A research project supported by the European Commission
FP5: Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development www.watertime.org Key Action 4: City of Tomorrow and Cultural Heritage Thematic Priority 4.1.2: Improving the quality of urban life watertime@ watertime.org Contract No: EVK4-2002-0095
D36: WaterTim e case study - Rom e, Italy
Emanuele Lobina, Senior Research Fellow, PSIRU, Business School, University of Greenwich (e.lobina@ gre.ac.uk)
and
Daniele Iacovitti, Freelance researcher, Pescara, Italy (ittivocai@ yahoo.it)
4th March 2005
One of 29 WaterTime case studies on decision-making on water systems
Watertime case studies Estonia: Tallinn
Finland: Tampere, Hämeenlinna
France: Grenoble
Germany: Berlin, Munich
Hungary: Budapest, Debrecen, Szeged Italy: Arezzo, Bologna, Milan, Rome Lithuania: Kaunas, Vilnius Netherlands: Rotterdam Poland: Gdansk, Lodz, Warsaw Romania: Bucharest, Timisoara Spain: Cordoba, Madrid, Palma de Mallorca, Gran Canaria Sweden: Stockholm UK: Cardiff, Edinburgh, Leeds
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WaterTime partners: PSIRU, Business School, University of Greenwich, UK ERL, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain Institute of Environmental Engineering and Biotechnology (IEEB), Tampere University of Technology, Finland International Water Affairs, Hamburg, Germany Eötvös József College, Hungary
Coordinator: PSIRU, Business School, University of Greenwich, Park Row, London SE10 9LS, U.K. www.watertime.org
Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEM ENTS...... 3 1 INTRODUCTION...... 4 2 CITY BACKGROUND ...... 4 3 WATER AND WASTEWATER UNDERTAKING ...... 4 3.1 BACKGROUND...... 4 3.2 WATER AND WASTEWATER UNDERTAKING PROFILE ...... 4 3.3 SYSTEM PROFILE ...... 5 3.4 REGION PROFILE ...... 5 3.5 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS...... 5 4 ACTORS IN WATER AND WASTEWATER SERVICES PROVISION AND PRODUCTION ...... 6 5 EPISODES...... 6 5.1 DECISION TO EXPAND ACTIVITIES OF —AZIENDA MUNICIPALIZZATA“ ACEA, AND TRANSFORMATION OF ACEA INTO AZIENDA SPECIALE: 1975-1998...... 6 5.1.1 Expansion of ACEA activities, poor governance and financial difficulties: 1975-1992...... 6 5.1.2 Transformation of ACEA into —azienda speciale“: 1993-1998...... 7 5.2 ACEA CORPORATISATION AND PART-PRIVATISATION: 1993-2004 ...... 8 5.2.1 The referendum on ACEA privatisation...... 9 5.2.2 Acea expansion in Italian water sector and alliance with Suez, expansion of international water operations, diversification into telecommunications, write-off and back to basics: 1999-2004...... 10 5.3 AWARD TO ACEA IN ROME ATO: 1994-2004 ...... 11 6 PARTICIPATION AND SUSTAINABILITY IN DECISION M AKING ...... 13 6.1 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ROME ...... 13 6.2 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN WATER AT REGIONAL LEVEL...... 13 6.3 SUSTAINABILITY...... 14 7 CITY IN TIM E...... 16 8 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS...... 17 8.1 DISCUSSION OF MAIN ISSUES WITH ACEA CEO...... 17 8.2 CONCLUSIONS...... 17 9 REFERENCES...... 19 NOTES...... 19
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Acknowledgements
The authors wish to acknowledge the financial support of the European Commission. We would also like to thank the following for making the time to be interviewed and providing documents and other material:
• Stefano Battilossi, Visiting Professor, Carlos III University, Madrid, Spain • Laura Colella, Press Office Head, Public Relations and Communication, Acea S.p.A. • Renato Drusiani, Director General, Federgasacqua • Andrea Mangoni, Chief Executive Officer, Acea S.p.A. • Mattia Morandi, Agenzia per il controllo e la qualità dei Servizi Pubblici Locali del Comune di Roma, Municipality of Rome • Alessandro Piotti, Dirigente Responsabile, Segreteria Tecnico Operativa, Autorità ATO2, Lazio Centrale-Roma • Carlo Ranuzzi, Gruppo Consiliare Partito della Rifondazione Comunista, Rome City Council • Stefano Zolea, Consulta Regionale degli Utenti e dei Consumatori del Servizio Idrico Integrato, Region Lazio
Unless otherwise stated, the views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission, nor any of the listed stakeholders.
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1 Introduction Watertime is based on 29 case studies. These case studies are expected to provide information on the interaction between a range of PESTE factors, at various levels, and the parties and processes involved in decision-making, including the constraints on decisions and objectives of decision-makers, so that models can be developed of these interactions to guide future decision-makers.
In the last 20 years, a number of decisions have been taken in Rome which have affected the institutional and organisational structure of water supply and sanitation services. Initially, the municipal multi-utility (energy and water) undertaking ACEA was restructured under full public ownership and management. In a second phase, the municipal enterprise was corporatised and listed on the stock exchange, although it remained majority owned by the municipality. The company was then transformed into a water multinational, exploiting opportunities in transition and developing countries as well as in Italy, as the Galli Law was being implemented in a number of ATOs and operating contracts put out for tender. In doing so, Acea has set up an alliance with a major water and electricity multinational, Suez, which now owns a minority stake in Acea‘s own capital. The new corporate structure has certainly facilitated Acea‘s expansion strategy but has also proved to imply a number of drawbacks. For example, the municipality has been recently considering to sell another tranche of its shares and reduce its stake below 50% of the capital but has refrained from doing so due to the adverse conditions of the share market (Acea‘s shares have been trading negatively for a long period despite positive financial results). Also, the company‘s expansion and diversification strategy led Acea to invest in the telecommunications sector, a move which proved unsuccessful and led the management to write-off its activities and refocus on core energy and water operations.
2 City background As of October 2001, Rome counted over 2.6 million residents.
3 Water and wastewater undertaking
3.1 Background The municipal enterprise ACEA has provided water supply and sanitation services to the commune of Rome since 1985. In 1992, Acea‘s original legal status, that of —azienda municipalizzata“, has been changed into —azienda speciale“ and in 1998 into that of a PLC listed on the stock exchange. Following the implementation of the Galli Law, a subsidiary of Acea has been appointed as the only water supply and sanitation operator under a 30-year concession for the ATO-2 area, including Rome and other 111 municipalities for a total of 3.6 million inhabitants.
The municipality of Rome is currently the major Acea shareholder with 54% of its capital and at the same time the major municipality in the ATO consortium responsible for planning, the selection of the water operator and regulation. Regulation is carried out by the ATO technical secretariat, which is called STO. Also, there are a number of consultative bodies at municipal, provincial and regional levels, such as the regional Garante who sponsors a committee of water consumers (Consulta Regionale degli Utenti e dei Consumatori del Servizio Idrico Integrato), inspired by the example of the English WaterVoice.
3.2 Water and wastewater undertaking profile In January 2003, Acea‘s 96.46% owned subsidiary (Acea, 2004: p. 33) Acea ATO2 started operations in Rome and other communes of ATO 2 —Lazio Centrale-Roma“ under a 30-year water supply and sanitation concession. As of June 2004, Acea ATO2 had taken over operations in 9 communes, including Rome, and the Simbrivio consortium, so that it served some 3 million inhabitants within the territory of the ATO. Acea
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ATO2 was also in the process of taking over operations in other 17 communes and had started the preliminary technical and economic evaluations of infrastructure in 8 communes (Acea, 2004: p. 13).
DATA CONCEPT Undertaking identification Acea ATO2 Geographical scope Rome (ATO 2 Lazio Centrale-Roma) Type of activity Water supply, sewerage and wastewater treatment Type of assets ownership Public Type of operations Public-private Total personnel (no) n/a Outsourcing (%) n/a Annual costs (EUR/a) n/a Annual revenue (EUR/a) n/a
Average annual investment (EUR/a) ⁄ 27.88 million (investments in commune of Rome only, 2001-2003)1 Tariffs (EUR/m) ⁄ 0.75/m3 (excluding VAT; data as of 30 June 2003, based on 200m3 of yearly consumption)2
3.3 System profile Acea ATO2 supplies some 330 million m3 of water per year, 95% of which is drinking water. The water supply pipeline network is 6,000 Km-long, reservoirs have an aggregate capacity of 480,000 m3 and the infrastructure system is completed by 70 wastewater treatment plants (Agenzia per il controllo e la qualità dei Servizi Pubblici Locali del Comune di Roma, 2004: p. 187).
3.4 Region profile*
DATA CONCEPT DEM OGRAPHY AND ECONOM ICS Population density (persons/km ) n/a Population growth rate ° Current (% per year) n/a ° Forecasted (% per year) n/a Gross National Product per capita (EUR/capita/a) ⁄ 29,400/capita3 ENVIRONM ENT ( Yearly rainfall (average for the past 30 years) ° Average (l/m2/a) n/a ° Maximum (l/m2/a) n/a ° Minimum (l/m2/a) n/a
3.5 Performance indicators Despite the large number of wastewater treatment plants serving the commune of Rome, only four of them have a significant capacity: Rome North (780,000 population equivalent), Rome East (800,000 population equivalent), Rome South (1,200,000 population equivalent) and Ostia (283,500 population equivalent). Nonetheless, pollution of the river Tiber has remained at extremely serious levels which Italy‘s national audit body Corte dei Conti attributed to a number of possible causes, including the fact that nor sewerage nor wastewater treatment cover the totality of the population, and the dated mixed sewerage system causing raw
* Relevant region must be regarded as the area served by the water undertaking, since it can be the city, as in Grenoble or Timisoara cases, or the autonomous community, as in Madrid case study
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www.watertime.org sewage spills following heavy rains. According to a note issued by Acea ATO2 in May 2002, the percentage of Rome‘s population served by wastewater treatment increased from 76.5% in 1995 to 86% in 2001 and was projected to reach 94.7% in the following 3 years. According to local regulator STO, out of a total population of 2,653,245, 397,987 or nearly 15% remained with no wastewater treatment service. The 2002 Acea ATO2 note also reported that the percentage of population without access to sewerage decreased from 4.4% in 1995 to 2.5% in 2001 and was projected to reach 1.3%. At the same time, the percentage of population served by sewerage but not by wastewater treatment decreased from 11.6% in 1995 to 11.2% in 2001 and was projected to reach 4% in the following 3 years (Corte dei Conti, 2003).
4 Actors in water and wastewater services provision and production It should be noted the prominence of local institutional and political actors, including the political parties and civil society organisations promoting the local referendum against Acea‘s privatisation, up until the semi- privatisation of Acea in 1998. Following Acea‘s listing on the stock exchange, the principal-agent relationship between the municipality of Rome and the public-private operator has been loosened. For example, Acea has taken autonomous initiatives, such as in the case of promoting amendments to its own statute, which have been inertly accepted by Rome city council. It is only in the extreme situation emerging with the evident failure of Acea‘s diversification, and the ensuing financial losses, that the municipal government was forced to take the initiative and impose a complete change in the company‘s management and strategy4.
Not only has Acea acted relatively independently from the municipal government in the pursuit of commercial objectives, as it would be expected of any privatised or semi-privatised company, but the process of its semi-privatisation has also led to the introduction of a foreign-based multinational as a major actor in the decision making process. Suez has first resorted to the Regional Administrative Court to block the direct award of the local water concession to Acea‘s own Acea ATO2, but unsuccessfully. Suez has subsequently entered into a strategic alliance with Acea, by becoming a shareholder and becoming able to appoint a disproportionately high number of representatives within Acea‘s Board of Directors (2 Directors over a total of 9, nominated by Suez holding a mere 2.268% of Acea‘s capital). It should also be noted that the recent amendment to Acea‘s statute falls in line with Suez‘ interests in the multinationals‘ attempt to optimise its risk portfolio by expanding further in the Italian market (see Lobina, 2005: pp. 20-21).
5 Episodes
5.1 Decision to expand activities of —azienda municipalizzata“ ACEA, and transformation of ACEA into azienda speciale: 1975-1998
5.1.1 Expansion of ACEA activities, poor governance and financial difficulties: 1975-1992 The reforms introduced in the last thirty to twenty years have affected water supply and sanitation provision in Rome from the operational and institutional points of view. The scope of water operations carried out by ACEA changed in response to the municipality‘s demands for the provision of a wider range of environmental services to the city of Rome. For example, in 1975 ACEA was entrusted with the task to expand service coverage to illegal settlements in peri-urban areas (called —borgate“) and a decade later it became responsible for operating wastewater treatment (Battilossi, 2001: 332). Extension of service coverage to the —borgate“, which ACEA previously served by tank, was an important contribution to the city‘s sustainable development. In fact, around 350,000 people lived in 82 —borgate“, accounting for 12% of the city‘s population, and raw wastewater used to contaminate groundwater (Battilossi, 2001: 342-343).
In 1985, Acea assumed responsibility for providing wastewater treatment to 3 million people in its service area5, so that the grounds were laid for it to act as a unique operator of integrated water services6. By so
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www.watertime.org doing, Acea moved towards meeting the requirement of the would-be Galli Law in terms of unifying and integrating water services in sufficiently broad territorial areas to ensure the achievement of economies of scale and scope. It should be noted that, according to Battilossi (2001: 344-345), although the wastewater treatment plants transferred by the commune of Rome were in a precarious state, the municipality contributed funds aimed at upgrading the infrastructure only irregularly and in modest amounts. Furthermore, the commune transferred responsibility to operate Rome‘s entire sewerage network to Acea, as it retained a minor part of it under its direct control.
ACEA succeeded in fulfilling the new operational tasks but not without problems, especially in terms of tapping the required financial resources (Battilossi, 2001: 339-340). The worsening financial crisis of Rome‘s municipal government had forced ACEA to substantially resort to self-financing in order to balance its budget as required by a legislative provision introduced at the end of 19787. In turn, as inflation resulted in interest rates on loans contracted with the municipality nearing 20%, ACEA reduced depreciation on investments in order to respect the obligation to balance the budget (Battilossi, 2001: 332). Within ACEA as a group, water operations were carried out at a loss as tariffs did not allow for full cost recovery, so that cross-subsidisation from the more profitable electricity division became necessary (Battilossi, 2001: 340)8.
In 1989, Acea was renamed from —Azienda Comunale Elettricità e Acque“ to —Azienda Comunale Energia e Ambiente“ œ that is to say, from —Municipal Enterprise for Electricity and Water“ to —Municipal Enterprise for Energy and Environment“9. It appears that this development was in line with the municipal strategy to expand Acea‘s field of activity beyond its original competencies. However, Battilossi (2001: 344-345) has stressed that municipal control and the ensuing —bureaucratic inertia“ resulted in economic and financial difficulties experienced by Acea, as well as in a cumbersome decision making process far from ideal in supporting the undertaking through such crucial changes.
5.1.2 Transformation of ACEA into —azienda speciale“: 1993-1998 ACEA‘s organisational structure and ownership changed in the 1990s‘ as the commune decided to enhance ACEA‘s accounting transparency and operational efficiency and drain resources to relieve the municipal budget deficit. The decision to inject transparency in the undertaking‘s accounts was a reaction to the diffuse illegality which had affected many Italian public enterprises since the 1980s‘, including bribery and the illegal financing of political parties, and which had not spared ACEA and Rome‘s city council. Illegality would be exposed since 1992, as Italian magistrates undertook a number of investigations, known altogether as —Mani Pulite“ (—clean hands“), which exposed the system of pervasive corruption which had been established in Italian economic and political life (a phenomenon defined as —Tangentopoli“, which might be translated as —Bribesville“)10.
In 1992, Acea was transformed from —azienda municipalizzata“ into a wholly municipally-owned —azienda speciale“11, pursuant to art. 22, l. n. 142/90, thus enjoying juridical personality and managerial autonomy (see Lobina, 2005: pp. 7-9). Rome city council adopted the decision in order to address economic considerations and enhance managerial efficiency. More precisely, the decision was informed by the requirement to abide to art. 22, l. n. 142/90, which did not contemplate the possibility of providing water services through an —azienda municipalizzata“, but the possibility of subsequently transforming Acea into a PLC was already discussed. In that sense, it appears that rationale for reform lied in the development of Acea‘s business potential and the introduction of transparency at managerial level following corruption charges brought against Acea executives.
Without changes in ownership, the new organisational mode seems to have enabled a striking improvement in Acea‘s finances and efficiency. Since 1993, Acea‘s accounts recorded extremely positive results and an increased ability to contribute to the municipal budget. For example, interests paid to the commune for the use of water supply and sanitation infrastructure grew from ITL 52.6bn in 1993 to ITL 69.6bn in 1995, to decline slightly at ITL 68.3bn in 1997. Investment and amortisation also grew, which put an end to the under-depreciation of the past (Battilossi, 2001: 348-352).
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Organisational changes were not the only ones to allow for enhancing Acea‘s economic and financial soundness. In November 1992, with magistrates investigating on —Tangentopoli“ becoming interested in a web of bribes revolving around Acea‘s subcontracting12 and the illegal financing of political parties13, the then mayor had had to dismiss the Board of Directors and appoint an interim administrator (—commissario“)14. Between 1992 and 1993, a number of Acea executives were arrested and convicted (Battilossi, 2001: 331). In April 1993, the arrest of 5 politicians led to the dissolution of Rome‘s executive committee15 and fresh mayoral elections which saw the victory of the centre-left candidate Francesco Rutelli16. From April 1993 to December 1993 Alessandro Voci was the ad interim administrator —commissario“ of Rome.17From January 1993 to February 1994 a commissioner temporarily was appointed as President of Acea.
5.2 ACEA corporatisation and part-privatisation: 1993-2004 In February 1994 the new mayor Francesco Rutelli, a member of the Green party18, appointed Chicco Testa as President of Acea. Chicco Testa was previously a member of Parliament who had acted as Secretary of the environmentalist association Legambiente from 1980 to 1987 and as President of Legambiente thereafter19. Mr. Testa, who would act as President of Acea from 1994 to 1996, received a mandate to improve Acea‘s finances and pilot its transformation and part-privatisation, aiming at contributing to the city‘s coffers as much as possible20.
Among the objectives of the proposed corporatisation and part-privatisation of Acea were the strengthening of managerial autonomy and financial transparency21 as well as allowing for the extraterritorial operation of Acea. For example, with corporatisation, Acea could have more easily taken advantage of the opportunities offered by the Galli Law in terms of liberalisation of water services outside Rome22. It should be noted that in December 1994 the city executive issued a document which confirmed that privatisation would be a trademark of its policy23.
As of 1994, Acea had a yearly turnover of ITL 1,500bn, invested ITL 300bn per year and had balanced accounts, with a total asset value of ITL 3,200bn. Also, Acea employed 4,290 workers. In May 1995, Acea contributed a total ITL 144.4bn to the municipal budget, of which ITL 51bn operating profits and ITL 93.4m interest receivable on assets.
On 1st January 1998, Acea was transformed from —azienda speciale“ into a municipally-owned PLC (Public Limited Company or joint stock company). On 16th July 1999, Acea was listed on Milan‘s stock exchange œ Rome‘s city council retained ownership of 51% of Acea‘s capital while 49% of the shares were floated on the market24.
The decision to transform Acea into a PLC aimed at: enhancing Acea‘s operational flexibility and performance, with increased efficiency resulting in improved service quality and lower tariffs; enjoying economies of scale and market opportunities in its traditional sectors but also in telecommunications; exploring joint ventures with Italian and foreign operators aiming at tapping financial, technological and strategic resources and expanding operations internationally. But there were also fiscal considerations. Another perceived advantage of the PLC in relation to the —azienda speciale“ setup was that it would reduce political interference as the municipality of Rome would only act in its capacity of shareholder. Also, the transformation into a PLC, with increased independence from the municipal government, would have ensured the separation of functions between the commune acting as owner and regulator and the company acing as operational agent.
As regards water services, the transformation of Acea into a Plc was regarded as allowing Acea to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the Galli Law, as a PLC would be able to operate more easily outside the commune of Rome and include the other municipalities of ATO2 as shareholders. The alternative would have been signing agreements with the other communes so that they could join the —azienda speciale“ transformed into a consortium, but this was presented as allegedly procedurally more complex. Most importantly, it was argued that direct access to financial markets would have allowed financing the
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www.watertime.org substantial investment programme without resorting entirely to self-financing and avoiding inflating water bills.
The 1998 decision to list Acea on the stock exchange was even more informed by fiscal considerations, in that the commune saw the opportunity to retain control on Acea while benefiting from proceeds of the sale of 49% of shares. Also, it was expected that the valorisation of Acea‘s human resources and assets, together with increased efficiency, would result in the increase in value of municipally-owned shares. In the short term, the municipality expected revenues of over ITL 1,660 billion, of which ITL 1,044 billion out of the sale of 40% of shares and ITL 559 billion out the anticipated reimbursement paid by Acea to the commune for the electricity infrastructure. Conversely, concession fees for the use of water infrastructure would be reduced by 60%, so that these would be aligned to the national average, that is to say at around 8% of turnover. Renouncing to fiscal revenues from payment of the concession fees would have contributed to the valorisation of Acea, estimated in some ITL 440 billion, and enhancing Acea‘s profitability. On the other hand, reduced concession fees and dividends would be compensated by the possibility of using privatisation proceeds to reimburse contracted loans and reducing the cost of debt service by ITL 127.1 billion per year. Furthermore, uncertainty on future legislation induced to expect the possible abolition of —canone“.
The move followed a number of reports, including one by Italian consultants and a second one by advisors IMI and SBC Warburg, which informed the part-privatisation of Acea with the only exception that the recommendation to unbundle water and energy operations was disregarded by Roman authorities. In particular, the consultants‘ reports advised that listing the minority of the company‘s capital on the stock exchange would allow for tapping equity capital on the share market and for creating joint ventures with foreign operators without loosing managerial control25 26.
The decisions leading to Acea‘s corporatisation and part-privatisation generated a considerable amount of opposition and the city council had to call a consultative referendum on the issue. Together with municipal transport undertaking Atac and refuse authority Amnu, Acea also had to liquidate property assets27.
Rome centre-left administration‘s strategy was to restyle the municipality as a holding company, controlling a number of subsidiaries active in local public services through an arm‘s length relationship, relieving the city council‘s budget deficit by selling part of the subsidiaries‘ shares and benefiting from the dividends distributed (for each of the shares still owned by the city)28. By listing 49% of Acea‘s shares on the stock exchange, the municipality aimed at reducing its debt by ITL 1,200bn and free ITL 370bn to invest in other areas. As the city administration had cumulated a budget deficit of around ITL 10,000bn, the decision to sell 49% of Acea‘s shares was linked to the stability pact between the government and local authorities provided for in the Budget Law. Other fiscal considerations included the possibility of repaying loans issued by the state bank Cassa Depositi e Prestiti without penalties, in case the plan for debt reduction relied on receipts from privatisation29.
5.2.1 The referendum on ACEA privatisation The decision to corporatise and part-privatise Acea was opposed by a variety of political forces including the far right party MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano) and the communist party Rifondazione Comunista, which managed to collect the 50,000 signatures required to request a consultative referendum on the matter. The city administration opposed the initiative despite its consultative and non binding nature, and the request for a referendum was first turned down but a ruling of the regional administrative court (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale) forced the municipality to hold the referendum30. Other attempts were made to affect the result of the referendum, such as the initial decisions to restrict the time for the consultation and not to send the required electoral certificates to voters, aimed at discouraging voters from participating and thus invalidating the results. Both decisions were then withdrawn, but the turnout proved to be low (34.81%). The city administration had announced that it would not take a negative result in consideration, as it was not bound to do so, and that it would press on with its plans anyway31. However, a slight majority of voters cast a favourable vote to the privatisation (52.05% YES against 47.95% NO). Some 800,000 citizens voted, corresponding to 34.85% of the electorate, cast their vote, a percentage above the minimum 25% required to declare the consultation valid32.
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5.2.2 Acea expansion in Italian water sector and alliance with Suez, expansion of international water operations, diversification into telecommunications, write-off and back to basics: 1999-2004
5.2.2.1 Acea expansion in Italian water sector and alliance with Suez Outside Rome, Acea has expanded operations throughout Italy either by acquiring equity stakes in local water companies (e.g. Acquedotto Nicolay and Acquedotto de Ferrari Galliera) or successfully bidding for a number of concessions awarded pursuant to the Galli Law, including Sarnese Vesuviano (in the Campania region)33, Frosinone (Lazio region)34, Siena and Grosseto35, Pisa36 and Florence37 (Tuscany). As of July 2003, Acea served 8,400,000 people across Italy which made it the largest water company operating in the country38. While initially Acea was bidding with Italian partners (either Enel as in Sarnese Vesuviano or other minor partners as in Frosinone), Acea has then set up an alliance with Suez and has been leading consortia participated by Suez Ondeo (e.g. in Siena and Grosseto, Pisa, and Florence).
The alliance between Acea and Suez, which applies to both the water and energy sectors, was forged with Suez Ondeo acquiring a minority stake in Acea‘s capital and Suez energy subsidiary Electrabel setting up a joint venture with Acea. In May 2002, Acea and Electrabel set up Acea-Electrabel holding SpA, a joint venture devoted to seek business opportunities in the Italian electricity and gas markets. In September 2002, Suez and Electrabel acquired a 1.9% equity stake in Acea. Also, Modena‘s municipally-owned multi-utility META SpA selected Electrabel and Acea as a minority partner to set up joint ventures in the energy, water and waste management sectors39. As of August 2003, META was holding talks with other municipally- owned multi-utilities based in the Emilia-Romagna region (Reggio Emila‘s Agac, Parma‘s Amps and Piacenza‘s Tesa) aiming to merge operations and create the fourth largest multi-utility in Italy40. As regards the ATO tenders, Suez took part in Acea-led consortia which won the tender for the acquisition of 40% equity stakes in Siena and Grosseto‘s Acquedotto del Fiora SpA, Pisa‘s Acque SpA and Florence‘s Publiacqua. In order to enhance economies of scale, local authorities were planning to merge Pisa and Florence operations, and possible plans to bring all Tuscany operations under one operator (for a total of 3.5 million people served) would be likely to include Suez41.
5.2.2.2 Expansion of international water operations In February 1999, Acea signed a 3-year collaboration agreement with SAUR International which did not materialise in any joint success. The agreement aimed at expanding the respective operating presence in the Mediterranean (including Lebanon, but with the exclusion of Beirut) and CEE regions. As of January 2000, Acea's international activity was limited to technical assistance and consulting in the area of restructuring. The company's presence spanned across the following countries: Cape Verde; Philippines; Singapore; Cameroun; Albania; Zambia; Peru; Somalia; Moldavia; Russia; Ukraine.
Since then, Acea has developed its water operations abroad and itself has become a small-sized multinational with concessions in Honduras, Peru (Hall & Lobina: 2002), Armenia (Lobina, 2001: 12-13) and, more recently, managing contracts in Colombia and the Dominican Republic42.
In 2001, AMGA Genoa-led consortium Tirana Acque won a 4-year technical assistance contract in Tirana, Albania. The contract was awarded as part of an agreement between Italy and Albania, which provided for the issuance of an ITL 20.3bn (⁄ 10.48m) soft loan to the city of Tirana and the fact that only Italian firms could bid in the tendering process43. Tirana Acque was 32% owned by Amga Genoa, 32% owned by Acea, 8% owned by Empoli‘s municipally-owned Publiservizi, 20% owned by Ares (grouping of Emilia Romagna- based municipally-owned companies Cis Forlì, Seabo Bologna, Agac Reggio Emilia and Ami Imola) and 8% owned by Ancona‘s Consorzio Gorgovivo44. In August 2003, Hera (the former Seabo Bologna, renamed after merging with a number of public utilities in the Emilia-Romagna region including Ami Imola) sold its 20% stake in Tirana Acque, so that Amga Genoa owned 50%, Acea 40% and Consorzio Gorgovivo 10%45.
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5.2.2.3 Diversification into telecommunications, write-off and back to basics Following the liberalisation of the Italian telecommunications sector, in 1999 Acea moved to enter this new market limited to the area of Rome. Acea also established an alliance with the Spanish company Telefonica, aiming to enter the Italian and then the global markets and set up the joint venture Atlanet. In March 2003, in the light of the poor performance of the telecommunications sector and the risk involved in carrying on with operations, Acea decided to entirely write-off its participation in Atlanet. In fiscal year 2002, Acea recorded net losses of ⁄ 165m which compared against ⁄ 41m profits posted the previous year. Telecommunications activities contributed ⁄ 108m to the aggregate losses recorded by the group in 2002.
As a result of the negative experience with diversification, Acea decided to focus its activities on the core water and energy operations. This marked a considerable U-turn in corporate strategy. In fact, in 2000 Acea had structured itself as a holding company with three divisions: Energy, Water and Environment. Many secondary activities might have been sold and to date the only non-core business subsidiary is a facility management joint venture set up with Rome‘s environmental services provider Ama.
5.2.2.4 Amendment to Acea‘s Statute: April 2004 In April 2004, Rome city council agreed to amend Acea‘s statute and bring maximum ownership by one private shareholder from 3% to 10%46. It remains to be seen whether Suez, that identified Italy as an opportunity to mitigate its risk portfolio following registering record losses in 2002 due to its operations in developing countries and particularly Argentina (see Lobina, 2005: pp. 20-21), will take advantage of the amended statute.
In September 2002, Suez acquired a 1.9% equity stake in Acea. As of August 2004, Suez had increased its stake to 2.268% and was reported as planning to further increase its stake47.
5.3 Award to Acea in Rome ATO: 1994-2004 Following the adoption of the Galli Law in 1994 and its integration by regional law 6/96 in January 1996, the 94 communes including Rome constituting ATO-2 decided in July 1997 to select Acea as unique water supply and sanitation operator for the whole ATO, once Acea would be transformed into a majority municipally-owned PLC. In November 1999, after Acea had been listed on the stock exchange, regional law 31/99 provided for the extension of ATO 2 from 94 to 111 municipalities for a total population of some 3.6 million. Also in November 1999, the municipalities confirmed Acea subsidiary Acea ATO 2 as the unique water supply and sanitation operator and decided that Acea would participate in the elaboration of the investment programme together with the technical secretariat of the ATO (called STO). In January 2000, Suez resorted to Lazio‘s Regional Administrative Tribunal to annul the municipalities‘ decision to select the water operator without competitive tendering, but the court rejected Suez‘ claim as ungrounded.
It should be noted that the survey of infrastructure, although based on responses from only 80% of the communes, was carried out by Acea ATO 2 and completed in the spring of 2001. The decision to delegate the elaboration of the asset register to the chosen public-private operator and to involve it in the definition of the investment plan was justified in the light of urgency to implement the Galli Law as soon as possible.
In May 2002, the concession agreement with Acea ATO 2 was approved by the 111 municipalities, together with the business and investment plan, and directly awarded (e.g. awarded without competition) a 30-year water supply and sanitation concession in Lazio‘s ATO 2, including Rome and other 93 municipalities. Acea‘s 96.5% owned subsidiary Acea ATO 2 SpA would serve a total 3.6m inhabitants in 111 communes, an increase of 20% in volumes supplied by Acea when its operations were confined to the city of Rome and of 1 million people in customers served. Total investments during the life of the concession were projected at some ⁄ 2bn, including investments in the commune of Rome. According to daily newspaper Il Giornale, the company would be "largely funded by public money". The non-competitive award to Acea ATO 2 was censored by the EU Commission, in the course of its infringement procedure against Italy, for being against EU competition law (see Lobina, 2005: pp. 15-16).
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In January 2003, Acea ATO 2 started operations in Rome and other communes, but not in their entirety. Total investments in the course of the 30-year concession were projected at ⁄ 3.810 billion although tariffs were only covering ⁄ 2.066 billion, which would require increasing tariffs in the future or tapping public grants. Projected investments were distributed as follows: 2/3 to Rome and 1/3 to the other communes, although in the first 6 years of the concession the commune of Rome would receive 35% of investments with the remaining 65% going to the other 111 municipalities.
In 2003, Acea ATO 2 was expected to invest ⁄ 43.8 million but invested only ⁄ 36 million due to delays in project development, so that local authorities were expecting overspending in the following years to compensate for the first year underspend. Of the ⁄ 36 million invested in 2003, some ⁄ 8.78 million were spent on IT and planning, over ⁄ 25 million on investments in the commune of Rome and more than ⁄ 2 million on investments in the other municipalities.
The table below shows investments made by Acea in the commune of Rome from 1993 to 2002.
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Investments by Acea in Rome, 29.30 23.80 28.80 18.10 23.60 27.62 29.37 27.07 30.46 28.07 water sector (⁄ million)48
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6 Participation and sustainability in decision making 6.1 Public participation in Rome At municipal level, public participation has taken place mainly through the 1997 municipal referendum. Following Acea‘s part-privatisation in 1998 and the implementation of the water supply and sanitation reform pursuant to the Galli law, Rome‘s citizens have been the recipient of information on Acea and Acea ATO2‘s operations and performance. However, it remains to be seen to what extent access to information translates into active and effective public participation.
6.2 Public participation in water at regional level Lazio‘s regional legislation integrating the Galli Law provided for the establishment of a watchdog (—Garante regionale del servizio idrico integrato“) responsible for protecting the interests of all water consumers in the region, including in Rome. The —Garante regionale“ would in turn set up a consultative body representing users and consumers (—Consulta degli utenti e dei consumatori“), structured around the model of the English Customer Service Committees (now the WaterVoice Committees). The —Consulta“ would be responsible for: a) collecting users‘ evaluation of service quality; b) promoting initiatives aimed at improving transparency and access to service; c) collecting statistics on complaints, on the needs of and suggestions by users, either individuals or associations thereof, in relation to the operation of the services; d) putting forward proposals to water operators and monitoring authorities in various ATOs in order to better safeguard users‘ interests.
Public Participation by Episode in Rome
Episode: Ep1 Ep2 Ep3 Information œ Transparency
Media 1 1 1 Web œ Internet 1 1 Notice Board Information centers Others (Official acts) Consultation
User questionnaires Impact assessments Focus group Opinion polls Discussion Participative budget Others (Stakeholder 1 consultation) Other (referendum) 1 Discussion
Multi-attribute analysis Subsidiaries roles Planning for real Meetings Others… Codecision making
Partnership Consensus building Participative budget Stakeholders members Others…
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Decision making
Concessions Stakeholders as operators Delegation Capacity building Others…
6.3 Sustainability This section assesses how the decision making process in each episode addressed sustainability objectives, in terms of water supply and sanitation provision. Decisions are first taken into account in view of how their objectives directly relate to sustainability and of the motives informing their adoption. For example, not all objectives pursued by decision makers are necessarily conducive to water sustainability as a number of personal, institutional and stakeholders‘ interests might prevail in the course of the decision making process. Subsequently, decisions are assessed in the light of the extent to which implementation of the adopted decisions succeeded in achieving set targets.
Sustainability of Final Outcome for Episode 1
Political and institutional sustainability: modest. Setup later changed not for necessity but for decision to commercialise Acea. Also, fiscal considerations (excessive concession fees) did not appear to undermine water operations‘ sustainability as a result of cross-subsidies from Acea‘s electricity operations. Finally, bureaucratic culture affected effectiveness and efficiency of operations.
Economic sustainability: modest. Although Acea‘s finances as a group proved in a good state, it is not clear whether water tariffs were sufficient to cover all costs, particularly in wastewater treatment. However, it should be noted that this is to be seen in relation to legal sectoral provisions on pricing.
Social sustainability: modest. It is not clear to what extent public participation took place.
Technical sustainability: low. Underinvestment in sanitation with 10% of the population in Rome still not served by sewerage and wastewater treatment.
Environment: low. Underinvestment in sanitation with 10% of the population in Rome still not served by sewerage and wastewater treatment.
City: Rome
Episode 1
PESTE factors ‰ Political Economic Social Technical Environment Sustainability High Medium X X X Low X X
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Sustainability of Final Outcome for Episode 2
Political sustainability: modest. Loss of control of commune on Acea and failed attempt to reduce municipal shareholding below 51% (failed due to adverse conditions of stock market). Also, Acea is acting independently of any local consideration, engaging in failed business ventures.
Economic sustainability: low. Non water considerations might affect economic sustainability of water operations. Failed diversification in telecommunications with record losses in 2002. Private shareholders with increased equity stakes might want to recover losses or maximise profits requiring substantial dividends from local water operations.
Social sustainability: modest. Limited public participation and municipal government‘s attempts to exclude municipal referendum. Also, reduced municipal control not replaced by adequate guarantees of transparency and accountability.
Technical sustainability: low. Semi-privatisation appears to have failed to bring any systematic pattern of increasing investments in water supply and sanitation, so that underinvestment has not been tackled.
Environmental: low. Semi-privatisation appears to have failed to bring any systematic pattern of increasing investments in water supply and sanitation, so that underinvestment has not been tackled.
City: Rome
Episode 2
PESTE factors ‰ Political Economic Social Technical Environment Sustainability High Medium X X Low X X X
Sustainability of Final Outcome for Episode 3
Political sustainability: modest. Due to the predominant weight of Rome within the ATO decision making bodies, see comments above regarding Episode 2 (loss of political control due to implication of Acea‘s commercial choices). See also risk of asymmetry of information due to decision to delegate infrastructure survey to the public-private operator and involve Acea in elaborating the investment plan.
Economic sustainability: low. Considerable investment programme not covered by tariffs. Asymmetry of information might create difficulties in assessing correct pricing levels.
Social sustainability: modest. It remains unclear to what extent public participation might meaningfully contribute to the adoption of local decisions on management of water operations.
Technical sustainability: modest. It remains to be seen what the implications will be of the adopted decisions. Insufficient elements so far.
Environmental sustainability: low. As tariff increases appear likely to be subjected to their social acceptability, in the absence of public awareness of requirements in terms of investments, the environment might loose out of the current situation, with a profit driven operator responding to demands in terms of dividends from Acea shareholders.
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City: Rome
Episode 3
PESTE factors ‰ Political Economic Social Technical Environment Sustainability High Medium X X X Low X X
7 City in Time In 1865, the Pope which then ruled in Rome awarded a 99-year concession for the renovation and operation of the ancient Acqua Marcia aqueduct (Acqua Pia Antica Marcia) to the majority English-owned private company Società dell'Acqua Pia Antica Marcia (also known as Anglo Roman Water Company), also established with Belgian and local partners. In 1870, the year of the unification of Italy as a nation State, the Acqua Marcia aqueduct was inaugurated under Pope Pio IX49.
At the beginning of the XX century, Rome was supplied water via four aqueducts. The Acqua Marcia aqueduct had the highest capacity, at some 4 m3 per second. The Vergine, Felice and Paolo aqueducts were operated by the commune of Rome50.
In 1909, the municipality of Rome established AEM (Azienda Elettrica Municipale) in order to provide electricity for public (e.g. street) and private (e.g. household) lighting51.
In 1937, under fascist rule, the Governor for Rome entrusted AEM with the construction and operation of aqueducts and water supply pipeline networks for the city of Rome. In the same year, AEM was renamed AGEA (Azienda Governatoriale Elettricità e Acque, that is to say Gubernatorial Enterprise for Electricity and Water) and works started for the construction of the Peschiera aqueduct52.
In 1938, the commune of Rome transferred the operation of the Vergine, Felice and Paolo aqueducts to AGEA53, while Acqua Marcia remained under the private concessionaire. Once completed, the Peschiera aqueduct stood out as one of the major in Europe with a capacity ranging from 5.5 m3 to 9 m3 per second and a total length of km 9354.
In 1945, with the end of fascist rule and WWII AGEA was renamed ACEA (Azienda Comunale Elettricità ed Acque, that is to say Municipal Enterprise for Electricity and Water)55.
In 1964, as the concession to Società Acqua Pia Antica Marcia (SAPAM) expired, ACEA acquired the operation of the Acqua Marcio aqueduct. This allowed ACEA to become the only provider of water supply to the city of Rome56.
It should be noted that the website of still existing Società dell‘Acqua Pia Antica Marcia S.p.A. appears to report a different version of events, suggesting that in 1964 the commune of Rome took possession of the company‘s infrastructure through coercion, which resulted in legal disputes continuing up to date57.
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8 Conclusions and discussion of findings 8.1 Discussion of main issues with Acea CEO On 25th May 2004, the author interviewed Acea‘s CEO Andrea Mangoni, who had previously served as Acea Director of Economy and Finance from 1996 to 2002 and Director General from December 2002 to its appointment as CEO in November 2003. Mr. Mangoni replied to a number of questions on the events which took place from 1996 onwards.
Mr. Mangoni emphasised that the transformation of Acea from a municipally-owned —azienda speciale“ to a PLC majority-owned by Rome‘s commune and listed on the stock exchange had led to the furtherance of transparency, as management would exclusively be aimed at the creation of value for the company‘s shareholders. Another advantage of the reform consisted of the introduction of a new operational culture, informed by the pursuit of commercial objectives, as under the —azienda speciale“ mode there was a very strong technical culture leading to the bureaucratisation of decision making. Interestingly, in addressing the new focus on the achievement of economic and financial results, Mr. Mangoni hinted to the different implications of pursuing short- or long-term commercial objectives without further elaborating on the matter.
Mr. Mangoni stressed that the primary motives of the commune in deciding to part-privatise Acea were of fiscal nature as the city executive struggled to reduce the municipal budget deficit. In the process, Acea was subject to —asset stripping“ as it was forced to buy power plants for a value equivalent to ⁄300m and had to pay a lease fee of —unparalleled“ proportions for the use of water and wastewater infrastructure (through payment of a yearly —canone“ to the city).
Mr. Mangoni stated that, in Acea‘s case, experience had demonstrated the existence of economies of scale and economies of scope in jointly operating water supply and sanitation services. For example, economies of scope resulted of the unique technical emergency support team for both services, as well as of the unique billing system for both services. Economies of scale were to be found in the operation of geographically contiguous pipeline networks, which would prompt Acea to seek expanding its Italian water operations further along the Tyrrhenian dorsal east of the Apennines, from Liguria in the North East to Campania in the South of the country.
Mr. Mangoni then pointed to the change in strategy of the whole Acea group following the write-off of telecommunications activities which led to record losses and prevented the distribution of dividends to the shareholders. The new strategy would refocus on the core energy and water activities, which would exclude any new attempt of diversifying in other sectors. Growth in the water sector would be still sought in Italy, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the implementation of the Galli Law but not internationally, although the contracts acquired so far would be retained, at least for the time being.
Finally, Mr. Mangoni commented on Acea‘s performance on the stock market noting that the business plan of the part-privatised multi-utility was initially welcomed by analysts, also in light of the company‘s activity in the then extremely promising telecommunications sector. Acea shares thus soared to sky-high levels and then plummeted with the crisis of the dotcom economy. Since the end of 2003, the stock market had shown renewed confidence in Acea and its shares as a result of the adoption of the new strategy and positive financial results.
8.2 Conclusions The following appear to be general conclusions to be drawn from the Rome case study, which might have a broader relevance to enhancing sustainability through urban water supply and sanitation services reform.
1) The fiscal considerations of the municipal government seem to have played a disproportionate role in the decision making process on the reform of urban water services under different organisational arrangements. This has prevented the municipality to exploit the full potential of the —azienda
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speciale“ despite the improved situation in terms of economic results and accountability, and to even consider other organisational modes under full public ownership such as the wholly municipally- owned PLC that would have ensured managerial and operational flexibility together with the possibility of maximising reinvestment of resources into the system. Instead, a mix of fiscal objectives and commercial ambitions have then informed the decision to part-privatise Acea, with little if any attention to objectives in terms of sustainability of water resources.
2) Emphasis on the valorisation of Acea has resulted in resources being devoted to commercial expansion rather than enhancement of water sustainability. This has led to the failed venture in telecommunications with record losses. Even after Acea‘s decision to refocus on its core business, it seems that its private shareholders‘ interests are informing Acea‘s agenda rather than the municipality. And the decision of all the 111 municipalities of ATO 2 to select a public-private operator without competitive tendering, to entrust it with the elaboration of the asset register and involving it in the elaboration of the investment plan seem to serve better the interests of the operator itself, in light of the legislative agenda of the time, rather than any purpose in terms of sustainability.
3) Decision making informed by one-sided approaches, based on limited sets of interests and considerations, being them fiscal or commercial, appears insufficient to promote the sustainability of water operations. The culture of water operators, as well as any other body participating in governance, appears crucial to ensuring that sustainability is addressed from a variety of perspectives. Flexible organisational arrangements should be promoted in light of their ability to constructively catalyse a range of cultures and interests converging on the sustainable development of water systems. All different cultures should be instrumental to achieving such goal rather than capturing the whole decision making process. For example, commercial considerations required as an instrument to financial viability rather than a goal in itself, and so on. Effective public participation has a potentially crucial role to play, that of functioning as cement for potentially conflicting interests and apparently incompatible cultural approaches.
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9 References
Acea, 2004. Gruppo Acea œ Relazione semestrale al 30 giugno 2004, June 2004 (http://213.199.8.46/upload/pdf/semestrale_2004.pdf; accessed on 4th March 2005).
Agenzia per il controllo e la qualità dei Servizi Pubblici Locali del Comune di Roma, 2004. Relazione annuale sullo stato dei servizi pubblici locali e sull‘attività svolta 2004 (http://www.agenzia.roma.it/Relazione_2004/9.pdf).
Battilossi, S. 2001. Acea di Roma œ 1909-2000 œ Da azienda municipale a gruppo multiservizi. Collana CIRIEC di Storia d‘Impresa. Franco Angeli: Milan, Italy: pp. 448.
Corte dei Conti, 2003. Relazione sul risultato dell‘indagine riguardante i servizi pubblici locali con particolare riferimento ai servizi idrici e alla depurazione delle acque reflue urbane nelle regioni Lombardia e Lazio.
Hall, D. & Lobina, E. 2002. Water Privatisation in Latin America, 2002. PSIRU Reports, June 2002 (http://www.psiru.org/reports/2002-06-W-Latam.doc).
Lobina, E., 2005. WaterTime National Context Report œ Italy, WaterTime Deliverable D10f (www.watertime.org).
Lobina, E., 2001. Water privatisation and restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe, 2001. PSIRU Reports, December 2001 (http://www.psiru.org/reports/2001-11-W-CEE.doc).
Notes
1 Sources: http://www.ato2roma.it/DOCUMENTI/investimenti/Tabella%20riassuntiva%20consuntivo%20- %202003.pdf (accessed 3rd March 2005); Agenzia per il controllo e la qualità dei Servizi Pubblici Locali del Comune di Roma (2004: p. 186); Email communication with Mattia Morandi, Agenzia per il controllo e la qualità dei Servizi Pubblici Locali del Comune di Roma, Municipality of Rome, 28th January 2005. 2 Source: Federgasacqua, Tariffe idriche al 30 giugno 2003 in alcuni capoluoghi di Provincia (IVA esclusa) calcolata su un consumo medio annuo di 200 mc. (http://www.federgasacqua.it). 3 Based on a January 2004 publication by Censis-Rur, based on data on municipalities, related to the period 2000-2003. Source: http://www.jobtel.it/rubriche/dossier/ArchivioDossier/Ricchezza_Italia_Censis.aspx#3 (accessed on 3rd March 2005). 4 Sources: R.E.S., —Eletto il Nuovo Vertice. Mangoni AD, in Consigli Giarda e Bernabé - L'Acea volta pagina con Fabiani L'azionista Comune: puntiamo sul core business“, La Stampa, 25th October 2003, p. 19; —Nuovo assetto societario per l‘Acea Spa: a rischio il 51% pubblico?“, Il Corriere della Sera Roma, 23rd October 2003. 5 As of June 1999, Acea operated wastewater treatment plants serving 2,519,500 people over a total population of 2,598,600, while Rome‘s municipality served the remaining 79,100 inhabitants. In terms of population equivalent, Acea accounted for 3,329,500 out of a total 3,408,600, with the municipality accounting for the remaining 79,100 (Battilossi, 2001: 399). 6 Source: www.aceaspa.it. 7 L. n. 843/1978, adopted on 21st December 1978, provided for —aziende municipalizzate“ to balace their budget and operate according to principles of economic soundness and efficiency. 8 The relative profitability of electricity operations was due to the prompt revision of electricity tariffs, aimed at adequately reflect variations in inflation, a policy introduced since the end of the 1970s‘ (Battilossi, 2001: 340). 9 Source: www.aceaspa.it. 10 Francesco Grignetti, —Una lunga storia di contrasti: Due Palazzi in guerra dai tempi di Sindona - Dalla Loggia P2 a Ustica passando per i fondi Iri oltre vent'anni di duri contenziosi fra inquirenti“, La Stampa, 3rd March 2004, p. 9.
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11 Source: www.aceaspa.it. 12 Liana Milella, —Papi, ex amministratore della Cogefar, avrebbe raccontato di tangenti per 4 miliardi; Mattioli e Mosconi sotto accusa - Martelli per sette ore dai giudici“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 25th February 1993, p. 2; —Sotto torchio il torinese Tardito; In cella 3 imprenditori“, La Stampa, 25th February 1993, p. 4; Liana Milella, —Arresti domiciliari all'imprenditore con facoltà di andare all'estero; Pesenti accusato per la Tosi - Pagò 14 miliardi a Dc e Psi“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 26th February 1993, p. 2. 13 Fabio Poletti, —Craxi, quarta informazione di garanzia; Dopo la valanga di accuse dal socialista Valerio Bitetto, ex amministratore dell' Enel“, La Stampa, 4th February 1993, p. 3; Giovanni Bianconi, —"In piena Tangentopoli continuavano a rubare"; Mmani Pulite: incorreggibili i —cassieri“ di partito“, La Stampa, 13th March 1993, p. 7; —Nuovi avvisi a sette parlamentari per le vicende Anas e Acea“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 24th March 1993, p. 2; Fabio Poletti, —Ciarrapico inguaia Andreotti; Avviso per un finanziamento illecito di 250 milioni ai socialdemocratici“, La Stampa, 6th April 1993, p. 2; —Milano, indagati due parlamentari dc; Nuovo incontro nella Procura della Repubblica tra i legali della Fiat e i giudici di Mani pulite - Sono il senatore Moschetti e l' on. Sbardella per le tangenti Acea“, La Stampa, 21st April 1993, p. 4; Fabio Poletti, —Craxi-Di Pietro, primo round; Due ore di colloquio tra l'ex segretario del psi e il magistrato di Mani pulite - "Gli ho spiegato il sistema delle tangenti"“, La Stampa, 10th October 1993, p. 5; —Di Pietro in trasferta dallo Squalo; Il pm di Mani Pulite a Roma: in mattinata incontro "top secret" con il procuratore Mele“, La Stampa, 22nd January 1994, p. 8. 14 —Sciolti i consigli di amministrazione dopo gli scandali giudiziari; Roma, commissari alle municipalizzate“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 4th Novembre 1992, p. 2. 15 Raffaello Masci, —Roma, la giunta travolta da nuovi mandati di cattura; Inchiesta Acea, in manette 5 politici. Il Consiglio comunale verso l' autoscioglimento“, La Stampa, 20th April 1993, p. 10. 16 Augusto, Minzolini, —Roma ha scelto, Rutelli al Campidoglio; Per il candidato del fronte progressista una notte di festa dopo il balletto degli exit poll“, 6th December 1993, p. 3. 17 http://www.bibliotecasalaborsa.it/content/locale/sindaci.html 18 —Una giunta per Roma - Il pds candida a sindaco il verde Rutelli“, La Stampa, 13th February 1993, p. 6. 19 Source: http://smau365.neoexpo.it/var/congressi/convegno1/Testa.htm. 20 Giorgio Santilli, —Rivoluzione nei servizi pubblici; Poker di manager per risanare la città“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 2nd February 1994, p. 8. However, the official decision to corporatise and part-privatise Acea would be announced in December 1994. 21 Giorgio Santilli, —Rivoluzione nei servizi pubblici; Poker di manager per risanare la città“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 2nd February 1994, p. 8. 22 Giorgio Santilli, —Rivoluzione nei servizi pubblici; Poker di manager per risanare la città“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 2nd February 1994, p. 8. 23 Giorgio Santilli, —Varato il bilancio '95 che prevede introiti per 1.560 miliardi dalle vendite; Roma avvia le privatizzazioni con Centrale del latte e Acea“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 11th December 1994, p. 4. 24 Source: www.aceaspa.it. 25 Isabella Bufacchi and Giorgio Pogliotti, —Entro giugno l'Acea diventa Spa - E nel '98 la quotazione in Borsa“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 14th February 1997, p. 27. 26 —Roma mette in vendita Acea (acqua e luce)“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 10th May 1995, p. 27. 27 Giorgio Santilli, —Varato il bilancio '95 che prevede introiti per 1.560 miliardi dalle vendite; Roma avvia le privatizzazioni con Centrale del latte e Acea“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 11th December 1994, p. 4. 28 —Il Campidoglio diventa una holding di aziende e servizi“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 16th April 1997, p. 26. 29 Giorgio Pogliotti, —Il Comune di Roma si accinge a lanciare la privatizzazione; Acea, Opv da 1600 miliardi“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 27th September 1998, p. 10. 30 —Lascia l'assessore Lanzillotta; Centrale del latte, e' bufera in Campidoglio“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 11th April 1997, p. 33. 31 Isabella Bufacchi and Giorgio Pogliotti, —Entro giugno l'Acea diventa Spa - E nel '98 la quotazione in Borsa“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 14th February 1997, p. 27. 32 Giorgio Pogliotti, —Vittoria di misura dei si' al referendum consultivo - Rutelli: inesorabile il processo di modernizzazione“, Il Sole 24 Ore, 17th June 1997, p. 27. 33 —Sarnese-Vesuviano win“, Global Water Report, Issue 134, 26th November 2001, pp. 2-3. 34 —Italian progress in Genoa and Frosinone“, Global Water Report, Issue 144, 19th April 2002, p. 4. 35 —Italy/Privatisation: Legal hurdles and regional wins“, Global Water Report, Issue 163, 28th January 2003, pp. 7-8. 36 —Italy/Companies: Further success for Acea“, Global Water Report, Issue 164, 7th February 2003, pp. 8-9. 37 —Italy/Companies: Acea and Ondeo in third joint win in Florence“, Global Water Report, Issue 175, 18th July 2003, p. 5. 38 —Italy/Companies: Acea and Ondeo in third joint win in Florence“, Global Water Report, Issue 175, 18th July 2003, p. 5. 39 —AceaElectrabel and META conclude a strategic agreement“, Europe Energy, 25 March 2003. 40 Francesco Allegra, « Hera vende il suo 20% ed esce da Tirana Acque », Milano Finanza, 26 August 2003, p. 10.
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41 —Italy/Privatisation: Legal hurdles and regional wins“, Global Water Report, Issue 163, 28th January 2003, pp. 7-8. 42 —Latin America/Companies: Italian success“, Global Water Report, Issue 163, 28th January 2003, p. 11. 43 Invitation to Tender - "Technical Assistance to the Greater Tirana Water Supply & Sewerage Enterprise", Republic of Albania, Ministry of Public Works, General Directorate of Water Supply and Sewerage, Greater Tirana Water Supply and Sewerage Enterprise (http://www.esteri.it/opportu/gare/gara130301.htm). 44 —Italy/Companies: Amga win in Albania“, Global Water Report, Issue 125, 6th July 2001, p. 7. 45 Francesco Allegra, « Hera vende il suo 20% ed esce da Tirana Acque », Milano Finanza, 26 August 2003, p. 10. 46 Delibera 73/04 del 28/04/04 — Modifica degli articoli 2,3,6,8,9,10,11,13,14,15,17,19,20,22,24 e introduzione dell‘art. 22 bis dello Statuto di ACEA S.p.a. 47 —Suez intenzionata a crescere in Acea“, Milano Finanza, 6th August 2004, p. 9. 48 Relazione annuale Agenzia Roma Tabella 9.2 pag.186 49 Source: Benito Ristori, —Assetata, Malata e poi Risorta œ Dalla fine dell‘Impero Romano al primo ”900 le vicende degli acquedotti romani“ (http://www.assocampi.it/roma/roma-acqua-2.htm). See also http://www.acquamarcia.it/lastoria.htm. 50 Source: Benito Ristori, —Il Sistema Acquedottistico Romano œ Lo sviluppo dell‘approvigionamento idrico di Roma dal primo ”900 ai giorni nostri“ (http://www.assocampi.it/roma/roma-acqua-3.htm); Benito Ristori, —Assetata, Malata e poi Risorta œ Dalla fine dell‘Impero Romano al primo ”900 le vicende degli acquedotti romani“ (http://www.assocampi.it/roma/roma-acqua-2.htm). 51 Source: http://www.aceaspa.it. 52 Source: http://www.aceaspa.it. 53 Source: Benito Ristori, —Il Sistema Acquedottistico Romano œ Lo sviluppo dell‘approvigionamento idrico di Roma dal primo ”900 ai giorni nostri“ (http://www.assocampi.it/roma/roma-acqua-3.htm). 54 Source: Benito Ristori, —Il Sistema Acquedottistico Romano œ Lo sviluppo dell‘approvigionamento idrico di Roma dal primo ”900 ai giorni nostri“ (http://www.assocampi.it/roma/roma-acqua-3.htm). 55 Source: http://www.aceaspa.it. 56 Source: http://www.aceaspa.it. 57 Source: http://www.acquamarcia.it/zamp.htm.
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