Anarcho-Capitalism, Aggression and Copyright

Łukasz Dominiak, PhD Faculty of Political Science and International Studies Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun

16/2014 Political Dialogues Keywords: anarcho-capitalism, libertarianism, copyright, intellectual property, aggression, private property

Abstract: is a ubiquitous belief that the institution In this paper I examine the relation be- of copyright protects original authors’ tween copyright and aggression from property against violation (aggression). the anarcho-capitalist perspective. I hy- Notwithstanding these common believes, pothesise that notwithstanding ubiqui- the main thesis of the paper is the follow- tous beliefs, copyright does not protect ing assertion: Copyright is an instance individuals’ property and freedom; on of aggression. Many libertarian think- the contrary, copyright, as well as others endorse the idea that the institution er types of intellectual property, initi- of intellectual property is incompatible ates aggressive violence against people’s with private property and consists in property and freedom being thereby an violation thereof. In this paper I present instance of aggression, not remedy there- the libertarian case against the institu- of. The function of norms of conduct is to tion of intellectual property and provide eliminate conflicts over scarce resourc- philosophical background for this criti- es. If a given norm of conduct, such as cism by elaborating on the relations be- copyright, itself produces scarcity where tween freedom, private property and ag- there was none before, conflicts and in- gression; particularly, I highlight the link consistencies will result. which connects the fact of scarcity with the possibility of conflicts and demon- strate how this link influences the ques- 1. Introduction tion of rights and aggression. In the present paper I deliver a politico- To investigate my research problem philosophical argument against intel- I employ both the case-based method lectual property, particularly against that reasons by analogy with paradig- copyright. The criticism I provide here matic cases1 and the method of reflective is based on the anarcho-capitalist political philosophy of Hans-Hermann Hoppe 1 On the case-based method see: S.E. Toul- and the theory of intellectual property min, A.R. Jonsen, The Abuse of Casuistry, Uni- developed by Stephan Kinsella. My main versity of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles research problem is the following ques- 1989, p. 323–324, passim; S.E. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, Cambridge University Press, New York tion: What is the relation between the in- 2008, p. 87–109, passim; J.F. Childress, Methods stitution of copyright and aggression? It in Bioethics, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics,

37 equilibrium that examines relations be- sents of course the paradigmatic case of tween sets of assertions2. private property rights violation: theft. Now imagine a different story. You 2. The Libertarian Case Against wrote a very good paper. Being proud Copyright of it, you keep the journal with your paper exposed on a shelf in your fl at. Your Commencing with the libertarian case academic challenger copies some parts against copyright, I will provide grounds of your paper and publish it under his for a fully-fl edged philosophical argu- name. This simple story represents the ment for my thesis. Let’s then consider paradigmatic case of intellectual prop- the following series of thought experi- erty violation: plagiarism. But what is ments. Imagine that you have a luxuri- the effect of the plagiarists’ action? You ous wrist watch. You wear the watch on still have the journal with your paper on every occasion and proudly so. During the shelf. It has not been taken from you. your usual afternoon stroll a pickpocket Nor have the ideas expressed in your silently approaches you and steals your paper been taken from you. Everything wrist watch. What is the effect of the you had before the plagiarist copied your pickpocket’s action as far as your pri- paper is still yours: the physical journal vate property is concerned? It is simple: with your paper on your shelf, the ideas legitimate property that you had before expressed in your paper, the patterns of (the wrist watch) has been taken from words in which you expressed the ideas. you without your consent and you do Hence, the plagiarist’s action does not not have it any more. The pickpocket’s constitute an instance of private proper- action constitutes an instance of private ty violation, let alone theft: the property property violation: the property that you you had before (the journal with your pa- had before has been taken from you (sto- per on your shelf, the ideas, the patterns len, destroyed, diminished etc.) without of words) has not been taken from you your consent. This simple story repre- without your consent. As Stephan Kin- sella noticed, “if you copy a book I have written, I still have the original (tangible) B. Steinbock (ed.), Oxford University Press, New book, and I also still ‘have’ the pattern York 2007, p. 29–34. of words that constitute the book. Thus, 2 On the method of refl ective equilibrium see: N. Daniels, Wide Refl ective Equilibrium and authored works are not scarce in the Theory Acceptance in Ethics, “The Journal of Phi- same sense that a piece of land or a car losophy” 1979, Vol. 76, No. 5; D.W. Haslett, What are scarce. If you take my car, I no longer Is Wrong With Refl ective Equilibria?, “Philosophical Quarterly” 1987, No. 37/148; J. Rawls, Outline of have it. But if you ‘take’ a book-pattern a Decision Procedure for Ethics, “The Philosophi- and use it to make your own physical cal Review” 1951, Vol. 60, No. 2; J.D. Arras, The book, I still have my own copy”3. Way We Reason Now: Refl ective Equilibrium in Bioethics, [in:] The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, Our possible opponent could disa- B. Steinbock (ed.), Oxford University Press, New gree with this conclusion on the basis York 2007; N. Daniels, Refl ective Equilibrium, [in:] that when the plagiarist from our story The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring copies the paper, he steals something 2011; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard Uni- versity Press, Cambridge 1971; R. Dworkin, Taking from the author, namely he steals the Rights Seriously, Bloomsbury Academic, London 2013; Ł. Dominiak, Metoda równowagi refl eksyjnej [refl ective equilibrium] w fi lozofi i polityki, “Athenae- 3 S. Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property, um. Polskie Studia Politologiczne” 2012, No. 36. Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn 2008, p. 32.

38 value of the paper. If copyright were distillery. He starts to sell wine. Some abode by, the author would gain fi nan- of your existing customers sometimes cial and other profi ts (colleagues’ ad- prefer to drink wine rather than whisky. miration, social status, fame etc.) from You see that you are losing customers selling copies of the paper and being its on behalf of your neighbour. The value exclusive author. Hence, the plagiarist’s of your whisky business drops because action constitutes an instance of “prop- of your neighbour’s actions. To stay in erty” violation: the “property” the author the business you have to considerably had before, namely the value of the pa- lower the price of your whisky to com- per, has been taken from him (dimin- pete with your neighbour for custom- ished) without his consent. In a word, by ers. But this again means that the value copying the paper, the plagiarist steals of your distillery plummets because of the value of the paper. The position that your neighbour’s actions. However, your property rights are about creating val- neighbour did not commit any immoral ues and that any diminution of value of act, let alone a breach of law or crime. He things constitutes therefore an infringe- just used his property to open his own ment on property rights is espoused for business. Your neighbour did not violate example by objectivist thinkers. For in- your tangible property. He did not steal stance, Ayn Rand points out that “by your whisky nor interfered with your dis- forbidding an unauthorized reproduc- tillery. Yet he, the same as the plagiarist, tion of the object, the law declares, in ef- diminished the value of your property. fect, that the physical labor of copying Any free market competition dimin- is not the source of the object’s value, ishes value of goods and services offered that that value is created by the origi- for purchase on the market. If the sup- nator of the idea and may not be used ply of a given good increases, the price without his consent; thus the law estab- (the value) of this good decreases. If one lishes the property right of a mind to that would like to protect the value of tangi- which is has brought into existence”4. ble goods against diminution, one would Also David Kelley expresses this value- have to oppose any free market competi- based theory of property rights when he tion, being thereby involved in violation says that “the essential basis of property of individuals’ freedom and private prop- rights lies in the phenomenon of creating erty rights. As Hans-Hermann Hoppe value”5. points out, “it is easy to recognize that Unfortunately, this reply would have nearly every action of an individual can the extremely paradoxical implications. alter the value (price) of someone else’s Consider another story. Imagine that property. For example, when person you run a distillery. You sell whisky and A enters the labor or the marriage mar- you are very successful businessman. ket, this may change the value of B in Your neighbour realises how successful these markets. And when A changes his you are and opens a winery next to your relative valuations of beer and bread, or if A himself decides to become a brewer or baker, this changes the value of the 4 A. Rand, Patents and Copyrights, in Capi- talism: The Unknown Ideal, New American Library, property of other brewers and bakers. New York 1967, p. 130. According to the view that value damage 5 D. Kelley, Intellectual Property Rights. Re- constitutes a rights violation, A would be sponse to Stephan Kinsella, „Institute of Objectivist Studies Journal”, vol. 5, no. 2, 1995, p. 13. committing a punishable offense vis-à-

39 vis brewers or bakers”6. As this line of on the condition that Green keeps this argument clearly demonstrates, the pol- information private. In that case, Brown icy of protecting value of tangible goods has granted to Green not absolute own- that the institution of intellectual prop- ership of the knowledge of his invention, erty (according to our possible opponent) but conditional ownership, with Brown is based on violates individuals’ freedom retaining the ownership power to dis- and property rights and therefore is an seminate the knowledge of the invention. instance of aggression. If Green discloses the invention anyway, Our possible opponent could try to he is violating the residual property right defend his position by singling out in- of Brown to disseminate knowledge of tellectual property as the only instance the invention, and is therefore to that where the protection of value is justifi ed. extent a thief”7. At fi rst glance this argu- But such a strategy would equal sur- ment seems persuasive. There are many render. This would mean that protecting tangible goods that are sold only condi- value of tangible goods in general vio- tionally. For example some breeds of ani- lates individuals’ freedom and property mals are sold under condition that they rights but in one special case it is alleg- will not serve as sires; also real estate edly justifi ed notwithstanding this viola- is subject to many conditions limiting tion. That would straightaway confi rm property rights of the purchaser etc. In my thesis. So, to argue that intellectual a word, it can be stipulated in the pur- property does not violate individuals’ chase contract that only some property freedom and property, our opponent has rights to a given good are being sold and to fi nd different criterion than the pro- if both parties of the contract agree on tection of value. it, there is by defi nition no violation of He could try to claim that property freedom or property rights. Unfortunate- violation does not consists only in steal- ly, this analogy is far-fetched as far as ing, destroying, diminishing or, generally such intangible goods as these protected speaking, expropriating but also in using by copyright are concerned. Consider the property in a way that is not permitted following line of argument. by the owner. He could argue that the If I buy a house that I cannot sell author of the paper or the owner of copy- until fi ve years pass under the sanction right sells the paper only conditionally, that I will be burdened with extra pay- i.e. with the restriction that the paper ments, this limitation of my property cannot be copied; that the owner sells rights pertains only to this very house. If only part of his property rights to the pa- somebody else sees my house and builds per. This is a position more or less rep- a very similar house of his own, he is resented by Murray Rothbard. Rothbard not bound by the purchase contract that formulates his argument in favour of in- I signed with regard to my house. Simi- tellectual property in the following way: larly, if I contractually agree that the cat “Suppose that Brown allows Green into I buy will not serve as sire, this contract his home and shows him an invention is binding only as far as me, the seller of Brown’s hitherto kept secret, but only and this very cat are concerned. If somebody else sees my cat and obtains a very

6 H.-H. Hoppe, The Great Fiction. Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline, Lais- 7 M. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, New sez Faire Books, Baltimore 2012, p. 15. York University Press, New York 1998, p. 123.

40 similar cat from other source, he is not tract), how is T2 bound by any contract bound by the contract that I signed. In- or reserved right?”8. Hence, copyright tellectual property works utterly differ- cannot be construed in terms of contrac- ently. If I buy a paper protected by copy- tual duties. These though are the only right, it is not only me who is allegedly one which do not violate people’s private bound by the contract with the copyright property. Imposing uncontractual duties owner but also any other person who on individuals by defi nition constitutes does not buy the paper nor borrows it an invasion on their freedom and prop- etc. If somebody else sees my paper or erty rights. listens to the conversation about its con- This broken analogy with tangible tent etc. and copies it, he also infringes property reveals the most important on copyright. Here the analogy with the feature of the institution of intellectual real contracts and tangible property col- property, especially of the copyright: the lapses. Copyright does not place con- fact that copyright directly violates in- tractual duties on the parties of contract dividuals’ freedom and property rights. but imposes obligations on people who From the moment I publish a paper that have never signed any contract with cop- is protected by copyright, you are not yright owners, not even the implicit one. allowed to use your tangible property, As Stephan Kinsella points out, “even i.e. your paper, computer, printer, ink, if a seller of an object could somehow brain, hands etc., in a way that infringes ‘reserve’ certain use-rights with respect on my copyright; from this moment on to the sold object, how does this pre- I am an owner of a part of your property. vent third parties from using informa- Again Kinsella writes: “ownership of ide- tion apparent from or conveyed in that al rights gives the IP owner some degree object? Reserved rights proponents say of control—ownership—over the tangible more than that the immediate buyer B1 property of innumerable others. Patent is bound not to reproduce the book; for and copyright invariably transfer partial this result could be obtained by pointing ownership of tangible property from its to the implicit contract between seller natural owner to innovators, inventors, A and buyer B1. Let us consider a third and artists”9. Even though you appropri- party, T1, who fi nds and reads the aban- ated your tangible property before I wrote doned book, thus learning the informa- my paper and even though you did it in tion in it. Alternatively, consider third a legitimate way, without violating any- party T2, who never has possession of or one’s rights, I become an owner of a part even sees the book; he merely learns of of your tangible property without your the information in the book from gossip, consent: you are expropriated by me to graffi ti, unsolicited e-mail, and so forth. the extent my copyright holds. I did not Neither T1 nor T2 has a contract with buy your property rights to your printer, A, but both now possess certain knowl- ink or computer, you did not give it to me edge. Even if the book somehow does not as a free gift. I became an owner of a part contain within it a ‘right to reproduce,’ of your property without your consent, how can this prevent T1 and T2 from just by the act of writing something that using their own knowledge? And even if you are not even interested in. Since one we say that T1 is somehow “bound” by a contractual copyright notice printed 8 S. Kinsella, Against..., p. 51. on the book (an untenable view of con- 9 S. Kinsella, Against..., p. 15.

41 can legitimately appropriate an item only structed by others” nor can you “do what in two ways, viz. either by homesteading you want” because I “interfere with your it or by free exchange, then if one be- activity”. However, if you wanted to stop comes an owner of an item in some other me for instance by suing me for slander, way, it constitutes a form of theft. In this you would “interfere with my activity” of sense copyright is not a way of protect- gossiping and I would be obstructed by ing individuals’ private property but of you. There could be some considerations expropriating people and violating their of greater good or lesser evil but the fact property rights. would still remain the same: my freedom of speech would be encroached by you. Similarly, if I disseminate derogatory 3. Freedom, Private Property and information about you, I interfere with Aggression your activity and obstruct your actions. Political philosophy knows a conundrum Whichever direction we move, the viola- concerning the boundaries of personal tion of freedom construed in a Berlinian freedom. The conundrum consists in way will result. As we see then, Berlin’s delineating the boundaries of personal criterion does not delineate the respec- freedom in such a way to avoid an over- tive spheres of personal freedom and lap of individuals’ spheres of freedom therefore does not help to avoid confl icts and the resultant confl ict between peo- between people. Why is it so? Because ple. The most famous attempt to solve the praxeological condition of possibil- this conundrum is Isaiah Berlin’s theory ity of confl ict between people is the fact of negative liberty according to which of scarcity. Confl icts can take place only “I am normally said to be free to the de- over scarce goods. If “all external goods gree to which no human being interferes were available in superabundance, if with my activity. Political liberty in this they were ‘free goods’, such as the air sense is simply the area within which that we breathe is normally a ‘free’ good, 10 a man can do what he wants” (or “the if whatever one did with these goods, his area within which a man can act unob- actions had repercussions neither with 11 structed by others” ). The problem with respect to his own future supply of such Berlin’s solutions as well as with many goods, nor with regard to the present or others is that, notwithstanding the ap- future supply of the same goods for oth- pearances, they do not help to avoid con- ers (and vice versa), it would be impossi- fl icts between people nor delineates the ble that there could ever be a confl ict be- respective spheres of personal freedom tween people concerning the use of such whatsoever. An example (different than goods. A confl ict becomes possible only copyright which would also be apt in if goods are scarce”12. Hence, a theory of this case) will suffi ce here. If I viciously freedom, justice, property rights or, gen- disseminate a false and derogatory in- erally speaking, a norm of conduct not formation about you that prevent you only has to allow for avoiding confl icts from getting a job that you would oth- over already scarce goods but also can- erwise have got, you do not act “unob- not itself generate such scarcity. Reputa-

10 I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, Oxford 12 H.-H. Hoppe, Economics and Ethics of Pri- University Press, Oxford 1958, p. 7. vate Property. Studies in Political Economy and Phi- 11 I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford losophy, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn 2012, University Press, Oxford 1969, p. 122. p. 381.

42 tion is not a scarce good though. If A has therefore against his liberty”14. Hence, if an opinion about C it does not mean that the libertarian (or anyone else’s) crite- B cannot have the same opinion about C. rion of delineating respective spheres of By treating reputation as a scarce good, personal freedom is to be able to avoid Berlin’s theory of freedom not only does confl icts and overlaps, its construal of not allow for avoiding confl icts but gen- private property must itself preclude the erates scarcity where there was none be- possibility of confl icts and overlaps. It fore and therefore induces confl icts over means that for the boundaries of liberty these artifi cially scarce goods. It means to be clearly delineated, the boundaries that Berlin’s criterion, the same as the of private property also has to be clearly institution of intellectual property, can- delineated, visible and objective. To boot, not serve as a norm of conduct because since the source of any confl ict is the “it is the purpose of norms to help avoid scarcity of goods, the institution of pri- otherwise unavoidable confl ict. A norm vate property cannot itself generate such that generates confl ict rather than help- a scarcity. ing to avoid it is contrary to the very pur- That is why the institution of private pose of norms. It is a dysfunctional norm property can concern only physical re- or a perversion”13. sources. First of all, only physical goods This politico-philosophical conun- are naturally scarce, so a confl ict over drum has been solved satisfactorily by them can arise. If confl ict can arise, then libertarian criterion of personal freedom. there is a need for norms that establish According to libertarianism, liberty is un- confl ictless ways of dealing with these derstood in terms of private property. It scarce goods: this is the role of private means that I am free as far as my private property rights. Second of all, if proper- property is not violated, provided I do ty rights concern only naturally scarce not violate your private property. Murray physical resources, they do not them- Rothbard explains “how the libertarian selves create scarcity and therefore they defi nes the concept of ‘freedom’ or ‘lib- do not themselves generate confl icts. erty’. Freedom is a condition in which Third, because the borders between a person’s ownership rights in his own physical goods are objective and visible, body and his legitimate material prop- the possibility of blunders is essentially erty are not invaded, are not aggressed non-existent; therefore it is easy for peo- against. A man who steals another man’s ple to say in advance what constitutes property is invading and restricting the the violation of property rights. As Hans- victim’s freedom, as does the man who Hermann Hoppe writes, “it is some sort beats another over the head. Freedom of technical necessity for any theory of and unrestricted property right go hand property (not just the natural position in hand. On the other hand, to the lib- described here) that the delimitation of ertarian, ‘crime’ is an act of aggression the property rights of one person against against a man’s property right, either in those of another be formulated in physi- his own person or his materially owned cal, objective, intersubjectively ascer- objects. Crime is an invasion, by the use tainable terms. Otherwise it would be of violence, against a man’s property and

14 M. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, Macmillan Publishing, New 13 H.-H. Hoppe, The Great..., p. 161. York 2002, p. 41.

43 impossible for an actor to determine ex lation thereof etc. So, Stephan Kinsella ante if any particular action of his were writes that the institution of intellectual an aggression or not, and so the social property “almost invariably protects only function of property norms (any property certain types of creations—unless, that norms), i.e., to make a confl ict—free in- is, every single useful idea one comes up teraction possible, could not be fulfi lled with is subject to ownership. But the dis- simply for technical reasons”15. tinction between the protectable and the Unfortunately, neither of these con- unprotectable is necessarily arbitrary”17. ditions is fulfi lled in the case of the in- Intellectual property “involves arbitrary stitution of intellectual property. First of distinctions with respect to what class- all, as I demonstrated above, ideas and es of creations deserve protection, and their expressions are not scarce. If A has concerning the length of the term of the pattern P expressing idea I and if B cop- protection”18 and “has no moorings to ob- ies pattern P, A still has both pattern P jective borders of actual, tangible prop- and idea I. Second of all, since ideas and erty, and thus is inherently vague, amor- patterns are not naturally scarce and phous, ambiguous, and subjective”19. intellectual property rights nonetheless Finally, we have come to the ques- protect them, they by necessity create an tion of aggression. The same as in the artifi cial scarcity. As Stephan Kinsella case of the concept of freedom, the con- points out, “by recognizing a right in an cept of aggression hinges upon the clear ideal object, one creates scarcity where construal of private property. Libertarian none existed before”16. But if intellectual political philosophy defi nes aggression property in general and copyright in par- in general terms as violence against pri- ticular create scarcity and if scarcity is vate property. First of all, since property the praxeological condition of possibility is understood as tangible property, ag- of confl icts, intellectual property does not gression means only physical violence or help to avoid confl icts but to create them. “invasion of the physical integrity of an- Therefore intellectual property rights are other person’s property”20. Second of all, dysfunctional norms and perversion of the category of property is broadly con- justice. Third, the borders between intel- strued within libertarianism, i.e. it refers lectual property are blurred, ambiguous, on the one hand to person’s body and arbitrary and subjective. There has not then is covered by the principle of self- been probably other case in the history ownership and, on the other hand, to of law (besides trial by ordeal) where the external tangible resources and then is answer to the question of what consti- covered by the principle of homesteading tutes an illegal act would be even in ten and free exchange. Similarly, aggression percent so intricate and arbitrary as in is understood as both violence against the case of intellectual property law. It person’s body and violence against per- is vague what is protected, how many son’s external tangible property. As Ste- “chunks” of this ideal “something” is phan Kinsella points out, “libertarians enough to constitute intellectual proper- tend to elaborate or defi ne the non-ag- ty and correspondingly to constitute vio- gression principle in a somewhat coun-

15 H.-H. Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and 17 S. Kinsella, Against..., p. 23. Capitalism, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn 18 S. Kinsella, Against..., p. 25–26. 2012, p. 23. 19 S. Kinsella, Against..., p. 24. 16 S. Kinsella, Against..., p. 33. 20 H.-H. Hoppe, A Theory..., p. 166.

44 terintuitive or idiosyncratic way, so that of property infringement — courtesy of ‘aggression’, as they mean it, covers both the state. While they have their origins in interpersonal bodily violence and theft or a much earlier privilege given to ‘friends trespass against other owned resources. of the crown’, in their modern incarna- In their elaborations they say that we tion they blend in with the welfare state’s oppose aggression against the bodies or wealth-distributing impetus. Far from property of other people”21. Moreover, being ‘natural’ property rights grounded not each act of violence is aggressive. For in the common law, patent and copyright an act to be an aggressive act, it has to are monopoly privileges granted solely initiate violence against other people and by state legislation (…) The mere act of their property without their consent. creation — composing a song, penning Now it is clearly visible that both a novel or inventing a mousetrap — gives intellectual property in general and the creator control over the tangible copyright in particular are instances of property of others. In addition to allow- aggression. They initiate invasion of le- ing the author partially to control the gitimate property of individuals who paper, ink, computer and photocopies of either homesteaded it or acquired it others, copyright in particular restricts through free exchange. This aggressive not only our rights to our property, but violence concerns both persons’ bodies to our very bodies (…) Patent and copy- and external tangible property. A copyright clearly undermine private property. right holder is allowed to violently stop A staunch defense of private property legitimate self-owners against their will must lead to anti-intellectual-property from employing their hands, vocal cords, conclusions”22. brains etc. to the extent his copyright stretches. Similarly, a copyright holder 4. Conclusions is allowed to violently stop other people against their will from using their com- In this paper I provided arguments in puters, printers, paper, ink etc. to the favour of the thesis that copyright is an extent his copyright stretches. In this instance of aggression. My line of argu- sense and to this extent a copyright ment was based on the theory developed holder becomes an owner of other peo- by Stephan Kinsella and political philos- ple’s bodies and their tangible property. ophy of Hans-Hermann Hoppe. Deriving As far as the fi rst type of infringement is from this Austro-libertarian tradition, concerned, copyright and other kinds of I demonstrated that since a copyright intellectual property rights verge on slav- holder becomes an illegitimate owner of ery – possessing other people, though to other people’s bodies and tangible prop- a very small extent. In the second case, erty, copyright means expropriation, they constitute theft. Again, libertarian redistribution and thereby aggression. theory gets it right: “Copyright and pat- For norms of conduct, theories of justice ent grants of privilege are another form and freedom included, to work and stay coherent, they have to solve confl icts

21 S. Kinsella, Libertarian Legal Theory, Self-Ownership, and Drug Laws, “The Daily Bell”, 22 I. Mercer, S. Kinsella, Do Patents and July 20, 2014, [online]: http://www.thedailybell. Copyrights Undermine Private Property?, [online]: com/exclusive-interviews/35492/Anthony-Wile- http://www.stephankinsella.com/wp-content/up- Stephan-Kinsella-on-Libertarian-Legal-Theory- loads/publications/InsightMag_com_symp_print- Self-Ownership-and-Drug-Laws/; 25.03.2015. able.htm; 25.03.2015.

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