense. 832 Ibid.

130 bluntly: those capabilities are vital for all of us. More allies should be willing to obtain them.”833

The British House of Commons Defence Committee said in its report on the conflict that the US decision not to lead operations in Libya was “beneficial, in that it forced European members of

NATO to face their own responsibilities, and shone a light on the gaps in European capabilities.”834 While the Libya operation demonstrated the absence of adequate European

ISTAR and air-to-air refueling tankers, other gaps were not highlighted because the conflict occurred in close proximity to NATO airbases.835 Some of these gaps include strategic airlift and missile defense systems. Finally, in the wake of combat operations in Libya, the United States voiced its support for NATO and EU efforts to pool and share military capabilities to bolster

European capabilities.836 837 The Libya operation also raised the possibility that the US may leave

Europeans to police their own neighborhood in the future.838

“Pivot to Asia”

After centuries at the heart of international affairs, Europe and its former colonies in North

America and Oceania face the return of East Asia as a leading economic and political power.

Following Japan’s path to development, the Asian Tigers, China and the Southeast Asian economies have forged a path to rapid economic growth. In 2011, the GDP of East Asia and the

833 “Monthly press briefing by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 5 September 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_77640.htm (accessed 12 May 2013) 834 Defence Committee, Operations in Libya, 10. 835 Ibid., 42. 836 “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the 48th Munich Security Conference, Bayerischer Hof, Munich, Germany,” U.S. Department of Defense, 4 February 2012, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4972 (accessed 14 April 2013). 837 “Remarks by Secretary Panetta at Carnegie Europe, Brussels, Belgium,” U.S. Department of Defense, 5 October 2011, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4895 (accessed 14 April 2013). 838 Daniel Dombey and James Blitz, “Europe feels strain as US alters Libya policy,” Financial Times, 6 April 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7b076c8e-5fb4-11e0-a718-00144feab49a.html#axzz2SAyJNME3 (accessed 2 May 2013).

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Pacific grew by 8.3 percent to reach more than US$9.3 trillion.839 Of particular importance to the global balance of power is the rise of China, whose economy grew by double-digit figures from

2003 to 2007 and reached a GDP figure of US$7.3 trillion in current US dollars in 2011.840 841 One year earlier, China surpassed Japan to become the second-largest economy in the world, while the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimated in November

2012 that China would overtake the US to become the largest economy in the world by 2016.842

843 China’s rapid economic growth, coupled with its population of 1.3 billion, led many to anticipate it would become the next superpower.844 845 Initially, the Obama administration reached out to China in an attempt to foster better cooperation with the rising power to ease the shift in the balance of power.846 This policy, however, failed to generate a viable Chinese-US condominium in world affair, known as the “G-2.”847 Instead, a series of diplomatic impasses culminated in the December 2009 Copenhagen talks on climate change, in which Obama was reportedly snubbed by the Chinese leadership.848 In a reversal of policy, the US administration shifted its Asia-Pacific policies from its singular focus on China to a broader policy meant to

839 World Development Indicators, The World Bank. 840 Ibid. 841 Ibid. 842 David Barboza, “China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy,” New York Times, 15 August 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 14 April 2013). 843 “Balance of economic power will shift dramatically over the next 50 years, says OECD,” Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 9 November 2012, http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/balanceofeconomicpowerwillshiftdramaticallyoverthenext50yearssayso ecd.htm (accessed 14 April 2013). 844 C. Fred Bergsten and others, China: The Balance Sheet: What the World Needs to Know Now About the Emerging Superpower (New York: PublicAffairs, 2006), 161. 845 Oded Shenkar, The Chinese Century: The Rising Chinese Economy and Its Impact on the Global Economy, the Balance of Power, and Your Job (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Publishing, 2005), 1. 846 David Shambaugh, “The China Awaiting President Obama,” Brookings, November 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/11/china-shambaugh (accessed 14 April 2013). 847 Richard C. Bush III, “The United States and China: A G-2 in the Making?” Brookings, 11 October 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/10/11-china-us-g2-bush (accessed 14 April 2013). 848 Kim Chipman and Nicholas Johnston, “Obama Snubbed by Chinese Premier at Climate Meeting (Update3),” Bloomberg, 18 December 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5uY22AnevM4 (accessed 12 May 2013).

132 boost US influence in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.849 850 These policies included a military component meant to increase US capabilities in a region facing growing Chinese military might.

From 2003 to 2012, China increased its military spending some 175 percent in real terms, the largest increase in defense spending for that period in the world.851 This increased spending helped boost Chinese capabilities and coincided with it increased assertiveness in territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea and with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South

China Sea.852 This stance marked the end of Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of “keep[ing] a low profile and achiev[ing] something” and made these countries keen to secure US assistance.853 To that end, the US intensified its defense cooperation in the region.854 855 856

These developments were part of a major shift in US policy. In a November 2011 op-ed entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called on the US to

“pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region.857 Clinton claimed that as the US withdraws from Iraq and

Afghanistan, it needs to “be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and

849 “US President Barack Obama in South East Asia visit,” BBC News, 18 November 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20384085 (accessed 14 April 2013). 850 Indira A. R. Lakshmanan, “Clinton Travels to South Pacific to Show U.S. Interests,” Bloomberg, 1 September 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-08-31/clinton-travels-to-south-pacific-to- show-u-dot-s-dot-interests (accessed 14 April 2013). 851 Perlo-Freeman and others. 852 “The Military Balance,” International Institute for Strategic Studies 113, no. 1 (2013): 245. 853 M. Taylor Fravel, “Revising Deng’s Foreign Policy,” The Diplomat, 17 January 2012, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/revising-deng%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy/ (accessed 14 April 2013). 854 Manuel Mogato, “U.S. military to boost Philippines presence; China tells army to be prepared,” Reuters, 12 December 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/12/us-philippines-usa- idUSBRE8BB0LL20121212 (accessed 14 April 2013). 855 Caren Bohan and James Grubel, “Obama boosts U.S. military in Australia, reassures China,” Reuters, 16 November 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/us-usa-australia-idUSTRE7AF0F220111116 (accessed 14 April 2013). 856 Donald Kirk, “US-Vietnam ties strengthen with military exercises, to China’s chagrin,” Christian Science Monitor, 12 August 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0812/US-Vietnam-ties- strengthen-with-military-exercises-to-China-s-chagrin (accessed 14 April 2013). 857 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century (accessed 10 March 2013).

133 advance our values.”858 Two months later, the Obama administration published a Department of

Defense strategic guidance document that reemphasized the “pivot” to Asia and the US desire to see its allies pick up a greater share of the security burden. In an age of rapid economic growth in East, South, and Southeast Asia, the report says the US military “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.”859 While emphasizing the importance of the transatlantic alliance and continued US interests in European stability, the report states “most

European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it. Combined with the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the

US military investment in Europe… our posture in Europe must also evolve.”860 While the US is to maintain its commitment to NATO’s mutual protection clause, Article V, it also aims to “work with NATO allies to develop a ‘Smart Defense’ approach to pool, share, and specialize capabilities as needed to meet 21st century challenges.”861 In his preface to the strategic guidance, Obama points to the Libya operation as a demonstration of the “growing capabilities of allies and partners… [which] create new opportunities for burden-sharing.”862 In line with the

“pivot,” the Pentagon announced in February 2012 that it would reduce the number of troops stationed in Europe by 11,000 by 2017, with two brigades withdrawn from the continent.863

858 Ibid. 859 “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Department of Defense, January 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf (accessed 23 February 2012). 860 Ibid. 861 Ibid. 862 Ibid. 863 “Pentagon details downsizing of US forces in Europe,” NBC News, 16 February 2012, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/16/10428342-pentagon-details-downsizing-of-us- forces-in-europe?lite (accessed 14 April 2013).

134

With the defense relationship declining in importance, Washington emphasized economic issues, including the possibility of a transatlantic free trade agreement.864

The decision to “lead from behind” in Libya, “pivot to Asia,” and cut the US presence in

Europe demonstrates that the United States no longer considers Europe a strategic priority. This is largely because of NATO’s success: the continent does not face an existential military threat.

865 With Europe largely secured, the United States is keen to see Europeans build up their deployable capabilities to police their own neighborhood. In spite of the pivot, the US is unlikely to completely pull out of Europe as its global ambitions require it to maintain a presence in this economically and geographically important region.866 Furthermore, NATO is the sole European institution in which the US is a full member, providing Washington with leverage in European affairs. The increased US attention to Asia, however, could mean it will become involved in conflicts that have little direct interest for its European partners, while the US could become less involved in European conflicts that are of limited ramifications to its interests.867 The US reluctance to provide strategic enablers to French forces in Mali in 2013 may foreshadow this shift in US policy.868 The US pivot to Asia also has ramifications for the policies of NATO allies. In its 2012 report on the NSS and SDSR, a joint committee of the House of Lords and House of

Commons called on the British government to “decide if the UK will continue to be as involved in US military action as we have been in the past if the US focuses on Asia-Pacific.”869 Finally, US cuts in defense spending may limit the US ability to fund its share of NATO projects, including

864 “Remarks With European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton Before Their Meeting,” U.S. Department of State, 14 February 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/02/204788.htm (accessed 14 April 2013). 865 Védrine, 13. 866 Ibid. 867 House of Lords and House of Commons, First review of NSS, 20. 868 Mark Hosenball and Tabassum Zakaria,”French urgency, U.S. caution collide in Mali operation,” Reuters, 26 January 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/26/us-usa-france-mali- idUSBRE90P04N20130126 (accessed 14 April 2013). 869 House of Lords and House of Commons, First review of NSS, 21.

135 missile defense, requiring European countries to offset these cuts or see their capabilities further degraded.870 In March 2013, the US canceled the final phase of the Europe-based missile defense system, claiming the US would prioritize missile defense against North Korea.871

The British and French governments both acknowledge the importance of “leading from behind” and the “pivot to Asia.” British officials see both developments as a warning that

European members of NATO must shoulder a greater share of the transatlantic defense burden.

In a May 2012 speech in Berlin, the British Secretary of State for Defence Philip Hammond warned European NATO states that they must cooperate “because the United States has made clear, that it intends to reflect in its strategic posture, the growing importance of the developing challenges in the Pacific… we, the nations of Europe, must take on more responsibility for our own back yard… This isn’t about the United States walking away; this is about the nations of

Europe taking more of the strain of our collective defense of our region.”872 The French government, meanwhile, interprets the pivot and Libyan operation as signs that the US is no longer opposed to European defense cooperation. French President Francois Hollande’s special advisor on national security, former foreign minister Hubert Védrine, told the French Senate’s

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Armed Forces Commission, “The context is today completely different: the United States are turning towards Asia, leaving us a new and unprecedented room of maneuver; US decision makers are today less hostile to a greater responsibility for European

870 Jorge Benitez, “U.S. Navy: Sequestration will limit missile defense deployments to Europe,” Atlantic Council, 8 February 2013, http://www.acus.org/natosource/us-navy-sequestration-will-limit-missile- defense-deployments-europe (accessed 14 April 2013). 871 David M. Herszenhorn and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Cancels Part of Missile Defense that Russia Opposed,” New York Times, 16 March 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/17/world/europe/with- eye-on-north-korea-us-cancels-missile-defense-russia-opposed.html (accessed 14 April 2013). 872 “Speech 2012/05/02 – Shared Security: Transforming Defence to Face the Future,” Ministry of Defence, 2 May 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2012-05-02-shared-security-transforming- defence-to-face-the-future (accessed 14 April 2013).

136 within the Alliance.”873 French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, meanwhile, told the

National Assembly Defense Commission that changes in US policy should lead “Europe to stop being a consumer of security and become a producer of security, to the profit of European states, but also in logic of regional and international responsibility towards the south and east.

The Americans are also today far more favorable to ‘l’Europe de la defense.’”874

Conclusion

In recent years, the United States has pressured its allies to take up more of the burden in maintaining security in Europe and neighborhood. Until 2011, this pressure was largely rhetorical and Europeans could afford to ignore it. Two key developments, however, altered the comfortable status quo. First, the United States elected to “lead from behind” in Libya in 2011.

Although the US played a key role in the operation, it quickly passed the burden of the operation to its European allies. Second, the US unveiled its “pivot to Asia,” which heralded a US shift in military capabilities and attention from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region. As anticipated by the research hypothesis, US actions served to pressure British and

French officials to emphasize greater defense cooperation.

873 Commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées, “Place de la France dans l’Otan et perspectives de l’Europe de la défense – Audition avec M. Hubert Védrine,” Sénat, 27 November 2012, http://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/20121126/etr.html#toc2 (accessed 14 April 2013). 874 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.”

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Chapter Six: NATO and the European Union

“I have always defended in France the idea that France’s rightful place was in the fold of NATO precisely so that its voice could be further heard and that that decision should have brought

Britain and France closer all the better.”875

President Nicolas Sarkozy, November 2010

As previously discussed, budgetary pressures and the end of the Cold War prompted European states to decrease their military spending, in the process limiting European military capabilities, disrupting the division of labor in the transatlantic alliance, and threatening the future of the

European defense industry. If the research hypothesis is correct, the evidence should indicate that the leading defense organizations in Europe – NATO and the EU – responded to these developments by promoting European military cooperation, both at the multilateral and bilateral levels. The hypothesis would also expect that these efforts yielded some response from member states, whether through deeper military cooperation or the adoption of NATO and EU rhetoric on cooperation.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Following the end of the Cold War, NATO has faced three troubling trends. First, the defense spending of European member states has fallen vis-à-vis the United States. The US share of

NATO defense spending rose from the Cold War average of 50 percent to 68 percent in 2007 and 72 percent in 2012.876 Second, the bulk of European defense spending is now supported by a handful of countries. In both 2007 and 2012, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom

875 “UK-France Summit press conference.” 876 “Secretary General’s Annual Report 2012,” NATO.

138 represented more than 50 percent of NATO Europe military expenditures.877 Third, overall

NATO spending has declined vis-à-vis emerging and developing countries. In 2003, NATO represented 69 percent of global defense spending. In 2011, the alliance made up 60 percent.878

In January 2013, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen warned that a failure to address these three trends could weaken US support for the alliance, deepen disparities within

NATO Europe, and weaken NATO vis-à-vis emerging and developing countries.879

This concern for the defense budgets and military capabilities of NATO Europe predates

Rasmussen’s secretariat. His predecessor, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, claimed NATO and the EU should cooperate to confront two common concerns: declining defense spending and capability shortages. He said in July 2008, “We must stop wasting valuable money and effort by duplication our capabilities and development programs.”880 To bolster the collective capabilities of the alliance, NATO launched four key cooperation projects.881 First, NATO allies agreed to provide peacetime air policing over the Baltic States.882 Second, 10 allies and two Partnership for

Peace (PFP) states jointly procured C-17 cargo planes in the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) project.883 Third, 12 allies and two PFP agreed to jointly charter Antonov An-124-100 cargo

877 Ibid. 878 Ibid. 879 Ibid. 880 “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the High-level seminar on relations between the European Union and NATO,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 7 July 2008, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-FB717079-395ED816/natolive/opinions_7879.htm (accessed 14 April 2013). 881 “Fact Sheet – Multinational Projects,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, May 2012, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20120516_media_backgrounder_Multinational_ Projects_en.pdf (accessed 12 May 2013). 882 “Baltic Air Policing,” NATO Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, http://www.jfcbs.nato.int/jfcbrunssum/baltic_air_policing.aspx (accessed 2 May 2013). 883 “Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC),” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50105.htm (accessed 25 March 2013).

139 planes to address a lack of strategic heavy lift capability.884 Fourth, 16 NATO allies agreed to operate 17 E-3A Sentry AWACS planes, making up for the absence of such planes in most

European air forces.885 Another capability project, Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) was launched in the 1990s to bolster the alliance’s reconnaissance and monitoring capabilities and has yet to yield an operational aircraft.886 In its current iteration, 13 NATO allies aim to jointly acquire and operate five Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles by 2015-17. While Britain and

France participate in the Baltic State policing effort and SALIS, they are not involved in the SAC,

AWACS, or AGS projects. At the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, alliance heads of state and government agreed to cooperate on ballistic missile defense, largely by hosting US interceptors and radars in Europe.887

“Smart Defence”

In response to the budget cuts instituted during the financial crisis, Rasmussen presented the

NATO “Smart Defence” concept at the February 2011 Munich Security Conference.888 The secretary general described the proposal as “how NATO can help nations to build greater security with fewer resources but more coordination and coherence.”889 This would be accomplished through the “pooling and sharing” of assets, as well as multinational research and development projects.890 The capability shortfalls of European allies during the Libya operation

884 “Strategic Airlift Interim Solutions (SALIS),” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50106.htm (accessed 25 March 2013). 885 “AWACS: NATO’s ‘Eye In The Sky,’” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48904.htm (accessed 25 March 2013). 886 “Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS),” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48892.htm (accessed 25 March 2013). 887 “Fact Sheet,” NATO. 888 “Building security in an age of austerity,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4 February 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_70400.htm (accessed 10 April 2013). 889 Ibid. 890 Ibid.

140 reinforced the case for “Smart Defence.”891 The allied formally adopted Smart Defence at the

May 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, with 22 multinational projects, aimed at “deliver[ing] improved operational effectiveness, economies of scale, and closer connections between NATO forces.”892 The number of Smart Defence projects reached 25 in January 2013.893 These measures included plans to pool maritime patrol aircraft, enable alliance fighters to share precision munitions, coordinate fuel handling logistics, and share multinational medical treatment facilities.894 Nearly one-third of the projects only involved European allies, with both

France and the United Kingdom participating.895 896 897 As of April 2013, however, only a few of the projects, such as training centers and bomb-disposal robots, had moved past the planning stage.898 899 900

Foreign Operations

As a multinational organization, NATO’s operations are inherently exercises in military cooperation. During the Cold War, NATO focused on improving interoperability between the allied armies. The collapse of the Soviet Union and NATO’s enlargement to former Warsaw Pact

891 “Monthly press briefing by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 5 March 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_84865.htm (accessed 14 April 2013). 892 “Secretary General’s Annual Report 2012,” NATO. 893 Ibid. 894 “Fact Sheet,” NATO. 895 “Secretary General’s Annual Report 2012,” NATO. 896 Védrine, 12. 897 Richard Norton-Taylor and Nick Hopkins, “UK warns Europe on Defence as US looks away,” The Guardian, 5 November 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/defence-and-security- blog/2012/nov/05/defence-nato-europe (accessed 14 April 2013). 898 Jorge Benitez, “, , , and U.S. agree to develop a Multinational Aviation Training Center,” Atlantic Council, 26 February 2013, http://www.acus.org/natosource/croatia-czech- republic-slovakia-and-us-agree-develop-multinational-aviation-training-cent (accessed 17 March 2013). 899 “Developing remote-controlled robots to clear roadside bombs,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 18 January 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_94095.htm (accessed 17 March 2013). 900 “NATO Defence Ministers make progress on capabilities, planning for new Afghan mission,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 10 October 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_90767.htm (accessed 19 March 2013).

141 nations, however, tested the alliance as NATO was called upon to participate in overseas operations. In the 1990s, NATO maintained embargoes, carried out airstrikes, and deployed peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. One of these operations, NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), remains active as of 2013 and is tasked with maintaining order in the former Serbian province.901

Following the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the United States, NATO invoked

Article V for the first time in its history. Drawing on NATO’s mutual protection clause, the alliance launched Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean to protect shipping against possible terror attacks.902 While the US-led operations in Afghanistan were initially carried out outside the confines of the transatlantic alliance, the NATO-led International Security Assistance

Force (ISAF) was established in December 2001 to secure Kabul and the surrounding area.903 In

2003, a UN resolution expanded ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan.904 In

February 2013, ISAF counted some 100,330 soldiers from 50 countries, including 9,000 British and 550 French soldiers.905 As the first major war undertaken by the alliance, the Afghan campaign served as a catalyst to bolster member states’ expeditionary capabilities.906 NATO combat operations in the country are slated to end in late 2014.907

901 “Kosovo Force – Mission,” Allied Command Operations, 2012, http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor/about- us/mission.aspx (accessed 25 March 2013). 902 “Operation Active Endeavor,” NATO Maritime Command, http://www.mc.nato.int/ops/Pages/OAE.aspx (accessed 7 April 2013). 903 “About ISAF – History,” NATO-ISAF, http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html (accessed 2 May 2013). 904 “ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 3 December 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69366.htm (accessed 2 May 2013). 905 “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures,” NATO-ISAF, 19 February 2013, http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/ISAF-ANA%20Troops%20Placemat- Feb19%202013.pdf (accessed 7 April 2013). 906 “Secretary General’s Annual Report 2012,” NATO. 907 Ibid.

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In the Horn of Africa, NATO launched two operations in December 2008 to combat

Somali piracy and protect UN and World Food Program (WFP) aid shipments. 908 The NATO missions in the Indian Ocean correspond closely with a similar EU mission, , and draws on Standing NATO Maritime Groups.909 The operations, coupled with the presence of armed guards on board ships, helped reduce Somali piracy to three-year lows in 2012.910 In

Libya, NATO took over command of combat operations from the United States in March 2011.911

At its height, some 8,000 NATO troops, 260 air assets, and 21 ships and submarines from took part in Operation Unified Protector, with 14 NATO member states deploying military forces.912

913 The alliance maintained the operation until October 2011, when the country’s dictator,

Muammar al-Gaddafi was killed and his regime toppled.914 915

Conclusion

NATO has encouraged greater defense cooperation among its member states, with the aim of boosting European military capabilities. While many of its joint projects are limited in scope, they provide a starting point for deeper cooperation. In an effort to promote as much cooperation as possible, NATO has encouraged cooperation between member states on

908 Maritime Command Northwood, “NATO and EU Work Together to Disrupt Pirate Group,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 8 January 2013, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_01/120106-OOS_2013_01_vs1.pdf (accessed 25 March 2013). 909 Ibid. 910 “IMB reports drop in Somali piracy, but warns against complacency,” ICC Commercial Crime Services, 22 October 2012, http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/811-imb-reports-drop-in-somali-piracy-but-warns- against-complacency (accessed 7 April 2013). 911 Jim Garamone, “NATO Assumes Command of Libya Operations,” U.S. Department of Defense, 31 March 2011, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63384 (accessed 7 April 2013). 912 “Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR Final Mission Stats,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2 November 2011, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_11/20111108_111107- factsheet_up_factsfigures_en.pdf (accessed 7 April 2013). 913 Rogers. 914 “’We answered the call’ – the end of Operation Unified Protector,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_80435.htm (accessed 7 April 2013). 915 James Meikle, “ is dead, says Libyan PM,” The Guardian, 20 October 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/20/gaddafi-dead-says-libyan-pm (accessed 7 April 2013).

143 bilateral or multilateral bases. In October 2010, Rasmussen voiced his support to the Franco-

British negotiations that would lead to the Lancaster House treaties, claiming deeper military cooperation between the two countries was “very much what I said is the way forward, to identify assets and capabilities that could be shared.”916 NATO has also encouraged deeper cooperation within the EU, with which it claims to have a special relationship.917 The NATO allies agreed at the May 2012 Chicago Summit that the alliance should cooperate with the EU so that

“Smart Defence” did not overlap with the EU’s equivalent: “pooling and sharing.”918

The European Union

The EU has played a significant role in European defense cooperation since 1998, when British

Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President met in St-Malo and agreed to build up Europe’s military capability outside NATO. EU efforts to promote European defense cooperation, however, intensified since 2009, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, directives on European defense market, and “pooling and sharing.” Like NATO, the EU has also deployed military forces overseas, encouraging member states to cooperate in the field.

Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed in December 2007 and entered into force in December

2009, bolstered the EU’s foreign policy and security capabilities. The treaty granted the EU a legal personality, set up the office of high representative of the union for foreign affairs and

916 Ian Traynor, “NATO chief backs defence deal between Britain and France,” The Guardian, 8 October 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/08/nato-chief-anglo-french-defence (accessed 14 April 2013). 917 “NATO-EU: a strategic partnership,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 29 October 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm (accessed 2 May 2013). 918 “Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 20 May 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed 17 March 2013).

144 security policy, created the post of president of the , extended the scope of the renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and abolished the three pillar structure that had defined the EU since the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht.919 With regards to defense issues, the treaty instituted three key reforms. First, the treaty established a collective defense clause modeled on NATO’s Article V.920 While EU member states are obliged to assist fellow member states who fall victim to foreign aggression, the commitment is qualified to protect a state’s neutrality or allegiance to NATO.921 Second, the Treaty of Lisbon extended the concept of “enhanced cooperation” to defense.922 This principle enables a group of member states willing to cooperate more closely on an issue than the whole of the EU to do so without breaking EU laws.923 This codified the existing practice of “coalitions of the able and willing,” which carry out CSDP missions.924 Third, the treaty established a procedure for “permanent structured cooperation.”925 This mechanism enables member states meeting a certain threshold in military capabilities to deepen their defense integration.926 Member states have yet to invoke

“permanent structured cooperation,” although some French officials hope to use it to expand the Lancaster House agreements or build-up the Weimar Plus Group (France, Germany, Poland,

Italy, and Spain).927 Britain, however, blocked an attempt in 2011 by the Weimar Group (France,

919 Merlingen, 37-38. 920 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, C 115/13 (Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, 2008), 42, sec. 7. 921 Ibid. 922 Treaty on European Union, 42, sec. 5. 923 “Glossary – Enhanced cooperation,” Europa, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/enhanced_cooperation_en.htm (accessed 7 April 2013). 924 Merlingen, 38. 925 Treaty on European Union, 42, sec. 6. 926 Merlingen, 39. 927 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Compte rendu n°27: Audition, ouverte à la presse, conjointe avec la commission des affaires européennes, de M. Pierre Vimont, Secrétaire général exécutive du Service européen pour l’action extérieur (SEAE), sur la politique européenne de défense, dans le cadre de la préparation du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale,” Assemblée

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Germany, and Poland) to draw on “permanent structured cooperation.”928 London reportedly feared being isolated from any deeper EU defense project.929

Defense Industry Directives

In an effort to foster a more integrated European defense market, the EU has issued two key directives, or EU legislation that all member states are required to implement or “transcribe” into national laws.930 Adopted in July 2009, Directive 2009/81/EC on defense and sensitive security procurement established the EU rules governing the procurement of defense equipment and services.931 The directive is meant to forge a Europe-wide defense market by introducing “fair and transparent rules” for procurement across the union, insuring firms from one EU country can compete for defense contracts in another.932 For example, the directive ensures that defense tenders exceeding some one million euros are publicly announced on an electronic bulletin available to firms across the union.933 The directive, however, is subject to

Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which states “any Member

State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions

Nationale, 28 November 2012, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/12-13/c1213027.asp (accessed 14 April 2013). 928 Ibid. 929 Ibid. 930 “What are EU directives?” Application of EU law, 25 June 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/introduction/what_directive_en.htm (accessed 2 May 2013). 931 Directive 2009/81/EC of the and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, L 216/76 (Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, 2009). 932 “Defence procurement – Frequently Asked Questions,” European Community: Internal Market, 28 August 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/faqs_28-08- 09_en.pdf (accessed 7 April 2013). 933 Merlingen, 82.

146 and war material…”934 The other key EU directive impacting the defense market is directive

2009/43/EC on transfers of defense-related products, which was adopted in May 2009.935 As the name of the directive suggests, it is meant to simplify the transfer of defense equipment within the EU by creating an EU-wide licensing system to transport these goods.936 The European

Commission claims the directive will help create wider supply chains, reduce administrative barriers, and prevent illegal transfers.937 The deadline for EU member states to transpose the directive into law expired in June 2011, with both France and the United Kingdom complying.938

939

These directives, however, are not without their critics. Some in the UK claim that directive 2009/81/EC may contradict the terms of the UK-US Defense Trade Treaty, which facilitates weapon sales and technology transfers between the United States and United

Kingdom.940 Others claim that EU member states continue to shield their defense markets from competition. In their January 2013 testimony to the House of Commons Defence Committee, representatives of the advocacy group Royal Aeronautical Society claimed that these directives made “made overt protectionism more difficult to sustain, but European countries are still

934 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, C 83/47 (Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, 2010), 346, sec. 1(b). 935 Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community, L 146/1 (Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, 2009). 936 “EU internal defence market is opening slowly,” European Commission: Enterprise and Industry, 28 June 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=6037&lang=en (accessed 7 April 2013). 937 Ibid. 938 LOI n° 2011-702 du 22 juin 2011 relative au contrôle des importations et des exportations de matériels de guerre et de matériels assimilés, à la simplification des transferts des produits liés à la défense dans l'Union européenne et aux marchés de défense et de sécurité, n° 0144 (Paris: Journal Officiel de la République française, 2011). 939 2012 No. 1910 – The Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2912 (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2012). 940 Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition, 28-29.

147 reluctant to embrace the virtues of competition.”941 The president of the French land defense industry lobby, Christian Mons, claimed in a November 2012 testimony to the French National

Assembly Defense Commission that “certain member states have not yet transposed [Directive

2009/81/EC] and have thus gone past the deadline fixed by the Commission. In addition, while the directive banned demands for industrial compensations – or offsets – between European states, these arrangements remain in some national regulations even after these countries transposed the directive.”942

European Defence Agency – “Pooling and Sharing”

In July 2004, the European Council created an intergovernmental body – the European Defence

Agency (EDA) – to help bolster European military capabilities.943 The EDA became an official EU agency in July 2011 and reports to the Council of Ministers.944 All EU member states except

Denmark participate in the EDA, which is tasked with helping its members develop their defense capabilities, promote research collaboration, boost armaments cooperation, and create a competitive EU defense market.945 946 The EDA’s flagship program is “pooling and sharing,” which is meant to limit duplication and maintain capabilities at a time of budget cuts and economic uncertainty.947 The concept arose from a German-Swedish initiative unveiled at a

941 Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition, 63. 942 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 23.” 943 Council of the European Union, 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the , L 245 (Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, 2008). 944 Council of the European Union, 2011/411/CFSP of 12 July 2011 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency and repealing Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP, L 183/16 (Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, 2011). 945 “Participating Member States,” European Defence Agency, http://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/who- we-are/EDApMS (accessed 10 April 2013). 946 “Mission and functions,” European Defence Agency, http://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/Whatwedo/Missionandfunctions (accessed 10 April 2013). 947 “Pooling and Sharing,” European Defence Agency, http://www.eda.europa.eu/aboutus/whatwedo/pooling-and-sharing (accessed 17 March 2013).

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September 2010 meeting of EU ministers of defense in Ghent.948 As part of “pooling and sharing” European defense ministers identified 11 areas for cooperation in November 2011.949

In spite of this agreement, however, “pooling and sharing” remains limited to comparatively limited measures, such as joint training structures, medical services, a cell to procure future satellite intelligence, and the removal of EU regulatory barriers.950 One exception is in air-to-air refueling, with 10 EU defense ministers agreeing in 2012 to set up a common pool of A330

MRTT tanker aircraft by 2020.951 952 The project proved successful in part because France -- keen to bolster Europe’s tanker fleet after the Libya conflict – convinced the United States that the

EU, not NATO, should pursue European tanker cooperation.953 French activism and US support helped the project progress past the planning stage. In November 2012, the EDA scored another success when EU defense ministers agreed to a “code of conduct on pooling and sharing.”954 The agreement called on EU states to consider cooperation from the offset of national defense planning, to protect the budgets of joint projects, to increase information sharing, and authorize the EDA to submit an annual progress report.955 In spite of these achievements, EDA efforts to promote greater cooperation continue to be hampered by the ability of member states to ignore its recommendations; set their own budgets, procurement priorities, and research goals;

948 Paul Ames, “Ministers agree to push forward pooling and sharing,”EuroPolitics, 24 September 2010, http://www.europolitics.info/ministers-agree-to-push-forward-pooling-and-sharing-art282145-13.html (accessed 10 April 2013). 949 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.” 950 European Defence Agency, Annual 2012 Report (Brussels: Publication Office, 2013), 8-18. 951 Ibid, 8. 952 Adrian Croft, “Ten European states agree military air tanker cooperation,” Reuters, 19 November 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/19/eu-defence-idUSL5E8MJJ1O20121119 (accessed 19 March 2013). 953 Commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées. “Audition de M. Philippe Errera, ambassadeur, représentant permanent de la France à l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord” Sénat. 22 January 2013, http://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/20130121/etr.html (accessed 12 May 2013). 954 “Defence Ministers Adopt Pooling & Sharing Code of Conduct,” European Defence Agency, 19 November 2012, http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/news/2012/11/19/defence-minsters-adopt- pooling-sharing-code-of-conduct (accessed 14 April 2013). 955 Ibid.

149 and limit the EDA’s budget.956 The EDA’s budget was limited to around €30 million in 2012.957 In

November 2012, the head of the EU Military Staff, General Ton Van Osch, claimed that the EU pooling and sharing project was failing because member states were cutting budgets too aggressively and without coordination.958 In line with the trend towards a “multiple-speed”

Europe, the EDA has begun focusing on groups of EU countries willing to cooperate on certain issues, instead of seeking EU-wide success. At a March 2013, EDA conference, European Council

President said, “What we need are tangible projects: All initiatives, whether bilateral or trilateral or in group, are welcome. Cooperation will be different according to projects and groups of countries. There is no one-size-fits-all. We must be pragmatic.”959

Foreign Operations

Since 2003, the EU has undertaken a number of civilian and military operations in the Balkans,

Caucasus, Middle East, Africa, Afghanistan, and Indonesia.960 Like NATO operations, these missions offered a chance for European armies and civilian experts to collaborate and forge greater cooperation. In additional to these operations, EU warships are active off the coast of

956 Merlingen, 81. 957 Julian Hale, “Air-to-Air Refueling, Cyberdefense, UAVs, Likely EU Summit Topics,” Defense News, 21 March 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130321/DEFREG01/303210023/Air-Air-Refueling- Cyberdefense-UASs-Likely-EU-Summit-Topics?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE (accessed 21 April 2013). 958 Brooks Tigner, “EU Pooling and Sharing Efforts ‘On Course to Fail,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 November 2012, 12. 959 Julian Hale, “EU Leaders: Pragmatic, Clustered Approach Needed for Defense,” Defense News, 21 March 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130321/DEFREG01/303210020/EU-Leaders- Pragmatic-Clustered-Approach-Needed-Defense?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE (accessed 21 April 2013). 960 “Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union February 2013,” European Union External Action, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?lang=en (accessed 14 April 2013).

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Somalia as part of Operation Atalanta, where they cooperate with NATO forces.961 EU forces in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden contributed to the aforementioned drop in piracy incidents.

Conclusion

As anticipated in the research hypothesis, NATO and the EU both encourage greater defense cooperation between their respective member states in an effort to bolster European military capabilities. Both are supportive of bilateral or multilateral agreements, such as the Lancaster

House treaties, as long as they deepen cooperation among European member states. As of early

2013, however, NATO and EU efforts have yielded only limited progress. Efforts to encourage pooling and sharing – whether through the EU, NATO, or a bilateral agreement – are all marked by concerns that the equipment may not be available in a time of need. National sovereignty remains a pressing issue hampering deeper military integration within either NATO or the EU.962

Nevertheless, statements by British and French officials reflect NATO and EU language on collective defense. In a speech to the Atlantic Council of the United States in Washington, DC in

January 2012, British Secretary of State for Defense Philip Hammond claimed that “collective defense is the only practical response to the world we live in – a world in which the unpredictable and diverse threats we face cannot be dealt with by any single country acting alone…”963 French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told the French National Assembly

Defense Commission in December 2012 that “the budgetary constraints that burden the defense budgets of all European member states could and should be compensated by increase cooperation. What is at stake is to maintain certain capacities, to develop others, avoid

961 “About Us,” EU NAVFOR Somalia, http://eunavfor.eu/home/about-us/ (accessed 14 April 2013). 962 Judy Dempsey, “How Much Are Americans Willing to Defend Europe?” New York Times, 7 January 2013, http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/07/how-much-are-americans-willing-to-spend-to- defend-europe/?gwh=978169ED6F2B73F416BCA46BB941C8CF (accessed 14 April 2013). 963 “NATO: The Case for Collective Defense in the 21st Century: Transcript – 1/5/12,” Atlantic Council, http://www.acus.org/event/nato-case-collective-defense-21st-century/transcript (accessed 14 April 2013).

151 duplication – whether of capacities or industrial tools –, to increase our interdependence, and to avoid the risk of losing our strategic rank.”964

Research Hypothesis Conclusion

The research hypothesis holds that international factors spurred Britain and France to deepen their defense collaboration through the Lancaster House treaties of 2010. It also claims that as long as these factors remain, France and the UK will move towards greater defense collaboration. The evidence presented in the six previous sections supports this conclusion.

First, the global financial crisis and the eurozone crisis saddled the British and French governments with high budget deficits, low or negative growth, and the pressure to cut spending. Both governments cut defense spending, leading to personnel cuts, reduced procurement, and the loss of some capabilities. The imperative to cut costs encourages both countries to consider cooperation as it provides benefits like economies of scale in procurement. Second, Britain and France are confronted by the same international threats and agree that they should focus their limited defense assets on an axis running from North Africa through the Middle East to the Indian Ocean. This convergence facilitates joint deployments and provides defense planners with some confidence that their partner can be relied upon in a crisis as both countries’ interests converge. Third, if Britain and France are to confront these threats at a time of limited spending they need to collaborate to retain certain essential capabilities, such as air-to-air refueling, ISTAR, and amphibious assault. Fourth, fundamental changes in the international arms market – the rise of emerging countries and the decline in European procurement – are threatening the future of European defense firms, prompting these to advocate for transnational mergers and cooperation projects. Fifth, the financial and political

964 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.”

152 burden of waging nearly decade-long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and maintaining global hegemony has become too much to bear for the United States, particularly after its economy was hobbled by the financial crisis of the late 2000s. As shown by the US decision to “lead from behind” in Libya and to “pivot to Asia,” the United States is keen to pass on defense responsibilities to its allies so it can focus its limited means on the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, the dwindling European defense budgets and capability gaps within both NATO and the EU spurred both organizations to promote deeper collaboration. Although programs like “Smart Defence” and “pooling and sharing” have failed to halt uncoordinated defense spending cuts among member states, they have set the groundwork for bilateral or multilateral cooperation among the “willing and able.” All these factors make defense cooperation the only mechanism for

Britain and France to retain their global standing on defense issues.

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Part III: Alternative Hypothesis – National

This essay’s alternative hypothesis holds that national factors are actually holding back deeper

Franco-British defense cooperation. Although the two countries signed the Lancaster House treaties because of budgetary pressures, national factors threaten to undermine the agreement and will prevent deeper integration. The following sections examine eight national factors that may undermine Franco-British cooperation. First, this hypothesis posits that both Britain and

France retain certain security interests, often legacy commitments dating back to the colonial era, which the other does not share. In a crisis, neither country could depend on the other to provide combat support. Second, the hypothesis claims that the British and French have different standards regarding when their forces should be deployed abroad. Third, the two countries disagree on the role the United States should play in European defense cooperation.

Fourth, Britain and France disagree on which multinational organization – NATO or the EU – should take the lead in defense cooperation on the European continent. Fifth, the two allies have different industrial defense policies, hampering their ability to jointly procure or develop new defense systems. Sixth, politicians in both Britain and France are willing to prevent defense cooperation to protect domestic jobs. Seventh, some prominent political parties in Britain and

France oppose defense cooperation. Eighth, British and French public opinion oppose deeper military cooperation and joint deployments.

Chapter Seven: Different Security Interests

“We have common commitments and we will shoulder them together.”965

President Nicolas Sarkozy, November 2010

965 “UK-France Summit press conference.”

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As previously discussed, if the alternative hypothesis is correct, than Britain and France will retain high-priority national commitments the other does not share. In keeping with the national and domestic focus of this alternative hypothesis, these will reflect differences in economic, political, or electoral considerations. As demonstrated in the “threats” and

“capabilities desired” sections of this essay, France and the United Kingdom do converge in their analyses of twentieth-century threats and of the kind of military capabilities required to confront these challenges. This section, however, demonstrates that the two countries inherited legacy commitments that the other does not share: France in sub-Saharan Africa and the United

Kingdom in the South Atlantic. While either country can expect rhetorical, diplomatic, intelligence, or even logistical support from their treaty partner in these respective areas, they are unlikely to receive combat support from their ally. This is because under the terms of the

2010 TDSC – the Lancaster House treaty on conventional cooperation – both parties must agree

“in writing” to an operation if they are to deploy forces jointly.966 The possibility that one ally would fail to support the other during a conflict is important because it impinges on close defense cooperation. If one party fears it would not be able to draw on shared or pooled assets in case of a crisis, then it is unlikely to countenance closer collaboration.

France and sub-Saharan Africa

Although its empire in Africa formally came to an end in 1960, France retains significant interests on the continent. In 2008, France was the largest EU investor in Africa, holding some

26 percent of the EU’s €153 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa.967 Half of African

966 France No 1 (2010), 5, sec. 2. 967 “Africa-EU – economic indicators, trade and investment,” Eurostat, 13 December 2011, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Africa-EU_- _economic_indicators,_trade_and_investment (accessed 20 April 2013).

155 investments in the EU that year were destined for France.968 These significant economic interests and the cultural and linguistic legacy of colonialism translate into large French expatriate populations across Africa. In 2012, some 98,090 French nationals resided in North

Africa, 117,378 in francophone Africa, and 18,796 non-francophone Africa.969 Among those living in francophone African countries, an estimated 30,000 resided and worked in the Sahel region, which is marked by significant political instability.970 Blighted by climate change and poor economic prospects, the countries of the Sahel face uncertain food supplies, low standards of living, and the associated political instability.971 Radical Islamist groups, including al-Qaida in the

Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are known to carry out attacks on security forces and to kidnap foreign nationals in this region.972 In spite of its instability, the Sahel is particularly important to France because one of its countries – Niger – is the fourth-largest source of uranium in the world.973

The resource is critical for French energy security as France generated more than 75 percent of its electricity from nuclear power in 2011.974 The French state-owned nuclear energy firm Areva plays a prominent role in Niger’s uranium mines, with some 25.8 percent of France’s uranium

968 Ibid. 969 “Les Français établis hors de France: Population française inscrite au 31 décembre 2012,” France Diplomatie, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/vivre-a-l-etranger/vivre-a-l-etranger-vos-droits-et/la- presence-francaise-a-l-etranger/les-francais-etablis-hors-de/ (accessed 20 April 2013). 970 Bate Felix and Alexandria Sage, “France launches ground campaign against Mali rebels,” Reuters, 16 January 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/16/us-mali-rebels-idUSBRE90D0FX20130116 (accessed 18 April 2013). 971 “Factsheet: The European Union and the Sahel,” Council of the European Union, 14 March 2013, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132802.pdf (accessed 21 April 2013). 972 Jonathan Masters, “Backgrounder: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),” Council on Foreign Relations, 24 January 2013, http://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717 (accessed 21 April 2013). 973 "World Uranium Mining Production,” World Nuclear Association, August 2012, http://www.world- nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Mining-of-Uranium/World-Uranium-Mining- Production/#.UXGj3rXFXzw (accessed 19 April 2013). 974 “Nuclear Power in France,” World Nuclear Association, 11 March 2013, http://www.world- nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/France/#.UXGlY7XFXzw (accessed 19 April 2013).

156 oxide concentrate imports originating in Areva’s Nigerien mines.975 This mining sector, however, has faced threats from kidnappers and militants, with Areva coming under pressure from the

Niger government for failing to meet its production requirements due in part to the threat of kidnapping.976 977 The possible threat to Niger’s uranium sector from a militant takeover in Mali likely weighed on the minds of French leaders as they decided to intervene in Mali in 2013.978 In the midst of these operations, French were sent to protect Areva facilities in

Niger.979

Before the 2008 defense review, France was a signatory to a number of bilateral defense agreements with francophone countries in sub-Saharan Africa. These treaties included clauses empowering French forces to intervene to protect its former colonies from both external and internal threats. From 2008 to 2012, the government of then President Sarkozy revised France’s defense agreements with Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the

Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Senegal, and Togo, removing French security guarantees.980 981

975 Ibid. 976 “Niger warns Areva on uranium mine delays,” Reuters, 11 October 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/11/niger-uranium-areva-idUSL6E8LBNJV20121011 (accessed 18 April 2013). 977 “French nationals among seven workers kidnapped in Niger,” BBC News, 16 September 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11325749 (accessed 18 April 2013). 978 Emilie Lévêque, “La France a-t-elle un intérêt économique à intervenir au Mali?” L’Expansion, 15 January 2013, http://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/economie/la-france-a-t-elle-un-interet-economique-a- intervenir-au-mali_368659.html (accessed 12 May 2013). 979 Jean Guisnel, “Niger: les forces spéciales protégeront les mines d’uranium d’Areva,” Le Point, 23 January 2013, http://www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/jean-guisnel/niger-les-forces-speciales-protegeront- les-mines-d-uranium-d-areva-23-01-2013-1619466_53.php#xtor=EPR-34 (accessed 18 April 2013). 980 “N° 3289 – Avis Présenté Au Nom De La Commission De La Défense Nationale Et Des Forces Armées, sur le projet de loi (N° 3194), adopté par le Sénat, autorisant l’approbation de l’accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la République du Cameroun instituant un partenariat de défense,” Assemblée Nationale, 30 March 2011, http://www.assemblee- nationale.fr/13/rapports/r3289.asp#P184_28422 (accessed 15 April 2013). 981 “N° 3286 – Rapport Fait Au Nom De La Commission des Affaires Etrangères Sur Le Projet De Loi, adopté par le Sénat, autorisant la ratification du traité instituant un partenariat de défense entre la République française et la République gabonaise,” Assemblée Nationale, 30 March 2011, http://www.assemblee- nationale.fr/13/pdf/rapports/r3286.pdf (accessed 15 April 2013).

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982 983 984 985 The French government, however, elected to maintain its commitment to the sovereignty of strategic Djibouti. In June 1977, France signed a basing agreement with the government of newly independent Djibouti and an agreement on monitoring Djiboutian airspace in February 1991.986 In December 2011, Sarkozy and Djiboutian President Ismaïl Omar

Guelleh signed an agreement reiterating France’s commitment to Djiboutian territorial integrity.987 The treaty includes a clause committing France to protecting Djibouti from external threats.988

Although France abrogated many of its security commitments in sub-Saharan Africa, it maintains an extensive presence on the continent and continues to carry out combat and support operations in a number of former colonies. French forces in Africa are divided into four categories with different mandates, timetables, and capabilities: 1) prepositioned forces, 2) forces under international mandate, 3) permanent forces, 4) and sovereignty forces.989 The

French 2008 white paper calls on the French military to reduce its overall troop presence in

Africa to two permanent bases on the Western and Eastern shores of sub-Saharan Africa, while maintaining its “sovereignty forces” in the French DOM-COM of Réunion. While France did

982 “La coopération militaire et de défense,” La France en République centrafricaine, 4 May 2011, http://www.ambafrance-cf.org/La-cooperation-militaire-et-de,485 (accessed 15 April 2013). 983 “N° 3598 – Projet de Loi autorisant l’approbation de l’accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de l’Union des Comores instituant un partenariat de défense,” Assemblée Nationale, 29 June 2011, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/projets/pl3598.asp (accessed 15 April 2013). 984 “Accords de défense avec Djibouti, la Côte d’Ivoire, le Sénégal et la Serbie,” Portail du Gouvernement, 21 November 2012, http://www.gouvernement.fr/gouvernement/accords-de-defense-avec-djibouti-la- cote-d-ivoire-le-senegal-et-la-serbie (accessed 15 April 2013). 985 “N° 352 – Projet De Loi autorisant l’approbation de l’accord entre le Gouvernement de la République Française et le Gouvernement de la République togolaise instituant un partenariat de défense,” Sénat, 10 March 2010, http://www.senat.fr/leg/pjl09-352.html (accessed 15 April 2013). 986 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 167. 987 “La France et Djibouti,” France Diplomatie, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones- geo/djibouti/la-france-et-djibouti/ (21 April 2013). 988 “Accords de défense avec Djibouti,” Portail du Gouvernement. 989 “La politique africaine de la France,” Sénat, http://www.senat.fr/rap/r10-324/r10-3244.html (accessed 11 March 2013).

158 rationalize its permanent bases in Djibouti, Gabon, and Senegal and maintained its presence in

Réunion, it continued to preserve its “prepositioned” forces in three operations on the continent: “Épervier” in Chad with 950 personnel, “Licorne” in Côte d’Ivoire with 450, and

“Boali” in the Central African Republic with 200 in 2011.990 These units, often equipped with ageing and inexpensive equipment, offer France a rapid reaction capability in sub-Saharan Africa that is more cost effective than airlifting forces from metropolitan France.991

Major French Overseas Operations (annual averages except for 2013) Theater of Operations Operation Type 2010 2011 2012992 2013993 Afghanistan NATO-led 4,361 4,269 3,472 1,550 Chad Autonomous 996 959 981 950 Central African Republic Autonomous 240 238 247 230 Côte d'Ivoire Autonomous 1,133 1,092 796 460 Relief, UN 95 0 0 3 Indian Ocean EU-led 495 283 431 200 Jordan Relief 0 0 40 80 Kosovo NATO-led 791 424 323 300 Lebanon UN 1,460 1,354 1,072 900 Libya NATO-led 0 1,789 0 0 Mali Autonomous 0 0 0 4,000 Total 9,571 10,408 7,362 8,673 Source: 2010-12 figures from Assemblée Nationale, N° 254, 13. 2013 figures from "Carte des opérations extérieures," Ministère de la Défense.

British economic interests in Africa are more limited than those of France and focused on a different part of the continent. In 2008, the United Kingdom held 13 percent of the EU’s

153 billion in FDI in Africa, compared to France’s 26 percent.994 The largest clusters of British expatriates are located in the Commonwealth countries of south and eastern Africa, as well as

990 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 56-57. 991 Pierre Tran, “Early Lessons from France’s Mali Action Emerges,” Defense News, 21 January 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130121/DEFREG04/301210002/Early-Lessons-From-France- 8217-s-Mali-Action-Emerge (accessed 15 April 2013). 992 The 2012 figures are estimates. 993 The 2013 figures are approximations for the month of February 2013. 994 “Africa-EU – economic indicators,” Eurostat.

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Nigeria, Ghana, and Egypt.995 At least 4,120 British nationals reside in the francophone sub-

Saharan countries, compared to 117,378 French nationals.996 Britain’s military capabilities in

Africa are also more limited than those of France. The UK’s only permanent facility on the continent is a training base in Kenya, although it maintains defense cooperation cells in Kenya,

Sierra Leone, and South Africa.997 The British NSS does points to the possibility of conflict in

Africa due to poverty, underdevelopment, and climate change, but the SDSR is comparatively tacit on the continent.998 The SDSR’s emphasis on the risks associated with ungoverned spaces and the need for Britain to support fragile states, however, may lend support for French action in the region.999 Limited British defense commitments and interests in Africa coupled with the country’s limited means in the aftermath of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya may make the British reluctant to provide anything more than logistical support for French operations in

Africa. When asked about possible disagreements over deploying shared carriers in crises involving French interests in West Africa, Cameron admitted in his November 2010 joint press conference with Sarkozy that political factors could prevent cooperation. He said, “Obviously we would only jointly commit a taskforce if we jointly agreed on the mission…”1000 The division in interests and capabilities in Africa between London and Paris were demonstrated in 2011 and

2013, when France undertook two prominent military operations in sub-Saharan Africa, both without combat support from the United Kingdom.

In 2011, French forces intervened decisively in Côte d’Ivoire as disputed elections led to fighting between the forces of the internationally-recognized winner, opposition candidate

995 “BBC News – Special Report: Brits Abroad – Africa,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/brits_abroad/html/africa.stm (accessed 20 April 2013). 996 Ibid. 997 “The British Army in Africa,” Army, http://www.army.mod.uk/operations-deployments/22724.aspx (accessed 15 April 2013). 998 HM Government, National Security Strategy, 16. 999 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 45. 1000 “UK-France Summit press conference.”

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Alassane Ouattarra, and the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo.1001 Using prepositioned forces in Côte d’Ivoire and other African bases, as well as reinforcements dispatched from

France, French forces provided decisive firepower for an UN-led operation already in the country.1002 1003 French forces demonstrated their ability to carry out special operation raids to rescue hostages, fly helicopters in urban combat operations, and protect some 5,000 expatriates.1004 A maximum of 1,650 French personnel took part in the operation.1005 British

Foreign Secretary William Hague voiced British support for military efforts to oust Gbagbo, but emphasized that no British forces would be deployed beyond a military liaison officer.1006

In 2013, French forces unilaterally intervened in Mali, where divisions resulting from the

March 2012 coup d’état left Malian forces unable to cope with the radical Islamists and well- armed fighters from Libya that took over an ethnic Tuareg rebellion.1007 1008 1009 Militants captured northern Mali in 2012, including the historic city of Timbuktu, raising concerns the region would become a safe haven for international terrorist groups, including AQIM.1010 France originally backed international efforts to build an African-led regional force to restore order in

1001 Bruce Crumley, “Anatomy of an Intervention: Why France Joined the U.N. Action in Abidjan,” Time, 6 April 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2063613,00.html (accessed 21 April 2013). 1002 “Côte d’Ivoire: renforcement de Licorne,” Armée de Terre, 5 April 2011, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/actu-terre/cote-d-ivoire-renforcement-de-licorne (accessed 21 April 2013). 1003 Adam Nossiter, “Strikes by U.N. and France Corner Leader of ,” New York Times, 4 April 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/world/africa/05ivory.html?_r=0 (accessed 21 April 2013). 1004 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 59. 1005 Ibid. 1006 “Ivory Coast: UK ‘would back’ UN Gbagbo military action,” BBC News, 31 December 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12098686 (accessed 15 April 2013). 1007 International Crisis Group, “Mali: Eviter L’escalade,” Rapport Afrique no. 189 (2012): i-ii. 1008 Michelle Nichols, “Libya arms fueling conflicts in Syria, Mali and beyond: U.N. experts,” Reuters, 9 April 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/09/us-libya-arms-un-idUSBRE93814Y20130409 (accessed 17 April 2013). 1009 Angelique Chrisafis, Afua Hirsch, and Nick Hopkins, “France launches air strikes on Mali,” The Guardian, 11 January 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/11/france-launches-airstrikes- on-mali (accessed 19 April 2013). 1010 Paul Melly, “France: How was it dragged into the Malian conflict?” BBC News, 14 January 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21009958 (accessed 17 April 2013).

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Mali and an EU mission to train the Malian military.1011 In January 2013, with international forces far from ready and the Malian military collapsing, the militants captured Konna in what appeared to be a march on the capital city Bamako.1012 French officials also feared the militants would capture Mopti air base outside Sévaré, which planners held was critical to deploy any international mission to Mali.1013 With the window for action narrowing and the Malian government asking for French assistance, Hollande ordered “prepositioned” forces in Chad and

Côte d’Ivoire to stop the militant advance and protect the 6,000 French nationals in Mali.1014 1015

Hollande claimed “Opération Serval” would continue in Mali until the country “is safe; has legitimate authorities, an electoral process, and there are no more terrorists threatening its territory.”1016 France dispatched infantry, armor, fighter jets, and combat helicopters to Mali, with its forces in the country reaching the 4,000 mark in February 2013.1017 In about three weeks of fighting, French and Malian forces regained control of all the major urban centers in formerly rebel-held territory.1018 The French operation received unanimous support in the UN Security

Council and spurred the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to accelerate

1011 Michelle Nichols, “U.S., France differ over how to deal with ‘explosive’ Mali,” Reuters, 10 December 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/10/us-mali-crisis-sahel-un-idUSBRE8B91A720121210 (accessed 18 April 2013). 1012 “Discours à l’Assemblée nationale relatif à l’intervention militaire au Mali,” Portail du Gouvernement, 16 January 2013, http://www.gouvernement.fr/premier-ministre/discours-a-l-assemblee-nationale- relatif-a-l-intervention-militaire-au-mali (accessed 18 April 2013). 1013 “Le Drian veut une prise de ‘relais’ rapide de la force africaine au Mali,” Le Monde, 20 January 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/01/20/le-drian-les-otages-francais-au-sahel-sont- vivants_1819703_3212.html (accessed 18 April 2013). 1014 Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Mali: le premier mort français de l’opération Serval,” Marianne : Secret Défense, http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefense/Mali-le-premier-mort-francais-de-l-operation- Serval_a912.html (accessed 17 April 2013). 1015 Associated Press, “French troops in Mali to fight extremists,” The Guardian, 11 January 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10606819 (accessed 17 April 2013). 1016 Angelique Chrisafis and Afua Hirsch, “France pledges to fight until Mali’s Islamist rebels are wiped out,” The Guardian, 15 January 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/15/francois-hollande- islamist-rebels-mali (accessed 17 April 2013). 1017 "Carte des opérations extérieures," Ministère de la Défense, 14 February 2013, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/rubriques_complementaires/carte-des-operations-exterieures (accessed 19 April 2013). 1018 “France’s Francois Hollande to visit Mali,” BBC News, 19 April 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21293616 (accessed 19 April 2013).

162 the deployment of a 3,300-strong peacekeeping force.1019 The Islamists rebels, however, regrouped in Mali’s thinly-populated north and continued to clash with French-led forces, with the French death toll reaching six in April 2013.1020 President Hollande announced in March 2013 that France would begin to scale down its operations in Mali in April 2013.1021 By July 2013, only

2,000 French soldiers are to be on the ground in Mali, with this figure to fall to about 1,000 by the end of 2013.1022 These forces are to cede primarily responsibility to the ECOWAS mission or a possible UN operation.1023

Throughout the Mali operation, France struggled to convince its allies to join in the fight as France would have to bear the brunt of combat operations for several months until Malian and West African forces were trained.1024 Six days into the operation, the EU authorized the creation of the European Union Training Mission: Mali (EUTM), but there was no appetite for an

EU combat mission to the country.1025 The British government voiced strong rhetorical support for French-led efforts in Mali, but elected not to provide combat support.1026 The death of six

British hostages in a hostage taking at a BP joint venture in southern Algeria by militants linked

1019 “Mali conflict: UN backs France’s military intervention,” BBC News, 14 January 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21021132 (accessed 17 April 2013). 1020 “Roadside bomb kills French soldier in Mali,” Al-Jazeera, 30 April 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/04/201343041937628215.html (accessed 1 May 2013). 1021 “Mali crisis: French soldiers to be withdrawn in April,” BBC News, 19 April 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21691368 (accessed 19 April 2013). 1022 Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Au Mali, ‘nous avons atteint nos objectifs’ assure François Hollande,” Marianne : Secret défense, 28 March 2013, http://www.marianne.net/blogsecretdefense/Au-Mali-nous- avons-atteint-nos-objectifs-assure-Francois-Hollande_a998.html (accessed 19 April 2013). 1023 Michelle Nichols and Louis Charbonneau, “U.N. considering deployment of peacekeepers in Mali on July 1,” Reuters, 15 April 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/15/us-mali-crisis-un- idUSBRE93E0WG20130415 (accessed 12 May 2013). 1024 “France’s Fabius says Africa ‘must’ send troops to Mali,” BBC News, 19 January 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21095456 (accessed 18 April 2013). 1025 Don Melvin and Sarah DiLorenzo, “EU approves military training mission to Mali,” Associated Press, 17 January 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/eu-approves-military-training-mission-mali-172059019.html (accessed 18 April 2013). 1026 “Mali crisis: Situation ‘serious concern’ for UK,” BBC News, 14 January 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21018382 (accessed 15 April 2013).

163 to the Malian rebels did not sway London’s hand.1027 1028 After a decade-long commitment in

Afghanistan and Iraq, British politicians held that the public would not support another extensive overseas commitment.1029 The British military was also strained by existing requirements and budget cuts.1030 Ultimately, the RAF contributed two C-17 cargo planes and a

Sentinel R1 surveillance aircraft.1031 1032 A small team of British special forces were also dispatched to provide “non-combat support” to French forces.1033 The UK also agreed to deploy some 330 military personnel to West Africa, with 40 to serve as military advisers in Mali, 200 to help train the Malian army from neighboring countries, and 90 to support one C-17 and one

Sentinel R1.1034 So concerned were the British about mission creep, however, that London opted not to provide “force protection” for its own military advisers, relying instead on French forces.1035 In these commitments, Britain provided forces similar to those sent by Germany,

1027 Eddie Buckle, “Cameron Says as Many as Six Britons Died in Algeria Siege,” Bloomberg, 20 January 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-20/cameron-says-as-many-as-six-u-k-nationals-killed- in-algeria-1-.html (accessed 18 April 2013). 1028 Florentin Collomp, “La diplomatie britannique rattrapée par la realpolitik,” Le Figaro, 18 January 2013, http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2013/01/18/01003-20130118ARTFIG00684-la-diplomatie- britannique-rattrapee-par-la-realpolitik.php (accessed 18 April 2013). 1029 Maria Golovnina and Mohammed Abbas, “Big words, little action in UK’s campaign against Sahara jihadists,” Reuters, 23 January 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/big-words-little-action-uks-campaign- against-sahara-110618397.html (accessed 18 April 2013). 1030 Ibid. 1031 Hayley Dixon, “David Cameron praises C17 plane just moments before it breaks down,” The Telegraph, 14 January 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9800099/David-Cameron- praises-C17-plane-just-moments-before-it-breaks-down.html (accessed 17 April 2013). 1032 Alex Spillius and Mike Pflanz, “Britain sends spy plane to Mali amid fears of ‘mission creep,’” The Telegraph, 25 January 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/9828083/Britain-sends-spy- plane-to-Mali-amid-fears-of-mission-creep.html (accessed 18 April 2013). 1033 Nick Hopkins, “UK special forces active in Mali,” The Guardian, 17 April 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jan/22/uk-special-forces-active-mali (accessed 17 April 2013). 1034 “Mali crisis: 330 UK military personnel sent to West Africa,” BBC News, 29 January 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21240676 (accessed 18 April 2013). 1035 Andrew Chuter, “U.K. to Train Malian Troops, Help with Logistics,” Defense News, 29 January 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130129/DEFREG01/301290019/U-K-Train-Malian-Troops-Help- Logistics?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE (accessed 18 April 2013).

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Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and Canada, among others.1036 1037 1038 1039 Even Russia, which is not a

French treaty ally, offered a cargo plane and a detachment of ground support personnel to back the French operation.1040

In the coming years, French forces could find themselves pulled into other African trouble spots, including the Central African Republic (CAR), where on average some 200 French forces are “prepositioned.”1041 In December 2012, rebel groups from northeastern CAR marched towards the capital Bangui, claiming the government of then President François Bozizé failed to abide by the 2007 peace agreements.1042 Although the parties signed ceasefire and power- sharing agreements in January 2013, fighting resumed two months later, leading to Bozizé’s resignation.1043 Mindful of the noxious legacy of French interventions in domestic African politics, Paris refused to prop up Bozizé.1044 The French military, however, dispatched some 350

1036 Matthias Gebauer and Philipp Wittrock, “Germany’s Mali Predicament: Trapped Between France and War,” Spiegel Online International, 17 January 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/french- mission-in-mali-puts-germany-in-a-tight-spot-a-878187.html (accessed 18 April 2013). 1037 Lori Hinnant, “Its Allies Reluctant, France Goes it Alone in Mali,” Associated Press, 16 January 2013, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/its-allies-reluctant-france-goes-it-alone-mali (accessed 18 April 2013). 1038 “Une quarantaine de militaires belges vers le Mali,” Le Soir, 27 January 2013, http://www.lesoir.be/172910/article/actualite/monde/2013-01-27/une-quarantaine-militaires-belges- vers-mali (accessed 18 April 2013). 1039 Agence France-Presse, “Italy to Send 3 Planes to Mali for Logistical Support,” Defense News, 18 April 2013), http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130122/DEFREG04/301220010/Italy-Send-3-Planes-Mali- Logistical-Support?odyssey=tab%7Ctopnews%7Ctext%7CFRONTPAGE (accessed 18 April 2013). 1040 Pierre Avril, “Mali: Moscou promet une aide militaire à la France,” Le Figaro, 18 January 2013, http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2013/01/18/01003-20130118ARTFIG00569-mali-moscou-promet- une-aide-militaire-a-la-france.php (accessed 18 April 2013). 1041 “Les forces françaises en République Centrafricaine,” Ministère de la Défense, 12 July 2010, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/autres-operations/operation-boali-rca/dossier/les-forces- francaises-en-republique-centrafricaine (accessed 19 April 2013). 1042 Lydia Polgreen and Josh Kron, “Rebels Are Advancing Toward Capital of Central African Republic,” New York Times, 27 December 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/28/world/africa/rebels-move-toward- capital-of-central-african-republic.html?_r=0 (accessed 19 April 2013). 1043 John Irish, “Central African Republic rebels declare ceasefire end,” Reuters, 20 March 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/20/us-car-rebels-idUSBRE92J0VW20130320 (accessed 19 April 2013). 1044 “Centrafrique: Bozizé lâché par Déby, ignoré par Hollande,” Radio France Internationale, 26 March 2013, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130326-centrafrique-bozize-lache-deby-lache-hollande (accessed 19 April 2013).

165 reinforcements to the CAR to protect its 1,250 nationals amid reports of violence in Bangui.1045

1046 Should the security situation deteriorate in the CAR, French forces may be pulled into the fighting. In late March 2013, French forces defending Bangui’s international airport opened fire on a pick-up truck they believed threatened their security perimeter, killing two Indian expatriates.1047 One month later, the newly installed and rebel-backed Centrafrican prime minister called on French and regional assistance to maintain order in the country after violent clashes between former rebels and residents of Bangui.1048 Regarding the violence in the CAR,

Foreign Secretary William Hague called on the warring parties to “show restraint and to respect human rights.”1049 Hague claimed London was “liaising closely with the French and with other international partners to monitor the fast-moving situation in the country.”1050 London, however, is unlikely to provide combat troop for any French operation in the CAR, where the UK

Foreign & Commonwealth Office does not maintain a diplomatic mission, the UK Trade &

Investment Department does not have an office, and it is estimated that only two British pensioners reside.1051 1052

1045 “République Centrafricaine: opération de sécurisation,” Ministère de la Défense, 6 April 2013, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/fil-defense/republique-centrafricaine-operation-de- securisation/%28language%29/fre-FR#SearchText=republique%20centrafricaine#xtcr=1 (accessed 19 April 2013). 1046 Agence France Presse, “Centrafrique: 350 soldats français envoys en renfort,” Libération, 23 March 2013, http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2013/03/23/centrafrique-le-premier-ministre-veut-negocier-pour- eviter-un-bain-de-sang_890730 (accessed 19 April 2013). 1047 “VIDEOS. Centrafrique: des soldats français tuent deux Indiens à Bangui,” Le Parisien, 25 March 2013, http://www.leparisien.fr/international/centrafrique-des-soldats-francais-tuent-deux-indiens-a-bangui-25- 03-2013-2670195.php (accessed 19 April 2013). 1048 “Le nouveau pouvoir centrafricain demande l’aide de la France,” Le Monde, 17 April 2013, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/04/17/le-nouveau-pouvoir-centrafricain-demande-l-aide- de-la-france_3161306_3212.html (accessed 19 April 2013). 1049 “Foreign Secretary concerned about Central African Republic,” Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 25 March 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-concerned-about-central-african- republic (accessed 19 April 2013). 1050 Ibid. 1051 “Central African Republic,” UK Trade & Investment, http://www.ukti.gov.uk/export/countries/africa/centralafrica/centralafricanrepublic.html (19 April 2013).

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In spite of the 2008 French white paper’s call for Paris to wind down its prepositioned forces in Africa, the French operation in Mali and continued presence in Chad, the CAR, and Côte d’Ivoire indicate that Paris may find it hard to withdraw from its African interests. The financial and strategic advantages of maintaining prepositioned forces in Africa, coupled with concerns about possible terrorist safe havens and the protection of French expatriates on the continent, may prompt France to abandon plans to phase out these missions.1053 The minimal British interest in francophone Africa, coupled with its limited defense relationship to the continent mean French defense planners cannot rely on Britain for support in the region.

Britain and the South Atlantic

In its 2010 SDSR, the British government claims Britain must maintain “an independent ability to defend the Overseas Territories militarily.”1054 Of particular importance among are the South

Atlantic territories: the , St. Helena and its dependencies (Ascension and Tristan da Cunha islands), and the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.1055 The Argentine

Republic, however, claims sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the South Georgia and

South Sandwich Islands, calling the former “Las Malvinas.” The Falklands are located some 250 nautical miles (460km, 290 miles) off the coast of Argentina and some 6,951 nautical miles

(12,875km, 8,000 miles) from the United Kingdom.1056 1057 This self-governing territory is populated by over 2,400 Falkland Islanders and an assortment of foreign workers from Chile and

1052 “BBC News – Special Report – Brits Abroad: Africa – Cent African Rep,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth/brits_abroad/html/africa.stm (accessed 20 April 2013). 1053 Tran, “Early Lessons.” 1054 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 12. 1055 Ibid., 19, 21, 24, 25, and 28. 1056 “The Falkland Islands,” HM Governor’s Office Falkland Islands, http://falklandislands.fco.gov.uk/en/the-falkland-islands/ (accessed 11 March 2013). 1057 Richard Norton-Taylor and Rob Evans, “UK held secret talks to cede sovereignty,” The Guardian, 28 June 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/jun/28/falklands.past (accessed 27 March 2013).

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St. Helena.1058 Argentina claims it exercised sovereignty over the Falklands until 1833, when the

United Kingdom evicted Argentine officials from the islands and claimed control.1059 The British dispute the Argentine’s historic claim to sovereignty and hold that they will not negotiate changes to the Falklands’ status without the authorization of the Falkland Islanders.1060 1061 The

Islanders, however, are keen to remain British citizens. In March 2013, the Falkland Islanders held a two-day referendum on whether to retain their status as a British overseas territory, with

99.8 percent voting for the status quo.1062 The Argentine government, however, does not believe that the right of self-determination applies to the Falkland Islanders, whom Buenos Aires considers “a transplanted population.”1063

The dispute over the Falklands has led to military confrontations in the past and remains deeply contentious today, prompting the United Kingdom to maintain significant defense assets on the islands. In April 1982, the military junta then in power in Buenos Aires invaded the islands and expelled its British governor.1064 The United Kingdom dispatched 28,000 troops and a 100- ship naval task force to retake the Falklands.1065 The war lasted less than three months and left

1058 Ibid. 1059 “La Cuestión de las Islas Malvinas,” Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, http://www.mrecic.gov.ar/es/la-cuestion-de-las-islas-malvinas (accessed 11 March 2013). 1060 “Foreign Secretary re-affirms UK’s support for Falkland Islands,” GOV.UK, 6 February 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-re-affirms-uk-s-support-for-falkland-islands (accessed 11 March 2013). 1061 Miller, Vaughne, “Argentina and the Falkland Islands,” House of Commons Library, 27 January 2012, http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05602 (accessed 12 May 2013). 1062 “Results of the referendum on the Political Status of the Falkland Islands,” Falkland Islands Government, 12 March 2013, www.falklands.gov.fk/results-of-the-referendum-on-the-political-status-of- the-falkland-islands/ (accessed 14 March 2013). 1063 “Resumen,” Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, http://www.mrecic.gov.ar/es/la- cuesti%C3%B3n-de-las-islas-malvinas/resumen (accessed 11 March 2013). 1064 The Sunday Times of London Insight Team, War in the Falklands: The Full Story (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982), 92. 1065 “Key facts: The Falklands War – Introduction,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457033/html/ (accessed 15 April 2013).

168 some 255 Britons and 655 Argentines dead.1066 The victory bolstered British nationalism and has been credited with helping Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives win the 1983 general elections.1067 The Argentine defeat, meanwhile, ushered the end of military rule and the return to democracy. The two countries restored diplomatic relations in 1990, although neither side backed down from its claim to the islands.1068 The issue lay relatively quiet until the late

2000s, when Argentina expressed concerns over British fishing licenses and oil prospecting in the disputed waters surrounding the Falklands.1069 In 2007, then Argentine President Néstor

Carlos Kirchner, cancelled an oil-and-gas agreement with the United Kingdom and banned energy companies active on the islands from Argentina.1070 Kirchner’s successor and widow,

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, took a particularly active stance on the Falklands after coming to office in late 2007. A left-wing populist facing economic troubles at home, Kirchner claims she is constitutionally-mandated to see the islands “returned” to Argentina.1071 In 2009, Buenos Aires made a formal claim to the continental shelf encompassing the Falklands and the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, which Britain rejected.1072 1073 In February 2010, Argentina decried

1066 “Key facts: The Falklands War – Task Force,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457033/html/nn2page1.stm (accessed 15 April 2013). 1067 “BBC History – Margaret Thatcher,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/people/margaret_thatcher (accessed 15 April 2013). 1068 “Timeline: Argentina,” BBC News, 10 July 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1196005.stm (accessed 15 April 2013). 1069 Jeremy McDermott, “Argentina Renews campaign over Falklands claim,” Telegraph, 30 June 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/argentina/1522729/Argentina-renews- campaign-over-Falklands-claim.html (accessed 11 March 2013). 1070 “Argentina and the Falklands, Rocking the boat,” The Economist, 31 December 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21542183 (accessed 11 March 2013). 1071 Jonathan Gilbert, “Falklands again? Why Argentina’s Kirchner keeps pushing the issue with Britain,” Christian Science Monitor, 3 January 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America- Monitor/2013/0103/Falklands-again-Why-Argentina-s-Kirchner-keeps-pushing-the-issue-with-Britain (accessed 15 April 2013). 1072 Candace Piette, “Argentina claims vast ocean area,” BBC News, 22 April 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8011539.stm (accessed 11 March 2013). 1073 Owen Bowcott, “Britain and Argentina dispute rights to seabed around the Falkland Islands,” The Guardian, 23 April 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/apr/24/falklands-britain-argentina-dispute- seabed (accessed 11 March 2013).

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British oil exploration in the waters off the Falklands as a “unilateral act,” which would lead to

“measures to defend our sovereignty; these are always peaceful measures.”1074 In retaliation,

Kirchner issued a decree requiring all ships using Argentine ports to obtain a permit to enter or leave Falkland waters.1075 In December 2011, Argentina convinced the South American trading bloc Mercosur, which includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay to ban ships flying the

Falkland Islands flag from using their ports.1076 After Britain sent Prince William, the third in line to the British throne and a search-and-rescue helicopter pilot, along with a Type 45 destroyer to the Falklands, Argentina decried British “militarization” of the dispute and appealed to the

United Nations.1077 1078 Following the March 2013 referendum, the British ambassador to the

United Nations warned Argentina that Britain would “robustly” defend the Falkland Islands and would willingly discuss any bilateral concern, except the sovereignty issue.1079

In spite of heightened tensions over the Falklands, the risk of military conflict is particularly low for the foreseeable future. First, the Argentine government has forsworn the

1074 “Oil drilling begins in the Falkland Islands,” Channel 4, 21 February 2010, http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/americas/oil+drilling+begins+in+the+falkland+islands/35 54857.html (accessed 11 March 2013). 1075 “Conferencia De Prensa Del Jefe De Gabinete De Ministros, Aníbal Fernández, En La Casa De Gobierno,” Casa Rosada, 16 February 2010, http://web.archive.org/web/20100326214059/http://www.casarosada.gov.ar/index.php?option=com_co ntent&task=view&id=6926 (accessed 11 March 2013). 1076 “South American states ban Falklands vessels from ports,” BBC News, 21 December 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16280613 (accessed 11 March 2013). 1077 “Argentina condemns British ‘militarization’ in Falklands,” Reuters, 7 February 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/08/us-argentina-falklands-idUSTRE81701420120208 (accessed 15 April 2013). 1078 “Special Committee on Decolonization Considers ‘Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)’, Hears From Petitioners, Island Assemblymen, Argentina’s President,” United Nations, 14 June 2012, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/gacol3238.doc.htm (accessed 15 April 2013). 1079 Louis Charbonneau, “UK to ‘robustly’ defend Falklands, Argentina seeks U.N. aid,” Reuters, 10 February 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/10/us-argentina-britain-falklands- idUSTRE81922T20120210 (accessed 19 April 2013).

170 use of military force to regain the island.1080 Second, economic difficulties and the legacy of military rule have led successive Argentine governments to slash military spending, leaving

Argentina military weaker than in 1982.1081 Third, the 1982 Falklands War prompted London to bolster its military presence on the islands. When Argentine marines landed on the Falklands in

April 1982, the islands were protected by only 68 Royal Marines and about 23 local volunteers.1082 In the war’s aftermath, the United Kingdom built a new military base, RAF Mount

Pleasant, and a military port, Mare Harbour.1083 In 2012, about 1,200 soldiers, three warships,

Rapier surface-to-air missile batteries, and four Typhoon fighters were deployed to protect the

Falklands.1084 The British government considers these measures adequate to repel any invasion that could be currently mounted by Argentina.1085 Nevertheless, the defense of the Falklands weighs heavily on the British government and military, particularly as Argentina continues to raise its claim. In the months leading to the 2013 Falklands referendum, British planners considered a “show of force” on the islands and drew up plans to deal with a range of possible

Argentine actions.1086 These included light raids on the Falklands to plant Argentine flags or

Argentine harassment of Falklands fishing boats and oil exploration ships. Following the 2013 referendum on the Falklands, Cameron pledged the UK would “always be there to defend

1080 “Canciller dice que Argentina recuperará las Malvinas en menos de 20 años,” CNN, 6 February 2010, http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2013/02/06/canciller-dice-que-argentina-recuperara-las-malvinas-en-menos- de-20-anos/comment-page-1/ (accessed 11 March 2013). 1081 “Falkland Islands: How strong is Argentina’s position?” BBC News, 1 April 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16280613 (accessed 11 March 2013). 1082 Sunday Times Insight Team, War in the Falklands, 4-5. 1083 “British forces overseas: Falkland Islands and Ascension Island,” Ministry of Defence, 17 December 2012, https://www.gov.uk/british-forces-overseas-falkland-islands-and-ascension-island (accessed 21 April 2013). 1084 “Could the UK still defend the Falklands?” BBC News, 27 February 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17157373 (accessed 27 March 2013). 1085 “Daily Hansard – Written Answers,” Parliament, 14 December 2011, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111214/text/111214w0002.htm (accessed 15 April 2013). 1086 Sean Rayment, “Defence chiefs prepare new plans to defend Falklands Islands,” Telegraph, 12 January 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/falklandislands/9797902/Defence- chiefs-prepare-new-plans-to-defend-Falkland-Islands.html (accessed 15 April 2013).

171 them.”1087 This political stance is matched with lobbying on behalf of the islanders in

Westminster and the support of British public opinion, which remains committed to the

Falklands’ defense some thirty years after the conflict.1088 A Guardian/ICM poll released in

March 2012 found that 61 percent of voters agreed that "Britain should protect the Falklands so long as the islanders want protecting, no matter what the cost."1089

Following the signing of the Lancaster House treaties in November 2010, British media outlets warned that relying on French assets could prevent the British from coming to the defense of the Falklands.1090 This is because France is unlikely to countenance dispatching combat troops to the South Atlantic, let alone its only aircraft carrier. In his joint press conference with Cameron in November 2010, Sarkozy did not pledge a French carrier in the event of renewed hostilities over the Falklands.1091 The French president, however, made a characteristically emotional appeal for Franco-British solidarity. “… if the British Prime Minister and the British government decided to send its aircraft carrier, it would take a hell of a crisis to do so,” Sarkozy said.1092 “To send an aircraft carrier out means a big crisis. Now, do you imagine frankly that our British friends would be likely to be facing a crisis so great that it would require sending out an aircraft carrier and that that wouldn’t affect France? What idea do you have of

1087 Shadia Nasralla and Maria Golovnina, “Britain pledges to defend Falkland Islands,” Reuters, 15 April 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/12/us-falklands-referendum-britain- idUSBRE92B0V120130312 (accessed 15 April 2013). 1088 “Falklands prepares for renewed UK Parliament with expected 50% turnover,” MercoPress, 29 March 2010, http://en.mercopress.com/2010/03/29/falklands-prepares-for-renewed-uk-parliament-with- expected-50-turnover (accessed 27 March 2013). 1089 Tom Clark, “Britain should protect Falkland Islands ‘at all costs,’ say 61% of voters,” The Guardian, 20 March 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/mar/20/falkland-islands-guardian-icm-poll (accessed 27 March 2013). 1090 “British press fears for Falklands amid military tie-up with France,” France 24, 2 November 2010, http://www.france24.com/en/20101102-british-press-fears-falklands-amid-closer-military-ties-with- france-defence (accessed 27 March 2013). 1091 “UK-France Summit press conference.” 1092 Ibid.

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France in that case?”1093 Sarkozy’s words hardly assuaged the fears of British tabloids, one of which claimed the “slippery French president” had “ducked out of vowing to send in a French aircraft carrier if Britain needed to defend the Falklands.”1094

Conclusion

As anticipated in the alternative hypothesis, France and Britain do retain significant security interests in areas that are of little interest to the other. The 2010 Lancaster House Treaties were signed at a time when sub-Saharan Africa and the Falkland Islands were less salient security concerns. The French 2008 white paper, published two years earlier, called for France to wind down its security presence in Africa, while Argentina had only just begun to reiterate its claim to the Falklands at that time. Since 2010, however, France has fought two conflicts in francophone

Africa, where it retains significant interests, while Argentina has aggressively pursued its claims to the Falklands, which British voters are keen to defend. The renewed salience of both conflicts may limit the extent of future Franco-British collaboration. While each country could expect some form of assistance from the other should war erupt in Africa or the South Atlantic, they would likely have to rely on their own military means. This is particularly troubling to defense planners if the two countries elect to share assets or depend on the other party for key capabilities, such as aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, budgetary pressures outweighed these concerns in 2010 and both countries may elect to cooperate more deeply on certain capabilities, while retaining independent forces to deal with any eventuality in these areas.

1093 Ibid. 1094 Tom Newton Dunn, “Sarkozy’s snub over Falklands,” The Sun, 3 November 2010, http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3209229/Nicolas-Sarkozy-ducks-question-of-helping- Britain-to-defend-Falklands.html (accessed 14 March 2013).

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Chapter Eight: Joint Deployments

“First, we will create a joint expeditionary task force: troops who will train and exercise together, making it easier for us to deploy quickly together on operations if we wish to do so…”1095

Prime Minister David Cameron, November 2010

One of the most prominent outcomes of the 2010 Lancaster House treaties was the creation of the Franco-British joint expeditionary task force.1096 Cameron described this unit as a rapid reaction force that could be deployed by air or sea to trouble spots.1097 For this force to be sent into combat, however, Britain and France would have to agree on the deployment. This essay’s alternative hypothesis holds that the British and French “strategic cultures” on deploying forces overseas diverge and that two countries have encountered great difficulty in deploying an integrated force abroad. Kerry Longhurst defined “Strategic culture” as the “distinct body of beliefs, attitudes, and practices regarding the use of force,” which is “persistent over time,” although it can change rapidly at key events in a state’s history.1098 This culture impacts foreign policy decisions by creating “the boundaries of what is considered ‘normal’ behavior” for officials.1099

An examination of the British and French white papers, however, shows significant convergence. These documents conclude that the military operations they are likely to face in

1095 “UK-France Summit press conference.” 1096 Ibid. 1097 Ibid. 1098 Jiri Sedivy and Marcin Zaborowski, “Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Relations,” in Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda, ed. Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski (New York: Routledge, 2005), 7. 1099 Ibid.

174 the future will be multilateral in nature. The British 2010 SDSR points out that the last significant operations carried out solely by British forces were the Falkland Islands in 1982 and Sierra Leone in 2000.1100 The French 2008 white paper, meanwhile, emphasizes that the “only hypotheses in which a purely national intervention remains plausible are the protection of our citizens overseas, the undertaking of bilateral defense accords that tie us to certain states, and, finally, a national response to attacks against our interests.”1101

The two countries also converge on when they would agree to deploy forces. The

French 2008 white paper lists seven key principles to guide French decisions on deploying forces: (1) The situation is a serious threat to national security or international peace and security.1102 (2) The government shall evaluate all other possible options to armed force. (3) The intervention must respect international law. (4) France must retain its political sovereignty, freedom of action, and capacity to evaluate the security on the ground. (5) The operation must abide by democratic principles, including a transparent accounting of the operational objectives.

(6) France must retain oversight of troop operations and the political strategy. (7) The intervention must be defined in terms of space and time. For its part, the British SDSR calls on officials to be “more selective in our use of the Armed Forces, deploying them decisively at the right time but only where key UK national interests are at stake, where we have a clear strategic aim; where the likely political, economic, and human costs are in proportion to the likely benefits; where we have a viable exit strategy; and where justifiable under international law.”1103 It adds that the coalition government inherited a “legacy of overstretch” from the

1100 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 59. 1101 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 72. 1102 Ibid., 76. 1103 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 17.

175 previous Labour governments.1104 British deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq wore down the military, with the SDSR warning the next decade might be spent “recovering capabilities damaged or reduced as a result of this overstretch.”1105 This statement indicates the British government may, not only less inclined, but less able to project force for a decade. In its 2012 evaluation of the Libyan operations, the House of Commons Defence Committee points out that many of the British assets allocated to the operation were slated for downsizing or elimination by the SDSR.1106 These included the Nimrod R1 and Sentinel ISTAR planes. It remains unclear if a similar operation could be carried out once the cuts planned in the SDSR come into effect.

Considerations about British overstretch may have spurred the British to avoid deploying more than a token force to assist French operations in Mali in 2013. The French military, meanwhile, found its logistical and helicopter capabilities stretched to the limit in the Malian conflict.1107

The British and French white paper reflect the lessons learned from US-led operations in

Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly with regards to the dangers of unilateralism and the importance of reconstruction. The French 2008 white paper reads, “unilateralism has shown its failings, both in terms of legitimacy and efficaciousness.”1108 Paris, instead, favors multilateral operations anchored in UN Security Council resolutions.1109 These operations can be undertaken both to tackle “threats to peace and international security” and acts of “genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other serious violations of international human rights.”1110 The French government claims that it is “nearly impossible to conceive of a military operation that would not be

1104 Ibid., 15. 1105 Ibid. 1106 Defence Committee, Operations in Libya, 9. 1107 Jean Guisnel, “Mali: l’aide logistique et discrète des Algériens,” Le Point, 26 April 2013, http://www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/jean-guisnel/mali-l-aide-logistique-et-discrete-des-algeriens-26- 04-2013-1660562_53.php (accessed 28 April 2013). 1108 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 114. 1109 Ibid. 1110 Qtd. Ibid., 115.

176 accompanied by a civilian action.”1111 The British SDSR calls on the government to “enhance directly the effectiveness of multilateral institutions most important to the UK’s national security interests.” These include the United Nations (UN), NATO, and EU.1112 Drawing on the

British experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, the SDSR also highlights the importance of maintaining capabilities to “address the root causes of conflict and fragility, support an inclusive political system which builds a closer society, and strengthen” the rule of law.1113

Britain and France share similar policies on when to deploy troops overseas. Learning from the legacy of US unilateral operations in the early 2000s, both countries agree on the importance of multilateral operations and post-conflict reconstruction. British overreach in the

2000s, however, may leave their government reluctant to take part in overseas operations, such as Mali in 2013.

Case Study: Libyan Intervention

The intervention cultures outlined in the white papers were put to the test in the events in Libya in 2011. The civil war the ripped through the North African country began three months after the signing of the Lancaster House treaties when anti-government protests inspired by the

“Arab Spring” morphed into violent clashes with security forces.1114 In February 2011, militias opposed to the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi seized control of several coastal towns, including the country’s second-largest city, Benghazi.1115 Gaddafi’s forces, however, regrouped

1111 Ibid., 131. 1112 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 61. 1113 Ibid., 45. 1114 Reuters, “Timeline: Libya’s civil war,” The Guardian, 19 November 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/19/timeline-libya-civil-war (accessed 28 April 2013). 1115 Martin Chulov, “Inside Libya’s first free city: jubilation fails to hide deep wounds,” The Guardian, 23 February 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/23/inside-libya-banghazi-jubilation (accessed 28 April 2013).

177 and threatened to reconquer lost territories and slaughter rebel forces.1116 The crisis served as a test of the newly revitalized Franco-British cooperation. The two countries took a leading role in the diplomatic activity surrounding international sanctions on the Gaddafi regime and the establishment of a no-fly zone.1117 1118 Ultimately, their activism led the UN Security Council to adopt UN Resolution 1973, which authorized a no-fly zone over Libya and empowered the international community to use “all necessary measures” to protect civilian lives.1119 Two days after the resolution was signed, French forces began air strikes against Libyan forces south of

Benghazi.1120 They were soon followed by US and British forces.1121 The ad hoc coalition operations over Libya progressively came under NATO command in late March 2011 and did not end until October 2011, when Gaddafi was killed and his regime toppled.1122 1123

To explain their decision to intervene in Libya, the British and French governments pointed to fears that a Qaddafi victory would lead to violent retributions against civilian populations in Benghazi. Sarkozy claimed that in Libya, “a peaceful civilian population that sought nothing more than the right to decide its own destiny faced the threat of death. We have

1116 Richard Spencer, “Libya: Gaddafi threatens bloodbath if West intervenes,” The Telegraph, 2 March 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8358013/Libya-Gaddafi- threatens-bloodbath-if-West-intervenes.html (accessed 28 April 2013). 1117 Louis Charbonneau, “U.N. council to vote on Libya but China a wild card,” Reuters, 26 February 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/26/us-libya-un-idUSTRE71P26Z20110226 (accessed 28 April 2013). 1118 Donnet, “Britain, France ready Libya no-fly.” 1119 “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,” United Nations Security Council, 17 March 2011, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm (accessed 28 April 2013). 1120 “Libya: French planes fire on military vehicle,” BBC News, 19 March 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12795971 (accessed 28 April 2013). 1121 David D. Kirkpatrick, Steven Erlanger, and Elisabeth Bumiller, “Allies Open on Qaddafi’s Forces in Libya,” New York Times, 19 March 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/world/africa/20libya.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 28 April 2013). 1122 Berry Malone, “Gaddafi killed in hometown, Libya eyes new future,” Reuters, 20 October 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/us-libya-idUSTRE79F1FK20111020 (accessed 28 April 2013). 1123 “NATO ends ‘most successful’ Libya mission,” The Telegraph, 31 October 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8859207/Nato-ends-most- successful-Libya-mission.html (accessed 28 April 2013).

178 the duty to respond to their desperate cry.”1124 For his part, Cameron told the British House of

Commons, “Gadhafi’s regime has ignored the demand of the UN Security Council Resolution

1970 that it stop the violence against the Libya people. His forces have attacked peaceful protesters and are not preparing for a violent assault on a city, Benghazi, of a million people…

Mr. Speaker, that is the demonstrable need.”1125 The intervention morphed from maintaining a no-fly zone, to bombing Qaddafi’s forces, and, finally, seeking to remove Qaddafi from power.

Cameron, Sarkozy, and US President Barack Obama explained their decision to escalate their involvement in joint op-ed. “Our duty and our mandate under U.N. Security Council Resolution

1973 is to protect civilians, and we are doing that. It is not to remove Qaddafi by force, but is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Qaddafi in power.” 1126

In accordance with their common focus on multilateralism and international authorization for combat missions, Britain and France strove to secure a United Nations (UN) resolution to legitimize any military operation in Libya. In a declaration following an international summit in Libya on the day French air strikes began, Sarkozy emphasized the international support for the mission. “Today, we intervene in Libya under the mandate of the

UN Security Council with our partners, and notably our Arab partners. We do this to protect a population civilian from the murderous madness of a regime that lost all legitimacy by murdering its own people.”1127 For his part, Cameron named “regional support” as one of three

1124 Agence France-Presse, “Verbatim – Sarkozy justifie l’intervention militaire en Libye,” Le Point, 19 March 2011, http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/verbatim-sarkozy-justifie-l-intervention-militaire-en-libye-19- 03-2011-1308723_24.php (accessed 28 April 2013). 1125 “PM statement on the UN Security Council Resolution on Libya,” Number 10, 18 March 2011, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pm-statement-on-the-un-security-council-resolution-on-libya/ (accessed 18 March 2011). 1126 Barack Obama, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy, “Joint Op-ed by President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy: ‘Libya’s Pathway to Peace,’” White House, 14 April 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/14/joint-op-ed-president-obama-prime-minister- cameron-and-president-sarkozy (accessed 3 May 2013). 1127 Agence France-Presse, “Verbatim – Sarkozy justifie l’intervention.”

179 tests for any British intervention in Libya.1128 “We’ve said there must be a clear wish from the people of Libya and the wider region for international action,” Cameron told the House of

Commons.1129 “It was the people of Libya… who were the first to call for protection from air attack through a no-fly zone. More recently, the Arab League has made the same demand.” He also emphasized the importance of “a clear legal base” from the UN for any military operation.1130

In line with the two countries’ emphasis on reconstruction and development, Britain and France supported efforts to bolster the Libyan government and its economy. By August

2011, Britain had made the second-largest aid commitment from an EU member state to Libya: nearly €13.7 billion.1131 The UK also flew nearly 13,000 migrant workers trapped in Egypt and

Tunisia back to Libya, helped support mine clearing efforts, and funded various projects meant to bolster human rights and democracy in Libya.1132 1133 In a February 2013 visit to Tripoli,

Cameron pledged additional aid for Libya and claimed “we are safer if we have a secure, stable democracy. That is why to me the Arab Spring is still part of the solution and not part of the problem.”1134 France, meanwhile, provided more than €2.9 billion in aid commitment by August

2011, as well as emergency aid to rebel-controlled areas.1135 1136 In February 2013, Libya

1128 “PM statement,” Number 10. 1129 Ibid. 1130 Ibid. 1131 Ami Sedghi and Sarah Marsh, “Humanitarian aid in Libya: how much has each country donated?” The Guardian, 22 August 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/aug/22/libya-humanitarian- aid-by-country#data (accessed 28 April 2013). 1132 “Situation in Libya – latest updates,” Department for International Development, 16 February 2012, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/situation-in-libya-latest-updates (accessed 28 April 2013). 1133 “Supporting democracy in Libya,” Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 22 March 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/priority/supporting-democracy-in-libya (accessed 28 April 2013). 1134 Patrick Wintour, “David Cameron pledges UK support in Libya visit,” The Guardian, 1 February 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/feb/01/david-cameron-libya-visit (accessed 28 April 2013). 1135 Sedghi and Marsh, “Humanitarian aid in Libya.”

180 requested international assistance to build-up its security forces and properly exercise sovereignty over its territory.1137 Libya claimed France, the United Kingdom, and Turkey had offered to provide technical and material support.1138 At Tripoli’s request, the French government hosted an international conference in Paris over Libyan security.1139 At a joint press conference with his Libyan counterpart during the conference, French Foreign Minister Laurent

Fabius said, “If there is no security, there is no sustainable development. If there is no security, there is no stable democracy.”1140

The Libyan intervention tested not only the principles governing Franco-British military cooperation, but its mechanics. The British and French shouldered the bulk of the allied bombing operations in Libya and provided two of largest contingents in the mission. France engaged a total of 4,200 personnel and 27 ships in the operation. At its peak, France had some

40 aircraft, about 20 helicopters, and a dozen ships, including the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier and a Mistral-class BPC, taking part in operations in Libya.1141 France carried out 25 percent of the coalition’s air sorties, as well as 20 percent of its air strikes and 90 percent of its helicopter strikes.1142 At the peak of operations, some 2,300 British service personnel participated in combat operations in Libya.1143 The UK deployed 32 aircraft, five attack

1136 “Libye: l’aide française arrivée à Benghazi,” Europe 1, 28 April 2013, http://www.europe1.fr/International/Libye-l-aide-francaise-arrivee-a-Benghazi-439381/ (accessed 28 April 2013). 1137 “La Libye demande de l’aide pour la sécurité de ses frontières,” Reuters, 28 April 2013, http://fr.news.yahoo.com/la-libye-demande-laide-pour-la-s%c3%a9curit%c3%a9-ses-204243370.html (accessed 28 April 2013). 1138 Ibid. 1139 “Réunion internationale de soutien à la Libye dans les domaines de la sécurité, de la justice, et de l’Etat de droit (Paris, 12 février 2013),” Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 12 February 2013, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/libye/la-france-et-la-libye/evenements- 4528/article/reunion-internationale-de-soutien-105319 (accessed 28 April 2013). 1140 Ibid. 1141 “Libye: point de situation n°50.” 1142 Ibid. 1143 Defence Committee, Operations in Libya, 45.

181 helicopters, refueling tankers, surveillance aircraft, and helicopters, as well as 16 warships and attack submarines.1144 The UK flew some 11 percent of the allies’ total air sorties or about 20 percent of the alliance’s air strikes.1145 This compared to the smaller contributions of other

NATO countries. While about half of NATO allies contributed forces to the operation, only eight took part in strike sorties: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, the United

Kingdom, and the United States.1146 1147 During the operation, British and French forces coordinated both within NATO and bilaterally. Of particular importance for bilateral cooperation were the helicopter operations launched from the French Mistral-class Tonnerre BPC and the

British helicopter carrier HMS Ocean.1148 Although the House of Commons Defence Committee noted in its report on the Libyan conflict that there were initial problems in coordinating Franco-

British forces in Libya, these were resolved in the field.1149 The government claimed one key difficulty was that the communication and information systems (CIS) meant to facilitate the communication of classified information between the two allies was not fully developed at the time of the operation.1150 The government said this problem was being addressed “as funding allows.”1151 The Defence Committee also pointed out that the British and French systems for strategic directions to the militaries were different in 2011.1152 The Combined Joint

1144 Ibid., 46. 1145 Ibid., 45. 1146 House of Commons Defence Committee, Operations in Libya: Government Response to the Committee’s Ninth Report of Session 2010-12, HC 1952, 2010-12 sess. (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2012), 11. 1147 Jorge Benitez, “National Composition of NATO strike sorties in Libya,” Atlantic Council, 22 August 2011, http://www.acus.org/natosource/national-composition-nato-strike-sorties-libya (accessed 28 April 2013). 1148 “UK and French ships rendezvous off Libyan coast,” Ministry of Defence, 19 September 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-french-ships-rendezvous-off-libyan-coast (accessed 28 April 2013). 1149 Defence Committee, Operations in Libya, 56. 1150 Defence Committee, Operations in Libya: Government Response, 15. 1151 Ibid. 1152 Ibid.

182

Expeditionary Force, however, should help the two sides overcome these differences through active cooperation.

Conclusion

The evidence examined indicates that Britain and France policies on deploying forces are actually similar on four grounds. First, the two countries agree that their forces will likely operate in multilateral settings in the future. Second, Britain and France share similar parameters governing when to deploy forces abroad. Third, they agree on the importance of obtaining sound legal mandates from international bodies for their military operations. Finally, the two regard reconstruction and development as instrumental in future conflicts. Operations in Libya reflected these convergences and demonstrated that the two countries could cooperate and coordinate their operations.

Chapter Nine: US Role in European Defense

“I want to be your friend, your ally, your partner, but I wish to be a friend who stands on his own two feet.”1153

President Nicolas Sarkozy, speaking before the US Congress, November 2007

This essay’s alternative hypothesis holds that further Franco-British defense cooperation will be hampered by the parties’ different perspectives on the role the United States should play in the defense of Europe. As previously mentioned, the transatlantic alliance was a point of contention between Paris and London during the Cold War. While these differences eased in the 1990s and

2000s, the 2003 Iraq War revived the divide between the “Anglo-Saxons” and France. The arrival

1153 Elaine Sciolino, “Sarkozy is Greeted Warmly by Congress,” New York Times, 7 November 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/washington/07cnd-sarkozy.html?_r=0 (accessed 20 April 2013).

183 of an atlanticist French president in 2007, however, led France to converge with the UK on the

US role in Europe. This development facilitated the Lancaster House agreements. In spite of

Sarkozy’s legacy, France remains keen to maintain autonomous French and European defense capabilities vis-à-vis the United States. The UK, however, does not share this interest as it greatly benefits from its close links to the US defense establishment. Disagreement the US role in

Europe may hamper greater defense cooperation unless the US, which now supports a stronger

European defense identity, can pressure the UK to commit to the continent.

Britain and the United States: the “Special Relationship”

The British decision to follow the US into the shook the post-Suez British consensus on the primacy of the “special relationship” with the United States.1154 UK Prime

Minister Tony Blair was derided as US President George W. Bush’s “lap dog” by the British media, while the public criticized Blair for “following” the US into a deeply unpopular war.1155

1156 A March 2010 cross-party committee of British MPs claimed that the “perception that the

British government was a subservient ‘poodle’ to the US Administration leading up to the period of the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath is widespread both among the British public and overseas and that this perception, whatever its relation to reality, is deeply damaging to the interests of the UK.”1157 Shortly after coming to power in May 2010, Cameron sought to maintain strong transatlantic ties without appearing subservient to the US before British public

1154 Mayer, “Why Britain’s Affair.” 1155 “50% see Blair as Bush’s lapdog,” The Guardian, 14 November 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2002/nov/14/foreignpolicy.uk1 (accessed 20 April 2013). 1156 Nick Assinder, “Blair battles ‘poodle jibes,’” BBC News, 3 February 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2721513.stm (accessed 20 April 2013). 1157 “House of Commons – Global Security: UK-US Relations – Foreign Affairs Committee,” Parliament, 18 March 2010, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/11403.htm (accessed 20 April 2013).

184 opinion. Cameron said in an interview with a US magazine, “I think that we should deal with things as they are rather than trying to be too needy.”1158

In spite of the Iraq War’s legacy and Cameron’s pronouncements, the new government in London was keen to maintain Britain’s long-standing ties to the United States, especially in defense matters. A 2008 US diplomatic document released in December 2010 by the whistleblowing website Wikileaks, quotes future British foreign secretary William Hague claiming that the conservatives wanted a “pro-American regime. We need it. The world needs it.”1159 A 2009 cable, meanwhile, held that future defense secretary Liam Fox told the US ambassador to London that the Conservative party “intends[s] to follow a much more pro-

American profile in procurement.”1160 As the world’s preeminent power, the US is a powerful ally, key source of military hardware and technology, and a security guarantor the UK is unwilling to discard. Fox said in an October 2011 speech, “NATO must maintain its primacy in

European defense because NATO is the alliance that keeps the United States in Europe.”1161 The

British 2010 SDSR makes it clear that Great Britain considers the United States to be its preeminent ally and “essential” for British security.1162 In his joint press conference with Sarkozy following the signing of the Lancaster House treaties in 2010, Cameron couched the closer defense relationship with France as beneficial for the all-important “special relationship.”

Cameron said, “I think in terms of the relationship we have with Washington, which is obviously a very strong relationship – it is the special relationship – they want European countries like

1158 Catherine Mayer, “Here Comes The Junior Partner,” Time, 26 July 2010, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2004113,00.html (accessed 3 May 2013). 1159 Andy Bloxham, “Wikileaks: Britain mocked by US over ‘special relationship,” The Telegraph, 4 December 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8180709/WikiLeaks-Britain- mocked-by-US-over-special-relationship.html (accessed 20 April 2013). 1160 Ibid. 1161 Justin Parkinson, “Calls for EU defense force are nonsense, says Liam Fox,” BBC News, 5 October 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15181010 (accessed 20 April 2013). 1162 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 57.

185

France and Britain to come together and share defense resources so we actually have greater capabilities.”1163 The British emphasis on the “special relationship” is derived not only from the advantages to be gained from a close partnership with the world’s preeminent military and economic power, but from the electoral support for the relationship. A March 2012 poll of 2,007

British adults found that 60 percent of respondents held the United States as an “ally.”1164 This compared to Canada with 41 percent, France with 24 percent, Germany with 24 percent, and

Italy with 20 percent. Two-thirds of respondents who voted for the Conservative Party in the

2010 general elections and 53 percent of Liberal Democrat voters agreed with the statement

“America has no truer friend than Great Britain.” The state of the special relationship is also important to the UK’s “chattering classes,” which worried throughout US President Barack

Obama’s first mandate about the plight of the “relationship.”1165

These concerns were spurred by changes in the United States’ attitude to the United

Kingdom While the Obama administration has brought rhetorical flourish and staged demonstrations of amity to bear on behalf of the “special relationship,” it sees the UK’s role in international affairs on par with those of other important US allies around the world.1166 1167 1168

The US’s 2012 defense strategic guideline, for example, does not mention the United Kingdom

1163 “UK-France Summit press conference.” 1164 “Britons Still Perceive a Special Relationship with America,” Augus Reid Public Opinion, 30 March 2013, http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/44474/britons-still-perceive-a-special-relationship-with-america/ (accessed 12 May 2013). 1165 Catherine Mayer, “Wikileaks Cables Add to Brits’ Insecurity About U.S. Partnership,” Time, 6 December 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2035370,00.html (accessed 20 April 2013). 1166 Nicholas Watt, “Barack Obama pays gushing tribute to special relationship,” The Guardian, 14 March 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/14/barack-obama-special-relationship (accessed 20 April 2013). 1167 Maggie Haberman, “Obama in NY says Israel is most important ally,” Politico, 30 November 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/69485.html (accessed 20 April 2013). 1168 Tim Shipman, “France is our biggest ally, declares Obama: President’s blow to Special Relationship with Britain,” Daily Mail, 11 January 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1346006/Barack- Obama-declares-France-biggest-ally-blow-Special-Relationship-Britain.html (accessed 20 April 2013).

186 by name, although it mentions India and Israel.1169 Instead, the UK is lumped in with other

European allies. Furthermore, Britain remains valuable to the US in large part because of its membership in the EU. Ahead of Cameron’s January 2013 announcement of an “in-out” referendum on British membership in the EU, the Obama administration issued a public warning to London.1170 US Assistant Secretary of State for European and. Eurasian Affairs Philip H.

Gordon couched his response to the possibility of a British referendum in terms of Washington’s relationship with Brussels. “We value a strong UK voice in a strong European Union,” Gordon said.1171 “We have a growing relationship with the EU as an institution, which has an increasing voice in the world, and we want to see a strong British voice in that EU. That is in America’s interests. We welcome an outward-looking EU with Britain in it.” Obama, meanwhile, called

Cameron ahead of his speech on Britain’s future in the EU to emphasize that the US “values a strong UK in a strong European Union.”1172 Ultimately, the US is not interested in an autonomous UK with declining global influence, preferring instead an EU shaped by atlanticist

Britain. It remains unclear, however, if US pressure can sway the increasingly eurosceptic British public opinion in favor of continued EU membership.1173

The Lancaster House treaties did not represent a shift in British attitudes away from the

“special relationship,” which remains of primary importance to British defense planning. To the

1169 “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership,” Department of Defense. 1170 Julian Borger, Ian Traynor, and Nicholas Watt, “Britain should stay in the European Union, says Obama Administration,” The Guardian, 9 January 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/09/us- warns-uk-european-union (accessed 20 April 2013. 1171 Kim Sengupta, “Obama administration warns Britain to stay in the European Union,” The Independent, 9 January 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/obama-administration-warns- britain-to-stay-in-the-european-union-8444789.html (accessed 20 April 2013). 1172 Andrew Grice, “Barack Obama piles pressure on David Cameron over EU exit,” The Independent, 20 April 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/barack-obama-piles-pressure-on-david- cameron-over-eu-exit-8458116.html (accessed 20 April 2013). 1173 Peter Griffiths, “Just a third of Britons want to stay in the European Union – poll,” Reuters, 18 February 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/02/18/uk-britain-eu-poll-idUKBRE91H0BE20130218 (accessed 20 April 2013).

187

British government, the treaties served as a way to bolster Britain’s military capabilities and maintain Britain’s importance to Washington at a time of budgetary constraints. The US, meanwhile, continues to encourage London to deepen its collaboration with the European continent at a time of rising euroscepticism.

France and the United States: Washington’s Conversion to Gaullism

The arrival of Nicolas Sarkozy to the Elysée Palace in 2007 brought a staunch atlanticist to power in France and altered the country’s relationship with Washington. In a 2007 speech before an enthusiastic joint session of the US Congress, Sarkozy voiced his love for Americana, waxed lyrical about the history of Franco-US cooperation, and claimed France was a “friend of the

United States of America.”1174 Sarkozy’s pro-US rhetoric was largely out of step with French popular opinion. A 2007 poll from the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that only 39 percent of French adults surveyed had a positive image of the United States.1175 The French president, however, did not let public opinion limit his atlanticism. The French 2008 white paper emphasizes the importance of France’s links with the United States and says that “NATO is the collective organization that united North America and Europe. That is the specific mission of the organization.”1176 Sarkozy followed through with the 2008 white paper’s claims, dispatching reinforcements to the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan in April 2008 and reintegrating NATO’s

1174 Sciolino, “Sarkozy is Greeted Warmly.” 1175 “Sondage: l’anti-américainisme progresse,” L’Express, 28 June 2007, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/sondage-l-anti-americanisme-progresse_465224.html (accessed 20 April 2013). 1176 Défense et Sécurité Nationale, 102.

188 military command in March 2009.1177 1178 Only a thin majority of French people surveyed in 2009 supported NATO reintegration, while two-thirds opposed the Afghan mission.1179 1180

Sarkozy’s time in office significantly altered Franco-US relations. French participation in

NATO’s integrated command enabled closer cooperation with the US, including a February 2011 spacial situational awareness agreement signed between then US Defense Secretary Robert

Gates and French Defense Minister Alain Juppé.1181 Nine months later, US President Barack

Obama and French President Sarkozy held a memorial ceremony in Cannes to mark the history of military ties between the US and France.1182 The French performance in the Libyan and

Afghan campaigns helped win the grudging respect of US officials and servicemen.1183 1184

Finally, whether through Sarkozy’s efforts or the arrival of a new US president, public opinion in

France warmed to the United States. An October 2010 poll of 1,010 US adults and 1,016 French adults carried out by the French-American Foundation and Harris Interactive found that about

1177 Steve Erlanger, “French Premier Backs Vote on Deployment in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 22 August 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/23/world/europe/23france.html?_r=0 (accessed 21 April 2013). 1178 Stefan Simons, “France’s Return to NATO: Sarkozy Breaks with De Gaulle and Tradition,” Spiegel Online International, 12 March 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/france-s-return-to- nato-sarkozy-breaks-with-de-gaulle-and-tradition-a-612840.html (accessed 20 April 2013). 1179 “France/Otan: 58% des Français pour,” Le Figaro, 10 March 2009, http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash- actu/2009/03/10/01011-20090310FILWWW00306-58-des-francais-pour-la-france-dans-l-otan.php (accessed 20 April 2013). 1180 Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Deux Français sur trois opposés à l’intervention en Afghanistan,” Libération: Secret Défense, 19 August 2009, http://secretdefense.blogs.liberation.fr/defense/2009/08/deux-fran%C3%A7ais-sur-trois-oppos%C3%A9s- %C3%A0-lintervention-en-afghanistan.html (accessed 20 April 2013). 1181 Jim Garamone, “U.S., French Defense Leaders Sign Space Agreement,” U.S. Department of Defense, 8 February 2011, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62733 (accessed 10 March 2013). 1182 David Nakamura, “In Cannes’ rain, Obama has moment in the sun,” Washington Post, 4 November 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/44/post/in-cannes-rain-obama-has-moment-in-the- sun/2011/11/04/gIQAl6GwmM_blog.html (accessed 10 March 2013). 1183 Elisabeth Bumiller, “Libyan War Goes a Long Way to Improve Pentagon’s View of France as an Ally,” New York Times, 26 August 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/27/world/africa/27military.html (accessed 10 March 2013). 1184 Kevin Dougherty, “French military effort in Afghanistan earning respect of U.S. troops,” Stars and Stripes, 31 October 2009, http://www.stripes.com/news/french-military-effort-in-afghanistan-earning- respect-of-u-s-troops-1.96007 (accessed 10 March 2013).

189 seven out of ten people in both France and the United States claimed the two countries were

“partners.”1185 This was up from 39 percent of French and 44 percent of US people surveyed in

2005. The survey also found that while 31 percent of French surveyed in 2005 said they liked the

United States, this figure climbed to 65 percent in 2010. A survey carried out by the BBC World

Service between July and September 2012 found that France was the most pro-Obama country out of 21 states surveyed, with 72 percent of French respondents backing the incumbent US president and only two percent supporting his electoral opponent, Mitt Romney.1186

The French rapprochement to the United States is likely to continue under Sarkozy’s successor, Socialist President François Hollande, in spite of his government’s emphasis on maintaining French autonomy and fostering European cooperation. Hollande demonstrated

French autonomy in May 2012, when he announced French forces would withdraw from

Afghanistan in late 2012, two years earlier than scheduled by NATO.1187 In his November 2012 report to Hollande on defense matters, former foreign minister Hubert Védrine reiterated

France’s commitment to the United States and the transatlantic alliance: “NATO will remain an alliance built around the premier military power in the world, the United States, with which we share fundamental values…”1188 Védrine’s report offers important insight into the strategic thinking at the heart of the new socialist government in Paris as it was commissioned by the president and its findings are “completely endorsed” by French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le

Drian.1189 Védrine’s analysis is not marked by Sarkozy’s enthusiasm for the United States, but by

1185 “France – Etats-Unis – Regards Croisés,” French-American Foundation France, 27 October 2010, http://www.french-american.org/files/faf-fr-cp-regardscroises.pdf (accessed 20 April 2013). 1186 “BBC poll: Rest of world favours Obama,” BBC News, 22 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-20008687 (accessed 20 April 2013). 1187 Helene Cooper and John H. Cushman Jr., “Hollande Tells Obama Troop Pullout Will Proceed,” New York Times, 18 May 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/world/afghan-security-iran-syria-on- agenda-between-g8-leaders-ahead-of-nato-summit.html (accessed 20 April 2013). 1188 Védrine, 18. 1189 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.”

190 a calculating realism that leads him to grudgingly endorse the former president’s atlanticist legacy. In his November 2012 testimony to the French Senate’s Defense, Foreign Affairs, and

Armed Forces Commission, Védrine emphasized that France should remain in NATO’s integrated command as leaving would offer no significant advantages to Paris and would only worsen relations with the US and European allies.1190 The former French foreign minister, however, called on France to maintain its independent voice within the alliance by encouraging greater

European defense cooperation and by defying the United States when their interests diverge.1191

In his report, Védrine voices concerns about US-led efforts to set up a missile defense system in

Europe and of the possible use of NATO’s “Smart Defence” projects to facilitate US arms sales to

European countries.1192 “Védrine, however, told the French Senate commission that

Washington’s war weariness, budget constraints, and “pivot to Asia” transformed Washington into a supporter of European defense cooperation.1193 Le Drian voiced a similar claim in his

December 2012 testimony to the French National Assembly’s defense committee. “The

Americans are furthermore today far more favorable to European defense cooperation, which holds both advantages and disadvantages: on the one hand, this grants us a free hand, but on the other, we are confronted with our own responsibilities,” he said.1194 “This is the sentiment that I gathered from my exchanges with the former Obama administration, the new one is not in place yet, but it seems to me that it will take a similar view.”1195 This emphasis on stronger

European military capability marks a convergence between the United States and France, which has long advocated for a stronger European capability independent of the US.1196 With

1190 Commission des affaires étrangères, “Place de la France dans l’Otan.” 1191 Ibid. 1192 Védrine, 8 and 19. 1193 Commission des affaires étrangères, “Place de la France dans l’Otan.” 1194 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.” 1195 Ibid. 1196 Commission des affaires étrangères, “Audition de M. Philippe Errera.”

191

Washington keen to see its allies take up a greater share of the responsibility for managing global crises, France’s military activism in 2011 and 2013 – Afghanistan, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and

Mali – makes it a particularly useful ally. Védrine’s report holds that France had replaced Britain and Germany as the United States’ leading European defense partner. “The Americans see thus in 2012 France as a reliable European partner due to the visible reductions in British military capabilities, to the political inhibitions in Germany, and to the fall in capabilities with other allies. They thus hope that France will not reduce its capabilities further.”1197 Védrine and Le

Drian call on France to cooperate with the US to convince recalcitrant European allies, especially

Germany and the United Kingdom to accept deeper European cooperation and thus build a viable partner capable of helping the US shoulder international security concerns.1198 1199

Védrine, however, recognizes that this US stance on European defense may change with the return of a Republican to the White House. The US’ “orientations and policies can significantly vary each two or four years, which can place us in opposition, even if that is not thankfully the case with the 7 November 2012 elections…”1200

While Sarkozy’s “atlanticist” shift did not reflect French public opinion and proved controversial at home, his Franco-US rapprochement survived his ouster from power in 2012. It benefited from a shift in French public opinion towards the US, as well as the Obama administration’s support for greater European defense cooperation. Ironically, it is in part because Paris is keen to maintain autonomous French and European capabilities independent of the US that the two countries have grown closer. Exhausted by a decade of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and inflated defense budgets, Washington is keen to hand over defense responsibilities

1197 Védrine, 14. 1198 Commission des affaires étrangères, “Place de la France dans l’Otan.” 1199 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.” 1200 Védrine, 19.

192 to other countries. This development offers a window of opportunity for France to strive for the

Gaullist dream of a European defense capability independent of Washington. To achieve this, however, Paris will have to convince London and Berlin.

The Entrenched Special Relationship

In spite of their convergence on the importance of defense ties with the United States, the UK remains far more intertwined with the United States defense establishment, than France would countenance. Since 1946, the United States and Great Britain, along with the former British dominions of Australia, Canada, and , have taken part in a close intelligence gathering system known as the “Five Eyes” or UKUSA Agreement.1201 The United States also shares satellite and other forms of intelligence with the UK. While France also shares intelligence with the United States, its 2008 white paper emphasizes intelligence sharing with

EU partners over specific mentions of the United States.1202 Instead, the 2008 white paper highlights France’s work with Germany and Italy on satellite imagery and radar activities.

Meanwhile, the British nuclear deterrent is closely linked with the United States due to the 1958

US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement and sale of US ICBMs to the United Kingdom. The British white paper emphasizes the need for the UK to continue close cooperation with the United

States on the nuclear deterrent, particularly on delivery mechanisms.1203 As the French developed a nuclear deterrent largely independently of the United States, the US does not figure in the nuclear deterrent planning sections of their white paper.1204 Since its nuclear project is homegrown, France has also developed its own warheads, rockets, and missiles, as

1201 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 27. 1202 Défense et Sécurité Nationale, 133. 1203 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 39. 1204 Défense et Sécurité Nationale, 70.

193 well as the associated civilian rocket and satellite industries.1205 With Europe reliant on the

United States for information on the orbit trajectory of satellites and objects over the earth,

France favors the development of a European extra-atmospheric surveillance system.1206 With these European efforts stalling, France announced plans to launch an autonomous space-based ballistic missile tracking system.1207 With the legacy of the Cold War, close intelligence and technology sharing, and a decade of joint operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the British and US defense establishments have a unique relationship. In March 2013, reports surfaced the entire

British and US chiefs of staff would hold a joint meeting for the first time since the 1940s to address the impact of budgets cuts in both countries and of how to maintain interoperability.1208

US Chief of Naval Operations Jon Greenert suggested that the UK and US could even share geographic areas, with US and British warships trading rotations.1209 The leadership of the

French military does not have such a relationship with its US counterparts. France also differs with the UK on Washington’s plans for a European missile defense program in Europe and the alleged use of NATO “Smart Defence” as a vehicle for the sale of US military equipment in

Europe.1210 The UK, however, supports “Smart Defence,” seeing it as an opportunity for its own firms.1211 While the status quo in US-UK defense cooperation is deeply entrenched, favorable to

US exports, and offers the US a loyal ally, it threatens the future of European defense cooperation by discouraging the UK from integrating its forces with those of its European

1205 Ibid., 143. 1206 Ibid., 179. 1207 Védrine, 8. 1208 Vago Muradian and Marcus Weisgerber, “U.S.,U.K. Chiefs to Hold Historic Strategy Meeting,” Defense News, 23 March 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130323/DEFREG02/303230007 (accessed 20 April 2013). 1209 Marcus Weisgerber, “U.K., U.S. Look to Preserve Capabilities,” Defense News, 30 March 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130330/DEFREG02/303300006 (accessed 20 April 2013). 1210 Commission des affaires étrangères, “Audition de M. Philippe Errera.” 1211 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Britain eyes more ‘smart defence’ deals with U.S. – official,” Reuters, 24 October 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/10/23/uk-britain-usa-defense-idUKBRE89M1NO20121023 (accessed 20 April 2013).

194 counterparts. If the US is keen to have a viable European partner to shoulder international responsibilities, it should encourage London to cooperate with the continent.

Conclusion

The United Kingdom’s dedication to the “special relationship” survived the Iraq War and remains the cornerstone of British foreign policy. France moved towards the UK position under

Sarkozy, but remains keen to maintain a French and European defense capability independent of Washington. Although London wants to bolster its capabilities through cooperation with

France to remain relevant to the US, it remains cold to defense cooperation within the EU.

Ironically, the French willingness to encourage European defense cooperation is more in line with Washington’s changing interests than London’s emphasis on NATO-first, and thus US-led, cooperation. Ultimately, the alternative hypothesis is correct in its claim that differences remain in the two countries’ policies to the United States. However, it fails to account for one international factor – changes in US policies – that has made the Franco-US rapprochement sustainable and led US officials to encourage a British rapprochement with the continent.

Chapter Ten: NATO or European Union?

“In terms of European defense, our views are well known. We see NATO as the most important organization at keeping us safe and secure.”

Prime Minister David Cameron, November 2010

This essay’s alternative hypothesis holds that Britain and France disagree on the role NATO and the EU should play in European defense. This section argues that beginning in French President

Nicolas Sarkozy’s time in office, the British and French positions on NATO converged to some degree, enabling the Lancaster House treaties. Nevertheless, three significant issues may

195 hamper future defense cooperation. First, Britain continues to prioritize NATO over the EU, while France holds the opposite view. Second, the two parties disagree on whether the

Lancaster House treaties are part of a push to integrate European defense. Third, the growing euroscepticism in the United Kingdom weighs over cross-channel defense cooperation, hampering deeper integration.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

As previously mentioned, the British commitment to the transatlantic alliance and the French effort to forge autonomous European defense divided the two allies during the Cold War.

Although Britain acquiesced to the creation of a European defense identity in the 1990s, it continued to emphasize NATO’s primacy. France, meanwhile, increased its cooperation with

NATO and slowly inched towards reintegrating the alliance’s military command structure. Both the French and British white papers emphasize the importance of NATO to their national defense planning, although the British prioritize NATO, while the French see it as one of many tools of foreign policy. The two countries raise the importance of the trans-Atlantic alliance and its principle of collective defense, with London calling it the “bedrock” of their defense1212 and

Paris claiming it is “essential” to France’s security.1213 Both also highlight the importance of the alliance in ensuring that North America, especially the United States, remains committed to the

European continent.1214 1215

The French and British positions on NATO grew closer in March 2009, when Sarkozy announced that France would return to NATO’s integrated military command, reversing a

1212 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 62. 1213 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 99. 1214 Ibid., 102. 1215 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 62.

196 decision taken by de Gaulle in 1966.1216 1217 Sarkozy came to power in May 2007 with the ambition to break with the Gaullist heritage by building Franco-US ties and strengthening French participation in NATO.1218 His government’s 2008 white paper is particularly sanguine about the transatlantic alliance, claiming that it is in France’s interest to contribute to the alliance and that the EU and NATO are compatible.1219 The white paper also calls for France to return to NATO’s integrated military command, claiming its absence prevented Paris from taking part in key alliance decisions.1220 France would reintegrate NATO under three conditions: (1) French membership cannot imply any “automatic” decision-making that would undermine political sovereignty. (2) France must retain its nuclear autonomy. (3) France must retain sovereignty over French forces. No French force should be permanently placed under NATO command during peacetime.1221 The government hoped that by reintegrating NATO’s military command, it would demonstrate its commitment to the alliance and assuage fears that French support for EU military capabilities was part of an effort to create an alternative to NATO.1222 Sarkozy’s decision was criticized by the opposition (PS), its center-left and environmentalist allies, and other political formations on the left, center, and far-right.1223 In April 2008, François

Hollande, then PS first secretary, called on parliament to censure the government’s decision to change the rules of engagement for French troops in Afghanistan and its intention to reintegrate

1216 “France ends four-decade NATO rift,” BBC News, 12 March 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7937666.stm (accessed 21 April 2013). 1217 “Lettre de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président de la République, adressée aux chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de l'Alliance atlantique, sur le retour de la France dans le commandement intégré de l'OTAN, le 19 mars 2009,” Vie Publique, 19 March 2009, http://discours.vie- publique.fr/notices/097000901.html (21 April 2013). 1218 Védrine, 5. 1219 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 99. 1220 Ibid., 110. 1221 Ibid. 1222 Védrine, 5. 1223 “L’OTAN, levier de l’Europe de la defense?,” Le Monde, 16 November 2012, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/11/16/l-otan-levier-de-l-europe-de-la- defense_1791862_3232.html (accessed 21 April 2013).

197

NATO’s military command.1224 Hollande claimed the latter was both “unfortunate and untimely” and that France would “lose in independence what we will not gain in security. We will be dragged on grounds and operations where we do not want to go. We will strike another blow at the European project…”1225

Four years later, Hollande occupied the Elysée Palace, but elected not to reverse

Sarkozy’s decision. In his 2012 report on France’s defense policy, former foreign minister Hubert

Védrine breaks with his Gaullist leanings and calls on France to remain in NATO’s integrated military command. “A French re-exit from the integrated command is not an option,” Védrine wrote.1226 “This would not be understood by anyone either in the United States or Europe and would not grant France any additional levers of influence.”1227 On the contrary, Védrine claims a

French withdrawal would only damage efforts to promote European defense cooperation by reviving fears that Paris seeks to undermine NATO.1228 Furthermore, Védrine points out that

France gained in influence since it reintegrated NATO. In 2009, a French national was named

Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) and put in charge of “Smart Defence,” training, preparing military capabilities, and developing new concepts and doctrines.1229 This is a prominent post at a time when the transatlantic alliance is attempting to spur greater defense cooperation. Furthermore, France obtained 13 NATO posts at the general-level, a number equal to that of the United Kingdom.1230 Full French membership in NATO, however, does not mean

1224 “Intervention de Francois Hollande – Motion de censure – mardi 8 avril 2008,” Parti Socialiste, 8 April 2008, http://discours.parti-socialiste.fr/2008/04/08/intervention-de-francois-hollande-motion-de- censure-mardi-8-avril-2008/ (accessed 20 April 2013). 1225 Ibid. 1226 Védrine, 10. 1227 Ibid. 1228 “La France doit être ‘plus dynamique’ dans l’OTAN,” Le Monde, 14 November 2012, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2012/11/14/la-france-doit-etre-plus-dynamique-dans-l- otan_1790366_3214.html (accessed 21 April 2013). 1229 Védrine, 6. 1230 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 44.

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Paris will acquiesce to all US policies or abandon efforts to promote defense cooperation at the

EU-level. French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian told the National Assembly Defence

Commission in December 2012, “the idea in the Védrine report is that, since we are in NATO and we will not leave it, we must take our place without doubts and to demonstrate our European will. That is what we are doing and will do.”1231 In the words of French Foreign Minister Laurent

Fabius, “France is an ally that exercises its responsibility as a founding member and is committed to promoting common values but does not hesitate, if necessary, to air its differences honestly.”1232

In spite of this rapprochement, British and French positions on NATO differ in three areas that may hamper cooperation: (1) NATO’s fundamental role, (2) “Smart Defence,” and (3) whether NATO or the EU should predominate. First, the two countries disagree on NATO’s fundamental role: should NATO remain a mutual defense pact conscribed to the North Atlantic or should it take on a global role. Following the terror attacks of September 2001, NATO was pulled into expeditionary operations and in cooperation with states outside the North Atlantic region and its periphery. As part of this effort, the United States and United Kingdom called on

NATO to forge “global partnerships” with non-European states to facilitate cooperation.1233 The

US “pivot to Asia” may reinforce calls for NATO to participate in the Asia-Pacific region through deeper partnerships or even by forging a “global NATO” that would no longer be bound to

Europe and North America.1234 In an address to the Atlantic Council of the United States in

January 2012, British Secretary of State for Defense Philipp Hammond pointed to the possibility

1231 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.” 1232 , “France and NATO,” New York Times, 5 December 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/opinion/global/aurent-fabius-france-and-nato.html?_r=0 (accessed 21 April 2013). 1233 Ivo H. Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006): 106. 1234 Karl-Heinz Kamp, “NATO Needs to Follow the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” Carnegie Europe, 27 March 2013, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=51314 (accessed 21 April 2013).

199 of Iran closing the Straits of Hormuz to oil shipping as “just one very real and very current example of where U.S. and European interests coincide outside the North Atlantic area, reminding us against why – as attention naturally drifts to the Asia-Pacific region – Europe and

America have more reason to work together rather than less.”1235 The French government, however, opposes transforming NATO from an alliance focused on mutual defense into the

“world’s gendarme.”1236 In his report, Védrine calls for NATO to remain focused on the North

Atlantic and “possibly” the Arctic.1237 Second, while the British speak highly of “Smart Defence,” the French favor its European counterpart: “pooling and sharing.” London’s February 2012 white paper on defense procurement reads, “We support the NATO Secretary General’s Smart

Defence initiative, with its emphasis on more pooling and sharing…”1238 The document is more critical of the comparable EU initiative, “The UK is also working to improve the effectiveness and performance of the European Defence Agency (EDA), including better-focused and more realistic work programs…” For his part, Hammond has praised “Smart Defence,” claiming the concept “points the way” to how European states can help maintain their defense capability amid budgetary constraints.1239 British trade officials have also led delegations of British firms to the United States in an effort to secure US contracts through “Smart Defence.”1240 The French government supports “Smart Defence” as long as it serves French and European industrial interests and does not undermine European defense cooperation. Védrine told the French

Senate’s Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Armed Forces Commission that France “must clearly state that projects launched in the framework of ‘Smart Defence’ are acceptable so long as they do

1235 “NATO: The Case for Collective Defense,” Atlantic Council. 1236 Védrine, 19. 1237 Ibid. 1238 Ministry of Defence, National Security Through Technology: Technology, Equipment, and Support for UK Defence and Security, Cm 8278 (London: The Stationery Office, 2012), 32. 1239 “NATO: The Case for Collective Defense,” Atlantic Council. 1240 Shalal-Esa, “Britain eyes more ‘smart defence’ deals.”

200 not overlap with those undertaken through the EU’s ‘pooling and sharing.’”1241 For his part, Le

Drian claimed in December 2012 that France’s participation in “Smart Defence” should take into account both French interests and those of the EU.1242 Le Drian said, “between the two notions of smart defense and pooling and sharing… we support pooling and sharing within the European

Defense Agency, where we are involved in several projects.”1243 He also warned that France must make sure that “Smart Defence” does not become a “commercial initiative of American industrial groups.”1244 Third, the French continue to see NATO as only one “toolbox” to be used on the road to forging European defense cooperation, while the British view NATO as the “basis for territorial defense.”1245 1246 In his December 2012 testimony to the National Assembly defense committee, Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said, “Let us be realist and pragmatic: as pointed out by Hubert Védrine in his report to the President of the Republic, while we want to feed the very long term ambition to relegate the military defense of Europe against military threats directly turned against it, this function is currently assumed by the states, with the help of the United States, within the framework of NATO.”1247 As previously discussed, the UK continues to prioritize NATO over any deepening of European defense cooperation.

Case Study: NATO Command of Libya Campaign

The French view of NATO as a “toolbox” from which it could draw from in a conflict differs from the British view that, whenever possible, NATO should command multinational operations. This difference was demonstrated in the early days of the Libyan operation, when

France’s desire to implicate non-NATO partners coupled with President Sarkozy’s insatiable

1241 Commission des affaires étrangères, “Place de la France dans l’Otan.” 1242 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.” 1243 Ibid. 1244 Ibid. 1245 Commission des affaires étrangères, “Audition de M. Philippe Errera.” 1246 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 12. 1247 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.”

201 desire for the limelight tested the patience of Britain and its partners. On 19 March 2011,

British, French, and US officials meeting in Paris agreed that military operations would begin on

19-20 March with the goal of protecting Libyan civilians and breaking Libya’s ability to resist the

UN-mandated no-fly zone.1248 Tensions, however, erupted that day when Sarkozy announced that French warplanes had just engaged Libyan forces heading towards Benghazi without Paris consulting with its allies.1249 In its report on the Libyan conflict, the Royal United Services

Institute (RUSI) claims this initiative angered British and US officials, who felt it was an obvious

“act of grandstanding” that only served to alert Qaddafi’s forces that the operation had begun.

1250 At the beginning of operations, de facto command of the Libyan operation was exercised by the head of the US Africa Command, General Carter F. Ham, on board the USS Mount Whitney command ship. The US, however, was keen to hand over leadership of the operation as soon as possible.1251 This was because the Obama administration pledged it would not to implicate the

US into another unpopular long-term military commitment.1252 US efforts to hand over command to NATO, however, were delayed by French desires to rest “political command” of the operation with a contact group made up of the participating countries, the African Union (AU), and the Arab League.1253 French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé claimed NATO’s role should be limited to serving as a “tool of planification and operational conduct.”1254 France claimed these measures were necessary so that participating nations that were not NATO members, such as

1248 Defence Committee, Operations in Libya, 35. 1249 Ibid. 1250 “Accidental Heroes,” RUSI, 4. 1251 Raddatz, Sciutto, and Marquardt, “U.S. Ready to Hand Over Libya.” 1252 Ibid. 1253 “Libye: tensions autour du commandement de la coalition,” Libération, 23 March 2011, http://www.liberation.fr/monde/01012327249-a-tripoli-kadhafi-se-dit-toujours-pret-pour-la-bataille-qu- elle-soit-longue-ou-courte (accessed 28 April 2013). 1254 Ibid.

202

Qatar, could exercise leadership.1255 The move, however, was seen by Turkey and others as an attempt to impose French leadership over the operation and possibly secure postwar benefits in

Libya.1256 France attempted to convince the British to support Franco-British leadership of this group, only to find the British sticking to their position that NATO was best suited to run the military operation.1257 In the meantime, the United States pressured its European allies to allow

NATO to take up leadership of the operation.1258 After diplomatic wrangling, France eventually agreed to allow NATO to take over command of the Libyan operations. On 31 March, the alliance assumed command of combat operations after assuming command of maritime operations, the UN arms embargo, and the no-fly zone in the preceding days.1259

Sarkozy’s decision to return to NATO’s integrated military command, coupled with his enthusiasm for the transatlantic relationship, marked a cross-channel rapprochement on NATO and made the Lancaster House treaties. France’s newfound place in NATO will survive the return of a Socialist president to the Elysée, but differences remain over a possible “Global NATO,”

“Smart Defence,” and NATO’s role in European defense integration. Ultimately, London and

Paris continue to disagree on which organization – the EU or NATO – should be the leading body in European defense cooperation. As demonstrated by the events in Libya, France continues to view NATO as a “toolbox” for command and control purposes during military conflicts and not

1255 Associated Press, “France wants body outside NATO to head Libya fight,” Washington Times, 22 March 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/22/france-wants-body-outside-nato- head-libya-fight/ (accessed 10 March 2013). 1256 “Wary of France, Turkey wants NATO in charge in Libya,” Today’s Zaman, 25 March 2011, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&newsId=239148&link=2391 48 (accessed 10 March 2013). 1257 Nicholas Watt, Nick Hopkins, and Ian Traynor, “Nato to take control in Libya after US, UK and France reach agreement,” The Guardian, 22 March 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/22/libya- nato-us-france-uk (accessed 12 December 2011). 1258 William Branigin, Scott Wilson, and Tara Bahrampour, “NATO moves toward command of Libya operations; French jets hit plane, air base,” Washington Post, 24 March 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/french-jets-shoot-down-libyan-plane-bomb-air- base/2011/03/24/ABleqsPB_story.html (accessed 12 December 2011). 1259 Defence Committee, Operations in Libya, 35.

203 as the automatic solution for any multinational military operation. This differs from the British perspective.

The European Union

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are part of the so-called EU “Big Three,” the three EU member states that set the union’s foreign policy and defense agenda.1260 In spite of this shared distinction, France and the UK hold different perspectives on the role the EU should play in defending the European continent. The British SDSR clearly prioritizes NATO, claiming it will

“continue to be among our highest priorities.”1261 The same white paper limits the EU’s military role to “promoting security and prosperity” in the European neighborhood and preventing conflict.1262 Compared to its ebullient words about the importance of NATO to the UK, the SDSR only considers the EU a “key part of our international engagement.” The British white paper does state that the UK would support EU military and civilian missions, but only if these are in the UK’s national interest, offer a good value, have clear objectives, and when – in the case of military operations – NATO does not plan to intervene.1263 The French, however, place great importance on the EU’s role in national defense.1264 Their 2008 white paper lists the

“contribution of France to European security” as the second priority for the French armed forces after protecting France’s people and territory.1265 It calls on Sarkozy’s government to engage

“itself in the relaunch of the European Union in matters of defense and security.”1266

1260 Stefan Lehne, “The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5 July 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/07/05/big-three-in-eu-foreign-policy/ck4c (accessed 21 April 2013). 1261 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 62. 1262 Ibid., 12. 1263 Ibid., 60. 1264 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 23. 1265 Ibid., 62. 1266 Ibid., 84.

204

Sarkozy’s efforts to jumpstart European defense cooperation, however, suffered a series of setbacks in the years that followed the white paper’s publication. While France obtained limited commitments on air transport fleets, joint training, and enhanced intelligence sharing during its presidency of the council of the EU in the second half of 2008, progress soon ground to a halt.1267 A number of EU member states, including the UK, were reluctant to cede control of national defense issues to the EU, while NATO members continued to prioritize that organization. As Cameron said in his November 2010 joint press conference with Sarkozy said,

“In terms of European defense, our views are well known. We see NATO as the most important organization at keeping us safe and secure…”1268 Then UK Defence Secretary Liam Fox said in an

October 2011 speech that calls for an EU military capability were “nonsense” as they would

“duplicate and divert from NATO at a time when resources are scarce.”1269 This opposition to duplicating capabilities has led Britain to oppose the development of European military command structures, a program dear to the French.1270 1271 The SDSR obliquely addresses the headquarters controversy when it calls on other EU member states to direct their efforts towards “improved national military and civilian capabilities, rather than institution building and bureaucracy.”1272 In the face of continued EU deadlock, Sarkozy abandoned efforts to secure deeper cooperation at the EU-level. As former French Defense Minister Alain Juppé said in a

February 2011 speech “What can France do? We’ve chosen to emphasize all the concrete areas

1267 Fabio Liberti, “A General Evaluation of the French EU Presidency,” Affaires-Strategiques, 19 December 2008, http://www.affaires-strategiques.info/spip.php?article465 (accessed 21 April 2013). 1268 “UK-France Summit press conference.” 1269 Parkinson, “Calls for EU defense force.” 1270 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 90. 1271 Bruno Waterfield, “Britain blocks EU plans for ‘operational military headquarters,’” The Telegraph, 18 July 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8645749/Britain-blocks-EU-plans- for-operational-military-headquarters.html (accessed 21 April 2013). 1272 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 63.

205 for cooperation, at different levels: bilaterally, or among a few, or all 27 together.”1273 With the

EU deadlocked, France sought bilateral defense agreements, including the Lancaster House treaties. The failure of Britain and France to convince the EU to adopt a common policy on the

Libyan no-fly zone in March 2011 marked another setback for the Sarkozy government’s enthusiasm for European common defense policy.1274

While in opposition, the socialists criticized what they perceived to be Sarkozy’s preference for NATO and bilateral agreements over France’s traditional focus on EU-level defense cooperation. After coming to power in May 2012, the Hollande government pledged to revitalize the French drive towards deeper European defense integration.1275 In his report to the

French president, Védrine calls on the government to continue advocating for EU defense by coordinating with Germany, the United Kingdom, and other leading European powers.1276

Drawing from the failures of the Sarkozy government to make headway at the EU-level, Védrine calls on France to take a realist approach and strike whatever bilateral and multilateral deals are possible as long as they deepen European defense cooperation. “This does not mean that

France should abandon efforts to promote European defense,” Védrine told the French

Senate.1277 “But it must do so without naïveté and with realism. It must thus put our European partners to the test, or at least some of them, as we are even less likely to make progress on this

1273 Alain Juppé, “Evolution and Future of European Defense,” France in the United States, 1 March 2011, http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article2191 (accessed 21 April 2013). 1274 Ian Traynor and Nicholas Watt, “Libya no-fly zone plan rejected by EU leaders,” The Guardian, 11 March 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/11/libya-no-fly-zone-plan-rejected (accessed 12 December 2011). 1275 Romain Rosso, “Le Drian mobilise l’Europe de la défense,” L’Express, 7 September 2012, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/le-drian-mobilise-l-europe-de-la-defense_1157630.html (accessed 22 April 2013). 1276 Védrine, 23. 1277 Commission des affaires étrangères, “Place de la France dans l’Otan.”

206 issue at the level of the 27.”1278 Védrine ultimately recognizes that British attitudes towards EU defense cooperation will be a significant obstacle to further cooperation.1279

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom has grown more supportive of

European defense cooperation. London and Paris led the union with their 1998 St-Malo declaration, which calls for the creation of an autonomous European military capability that did not supersede NATO. The current government in London supports European initiatives as long as they can increase the capabilities of member states, do not build “duplicate” institutions already existing in NATO, and do not threaten NATO’s primacy.1280 Britain participates in a number of common security and defense policy (CSDP) missions, as well as “Operation

Atalanta,” which was under British command in January 2013.1281

In spite of this rapprochement, there are three key sticking points between the two countries: (1) the creation of a European defense headquarters, (2) whether to broaden the

Lancaster House treaty on conventional cooperation to third-parties, and (3) EU industrial defense policy. First, Britain continues to oppose the creation of European headquarters for overseas civilian and military operations. London couches its opposition in terms of avoiding

“duplication” with existing NATO or national capabilities at a time of limited budgetary resources.1282 In a May 2012 speech in Germany, UK Defence Secretary Hammond claimed

Britain viewed NATO as the “center-piece” of British collective defense efforts because

“institution-building [i.e. EU defense cooperation] consumes resources that are in short supply

1278 Ibid. 1279 Védrine, 25. 1280 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 20.” 1281 “Chain of Command,” EU NAVFOR Somalia, 2013, http://eunavfor.eu/chain-of-command (accessed 22 April 2013). 1282 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 20.”

207 and deflects energies better spent making the current architecture work more effectively.”1283

However, the so-called Weimar Plus countries (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain) support the creation of such headquarters.1284 This means that the other leading European military powers, including Britain’s former ally on this issue Poland, are aligned against the

British position.1285 Second, London opposes efforts to broaden the Lancaster House treaty on conventional defense cooperation to other EU member states, a development that would create the core of a future European defense entity. At the heart of this dispute are the parties’ different interpretations of the purpose of the Lancaster House treaties. For the Conservative government in London, the treaties are measures to preserve certain capabilities at a time of budget shortfalls. As Cameron said in November 2010, the treaties are about “practical, hard- headed cooperation between sovereign countries… If we do all these things, then we can expand our sovereign capabilities even at a time when resources are tight.”1286 For the new

Socialist government in Paris, however, the treaties are part of its drive to forge European defense cooperation. In his December 2012 testimony to the French National Assembly Defense

Commission, Le Drian emphasized that his government was keen to preserve the Lancaster

House treaties, but that it did not see the relationship as “exclusive” or incompatible with building broader European defense cooperation.1287 One possible avenue to expand the treaty on conventional cooperation is the Weimar Plus grouping. In November 2012, the Weimar Plus

1283 “Speech 2012/05/02,” Ministry of Defence. 1284 Andrew Rettman, “Five EU countries call for new military ‘structure,’” EU Observer, 16 November 2012, http://euobserver.com/defence/118226 (accessed 21 April 2013). 1285 Judy Dempsey, “Poland and France Move Toward a Europe Less Dependent on U.S.,” New York Times, 18 March 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/19/world/europe/19iht-letter19.html (accessed 21 April 2013). 1286 “UK-France Summit press conference.” 1287 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.”

208 issued a common declaration on the need to relaunch European defense cooperation.1288 Paris claims it keeps London abreast of the Weimar Plus efforts and is keen to see Britain participate.1289 Le Drian said, “Those that want to must be able to join the Franco-British initiative; similarly, the British must be able to take part in Weimar Plus initiatives.”1290 The

British, however, have shown no intention to participate in Weimar Plus. Furthermore, they have opposed efforts to invoke the Treaty of Lisbon’s “permanent structured cooperation” clause with regards to Weimar or Weimar Plus, fearing they might be isolated from what would become the nucleus of further European integration.1291 Third, as previously described, London does not share France’s concerns with NATO “Smart Defence” and does not prioritize the equivalent European project: “pooling and sharing.” Furthermore, London does not participate in the European Air Transport Command (EATC), a French-led initiative to pool European transport aircraft and has sought to reduce the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) budget.1292

1293

Sarkozy’s efforts to build up European defense cooperation from 2008 to 2010 largely proved fruitless, prompting his government to agree to a bilateral solution with the United

Kingdom. The new Socialist government in Paris is keen to revive “l’Europe de la defense” through whatever means possible, including by deepening the Weimar and Weimar Plus groups, which do not include the United Kingdom. While France has voiced support for extending the

Lancaster House agreement to other continental allies, London remains keen to avoid any

1288 Cne Cantin, “« Weimar + » : un nouvel élan à l’Europe de la Défense,” Ministère de la Défense, 19 November 2012, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/weimar-un-nouvel-elan-a-l-europe-de- la-defense (accessed 21 April 2013). 1289 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.” 1290 Ibid. 1291 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n°27.” 1292 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 33.” 1293 Patrick Hennessy, “Britain ‘to veto European Defence Agency budget increase,’” The Telegraph, 28 November 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8165333/Britain-to-veto-European- Defence-Agency-budget-increase.html (accessed 21 April 2013).

209 development that could threaten NATO’s supremacy. The two countries also disagree on whether to prioritize the EU’s “pooling and sharing” over NATO’s “Smart Defence.”

British Euroscepticism

The European financial crisis, disdainful media coverage of the continent, and British politicians’ use of Brussels as a whipping post spurred the rise of euroscepticism as a political force in the

United Kingdom. An October 2012 poll by the online market research agency Opinium and the

Observer newspaper found that 56 percent of British respondents would probably or definitely vote for the United Kingdom to leave the EU in a referendum.1294 About 68 percent of

Conservative voters would support an exit, compared to 44 percent for Labour and 39 percent for the LibDems. A poll in May 2001 found that 68 percent of British respondents wanted to remain part of the EU, compared to 19 percent who wanted a British exit.1295 The rise in eurosceptic sentiment has helped bring a heretofore fringe political party – the UK

Independence Party (UKIP) – to the foreground of national politics. The party advocates a full

British exit from the EU, which it claims is undemocratic and damaging to the British economy.1296 UKIP’s rise directly threatens the right-wing of the Conservative Party, scuttling

Conservative candidates in a series of prominent by-elections in 2012 and 2013.1297 1298

Eurosceptic sentiments and UKIP’s rise have led some Tory backbenchers to pressure the

1294 Daniel Boffey and Toby Helm, “56% of Britons would vote to quit EU in referendum, poll finds,” The Observer, 17 November 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/nov/17/eu-referendum-poll (accessed 21 April 2013). 1295 Tom Clark, “Euroscepticism growing among voters, Guardian/ICM poll finds,” The Guardian, 26 December 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/dec/26/euroscepticism-growing-voters-poll (accessed 22 April 2013). 1296 “About Us,” UK Independence Party, http://www.ukip.org/page/ukip-history (accessed 21 April 2013). 1297 Helen Pidd and Martin Wainwright, “Labour holds off Ukip in byelections,” The Guardian, 30 November 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/nov/30/labour-rotherham-byelection-ukip (accessed 21 April 2013). 1298 James Kirkup and Rowena Mason, “Eastleigh by-election: Ukip inflicts major setback on David Cameron,” The Telegraph, 1 March 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9901730/Eastleigh- by-election-Ukip-inflicts-major-setback-on-David-Cameron.html (accessed 21 April 2013).

210 government to reconsider Britain’s EU membership. As early as October 2011, some 80

Conservative backbenchers voted for a motion calling for a referendum on British membership in the EU, defying the government.1299 In June 2012, some 100 Tory MPs signed a letter calling on the government to publicly commit to a referendum after the next general elections.1300

Under pressure from eurosceptic Tory backbenchers, Cameron made a prominent speech in

January 2013 outlining his vision for a reformed EU focused on free markets and competitiveness, with some powers returned to national governments.1301 1302 Cameron also pledged to renegotiate EU treaties or Britain’s membership in the union and promised an “in- out” referendum before the end of 2017 should the Tories remain in power after the next general elections. Cameron pledged to campaign for British membership in the EU if he can renegotiate Britain’s position in the union. It remains unclear, however, if Cameron can convince continental states to cooperate with his plans or change British public opinion towards the union. A February 2013 poll by the Financial Times and Harris International held that only 33 percent of British respondents would like Britain to remain in the EU, with 50 percent wanting to leave.1303 British firms, however, appear keen to preserve British membership in the EU, which grants the country access to the Single Market and the means to shape the union’s policies. The

British business lobby group British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) surveyed some 4,000 businesses in the United Kingdom in April 2013 and claimed that while 64 percent said they

1299 Elizabeth Rigby and Kiran Stacey, “Conservative backbenchers defy Cameron,” Financial Times, 25 October 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2856a460-fe3c-11e0-a1eb- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz2R7GfidjS (accessed 21 April 2013). 1300 Tim Montgomerie, “100 Tory MPs call for Cameron to prepare legislation for EU referendum,” ConservativeHome.com, 18 June 2012, http://conservativehome.blogs.com/thetorydiary/2012/06/100- tory-mps-call-for-cameron-to-prepare-legislation-for-eu-referendum.html (accessed 21 April 2013). 1301 Isabel Hardman, “Exclusive: David Cameron meets eurosceptic backbenchers ahead of speech,” The Spectator, 16 January 2013, http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2013/01/exclusive-david-cameron- meets-eurosceptic-backbenchers-ahead-of-speech/ (accessed 21 April 2013). 1302 “David Cameron’s EU speech – full text,” The Guardian, 23 January 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum (accessed 21 April 2013). 1303 Griffiths, “Just a third of Britons.”

211 agreed with making adjustments to the UK’s ties to the union, only 18 percent favored a full

British exit from the union.1304

British efforts to renegotiate EU treaties or its standing within the union may damage

London’s relations with continental states, particularly France. In the aftermath of Cameron’s speech, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius warned Britain about seeking a “Europe à la carte” and said that France would “roll out the red carpet” for British firms in the event of a

British exit.1305 A British exit from the union would complicate Franco-British defense cooperation, damage efforts to forge a European defense capability, and reduce both British and European clout in international affairs.1306 The possibility of a British exit may act to limit further cooperation, whether bilateral or multilateral, in the years to come. Even if Cameron’s referendum does not take place, euroscepticism has become a powerful force in British politics and may hamper future European defense cooperation, whether bilateral or at multilateral. In

December 2012, officials from the 27 EU member states agreed to “systematically consider cooperation” across Europe when member states draw up their defense plans.1307 This comparatively anodyne agreement sparked outrage among Tory backbenchers. Conservative

MP Peter Bone said, “The Conservative Party position has always been that NATO is the bedrock of the defense of Europe… The idea of a European defense force is something that we’ve absolutely been against.”

1304 “UK businesses want change to EU terms, says lobby group,” BBC News, 21 April 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22144827 (accessed 21 April 2013). 1305 Kate Connolly, Kim Willsher, Jason Burke, and Jonathan Kaiman,” Reaction to Cameron’s EU speech: ‘A politics of cherry-picking will not work,’” The Guardian, 23 January 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-europe-international-reaction (accessed 21 April 2013). 1306 Nick Hopkins, “UK would jeopardise military standing by leaving EU, says German minister,” The Guardian, 22 April 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/22/uk-military-eu-german-minister (accessed 22 April 2013). 1307 Tim Ross and Bruno Waterfield, “David Cameron signs up to more joint military operations with Europe,” The Telegraph, 16 December 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9746517/David-Cameron- signs-up-to-more-joint-military-operations-with-Europe.html (accessed 22 April 2013).

212

Conclusion

The alternative hypothesis is correct in its claim that France and the United Kingdom disagree on the role NATO and the EU should play in European defense. While the United Kingdom has warmed to the EU defense identity since the 1990s, it continues to favor NATO and to limit deeper European defense integration. France, for its part, continues to view European defense cooperation as a key foreign policy priority, preferring to see NATO serve as a defensive alliance focused on the North Atlantic. Paris’ failure to secure significant progress at the union level during Sarkozy’s presidency, however, spurred the new Socialist government to deepen

European cooperation through multilateral agreements, such as Weimar Plus. France has also proposed to no avail that London agree to extend the Lancaster House treaty on conventional defense cooperation to other EU member states. Finally, the rise of eurosceptic sentiment in the

United Kingdom may dampen defense cooperation, particularly if the UK leaves the union.

Chapter Eleven: Different Industrial Defense Policies

“Now, on the unmanned air systems, apart from the small tactical air systems there is no such thing as a European unmanned air system and we’re going to have, in the next 10 years, a surveillance unmanned air system. We are further going to boost Franco-British missile construction with joint missile construction...”1308

President Nicolas Sarkozy, November 2010

Tight budgets and increasingly costly defense systems have spurred European states to join forces to research, develop, and procure future military hardware in an effort to benefit from shared costs and expertise, as well as economies of scale. For countries to cooperate, however,

1308 “UK-France Summit press conference.”

213 they must agree on industrial policy questions, such as whether to procure from the global marketplace or to protect domestic suppliers. This essay’s alternative hypothesis posits that efforts by British and French governments to cooperate on defense research and procurement will be hampered by differences in military industrial policies.

Treaty for Defence and Security Co-operation

Both the British and French white papers call for closer cooperation with countries on defense procurement.1309 The 2012 British white paper on defense procurement and technology, the

National Security Through Technology (NSTT) report, calls on Britain to cooperate with the

United States and France on defense procurement.1310 The report claims Britain can draw three kinds of benefits from such cooperation.1311 First, the United Kingdom can take advantage of economies of scale and the lower costs associated with harmonized requirements, pooled resources, shared facilities, and longer production runs. Second, cooperation can provide the UK with access to technology it might not otherwise obtain independently. Third, industrial defense cooperation can boost interoperability, improve bilateral relations, and help bolster the capabilities of allied forces. For its part, the 2008 French white paper warns that European defense industry remains “too excessively broken up” to compete internationally and that the first step towards European industrial cooperation is for countries to “increase cooperation in acquisition policy.”1312 The white paper also calls on the government to favor the creation of

European industrial groups capable of competing on the global stage.1313

1309 Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition, 27. 1310 Ibid. 1311 Ministry of Defence, National Security Through Technology, 31. 1312 Défense et Sécurité Nationale, 92. 1313 Ibid., 265.

214

In light of this convergence, the Lancaster House treaty pertaining to conventional defense, the Treaty for Defence and Security Co-operation (TDSC), calls on France and the

United Kingdom to “reinforc[e] the defense industry of the two Parties, foste[r] cooperation in research and technology, and develo[p] cooperative equipment programs.”1314 The treaty also calls on the two parties to “undertake to consult before taking any decision on significant capability programs or procurement.”1315 The treaty is meant to help “maintain key capabilities” and mark the beginning of a “long-term relationship.”1316

Different Industrial Policies

While the British and French governments are keen to facilitate cooperation, the two have different policies on defense industrial and technology. While Britain favors an “open market” approach aimed at providing the best equipment for the lowest price, France’s industrial policy aims to protect French autonomy and build a European defense industry.

A product of the coalition government dominated by the Conservative Party, the 2010

SDSR calls on the British government to purchase equipment through global competition whenever possible, with the goal of purchasing “off-the-shelf” products, or equipment already available and tested, at the most competitive prices.1317 When these “off-the-shelf” products are unavailable or unsuitable, the government is to consider modifying “off-the-shelf” equipment.1318 If this is not possible, the government will then hold a competition based on its requirements or join an existing program. In the few cases the British government claims a national security concern is at stake, the state will take an active role and protect the firms in

1314 France No. 1 (2010), 1, sec. 2. 1315 Ibid., 7. 1316 Ministry of Defence, National Security Through Technology, 31. 1317 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 30. 1318 Ministry of Defence, National Security Through Technology, 16.

215 question from foreign competition. These critical areas include information and communications capabilities, the nuclear deterrent and associated submarine technology, electronic warfare and defensive aids, and means to remain an “intelligent consumer.”1319 In defending a more open procurement process, the white paper emphasizes the importance of obtaining “value for money” in defense spending.1320 To define the concept, the NSTT holds that the MOD “does not consider wider employment, industrial, or economic factors in its value for money assessment.”1321 Ultimately, the NSTT describes this pro-competition policy as “pragmatic, not altruistic; we will be supportive, but not protectionist.”1322

The government believes that by introducing greater competition, British defense firms will become more competitive on the global stage. The white paper largely limits the government’s industrial policy to promoting British exports abroad.1323 It admits, however, that this would depend on other governments agreeing to open up their own defense procurement.

British firms, however, fear that the government’s approach threatens the future of Britain’s defense industry. The British trade organization representing the countries’ aerospace, defense, security, and space firms, ADS Group, criticized the government’s white paper, claiming it does not offer a proper defense industrial strategy.1324 The aerospace conglomerate Finmeccanica, meanwhile, told the Defence Committee, “the White Paper does not promote a defense industrial strategy. Rather, it articulates an argument whereby a minimalist approach to operational sovereignty is gap-filled by a wholesale preference for “off-the-shelf” acquisition.”1325 The Royal Aeronautical Society, a London-based non-profit organization

1319 Ibid., 27. 1320 Ibid., 12. 1321 Ibid. 1322 Ibid., 9. 1323 Ibid., 10. 1324 Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition, 18. 1325 Ibid.

216 dedicated to the promotion of aerospace technology, said in its testimony to the House of

Commons Defense Committee, “hoping that others will follow by example or persuasion offers little protection in a hard commercial environment where other national industries are well supported by governments and access to markets closely monitored and controlled.”1326

Britain’s defense industrial policy has alternated depending on the party in power in

Westminster. Prior to the deregulations and privatizations of the Thatcher era, the British government maintained close ties to the country’s defense firms, leading to a so-called “cozy relationship” between the MOD and its suppliers.1327 In 1984, however, then Chief of Defence

Procurement Peter Levene called for the introduction of market reforms, such as open competition, in defense procurement.1328 In the 1990s, however, defense contractors complained that they were competing against foreign firms that benefited from more supportive industrial policies in their home countries.1329 In 1998, the new Labour government’s

“Smart Acquisition” project set up “cooperative ‘partnering’” on individual projects between the

MOD and contractors chosen by competitions.1330 After two decades of open competition, the

Labour government unveiled in 2005 its “Defence Industrial Strategy,” which recognized a

British responsibility to sustain onshore technological and industrial capabilities.1331 This marked a return to a more protective relationship between the government and its defense industry.

Five years later, however, the Conservative Party was back in power and these policies were

1326 Ibid., 26. 1327 Ibid., 56. 1328 Ibid. 1329 Ibid. 1330 Ibid. 1331 Ibid.

217 reversed. The Labour opposition, however, continues to advocate for a more protectionist industrial defense policy.1332

The French 2008 white paper outlines an “industrial and research” policy intended to help France “retain its strategic autonomy and contribute to the creation of a European industrial and technology center of competence.”1333 France has a three-tier approach to industrial policy and procurement. For technologies and equipment it deems “necessary for national sovereignty” it will seek to remain autonomous by procuring solely from protected domestic firms.1334 These sectors include nuclear weaponry, space-related ballistic missiles, submarines and related propulsion systems, and cryptographic communications.1335 For the majority of its requirements, however, France favors “European interdependence” or the purchasing of equipment from cross-European firms and European collaborative projects.1336

Top among the French priorities is the creation of a European fighter program that would be autonomous from the United States.1337 This contrasts with the United Kingdom’s decision to join the US-dominated Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. Finally, France will look to the global market for equipment that it does not deem must be protected at the national or European level, either because they are offered by a wide number of possible providers or because it is possible to provide for these requirements in case the supply is disrupted.1338

1332 “BAE/EADS deal collapse: full reaction,” The Guardian, 10 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/oct/10/bae-eads-deal-collapse-full-reaction (accessed 27 April 2013). 1333 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 261. 1334 Ibid., 264. 1335 Ibid., 267. 1336 Ibid., 264. 1337 Ibid., 267. 1338 Ibid., 264-65.

218

The French emphasize that the defense industry’s high-technology requirements and limited clientele make the sector different from other parts of the economy.1339 A number of defense firms operating in France claim its industrial strategy enables them to plan for long- term costs, including research and development. The CEO of EADS, Thomas Enders, said to the

French Senate’s Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Armed Forces Commission, “… an industry cannot succeed without a truly ambitious industrial policy. That is the role of the state. The success of our industry in France is the result of a guided partnership by public institutions such as DGA,

DGAC, or CNES that have been able to put together long-term programs, covering all the steps of research and development…”1340 Furthermore, the French, unlike the British, claim that domestic firms are unlikely to develop new equipment or conduct expensive research unless the state can guarantee orders. For example, the French government provided Dassault Aviation with contractual pledges that at least 11 Rafale fighters would be procured in France or abroad every year. The French government expected that the fighter would be sold to overseas customers and that it would not have to buy all 11 aircraft.1341 This, however, proved optimistic and the Cour des comptes estimates that France had to order 16 more Rafales than expected for the 2009 to 2014 period for over one billion euros.1342

These different procurement philosophies raise three problems for Franco-British defense cooperation. First, should the two countries attempt to jointly procure a defense system, they may disagree whether to limit the tender to their national companies, to European firms, or to global competition. Second, would the British agree to join the French in guaranteeing to procure a given system? Third, the industrial defense clauses of the 2010 TDSC

1339 Ibid., 272. 1340 Commission des affaires étrangères, “Audition de M. Thomas Enders.” 1341 Cour des comptes, Bilan de loi de programmation militaire, 30. 1342 Ibid., 46.

219 were premised on both countries providing the other’s firms with a fair playing field in its defense bids. This fits the British procurement philosophy, but is more controversial in France. In a written testimony to the House of Commons Defence Committee, EADS officials claim the

British procurement strategy has benefited French firms over their British counterparts.

“The UK does not have an effective national defense and security industry

strategy. This is in contrast to France, Germany, and most other advanced

industrial countries. The result is beginning to show with France, where the UK

is beginning to adopt or be guided by the French industrial strategy… The

bilateral agreement with France is supposed to be just that, two-way. But there

is no evidence that France is opening up its defense market to UK based

companies, yet the UK actively encourage French companies to go after UK

domestic defense contracts. Recent announcements on UK-French collaborative

Unmanned Air Systems showed that the technology study contract is to be led

by DGA, not MOD UK as originally planned.“1343

Commitment to Research and Development

The 2010 TDSC calls on Britain and France to “undertake to develop and to preserve key industrial capabilities and defense technologies so as to improve their independence in relation to key defense technologies.”1344 To cooperate on long-term procurement projects, however, both France and the United Kingdom must be willing to sustain a viable commitment to research and development. In its analysis of Britain’s technology plan, the House of Commons’ Defence

Committee warns that without adequate government investment, the British defense manufacturing base and its technological know-how will degrade, making it a less attractive

1343 Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition, 28. 1344 France No. 1 (2010), 9, sec. 1.

220 partner for collaboration to its allies.1345 The same applies to France. In their testimony to the

House of Committee’s defense committee, EADS and ADS claimed that the British government’s commitment to “off-the-shelf” procurement and open competition is a threat to the country’s research and technology base.1346 This is because British firms may be unwilling to fund expensive research projects without certain procurement guarantees.1347 Furthermore, this policy follows a decline in government spending on research and development. In January 2013, the MOD spent some 1.2 percent of its budget on science and technology compared to 2.4 percent a decade earlier, while the budget itself fell from £670 million in 1997-98 at 2009 prices to around £410 million in 2012-13.1348 Spending on research and development, meanwhile, fell from 8.3 percent in 2005 to 5.3 percent in 2009. As previously stated, the French government continues to guarantee future procurement contracts to preserve research and development contributions from its firms. The French government’s research and development budgets, however, have also fallen in recent years. Since 1990, the French research budget has fallen by about 60 percent and the development budget by 70 percent.1349 Firms have difficulty funding long-term research and development due to the low return on investment in the short and medium terms. This long-term research and technology budget in France is now about €750 million compared to €1.5 billion in the mid-1990s. For comparison, the US Pentagon’s fiscal 2013 budget plan called for US$69.7 billion in research and development.1350 The British and French both face declining research and development budgets, although France continues to provide

1345 Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition, 37. 1346 Ibid., 38 and 62. 1347 Ibid., 62. 1348 Ibid., 37. 1349 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 23.” 1350 Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Exclusive: Pentagon budget eyes $178 billion for R&D, procurement,” Reuters, 12 February 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/12/us-usa-budget-pentagon- idUSTRE81A0IF20120212 (accessed 27 April 2013).

221 procurement guarantees, ensuring that private sector firms are more willing to share in the cost of future technologies.

International Cooperation

France and the United Kingdom also disagree on two industrial defense issues: cooperation with the United States and multilateral European projects.

When considering foreign cooperation in procurement projects, the British government favors bilateral cooperation as they consider these less likely to lead to the “mixed result” common for multilateral projects.1351 These programs are to be judged on four points: (1) common requirements, (2) complementary technological abilities, (3) affordability for both parties, and (4) and any advantages for exports or industrial policies.1352 This reluctance to enter into multilateral procurement programs is in part due to the cost overruns and delays associated with such European procurement projects as the A-400M and Eurofighter Typhoon. Speaking to the French National Assembly Defense Commission in November 2012, the British ambassador to Paris said, “Bilateral cooperation is important for equipment, because experience shows that trying to launch an equipment project with five, 10, or 20 countries is an enterprise destined to fail. It is better to begin alone or at two and two enlarge the circle…”1353 British opposition to multilateral cooperation may also reflect the current government’s opposition to deeper

European military integration. This differs from the French government’s longstanding commitment to deeper European cooperation. As previously discussed, the United Kingdom views the 2010 Lancaster House Treaty on conventional cooperation as just a bilateral

1351 HM Government, Strategic Defence and Security Review, 59-60. 1352 Ibid., 60. 1353 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 20.”

222 agreement meant to maintain capabilities at a time of austerity.1354 The French, however, interpret the treaty as part of a wider effort to forge a viable European defense industry. The

French 2008 white paper calls on the government to work towards the creation of European industrial defense groups anchored in a common market for arms and capable of competing on the international stage.1355 To reach this ultimate goal, the government is to forge bilateral and trilateral deals and encourage the European Defence Agency (EDA) in its efforts to coordinate procurement decisions and pool research and development efforts.1356 France’s support for the creation of a European defense market is part of a general transfer of France’s historic autonomy on defense matters to the European level. While France historically sought to produce its own fighter jets, the 2008 white paper indicated that future combat aircraft programs are likely to be too expensive for France to shoulder alone.1357 The creation of a competitive European defense market would serve as an alternative to the US industrial leviathan.

The United Kingdom, however, prizes its close defense relationship with the United

States over its ties to France and other continental Europeans. The 2012 British white paper on defense technology identified the United States as its “major bilateral acquisition partner. 1358

The paper outlined the advantages to be gained from working closely with the US on defense procurement. “Collaboration with the US offers access to cutting-edge research and technologies and improved interoperability with our major ally.”1359 The UK does benefit from extraordinary access to US military technology, but this comes at a price. The UK-US Defense

Trade Treaty facilitates technology transfers between the two countries by removing export

1354 Ibid. 1355 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 265. 1356 Ibid., 265 and 271. 1357 Ibid., 267. 1358 Ministry of Defence, National Security Through Technology, 31. 1359 Ibid.

223 license requirements, but it restricts similar flows from the UK to the rest of the world, including other EU member states. 1360 1361 As part of this close defense collaboration, Britain joined the

United States’ F-35 Lightning II program as the only level one partner, rejecting French calls for a

European combat aircraft project.1362 British defense firms benefit from the transatlantic relationship as they can access the world’s largest defense market. BAE Systems, Rolls-Royce and others are involved in manufacturing elements of the F-35 and stand to benefit from the large orders placed by the United States.1363 1364 The importance of the US market for certain

British defense firms was on display during the September and October 2012 negotiations to merge BAE Systems and EADS. BAE Systems’ US unit, which is ringed off from its British parent company in accordance with US security requirements, reported some US$14.4 billion in defense contracts in September 2012 and represented 47 percent of the firm’s 2011 revenue.1365 It was BAE Systems’ large inroads in the US defense market that made the firm particularly interesting for EADS.1366 For the merger to proceed, however, BAE Systems needed to obtain US approval as Washington was concerned about the influence wielded by the French,

1360 “Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation,” US Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, 21 June 2007, http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/treaties/documents/UK_Treaty.pdf (accessed 12 March 2013). 1361 Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition, 29. 1362 “Joint Strike Fighter F-35,” Royal Air Force, http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/f35jointstrikefighter.cfm (accessed 12 March 2013). 1363 “F-35 Program Propulsion,” The F-35 Lightning II, http://www.jsf.mil/program/prog_org_propulsion.htm (accessed 12 March 2013). 1364 “F-35 Program Air Vehicle,” The F-35 Lightning II, http://www.jsf.mil/program/prog_org_airvehicle.htm (accessed 12 March 2013). 1365 Gopal Ratna and Sara Forden, “BAE Said to Brief Pentagon on EADS Merger to Save Status,” Reuters, 28 September 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-28/bae-said-to-brief-pentagon-on-eads- merger-to-save-status.html (accessed 27 April 2013). 1366 Laurence Knight, “BAE Systems-EADS: The rationale,” BBC News, 10 October 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19783954 (accessed 27 April 2013).

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German, and Spanish governments in EADS.1367 1368 After Germany scuttled the proposed merger, questions were raised about BAE Systems seeking a US partner, which would further push the UK defense sector into the arms of Washington. In a November 2012 interview with Le

Figaro, Boeing CEO James McNerney, Jr. claimed that BAE Systems would find it easier to find a solution in the United States than in the EU. “I think that from the point of view of US legislation, an offer coming from a US company for BAE would be more likely to be accepted than coming from a European firm.”1369

Commitment to boost exports

The prominent competition between the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Rafale for overseas consumers may be the last such high-profile fighter jet competition between rival European programs. France, at the very least, will be unable to shoulder another autonomous combat aircraft program and will need to look for partners. The 2010 TDSC calls on France and the

United Kingdom to “facilitate and promote equipment jointly produced by French and United

Kingdom entities to third parties…”1370 In spite of their differences on other industrial issues,

Britain and France agree that the state must play a key role in promoting arm sales abroad. Both countries have pledged to dispatch high-ranking ministers to promote their products overseas.1371 1372 The two countries have also voiced the willingness to sign inter-governmental

1367 Simon Bowers, “BAE Cranks up Washington lobbying machine to push through EADS merger,” The Guardian, 24 September 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/sep/24/bae-systems- washington-lobbying-machine-eads (accessed 27 April 2013). 1368 “BAE to ringfence US defence arm in bid to win merger approval,” The Guardian, 23 September 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/sep/23/bae-eads-merger-ringfence-fox (accessed 27 April 2013). 1369 Véronique Guillermard and Yann Le Galès, “Boeing accélère la sortie de nouveaux modèles,” Le Figaro, 15 November 2012, http://bourse.lefigaro.fr/indices-actions/actu-conseils/boeing-accelere-la- sortie-de-nouveaux-modeles-307033 (accessed 4 April 2013). 1370 France No. 1 (2010), 8, sec. 3. 1371 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 281. 1372 Ministry of Defence, National Security Through Technology, 10.

225 treaties to help clients finance programs, train crews, and provide maintenance assistance.1373

1374 The British government’s emphasis on competition, however, may hamper Franco-British efforts to promote their defense systems as foreign governments are unlikely to purchase systems rejected by their home countries.1375 In his November 2012 testimony to the French

National Assembly defense commission, Renault Trucks Defence CEO Gerard Amiel claimed that in difficult economic times, defense sector firms “can think of no other support from the state than the label ‘,’ which nevertheless brings an important multiplier effect in export sales and a return in terms of jobs for France.”1376 Another problem is the absence of a British equivalent to the French General Directorate for Armament (DGA), which plays an important role in promoting the country’s exports overseas.1377

Case Study: UAV Cooperation

The differences in British and French industrial policies were reflected in their efforts to cooperate on acquiring drones in the aftermath of the Lancaster House treaties. In their joint press conference following the signing ceremony in November 2010, Sarkozy and Cameron announced the two countries would work to develop a next-generation unmanned aerial vehicle

(UAV).1378 The two countries were already behind the United States and Israel in developing

UAVs, especially armed and unarmed medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drones. The dearth of British or French drones was apparent on the battlefields of Libya, requiring the deployment of US drones.1379 1380 The British emphasis on “off-the-shelf” procurement,

1373 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 280. 1374 Ministry of Defence, National Security Through Technology, 53. 1375 Defence Committee, Defence Acquisition, 26. 1376 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 21.” 1377 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 22.” 1378 “UK-France Summit press conference.” 1379 David S. Cloud, “U.S. begins using Predator drones in Libya,” Los Angeles Times, 22 April 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/22/world/la-fg-gates-libya-20110422 (accessed 12 March 2013).

226 however, clashed with the French interest in promoting European industries. In an October 2011 testimony to the French National Assembly’s defense commission, then Defense Minister

Gérard Longuet voiced his concerns that the British might push for a global solution. “We would like to make them understand that if we agree on defining the desired products, we could, in line with European directives, open a negotiation that is not a global call for bids,” Longuet said.1381 “We must convince them that, in our long-term vision, we want to have European suppliers… which would guarantee us some security of supply and continuity. On the contrary, a global call for bids could lead us to select suppliers that are for the moment competitive” but unavailable in the long-term. “We must convince the British to share our concept of industrial policy.” Ultimately, the British and French elected to purchase modified “off-the-shelf” capabilities in the short and medium term and to cooperate on developing a European UAV in the long-term. 1382 1383

Conclusion

The alternative hypothesis is correct in its claim that Britain and France have different industrial procurement strategies and that these can harm efforts to jointly research, develop, and procure future capabilities. The alternative hypothesis’ emphasis on domestic politics in shaping defense policies and cooperation is vindicated by the shift in industrial policies between the

Labour and Conservative parties in the United Kingdom. However, the French and British agreement on UAVs demonstrates that political will can override different industrial policies.

1380 “U.S. spy drones aiding Mali conflict,” UPI, 4 March 2013, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World- News/2013/03/04/US-spy-drones-aiding-Mali-conflict/UPI-40421362411298/ (accessed 12 March 2013). 1381 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Compte rendu n° 37: Audition de M. Gérard Longuet, ministre de la défense et des anciens combattants, dans le cadre du projet de loi de finances pour 2012,” Assemblée Nationale, 4 October 2011, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cr- cdef/11-12/c1112001.asp#P2_68 (accessed 27 April 2013). 1382 Assemblée Nationale, N°254, 38. 1383 Mark Daly, “Out of favour: why European Males are the poor relation,” Jane’s International Defence Review 45, no. 7 (July 2012), 54.

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Chapter Twelve: Job Security and European Defense Integration

“… I believe, after the failure of the BAE/EADS fusion, that the probability of a grand European

‘deal’ is diminishing, because of the economic crisis, which raises great concerns about employment and relaunches the protection of national interests.”1384

Luc Vigneron, CEO of , December 2012

Former US speaker of the House Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill is credited with coining the phrase “all politics is local” to explain how voters are generally swayed by everyday issues, such as job security, over national concerns, such as foreign policy.1385 The politics of defense procurement is particularly “local,” with politicians keen to preserve jobs in their bailiwicks regardless of objections from industry and defense ministry officials. If this essay’s alternative hypothesis is correct, the evidence should show that politicians in France and the United Kingdom also prioritize local job protection over reforms to the European defense sector. This is because rationalizing the European defense market and creating large, transnational defense firms capable of competing against US giants would lead to job losses as national firms disappeared or were merged with others. This section focuses on three questions. (1) Do defense firms employ significant numbers of workers in France and the United Kingdom? (2) What are national policies towards protecting and promoting these sectors? (3) Did concerns about protecting jobs affect negotiations surrounding the proposed merger of BAE Systems and EADS in 2012?

1384 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 32.” 1385 Mario M. Cuomo, “The Last Liberal,” New York Times, 11 March 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/books/01/03/11/reviews/010311.11cuomot.html (accessed 12 March 2013).

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Defense Industry Jobs

The defense sectors in Britain and France represent hundreds of thousands of manufacturing, research and development, and associated jobs. The 2012 British white paper on defense procurement claims that some 300,000 jobs in the United Kingdom were associated with the country’s defense spending and exports that year.1386 The French defense market, meanwhile, was estimated in 2012 to support 165,000 direct and indirect jobs, as well as some 50,000 induced jobs.1387 Globalization and the deindustrialization of developed economies have made defense jobs some of the last manufacturing jobs available in countries like Britain and France.

BAE Systems employs some 37,500 people in the UK and is the country’s largest manufacturing employer.1388 Unlike service-sector jobs, these defense manufacturing positions are often located away from major urban centers, in areas that would otherwise have suffered from the rusting of industrial belts. French defense industry jobs are primarily located in six French regions: Île-de-France, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, Brittany, Centre, Aquitaine, and Lower

Normandy.1389 In the United Kingdom, defense manufacturing supports communities like

Barrow-in-Furness (Cumbria), Pendle (Lancashire), and Portsmouth (Hampshire).1390 These defense jobs sustain ecosystems of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that act as suppliers, as well as local service providers. The activities of the largest French defense firms are believed to support some 4,000 SMEs across the country.1391 EADS UK, meanwhile, claims that it

1386 Ministry of Defence, National Security Through Technology, 6. 1387 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 23.” 1388 Dan Milmo, “BAE-EADS: Angela Merkel blamed for collapse of £28bn merger,” The Guardian, 11 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/oct/10/angela-merkel-bae-eads-merger (accessed 26 April 2013). 1389 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 23.” 1390 “Manufacturing towns: The last of the metal-bashers,” The Economist, 30 March 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21574513-odd-corners-country-british-industry-clings-last- metal-bashers (accessed 26 April 2013). 1391 Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, “Compte rendu n° 37: Audition, ouverte à la presse, de MM. Philippe Berna, président du Comité Richelieu, président de la société Kayentis, de

229 alone “indirectly supported” 135,000 jobs from its UK supply chain.1392 Finally, defense firms also employ highly-educated personnel that would otherwise likely migrate from these smaller communities to major urban centers. The UK trade association for the aerospace, defense, security, and space industries, ADS, claimed in 2012 that 59 percent of employees working for

British defense firms hold a university degree or equivalent.1393 Defense cuts, company mergers, and restructurings can lead to layoffs and the loss of skilled laborers to other sectors and regions.1394

Officials elected to represent communities dependent on the defense industry are generally keen to defend these interests. For example, the British MP for Barrow and Furness,

John Woodcock (Labour), advocates for defense policies, such as the British nuclear deterrent, that support the BAE Systems submarine factory in Barrow.1395 In France, the deputy for the

Manche department, Geneviève Gosselin, called on state-owned DCNS to hire additional welders and electricians to help ensure the Barracuda submarine program could proceed.1396

Gosselin’s department is home to DCNS facilities linked with the program. Questions of job security can lead politicians to oppose mergers they fear would lead to restructurings. In

October 2012, a Tory backbencher representing Wyre and Preston North (Lancashire), Ben

Wallace, led a group of 45 rebellious Tory MPs in urging Cameron to veto the proposed merger

Thierry Gaiffe, président de la commission défense du Comité Richelieu, président de la société Atos Racks, sur la dimension industrielle du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale,” Assemblée Nationale, 12 December 2012, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/cr-cdef/12- 13/c1213037.asp#P5_553 (accessed 26 April 2013). 1392 House of Commons Defence Committee, “Written evidence from EADS,” Parliament, 11 April 2012, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/106/106vw07.htm (accessed 22 April 2013). 1393 Defence Committee, “Written evidence from ADS.” 1394 “Manufacturing towns,” The Economist. 1395 Angela Smith and John Woodcock, “Labour is right to support Trident,” The Guardian, 26 April 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/mar/31/labour-right-support-trident (accessed 26 April 2013). 1396 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 31.”

230 between BAE Systems and EADS.1397 Wallace’s constituency is home to several defense firms, including BAE Systems, and he expressed concerns that the deal would hand over the British defense industry and its associated jobs to a firm dominated by the French and German governments.1398 1399 In France, political pressure on the defense sector may be even more direct. Unlike its British counterpart, the French state elected to retain significant shares in or outright ownership of defense companies. The land defense firm Nexter and the naval defense company DCNS, for example, are both state-owned, while Paris retained a 22.35 percent share in EADS until December 2012.1400 1401 1402 These ownership structures may make it particularly difficult for these firms to shed jobs or consider mergers and acquisitions.

National Protectionism

The defense sector, unlike other areas of the economy, is generally dominated by the industrial and security policies of its home country. Even in the most “classically-liberal” countries, the state plays a powerful role as it is the leading or only client, is often involved in the capital of these enterprises, and holds powerful regulatory oversight.1403 Governments may protect their domestic industries for a variety of reasons, including national security concerns and job protection. The 2010 Lancaster House treaty on conventional defense collaboration, however, requires France and the United Kingdom “to facilitate to the greatest extent possible the

1397 Nicholas Watt, “Tories rebel over BAE merger,” The Guardian, 5 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/oct/05/tory-mps-rebel-bae-merger (accessed 26 April2 013). 1398 “Constituency,” Ben Wallace MP: Wyre & Preston North, http://www.benwallacemp.com/constituency.htm (accessed 26 April 2013). 1399 Jim Pickard, Andrew Parker, and Anousha Sakhoui, “MPs urge Cameron to veto BAE-EADS deal,” Financial Times, 5 October 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0609c59e-0eef-11e2-9343- 00144feabdc0.html#axzz2RaUmBcox (accessed 26 April 2013). 1400 Matthew Curtin and Thomas Leppert, “France sells 2.1% EADS Stake,” Wall Street Journal, 26 April 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324474004578446202594551718.html (accessed 26 April 2013). 1401 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 30.” 1402 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 31.” 1403 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 32.”

231 transfer of defense and security equipment and services between the Parties…”1404 The treaty also calls on the two parties “not to hinder legitimate access to its markets and to its

Government contracts in the field of defense and security.”1405 As discussed in the previous section of this essay, however, French industries appear to benefit more from Franco-British defense cooperation. This is because of the difference between the current British and French industrial policies, with the former favoring an “open procurement process” and the latter keen to protect firms for strategic and industrial concerns.1406 1407 Protectionism in France is often worded in terms of maintaining majority or equality in a joint partnership or the “perpetuation in France of the necessary competencies or maintenance of autonomy and supplying of forces.”1408 These demands have played a role in preventing mergers and deeper cooperation between Nexter and foreign firms, such as Germany’s Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei

Wegmann.1409

Case Study: the BAE Systems-EADS Merger

In October 2012, the German government blocked a proposed merger between Britain-based defense firm BAE Systems and the European multinational aerospace and defense giant

EADS.1410 Although the German government did not provide a clear reason for its decision, media reports claimed center-right German Chancellor Angela Merkel did not believe Germany

1404 France No. 1 (2010), 8, sec. 1. 1405 Ibid., 8, sec. 2. 1406 Défense et Sécurité nationale, 261. 1407 Ministry of Defence, National Security Through Technology, 12. 1408 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 30.” 1409 Commission de la défense, “Compte rendu n° 23.” 1410 “The proposed merger of BAE and EADS: Kaputt,” The Economist, 10 October 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/10/proposed-merger-bae-and-eads (accessed 26 April 2013).

232 would retain enough influence in a new “BEADS.”1411 At stake was the percentage of shares each country would hold in the new firm. At the time of the negotiations, Germany controlled 22.35 percent of these shares through car manufacturer Daimler AG, while France and French firm

Lagardère SCA held a combined 22.35 percent.1412 As part of the merger talks, the parties considered reducing the French and German shares to nine percent each, but both Berlin and

London feared France might increase its stake by acquiring Lagardère’s shares.1413 The British went further and advocated for a “BEADS” without state-owned shares, calling instead on the three countries to hold “golden shares” in the future firm.1414 The British “golden share” in BAE

Systems enables London to block unwanted mergers.1415

Behind the disputes for shares, however, lay a struggle for job security at a time of economic instability. One key dispute between the British, French, and German governments was over the location of “BEADS” headquarters.1416 The plan called for the head office of the new company to be set up in Toulouse, while the defense headquarters would be in London.1417

Germany’s demand that the future firm set up corporate headquarters in Munich were disregarded in the talks, a sign that German sway in EADS could be undermined by the merger,

1411 Dan Milmo, Kate Connolly, and Kim Willsher, “Angela Merkel blocks BAE/EADS merger over small German share,” The Guardian, 10 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/oct/10/angela-merkel-bae-eads-merger-german (accessed 26 April 2013). 1412 “French shareholders wants EADS-BAE tie-up redrawn,” Agence France-Presse, 1 October 2012, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iaHxAwN6lYdzcDCyY6AVQ- WqjoiQ?docId=CNG.94fb48b493fa1aacf4fc347be86ebaf0.6e1 (accessed 26 April 2013). 1413 Dan Milmo, “BAE Systems and EADS in last-ditch talks to salvage deal,” The Guardian, 9 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/oct/09/bae-systems-eads-no-breakthrough (accessed 26 April 2013). 1414 “BAE-EADS merger: France and Germany ‘must reduce stake,” BBC News, 26 April 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19863730 (accessed 26 April 2013). 1415 Milmo, “BAE-EADS: Angela Merkel.” 1416 Tom Bawden, “French and German HQ row hits BAE, EADS tie,” The Independent, 3 October 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/french-and-german-hq-row-hits-bae-eads-tie- 8194688.html (accessed 26 April 2013). 1417 Gernot Heller and Tim Hepher, “France, Germany clash over EADS-BAE headquarters: sources,” Reuters, 2 October 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/02/us-eads-bae- idUSBRE8910OC20121002 (accessed 26 April 2013).

233 putting at risk some 50,000 jobs at 29 sites across Germany.1418 1419 As the negotiations unfolded, the German economy ministry published a report warning that the two firms had provided inadequate guarantees on keeping EADS plants open in Germany.1420 Of particular concern to German interests were EADS’ defense sector jobs, which would be most at risk in a merger with the defense-oriented BAE Systems.1421 EADS’s defense activities are largely confined to its Cassidian branch, which is based in Germany’s Bavaria, a traditional electoral stronghold for the German center-right.1422 1423 During the negotiations, the largest labor union in Germany, IG Metall, pressured the government by calling for “credible pledges from the companies about job security,” as well as “credible statements from the governments about military contracts.”1424 Following a series of electoral defeats for the center-right in state elections and polls indicating a divided electorate ahead of the September 2013 general elections, Merkel could ill afford a merger that threatened German jobs.1425 1426 1427

1418 Milmo, Connolly, and Willsher, “Angela Merkel blocks BAE/EADS.” 1419 “Fusion EADS-BAE: entre déclarations et intentions, où en est la partie de poker?” Le Monde, 8 October 2012, http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2012/10/08/fusion-eads-bae-entre- declarations-et-intentions-ou-en-est-la-partie-de-poker_1771613_3234.html (accessed 26 April 2013). 1420 Agence France-Presse, “Germany Says EADS-BAE Merger Talks Need More Time,” Defense News, 27 September 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120927/DEFREG01/309270001/Germany-Says- EADS-BAE-Merger-Talks-Need-More-Time (accessed 26 April 2013). 1421 Frédéric Lemaître, “Pourquoi Angela Merkel a bloqué le projet EADS-BAE,” Le Monde, 10 October 2012, http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2012/10/10/pourquoi-angela-merkel-a-bloque-le-projet- eads-bae_1773074_3234.html (accessed 26 April 2013). 1422 Ibid. 1423 Valerie Lion, “Fusion EADS-BAE: un paris géant,” L’Express, 19 September 2012, http://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/entreprise/fusion-eads-bae-un-pari-geant_336969.html (accessed 26 April 2013). 1424 Angela Monaghan, “Europe’s largest union urges governmental safeguards on BAE-EADS merger,” The Telegraph, 20 September 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/9556539/Europes-largest-union- urges-government-safeguards-on-BAE-EADS-merger.html (accessed 26 April 2013). 1425 “Sonntagsfrage – Emnid,” Wahlrecht, http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/emnid.htm (accessed 26 April 2013). 1426 “Sonntagsfrage – Forsa,” Wahlrecht, http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/forsa.htm (accessed 26 April 2013). 1427 “Germany ruling parties lose poll in Schleswig-Holstein,” BBC News, 6 May 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17973536 (accessed 26 April 2013).

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Germany, however, was not alone in its concerns for job security. As previously discussed, a number of British MPs warned that a “BEADS” dominated by German and French state interests would pose a grave threat to the British defense industry. British trade unions and MPs called on BAE Systems and EADS to protect the 52,000 British manufacturing and engineering jobs at stake in the merger.1428 The largest labor union in Britain, Unite, said it would only support the merger if it was accompanied by job guarantees for employees of BAE

Systems and EADS.1429 For its part, the trade union Prospect warned that the deal would only harm British businesses and workers, while continental Europeans would reap the benefits.1430

Some MPs and labor officials were particularly concerned about job losses because they feared a “BEADS” would find it easier to sack British employees than their continental counterparts because Britain has one of the more flexible labor markets in Europe.1431 Leaders in the government and opposition echoed these concerns. Speaking about the deal, British Defense

Secretary Philip Hammond said, “We will want to be reassured not just about the security implications but about the implications for the future allocation of work to the UK. It’s not just military work but Airbus work.1432 For its part, the opposition Labour party called on the government to obtain safeguards over jobs and strategic interests.1433 In spite of these concerns,

Cameron claimed he was “really, really interested” in the merger and his government did not

1428 Nick Hopkins and Dan Milmo, “BAE merger with EADS must defend British interests, Hammond warns,” The Guardian, 13 September 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/sep/13/bae- merger-eads-uk-hammond (accessed 26 April 2013). 1429 Milmo, “BAE-EADS: Angela Merkel.” 1430 Defence Committee, “The impact on UK Defence.” 1431 Dan Milmo, Kim Willsher, and Kate Connolly, “BAE’s supermerger sends shockwaves round the world,” The Guardian, 26 April 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/sep/16/bae-eads- merger-fears (accessed 26 April 2013). 1432 Hopkins and Milmo, “BAE merger with EADS.” 1433 Jim Pickard and Andrew Parker, “BAE tie-up bad for UK, warns Darling,” Financial Times, 4 October 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/33c84138-0e3e-11e2-8b92-00144feabdc0.html#axzz28R2Meo79 (accessed 26 April 2013).

235 scuttle the project.1434 This was perhaps in line with his government’s free market doctrine or the belief that an ailing BAE Systems would cut jobs even if the merger failed.1435

French politicians and labor leaders also voiced concerns about job losses during the merger negotiations. A spokesperson for Workers’ Force (FO), the main labor union representing French Airbus workers, said it would remain “extremely vigilant” and that job creation remained the top priority. “We will be questioning the management. We don’t want it turning into an Anglo-Saxon-style management.”1436 An official from the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), a French confederation of labor unions, called for an “extraordinary European committee” of labor unions to examine the proposed merger.1437 In an effort to mollify the labor unions, Airbus CEO Fabrice Brégier claimed that a “combination EADS/BAE Systems should not impact Airbus and its employees in their daily operations.”1438 These concerns traveled to the top of the French state, with Hollande narrowing France’s position in the negotiations to four key points: “jobs, industrial strategy, defense activity, and the interests of our respective states.”1439 Ultimately, France appeared satisfied with the ownership structure on offer and did not scuttle the talks. This may have been because the government felt the jobs in question were secure, that European defense cooperation was more important, or because Hollande does not face reelection until 2017.

1434 Milmo, “BAE-EADS: Angela Merkel.” 1435 Simon Goodley, “BAE Systems plans to cut 3,000 more jobs as defence budgets are squeezed,” The Guardian, 25 September 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/sep/25/bae-systems-job-losses (accessed 26 April 2013). 1436 Milmo, Willsher, and Connolly, “BAE’s supermerger.” 1437 Agence France-Presse, “Qui a peur de la fusion EADS-BAE Systems?” Le Point, 13 September 2012, http://www.lepoint.fr/economie/qui-a-peur-de-la-fusion-eads-bae-systems-13-09-2012-1505905_28.php (accessed 26 April 2013). 1438 Ibid. 1439 “EADS-BAE; l’emploi, priorité de Hollande,” Le Figaro, 22 September 2012, http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/2012/09/22/97002-20120922FILWWW00425-eads-bae-l-emploi- priorite-de-hollande.php

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Conclusion

As the alternative hypothesis anticipated, governments remain willing to prioritize job security above foreign policy ambitions, scuttling industrial defense mergers in the process. This is because the defense industry offers some of the last manufacturing jobs in the developed countries of Western Europe. To defend these interests in the medium-term, governments are willing to ignore possible long-term gains that could be obtained from integrating the European defense sector. Concerns about job security appear to have played an important role in

Germany’s 2012 decision to scuttle a merger between BAE Systems and EADS.

Chapter Thirteen: Domestic Political Parties

“France and Britain are neighbors and they are not going to move. Whatever the political views of those who will step into our shoes, they will be faced with the following reality – namely, that

Britain is France’s closest neighbor. That is a fact.”1440

President Nicolas Sarkozy, November 2010

In contrast to President Sarkozy’s claim, this essay’s alternative hypothesis holds that the different political parties in France and the United Kingdom hold dissenting views on Franco-

British cooperation. These differences could threaten the future of cross-channel defense cooperation should the parties in power lose office. For both Britain and France, this essay examines four leading political parties and their positions on the Lancaster House treaties and other relevant issues. In the United Kingdom, the author selected the three leading parties in

Westminster – the center-right Conservative Party, the center-left Labour Party, and the centrist

Liberal Democrats – and one rising political force: the anti-EU UK Independence Party (UKIP). For

1440 “UK-France Summit press conference.”

237

France, this essay examines the top four parties in the first round of the 2012 presidential elections: the center-left Socialist Party (PS), the center-right Union for a Popular Movement

(UMP), the far-right National Front (FN), and the far-left Left Front (FDG).

British Parties

Both before and after it lost power in the May 2010 elections, the center-left Labour Party advocated for closer military cooperation with France. Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair reached a number of defense agreements with center-right French President Jacques Chirac, beginning with the St-Malo in 1998 that launched efforts to develop an EU military capability.1441 In 2003,

Blair and Chirac met in Le Touquet, France, where they agreed to propose that the EU take over from NATO in Bosnia, to create “capabilities agency” to coordinate military procurement, and to collaborate on aircraft carriers.1442 In 2006, the two countries agreed to cooperate on a future aircraft carrier and to establish a High Level Bilateral Working Group to examine ways to cooperate on armament programs.1443 In 2009, Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown and center-right French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed that the two countries cooperate on communication satellites and UAV technology.1444 In February 2010, the Labour government published a report meant to inform the upcoming strategic defense review. This “Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review,” singled out the United States and

France as possible partners on defense matter.1445 Furthermore, the report indicated that

France’s return to NATO’s integrated military command offered “an opportunity for even

1441 “Anglo-French Military Pact,” BBC News. 1442 “UK and France boost defence ties,” BBC News, 5 February 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2726111.stm (accessed 13 March 2013). 1443 “UK-France Military Cooperation,” France in the United Kingdom, 7 July 2006, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/UK-France-military-cooperation.html (accessed 13 March 2013). 1444 “30th France-United Kingdom Summit in Evian,” France in the United Kingdom, 8 July 2009, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/30th-France-United-Kingdom-Summit.html (accessed 13 March 2013). 1445 Ministry of Defence. Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review, Cm 7794 (London: The Stationery Office, 2010), 15.

238 greater cooperation with a key partner across a range of defense activity.”1446 After Cameron signed the Lancaster House treaties in November 2010, Labour Shadow Defence Secretary Jim

Murphy voiced support for the agreement. “Most of us on both sides of the House support and welcome in principle further steps to improve what is already a very strong relationship.”1447

Murphy, however, sought guarantees that the UK would retain its ability to act independently, including in the protection of its overseas territories. He also asked whether the French were bound to provide a carrier in the event the United Kingdom requested French assistance and

France refused. The shadow defense minister pointed out that France and the United Kingdom had not always agreed on military deployments. “We hope and expect that the UK and France will increasingly find common cause, but there is not guarantee that will be the case in all circumstances over the next 50 years.”1448 Some Labour MPs, however, dissented with their leadership. Former Labour defense under-secretary and MP Kevan Jones said, “If we had done this in government we would have been completely pilloried by the Conservative Party, and quite rightly.”1449 MP Sir Peter Tapsell, meanwhile, said “George Bush and Tony Blair were hell- bent on invading Iraq, but President Chirac took a different view. If in the future there are divergences in military or foreign policy matters, who gets the helicopters and the fighters onto the aircraft carrier?”1450

Even before coming to power in the May 2010, the center-right Conservative Party supported closer defense collaboration with France. In February 2010, then Shadow Defence

Secretary Liam Fox voiced his agreement with the Labour government’s report calling for

1446 Ibid. 1447 “House of Commons Tuesday 2 November 2010,” www.parliament,uk, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101102/debtext/101102- 0001.htm#10110260000595 (accessed 13 March 2013). 1448 Ibid. 1449 Alison Little, “Alarm over UK-French treaty,” Daily Express, 3 November 2010, http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/209183/Alarm-over-UK-French-treaty (accessed 14 March 2013). 1450 Ibid.

239 greater defense cooperation with France. Fox said, “We agree that France and the United States are likely to be our main strategic partners. For us there are two tests: do they invest in defense, and do they fight? Sadly, too few European allies pass both these tests?”1451 After coming to power in May 2010, the Conservative-LibDem coalition set the groundwork for a defense accord with France in a series of policy speeches announcing their commitment to cooperation with

Paris.1452 1453 Some Tory backbenchers, however, expressed concerns about the treaty. MP

Bernard Jenkin, a former shadow secretary, said he approved of defense cooperation, but not shared strategy. “There is a long track-record of duplicity on the French part. When it comes to dealing with allies, we should never be under any illusion. The French act in what they see as their strategic interests.”1454

The centrist Liberal Democrats party also agreed on the importance of military cooperation with France, which they see as important to boost European defense and reduce

Britain’s reliance on the “special relationship.” The party’s campaign platform – the Liberal

Democrat Manifesto 2010 – claims the party aims to “reinvigorate Franco-British and wider

European defense co-operation to ensure procurement costs are kept low.”1455 In the aftermath of the Lancaster House signing ceremony, LibDem ministers defended the treaty.1456 Lord

“Paddy” Ashdown, the former LibDem leader, said “I am clear that Paris sees this as the first

1451 “Fox: Brown still in denial over defence black hole,” PoliticsHome, 3 February 2010, http://www.politicshome.com/uk/article/5319/fox_brown_still_in_denial_over_defence_black_hole.html (accessed 13 March 2013). 1452 Liam Fox, “2010/06/14 – Strategic Defence and Security Review,” Ministry of Defence, 16 June 2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2010-06-14-strategic-defence-and-security-review (accessed 13 March 2013). 1453 Liam Fox, “2010/07/20 – Farnborough International Air Show,” Ministry of Defence, 20 July 2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2010-07-20-farnborough-international-air-show (accessed 13 March 2013). 1454 Kirkup, “David Cameron hails.” 1455 Liberal Democrats. Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010 (London: Liberal Democrat Image, 2010), 65. 1456 “Heckler brands minister racist on TV over French army,” BBC News, 4 November 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11699172 (accessed 14 March 2013).

240 move to wider European defense co-operation, which I am strongly in favor of. Paris's view and long-term aims on this will be inimical to many in the Conservative Party, including maybe our

Defence Secretary [Liam Fox].”1457

The UK Independence Party (UKIP), which seeks to extricate the UK from the EU, was one of the few parties that voiced its opposition to the Lancaster House treaty. The party leader,

European Member of Parliament (EMP) Nigel Farage, called the treaty an act of “utter madness.”1458 This stance is in line with the party’s mistrust for European integration and continental European countries in general. While UKIP is committed to the NATO alliance and the “special relationship” with Washington, the party opposes the Common Foreign and

Security Policy (CFSP), which it calls an “EU Army.”1459

In contradiction to the alternative hypothesis, the three leading political parties currently in the House of Commons all support the Lancaster House treaties. The only outlier in this survey is UKIP, which is staunchly opposed to anything it interprets as a step towards

European defense cooperation outside NATO. However, the concerns expressed by Tory backbenchers may presage a shift in the Conservative Party should it grow more eurosceptic.

French Parties

The Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) was created in 2002 out of several center-right parties under then President Jacques Chirac. As previously described, it was Chirac and Blair’s joint declaration at St-Malo in 1998 that launched efforts to pool European defense capabilities

1457 Kim Sengupta, “Sarkozy launches new era with gaffe,” The Independent, 3 November 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/sarkozy-launches-new-era-with-gaffe-2123547.html (accessed 14 March 2013). 1458 Little, “Alarm over UK-French treaty.” 1459 “In The National Interest: Time to Rescue our Armed Forces,” United Kingdom Independence Party, 1 March 2010, http://www.ukip.org/media/policies/UKIPdefencepolicy.pdf (accessed 14 March 2013).

241 in the post-Cold War era. The UMP largely supported the Lancaster House treaties, which were negotiated by a UMP president. The UMP deputy secretary general, Axel Poniatowski, said in a press communiqué released the day of the treaty signing that the agreement represented “an unparalleled rapprochement in defense matters” and an “essential marriage of reason” necessary “to maintain a prominent position on the international stage.”1460

For its part, the French Socialist Party (PS) welcomed the 2010 Lancaster House treaties, interpreting them as a step forward for European defense cooperation. In November 2010, the

PS budget rapporteur, Jean-Michel Boucheron, said the treaties were “welcomed and [they] should be approved” at a time when “European defense cooperation is broken down.”1461

Although the PS and UMP disagreed on the nature of the treaty – deepening European integration or a “marriage of reason” the two parties supported it. The PS, however, warned that it would try to extend the treaty to other European parties if it came to power. Ahead of the May 2012 presidential elections, Hollande dispatched his future defense minister, Jean-Yves

Le Drian to London to voice support for the Lancaster House treaties.1462 “We would like to continue what was engaged at Lancaster House. We are two countries with the most military might in Europe,” Le Drian said. “Therefore, our countries have to speak from the same sheet.”1463 Le Drian, however, pointed out that France hoped this “entente” could lead to

“greater cooperation elsewhere in Europe.”1464

1460 Axel Poniatowski, “Communique de Presse,” EurActiv, 2 November 2010, http://www.euractiv.fr/sites/default/files/cp_ump_-_poniatowski_accord_france_royaume-uni_- _02.11.10.pdf (accessed 27 April 2013). 1461 “Defense: reactions a la signature d’un partenariat franco-britannique,” Agence France Presse, 2 November 2010. 1462 Kim Wilssher, “François Hollande ‘will retain Franco-British defence ties’ as president,” The Guardian, 1 April 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/01/francois-hollande-france-britain-defence (accessed 12 May 2013). 1463 Ibid. 1464 Ibid.

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Although the far-right National Front (FN) won only two seats in the 2012 elections to the National Assembly, the party’s presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, came third in the first round of the presidential elections, winning 17.9 percent of the vote.1465 1466 During the election campaign, Le Pen called on France to abandon the Lancaster House treaty pertaining to nuclear cooperation, claiming it was a threat to France’s autonomous nuclear deterrent. “Naturally, we fiercely express our opposition to the process to mutualize our nuclear capabilities with England, which constitutes a major historic error,” she said.1467 Denouncing the “Anglo-Saxon” world order, Le Pen called on France to abandon both NATO and EU defense cooperation in favor of a

“Franco-German-Russian axis.”1468 1469 This attitude would likely have led a Le Pen administration to also abandon the Lancaster House treaty on conventional cooperation.

The far-left coalition Left Front (FDG) won 10 seats in the 2012 National Assembly election and its presidential candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon of the Left Party, came fourth with

11.1 percent of the vote.1470 1471 During the campaign, Mélenchon claimed the French state must own or maintain significant shares in its defense industries and not grant another power oversight over French military decisions.1472 To that end, Mélenchon said he would break with

1465 “Résultats de l'élection présidentielle 2012,” Ministère de l’Intérieur, http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les resultats/Presidentielles/elecresult__PR2012/%28path%29/PR2012//FE.html (accessed 27 April 2013). 1466 “Résultats des élections législatives 2012,” Ministère de l’Intérieur, http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les- resultats/Legislatives/elecresult__LG2012/%28path%29/LG2012/%28path%29/LG2012//FE.html (accessed 27 April 2013). 1467 “Défense: les candidats à la présidentielle restent (presque) tous dans le rang,” La Tribune, 2 April 2012, http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique- defense/20120402trib000691566/defense-les-candidats-a-la-presidentielle-restent-presque-tous-dans-le- rang-.html (accessed 27 April 2013). 1468 Ibid. 1469 “Les vidéos du Colloque Idées Nation: « Défense : retrouver les moyens de notre indépendance »,” www.frontnational.com, 12 December 2011, http://www.frontnational.com/videos/les-videos-du- colloque-idees-nation-defense-retrouver-les-moyens-de-notre-independance/ (accessed 27 April 2013). 1470 “Résultats de l’élections présidentielle 2012,” Ministère de l’Intérieur. 1471 “Résultats de l’élections législatives 2012,” Ministère de l’Intérieur. 1472 “Défense: les candidats,” La Tribune.

243 the Lancaster House treaties. Claiming his foreign policy was in line with “alter-globalization” theory, Mélenchon called on France to leave NATO and EU military cooperation, cooperate with emerging and developing nations on security, and only commit forces through the UN.1473

In contradiction to the alternative hypothesis, the two leading centrist parties most likely to win office in France are both supportive of the Lancaster House treaties, although the

PS is keen to see the treaty extended to other EU member states. Should the FN or FDG come to power, however, the Lancaster House treaties would likely be scrapped.

Conclusion

The alternative hypothesis was incorrect in its assumption that significant differences of opinion among political parties within France and the United Kingdom pose a direct threat to defense cooperation. Were an extreme political formation, such as UKIP in Britain or the FN or

FDG in France, come to power, however, the Lancaster House treaties would likely be scrapped.

These two events, however, are unlikely to occur. There are some differences, however, between the centrist political parties in both France and the United Kingdom that could shape the kind of cooperation that can be achieved. The Labour Party has proven in recent history more supportive of British participation in European defense projects. The PS, meanwhile, has proven more favorable to European defense cooperation than the UMP after the reversals

Sarkozy experienced in the late 2000s.

1473 Ibid.

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Chapter Fourteen: Public Opinion

“Agincourt, Trafalgar, Waterloo… you don’t have to be a learned scholar of our island history to know that, over the centuries, Britain’s entente with France has not always been cordiale.”1474

Daily Mail, November 2010

It is often said that elections are not decided by foreign policy disputes, but by issues related to economic growth, welfare benefits, and social issues.1475 1476 Democratically-elected governments also find it possible to act against public opinion when making foreign policy decisions.1477 1478 In some cases, however, foreign policy can prove so divisive they it has a direct impact on domestic affairs, as was the case for British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Spanish

Prime Minister José María Aznar.1479 1480 If this essay’s alternative thesis is correct, British and

French public opinions are opposed to defense cooperation and this has had a demonstrable impact on police decisions. This section first examines the editorials and op-eds published by leading British and French newspapers about the Lancaster House treaties to examine if these

1474 Daily Mail Comment, “But will the entente be forever cordiale?” Daily Mail, 2 November 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1325792/BRITAIN-AND-FRANCE-DEFENCE-PACT-But-entente- forever-cordiale.html (accessed 27 April 2013). 1475 “Britain’s very domestic election: A foreign affairs debate that barely mentions foreigners,” The Economist, 23 April 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2010/04/britains_very_domestic_election (accessed 28 April 2013). 1476 “La sécurité n’est pas la priorité des Français,” Le Parisien, 28 April 2013, http://www.leparisien.fr/election-presidentielle-2012/la-securite-n-est-pas-la-priorite-des-francais-27-03- 2012-1925975.php (accessed 28 April 2013). 1477 Alan Travis, “Support for war falls to new low,” The Guardian, 21 January 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/jan/21/uk.iraq2 (accessed 28 April 2013). 1478 Al Goodman, “Polls: 90 percent of Spaniards against war,” CNN 29 March 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/03/29/sprj.irq.spain/ (accessed 28 April 2013). 1479 Aparnaa Seshadri, “Tony Blair to Resign in a Year,” ABC News, 7 September 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=2405434&page=1#.UX1tbcp4-Hg (accessed 28 April 2013). 1480 “Spain threatens Iraq pull-out,” CNN, 15 March 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/03/15/spain.election/ (accessed 28 April 2013).

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“opinion leaders” opposed defense cooperation. The section then turns to polling data about defense cooperation and joint military operations.

British Newspaper

The British broadsheets greeted the Lancaster House treaties with guarded support, claiming it made sense to pool resources at a time of financial constraints. The British tabloids, however, turned to nationalist tropes to denounce what they perceived as Britain surrendering its armed forces to the old rival from across the English Channel. The editorial board of the center-right broadsheet Daily Telegraph’s supported the treaties’ cost saving measures, but called on the

United Kingdom to retain its ability to carry out operations autonomously of the French.1481

“While these treaties might make sense at a tactical level, the strategic interests of the two countries are often very different. And we should remember that President Sarkozy, as a French leader with strong Anglo-Saxon inclinations, is a rarity.”1482 In closing, the editorial raises the possibility that the treaty could encourage France to play a more active role in NATO operations.

The pro-business Financial Times, for its part, backed the Lancaster House treaties, claiming it could help the two countries maintain military capabilities at a time of tight budgets and convince the US that there are “at least two European powers serious about strengthening their military capabilities.” The editorial reads, “There is no need to hail these agreements as representing a fundamental transformation of the sometimes strained alliance that has united the UK and France since 1945. But the accords are timely, realistic, well-balanced and an encouraging step forward for the two countries concerned as well for their US and European

1481 Telegraph View, “Anglo-French treaty must not bind Britain’s hands,” The Telegraph, 2 November 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8106077/Anglo-French-treaty-must-not-bind- Britains-hands.html (accessed 14 March 2013). 1482 “Spain PM orders Iraq troops home,” BBC News, 18 April 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3637523.stm (accessed 28 April 2013).

246 partners in NATO.”1483 The Times, a generally centrist to center-right newspaper, held guarded pessimism towards the deal, concluding “The question about this Anglo-French entente is whether, in a crisis, it symbolizes solidarity or muddies it.”1484 The editorial board further claimed the two countries hold “differences of view, interest, and capability…”1485 The centrist

The Independent favored the treaty, with their editorial stating “Co-operation, designed in such a way as to cover possible gaps and exploit complementary strengths, while not jeopardizing independence of action, makes eminently good sense.”1486 The editorial board, however, went further, claiming the treaty could herald a British turn to European defense cooperation. “The future of Britain’s defenses may not yet be as European in complexion as it could and should be, but the principle of seeking allies across the Channel, rather than across the Atlantic, has now been set, and that marks a historic shift.”1487 The Guardian, a center-left newspaper, held guarded optimism for the treaty, claiming it makes “eminent pragmatic sense” to pool resources when “neither country can afford the role it has carved out for itself.”1488 The editorial board also hoped that a French influence on the British armed forces might prevent a repeat of the

Iraq war. It was, however, less sanguine about the nuclear agreement, claiming it could reduce the cost of the nuclear deterrent and undermine efforts to dispense with Britain’s nuclear weapons. In their coverage of the Lancaster House treaties, the British tabloid industry lived up

1483 “A new entente for Paris and London,” Financial Times, 2 November 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/76e986b4-e6b5-11df-99b3-00144feab49a.html#axzz2NT0ZYwn7 (accessed 13 March 2013). 1484 “Allies and Interests: The Anglo-French defence agreement may disguise differences of strategy, whereas clarity in a crisis is essential,” The Times, 3 November 2010, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/leaders/article2791906.ece (accessed 14 March 2013). 1485 Ibid. 1486 “Leading article: A modest start that could mark a historic European shift,” The Independent, 3 November 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/leading-article-a-modest-start-that- could-mark-a-historic-european-shift-2123388.html (accessed 14 March 2013). 1487 Ibid. 1488 “Anglo-French defence pact: The two musketeers,” The Guardian, 2 November 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/nov/03/anglo-french-defence-pact-editorial (accessed 14 March 2013).

247 to its formidable reputation. Drawing on a palette of Francophobic clichés, historiographical tropes, and a weak grasp of the event at hand, the tabloids generally painted a misleading picture of the Lancaster House treaties. The Sun warned the “slippery” French president had

“ducked out” on a pledge to assist the British in the Falklands.1489 In an editorial, the Daily Mail asked how could the Conservative Party, “who rightly opposed plans for a European army, even consider handing operational control of the SAS to France?”1490

French Newspaper

The Lancaster House treaties did not spark vivid commentary in France, where newspapers largely covered them as cost-cutting measures. An editorial published in the pro-business Les

Échos points out that the treaties were largely overlooked by French media outlets focused on rumors surrounding ministerial reshufflings in Paris.1491 The piece, however, makes the claim that the treaty is truly historic in that it enables London to diversify away from the United States and enables France to bind the only other military power in Europe to the continent. It concludes that “for the first time in 62 years, the Europeans are offering Europe the means to temper the monopoly of the American shield.”1492 An op-ed in the same paper claims the treaty was a step towards defense cooperation at the European-level.1493 It also claims the treaty serves to reinforce the London-Paris defense axis at a time when Germany is becoming the dominant partner in the economic axis between Berlin and Paris. The center-right Le Figaro published an op-ed supporting the Lancaster House agreements, claiming they were both

1489 Dunn, “Sarkozy’s snub.” 1490 Daily Mail Comment, “But will the entente.” 1491 “L'esquisse d'une défense européenne,” Les Échos, 16 November 2010, http://www.lesechos.fr/16/11/2010/LesEchos/20805-81-ECH_l-esquisse-d-une-defense-europeenne.htm (accessed 14 March 2013). 1492 Ibid. 1493 Dominique Seux, “L’Europe se reprend,” Les Échos, 3 November 2010, http://www.lesechos.fr/03/11/2010/LesEchos/20797-63-ECH_l-europe-se-reprend.htm (accessed 14 March 2013).

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“historical” and “unavoidable.”1494 The op-ed claims the agreements marked progress for

European defense cooperation. “… if the two capitals can agree to mutualize their forces, share in great procurement projects, and prepare to deploy jointly, then, in a very pragmatic way, it is

European defense as a whole that is progressing.”1495 A piece in the center-left Marianne points out that the treaties were not, “far from it, a restart of European defense.” Rather, the treaties are outcomes of France’s return to NATO and the failure to convince other Europeans to maintain an international military role. The piece claims these treaties were signed under the

“benevolent gaze of the United States.”1496 An op-ed in the left-wing Libération claims the

Lancaster House treaty on nuclear cooperation could help control the cost of maintaining the ability to project force abroad and preserve France’s nuclear deterrent.1497

Polling Data

This author could only find one reputable poll on defense cooperation carried out at the time of the signing of the Lancaster House treaties. In November 2010, the Financial Times and the market research firm Harris Poll released a survey of the opinions of Europeans from five countries to the sharing of military assets and of defense budget cuts. 1498 The poll found that while 60 percent of French nationals surveyed supported sharing military assets with another

1494 Pierre Rousselin, “Paris-Londres: une question de survie,” Le Figaro, 1 November 2010, http://www.lefigaro.fr/mon-figaro/2010/11/01/10001-20101101ARTFIG00481-paris-londres-une- question-de-survie.php (accessed 14 March 2013). 1495 Ibid. 1496 “Faute d’Europe, l’entente cordiale,” Marianne, 6 November 2010, http://www.marianne.net/Faute- d-Europe-l-entente-cordiale_a199331.html (accessed 14 March 2013). 1497 Renauld Helfer-Aubrac, “La dissuasion française en danger,” Libération, 12 November 2010, http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/01012301729-la-dissuasion-francaise-en-danger (accessed 27 April 2013). 1498 “Military sharing plan finds resistance - Britons less keen than other nations, cuts to forces are biggest UK fear,” Harris Interactive, 2 November 2010, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/uk/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/FinancialTimesHarrisPolls/tabid/567/mid/1 802/articleId/615/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/Default.aspx (accessed 14 March 2013).

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European country, only 33 percent of British national surveyed were supportive.1499 The British score was the lowest of five European countries. The same poll found that British respondents were the most concerned about the impact of budget cuts on European defense. Eighty-one percent of British respondents said they were at least somewhat concerned, compared to 54 percent for France. These sentiments, however, did not prevent the Cameron government from signing the Lancaster House agreements.

Poll – Sharing Military Assets Polling Question: "Some also argue for closer co-operation between countries on military issues, as being discussed by the UK and France. How much would you support or oppose Europe sharing military resources with another country?"1500 Support (%) Great Britain France Italy Spain Germany Very much support 8 20 16 22 21 Somewhat support 25 40 32 22 21 Net Support 33 60 48 44 48

Somewhat oppose 22 8 10 6 9 Very much oppose 13 5 5 9 7 Net Opposition 35 13 15 14 16 Source: “Military sharing plan finds resistance - Britons less keen than other nations, cuts to forces are biggest UK fear,” Harris Interactive, 2 November 2010, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/uk/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/FinancialTimesHarrisPolls/tabid/567/mid/1802/articleId/615/ctl/Rea dCustom%20Default/Default.aspx (accessed 14 March 2013). The Financial Times and Harris Poll also investigated whether their respondents approved of defense cuts as a means of bringing down budget deficits, with the British most likely to oppose cuts to defense spending. When asked whether they believe cutting defense budgets to bring down the national deficit is “mostly a good thing or mostly a bad thing for your country,” only 25 percent of British respondents claimed these cuts were “a good thing.” This

1499 The poll was conducted online among 5,124 Europeans between the ages of 16 and 64 in four countries -- Great Britain (1,016), France (1,082), Spain (990), and Germany (1021) – and between the ages of 18 and 24 in Italy (1,015) between 12 and 19 October 2010. The pollsters weighted figures for age, sex, education, region, and Internet usage to bring these in line with their national proportions. 1500 The percentages in this chart may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

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compared to 40 percent of French respondents. The Cameron government, however, agreed to

the largest defense cuts since the end of the Cold War.1501

Poll – Defence Cuts: Good or Bad Polling Question: "Defence budgets in many countries including Europe are being cut in order to further bring down national budget deficits. Do you see these cuts as mostly a good thing or mostly a bad thing for your country?" Response (%) Great Britain France Italy Spain Germany Mostly a good thing 25 40 41 45 49 Mostly a bad thing 39 16 23 20 14 Source: “Military sharing plan finds resistance - Britons less keen than other nations, cuts to forces are biggest UK fear,” Harris Interactive, 2 November 2010, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/uk/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/FinancialTimesHarrisPolls/tabid/567/mid/1802/articleId/615/ctl/Rea dCustom%20Default/Default.aspx (accessed 14 March 2013).

Finally, the Financial Times and Harris Poll compared the respondents’ take on defense cuts with changes to the welfare state. The pollsters asked whether respondents in the five European Union member states and the United States would support a “re-examination of Europe’s welfare states” to tackle budget deficits. Great Britain was the closest European state to the United States’ large figures in support of a “re-examination” of the welfare state, with France the furthest. This question, however, does not address what “re-examination” entails and – if this means cuts – what programs are to be cut.

Poll – Budget Deficits and the Welfare State Polling Question: "Some argue that the large budget deficits and the spending cuts that have happened or been proposed call for a re-examination of Europe's welfare states. How much do you agree or disagree with this view?" Support United States Great Britain France Italy Spain Germany Strongly agree 21 17 9 8 21 16 Somewhat agree 57 61 59 61 49 58 Net Agree 77 77 68 68 70 73

Somewhat disagree 17 18 25 25 18 22 Strongly disagree 5 5 6 6 12 5 Net Disagree 23 23 32 32 30 27 Source: “Military sharing plan finds resistance - Britons less keen than other nations, cuts to forces are biggest UK fear,” Harris Interactive, 2 November 2010, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/uk/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/FinancialTimesHarrisPolls/tabid/567/mid/1802/articleId/615/ctl/ReadCustom%20 Default/Default.aspx (accessed 14 March 2013).

1501 James Blitz, “Biggest UK defence cuts since cold war,” Financial Times, 18 October 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80eff352-daa6-11df-81b0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2RaUmBcox (accessed 28 April 2013).

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In the absence of additional polling data regarding the Lancaster House treaties and the pooling and sharing of military hardware, it may be possible to glimpse public opinion about military cooperation by examining support for military missions undertaken by Britain and

France. The British and French-led operations in Libya, saw the middling public support at the beginning of the operations steadily decline as fighting dragged from March 2011 to October

2011. According to a survey carried out by the French polling agency Ifop in late March 2011, some 66 percent of the 1,000 French adults surveyed backed the operation, while 34 percent were opposed.1502 This marked a dramatic increase in support for the operation compared to a poll carried out at the beginning of March 2011, before the operation began. Then, only 36 percent of the 1,002 French adults polled supported military intervention in Libya and 63 percent opposed it.1503 In the United Kingdom, the polling group YouGov surveyed 1,057 British adults after combat operations began in March 2011. It found that 45 percent supported the war, while 36 percent opposed it.1504 A poll of 2,028 British adults by ComRes and ITV, however, found that 35 percent of respondents agreed it was right for Britain to participate in military actions against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s forces in Libya, while 43 percent disagreed and 22 percent did not know.1505 In spite of ambivalent support for the operation, both Britain and

France elected to engage forces in Libya and remained committed to the mission until Qaddafi was toppled.

At the beginning of the Mali conflict, French public opinion polls indicated broad support for military operations in the country. A poll carried out by the polling institute BVA and

1502 “Les Français et la Légitimité d’une Intervention Militaire en Libye,” Ifop, 23 March 2011, http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/1441-1-study_file.pdf (accessed 27 April 2013). 1503 “Les Français et la Légitimité d’une Intervention Militaire en Libye,” Ifop, 3 March 2011, http://www.ifop.com/?option=com_publication&type=poll&id=1427 (accessed 27 April 2013). 1504 , “Analysis: Opinions on Libya,” YouGov, 22 March 2011, http://yougov.co.uk/news/2011/03/22/analysis-opinions-libya/ (accessed 27 April 2013). 1505 “Poll Digest – Political – ITV News Cuts Index + Libya Poll,” ComRes, 21 March 2011, http://www.comres.co.uk/poll/256/itv-news-cuts-index-%2B-libya-poll.htm (accessed 27 April 2013).

252

Le Parisien-Aujourd’hui en France found that 75 percent of the 1,252 French adults polled in

January 2013 supported the operation.1506 Only 23 percent voiced their opposition. An Ifop poll carried out that same month found that 63 percent of the 1,021 French adults polled supported the military operation, while 37 percent opposed it.1507 In the United Kingdom, however, public opinion was more skeptical of the operation. About 33 percent of the 2,013 British adults polled by Populus in January 2013 said they supported the government’s decision to send transport planes to help the French military.1508 About 31 percent opposed the decision and 36 percent did not know. About 61 percent of respondents, however, agreed with the statement: “By supporting France’s action in Mali the Government is only increasing the terrorist threat to the

UK.” This fear was reflected in the statements of the parliamentary opposition and in the government’s decision to avoid dispatching combat troops to Mali.1509

Conclusion

The alternative hypothesis’ claim that public opinion would oppose military cooperation and that this would impact policy makers was not borne out by the facts presented. Beyond the alarmist articles published by British tabloids, British and French newspapers were largely supportive of the treaties. Polling data did indicate public opposition in the United Kingdom to the sharing of military assets, but this did not impact the coalition government’s decision to sign up the Lancaster House treaties. The British and French public’s ambivalent support for military

1506 Frédéric Gerschel, “Sondage: 75% des Français soutiennent l’intervention au Mali,” Le Parisien, 15 January 2013, http://www.leparisien.fr/international/sondage-75-de-francais-soutiennent-l-intervention- au-mali-15-01-2013-2483685.php (accessed 28 April 2013). 1507 “L’adhésion des Français à une intervention militaire au Mali,” Ifop, 13 January 2013, http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2115-1-study_file.pdf (accessed 28 April 2013). 1508 “Mali Poll: Online Fieldwork: 18th-20th January 2013,” Populus, 20 January 2013, http://www.populus.co.uk/uploads/Mali%20Poll.pdf (accessed 28 April 2013). 1509 “Mali conflict: MP seeks Commons vote on UK troops deployment,” BBC News, 31 January 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21273470 (accessed 28 April 2013).

253 operations in Libya also did not bar the two countries from taking part in combat operations there. In the case of Mali, however, public policy reflected the British public’s concerns.

Alternative Hypothesis Conclusion

The alternative hypothesis holds that national factors are actually holding back deeper Franco-

British defense. Although the two countries signed the Lancaster House treaties because of budgetary pressures, this hypothesis claims national factors threaten to undermine the agreement and will prevent deeper integration. The evidence presented in the eight previous sections, however, provides only mixed support for this claim. First, Britain and France do retain legacy commitments to areas of the world that are not shared by their respective partner: the

South Atlantic for Britain and sub-Saharan Africa for France. This means that defense planners in both countries must instead plan to retain autonomous capabilities to act in these areas. The two countries, however, may elect to maintain small autonomous capabilities necessary for these commitments, while deepening cooperation elsewhere. Second, in contrast to the alternative hypothesis, Britain and France share similar policies on deploying forces overseas and proved they could jointly deploy combat forces during the 2011 Libya operation. Third,

Britain and France do disagree on the role the US should play in European defense, with London keen to see the US implicated whenever possible by working through NATO, while France wants to build up European’s defense capability and limit the US role in Europe to cases revolving around Article V mutual protection. The hypothesis’ focus on national policies, however, fails to take into account the change in US policy on European defense cooperation. While the US was historically reticent to see Europe develop a defense identity outside of NATO, it has come to favor deeper European integration in recent years. This means that the French position is actually more constructive to US aspirations than the British stance. US pressure on London to

254 remain in the EU and deepen its defense cooperation with the continent may help the British and French positions converge. Fourth, the British and French do disagree on which defense organization to prioritize: NATO or the EU. The UK views NATO as the primary mechanism to deal with security concerns, while the EU is limited to a support role. France, however, wants to build an independent European defense capability, with NATO limited to Article V concerns in the North Atlantic region. Of particular concern to Franco-British defense cooperation is the rise in British euroscepticism, which could make British politicians more reluctant to collaborate with

France on defense issues. It remains unclear if the changed US stance can help mitigate British euroscepticism. Fifth, the British and French do have different industrial defense policies, with

Britain favoring an “open market” approach to procurement, while France is keen to protect both homegrown and European defense industries. It is, however, possible for the two sides to bridge this divide as demonstrated by the slow progress achieved by the Franco-British UAV program. Sixth, politicians in both France and the UK are willing to sacrifice deeper European industrial integration to protect jobs. This may make outright mergers between European firms difficult, particularly when governments maintain shares in the companies involved. However,

European defense firms may remain competitive if they agree to pool their efforts into joint

European programs, such as the Dassault-led Neuron drone. Seventh, in contrast to the alternative hypothesis, the parties most likely to seize power in France and the UK are all supportive of the Lancaster House treaties. Eighth, it does not appear that the arguably obscure issue of Franco-British military cooperation is salient enough to impact national politics. While one poll found that a majority of British adults surveyed opposed the pooling and sharing of military equipment in 2010, the British government nevertheless signed on to the Lancaster

House treaties. Furthermore, the British and French governments played an active role in the

Libyan operations in spite of public uncertainty or opposition to the war. These mixed results

255 indicate that factors like legacy defense commitments and NATO and EU policies may limit the outline of future defense cooperation agreement, but do not threaten the future of the

Lancaster House agreements. Alternatively, these factors may slow down deeper integration until international developments or budget pressures are simply too great to ignore.

256

Conclusion

This essay sought to determine what kind of factors – international or national – was most important in shaping Franco-British defense cooperation since 2010. The research hypothesis posited that changes in the international system were the primary drivers behind the Lancaster

House agreement and subsequent cooperation. The alternative hypothesis claimed that national factors, such as national policies, job security, and public opinion, hamper the full implementation of the Lancaster House treaties and will prevent deeper military cooperation.

Ultimately, the preponderance of evidence rests with the research hypothesis. The global financial and eurozone crises have forced both British and French governments to make significant cuts to their national defense budgets, in the process reducing or suppressing certain capabilities. These budget cuts, however, have not coincided with the unveiling of a safer world.

Instead, Britain and France are confronted with common threats ranging from terrorism and failed states to nuclear proliferation. To effectively deal with these challenges at a time of budgetary constraints, London and Paris must cooperate if they are to remain the last European states capable of rapidly projecting force abroad. The Lancaster House treaties also extend

Franco-British cooperation into military industrial affairs. Again, this is in reaction to changing international factors, namely the rise of new defense competitors and the decline in European military procurement. These developments spurred European defense firms to advocate for greater European defense cooperation and integration. Britain and France must also respond to changes in the military policy of their most powerful ally, the United States. Also faced with its own budgetary pressures, the US is keen to see Europeans build up their own military capability and handle security issues in their “neighborhood.” After years spent opposing European defense integration outside of NATO, the United States has become an advocate of deeper

European integration and this may make all the difference. Its decision to “lead from behind” in

257

Libya and Mali, along with its “pivot to Asia” may force the United Kingdom to accept the need to deepen EU defense cooperation. Finally, both NATO and the EU have sought to boost

European defense capabilities through projects like “Smart Defence” and “pooling and sharing.”

When these projects failed to provide significant results at the NATO- or EU-level, both organizations encouraged those members “willing and able,” such as France and the UK, to deepen their cooperation.

The alternative hypothesis, however, is not without merit. Some of Its factors help explain why progress on Franco-British defense cooperation has proven so haphazard. Britain and France’s different legacy commitments limit defense integration as each country must maintain autonomous capabilities to deal with possible threats in the South Atlantic and sub-

Saharan Africa respectively. Differences of opinion on the best framework for defense cooperation – NATO or the EU – and industrial policies – “open market” or protectionist – are deeply ingrained within parties and bureaucracies and difficult to change or circumvent.

Furthermore, politicians can come under heavy pressure to protect certain industries or jobs from mergers or foreign competition. Ultimately, progress on Franco-British defense integration only comes about when the pressure from international developments offers decision-makers with two stark choices: lose your influence in world affairs or make painful sacrifices in national sovereignty. In 2010 Britain and France chose to sacrifice a margin of national sovereignty to retain their rank. No other European country has been confronted with this choice as only

France and the United Kingdom, by virtue of their imperial legacies and great power status, retained the capacity to use force in world affairs after the Second World War. The future of

European defense integration rests on whether the two countries will continue to choose to sacrifice national sovereignty to retain significant military capabilities.

258

The alternative hypothesis also highlights two domestic developments that could unravel Franco-British rapprochement and the wider European defense project, regardless of pressures from the international system. The first is a British exit from the EU following a popular referendum and the second is the rise to power of a far-left or far-right party opposed to Franco-British cooperation in either country. The rise in British euroscepticism and in the fortunes of UKIP, coupled with the political polarization in France make these two developments more likely.1510 1511

1510 “Local elections: Nigel Farage hails results as a ‘game changer,’” BBC News, 3 May 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22382098 (accessed 3 May 2013). 1511 Alexandra Renard, Antoine Mariotti, Eve Irvine, and Charlotte Boitiaux, “Entre affaire Cahuzac et chômage record, le FN se pose en vedette du 1er-Mai,” France 24, 1 May 2013, http://www.france24.com/fr/20130501-france-front-national-1er-mai-marine-le-pen-vedette-chomage- cahuzac-sondage (accessed 3 May 2013).

259

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