L’Entente Frugale: an Analysis of the International and National Factors Shaping Franco- British Defense Cooperation since 2010 by Guillaume Simard-Morissette B.A. in International Affairs, May 2009, The George Washington University A Thesis submitted to The Faculty of The Elliot School of International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of Master of Arts May 19, 2013 Thesis directed by Michael J. Sodaro Professor of Political Science and International Affairs © Copyright 2013 by Guillaume Simard-Morissette All rights reserved ii Abstract of Thesis L’Entente Frugale: an Analysis of the International and National Factors Shaping Franco- British Defense Cooperation since 2010 In November 2010, France and the United Kingdom signed two defense agreements in Lancaster House, London, marking the most significant military rapprochement between the two countries since the 1956 Suez Crisis. The two agreed to pool key military capabilities and cooperate in defense procurement, as well as build two joint nuclear research facilities. As the two leading military powers in the European Union (EU), France and the United Kingdom set the pace of European defense cooperation. A deepening defense relationship between London and Paris may herald deeper European cooperation in this most fundamental element of national sovereignty. This essay examines two alternative hypotheses to explain Franco-British defense cooperation since 2010. The first holds that the changing international landscape, which is marked by factors like the international financial crisis, changes in the global arms market, and shifts in US priorities, is encouraging cooperation. The other hypothesis posits that national factors, such as concerns about job security and differences over NATO and EU policies, are hampering cooperation. It concludes that international forces are dominant, but warns that certain factors, such as legacy commitments and rising euroscepticism in the United Kingdom, may derail Franco-British and thus European defense integration. iii Table of Contents Abstract of Thesis…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..… iii List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. v Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 Part I: Historical Background…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 8 Part II: Research Hypothesis – International…………………………………………………………………………………………... 44 Chapter One: Global Financial Crisis and Austerity……………………………………………………………………. 44 Chapter Two: Threats……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 68 Chapter Three: Capabilities Desired………………………………………………………………………………………….. 80 Chapter Four: European Defense Firms………………………………………………………………………………….. 104 Chapter Five: US Pressure on Europe……………………………………………………………………………………... 126 Chapter Six: NATO and the European Union…………………………………………………………………………... 138 Research Hypothesis Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 152 Part III: Alternative Hypothesis – National……………………………………………………………………………………………. 154 Chapter Seven: Different Security Interests……………………………………………………………………………. 154 Chapter Eight: Joint Deployments…………………………………………………………………………………………… 174 Chapter Nine: US Role in European Defense…………………………………………………………………………… 183 Chapter Ten: NATO or European Union?..................................................................................... 195 Chapter Eleven: Different Industrial Defense Policies……………………………………………………………... 213 Chapter Twelve: Job Security and European Defense Integration…………………………………………… 228 Chapter Thirteen: Domestic Political Parties…………………………………………………………………………... 237 Chapter Fourteen: Public Opinion…………………………………………………………………………………………... 245 Alternative Hypothesis Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….... 254 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 257 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….… 260 iv List of Tables Top 10 Biggest Military Spenders in 2012…………………………………………………………………………………………..…… 52 France – Binding Orders on Prominent Arms Deals………………………………………………………………………………... 66 Priority Risks to France – 2008 Defense White Paper……………………………………………………………………………... 71 Priority Risks to the United Kingdom – 2010 National Security Strategy……………………………………………….… 72 Prepositioned French Forces – 2013………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 74 French Sovereignty Forces – 2013…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 75 British Military Tasks – French Military Tasks………………………………………………………………………………………….. 81 “Future Force 2020” Missions………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 82 French Military Objectives – 2008 White Paper………………………………………………………………………………………. 84 SIPRI – Top 20 Defense Firms 2011……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 105 SIPRI – Top 20 European Defense Firms 2011……………………………………………………………………………………….. 108 SIPRI – Top French and British Defense Firms 2011………………………………………………………………………………. 121 Major French Overseas Operations…………………………………………………………………………………………………….… 159 Poll – Sharing Military Assets………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 250 Poll – Defense Cuts: Good or Bad…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 251 Poll – Budget Deficits and the Welfare State………………………………………………………………………………………… 251 v Introduction In September 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron and then French President Nicolas Sarkozy enjoyed a rare perk for contemporary European leaders: a victory lap.1 Under the cover of fighter jets and combat helicopters, the two leaders traveled to Tripoli, where cheering crowds welcomed them, grateful for British and French support against former Libyan strongman Muammar Gadhafi.2 It was British and French diplomats that spurred efforts to secure a United Nations (UN) no-fly zone over Libya in March of that year.3 In the ensuing NATO air campaign, Britain and France carried out the bulk of the offensive air sorties. 4 5 6 Franco- British cooperation over Libya came in the midst of a defense rapprochement between the erstwhile rivals. Signed in London’s historic Lancaster House in November 2010, the Treaty for Defense and Security Co-operation (TDSC) called on the two countries to pool key military capabilities and cooperate in defense procurement at a time of austerity.7 Its sister treaty, the Treaty relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamic Facilities (TJRHF), lay the groundwork for 1 Scott Peterson, “Sarkozy, Cameron visit Libya for victory lap, pep talk,” Christian Science Monitor, 15 September 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0915/Sarkozy-Cameron-visit- Libya-for-victory-lap-pep-talk (accessed 14 October 2012). 2 Simon Denyer, “Sarkozy, Cameron vow to support Libya, help find Gaddafi,” Washington Post, 15 September 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/sarkozy-cameron-vow-to-support- libya-help-find-gaddafi/2011/09/15/gIQA2VGhUK_story.html (accessed 14 October 2011). 3 Associated Press, “France and UK spearhead ‘no fly zone’ in Libya,” France 24, 18 March 2011, http://www.france24.com/en/20110318-cameron-sarkozy-lead-no-fly-zone-effort-libya-benghazi (accessed 14 October 2012). 4 Simon Rogers, “Nato operations in Libya: data journalism breaks down which country does what,” The Guardian, 31 October 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data- journalism-operations-country# (accessed 14 October 2012). 5 “Libye: point de situation n° 50 – bilan de l’opération Unified Protector,” Ministère de la Défense et des anciens combattants, 8 November 2011, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/autres- operations/operation-harmattan-libye/actualites/libye-point-de-situation-n-50-bilan-de-l-operation- unified-protector (14 October 2012). 6 “The UK’s contribution to freeing Libya,” Ministry of Defence, 5 January 2012, http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/MilitaryOperations/TheUksContributionToFreeingLib ya.htm (accessed 14 October 2012). 7 James Kirkup, “David Cameron hails ‘new chapter’ in Britain-France military co-operation,” The Telegraph, 2 November 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/8105006/UK-France-defence- David-Cameron-hails-new-military-co-operation-between-Britain-and-France.html (accessed 14 October 2012). 1 joint testing facilities for the two countries’ nuclear deterrent. Dubbed the “Entente Frugale” by wry commentators in the United Kingdom,8 these treaties presaged allied operations in Libya and a series of military industrial cooperation efforts. The Lancaster House treaties marked a significant step forward for European defense cooperation as London and Paris are the two leading diplomatic and military powers on the continent. The two are the only European Union (EU) member states that occupy permanent seats on the UN Security Council (UNSC), maintain nuclear arsenals, and retain the capability to rapidly project force outside Europe. Since the St- Malo Declaration of 1998, Franco-British cooperation has been at the heart of efforts to improve Europe’s defense capabilities. Although Germany could serve as a partner for Britain and France in deepening European defense capabilities, the legacy of the Second World War has made Berlin reluctant to deploy combat forces. This reluctance limits Franco-German defense to symbolic measures, such as the Franco-German Brigade, which has never been deployed as a whole.9 Thus, it is when Britain and France join forces that European defense integration advances. A changing global landscape is making such integration increasingly