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In the shadow of the giant: USAF Tactical Air Command in the era of strategic bombing, 1945-1955

Ziemke, Caroline Frieda, Ph.D.

The Ohio State University, 1989

Copyright ©1989 by Ziemke, Caroline Frieda. All rights reserved.

UMI 300 N. ZeebRd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

IN THE SHADOW OF THE GIANT;

USAF TACTICAL AIR COMMAND IN THE ERA OF STRATEGIC BOMBING,

1945 - 1955

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of the Ohio State University

By

Caroline Frieda Ziemke, B.A., M.A.

The Ohio State University

1989

Dissertation Committee: Approved By

Williamson Murray - Allan R. Millett Advisor John F. Guilmartin, Jr. Department ofHistory Copyright by Caroline Frieda Ziemke 1909 To Earl and Ida Mae

11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the people without whom this project might never have seen print. Dr. Williamson Murray provided energetic guidance to my entire course of study at Ohio State and helped me find my true calling. Mr. Robert Perry of the RAND

Corporation provided the inspiration for my research and gave generously of his own time and coffee to guide me through the intricacies of current and past U.S. Air Force policy and around the pitfalls of military analysis. Dr. Richard Kohn, Dr. Jospeh P. Harrahan, and the Office of

Air Force History saw some spark of merit in my work and awarded me the research grant that made the project financially viable. I particularly want to thank Mr. William Mahoney of the National Archives, Military

History Branch; Dr. Richard Sommers of the US Army Military History

Institute; Dr. James Kitchens of the Alfred F. Simpson Historical

Research Center, Maxwell AFB; and the staffs of these three institutions for many hours of advice and assistance without which this project would have been impossible. I also thank Dr. E. Hawkins and Grace Tilford for their friendship and hospitality to me during my sojourns to south- central Alabama. I am indebted to Dr. Earl Ziemke, and Dr. Jeffrey

Record for their comments on numerous draft manuscripts and to the members of my dissertation committee: Dr. Murray, Dr. Allan R. Millett, and Dr. John F. Guilmartin, Jr. Finally, I thank my Mother, my Father,

Wick, Bob, and Jeffrey for always having confidence in my abilities, even when my own falters.

i i i VITA

March 2, 1958 Born: Washington, D.C.

1979 B.A., University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia

1982 M.A, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana

1982-1983 Archives Associate, Indiana University Archives, Bloomington, Indiana

1985-Present Consultant, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

1988-1989 Part-time instructor. Division of Academic Credit, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia.

PUBLICATIONS

"Senator Richard B. Russell and the Lost Cause in Vietnam," Georgia Historical Quarterlv. Vol. LXXII, No. 1, Spring, 1988.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Military History

Minor Fields: Modern Western Europe

National Security Policy Studies

IV TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iii

VITA...... iv

LIST OF TABLES...... vi

INTRODUCTION...... 1

CHAPTER

I. THE GENESIS OF TAC, 1945 - 1947...... 10

II, IN THE WILDERNESS, 1948 - 1949...... 63

III. TAC RESURRECTED, 1950 - 1951...... 116

IV. TAG'S REDEMPTION, 1951 - 1953...... 182

V. TRANSFIGURATION, 1953 - 1955...... 239

CONCLUSION...... 301

APPENDICES

A. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS...... 311

B. USAF COMBAT WINGS: 1946 - 1957...... 312

C. USAF MANPOWER LEVELS, 1945 - 1957...... 313

D. US MILITARY SERVICE STRENGTHS, 1945 - 1957...... 314

E. US DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS AS PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL SPENDING AND GNP: 1945 - 1957...... 315

F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: BUDGET AUTHORIZATIONS, 1950 - 1953...... 316

G. USAF ASSIGNED RESOURCES: USAFE, 1946- 1957...... 317

H. US MILITARY PERSONNEL, EUROPEAN COMMAND, 1950 - 1960...... 318

J. TAC COMMANDERS, 1946 - 1959...... 319

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 320 LIST OF TABLES

t a b l e PAGE

1. USAF COMBAT WINGS: 1946 - 1957...... 312

2. USAF MANPOWER LEVELS, 1945 - 1957...... 313

3. US MILITARY SERVICE STRENGTHS, 1945 - 1957...... 314

4. US DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS AS PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL SPENDING AND GNP: 1945 - 1957...... 315

5. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: BUDGET AUTHORIZATIONS, 1950 - 1953...... 316

6. USAF ASSIGNED RESOURCES: USAFE, 1946 - 1957...... 317

7. US MILITARY PERSONNEL, EUROPEAN COMMAND, 1950 - 1960...... 318

8. TAC COMMANDERS, 1946 - 1959...... 319

VI The Tactical Air Command— most necessary of the Air Force Commands in Limited or Small wars— has been severely cut and is fighting for its life against absorption by the Strategic Air Command. -The New York Times, August 25, 1957

I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.

-Winston Churchill, November 10. 1952

I don’t know about the British Empire, but I think there’ll be a TAC for a long time— at least as long as we stay in there and pitch.

-General Otto P. Weyland, May 9, 1957 INTRODUCTION

The controversy over the proper application of aircraft in war is

as old as the history of manned flight. When the first manned hot-air balloon floated over Paris in 1783, there were undoubtedly two military

officers on the ground arguing whether it could be better used as forward observation to supplement cavalry or as a platform from which to drop weapons on opposing armies. The Wright brothers delivered the first airplane to the US Army in 1909: an elemental machine with no mission and little apparent potential beyond reconnaissance.* At the beginning of World War I, ground commanders perceived aero-squadrons as little more than advanced cavalry spotters, but by 1910 all the basic principles that underlie current offensive air doctrine were in place. Likewise, the lines were permanently drawn between air and ground force views of the role and mission of the airplane in war. While the personalities, technologies, and doctrinal details would change, neither the basic principles nor the points of debate would see significant change in the ensuing half-century. Both Army ground and Air Service officers made up their minds early concerning the proper role of aviation in warfare, and neither was eager to revise those opinions.

In the years immediately following World War I, debate centered

^Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, (Maxwell, AFB, Alabama, 1971), p p . 8-9.

1 2

on the potential rather than actual capabilities of airpower. General

John J. Pershing summed up Army skepticism, arguing that airmen attached

too much importance to missions behind enemy lines which he regarded as

"of secondary importance during the battle, as aviators were...expected

to assist our ground troops. While few air officers advocated creation of an independent air arm like Britain's Royal Air Force, and most acknolwedged that the capabilities of existing aircraft limited air operations primarily to supporting field armies, they nonetheless speculated that with more technologically advanced aircraft, air operations applied against the enemy’s national will and productive capacity might prove decisive in future wars. The US Air Service had participated in allied bombing raids against Rhine cities during the closing months of World War I and had already developed a rudimentary

"strategic bombing" doctrine before the armistice. The "Gorrell plan"— named for its author. Lieutenant Colonel Edgar S. Gorrell— proposed that the best way to stop the Germans at the front was to destroy the producing factories, a tactic that would result in both moral and physical damage to the enemy, overwhelm his defenses, and wreck manufacturing works and shatter the morale of the workingmen.^ The

Gorrell plan provided a foundation for future strategic doctrine, but the war had afforded the Air Service little time to test its ideas, leaving postwar air theories lacking sufficient supporting experience.'*

^Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941, (Washington, D.C., 1985), p.3.

=Ibid., p. 11.

'•Alfred F. Simpson, Historical Development of Tactical Air, lecture before the Air War College, 13 April 1953, AFS/HRC, K239.716253-65, p. 5. 3

Tactical aviation, in contrast, emerged from World War I with a

wealth of operational experience from the US, British, French, and German

air forces and the foundation for a sound, and fairly sophisticated set

of principles of employment. General Billy Mitchell, credited with

significant tactical innovations during his command of US air units at

St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne, became an energetic advocate of attack

operations during the early 1920s. Mitchell proposed development of

"flying tanks"— armored attack aircraft designed for low-altitude

operations— in 1919 and, along with others at the Air Corps Tactical

School (ACTS), devoted considerable time to development of doctrine for

attack aviation during the 1920s.= Another important tactical innovator

was then Captain George C. Kenney. As the ACTS’s instructor in attack

aviation, Kenney spearheaded the development of tactical doctrine between

1926 and 1929, wrote the textbooks for attack aviation, and, with the help of ACTS students, flew practice maneuvers to test his new tactics.*

This "heydey" of attack aviation ended during the late 1920s as Mitchell

increasingly obsessed with strategic bombing theory, abandoned tactical

doctrine and took many of the most promising minds of the Air Corps with him. During the late 1920s and the 1930s, both doctrine and capabilities

for attack aviation stagnated as the Air Corps emphasized strategic bombing. As a result, the Air Force entered World War II with tactical

’Ibid., pp.39-40.

^During World War II, General Kenney would again become one the the Air Forces most innovative tactical aviators, serving under MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific. He first worked out many of the innovative tactics he applied in World War II during his tenure at the ACTS during the late 1920s. Ibid., p. 66; see also, George C. Kenney, General'Kennev Reports, USAF Warrior Studies Series, (Washington, D.C., 1987). 4

doctrine little changed since the early 1920s and technological capabilities far behind those for strategic bombardment.

Mitchell's courtmartial and subsequent public crusade to promote strategic bombing set precedents for the Air Corps (and later USAF) beyond the predominance of strategic bombing. Because of the lack of operational experience during World War I, strategic bombing theory took on the characteristics of religious faith, or in the words of General

Haywood S. Mansell, was "based more on hope than fact. The militancy with which Mitchell approached his campaign left the imprint of stridency on the Air Corps and set a standard for future relations between air and ground force advocates that has survived well into the post-nuclear age.

As General Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold would later note, Mitchell's doctrines may have been basically sound, but his tactics were not very shrewd: instead of softening War Department resistance to the new air theories, the net result of "Mitchellism" was to cement skeptics more than ever against emerging air power.* The advent of nuclear weapons, which might have rendered strategic bombing enthusiasts more confident of their position, instead left them even more vociferous in their dealings with the rest of the military establishment.

The Army and Navy did not share the Air Corps' optimism concerning the potential decisiveness of strategic bombing and continued to focus attention on the use of aviation in support of surface operations during the interwar years. The Marine Corps made impressive advances in the development air tactics to support amphibious operations. The Army,

^Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine, p. 60.

° Ibid., p. 17. 5

while unable to prevent the Air Corps from abandoning tactical

innovation, did succeed in keeping organizational control of aviation.

When war broke out in 1941, it was the Army, not the Air Force, that had

the clearer conception of the control and employment of tactical

aviation. The Air Force, furthermore, found itself bound by a War

Department field regulation, circa 1923, that stated that "the mission of

the infantry is the general mission of the entire force" and that the

bomber, while potentially important to the outcome of a war, "must not

take precedence over the support of ground operations by proper tactical

employment."^

World War II provided the operational experience necessary to end

some of the inter-service debate over the role of aviation in warfare.

Because of the Air Force’s failure to develop any meaningful doctrine for

attack aviation, early employment of tactical aviation in North Africa

was in accordance with Army concepts based primarily on what General

Elwood P. Quesada later called "hysterical acceptance" of the German air

support doctrine employed in early campaigns. The North African

campaign proved the essential validity of a number of basic Air Force

principles— mass, flexibility, and centralized control of air assets— to

the satisfaction even of influential Army commanders, including General

‘^Simpson, "Historical Development of Tactical Air," p. 7.

^'^Lt. Gen. Elwood P. Quesada, "Tactical Air Power," Air University Quarterlv Review, Vol. I, No. 4 (Spring 1948), pp. 37-45. Recent research has made it clear that US airmen like Quesada misread the relationship between the Luftwaffe and German Army commanders. If the Luftwaffe misapplied its tactical air assets, it was not because its doctrine was developed by or for ground officers. For the most recent analysis of the structure and doctrine of the Luftwaffe on the eve of World War II and its wartime operations, see Williamson Murray, Luftwaffe, (Baltimore, 1985), pp. 1-23. 6

Dwight D. Eisenhower. Under the tutelage of the RAF, and particularly

Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur ("Maori") Coningham, the Army Air Force

developed its first formal doctrine for tactical employment of air power-

-FM 100-20— in July 1 9 4 3 . In the closing years of the war, tactical

air commanders like Quesada and Kenney would, in cooperation with ground commanders, make remarkable progress in air-ground tactics and doctrine.

At the same time, they built a considerable cache of good will among the

Army generals they supported that would serve the Air Force well in its postwar campaign for independence.

The lessons of strategic bombing in World War II were somewhat mixed, although not in the minds of Air Force "true believers."

Strategic bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan proved air power was a decisive force in modern warfare, and more important, that a military power could not hope to win a war without it. Those campaigns, however, fell short of proving that air power alone could win wars, independent of surface forces. The Army and Navy were quick to note that the atomic attacks on Japan that ended the war were less than decisive since the Japanese military machine had already been thoroughly defeated on the ground, on the high seas, and in the air by what could only be classified as a combined force. The Air Force, nonetheless, saw the a- bomb as the direct cause of the Japanese surrender, as proof of air power’s decisive role in modern warfare, and as a sign that conventional surface campaigns would soon be obsolete. The legacy of strategic

i^War Department Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, (Washington, D.C., 1944); Air Superiority in World War II and Korea, Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harrahan, editors, USAF Warrior Studies Series, (Washington, D.C., 1983), pp. 32-35. 7

bombing after 1945 was at best ambiguous and did not resolve the decades- old debate over the relationship between air power and surface

strategy.

From the beginning, the debate between strategic bombing enthusiasts and proponents of tactical aviation involved more than pure operational theory; and as a result, it took on an importance far beyond

the realm of military strategy and became dogma among airmen. At its most fundamental level, the debate was about autonomy of the air arm. From

the earliest days of the Air Service during World War I, airmen sought a mission that would give them status equal to surface forces. Strategic bombing, independent of surface campaigns, was the one mission that air power alone could fulfill, and it was to be the foundation of the Air

Force’s identity. Air power was, in the 1920s and 1930s, a revolution, and its advocates took on all the zeal, inflexibility, and myopia of the

"true believer." Like any revolution, however, air power had its counter-revolutionaries. For the most part, non-conformists— like Claire

Chennault, who criticized the neglect of pursuit aviation during the

1930s— were excluded from the ruling elite to ensure the continued dominance of orthodoxy. During World War II, however, the numbers and influence of those within the Air Force who believed there was more to air power than strategic bombing grew. Ironically, after the war it would be these "non-conformists," like Quesada and Kenney, who would tip the balance of Army opinion (in spite of its lingering suspicion that the

^®There are countless histories of allied and German strategic bombing campaigns during World War II. Among the most recent analyses of their overall contribution to allied victory, and their lessons for the future see Murray, Luftwaffe, and Robert J. Overy, The Air War, 1939- 1945, (New York, 1980). a

strategic bombing zealots would strangle tactical aviation) in favor of

the Air Force and bring it the independence it sought. In the postwar

period, the tactical "non-conformists" would remain loyal to their service and would accept and defend its basic principles, including the

predominance of strategic bombing. They would, nonetheless, again find

themselves outside the elite and threatened with exile.

This study will trace the continuing struggle to maintain tactical aviation in the post-nuclear era in the context of the development of the

Tactical Air Command (TAC) during the decade following World War II. In so doing, it will attempt to answer a number of questions. First, how did USAF’s primary (and necessary) identification with its strategic mission effect its attention to its other missions, specifically tactical air operations? Second, how did TAC, in the face of what it perceived as

USAF indifference, first survive and later thrive under the shadow of the

Strategic Air Command? Third, to what extent did the military and civilian political environments rather than assessments of likely military threats on the hbrizon guide TAC’s growth, particularly after the Korean War? Fourth, what role did external agents (the Army,

Congress, or presidential administrations, for example) play in the shaping of TAC in the decade following World War II?

In answering these questions, this study will focus on several general themes. One of the central issues is the evolution of tactical doctrine, in this case, concentrating on the developmental process rather than specific doctrinal details. Interservice relations after reorganization bear heavily on TAC’s maturation during the period under 9

study. TAC was, in a sense, the bridge between the independent Air Force

and its roots as the Army Air Forces, a role that both enhanced and

frustrated TAC’s development. As the primary Air Force agency

responsible for joint operations, TAC had to maintain a good working

association with Army ground force commands regardless of the general atmosphere of Army-Air Force relations. TAC’s relative success in that

role influenced the command’s development at the various stages in its history and directly effected overall U.S. conventional military capabilities. During the period under study, TAC enjoyed a series of strong commanders: Quesada, Robert M. Lee, John K. Cannon, and Otto P.

Weyland. Each left his mark on TAC, and the command owes much of its success, its character, and in some cases its survival, to their dedicated, energetic, and effective leadership, thus how each influenced the character of TAC is an important part of this study. Finally, numerous key events (World War II, the Berlin Airlift, Korea), policies

(NSC-68, Containment, the New Look), and strategies (Massive

Retaliation), during the period proved pivotal in determining the future of TAC. Understanding which policies and events were most decisive and why is vital in understanding the relationship between national policies and the evolution of military institutions and capabilities. CHAPTER I: THE GENESIS OF TAC, 1945-1947

On March SI, 1946, the Army Air Forces (AAF) officially constituted the Headquarters, Tactical Air Command at Drew Field in Tampa Florida and established its first organization for direct cooperation with Army ground forces in the development of aii— ground doctrines and capabilities. Given the experience that the Army and the AAF gained in ail— ground cooperation in the European Theater during World War II, the creation of TAC seemed a logical step to all but the most hard-boiled disciples of Douhet, the prewar Italian prophet of victory through strategic bombardment. Yet, within a year, TAC would find itself struggling for its survival against onslaughts from the highest levels of the AAF and later, the United States Air Force. During the three years following "V-J Day," TAC would be a pawn in a series of interservice conflicts: the battle over military unification and Air Force independence, the controversy over service roles and missions, and the ongoing friction brought on by a shrinking military budget. All the while, TAC and its commanders strove to build a credible combat capability out of a skeleton command in the face of severe manpower and resource shortages and institutional hostility from within the Air Force.

The organizational evolution of TAC began in the closing months of

World War II as the military services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff began

10 11 planning the postwar defense structure. On December 15, 1944, the AAF activated the Continental Air Force (CAF) to oversee operational air assets in the Zone of Interior, a first step toward decentralization of

Headquarters AAF, reorganization, and integration according to operational missions. It immediately became apparent that the operational development of air power during World War II left the role of air forces too complex for "catch-all" commands, and that CAF needed further decentralization, until by late 1945 its organization anticipated that of the postwar AAF and, later, the United States Air Force.%

The CAF's highest priority in planning its postwar structure was

"to place greater emphasis on the training and equipment of crews and units for ground cooperation and joint operations, and to provide a headquarters at air force level for full participation in aii— ground and joint training." World War II operations had demonstrated the potentially decisive role of effective air-ground cooperation in major surface campaigns. The CAF planners, however, shared the concern of Army ground force commanders that air-ground operations had become a low priority in equipment and training as strategic bombing enthusiasts gained ascendancy in the AAF. A June 20, 1945 CAF memo stressed that

"the tactical air force has assumed a major role in modern warfare" and that "its representation within the Continental Air Forces by one of the four presently assigned air forces is considered necessary to properly

iHistorv of Headquarters, Continental Air Force (SAC), [hereafter cited as History, CAF] 15 December 1944 to 21 March 1946, "Organization and Missions," p. 73-74, 416.01, Alfred F . Simpson Historical Research Center [hereafter cited as AFS/HRC], Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 12 accomplish the assigned mission of air-ground and joint training.

To ensure proper attention to joint operations, the CAF proposed formation of an Operational Air Force (OAF), made up of at least two tactical air commands and a bomber command to operate and conduct pipeline training in the Zone of Interior. The OAF would be responsible for development and maintenance of organization, training, and doctrine for tactical operations in cooperation with the Army ground forces in the

United States. In addition, it would provide air-ground training with the Army and joint training with the Navy, establish liaison with the

Navy’s air support establishment, monitor aii— ground operations and evaluate their effectiveness, and provide units to assist in the air defense of the United States. On August 8, the CAF presented its detailed plan of organization for the postwar period to Headquarters,

AAF, and received permission to initiate a three-phase implementation program to begin immediately and conclude on December 3 1 .^

The cessation of hostilities in September, 1945 and subsequent demobilization brought important changes in AAF planning for the postwar

"interim Air Force." Headquarters, AAF issued a revised "V-J Plan," based on a 70 group air force, to govern future planning. In response to the new plan the CAF submitted its own revised proposal for reorganization of Zone of Interior forces, under which the CAF would provide a global striking force, tactical and joint operations units.

^Confidential Letter CAF 322 to Commanding General AAF, "Formation of an operational air force in the United States," 20 June 1945, Historv, CAF, exhibit 52.

^Historv, CAF, "Organization and Missions," p. 77-79. 13 pipeline training for units and air crews, and continental air defense planning. Anticipating a favorable decision from AAF Headquarters, the

CAF went ahead with plans to activate its Operational Air Force in the event that it were included in the interim air force. Throughout the remainder of the year, Air Force Headquarters continued to ponder postwar organization for the next several months but issued no concrete plans, leaving CAF planners uncertain as to its future role and that of the OAF.

As early as August, 1945, however, AAF leadership acknowledged that relegating tactical air power to the status of a subordinate combat command within the CAF might undermine the campaign for an independent

Air Force. Some Army ground force commanders had already started lobbying to bring tactical air power under their direct operational control in any future AAF incarnation, but, as General Elwood R. "Pete"

Quesada pointed out,

If the Army's argument [was] that the fighting of the land battle must embrace that theory of command of air forces, then all the air forces should be in the Army. . . .We were able to cope with that argument by saying we proved in Europe, and also proved in the Pacific, that the air forces knew better how to use the air forces whether it was a ground battle, an air battle, or a sea battle. . . .and that it would result in duplication otherwise.'’

In the battle over the proper allocation of tactical air assets, the AAF had the support of important Army commanders, including Generals J.

Lawton ("Lighting Joe") Collins and Dwight Eisennower. The more savvy

'’Conversations between Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada and Lt. Col. Steve Long and Lt. Col. Ralph Stevenson, [hereafter cited as Quesada Oral History] Senior Officers Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute [hereafter cited as AMHI], Carlisle Barracks, Pa., interview #3, p. 32. 14

AAF planners also recognized, however, that the Air Force could not take such support for granted and that the Army might well push for its own

tactical air arm if it perceived that it was not a high enough priority within the new air forces. To quash Army anxieties about the future of tactical air. Brigadier General William F. McKee proposed an organizational plan for a tactical air command in August 1945. In

McKee's plan, TAG would have taken on a two-part organization: a highly mobile, fully trained operational command available for emergency overseas deployment, and a skeleton TAG headquarters in the zone of interior to coordinate training and joint exercises. McKee’s plan for a fully mobilized operational command was never implemented because of the rapid demobilization that followed the Japanese surrender, but his idea for a standing TAG in the Zone of Interior for joint training and maneuvers constituted an important element of the postwar organization of tactical air assets in the AAF.= The lessons of World War II regarding the relative merits of strategic versus tactical applications were by no means conclusive. In fact, had the atom bomb not appeared in time for

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, postwar conclusions might have been quite different. The wisdom might then have been that airpower was not an independently decisive but only a major factor in victory when employed in combination with land and sea power. The "triphibious" victory that seemed likely before August 1945 led some airmen to conclude, as did

Major General Follett Bradley, that

We do not need a Mahan of air power so much as an oracle of combined operations— triphibious if you will. The true

"'Herman S. Wolk, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, 1943-1947. (Washington, D.G., 1984), pp. 128-131. 15

expositor of military things to come...must evaluate correctly the effect of air power in combination with land and sea power on a battle, a campaign, and a war, and he must know something of the techniques by which that effect is produced.6

Even after 1945, the implications of atomic weapons were far from clear.

There was some doubt among both Navy, Army, and Air Force officers

(including Admiral William Leahy, General Dwight Eisenhower, and General

Ira Eaker) as to whether the bombs dropped on Japan were necessary. All wartime planning for the postwar military structure took place without knowledge of the bomb. Afterwards, a sense of dread led some to question its usefulness as the cornerstone of US national defense.^

The future role of tactical air power in the postwar Air Force mission was already a matter of debate in early 1946, as it had been from the earliest days of air power theory. Some hard-core strategic bombing enthusiasts, like Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of the AAF and one of the original Douhetans in the US air service, admitted that operations in the European theater proved the value of "tactical" operations and demonstrated their potential decisiveness in ground campaigns.® General

Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold, another well-known strategic bombing advocate and Commanding General of the AAF during World War II, warned at war’s end against letting the lessons of that war— either'tactical or

^Follett Bradley, "A Mahan of the Air," Letter to the Editor, New York Times, April 9, 1945.

■^David Maclssac, The Air Force and Strategic Thought, 1945-1951," International Security Studies Program, Wilson Center, Working Paper number 8, (Washington, D.C.; 1979), p.13.

®Spaatz, as a Major in the Army Air Service in the 1920s, was a partner of General Billy Mitchell in the drafting of U.S. strategic bombing theory and one of the first Air Force separatists in the 1920s and 1930s. As such, he was never regarded as an ally of air ground cooperation 16

strategic— lead to rigidity or complacency. "National safety would be

endangered)" he argued, "by an air force whose doctrines and techniques

are tied solely to the equipment and processes of the moment." He went

on to state that an air force "which does not keep its doctrine ahead of

its equipment, and its vision for into the future, can only delude the

nation into a false sense of security." While he surely meant a large

part of that "forward looking" strategy to involve strategic forces, he

added that

The basic planning, development, organization and training of the Air Force must be well-rounded, covering every modern means of waging air war. . . .The Air Force’s doctrine must be flexible at all times and entirely uninhibited by tradition.

If Arnold’s statement could be interpreted as a call for an Air

Force with capabilities and doctrine that considered both strategic and

tactical missions, there were a number of air theorists who disagreed.

The most vocal element of the strategic bombing advocates concluded that

the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were decisive in the Pacific

and proved the validity of strategic bombing theory and rendered ground

campaigns virtually obsolete. These bomber enthusiasts rushed to prove

that military strategy had entered a new era from which it could not turn back, one that left all operational experience prior to August 9, 1945

irrelevant. The ominous aspect of such theory for TAC was its ultimate conclusion that tactical air support of conventional surface operations

was not merely unnecessary but constituted a perilous misapplication of resources that might cost the US victory in a future war. 17

One extremely high-profile advocate of this position was Alexandr

de Seversky, a Russian expatriate pilot and long-time air power

proponent. In a February 1946 report to Secretary of War Robert

Patterson on "The Role of Air Power in the Victory over Japan" de

Seversky asserted that "the classic doctrine that a nation cannot be

defeated while its army is intact has been cancelled out for all time."

The reason air power was not decisive in Europe, he argued, was that air

forces there were auxiliaries in support of the surface strategy whereas

in the Pacific the air forces applied were primarily strategic. He

ignored two years of painstaking advances across the Central Pacific that

enabled the allied forces to seize air bases that brought the Japanese mainland within range of the big bombers, not to mention the

contributions that both land- and sea-based tactical air forces made to

that effort. He then went on to assert that the Japanese "because of

their geographic advantage of tremendous distance and formidable terrain, would have had an excellent chance to fight the war at least to a draw."

At the very least, he concluded, without resort to the atom bomb, the US would likely have found itself in a war that was "protracted for tens and even scores of years, and most likely would have ended in stalemate." De

Seversky dismissed concerns over the moral implications of atomic war as

little more than sentimentalism and condemned what he saw as a psychological resistance to strategic bombing that delayed its use in the war and cost unnecessary loss of life. There were, he argued, "no visible effects different in nature from those caused by incendiary bombing," and "had Hiroshima and Nagasaki been modern concrete and steel cities, there would have been no wholesale collapse of houses, no IB bonfire, and no such tremendous loss of life.

Fortunately, the mainstream within the Air Force did not share de

Seversky’s extreme views and realized that US strategy could not rely entirely on atomic war especially given the likely transient nature of the US atomic monopoly. Still, an increasing proportion of air advocates, both within and outside the Air Force, came to agree that air power’s future lay with strategic rather than tactical aviation.

Spaatz held that the Air Force had an obligation to maintain a viable tactical capability and urged his commanders to seek "strong personal relationships with the commanders and staff of the other services" in the spirit of cooperation. His motives for doing so, however, were far from altruistic, stemming from the recognition that any attempt to downgrade the role of tactical air power within the air force would lead to almost immediate agitation among ground force commanders for a separate Army tactical air arm.ii Regardless of the motive, however, Spaatz did give

Eisenhower and General Omar Bradley his word that the Air Force would honor its pledge to maintain a capability to provide strong tactical

^Alexandr de Seversky, "Report to Secretary of War Robert Patterson on the Role of Air Power in the Victory over Japan," 11 February 1946, Papers of Carl Spaatz [hereafter cited as Spaatz Papers], Library of Congress— Manuscript Division [hereafter cited as LC/MD], Washington, D.C., Box 255, "Air Power— U.S."

*-'^See, for example, Robert F. Futrell, "The Influence of the Air Power Concept on Air Planning, 1945-1962," Militarv Planning in the Twentieth Centurv, Proceeding of the Eleventh Military History Symposium, USAF Academy, (Washington, D.C.: 1986); John T. Greenwood, "The Emergence of the Post-war Strategic Air Force, 1945-1953," Air Power and Warfare. Proceedings of the Eighth Military History Symposium, USAF Academy, (Washington, B.C.: 1979); and, Maclssac, The Air Force and Strategic Thought.

i*Wolk, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, p. 128. 19 support to ground forces. Still, Spaatz was at heart a Douhetan and he too basked in the afterglow of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. World War II, he explained, "fully demonstrated the soundness of our concept of the strategic air offensive." The atom bomb, far from altering those basic concepts, had "given us another weapon for the exploitation of air power to a degree not dreamed of before." In this context, in calling for interservice cooperation, Spaatz seemed almost to be humoring the now obsolete surface forces, as he explained that "while it is true that any future conflict will undoubtedly begin with air action and may well be consummated by it, the Air force must be able to workconjointly with the

Ground Forces and with the Navy."'^

The broader defense establishment was somewhat more conservative in its estimation of the future role of air power relative to the other services. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee (the principal policy planning agency for the JCS) concluded that, while the atom bomb was revolutionary and greatly enhanced US strategic capabilities, it did not-

-especially given the transitory nature of the atomic monopoly— eliminate the need for conventional forces to attack, occupy, and defend territory.%n all probability, the air forces would play the same roles in a future war that they did in the last, although weapons, tactics, and scope could change. The JSSC moderated its position

i^Carl Spaatz, "The Future of the Air Force," Statement on assumption of Command, USAAF, 9 March 1946, Spaatz Papers, Box 255, "Air Power— U.S.," p. 9-10.

i^Three flag or general officers (often one from each service) made up the JSSC, which performed long-range planning and advised the JCS on strategic matters. See, James F. Schnabel, Historv of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 1: 1945-1947, (Wilmington, 1979). 20

somewhat in response to criticism from Eisenhower that its report

underestimated the implications of atomic weapons for future military

planning. Still, the JSSC stood by its recommendation that the Air Force

join the other services in the effort to counter the spreading popular

misconception that atomic weapons had rendered conventional forces obsolete lest the government lose popular support for the maintenance of a strong conventional military structure.

The central issue in determining the character of the postwar military was, of course, what sort of war, if any, the US was likely to fight. In late 1945, the JCS compiled a list of likely scenarios, most of which involved territorial disputes, conflicts arising from British and French attempts to resurrect their colonial empires, social upheaval in areas hard-hit by the war, and the continuing political turmoil in

China. The defense establishment regarded the prospect of direct conflict with the Soviets over Western Europe or Asia a possibility, but still a remote one. Because it doubted that the United Nations would become effective in restraining major power conflicts, the JCS concluded that the US would have to retain its capability to fight major wars and, until the US atomic stockpile was considerable larger, conventional ones.

It concluded, however, that pressure for demobilization necessitated some dependence on atomic striking power to hold back Soviet advances until the US had time to mobilize. Ironically, while limited-war scenarios dominated the JCS’s own list of likely threats, virtually no planning was

^'‘Schnabel, Historv of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. 1: 1945 1947, pp. 279-280. 21

devoted to preparing for them.i=

The Japanese surrender had brought intense domestic political

pressure to "bring the boys home" and left servicemen still on active

duty but eager to return to civilian life dissatisfied and uncooperative.

The Truman administration wanted to balance the budget and return the

economy to a more sound, peacetime footing and regarded defense spending

as an unnecessary strain. Truman, thanks in part to the influence of

Ambassador George Kennan’s "Long Telegram" of March 1946, hoped that

economic and political pressure could effectively defend US interests by

constricting the Soviet Union’s influence in nations seeking economic

development or reconstruction.^* In so doing, the US could defend its

international interests while avoiding a continuing and costly need for a

direct military presence in Europe. Through economic assistance programs

like the Marshall Plan (Europe) and Point Four (Western Hemisphere), the

Truman administration hoped to advance the cause of freedom without

resort to military force. As Secretary of State from January 1947 to

January 1949, General George C. Marshall would promote this view that the

i=Ibid.. pp. 140-143, 276-283.

i*Kennan based the "Long Telegram" (so named because it totalled well over 5,000 words) on the contention that the Soviets were not fundamentally different from their Tzarist predecessors as regarded their relationships with the outside world. Their "Marxist" ideology, he argued, was merely a "fig leaf" that the Stalinists used to rationalize the political oppression and military excesses of the current regime. Since, like the Russians before them, the Soviets were unlikely to attack a strong opponent, the US need only create the appearance of relative strength to thwart Soviet expansionism. Kennan stressed the importance of energetic US propaganda in Europe and other threatened areas, economic vitality in the US and Western Europe, and a strong alliance with Britain and other Western nations to block the spread of Soviet influence. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VI, (Washington, B.C., 1966), pp. 696-709. 22

dollar was mightier than the sword and implement it in a number of

postwar economic recovery programs abroad.

The AAF’s tactical air assets had been particularly hard hit by

demobilization and constituted little more than a skeleton force by late

1945. In an effort to consolidate what remained of its tactical

capability, the AAF redeployed its surviving tactical units to Biggs

Field, Texas under the command of the Third Air Force (a training

organization during World War II). On December 5, the CAF directed Third

Air Force Headquarters to evaluate its tactical program and make recommendations for a future structure for the Operational Air Force. Oh

December 22, Third Air Force forwarded its recommendations along with an outline of requirements for an aii— ground cooperative command that it compiled with the help of the XlXth Tactical Air Command. The

Continental Air Force immediately set out to develop a final operating plan for presentation to the Commanding General of the AAF. The proposal, based on the operational structure of the Ninth Air Force in the European Theater, hinged on two fundamental organizational

i^Marshall also tended to be more favorably disposed toward the Air Force program than might be expected from an Army officer. While he never bought the entire Air Force line, he acknowledged the revolutionary nature of air power and tended to agree that much of the Army and Navy criticism stemmed from institutional jealousy. Marshall had taught Billy Mitchell at the Army Staff College and was a lifelong friend of Hap Arnold, who was his hand picked choice as Commander of the AAF during the war. He had earned a reputation within the Army as an unorthodox tactician and a critic of Army "scholasticism," and seemed by nature more receptive to the ideas of aviators than the average ground officers. See Frederic A. Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force, (Baltimore: 1980), p. 26-28. 23

requirements: mobility and flexibility.^®

A War Department directive dated March 21, 1946 ended speculation

as to the fate of the CAF. The AAF, in consultation with the other

services and the War Department, had developed a final plan for the

interim air force that divided the CAF's missions into three key parts:

strategic operations, tactical operations, and air defense. Rather than

centralizing all three under one headquarters in the Zone of Interior,

the AAF created three independent commands, each charged with one of the

key missions. It redesignated Headquarters, CAF as Headquarters,

Strategic Air Command, created two new Commands for Air Defense (ADC) and

Tactical Air (TAC), and divided the operational units of the CAF among ,

the three new commands, allocating the Third Air Force and the IX Troop

Carrier Command to TAC.^^ Tactical Air Command also took over the

Headquarters organization of the Third Air Force at Drew Field in Tampa.

Tlie AAF appointed Major General Quesada, commander of the Third Air

Force, to assume command of TAC upon its activation and established its

interim mission prior to its activation on March 21.®” TAC's mission, as

*®Historv of the Headquarters, Third Air Force, 2 September 1945 - 21 March 1946, Volume I, 438.01, AFS/HRC, p. 103.

^■^Adjutant General’s Office, Letter order establishing Air Defense, Strategic Air, and Tactical Air Commands, 21 March 1946, 170.46-2, AFS/HRC; Unclassified letter, Edward F. Whitesell to Comm. Gens. AAF and CAF, War Department AG 322, 21 March 1946, "Establishment of Air Defense, Strategic Air, and Tactical Air Commands; Redesignation of the Headquarters Continental Air Forces and Certain Other Army Air Forces Units; Activation, Inactivation and Assignment of Certain Army Air Forces Units," History, Headquarters CAF, Exhibit 59.

®”Available sources regarding the development of the Tactical Air Command in its early period, 1946 through 1947, presents something of a problem for the researcher. TAC did not begin writing unit histories until late 1948, and the histories for the previous two years were compiled retroactively. Unfortunately, as the TAC historian explains in 24 forwarded to Quesada on March 12 was to

be prepared to participate in joint operations with ground and/or sea forces; to cooperate with the Air Defense Command in the Air Defense Mission; to operate independently in offensive operations; to train units and personnel for the maintenance of the tactical forces in all parts of the world; to cooperate with Army Ground Forces in training of airborne troops; to perform such special missions as the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, may direct.

In addition to the operational units it inherited from the CAF, the

AAF assigned additional units to TAC including the XIX Tactical Air

Command, and two inactive Headquarters and Headquarters Squadrons, the

Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces. Upon its activation, TAC consisted of forty-one stations in twenty-one states: three under Ninth Air Force, fourteen under Third Air Force, and twenty-four directly under TAC

Headquarters. Of these, however, fewer than half were on active duty status, the rest either on standby or surplus status. Ninth Air Force was reactivated at Biggs Field in El Paso, Texas on March 28 and assigned eighteen subordinate units including the XIX Tactical Air Command. On

March 31, TAC inactivated the IX Troop Carrier Command and reassigned its units as the Third Air Force (Troop Carrier). TAC was now established as a coequal command with an impressive organization but in reality still existed largely on paper. It would take time, resources, and energetic

the introduction to the 1946 volume, by December 1947 when TAC began the collection of material for these histories "much of the data pertaining to the period March 1946 - December 1946 had already disappeared." Because of the dearth of hard documentary evidence for the period, some gaps still exist and other evidence comes, of necessity, from less direct or secondary sources.

s^Letter, Commanding General Army Air Forces to Commanding General Tactical Air Command, Subject: Interim Mission, 12 March 1946, Historv of the Tactical Air Command [hereafter cited as TAC History], March 1946 - December 1946, Vol. I, 417.01, AFS/HRC, Supp. Doc. #4. 25

and determined leadership to transform it into a viable operational

command.

Few men were more qualified or better suited to take over command

of the infant TAC than Major General Quesada. His credentials as a

tactical aviator were impeccable, and he enjoyed high regard among Air

Force officers, Army ground force commanders, and civilian policymakers

alike. Quesada began his Air Force career in 1925, received his first

active duty posting in 1927 and immediately established a reputation as

aninnovator and a risk taker.As a student at the Air Corps Tactical

School in the 1930s, he was properly indoctrinated with strategic bombing

theory but also appreciated the views of "renegades" like Claire

Chennault who warned that air forces should not pursue the independent

offensive mission to the exclusion of other and (in the Air Force view)

less potentially decisive missions. Quesada also studied at the Army

Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth where he developed

considerable familiarity with ground operations.

Quesada acquired extensive tactical air experience during World War

II, first in Africa under RAF Air Vice Marshall Sir Arthur ("Maori")

®*^A participant in the January 1929 flight of the Question Mark, Quesada can be counted among the founding fathers of air refueling. He was also the first aviator to fly solo from Buenos Aires to Norfolk. In 1942, as a colonel in the First Air Force, he nearly faced a court martial after ordering his air defense forces to end the dangerous practice of using searchlights to identify incoming planes at night, increasing the risk of landing accidents. Quesada reasoned that since currently operational German aircraft could barely reach England from their home bases. Air Defense Forces could safely assume that there were none within a thousand mile radius of the U.S. and that any incoming aircraft were, thus, friendly. John Schlight, "Elwood R. Quesada: Tac Air Comes of Age," in John L. Frisbee,Makers of the United States Air Force, (Washington, D.C., 1987). 26

Coningham and later as commander of the IX Tactical Air Command in

Western Europe. He credited Coningham and the RAF with much of the

success in air-ground operations and the formulation of US tactical air

doctrine. In cooperation with General Omar Bradley, Commander of the

First Army, Quesada made important advances in air-ground tactics,

including improvising one of the first tactical air control parties

during the breakout at St. LÔ. Prior to that time, Quesada shared the

aviator’s aversion to close support, and throughout his career he

remained resistant to the Army tendency toward excessive reliance on

aircraft for firepower support, but he came to realize, however, that

this is where the fighting is. . .the infantry is doing the fighting. . .the results are proven. [Close air support] does help them in their role, and that’s what I’m there for. I’m willing to do almost anything to help them.^a

Quesada’s rare talent for cooperation with the ground forces

enabled him to establish valuable friendships. The resulting influence

and respect he enjoyed among Army commanders would serve both him and the

Air Force well after the war, although some of his fellow air officers

disparaged his ready cooperation with the Army ground forces, charging

that he was aiding and abetting the Army in its attempt to acquire its

own tactical air force. While unwilling to "waste lives and use airpower

in a ineffective way" or to provide ground support at the expense of more

lucrative targets, Quesada emerged from the European campaign with a view seldom voiced in the postwar Air Force: that the answer to the conflict over service priorities was to establish a fair balance and that "you

^^Quesada Oral History, interview #3, p. 14. 27

can’t just sit there and say 'hell,

Generals Arnold and Spaatz greatly admired Quesada and tried to have him assigned as President Harry Truman’s military aide. When their campaign failed, he served briefly as chief intelligence officer of the

AAF. Administrative duty was not to his liking (it "just bored the hell out of me"), and immediately after V-J Day he joined an AAF group— which included Spaatz, Ira Eaker, Fred Anderson, Lauris Norstad, and Hoyt

Vandenberg— formed to lobby for the creation of an independent Air Force.

Quesada’s specific role, as he saw it, was to "resist and explain and advocate and argue why the tactical air forces should not be moved over to the Army." He was particularly suited to the job because he could

"argue with a great degree of conviction, and with some degree of experience, and hopefully [be] listened to at times.

Quesada proved himself a valuable lobbyist for the independent Air

Force, particularly among Army ground officers, not a few of whom acknowledged their indebtedness to him for his determined and reliable support during the war in Europe. As he himself acknowledged years later,

It was to some extent. . .the confidence that Bradley and Eisenhower had in. . .Pete Quesada [that] was generated during the war in Europe that permitted them to accept philosophically the idea [that] the air forces knew their arms best.

Quesada had also established a number of valuable friendships on Capital

Hill, particularly with Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Chairman of the

Army Services subcommittee in the Senate. Quesada willingly put his

e^Ibid., Interview #3, p. 14.

z^Ibid., Interview #3, p. 31. 28

considerable personal reputation on the line on behalf of the independent

Air Force, believing that the new Air Force would recognize the

importance of sustaining the good operational relationship that he had

hammered out with the Army during the war and would, as a show of good

faith, build and maintain a viable tactical air capability. General

Spaatz, who later became the first Chief of Staff of the Air Force,

agreed with Quesada and assured General Dwight Eisenhower and General

Bradley that "the Air Force would always honor and always meet its

commitments to the Army and provide strong tactical air forces.in

the end, the Army brass, led by Eisenhower, endorsed the creation of the

US Air Force and agreed that it could best carry out the tactical air

mission. In a letter to all members of the Army on the occasion of

Truman’s signing of the National Security Act of 1947 on July 26, 1947,

Eisenhower expressed his conviction that the Army and the Air Force could

work together in the best interest of both:

I am particularly anxious that the existing pleasant and friendly relations between the ground and air personnel continues and that every possible means be adopted to insure that legal recognition of the autonomy of the air force will serve only to bring us closer together in friendship and performance of duty.^?

When Quesada assumed command of TAC in March, 1946, he did so with

enthusiasm and determination, genuinely committed to the idea that the

^ Ibid., Interview #3, p. 33; Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine; A Historv of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: 1971), p. 105.

E7"Letter from Dwight Eisenhower to all members of the Army," 26 July 1947, RG 165: Records of the Army Chief of Staff, Decimal File, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Box 365, Book 1. 29

Army and Air Force could function as an effective team in air-ground operations and believing that both his personal honor and that of the Air

Force were on the line. He sought a structural organization for TAC that was fully self-contained and patterned on the Ninth Air Force and

Tactical Air Command in Europe with their inherent mobility and flexibility. On April 12, he submitted to Headquarters, AAF an organizational plan for TAC designed to provide the mobility and flexibility he believed was necessary if TAC were to fulfill its mission of tactical air support of ground force operations. Quesada’s plan proposed three numbered air forces under TAC, the Ninth and Twelfth as

"Tactical" air forces and the Third as a Troop Carrier air force. In the interest of effective cooperation with ground forces in training and maneuvers, the plan suggested stationing one of the tactical air forces

(the Twelfth) on the West Coast and the other (the Ninth) on the East

Coast. The Third (Troop Carrier) would move to Greenville Air Base,

North Carolina, because of its proximity to Army airborne and parachute schools at Fort Bragg and Fort Benning. The AAF rejected his proposal to move the Ninth, frustrating his plans and leaving both tactical air forces in the Western half of the United States.

On May 27, Quesada moved Headquarters TAC from Tampa to Langley

Field, Virginia, which TAC had recently acquired from Air Transport

Command. The Department of the Army planned to activate the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces (AFF) in November under the command of

General Jacob Devers, to simulate an Army group headquarters for training in the Zone of Interior. Quesada believed interservice cooperation in

z^TAC Historv, March - December 1946, Vol. I, pp. 16-17. 30

the development of joint doctrine, techniques, training, and maneuvers,

required the establishment of parallel headquarters that could work side

by side in close proximity. He thus proposed moving TAC headquarters to

Langley Air Base, Virginia, which was close to both AFF Headquarters at

Fort Monroe, Virginia, and the Atlantic Fleet Headquarters at Norfolk.

Equally committed to the concept of joint operations, Quesada and Devers

kept in close touch so that, as the former explained, "we wouldn’t go off

managing our own affairs. . .in their own vacuum.In fact, early on

they considered sharing a station and establishing a joint headquarters

with TAC and AFF having adjacent offices in the same building.

Although their utopian vision did not come entirely to fruition, the two

worked well together. The fact that Devers outranked Quesada was the

source of some consternation at Air Force Headquarters but never bothered

Quesada, who believed that in settling their differences "logic would

carry the day rather than rank."^^ Both Quesada and Devers, however,

faced an uphill battle in selling the concepts of effective air-ground

cooperation within their respective services, both of which had deeply

held convictions concerning the proper relationship of air and ground forces. The job became even tougher as budget cuts led to altercations

G^Letter, Headquarters TAC to Headquarters AAF, "Organizational Plan of the Tactical Air Command," 12 April 1946, TAC Historv, March - December, 1946, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #7; Letter, Headquarters Ninth AF (Tactical) to Headquarters TAC, "A Review of Tactical Air in Joint Operations," n.d., Historv of the Tactical Air Command, July - November, 1950, Volume 4: Supporting Documents, p. 3.

aoQuesada Oral History, Interview #5, p. 23.

31TAC Historv, March - December, 1946, Vol. I, p. 31.

ssQuesada Oral History, Interview #5, p.23. 31

over limited military resources and the military unification debate

triggered enmity regarding service roles and missions that undermined the

trust that Quesada had earlier fostered between the Air Force and Army

commanders.

TAC’s initial capabilities depended overwhelmingly on World War II

left-overs in both equipment and doctrine. The only official doctrine governing tactical air operations was FM 100-20, "Command and Employment

of Air Power," that the AAF had compiled based on operational experience from the North African campaign and existing RAF doctrine. FM 100-20 had

not been revised since its publication in July 1944, and thus did not reflect the important technological and tactical advances made in Western

Europe and the Pacific during the latter years of the war. Futhermore, it was a source of consternation in the Army because it ranked cooperation with surface forces dead last among air priorities. Even among tactical air priorities, aii— ground operations was the third priority behind air superiority and interdiction.Despite repeated assurances from the Air Force that the order of tactical missions did not imply that one took absolute precedence over the other, the Army suspected that the order of missions was no accident. One of the most important early accomplishments of TAC was the drafting of FM 31-35t "Air

Ground Operations" based primarily on the innovations of Quesada and other tactical air commanders during World War II. FM 31-35 was essentially a sound doctrine, but it did not provide adequate guidance for joint training and operations or room for adjustments to technology

B^War Department Field Manual FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, (Washington, B.C.: July 1944), Chapter 2: Air Operations, p. 6, 9-11. 32

and tactics in the future. Quesada and other tactical air advocates

recognized the need for more comprehensive doctrine than that provided by

FM 100-20 and FM 31-35, but administrative and demobilization pressures

precluded any serious effort to formulate truly joint doctrine until

1949. In the interim, Quesada and Devers commenced aii— ground training

and maneuvers using them as a laboratory through which to develop de

facto doctrine based on newer technology and more varied scenarios.

In an effort to modernize its capabilities, TAC established

internal research and development priorities based on the command's

analysis of deficiencies in its wartime operations. Among the most

crucial weaknesses TAC perceived in its capabilities were: the inability

of combat air forces to conduct operations at night or in periods of bad

weather (which in Northern Europe was most of the time), inadequate radar

capabilities, and the application of new jet aircraft to air-ground

operations. The Command undertook several major projects to overcome

those problems, including: Q4876, "The Development of Doctrine and

Techniques for Tactical Night Striking Units Employing Light Bombardment

Aircraft; Q4S41 to test the tactical capabilities of the P-BO; H4B56 to

develop radar and communication equipment for tactical air control; and,

H4B04 to test navigation systems for Airborne operations which eventually

led to the establishment of the Pathfinder School.

TAC's equipment also consisted primarily of hand-me-downs and two new aircraft types that had emerged from the research and development

system too late to see action during the war. TAC's primary cargo and

troop transport aircraft were C-46s, C-47s, C-54s, and C-B2s along with

3^TAC History, March - December 1946, Vol. I, pp. 74-7B. 33

scattered gliders and helicopters. For tactical bombardment TAC used the

A-26 and the B-25; its fighters consisted primarily of P-47s, P-51s, and

the new jet fighter, the P-SO "Shooting Star." Assorted liaison aircraft

(L-6s), heavy bombers, including B-17s, and trainers like the T-6 rounded

out TAC's capabilities. The two latest models, the P-80 and the C-82,

were new to the flight lines and bedeviled TAC with performance and

maintenance problems that strained already scarce personnel. Overall,

numbers of aircraft available proved less of a problem for the command

than keeping them in service as demobilization drained skilled labor and

pilots from TAC's ranks.

Despite the obvious obstacles, Quesada and Devers made notable

progress in establishing a spirit of jointness between the two commands

and in encouraging the other services to participate in their experiment.

In November, 1946, TAC participated in its first major joint Army-Navy-

Air Force training exercises. Operations MOUNTAIN GOAT and ALISO CANYON,

at Camp Pendelton, California, in which six tactical air groups flew a

total of 3,337 troop carrier and close-support missions over a two week

period. These exercises also marked the first use of a jet-propelled

aircraft, the P-80, as a fighter-bomber in close support of friendly

ground forces. TAC units participated as well in 159 air shows and

recruiting demonstrations, which Quesada considered essential to "selling

the importance of air power to national defense to the American people."

By May, the strain on TAC's limited fleet forced Quesada to streamline

such activities. He first established "Squadron 2," which concentrated all air demonstration activity in one unit, relieving the pressure on

other TAC units and freeing them for important training activities. 34

Later, in November, the demand so exceeded available assets that the AAF suspended all air demonstrations.3=

Despite his dedication to the tactical air mission, Quesada faced almost insurmountable challenges to his attempt to build a viable capability during a period of massive demobilization. In October, AAF

Regulation 20-19 declared TAC's permanent mission:

[To] provide and operate that portion of the AAF which is maintained in the United Sates, and in such other areas as may be designated from time to time, for cooperating with land and sea forces in the conduct of land and amphibious operations.

AAF 20-19 went on to delegate a number of specific responsibilities to the command including troop carrier, liaison, helicopter, and tow-target aviation, along with development and testing of research projects.

Unfortunately, in the year since the German surrender, AAF manpower strength had fallen from 2,282,259 in June 1945 to 455,515 in June 1946.

Prior to TAC's activation, CAF had notified Spaatz that "the Army Air

Forces can no longer be considered anything more than a symbolic instrument of national defense" and that "willy nilly" discharge of key personnel and trained maintenance specialists had caused the basic structure of the Air Forces to dissipate.In March, Spaatz warned that the current air force could not fight at wartime effectiveness and set

January 1, 1947 as the deadline for restoring the AAF to "fighting effectiveness." Spaatz warned the budget-cutting Truman administration that the AAF required certain minimum levels, including a minimum 400,000

3=TAC Historv, March - December, 1946, Vol. I, pp. 66-67.

G^Schnabel, Historv of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. 1; 1945 - 1947, p. 215, 238. 35

in manpower. "The Army Air Force," he warned, "can accomplish its

mission only if it maintains an air force-in-being of adequate size and

proper composition, strategically deployed, and in a high constant state

.of readiness."3? The Truman administration, however, went ahead with

its "economy" program to bring relief to the taxpayers, part of which was

to cut military spending across the board and Air Force expansion plans

from seventy to fifty groups.

Tactical Air Command and the two other major air commands thus

faced the challenge of reaching "fighting effectiveness" while at the

same time revising their existing programs downward in the interest of

economy. TAC streamlined its operations by cancelling activation of new

operational and service units and transferring all but one of its surplus

fields to other commands.In September the AAF approved a TAC plan to

inactivate the Third (Troop Carrier) Air Force and move the Ninth Air

Force to its Greenville, North Carolina base to facilitate maneuvers with

Army units stationed at Forts Bragg and Benning. While concerned that

combining two distinct missions— tactical air and troop carrier— might

prove to the detriment of both, Quesada concluded that "we must not be

influenced by our desire to keep our little empire intact" and must "make

a conscious effort to contribute to the economy forced upon us." The advantages of finally having a tactical air force headquarters

permanently stationed on the east coast, he believed, would offset any

3?Sidney Shalett, "Spaatz Shakes up Army Air Forces," The New York Times, 13 March 1946, p. 16.

30TAC Historv, 1947, Volume I : Mission and Organizational Developments, January - December, 1947 (August 1949), p. 50, 417.01, AFS/HRC; TAC Historv, March - December 1946, Vol. I, pp. 20, 33-40. 36

potential loss of relative mission effectiveness.^?

The most troublesome product of demobilization was the constant

shortage of trained personnel, particularly in maintenance and other

support functions, that TAC and the Air Force would battle until 1950.

Pilot losses were, of course, particularly debilitating given both the

demand and the length of time required to train new pilots. Postwar

demand for ferry pilots was a further drain on TAC's limited resources

and severely impeded tactical training.In May, the Air Force began

monthly reductions of civilian support personnel until, by December 31, civilian strength in the Air Force dropped from 10,000 to approximately

4,000.^1 The loss of civilian personnel particularly hurt TAC and offset

its modest increase in enlisted personnel earlier in the year. As a result, the command curtailed or consolidated some administrative and

support activities and diverted time and resources from building TAC capabilities into recruiting and training. High accident rates brought on by insufficient training of maintenance personnel and pilots demonstrated the severity of technical and support shortages and forced

TAC to establish a permanent Flying Safety Program to alert group commanders to the problem. Despite stepped up recruiting and training programs, the command remained under-manned and the annual turnover rate for trained personnel was high: 125 percent for officers and 118 percent for enlisted personnel. The high attrition among enlisted personnel left

TAC distressingly top-heavy, making it difficult to find suitable

3?TAC Historv, March - December 1946, Vol. I, pp. 19-21.

^■>TAC Historv, 1947, Vol. I, p. 52.

^^TAC History, March - December 1946, Vol. I, pp. 138-142. 37 postings for commissioned officers and forcing some to perform functions normally assigned to non-commissioned officers or senior enlisted men.

The effect on morale was predictably degenerative."^ In March, the ratio of officer to enlisted men in TAC was roughly 1:2 and by December had improved to only 1:9. Well into 1947, efforts to offset losses brought on by the demobilization— or disintegration— of the wartime AAF overshadowed TAC's primary mission: establishing a viable and effective combat air arm."^

The nine months between March and December, 1946 constituted a period of both frustration and achievement for the fledgling Tactical Air

Command. Most of the frustrations— manpower shortages, maintenance, training, for example— were the products of external forces and factors well beyond the control of TAC's commanders. Of these, demobilization and budget-cutting proved the most troublesome. By December, TAC could, nonetheless, boast of some notable achievements. Reorganization over the course of the year resulted in a more streamlined, unified, and cohesive

TAC and enabled it more easily to surmount the disadvantages of its diverse origins. TAC was still far from a final solution to its personnel shortages, but by December it had at least taken concrete steps to minimize its adverse affects. In one respect, TAC was able to turn demobilization to its advantage by instituting a "force-out" program to purge all but the highest caliber officers from its ranks. There was, according to one command directive, "no room for borderline officers who

•Ibid., pp. 96-100.

"^Annual Report of the Secretarv of the Air Force for Fiscal Year 1948, July 1, 1947 - June 30, 1948, (Washington, 1948), pp. 149-150. 38

cannot be depended on to carry their share of the responsibilities."'^'*

All these steps had the cumulative affect of increasing stability within

the command, a prerequisite to overcoming the trauma of creating a new

command organization and getting on with the business of creating a

viable combat air arm.

During its first months in 1946 TAC was like a premature infant:

alive and breathing, but struggling to develop the capability and

strength to survive as a viable independent entity. While TAC's

surroundings had not yet become malevolent, strategic bombing was on the

ascent and became its prime competitor for limited assets— material,

intellectual, and political. Tactical air power profited from a

dedicated and stubborn if small cadre of advocates within the air force

who saw the military milieu differently than most of their AAF

colleagues. Their determined advocacy of tactical air power, Spaatz's

promise to the Army, and a few outspoken political allies kept TAC alive.

TAC's single best guarantee of survival in late 1946, however, stemmed

from the force within the AAF that most directly threatened it: the aspirations of those who sought an independent strategic Air Force. Air

Force planners whose ultimate goal was the creation of the world's premier strategic air force did not relish devoting scarce resources to

tactical air capabilities that only benefitted the Army, but they understood that given the nature of interservice politics the latter was

impossible without first ensuring the former.

'*'*TAC Historv, March - December 1946, Vol. I, p. 128. 39

The outlook for TAG brightened somewhat in early 1947 as the Air

Force began to turn its attention to the prospect of becoming an

independent service. TAG was central to the process because the Air

Force leaders, whatever their view of the relative importance of tactical

air operations were good politicians. The Navy opposed unification

because it would create a centralized military bureaucracy and grant the

Air Force its independence. The creation of the Secretary of Defense to

oversee all military policy and the legitimation of the JGS would

undermine the autonomy that the Navy had enjoyed for nearly two

centuries. The establishment of an independent air force might

challenge its own naval air force as well as its claim to strategic

decisiveness in the postwar period.

The Navy's resistance made Army support for the Air Force position

in the unification debate imperative. An important step in courting the

Army was to convince ground force commanders that an independent Air

Force would provide adequate tactical air support to surface operations.

Quesada, who had already spent several months in the Pentagon lobbying

among Army officers, was especially cognizant of that requirement, and he

determined that TAG would provide that support in such a way as to convince the Army that they could not perform the mission as well as TAG.

The establishment of the United States Air Force, he believed, should be treated not as "a pillow but as a springboard." The future progress of

USAF depended, in his view, on "livCing] up to all the things we have said we can do" in a spirit of "understanding and cooperation" in relations with the Army and the Navy. In so doing, the Air Force too sought to "gain a great deal in the future which might otherwise be 40

lost." In early January, Quesada initiated a program to indoctrinate TAG personnel in the principles behind service unification and Air Force

independence in order to foster such understanding.On the occasion of

the signing of the National Security Act of 1947 that gave the Air Force its institutional independence, Quesada stated that

The onus is upon us to accomplish the unification now provided by law. The establishment of the United States Air Force affords us the opportunity to bring the personnel of all services more closely together in a common objective to support and defend the country. To attain this objective, all members of this command are enjoined to maintain cordial relations with the personnel of the other services with whom they come into contact. We must spare no effort to instill in the minds of all , that we are part of a hard-hitting team with no other objective than the adequate defense of our country.

TAG had already issued new mission statements for the Ninth and

Twelfth Air Forces that stressed that the command's highest priority was on its joint mission, stating that the two operational Air Forces would:

be specifically trained and equipped to cooperate and participate in conjunction with surface forces and ground armies for conducting land and amphibious operations. In accomplishing its mission, maximum cooperation and coordination will be effected with other air forces and units of this command.'»’’’

In both mission statements, Quesada underscored the predominance of the operational training aspect of TAG’s mission in an attempt to shift the

4'=TAG Letter 327, "Unification of the Armed Forces," January 6, 1947, TAG History, 1947, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #57/2.

'♦'^Letter from Maj. Gen. Elwood Quesada to all TAG units, "National Security Act of 1947," August 1, 1947, TAG Historv, 1947, Vol. 1, Supp. Doc. # 69.

''■’Letter, Glenn 0. Barcus, Ghief of Staff TAG, Headquarters TAG to Headquarters 9th AF, "Mission of the Ninth Air Force," 14 January 1947, TAG Historv, 1947, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #6. TAG issued an identical mission statement for the Twelfth Air Force on 11 February. 41

command's emphasis from demobilization and recruiting, which had sapped

its energy and resources during 1946 to building TAG into an effective

combat air arm. As certain as he was that a fully independent Air Force,

and tactical air forces co-equal to ground armies were essential to

effective exploitation of air power, Quesada understood that neither of

those goals precluded— in fact, both demanded— constructive communication

and cooperation with ground forces.

In pursuit of a new era of Air Force-Army cooperation, Quesada and

Devers committed their limited resources to a progressive program of

joint training and maneuvers during 1947 aimed at convincing skeptics on

both sides that effective teamwork between co-equal ground and air commanders was indeed possible. By early 1947, however, the demand for

such joint demonstrations and exercises overwhelmed TAC's ability to supply units to participate in them. In part to reduce strain on their

limited resources, TAG and the AFF centralized such activity in the Air

Ground Indoctrination Gourse conducted between February and May. The

Gourse replaced the numerous small-scale maneuvers and recruitment demonstrations that dominated TAG activities during the previous year with a single large-scale exercise that encompassing the full scope of tactical air operations. The four-day demonstration was repeated in all eight Army ground force schools over a four-month period, and provided the Ninth Air Force with a total of 1,040 training sorties and 3,247 flying hours. In the course of the demonstrations, TAG troop carrier units transported 2,547 troops and 151,400 pounds of equipment and support aircraft expended 1,082 bombs in close support demonstrations.

The tactical air force for the Air Indoctrination Gourse consisted of 42

thirty-one A-26s, nine B-26s, twenty-four C-82s, eighteen P-47s, forty-

one P-51s, and seven FP-BOs. Virtually all operational units of the

Ninth Air Force participated in the exercises, which proved a worthwhile

training exercise for tactical air and ground force personnel alike.'*®

TAG and the AFF regarded the Air Indoctrination course as an

overall success, particularly in relieving some of the misapprehensions

over the proper relationship between air and ground forces in joint

operations. According to Quesada, it surpassed TAC’s "fondest

expectations." The ground forces could draw some reassurance that the

Air Force was committed to the mission, while TAG could, in its view,

present a picture of tactical air operations more consistent with Air

Force doctrine than had been possible in earlier, piecemeal exercises.

In his report to Spaatz at the conclusion of the first series of

demonstrations, Quesada wrote that

It was the desire of this command to evolve a plan whereby the Air-Ground Team could be displayed and examined in its entirety. The objective of such a plan was the purporting of an Air-Ground action from the time of inception to completion. Further, it was the desire of this Command to present "Tactical Air Power" in a manner congruous with the experience derived from the last conflict.'***’

Spaatz concurred with Quesada’s evaluation and commended TAG "for the accomplishment of a sound, progressive program of presenting the concept

of air employment to the Ground Forces and the conduct of the Air

Indoctrination Exercise as the prime medium of promulgation." Spaatz,

'*®Tactical Air Command, Ninth Air Force, Air Indoctrination Course, (February - May 1947), 168.607-44, AFS/HRC, Papers of Maj. Gen. Robert M. Lee.

'***’Uetter from Quesada to Spaatz, "Tactical Air Command Policy on Air-Ground Cooperation," May 28, 1947, TAG History, 1947, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #130. 43

like Quesada, welcomed the course as an opportunity to cooperate with the

ground forces without undermining the crucial emphasis on unit training

and internal USAF doctrinal consistency.

In August, the Air Indoctrination Course expanded its scope to

include greater AFF participation and thus become a more truly joint

operation. Its official title became "Operation COMBINED, A Presentation

of the Ail— Ground Team," but that cumbersome appellation was soon

shortened to "Operation COMBINE." Quesada and Devers viewed COMBINE as a

vehicle through which to "represent the proper employment of Air Power."

Operation COMBINE I made its debut at Fort Benning on September 29, with

air units under the command of the Ninth Air Force. The three-day

demonstration included all Ninth Air Force fighter, reconnaissance, and

troop carrier squadrons, two SAC units and a battalion combat team of the

82nd Airborne Division. The demonstration had a number of objectives:

to raise awareness of air-ground capabilities outside TAC and the AFF, to

hone the abilities of the airmen who participated in the exercises, and, perhaps most important, to refine the tactical air doctrines that had

emerged during World War II. COMBINE repeated its show five times during

the remainder of the year, and before an audience including the student

bodies of all the Army schools, the Command and General Staff School at

Fort Leavenworth, the Armed Forces Staff College, and Air University.

Quesada capitalized on COMBINE’S public relations value to augment TAC’s constituency, encouraged Spaatz and his Vice Chief of Staff Hoyt

Vandenberg to attend and urged them to issue invitations to Secretary of

“'-Letter from Spaatz to Quesada, June 19, 1947, TAC Historv, 1947, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #130/1. 44

the Air Force Stuart Symington and Secretary of Defense James Forrestal.

Quesada also exploited COMBINE outside the military establishment, welcoming interested members of Congress, state and local officials, and foreign military representatives. At the conclusion of COMBINE 1,

Quesada and Devers deemed it an effective and accurate representation of ail— ground capabilities and cooperation between TAC and the AFF and agreed that it would be a beneficial annual event for both commands.

TAC participated in a number of other joint exercises during 1947.

"Operation 100" involved training in the use of Joint Operations Centers

(JOC) and tactical control facilities, culminating with "Operation 200": a maneuver involving an "enemy" invasion of the Carolines that began on

December 19 and continued on a periodic basis into 1948 in which Ninth

Air Force units conducted tactical missions against the "enemy" in simulated engagements throughout the Southeast. All elements of the

Ninth Air Force participated in the training exercises, and the 502nd

Tactical Control Group provided air-ground communications. Operation

100/200 was TAC’s most extensive and sustained effort during 1947 and provided valuable training in a most crucial aspect of joint operations.

TAC units also participated in two important amphibious maneuvers. In the first, "Exercise CAMID 11"— conducted during July and August off the coast of Virginia in cooperation with the amphibious forces of the

Atlantic Fleet— TAC provided a squadron of P-51s, and several flights of P-80s provided photo reconnaissance and sent observers to assess the effectiveness and adaptability of its tactical air forces

^’•Letter, Gen. Elwood R. Quesada to Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, 8 October 1947, Papers of Hoyt Vandenberg, LC/MD, Box 45, "Tactical Air Command;" Schlight, "TAC Air Comes of Age," p. 201. 45

to the naval air coordination system.

In "Operation SEMINOLE"— conducted off the Florida coast during

October to test high level joint planning under the new defense

establishment— Twelfth Air Force provided operational units augmented by

the 502nd Tactical Control Group and the 934th Signal Battalion from the

Ninth Air Force. Troop carrier units from TAC participated in numerous

exercises in cooperation with Army airborne units, of which two of the most important were winter exercises. In "Exercise SNOWDROP," conducted

at Pine Camp, New York between November and February, TAC provided troop carrier support from the Ninth Air Force to test current equipment and develop air transport tactics and techniques for cold weather and ovei— snow missions. "Exercise YUKON," in which troop carrier elements from

the Twelfth Air Force air lifted reinforced infantry companies from Fort

Lewis, Washington to Big Delta, Alaska for arctic indoctrination

training, began in November and marked the first joint exercise in which the Army and the Air Force participated as co-equal services.

Quesada’s efforts to maintain a high public profile for TAC disguised the fact that the command still struggled with many of the same problems it faced in 1946 while the prospect of Air Force independence increased the pressure to establish greater overall effectiveness. The heavy demands of air demonstrations, joint exercises, and ferry missions exacerbated the manpower shortages and training deficiencies that continued to plague the command. Turnover rates among military personnel were also a lingering problem, and though improved from 1946-1947 levels.

”^Annual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force, FY1948, pp. 152- 154. 46

they continued to hover at 73 percent for enlisted and 64 percent for commissioned personnel. TAC persistently urged its unit commanders to

support the AAF recruiting effort. It instituted a number of incentives to attract officers and enlisted personnel into TAC such as a garrison school system that allowed military personnel to broaden their military eduction and an "Interim Training Program for AAF Officers" that offering courses for commissioned officers with less than six years service to

"advance their military eduction, broaden their understanding of AAF procedures, functions and policies, and prepare [them] for forthcoming responsibilities in the AAF." In October, TAC launched a "USAF Aviation

Cadet Program" to train 3,000 new pilots by the end of 1949 using T-6 trainers and P-51s for basic and P-80s for advanced fighter training. By years end the personnel problem remained, with some TAC units still operating at less than seventy percent of their authorized strength; but the command’s energetic recruiting program began to pay off, and as of

December 31 TAC recruiters had attracted over 10,000 new enlistments.

Maintenance was a persistent concern for TAC since, even when adequately trained pilots were on hand, most units lacked sufficient maintenance personnel to keep aircraft in service. In March,

Headquarters AAF established a minimum in-commission level of sixty percent for all units and stated its intent to call unit commanders to account should they fall below that level. The sixty percent minimum was itself a low standard of efficiency, but indicated AAF recognition that low in-commission rates were the product of problems (shortages of adequately trained personnel and equipment) that were often beyond the

=3Ibid., p. 157. 47

immediate control of individual commands. Tactical units equipped with

P-BOs and C-82s faced additional problems in maintenance and performance

as they struggled to overcome the design flaws inevitable in any new aircraft. "Operation BOOTSTRAP," a comprehensive maintenance training program that began in September, attempted to speed up the re-manning of

TAC units by providing on-the-job training for new personnel in a number of specialties, including a maintenance indoctrination course for pilots launched in October.

Training remained a high priority into 1948. An accelerated TAC training program for the first quarter of 1948 took precedence over flying, maintenance, and other normal command functions. TAC devoted

3,100,000 hours to intense training in three areas: professional

(technical and administrative), military, and standardization to ensure that each individual had the same duties and performed at the same level as counterparts in other commands. As part of "Operation BOOTSTRAP" the program was a notable success, resulting in a net decrease in the number of untrained or unspecialized airmen and an increase in the number of technical areas in which manpower met or exceeded minimum requirements

Despite the program’s success in laying a foundation of trained personnel upon which to build a truly viable command, Spaatz, now USAF Chief of

Staff, reprimanded TAC on the grounds that its progress in implementing its portion of the 55-Group program was less than satisfactory. In particular, TAC fell short of minimum goals in aircraft in-commission rates, alleviating equipment shortages in units, and improving the status of unit training.

’Ibid ., p. 154. 48

In reply to Spaatz's criticism, Quesada pointed out that because forty percent of the personnel assigned to TAC during late 1947 were either untrained or inappropriately trained, the command had to divert an inordinate share of time and resources to basic technical and military training at the expense of more advanced unit training. Forced to absorb the troop transport missions after the inactivation of the Third Air

Force, TAC’s two air forces faced dramatically increased operational and training responsibilities, a further drain on overall unit effectiveness.

Quesada acknowledged that the intensive training program implemented during January and February had resulted in a low in-commission rate during the period but asserted that the long term dividends of the program would far outweigh any temporary setbacks.

TAC faced other problems in early 1948. The arrival of jet aircraft dictated considerable shifting or renovation of stations since most TAC bases did not have long enough runways or sufficient maintenance facilities to accommodate jets. Continuing personnel shortages deteriorated further when the Berlin Blockade and the ensuing "Operation

VITTLES" airlift drained Zone of Interior personnel and equipment, leaving TAC an even lower priority in those areas. Doctrinal disputes over joint operations continued, especially with the Navy, despite the success of COMBINE, and although the April Key West Agreement would alleviate that tension somewhat, disputes continued. TAC’s shortage of attack aircraft also undermined the realism of joint maneuvers, a situation which Quesada attempted to remedy by requesting that USAF

z^Letter from Spaatz to Quesada, March 2, 1948; Quesada reply, March 6, 1948; TAC History, 1 January - 30 November 1948, Vol. 1: Oroanization and Mission, Supp. Docs. # 119, 120/2. 49

reassign B-29s (which were being phased out in favor of newer jet

bombers) to TAC for use in light bombardment missions. Quesada e^so

hoped the B-S9 units might improve TAC’s status within the Ai- -orce by

giving it a more "strategic" role. The Air Force refused, arguing that

to assign single-purpose light bombers to TAC would "compromise" it and

instead, ordered SAC units to begin training their units in tactical

operations for participation in joint exercises. This "borrowing"

arrangement quickly proved completely unsatisfactory as SAC, citing its

own heavy operational and training schedules, repeatedly begged out of

joint maneuvers.=6

Despite TAC’s organizational and training problems, Quesada and

Devers continued to improve the working relationship between the Army and

Air Force during early 1948. Some tension over control of liaison

aircraft remained, but generally relations were good. The Army, less

than six months after Air Force independence, still tended to view its offspring with a certain sense of pride and shared experience. Such was not the case, however, with the Navy, and doctrinal difference over the proper role of tactical aviation remained deep and bitter.TAC made some important tactical and doctrinal breakthroughs during "Exercise

TIMBERLINE," conducted in cooperation with the Army Mountain Winter

Warfare School in March, in which Twelfth Air Force jet fighter, reconnaissance, and tactical control units operated in rough, mountainous terrain in the Colorado Rockies. TAC concluded that its units, flying P-

80s, had proved jet aircraft operating in close coordination with surface

=^TAC Historv, Jan. - Nov. 1948, Vol. I, pp. 38-39.

=^Ibid., pp. 97-100. 50

forces more effective in mountainous or remote terrain than divisional artillery. In May, "Exercise ASSEMBLY" focused on troop carrier operations, but the Ninth Air Force also provided reconnaissance, fighter-bomber, and liaison aircraft and a tactical control group in support of ground operations. "Exercise MESQUITE," during the same month, provided Twelfth Air Force units with valuable training in providing column cover for armored forces in an attack, concentrating on visual and photo reconnaissance and target marking.

The great success story of Army-Air Force cooperation in 1948 was

"Operation COMBINE III" held during October and November. The Atlantic

Fleet under the command of Admiral W. H. P. Blandy joined TAC and the AFF in a series of demonstrations in the planning and execution of joint air- surface operations at Eglin AFB, Florida. The participation of naval and marine pilots proved the major breakthrough of the operation, which also saw Air Force pilots operating from Navy carriers in specially refitted

TAC aircraft. COMBINE III captured the imagination not only of its participants, but of civilian policymakers, analysts, and journalists looking for some sign of an end to what had become bitter interservice wrangling over roles and missions. New York Times defense correspondent

Hanson Baldwin expressed the hopes of many when he speculated that "if big oaks from little acorns grow, the young officers at the working and flying levels may have planted something that eventually may shadow the

Pentagon with the beneficent shade of spiritual unity.

®®Hanson Baldwin, "Service Unity in Action," The New York Times, October 16, 1948. 51

The United States Air Force had become a separate and equal service

on September 18, 1947. Independence marked the end of nearly three

decades of struggle for the air forces, but it marked just the beginning of TAC's struggle for survival. The Air Force had been willing to

promise almost anything to get Army support in the struggle for

independence, but ground commanders began to doubt the voracity of those

promises even before the ink was dry on the National Security Act of

1947. By November those doubts, fueled by the rhetoric of strategic

bombing enthusiasts and even moderate figures like Spaatz, had grown into a controversy among the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force over who should control tactical air power and what proportion of air resources should be devoted to it. Hackles began to rise in the Army and the Navy when

Spaatz and others at Headquarters USAF began warning against "diversion from the air force strength . . . for the purpose of providing a sea­ borne air force to project itself independently into an air campaign" and proposing that "the fighter and fighter-bomber which participates in the ground battle are the same as those needed to win the air battle." The

Navy detected an impending challenge to its carrier-based air force, and the Army sensed the first step toward the dilution of an already threatened tactical air capability.=?

Quesada received widespread praise after COMBINE III for his bold advocacy of tactical air power and his belief that the three services were interdependent. By mid-1948, however, Quesada’s views stood in stark contrast to the dominant Air Force view that future military victory— and future Air Force growth— hinged on strategic air power. In

=?Ibid.. p. 2, 3. 52

the forefront of the drift toward SAC dominance was Spaatz, whose

advocacy of strategic bombing became more forceful and his defense of

tactical air ever more qualified during the fight over dwindling military

budgets. "The war of the future," he contended, "will again be decided

by which side wins the air war." He warned that "we risk defeat and ruin

if we temporize with any form of organization which jeopardizes our

ability to concentrate our air strength at the crucial area," and that,

while cooperation with surface forces might still be necessary "the

extent to which our total air strength to fight the air war is depleted

to meet these commitments may well determine the outcome.Other

strategic bombing advocates argued that tactical aviation was an

"extravagance of the past [that] may not be possible in the future,"

constituting an unnecessary drain on the nation’s economy: "if at any

time, it appears that expenditure for tactical aviation will jeopardize

development in strategic, the former will have to be sacrificed."*^

Essentially, TAC had become a hostage in the budget battle: USAF would have its strategic air force, and if the administration reduced its 70-

Group goal to 48-Groups, as it planned to do, the earliest and deepest cuts in the Air Force would come in tactical rather than strategic capabilities

The National Security Act of 1947 attempted to centralize and unify military policy by giving official legal sanction to the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, creating a Secretary of Defense to oversee the entire defense

**Carl Spaatz, "U.S. Air Force," n.d. [1948], Spaatz Papers, Box 269.

*iLt. Col. Joseph L. Dickman, "Douhet and the Future," Air University Quarterlv Review, Vol.. II, No. 1 (Summer 1948), pp. 12-13. 53

establishment» and a National Security Council (NSC) to advise the

President in the "integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies

relating to national security.Clear, legal definitions of service

roles and mission aimed at minimizing areas of interservice tension, and

for the most part the effort succeeded. The official sanction of a naval

air arm, however, left the conflict between the Navy and the Air Force unresolved. As competition for resources in an era of budget cuts and

for a continuing strategic role in the atomic age grew more intense, the nebulous line between Navy air and USAF missions became more troublesome.

In an October, 1947 meeting of Truman’s "War Council," Secretary of

the Air Force Stuart Symington voiced Air Force concern that the development of Naval air encroached on the tactical missions of the Air

Force. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal acknowledged the possibility of mission overlap, but cited air support of amphibious operations in the

Pacific, which were much more dispersed than AAF support in the European

Theater, as evidence of the need for the flexibility of Naval air support, especially in view of the Air Force’s less than enthusiastic attitude toward its tactical mission. Spaatz countered with the Air

Force view that strategic and tactical aircraft were essentially interchangeable, leaving no need for a separate system of installation, supply and overhead for tactical air power. In an effort to resolve the tactical air power conflict, Forrestal requested memos from Eisenhower and Spaatz analyzing service satisfaction with Air Force tactical air support during World War II and its postwar allocation of resources in

republic Law 253, "The National Security Act of 1947," 80th Congress, 1st session. 54

that area.6a

Eisenhower responded to Forrestal’s request in November in a

lengthy memo on tactical air operations. Eisenhower began by stating his

unqualified acceptance of the concept of complimentary roles:

Under this three service concept, it is axiomatic that no single service should acquire forces or equipment necessary to accomplish joint missions single-handed, if such forces or equipment unnecessarily duplicate those characteristics of and fundamental to the other two services.

Eisenhower cited both Pacific and European Theater operations in World

War II as evidence that cooperation among all three services under

unified command provided the greatest concentration of force at the

decisive point as well as economy of force in secondary tasks. He agreed

with the Air Force view that command of the air was essential to

successful ground operations and that it could best be achieved with air

forces operating under a centralized command. Such a system, he agreed,

ensured concentration of air assets at the decisive point, at the

decisive time, regardless of whether the mission is strategic or tactical

and allowed maximum exploitation of air power’s inherent flexibility.

The Army remained satisfied, as it had been in World War II, that the Air

Force was willing to provide the air support it needed in sufficient numbers. The Army, Eisenhower stressed, "does not belong in the air, it

belongs on the ground." Planes, he pointed out, were only part of the

issue

Control of the tactical air force means responsibility not merely for the fighters and medium bombers themselves, but, as well, for the entire operating establishment required to support those planes. . . .Assumption of this task by the

63fhe Forrestal Diaries, "War Council," October 21, 1947, p. 333- 334. 55

Army would duplicate, in great measure, the primary and continuing responsibilities of the Air Force, and, in effect, would result in the creation of another air establishment.

Finally, he argued that Congress had already thoroughly explored the

question of whether the tactical air forces should be included in the

Department of the Army during the hearings on the National Security Act.

The Army, Air Force, and Congress agreed at that time that the tactical

air mission belonged with the Air Force, and Eisenhower stressed that

developments since had not convinced him that the arrangement needed revision. To do so, he stated, would violate the letter and spirit of

that legislation.6^

In an effort to resolve the air power controversy, Truman appointed an independent "Air Policy Committee" headed by Thomas K. Finletter, a future secretary of the Air Force and well-known air power advocate, to study the problem in depth and make policy recommendations. The committee focused its study on all-out war with the Soviets, gave little consideration to more limited scenarios, and issued a final report in

January, 1948 that strongly endorsed USAF’s plan for a 70-group Air

Force, even at the expense of modernization of the other military services. Secretary of Defense Forrestal found the conclusions of the

Finletter Commission unsatisfactory, arguing that it was already

"lamentably clear" that significant limitations existed on US "military power to deal with the various potentially explosive areas over the

6*Memo for the Secretary of Defense from Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower, "Tactical Air Support," November 3, 1947, RG 330; Records of the Secretary of Defense, Decimal File, September 1947-June 1950, CD 13-1-6, Box 73, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 56 world."63 The 70-Group Air force was, he stated, "a seductive and unrealistic alternative" that "might throw the military establishment off balance." The Navy and the Army, he insisted, "are just as necessary to the national security as the Air Force" and "do not exist solely for the support of the Air force." To ignore their functions and capabilities, he warned, "would be to disrupt an effective team in order to give one player a chance for a grandstand play."*6 The real issue was resources: few argued that the 70-Group plan would not be desireable in the best of all possible worlds, but the reality in the age of Truman administration budget cuts, was that means were limited. The question to be resolved was how to divide limited assets between the three services in the best overall interest of national defense, but the Army and the Navy were hardly prepared to accept the leftovers of an Air Force shopping spree.

The Department of the Navy also lobbied energetically against the proposed 70-Group Air Force. The estimates upon which the

70-Group plan rested, Admiral Leahy argued, on military considerations developed in a theoretical vacuum and did not "take into consideration the capacity of industry to produce these aircraft nor the availability of funds." The Navy dismissed the Air Force requirements as an irresponsible "wish list" seriously out of line in view of past operational experience and existing JCS joint war plans. The Air Force’s

6=The Forrestal Diaries, Walter Millis, ed., (New York, 1951), p. 373-374. Forrestal had testified before the Finletter Commission that while the US should modernize its air power, it should monitor such growth with an eye toward "bringCingl into better balance the components of [the military] establishment." Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, p. 115.

66"Forrestal says 70 Air Units Would Unbalance Defense," The New York Times, April 23, 1948. 57

estimated attrition rates, for example, "[were] not only four to five

times those actually experienced in World War II," but were "so fantastic

that no armed force in the world would continue to exist as an organized

entity if it were subjected to them."^? In a communication with the Air

Policy Committee, the Defense Department cited a the JCS report that

concluded that even air planning for all-out war in which the enemy had

weapons of mass destruction should put more emphasis on tactical

aircraft. In particular, the JCS urged greater emphasis on medium and

light bombers and cargo aircraft in any planning for the 70-group Air

Force.68

The wrangling between the service chiefs over roles, missions, and

most important, budgets, became so intense as to cripple JCS activities

in other areas. To deal with the problem once and for all, Forrestal

announced on March 10 that the service chiefs would meet, far from the

Washington spotlight in Key West, Florida, to thrash out the roles and

missions controversy. If they still failed to resolve their differences,

6?The Navy reported cited actual Air Force attrition rates in the European Theater during World War II as: B-S9s 6.2 percent, B-17s/B-24s 7.96 percent, and fighters 6.9 percent. Air Force estimates for attrition rates per month in current JCS War Plan were: B-36s 65 percent, medium bombers 50 percent, light bombers 30 percent, day fighters 40 percent, all-weather fighters 40 percent, reconnaissance 30 percent, and liaison 5 percent. Projected attrition across the entire inventory, including non-combat aircraft per month was estimated at 83 percent. According to these estimates. Air Force operational units could expect a 350 percent attrition rate by D + 6 months. Cover letter. Admiral Leahy to Secretary of Defense, and (TOP SECRET) "Present and Future Aircraft Requirements for the Armed Services," December 11, 1947, RG 330, September 1947-June 1950, CD 3-1-29, Box 8: USNA, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

6®Letter from Secretary of Defense to President’s Air Policy Commission, December 11, 1947, RG 330, September 1947-June 1950, CD 3-1- 29, Box 8, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 58

Forrestal warned, he would make his own decisions. Forrestal went into

the Key West Conference believing that the Navy needed its own air power,

but that it did not require an independent strategic bombing capability.

Most crucial, in Forrestal’s thinking, was the neglect of the ground

forces that had resulted from the ongoing debate over air power. Both

the Air Force and the Navy, he wrote in his notes for the meeting, "have

to give much more thought and help to the third Department, the Ground

Forces, who are the catch-all for the unwanted and unglamorous jobs."*?

The Chiefs did succeed in drafting a "broad based" set of

agreements by March 14, which included an agreement between the Army and

the Air Force that tactical air support fell logically in the scope of

the Air Force mission. The Air Force agreed that its tactical mission

was not subordinate to the strategic mission and that the latter must not be pursued at the expense of the former.?* The strife seemed to be

close to an end until March 16 when Spaatz and his assistant. General

Lauris Norstad, refused to sign the press release announcing the

agreement on the grounds that it implied the formation of two separate air forces with independent, and redundant, training and support operations. Forrestal overruled Spaatz’s objection on the grounds that the National Security Act had specifically and permanently established

*?The Forrestal Diaries, "Notes for Friday— Opening Meeting," pp. 390-392.

?*The Key West agreement also included Air Force concession to the development of air weapons to support the Navy's mission (as long as they did not include strategic bombers) and the need for Naval air support of the Air Force in an all out air campaign. The Air Force also acknowledged that Navy should have the right to attack targets on land that directly effect Naval operations (ports, dry-dock facilities, artillery positions threatening amphibious operations, etc.). 59

the Naval Air Arm. Spaatz's continuing insistence that the Key West

terms, while basically sound, needed "interpretation" necessitated yet

another conference, at Newport, Rhode Island, in May to tackle the

remaining unresolved issues.The Key West Agreement, nonetheless, went

officially into effect on April 21, with the publication of "Functions of

the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," superceding Executive

Order 9877, the previous regulation prescribing service roles issued in

July 1947 as part of the National Sec-.rity A c t . ? e

The relative silence of Army leadership on the question of tactical

air power raises questions as to why it chose to be so complacent on an

issue it regarded as vital to its future capabilities. Eisenhower, in

his memo to Forrestal, had a perfect opportunity to disparage the Air

Force for what the Army perceived as neglect of tactical air capabilities

since 1945. Despite spreading concern among Army commanders that the Air

Force was not maintaining reasonable tactical capabilities. Army

leadership at the highest levels— Eisenhower, Collins, and Bradley—

continued to proclaim their faith that the Air Force would fulfill its

pledge to provide adequate tactical air support. In reality, this

7iThe issues that Spaatz wanted clarified primarily involved control of atomic weapons. The Navy’s push for the super-carrier United States was, in part, an attempt to get a piece of the atomic delivery mission. Spaatz did not fundamentally object to Naval air strikes against "strategic" targets and acknowledged the Air Force’s interest in using all available resources to win in an all-out war, but he wanted operational control of atomic weapons vested exclusively in the Air Force Chief of Staff as an "agent for the Joint Chiefs." The Forrestal Diaries, "Newport Conference," August IB, 1940, p. 476.

7=The Forrestal Diaries, "Key West Conference," p. 392-393; Schnabel, Historv of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. II: 1947 - 1949, (Wilmington, 1979); AF Bulletin No. 1, 21 May 1948; JAAF Bulletin No. 11, 30 April 1948; JAAF Bulletin No. 13, 13 May, 1948. 60 apparent complacency was likely part of an overall strategy to avoid sabotaging the tactical air situation even further.

Quesada deserves some credit for postponing an all-out Army-Air

Force confrontation over tactical air power. By perpetuating joint operations, even when TAC reached its nadir, he managed to keep up at least the appearance of progress on joint doctrine and capabilities. In so doing, he reassured Eisenhower and Bradley that he and Spaatz had every intention of keeping, their word and that any current decline in capabilities was temporary. Beyond individual relationships, there lingered a sense of common interest between the Army and the Air Force, however endangered. The network forged among West Point and Leavenworth classmates, command partners from World War II, and other shared career experiences still survived in the post-independence period, and the Navy was still the odd man out. Thus, the Army may still had been reluctant to air its differences with the Air Force publicly, preferring to depend on those old relationships.

There was also a disparity between Army leadership and field commanders in their perception of the problem. By far, the majority of complaints regarding the state of tactical air power came from ground force commanders whose views were somewhat provincial. The same commanders who griped about air support also frequently charged that Army divisional artillery was deficient, making them easy to dismiss as "fire- support hypochondriacs." In early 1948, Army leadership still had reason to believe that the Air Force intended to perpetuate its tactical capability and to dismiss rhetoric to the contrary as just that. TAC’s capabilities were at a low ebb, but so were those of all the services. 61

Not many units in any branch of the service escaped the disastrous effects of budget cuts and helter-skelter demobilization, but there was reason to believe that the situation would improve as the country emerged from its wai— weariness.

Perhaps the most important motive for Army restraint in the tactical air debate was the concern that if it launched an attack on the

Air Force for its neglect of tactical air someone might call its bluff.

Despite pressure from some ground commanders, the Army, to paraphrase

General William T. Sherman, did not seek and would not accept the tactical air mission. As Eisenhower’s memo to Forrestal indicated, the

Army essentially agreed with the Air Force contention that existing doctrine and organization for tactical air support was basically sound.

Differences of opinion persisted regarding employment, priorities, and command relationships, but none of these yet seemed beyond resolution.

An Army tactical air force would require a vast increase in resources if it were to function effectively and the construction of an entire support structure— air fields, repair facilities, trained technicians, training system, pilots— not to mention the expense of developing and procuring tactical aircraft. Tactical air would become no more— probably less— glamorous as an Army mission and would not, in all likelihood, bring an increase in Army funding sufficient to offset its cost. Thus, the outcome was likely to be a tactical air force no better, and possibly worse, that what the Air Force already provided but which would constitute a considerably greater drain on Army resources elsewhere.

In short, what the Army sought in 1948 was neither its own tactical air force, nor a radical change in the Air Force’s tactical doctrine or 6 2

mission: all it asked was that the Air Force keep up the capability it promised the Army in 1946. As Eisenhower said, "the Army belongs on the ground," its primary concern being with its role in the military establishment. The Army suffered, in the late 1940s, from an inferiority complex aggravated by its perception that the Air Force regarded it as functionally obsolete. The struggle to preserve the tactical air force was, in a sense, a campaign to reassert, to the Air Force and the defense establishment in general, the continuing importance of the Army's mission to the national defense.

The Key West Agreement seemed to put to rest once and for all the debate over who should provide tactical air support to surface forces, and the Air Force was confident that the mission was safely under its control, more or less with the Army’s blessing. The debate was, in reality, far from over. Indeed, it had merely undergone a change of venue: what had been an open debate between the Army, Navy, Air Force,

Congress, the Executive, and interested journalists now became a private controversy within the Air Force. To Headquarters, USAF, it was a battle to affirm the permanence of its independence from the Army. To TAC, it was a struggle for its continued existence. CHAPTER II: IN THE WILDERNESS, 1948-1949

The dominant players in the ongoing debate over roles and missions

were out after bigger game than tactical air power: control of atomic weapons and the strategic dominance that came with it. To the extent

that tactical air power entered into the debate at all, it was usually as a bludgeon with which one service— usually the Navy— could attack the othei the Air Force. In the rich hyperbole of the roles and missions controversy, true tactical air power advocates, whether from the Air

Force, Army, or Marine Corps, had little chance of making a significant impression. Inside the Air Force, TAC found itself in a similarly powerless position. Quesada and other TAC commanders knew that their capabilities were inadequate and their status shrinking. Attempts to build TAC into a viable operational command during its first three years met with small successes and major frustrations. TAC’s options in dealing with the problem were equally limited. To take the argument outside the Air Force— to the Army, Congress, or the press— would only

intensify USAF’s hostility and might trigger an Army campaign to usurp the mission. To Quesada and his allies, the most promising strategy was to close ranks with the Air Force and hope that in the 70-, 57-, or 48-

Group Air Force, tactical air power would endure. TAC was a political bargaining chip; its commanders could only hope that if the USAF lost the hand, it would not carry through with its threat to decimate, or worse

63 64

liquidate, the Tactical Air Command.

Contrary to historical legend, the postwar shift from conventional

preparedness toward atomic strategy did not arise from any overwhelming

belief that atomic warfare was inevitable in a bipolar world— that came

much later, if ever. In the waning days of his tenure as Secretary of

Defense, Forrestal warned against a single-scenario national military

strategy, since no one could predict with absolute certainty the form and

character of future war. "If one did not have an enemy," he explained,

"it would be possible to have a perfect plan that could be taken off the

shelf for immediate execution, but unfortunately the enemy does not

always conform."* In reality, the new dominance of atomic strategy was

in large part a political expedient: the risk of war (Cold War rhetoric

notwithstanding) was low, the US still had an atomic monopoly (although

not for as long as it expected), political pressure for demobilization was high, and the administration wanted to return the economy to a

peacetime footing by cutting defense spending and balancing the budget.

Thus, each service promoted that strategic outlook which best protected

its status. The Air Force, of course, stressed all-out war and the atomic deterrent in which its strategic striking capabilities would be

decisive. The Army warned of the threat of limited war where atomic retaliation would not be appropriate and shared powers were essential.

The military services shattered yet another myth— that military

institutions are stodgy and resist change— by recognizing that their continued growth depended on capturing for themselves a piece of the

*The Forrestal Diaries, October 27, 1948, "General Notes on the Question of Naval Aii— Air Force," pp. 513-514. 65

atomic pie: not because that was the kind of war they were likely to

fight, but because that was where the money was. Here marks the

beginning of a new era in which defense planning involved less a reasoned

analysis of likely threats and appropriate responses than a public and

politicized battle for status, influence, and most important, money. No

service was better at this new game than the Air Force, and no Chief of

Staff more determined than General Hoyt Vandenberg.

From the beginning of Vandenberg's tenure as Chief of Staff, the

Air Force proved that despite its "newcomer" status it did not intend to

become a passive "team player" in the age of military unification. It is

questionable whether the Air Force was ever particularly interested in

unification; more likely, they saw it as the quickest means for their

goal of independence. Apparently not satisfied with becoming an

independent service, USAF immediately sought to be the predominant one,

although graciously conceding that the "obsolete" surface forces should

be retained for supplemental "mop-up" operations. USAF’s rhetoric of

supremacy engendered increasing animosity among the other services— especially the Navy— that saw their strategic relevance under attack.

The Navy would launch a campaign to coopt the strategic mission, culminating in the "Revolt of the Admirals," but hedged its bets: it

joined the Army in its effort to prevent Air Force predominance and produced the most outspoken critics of Air Force tactical capabilities.

The Air Force, however, still protective of its independence and determined not to be in any sense subordinate, pursued a course over the next two years that decimated its tactical air capability and undermined its contribution to the coming conflict in Korea. 66

General Carl Spaatz retired as Air Force Chief of Staff on June 30,

1948, and was succeeded by Vandenberg, one of the AAF’s shining stars during World War II as commander of the tactical Ninth Air Force in

Europe and Spaatz's right hand man since 1946. At war’s end, ground commanders and journalists alike praised Vandenberg as "one of the chief architects of the system of air and ground cooperation," but his fellow airmen were more reserved in their praise, some criticizing him for allowing the Ninth to work too closely with ground commanders at the expense of more important, less costly missions behind enemy lines.®

Vandenberg was not a visceral atomic strategist, and he frequently warned his fellow air officers and Congress that it would be dangerous to neglect the conventional aspects of military preparedness. Still, as

Chief of Staff, he seemed to take the criticism he had received as Ninth

Air Force commander to heart. He initiated a program to purge USAF of its "arbitrary" division into tactical and strategic capabilities, which

Air Force dogmatists insisted benefitted only the Army and threatened the predominance of air power.

The Air Force was dogmatic in its belief that it had replaced the

Navy as the United States’s first line of defense, but it was less confident of its relative status within the military establishment. To the Army, the major command status of TAC represented the Air Force’s intention to keep the tactical mission alive, at least in its organizational structure. To the Air Force, it was a reminder of its former subordinate status and a threat to its future independence. As

®Noel F . Parrish, "Hoyt S. Vandenberg: Building the New Air Force," in Makers of the United States Air Force, p. 210. 67

long as TAC remained a major command, the Army had an influence over one

third of the USAF mission. Further, some within the Air Force, including

Vandenberg, seemed to believe that TAC constituted a fifth column through

which the Army might endeavor to purloin the tactical mission. General

Quesada shared this concern and was determined to keep the tactical

mission for the Air Force, but contrary to the majority view, he

maintained that

the way to keep the tactical air forces from being dominated by the Army was to be so damn efficient in the manipulation of your own forces that they are the last ones who would want to dominate it.^

Unfortunately, Vandenberg and the Air Staff accepted the opposing

view that Quesada at TAC was getting too close to Devers at AFF and

allowing Army concerns to dominate TAC operations. The administration's

austerity budget also left the Air Force with only 48 of the 70 groups it

sought, making consolidation of combat commands necessary if USAF was to

continue strategic expansion at the rate it desired.'* In the summer of

1948 Vandenberg launched a reorganization that would to expand USAF’s

Table of Organization while minimizing the Army’s access to air planning

through its relationship with TAC. The reorganization downgraded

Tactical and Air Defense Commands to operational headquarters (an

organizational structure unprecedented in peacetime) under a new

Continental Air Command (ConAC). The ConAC organization would "throw the

full weight of the combined units" into either tactical or defensive operations, providing better cooperation with the Army and Navy by

^Quesada Oral History, interview #3, p. 35.

^Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, pp. 124-125. 68

permitting assignment and re-grouping "as circumstances may require."=

The Truman administration had long emphasized an increased role for reserve forces in future military planning. Executive Order Number

10007, "Organization of the Reserve Units of the Armed Forces," directed that training and organization of civilian components become a higher priority in the services as part of the administrations push for

Universal Military Training. The USAF reorganization, thus, aimed at strengthening Air National Guard and Reserve programs by concentrating them under one command.* Because it regarded its tactical units as

interchangeable with air defense units, USAF Headquarters held that the

ConAC organization would increase efficiency; ConAC could assign units to operational headquarters in response to changing requirements.

Finally, the ConAC organization would maintain a maximum number of headquarters as cadres for future expansion or in the event of hostilities. Two factors, however, prevented USAF from abolishing TAC altogether. First, USAF understood that it would lose a valuable body of

"know-how" and experience in the utilization of tactical air power should

TAC disappear. Second, it needed a headquarters with direct access to the AFF and the Atlantic Fleet to facilitate planning for joint training and maneuvers.?

The proposed reorganization was in part a response to public and

“Walter Waggoner, "New Command Set up for all U.S.," The New York Times, November 19, 1948.

*Historv of the Continental Air Command, 1 Dec. 1948 - 31 Dec. 1949, Vol.I: Text, Sec. I; "Organization and Mission of the Command," 419.01, AFS/HRC, p. 1.

^ Ibid., pp. 1-4; TAC Historv, 1948, Vol. I, pp. 101-104. 69

political pressure for greater emphasis on air defense, which had been

even more neglected than TAC in the postwar years. Lieutenant General

George Stratemeyer, commander of the ADC, had requested in April, 1948,

that four fighter wings (two from TAC and two from SAC) be transferred to

his command as a "permanent part of the air defense force." Headquarters

USAF rejected Stratemeyer’s request, but it did order SAC and TAC to

begin training their fighter units in air defense doctrine and

techniques. The international environment fueled new concerns for air

defense as the March Coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Crisis in 1949 made war in Europe seem imminent. Even the heavily "strategic" Finletter

Report stressed that fightei— interceptor units for air defense were essential, but that "no plans for defense should be made in derogation of

the striking counter offensive air arm in being."® In view of Truman

administration budget cuts and reduction of the 70-Group Air Force to 48 groups, however, the only immediately available source of a quick, viable air defense capability was TAC.®

Quesada, not surprisingly, immediately and energetically resisted the Air Force's proposal. In defense of preserving the existing structure and status of TAC he cited a number of important factors.

First, TAC provided a single point of contact through which to coordinate activities in cooperation with the other services in an organization the other services are familiar with and in which they had confidence.

Second, TAC allowed for a more economical use of tactical assets since

^President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age; A Report by the President's Air Policy Commission. [Finletter Report], (Washington: January 1, 1948, p. 25.

®ConAC History, 1 Dec. 1948 - 31 Dec. 1949, Vol. I, Sec. I, pp. 4-5. 70 the same headquarters and command structure functioned in both offensive and defensive tactical operations. Third, the existing organization minimized the number of headquarters involved in the same function and eliminated the need to train units in both air defense and air support doctrine and techniques, a factor of no small concern for both economic and operational reasons. Finally, Quesada stressed that TAC was a proven entity that ensured better training and interservice cooperation and provided an institution through which to perpetuate the doctrine and know-how of past and future operations.?

The arguments against ConAC, in Quesada's view, were legion. It made no sense, he argued, to create an excessive number of headquarters at a time when all military services were under pressure to economize.

Further, it would undermine tactical training because units would be frequently transferred from one command to another and would not accumulate significant experience in any one area. Interservice cooperation for joint operations would be seriously undermined, Quesada warned, because the TAC commander would no longer have any means to carry out his responsibilities and to regulate tactics and doctrine. In short, the ConAC proposal ran counter to all the past doctrine and experience in tactical air operations.

Despite Quesada's resistance to the reorganization, Vandenberg offered him overall command of ConAC, and he was inclined to accept since in so doing, he could ensure that the new organization would represent

^"Arguments in Favor of the Tactical Air Command Proposal," n.d., Quesada Papers, LC/MD, Box #7.

‘■^"Arguments Against USAF proposal," Quesada papers, box #7. 71

TAC's interests. In discussing the plan with Vandenberg, however, Quesada became increasingly suspicious of the real motives behind the reorganization. Its previous subordination to the Army left the Air Force with fewer senior officers than the other services and a lingering institutional inferiority complex. The reorganization created more vacancies for senior general officers in the Air Force and thus paved the way for more three- and foui— star billets, and Quesada suspected that this, rather than an interest in improved efficiency, was the principal motive behind reorganization. As a result, he refused Vandenberg’s offer, explaining years later that he "could not assume a command for a reason that 1 think is so sinister." The objective, he concluded, "was to make twelve more headquarters, each of which was to have a major general and a lieutenant general," a proposal that he found "damn repulsive."11 Stratemeyer of ADC did not share Quesada's misgivings and accepted command of ConAC. Ironically, barely seven months after his request for two TAC fighter wings was rejected, Stratemeyer found himself in direct command of all of TAC’s operational assets.

The Air Force reorganization received mixed reviews. Some observers praised the reorganization as an "encouraging step forward in the needed centralization of authority for plans and administration of the air defenses of the United States" that reduced the risk of

"deployment abroad of fighter forces that were more vitally needed at home, or immobilization here of men and machines that could be more effectively used in meeting a threat away from our shores."'^ Others

iiQuesada Oral History, interview #5, p. 21-23.

’■^Editorial, New York Times, November 20, 1948. 72 found the move less praiseworthy, and warned that the reorganization smacked of "empire building." Moreover, as one commentator pointed out,

ConAC unnecessarily subordinated tactical aviation, which had played a decisive role in the last war and would in all probability do so in the next. The Air Force, in the estimation of some, concentrated too heavily on strategic air power at the expense of close-support aviation.

The Air Force implemented the reorganization plan and activated the Continental Air Command on November IS, 1948, leaving TAC, as the New

York Times reported, "in charge of largely paper reserves." Quesada resigned his command and left TAC on November 23, first, to head a

Pentagon task force to draft legislation nationalizing the Air National

Guard (an assignment he found "very unpleasant, disagreeable, and unsuccessful"), and later, to direct "Operation GREENHOUSE," the first hydrogen bomb test at Bikini atoll. He retired from the Air Force in

1951. Although Quesada denied speculation that he retired in protest over the Air Force’s neglect of tactical air power, he admitted that his disappointment played a role in his decision.The Air Force’s decision to downgrade TAC left him "personally offended" and "let down." Both he and Spaatz felt betrayed, and both felt that the Air Force had deceived the Army. As he later recounted:

Spaatz made that commitment to Eisenhower, and it was a very

i^Hanson Baldwin, "New Steps for Defense," The New York Times, November 25, 1948.

‘‘’The New York Times, in reporting Quesada’s retirement, stated that his reasons were "still a secret," but speculated that he "was in a dispute with fellow officers." Quesada himself, asked why he retired, answered that he had no reason "that I’d like to express" because of "ethical considerations." "An Air Force Hero Retires," New York Times September 30, 1951. 73

strong commitment. Eisenhower was persuaded by it; Spaatz meant it. . . .Spaatz was annoyed, quite annoyed when that promise was sort of abrogated. . . .When the tactical air forces were put under the continental air command . . . He made strong promises to Eisenhower to the effect that the tactical air forces would remain under a commander. They would honor their commitment and their obligation to provide that service to the Army. It was to a large extent that promise that permitted Eisenhower to support a separate air force.

Quesada continued to criticize the parochialism of the Air Force

(demonstrated in the decision to eliminate TAC), a trait that he found especially distasteful in view of the Army’s willingness to accept the principle of air force control of tactical air forces and its faith that

USAF would come through when the time came to fulfill that role. "The violation of that principle," he later stated, "was a sad day for the Air

Force." It had, in his view, broken faith with the Army "for a very unattractive reason" and "deserveCdl a good kick in the ass for doing what they did. They shouldn’t have done it, and they were poorly motivated."1=

Quesada’s successor as commander of the diluted Tactical Air

Command was Major General Robert M. Lee, whose credentials as a tactical aviator were nearly as impressive as Quesada’s. He had spent most of the last war organizing, training, and commanding tactical air forces, serving after June 1944 as deputy director for operations under

Vandenberg at Ninth Air Force. After the war, Lee joined Quesada in the effort to build a postwar Tactical Air Command and served as Chief of

Staff, and later deputy commander. He worked closely with Quesada and

isQuesada Oral History, interview #3, pp. 33-36. 74

his assistant chief of staff, Col. William W. Momyer, in the drafting of

FM 31-35; the first comprehensive doctrine for tactical air power, based

on the experiences of World War II, Lee began his command determined

that, major command or not, TAC would vigorously pursue its assigned

mission and make the most of its available assets. Lee was the first to

admit that the new organization was less than ideal and barely met even

minimum requirements, but the final determination of its adequacy would,

in his mind, "rest largely on what experience will dictate in the

future.

Lee, like Quesada, was committed to the concept of tactical air

power in all its aspects— including air ground cooperation— and struggled

to keep the doctrine and mission alive, but the means at his disposal

were sadly deficient. TAC's new mission emphasized planning for joint

operations, participation in training and maneuvers, conduct of tactical

operations in the Zone of Interior in cooperation with ConAC, liaison with surface forces, training ConAC units in tactical air doctrine and

techniques, preparation of units for overseas deployment, and making recommendations to the Commanding General, ConAC regarding allocation of

forces, proficiency standards, and capabilities.^? ConAC took over

direct command of all TAC and ADC units, creating a "pool of air power" for allocation according to a "pendulum principle": units would shift between commands as "circumstances dictate" but administrative control

^'^Letter from Lee to Stratemeyer, December 17, 1948, TAC History, 1 January - 30 November 1948, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #236.

i?Letter from Stratemeyer to Lee, "Reorganization of the Tactical Air Command," December 16, 1948, TAC History, Jan. - Nov. 1949, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #235. 75

would remain with the regional air force to which they were assigned.

TAC had ceased to be a "force-in-beingj" its headquarters consisted of a

command section, a small administrative staff, and deputy commanders for operations, plans, and communications. The total personnel assigned to

the command totalled less than 150: 66 officers, 43 airmen, and 35 civilians.

The Continental Air Command's organization and structure represented a departure from the postwar pattern of organization by function with each major command specializing in a particular aspect of air operations. The reorganization merged the distinct and separate functions of air defense and tactical aviation into one command and left

ConAC to sort out their divergent and often conflicting requirements.

ConAC constituted two-thirds of the Air Force mission but barely one- fifth of its resources. Rather than create a new headquarters,

Stratemeyer elected to redesignate Headquarters ADC as Headquarters

ConAC, thereby establishing a strong historical link between the two commands. Even Headquarters USAF recognized the problems inherent in that move and revoked the redesignation, ordering the establishment of an entirely new organization. The imprint of ADC on ConAC's structure, thinking, philosophy, administration, operations, missions, and functions nonetheless remained. The basic law of the new command had its roots in

Air Defense Command, since ADC's regulations were redesignated ConAC regulations in toto. The headquarters staff of ConAC, with the exception of a few key personnel "imported" from TAC, was the former ADC hierarchy.

*-’°TAC Historv, 1 July - 30 November, 1950, Vol. 1, "Roles and Missions," p. 2. 76

ConAC dispersed its operational units among the Air Forces of six

"regional defense areas.

The shrinking status of the Tactical Air Command mirrored a general deemphasis on tactical aviation throughout the Air Force. Apart from the forced reduction to 48 groups and the bureaucratic expansion inherent in

the reorganization, the subordination of TAC represented a major shift of priorities in the Air Force. With Vandenberg leading the way, air theorists repudiated the distinction between tactical and strategic air power inherited from the operational experience of World War II, preferring to think and plan in terms of offensive and defensive forces and tactical and strategic targets. In theory, defensive forces included support of ground operations, but in reality, the bulk of planning and resources went to defensive operations designed to deny the offensive to the enemy: air superiority, air defense, and interdiction. The Air

Force refused to think about the possibility of a major air-ground campaign, and in an era when atomic weapons still had names like "Fat

Boy," the idea that tactical air might be a means to expand its share of the atomic mission had not entered the equation. The philosophical split between tactical air proponents and the rest of the Air Force continued: the mainstream of air power theory was unwilling to admit any possibility other than all out nuclear war.^*

The Air Force, by 1949, had come to view the Tactical Air Command—

i^ConAC Historv, 1 Dec. 1948 - 31 Dec. 1949, Vol. I, Sec. I, pp.lO- 12, 18-19.

®°See William W. Momyer in Air Suoerioritv in World War II and Korea; An Interview with Gen. James Ferguson, Gen. Robert M. Lee, Gen. William Momver, and Lt. Gen. Elwood P. Quesada, Richard H. Kohn and Joseph P. Harrahan, general editors, (Washington D.C.: 1983), p. 62. 77

at least in its previous form— as a functional and organizational

anachronism. The tactical air mission is closely tied to the action of

surface forces, and since USAF perceived little likelihood of major

surface campaigns it saw no need for a distinct tactical air function.

Air theorists generally concluded that World War III would be a global, nuclear conflict in which the difficulty of carrying out conventional

surface actions on the World War II model would be so great as to make

them u n l i k e l y . 21 USAF's was a bleak picture of future international

conflict: wars between nations rather than armies that aimed at the utter destruction of national economies, industry, politics, and peoples; psychological, biological, and atomic warfare aimed at national capitulation rather than decisions on the battlefield; victory without

invasion in which surface forces engaged in "mop up" operations, occupation, and control of enemy territory.== Tactical air, closely tied to surface operations, would be relevant only in the exploitation phases, playing no significant role in the decisive phases of modern global warfare. In light of such a scenario, maintaining tactical air power as a distinct force constituted an "extravagance" that the nation could ill afford.22

Ironically, the argument that seems to have given Headquarters USAF its inspiration to downgrade TAC came from within the command itself.

Momyer, then a colonel and assistant chief of staff at TAC, wrote a study

2iFutrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, pp. 108-109.

2ecol. William H. Wise, "The Future of the Tactical Air Force," Air University Quarterlv Review, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Spring 1949), pp. 33-39.

22Dickman, "Douhet and the Future," p. 13. 70

in which he concluded that, among other things, TAC would not become involved in hostilities "unless the atomic offensive failed and the war degenerated into a conventional air-surface action," a contingency which he estimated would not occur until roughly two years after the outbreak of hostilities. He dismissed the use of jet fighter escorts for long- range strategic bombers as "an obsolete concept from the last war," particularly since the performance capabilities of current fighters (F-80 and F-84) precluded such employment (air to air refueling was still in its infancy). "It is apparent," Momyer concluded, "that the equipping of the strategic striking force as pertains to fighter aircraft is incompatible with the tactics propounded for the employment of that force." The only other likely utilization of TAC's fighter units, he argued, would be air defense operations in support of the ADC. Momyer intended, through his study, to convince USAF that in the interest of flexibility "all fighter units should be trained and capable of performing any mission for which the use of fighter aircraft is employed," but in effect, he constituted a "fifth column" in the Air

Force campaign to emasculate the Tactical Air Command.

The deflation of tactical air power was USAF’s justification for abolishing the tactical air force as part of its peacetime organization.

While grudgingly conceding that air power involved three legitimate roles— strategic, tactical, and defensive— strategic air advocates argued that limited resources did not allow for the development of specialized forces for each. Instead, the Air Force and the nation needed to focus their strength and efforts "in accordance with sound concepts of

e^ConAC Historv, 1 Dec. 1948 - 31 Dec. 1949, Vol. I, Sec. I, pp. 7-8. 79 employment" in a manner designed to "insure national security."

Separation of air assets into "tactical" and "strategic" air forces, according to this view, represented "unrealistic" specialization that diluted overall strength and narrowed thinking within those specialized fields. One such critic cited Lieutenant General James Doolittle’s characterization of tactical bombing as "knocking over the milk pail each day, while strategic bombing is an effort to kill the cow."^° The alternative to a tactical air force for "un-decisive" phases lay in training rather than organization. The majority view in USAF held that since strategic forces could conduct tactical missions but not vice versa, strategic forces trained in tactical operations provided greater flexibility and economy of force while only marginally compromising operational effectiveness. In short, as one airman argued, "the peacetime maintenance of a specialized tactical air arm at the expense of the strength and effectiveness of the decisive air echelons is unwarranted.

Lee fought to keep the tactical air mission and doctrine alive, but

— given the Air Force’s position, current defense priorities, and ConAC’s strong organizational link with the ADC— air defense was paramount and received the lion’s share of resources. As a result, tactical air power was, more than ever, "low man on the totem pole." The emphasis on strategic air power had the greatest impact on equipment and forces, and equipment for tactical air power evolved only slightly. Advances in air

M. Spaight, "A Matter of Nomenclature," Air University Quarterlv Review. Vol. II, No. 2 (Fall 1949), p. 27.

eajbid., p. 39. 80

defense capabilities often benefitted TAC indirectly, but in general it

limped along with aging World War II capabilities. Lee remained aggressive, however, in maintaining TAC’s liaison with the agencies in charge of developing new and modifying existing equipment, especially the

Air Materiel Command. TAC’s Plans Division actively participated in outlining future projects to ensure that tactical doctrine was compatible with the new equipment and vice versa. As a result, while nothing radically new arose to affect tactical air power, progress in other areas and improved effectiveness of existing instruments contributed to TAC’s overall capabilities; the atomic bomb sight enhanced the accuracy of conventional precision bombing, improved navigation equipment facilitated both air support and air transport operations, and the development of television and improvements in photographic capabilities allowed the transmission of vital data from air to other air and ground forces.

TAC leadership was well aware of the reality that tactical requirements were suffering at the hands of strategic priorities did not alleviate TAC’s mission, and establishing "with what" as well as "how" to provide air support remained a dilemma.^® USAF suggestions that it might develop a single aircraft to cover the entire responsibility of tactical aviation (excluding transport) met with only a lukewarm response from

TAC, which regarded the proposal as unrealistic in practical terms.

The first F-84 fighters had arrived in TAC in August 1948, and while TAC did not have them under its direct operational control long enough fully

z^TAC History, Jan. - Dec. 1949, Vol. I, p. 14.

^®"Summary," TAC History, 1 Jan. - 31 Dec. 1949, Vol. 1, p. 106.

e^Ibid., p. 107. 81

to investigate the aircraft’s potential, Lee made sure that TAC

representatives participated in all future demonstrations and

modification. Exercise TARHEEL (April - May, 1949) had demonstrated that

the F-84 was only marginally suited to the close support role because of

its restricted range and altitude capabilities, leading to more in-depth

evaluation of the performance of the F-84 and the older F-80C to

determine which was better suited to the tactical mission. The F-84

presented some problems: its high speed limited the pilot’s ability to

identify ground targets, and when fully loaded it had insufficient range

(approximately 270 miles) and showed dangerous maneuver characteristics

at the slower speeds required for aii— ground operations.s* The F-80C,

modified to extend its range and equipped with external pylon bomb racks,

proved better suited to the tactical mission than either the F-84 or the

even newer F-86A.=i TAC’s campaign for the modification of the new jet

fighters to improve their suitability to the aii— ground mission ran counter to the general air force emphasis on development of new aircraft

rather than modification of old. With input from TAC, however, USAF allowed some modification of the F-80, including implementation of the

TAC requirement for the F-80T equipped with wing pylons that enabled it to carry both external ordinance and wing-tip fuel tanks to facilitate close-support operations. Overall, however, TAC’s attempts at modernization through modification met with only limited success because

^""Evaluation of the F-80C, F-84E, and F-86A," TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 30 Dec. 1949, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #91.

Ibid.; and. Memo from Lee to Commanding General, ConAC, "Tactical Suitability Tests, F-80C with Pylon Bomb Racks," TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 30 Dec. 1949, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #79. 82 of decisions like that of the Air Proving Ground, which cancelled target testing of the jet fighters because "in addition to other reasons, of the present low USAF priority currently assigned to tests of equipment pertaining to TAC."se

Because he believed that the current emphasis on strategic air power would eventually change, Lee emphasized the need to "sell" tactical air power and maintain a high priority on doctrinal advancements.

Without direct control of operational units for regular training and maneuvers, it was difficult to disseminate and regulate doctrine among the operational forces, but Lee and his colleagues at TAC managed at least to maintain a philosophy of tactical air operations.%AC cooperated directly with the AFF in drafting the "Joint Action Armed

Forces" to provide interim doctrinal guidelines for joint maneuvers.

The Plans Division initiated a program to formulate and publish a comprehensive series of Air Force Manuals covering "the principles, procedures, and techniques used in the employment of air power." The existing manuals and histories of World War II that USAF used in teaching field operations did not reflect the emergence of air power as a separate and distinct force. TAC hoped that by redrafting World War II doctrine the important changes that had taken place since 1946 would make tactical doctrine more relevant, would facilitate the development of future

==TAC History, 1 Jan. - 30 Dec. 1949, Vol. I, p. 37-38.

sGQen. Robert M. Lee in Air Superiority in World War II and Korea, p. 61-62.

s^Memo from Lee to Commanding General, ConAC, "Current Activities of the Tactical Air Command," TAC History, 1 Jan. - 31 Dec. 1949, Vol. Ill, Supp. Doc. #266, Inclosure 1. 83

capabilities, and might improve its credibility within the air power community.3=

Lee received considerable moral support from Quesada in his effort

to parry attempts to abolish tactical air altogether. Even after his departure from TAC the latter continued to be an outspoken and respected advocate of the tactical mission. In a 1948 article in Air University

Quarterlv Review, Quesada pointed out that US tactical air doctrine began

in a virtual vacuum and evolved the hard way: through operational experience, and often disaster, in North Africa, Italy, Western Europe, and the Pacific. By 1945, the USAAF had a concrete, highly developed doctrine that provided a blueprint for complex but efficient air-ground forces. In order for so sophisticated a doctrine to be properly implemented, TAC had to maintain a realistic operational capability, at least as a major subordinate command under the ConAC. The RAF (after whose doctrine USAF’s tactical doctrine was patterned) shared the Air

Force’s enthusiasm for strategic bombing theory, but it nonetheless believed that tactical air power had to operate as a distinct force in order properly to execute its mission. Quesada agreed that TAC should not be subordinate to the Army and that its contribution to the ground campaign might frequently be indirect (air superiority or interdiction) rather than direct (close air support, troop transport). The evolution of tactical doctrine, he argued, need not stop with the development of atomic weapons. The defeat of Germany proved the value of tactical air power in a strangulation campaign. In the future, Quesada predicted, tactical air power might be most valuable in preventing opposing armies

3=TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 31 Dec. 1949, Vol. I, p. 29. 84 from ever coming into contact with one another, which would preclude drawn-out surface campaigns in future conflicts. Even when surface conflict did occur, Quesada held that close air support would constitute a relatively small portion of tactical air operations.Through such arguments, Quesada and other tactical air proponents emphasized the independent capabilities of tactical air power in an effort to downplay the "subordinate" aspects of aii— ground operations.

TAC continued to participate in planning for joint maneuvers with the Army Field Forces, but its reduced status complicated the process.

When TAC was a major command, it enjoyed relatively parallel status with the AFF and had direct control of combat units, which facilitated the promulgation of joint doctrine and the supervision of joint operations to ensure adherence to that doctrine. The AAF retained primary responsibility for Army participation in joint operations and training in the Zone of Interior, instruction at the Army service schools, and development and enforcement of doctrine, but the Air Force no longer had such an agency. TAC could only circulate new doctrine as "approved by the Tactical Air Command" and encourage operational units to use it as part of their training and operations. In planning joint exercises and manuevers, TAC had to coordinate not only with the AFF but also with

ConAC to ensure that its plans did not conflict with other operations.

This frequently meant that TAC could provide only a fraction of the tactical air support that the Army needed to conduct realistic training.

The result was a lack of standardization and adherence to doctrine within

B^Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada, "Tactical Air Power," Air University Quarterlv Review, Vol. 1, No. 4, (Spring 1948), pp. 37-45. 85

the Zone of Interior that gradually spread to the theater air forces with

unfortunate consequences.s?

The vagaries of ConAC organization served to undermine effective

joint operations, and TAC persistently pushed for a more structured

relationship between ConAC and its subordinate commands. TAC notified

ConAC early in 1949 that it was in the "unsatisfactory position" of

having to plan exercises with the AFF without a clear program approved by

higher headquarters. TAC needed to know, on a yearly basis, what

operational assets would be available and the procedure for planning for

joint exercises. Lee suggested that TAC and AFF draw up an annual

schedule of training exercises that ConAC could coordinate with its own

schedule to allow necessary adjustments to be made well in advance.

Despite ConAC recognition that such an arrangement was necessary, it took

no immediate action to rectify the deficiency until the ADC was fully established. As a result, the majority of TAC’s effort went to

organizing its forces to enable it to carry out its mission, and juggling

Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and ConAC schedules to plan joint operations.

By the end of 1949, the basic organizational problems remained, but TAC had built an agency minimally capable of carrying out USAF’s responsibility for cooperation with other services in tactical air support.

The size and heterogeneity of ConAC left its fiscal and budgetary

3?Letter from Wolfinbarger to Commanding General, TAC, "A Review of Tactical Air in Joint Operations," n.d. (file), Historv of the Tactical Air Command, July - November 1950, Volume 4: Supporting Documents, AFS/HRC, pp. 2-3.

B^ConAC Historv, 1 Dec. 1948 - 31 Dec. 1949, Vol. Ill; Operations and Training, pt. 1, pp. 93-94, 105. 86

situation similarly chaotic. As a completely new organization with no past experience from which to proceed, ConAC found translating its

diverse functions and missions into dollars and cents— especially given

increasing pressure to economize— a formidable task. Reorganization

itself was a tremendous drain on resources as was the construction of an essentially new air defense structure, forcing TAC to settle for paltry

leftovers. Its total budget for joint operations in FY1949 was $716,315, a figure that even ConAC acknowledged was "a minor fraction of the amount. . .necessary to conduct scheduled operations.TAC also lost

its Budget and Fiscal section in the reorganization, leaving the only organization within ConAC with experience in planning for and conducting air exercises and maneuvers unequipped to render accurate budget estimates. That responsibility fell to the numbered air forces, most of which had no experience with the budgetary aspects of their maneuvers, resulting in wide variations in funding estimates.^*

TAC participated in four joint operations during 1949, of which two— "Operation TARHEEL" and "Operation LITTLE COMBINE"— were intended to train Army and Air Force personnel in techniques of aii— ground operations. In TARHEEL, the biggest and most successful of the joint maneuvers, 140 tactical aircraft operated in support of an Army force of

26,000 men, 4,000 trucks, 2,000 trailers, 350 tanks, and 70 heavy guns.

The debilitating effect of inadequate tactical training in the Zone of

Interior soon manifested itself in joint maneuvers oversees. In

s^lbid., p. 103.

^'^ConAC Historv, 1 Dec. 1948 - 31 Dec. 1949, Vol. VI: Fiscal Aspects of Command Operations, pp. 3-5, 15-16. 87

"Exercise HARVEST," conducted within the European theater in late 1949,

observers from TAC concluded that the 2nd Air Division, which provided

the tactical support, "demonstrated either a complete lack of

understanding of FM 31-35 or a lack of desire to adhere to it." The

situation in the Pacific theater was worse. During the twelve months

prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, no realistic joint

exercises took place because no Air Force agency within the theater had a

sufficient understanding of doctrine to enter into such operations.'*^

Criticism of Air Force tactical air power escalated under the new

organizational regime. Critics of the Air Force charged that "with all

the billions being spent for armament. . .the amazing truth has leaked

out that the ground troops of the United States are today without direct

air support of any consequence."'*^ USAF responded in June, 1949 by

establishing a Board of Review for Tactical Air Operations. Because of

his reputation as a tactical aviation advocate and his friendly relations

with the Army, the Air Force appointed Quesada to head the Board. The

purpose of the Review Board was: to review current doctrine, tactics,

procedures, and equipment; to determine their suitability in light of new

developments; and, to make appropriate recommendations. The memo

charging Quesada with his responsibilities stated, in part, that current doctrine as reflected in FM 31-35 and FM 100-20 reflected the stresses

and conditions of the period in which they were written and need revision

in light of developments since World War II. The Board was also

'*^ Ibid., p. 4.

'*®David Lawrence, "Army Ground Forces Held Almost Without Direct Air Support: Tactical Air Arm Called Neglected as Millions Go into Strategic Bombers," Washington Star, June 9, 1949. 88 empowered to examine existing aircraft in light of their suitability for the ground support mission. In particular, the Board was to consider the modification of the B-26 and the F-47 (formerly the P-47) for the ground support mission. Serving on the Board with Quesada was Gen. Otto P.

("Opie") Weyland, who would later command the Fifth Air Force in Korea and the Tactical Air Command during the 1950s.

During the first meeting of the Board at Langley AFB on June 29,

Quesada made it clear to the members of the committee that this review would not be a "whitewash" of current tactical air doctrine, and that all aspects of tactical air operations were open to review. Lee presented the Board with a summary of tactical air concepts, methods and procedures for implementing those concepts, basic principles, priorities, capabilities, and future requirements to familiarize committee members with TAC’s current status as a take off point for its deliberations.^^

The Board eventually decided that it should stand as a permanent body to review on a periodic basis the status of tactical air doctrine and capabilities.

The first step the Review Board took was to define the concept of tactical air power it would use as the foundation for the review. As they defined it, tactical air power implied three basic concepts:

1) Support of major surface campaigns designed to exploit the strategic air offensive by engaging military forces of an enemy nation on the battlefield.

'*'^Memo, Muir S. Fairchild, USAF Vice Chief of Staff to Gen. Quesada, "USAF Board of Review for TAC Air Ops," June 10, 1949, Quesada Papers, LC/MD, Box 6.

'^'^"Notes on F irs t Meeting," 21 June 1949, Proposed Board of Review Report Form, Quesada Papers, Box 6. 89

2) support of limited surface campaigns by denial of the area from penetration by enemy forces, subsequent participation in such military actions as required to expand and hold the area.

3) Support of the strategic air offensive within the capabilities of tactical air power by attriting enemy forces, destruction of the mobile transportation facilities of enemy nations, isolation of deployed enemy field forces from their sources of sustenance.

The Board also adopted a set of basic principles that should govern the employment of tactical air power, either in independent operations or in conjunction with surface forces:

1) Integration of surface and air efforts to achieve maximum effectiveness

2) Centralized control of tactical air power to allow flexibility and concentration of effort at the decisive point

3) Air superiority is essential to the success of a major ground campaign

4) Interdiction of the battle area is a high priority

5) Close tactical air support is essential .'•=

The Review Board met five times between July and September, and heard testimony concerning tactical air power from representatives of all the services and most of the major air commands. In September, the Board drafted a set of findings that was generally critical of current USAF capabilities. The Board acknowledged that tactical air assets would, and should be an integral part of future air defense, but did not agree that a combined command such as ConAC provided adequately for tactical air power. The Air Force needed a centralized and cohesive nucleus through which to plan and train for joint operations. The Board went on to warn

*="Notes on Second Meeting," Proposed Board of Review Report Form, Quesada Papers, Box 6. 90

that if USAF persisted in its "negative attitude" toward tactical air

power "within 4 to 6 years the Army will have sufficient evidence to

justify acquisition of its own Air Force on the grounds that USAF is

neither able nor willing to discharge its responsibility for support of

ground forces." To prevent such an outcome, the Air Force needed, to take

two steps: first, to educate Army officers in the role, capability, and

doctrine for air support; and, second, to give the Army more real

evidence of a willingness to train, organize, and equip combat units for

cooperation with ground forces.

Regarding the Continental Air Command, the Board found that its

concept was not entirely wrongheaded, but its implementation was flawed.

The principle of economy of force recommended against the creation of two

separate commands with exclusive missions, but catch-all training on the

current model was also inadequate. Instead, each command should devote

the majority of its training to a primary mission— either defense or

tactical air— with secondary training in the other area. Likewise, the

Board recommended that Strategic Air Command forces receive generalized

training in the tactical doctrine and concepts. The Board strongly

recommended that TAC be reinstated, at least as a subordinate command

under ConAC and assigned one or more tactical air forces for two

important reasons. First, TAC was a universally understood designation

that was accepted service-wide and was more harmonious with the

organization of surface forces. Second, the Air Force needed a tactical air "force-in-being" with primary responsibility for cooperation with

surface forces. The TAC organization should be complete within itself, fully capable of carrying out its mission, and must have command. 91

administration, and operational control of at least the minimum number of

tactical units necessary to plan and implement operations.

The Board’s analysis of aircraft took into consideration both

existing capabilities, potential for future modification, and Army

assessment of its requirements for tactical aircraft. It concluded that,

contrary to Army demands, there was no apparent need to develop a new

light bomber for close air support; however, the Air Force should place

more emphasis on training existing medium bomber units in tactical air

operations. Army concerns regarding the suitability of jet fighters in

the close support role were, in the Board’s view, unfounded. The jet, it

concluded, was "superior in all fields of endeavor;" what was needed was

more extensive joint training to alleviate the Army’s misgivings.^* In

general, the Board determined that the Air Force research and development program should place more emphasis on requirements suitable for tactical

air operations. Such an emphasis did not require the development of designated aircraft in most cases, however, since existing strategic and

air defense weapons systems were generally suitable, or if not, easily modified.

The Air Force decision to convene the Review Board on Tactical Air

Operations was, to a degree, a response to spiralling and increasingly vocal dissatisfaction with tactical air power in the Army. In February,

the new Army Chief of Staff, Omar Bradley, expressed dissatisfaction with the imbalance between tactical and strategic forces in defense planning.

**"Notes on Fifth Meeting," September 27-28, 1949, Proposed Board of Review Report Form, Quesada Papers, box 6.

*7"Notes on Fourth Meeting," September 16, 1949, Proposed Board of Review Report Form, Quesada papers, box 6. 92

Army criticism, he insisted, should not be interpreted as opposition to

strengthening the air arm, but "reckless reliance on a knockout (air)

blow in the opening months of a conflict," he warned, might risk defeat.

All the services should share the burden of strengthening air power,

which he admitted was a first priority weapon, the Army should not have

to make all the sacrifices, for "if we starve the Army. . .to feed those

first priority forces, then we shall have to anticipate that ground

support will be perilously thin, and the large-scale ground offensive

will, of necessity, be long delayed." Even in the nuclear age, Bradley

insisted, the bottom line was that "whatever the devastation in the

cities and the disorder in his existence, man will not be conquered until

you fight him for his life.'"*®

The Army had an opportunity to voice its specific grievance

regarding tactical air power before the Review Board. In general, the

Army representatives seemed satisfied with the Army’s relationship with

TAC, although it felt that more interaction was needed at the operational

level. In the area of doctrine, the Army representatives called for a

revision of joint-doctrine to better reflect past operational experience

as well as the viewpoints of both services. The Army also felt that

future operational doctrine should allow for direct control of tactical air assets bÿ ground force commanders— something that even the most

staunch tactical air advocates regarded as heresy— or at least employment at the ground commanders discretion. The most critical deficiencies, in

the Army view, were in the area of cooperative planning and joint

’’®John H. Fenton, "Bradley Back Economies by U.S. at Military Risk to Avoid ’Bust’," The New York Times, February 5, 1949. 93

operations. The Army witnesses called for the establishment of more

permanent institutions for training and joint operations: a Joint

Tactical Air Support Center at Fort Bragg, more Air Force liaison

officers to relevant Army activities, an Army liaison officer at the Air

Force Proving Ground at Eglin AFB, and participation of tactical air

units in maneuvers of the Army infantry and armored divisions at Forts

Lewis and Hood. All of these steps, they suggested, would build

confidence, dispel concerns over lack of cooperation, and reassure Army

ground forces of the Air Forces’ ability to support them.*^ In short,

even in view of the recent abbreviation of the Air Force’s tactical air organization, the Army sought little more than reassurance of USAF’s good

faith intention to perpetuate the mission.

As the debate over Air Force reorganization dragged on into the

fall of 1949, USAF continued to defend its structure as serving the best

interests of national security without diminishing its capability to support ground operations. Advocates of the new structure for ConAC argued that it allowed USAF to maintain trained units equipped with

"modern, high performance ground support aircraft" that were capable of expansion to support any likely surface campaign. ConAC supporters charged that critics of the new organization who advocated a distinct tactical air force failed to realize that "our surface forces are small and require only a modicum of air support." Total army strength, they pointed out, was roughly equal to one field army, for which one tactical air force could provide support. As ConAC had the equivalent of one

4^"Notes on Third Meeting," July 14-15, 1949, Proposed Board of Review Report Form, Quesada papers. Box 6. 94

tactical air force in trained and equipped units, and an air defense unit capable of conversion in a few months, "it is obvious that the Air Force

is more than prepared to uphold its share in any immediate joint air- surface operation." In the event of an extended surface campaign, the

Air Force maintained that it could expand its tactical units in ample time to support Army operations.'”-'

Such assurances from the Air Force did little to assuage the misgivings of those who believed that an inordinate share of available defense resources were going into the strategic air force. In particular, defense experts expressed concern that the current Air Force structure did not allow for the possibility that strategic bombing might fail to end a future war in thirty days. In such a case, the Soviets would likely have advanced into friendly territory, increasing the risk of using atomic weapons and leaving US ground operations severely handicapped by the lack of tactical air power.Throughout 1949 a controversy smoldered over USAF procurement of the B-36. Public interservice squabbling became so intense that Secretary of Defense Louis

Johnson issued a gag order forbidding further public statements on the issue by military leaders. The B-36, a behemoth of a long-range bomber with a large price tag ($5,757,584 per copy) and questionable capabilities (it was especially vulnerable to jet interception) eclipsed all other aircraft in USAF procurement, to the particular distress of

“■'■Lt. Col. Howard D. Sutterlin, "Tactical Support Aviation in the USAF," Air University Quarterly Review, Vol. II, No. 2 (Fall 1949), pp. 53-54.

=iLawrence, "Army Ground Forces Held almost without Direct Air Support." 95

tactical capabilities. The public debate involved primarily the Air

Force and the Navy; the Army stayed out of the public fray, but it privately made its position clear on two important points. First, in obtaining funding for its strategic bombing force, the Air Force must not neglect development and maintenance of an adequate tactical air force to support Army ground forces and sufficient transport capability to execute airborne operations. Second, big bombers armed with atomic bombs could not win wars alone; therefore, the role of ground forces in taking advanced bases and holding territory captured from the enemy must remain an essential assumption in future military planning. Army leaders continued to maintain a low profile in the press, but within Pentagon circles, assailed the Air Force for orienting its planning too much toward bombers at the expense of the tactical air force. In USAF’s proposed 48-Group Plan, air-ground support capabilities consisted of one light bomber group (48 aircraft) and 1,275 fighters, which the Army considered clearly inadequate. At the same time. Army spokesmen admitted that budget limitations made maintenance of an adequate tactical air force-in-being impossible and accepted Vandenberg's assurance that USAF would provide adequate support in the event of a war.“® The Army repeatedly quashed rumors of a major dispute over tactical air power and insisted that the Army and Air Force were "working out [their] problems and there [were] no obstacles or wrong attitudes." Although budget limits had taken their toll on tactical air support capabilities. Army spokesmen insisted that the Air Force was cooperating in efforts to

“^Walter Trohan, "Army Silent, Watchful in B-36 Dispute: Holds Infantry is Decisive," Chicago Tribune, July 12, 1949. 96

expand joint maneuvers and reemphasize development of tactics and

techniques in that area.=3

The Army and the Air Force reached a temporary rapprochement on the

tactical air power issue during the spring and summer, largely thanks to

the efforts of General Devers and Lee’s persistent "selling" of tactical

aviation inside and outside the Air Force. Devers privately told

Vandenberg and other members of the USAF staff that the Air Force had to

make a commitment to improving the existing tactical air situation,

especially in view of increasing criticism from the Department of the

Navy. He demanded particular attention to the shortage of troop carrier

aviation and insufficient joint training in close support resulting from

TAC’s loss of its operational capabilities. In addition, he urged the Air

Force to take Army concerns into account in developing future fightei—

bombers for close support operations and to consider allocating a greater

share of the 48-Group Air Force to tactical missions.®'* Tactical air

advocates within USAF supported Devers, especially his claims that the

Soviets placed much greater emphasis on aii— ground support in their

general air planning than did USAF. In April, Stratemeyer, Commander of

ConAC, assured Devers that he would restore some of the tactical air

units that Headquarters USAF had eliminated under the 48-Group Plan and

®®John A. Giles, "Gray Denies Dispute between Army, Air Force on Tactical Air Support," Washington Star, July 10, 1949.

“"Among the requirements the Army considered vital for future fightei— bombers for close air support: ability to hover over targets, ability to operate from short, rough, forward airstrips, and "endurance" characteristics that emphasized time in the air rather than range. 97

make fighter squadrons more readily available for joint maneuvers.==

Among the other changes he proposed was the activation of an operating air force headquarters— consisting of a tactical control group, a signal battalion, and a radar calibration unit— to form the basis of a tactical air force headquarters in field manuevers with the Army, a development

that Lee had advocated since late 1 9 4 8 . The Tactical Air Force

(Provisional) was designated on May 7, 1949, relieving many of the problems that TAC and the AFF had earlier experienced in planning and carrying out joint manuevers.=? Vandenberg also pledged greater Air

Force attention to tactical air power, but Devers maintained a healthy skepticism. "What we have now are assurances, not guarantees," he stated, but "I think if we keep after them— keep bouncing them— things will be all right."==

As the debate heated up in the fall of 1949, the Army came under increasing criticism for failing to speak out in defense of tactical air power. Journalists questioned how "a great soldier like General Bradley can sit by and allow tactical air support to dwindle to almost nothing

°=The units that Stratemeyer proposed to restore were: the 20th tactical fightei— bomber group, 2 reconnaissance squadrons, 1 light bomber squadron, and an unspecified number of tow-target and liaison squadrons, all of which Headquarters USAF had cut in its 48-Group proposal. Stratemeyer suggested further expansions should the Air Force expand to 57 groups: reactivation of the 81st fighter group and expansion of the light bomber squadron to group status. "Letter from Stratemeyer, ConAC, to Devers, AFF," April 26, 1949, TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 31 Dec., 1949, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #76/4.

=aibid. •

“■^Headquarters, ConAC, "General Order 54," April 28, 1949, TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 31 Dec., 1949, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #77/1.

“®John G. Norris, "Army Wins Fight for Greater Air Support of Ground Troops," Washington Post, July 10, 1949. 98

and yet say or do nothing about it."='^ Finally, perhaps in response to such criticism, the Department of the Army began, in September, to speak out against what it saw as an inordinate emphasis on strategic air power

in USAF planning. Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray led the rebellion against Air Force neglect of tactical air power, charging that USAF was selling the nation a "candy sweet doctrine that the atomic bomb, guided missiles, planes, and supersonic speed have relegated the Army’s G.I. Joe to an unglamorous bit part" in a "unrealistic, push-button, one-two type" scenario likely to occur only in comic strips. Secretary Gray agreed that strategic air power was vital to national defense, but disagreed with "the specious argument that air power and super weapons, virtually alone, would be able to make a war relatively easy and that as a result there [was] a dwindling need for Army Forces.

USAF tactical air capability became a subject of public debate in late 1949 when the "Revolt of the Admirals" once again brought the roles and missions debate to a head. Although the controversy centered on the

Air Force’s procurement of the B-36 and the cancellation of the Navy’s

CVB-58, the 65,000-ton supercarrier United States, tactical air power once again served as a bludgeon with which the Navy could attack Air

Force planning and readiness. The Navy convinced one of its energetic

Congressional supporters, Representative Carl Vinson— Chairman of the

House Armed Services Committee— that the state of military planning was sufficiently grave as to warrant hearings on "Unification and Strategy,"

“’’’Lawrence, "Army Ground Forces Held almost without Direct Air Support."

*'5"Gray Assails Theory of Easy Atom War," Washington Post, August 24, 1949. 99

which were held in October 1949.

The Vinson Committee hearings, which dealt with "the B-36 and

related matters," constituted a public airing of interservice animosity, unprecedented to date, in which the Navy attempted to prove that the Air

Force was leading the US into a dangerous state of unreadiness while the

Army and Air Force sought to prove current national strategy basically

sound. Navy testimony repeatedly stressed that the Air Force was misguided in its emphasis on strategic weapons at the expense of its

tactical capability thus endangering oversees bases and the US homeland by "pouring scarce budget dollars into large, expensive planes dedicated to an unsound theory of war."- Vice Admiral Arthur Radford, Vice Chief of

Naval Operations for Air, accused the Air Force of deceiving the American people that strategic air power constituted a "cheap, easy" way to win a war. As a result, it concentrated on "slow, expensive, very vulnerable, single-purpose, heavy atomic bombers at the expense of the small, fast bombers and extremely high performance fighters for which we now have such an urgent need in great numbers" and which, he argued, were "more efficient in destroying such key targets of strategic warfare as bridges, canal locks, tunnels, and transport equipment." So-called tactical aircraft, Radford posited, more greatly enhanced the flexibility of air power than a huge fleet of single-purpose strategic bombers; and, even in strategic bombing campaigns, high performance fighters would be essential in maintaining command of the air, yet less than six percent of

Air Force research and development resources went into tactical and 100

fighter aviation.Admiral Thomas C. Kincaid, Commander of the Eastern

Sea Frontier and Atlantic Reserve Fleets, followed up Radford's testimony by suggesting that given the state of USAF tactical air power and the

strategic situation in Western Europe in which forward basing was either unavailable or subject to being overrun, it was conceivable that in

future wars, landings on the Normandy model would have to receive their tactical air support from carrier based air forces.*®

During the B-36 controversy, the Marine Corps entered the fray for the first time, testifying to the inadequacy of Air Force tactical capabilities. The Marine Corps’ witness. Brigadier General Vernon Megee, testified that the Air Force routinely misrepresented its tactical air capabilities going back even to its wartime operations in Europe. The history of Army-AAF cooperation before the war and during its early periods was, he argued, "one of frustration and disappointment for the

Army ground forces," since "then as now the primary concern of the Air

Force high command was with the theory of independent air operations."

Current Air Force tactical capability, according to Megee, existed only on paper, a fact that would, in the event of an early outbreak of war, necessitate provision of a major part of air-ground support by the Navy

*'United States Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, The National Defense Program: Unification and Strategy, 81st Congress, 1st session, (Washington, D.C.: 1949), p. 46, 52.

*®Ibid., p. 278; and. Investigation of Close Support Aviation, January 9, 1951, Tab B: "Congressional Testimony: Extracts Pertinent to Close Tactical Air Support from a Report of Investigation by the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on Unification and Strategy," March 1, 1950, National Archives, Washington, D.C., RG 319, Decimal File, 1951-52, Box 77GB, file 452.1.

^^Unification and Strategy, p. 195. 101

and Marine Corps.*'* While Megee agreed that Army air support

requirements were less than those of the Marine Corps, he still

emphasized the "necessity of having adequate— or more than adequate—

tactical air support in the opening phase of a war" since a strong

tactical air force at that time "might well be decisive."*=

The Air Force prepared its rebuttal to Megee’s testimony on the

basis of two different assumptions: first, that World War III would not

involve large-scale amphibious operations and surface campaigns on the

Eurasian land mass, and second, that the atom bomb had made large-scale

amphibious and surface campaigns obsolete and that World War III would

thus not follow the pattern of World War II. In so doing, it sought to

prove that under either scenario, the Air Force was not derelict in

regard to tactical aviation. The basis of USAF’s self-defense was its

contention that those who criticized its tactical air power had fallen

victim to the widespread misconception that military air forces could be

rigidly compartmented into "tactical" and "strategic" aviation, when in

reality, no hard and fast line existed either in terms of appropriate

target or in type of aviation equipment. To engage in such arbitrary compartmentalization, in the Air Force view, was to endanger the

effective employment of military air assets in a time of crisis.

Likewise, the Air Force insisted that air-ground support constituted a

much broader scope of operations than the "close support" that

*'*Ibid., p. 197.

*=Ibid., p. 199. 102

characterized Marine aviation doctrine.

The Air Force insisted that its tactical force-in-being, contrary

to Megee’s charges, was capable of supporting land operations should

World War III become a protracted surface campaign. The extent to which

existing tactical capabilities were lacking was attributable to budgetary

limitations that did not allow any one mission to receive all desirable

assets. Should World War III follow the second scenario— all out atomic

strategic bombing campaigns— clearly any components of the air force

designed specifically for close support operations would be useless and

never employed in combat. Flexibility, in either scenario, would be at a

premium, and in terms of military planning would produce the highest

level of preparedness at the lowest cost.*?

In its official statement to the Vinson Committee in response to

Megee’s statement, the Air Force admitted that tactical air did not

receive the proportion of resources it ideally demanded. Air Force

priorities were, however, established by current JCS War Plans that

established for USAF three major missions in order of priority:

a. The retaliatory atomic offensive: requires a force-in- being capable of operating at full efficiency and full strength within hours of the outbreak of war

b. The air defense of the United States, which likewise requires a force in being

c. Air support of ground troops, which must be capable of supporting ground troops at such time as they are

**James F. Whisenand, "Papers Prepared for rebuttal to Brig. Gen. Megee’s testimony before the Vinson Committee investigating the B-36, November-December, 1949: I. General," Miscellaneous materials from the personal collection of Mai. Gen. James F. Whisenand, USAF (Ret.). AFS/HRC, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 168.7017-45, pp. 1-3, 5-7.

*?Ibid. . p. 9-13. 103

enlisted, trained, organized, and deployed for combat. Such a force must be capable of expansion as fast as the ground forces to be supported, with fully developed organizational plans, procedures for joint training, doctrine as to command structure and organization, and effective modern eq u i p m e n t .

These priorities were the guideline for USAF’s group structure; should

the JCS determine a different priority based on revised war plans,

according to the statement, the Air Force would comply.

The USAF statement of rebuttal went on to challenge Megee’s concept

of tactical air power that, in the Air Force view, reflected

misconceptions common among critics of its tactical air capability. The

Marine Corps, USAF argued, too narrowly defined tactical aviation as only

missions which provide close support to ground troops.From that

perspective USAF’s tactical capability could be ruled deficient, but such

a view overlooks the inherent flexibility of the strategic air force that

enabled it to shift from its primary mission to ground support with

relative success, especially in isolation of the battlefield, air

superiority, and attacks on enemy troop concentrations. Strategic

bombers could also function in close support operations, and although

USAF would employ the B-36 for tactical missions only in extreme emergencies, it insisted that other aircraft, for example the B-47, could

operate quite effectively. After all, as General George C. Kenney argued, "the bomber is merely a weapon for putting fire power on a

target, and it makes no difference to the bomber, its crew or the

6=Ibid., p. 2.

6?Memo for Maj. Gen. S. E. Anderson from Maj. Gen. F . F. Everest, "Statement on Tactical Aviation," November 22, 1949, Papers prepared for rebuttal before the Vinson Committee. 104

supported force whether the vehicle for transporting the firepower in a

big plane or a small one." Furthermore, "the big bomber carries more TNT

than the small bomber, so that actually it is a better support weapon

than the small bomber," and " it can operate from distant bases and

therefore saves the ground forces the worry about constructing huge,

expensive airdromes in forward positions."?*

Air Force witnesses also denied charges that USAF had allowed its

strategic mission to strangle its tactical capabilities. What was most

vital to effective air-ground operations was a strong liaison between the

air and ground commanders and a schedule of training that allows tactical

and ground units to engage in annual joint training.?’- In its

organization, command structure, and joint training, USAF had met its responsibilities in that regard. It established Tactical Air Command as

a tie-in to the Army at a "mutually satisfactory level," had located

tactical units at such points as to facilitate joint training with the

troops they were to support, and had worked with the Army to acceptable field command procedures "to insure the most effective use of tactical

air units cooperating with ground troops." As to the proper ratio of tactical aviation to ground divisions, the Air Force argued that it "is not a question of what the tactical air commander or the ground commander would like, but what can be soundly provided upon an evaluation of competing priorities," and in view of fiscal realities Megee’s proposal

(four tactical air groups per Army division) was outside the realm of

?*Gen. George C. Kenney, "Flexibility of Air Power," November 1949, Papers prepared for rebuttal before the Vinson Committee, p . 1.

?Mbid.. p. 2. 105

realistic possibility.

In his testimony before the Vinson Committee, Vandenberg asserted

that the planning for the, 48-Group Air Force committed a proportionate share of resources to tactical air power, including a modern fleet of aircraft for support of ground troops.He further declared that devoting a greater share of resources to tactical air would endanger national security. Strategic air power, he argued, was the only hope for the US to offset the enemy's advantage in manpower, but diverting resources away from strategic into tactical air would undermine the atomic deterrent. In addition, such a diversion would signal to the

Soviets that they could rechannel the vast resources they devoted annually to air defense into development of offensive forces. Finally, such a diversion would deprive the US of its opportunity, should war break out, to destroy enemy capabilities at the source and would thus increase the likelihood of a protracted and mutually devastating ground war. In questioning the implications of the tactical alternative,

Vandenberg raised the specter of massive standing armies— a là Napoleon and Hitlei— passively awaiting attack.?^ Even in view of his questionable historical analogy (neither Napoleon nor Hitler could rightly be characterized as awaiting attack), perhaps the most surprising of Vandenberg’s contentions in his testimony was that the strategic

Statement on Tactical Aviation," p. 6-7.

73The aircraft to which Vandenberg referred as either completed or near completion were as follows: assault, C-122, C-123, C-125; twin- engine cargo, C-120; four-engine transport, C-124; twin-engine transport, C-119 (modified for forward operations); helicopters, XH-16, XH-17, H-19; and for close air support and other attack operations, XB-51, B-45C, F-84E.

~^**Unification and Strateov, p . 455-456. 106

mission should take priority even over air superiority capabilities. In

contrast to the other military witnesses who held that command of the air

is a necessary prerequisite to a successful strategic bombing campaign,

Vandenberg testified that command of the air was relative and that

strategic bombing missions could operate with reasonable success without

command of the air.?= Vandenberg's remarks seemed disconcertingly

reminiscent of World War II claims that "the bomber will always get

through."

The Vinson Committee released its report on unification and

strategy in March, 1950, in which it concluded that strategic bombing,

long-range bombers, and intercontinental interdiction received a

disproportionate share of public attention leading to a general misconception that strategic bombing was synonymous with air power. It

sided with the Army and Navy in warning against "overemphasis on single­ weapon, easy war concepts" and in pointing out that "air power consists

of many elements; Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aviation; strategic and tactical aviation." In numbers of aircraft, the committee concluded

that tactical aviation should comprise a larger share as "strategic air power is but one specialized element of the total air power of the United

States." Accepting the Air Force plan to augment US strategic air power at the expense of its tactical and naval air forces would, in the committee's view, constitute an overall reduction in the nation's air strength, despite Air Force claims to the contrary.?^

^^Unification and Strateov, p. 487.

76Reqort of Investigation bv the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on Unification and Strategy, March 1, 1950, in Investigation of Close Support Aviation. 107

Army Chief of Staff Collins had essentially supported Vandenberg's

assertions in his own testimony before the committee. He denied

allegations of Army passivity regarding tactical aviation, but insisted

that air-ground support was an issue that could, and should, be resolved

between the Army and USAF. "I can assure you," he stated, "that the Army

acquiescence in relinquishing tactical air was not arrived at idly or

without doubts and misgivings in some quarters," and Collins assured the

Vinson committee that the Army intended continuously to police Air Force

activities in tactical aviation. Even under the abbreviated 58-Group

plan, however, there were thirty-six wings capable of delivering ground

support were it required. USAF’s willingness to cross-train its strategic units in aii— ground tactics largely compensated, in Collins’s

view, for the deficiencies in tactical units. In short, Collins (and by his suggestion, the Army) was confident that the Air Force was willing and prepared to provide adequate ground support in the event of a major surface campaign.??

The committee was favorably impressed by the Army’s apparent satisfaction with Air Force support aircraft and plans, but urged a closer relationship among military aviators for the benefit of all. The committee found no reason why all three services involved in aii— ground operations— Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps— should not cooperate to

improve their doctrines and enhance their professional experience. The

Marine Corps, for example, could pass along some of its expertise in close air support, while coming to understand better the limitations of its doctrine in larger surface campaigns. Not only could the doctrines

^^Unification and Strateov, p. 544. 108

and capabilities of all three profit from increased cooperation, but such

interaction could reduce the tensions and suspicions that have long

crippled interservice relations. The Committee specifically recommended

the establishment of a Joint Army, Air Force, Marine Corps Training

Center to promote the development of sound close air support tactics and

techniques. It also urged greater cooperation between the Air Force and

Navy to resolve questions concerning the performance of their tactical

aircraft.

The Vinson Committee’s report reflected a growing concern over the

state of Air Force tactical aviation. In March, Eisenhower, through

General Collins, expressed concern over the Air Force’s stubborn

insistence on centralized control of theater air assets, asserting that

"the principle of complimentary roles and consequent interdependence of

the three components of the armed services. . .is sound only if the

principle of a unified commander is likewise applied whenever elements of

two or more services are supporting one another.General Devers, now

retired, also expressed concern, speculating that since the Air Force

reorganization, Vandenberg was more concerned with overhead than with

"planes and pilots." Like the Vinson Committee, Devers was "astounded at

the ignorance of many of our prominent, thinking civilians on the ground

Army and its tactical support" and cited the need to foster greater public awareness of tactical air support:

7B"Summary of Committee Views," Report of the Committee on Armed Services: Unification and Strategy, in Investigation of Close Support Aviation.

T^Letter from Gen. J. L. Collins to the Secretary of the Air Force, March 9, 1950, RG 319, Decimal file, 1950, Box 611, CD 373.1, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 109

I have been sitting on two BoardCs] for the past six months. For some reason, the civilian members have the idea that the Marines are the only service that have a tactical air force. I believe the time has come to give more publicity to what the Tactical Air Force that supports the Field Army consists of and what the Air Force is doing about it.®°

The Vinson Committee had expressed, in its final report, impatience with the interservice squabbling and interference through which one service attempted to impose decisions on the others that affected their basic structure or mission. The perception that such military turf battles had begun to interfere with sane military planning spread to other quarters as well by mid-1950. Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times warned that "there is far too great a danger to the nation in force a party-line concept of strategy." Nowhere was the party line approach to strategy more flagrant than in the Air Force. Both civilian and military policy makers had begun to realize a changing foreign policy meant that strategic bombing alone might not win a future war and that the employment of atomic weapons might "lose the peace." The Army and Navy view was that a sound strategy must integrate air power with surface forces and that tactical air power in support of those operations could be as vital as independent strategic bombing. The majority view in the

Air Force, however, continued its weak endorsement of tactical air power while adhering to its traditional strategic concepts. The Air Force was, in Baldwin's words, "firmly controlled by American Douhets flying out

G^Letter from Jacob L. Devers, Gen. USA, Ret. to Gen. Omar Bradley, Chair, JCS, May 10, 1950, and Letter from Devers to Gen. J. Lawton Collins, May 10, 1950, RG 319, ACS Decimal File, 1950, Box 569, CD 201: D, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 110 into the wild blue yonder.

Criticism of the existing structure for both tactical and air defense aviation intensified contributing to USAF’s decision during the first half of 1950 to consider proposals for another reorganization. The first hints of reorganization reached Tactical Air Command in Air Force communications that mentioned a "currently planned reorganization of the

United States Air Force" and prevalent rumors of "a contemplated major change" beginning in February. Continental Air Command initially proposed a reorganization of all combat air assets— tactical and air defense— into a major subordinate Combat Air Command in an effort to end the inefficient split jurisdiction that characterized the existing organization of ConAC’s operational assets. Headquarters USAF, however, rejected that proposal, prompting ConAC to consult TAC and ADC for suggestions.ee

The second time around, ConAC proposed a more flexible command organization that created two subordinate commands— TAC and ADC— with jurisdiction over both the operational and administrative functions in their respective areas. The inefficiencies of ConAC’s present organization had long frustrated the leadership of TAC and ADC and lead both to endorse this aspect of the ConAC proposal with considerable enthusiasm. TAC was likewise encouraged by the proposal to establish a fully mobile Tactical Air Force Headquarters at Pope AFB, North Carolina

®^Hanson Baldwin, "Services Far Apart: National Security Is at Stake in Fight over How Air Strength is Best Used," New York Times, June 26, 1950.

®®"Impending Reorganization," TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 30 June, 1950, Vol. I: Narrative and Supporting Documents, pp. 7-13. I ll

and the reassignment of the 9th Air Force as its operational branch.A

concurrent suggestion that responsibility for the "Air Personnel Command"

shift from ConAC to TAC brought some consternation. The frustrating

manpower problems of the immediate postwar years were still fresh in

TAC’s institutional memory, and its commanders assumed that personnel

procurement would similarly undermine execution of the tactical air

mission, since ConAC’s proposal did not suggest augmenting TAC

Headquarters to a degree adequate to offset the additional administrative

responsibilities. Headquarters USAF ultimately sided with TAC, rejecting

the "Air Personnel Command" proposal and ConAC’s suggestion that tactical

and air defense units share the same bases, which TAC argued ignored the

inherent difference between static air defense and mobile tactical

units.

A Department of Defense press release on May 23 formally announced

the impending organization, including the reassignment of operational assets directly to TAC that amounted to "a renaissance for the Tactical

Air Command." The overall plan, which was to be implemented over a period of months, would strengthen air defense capabilities and make

available more effective training for tactical support of ground forces.

Under the new organizational regime, ConAC retained responsibility for overall planning for air defense, tactical air support, and mobilization, but the plan freed up tactical assets for more direct control by TAC and

Internal Reorganization, 1950," ConAC History, 1 Jan. - 30 June, 1950, Vol. I: Organization and Mission of the Command, p. 7.

G^Ibid., p. 7; TAC History, 1 Jan. - 30 June, 1950, Vol. I, pp. 11-13, 112

ADC.8= The implementation of the reorganization began immediately on a phased basis and marked the end of the "operational headquarters" as a entity in the peacetime air force and the reemergence of TAC as an

independent, if subordinate headquarters. It also streamlined ConAC’s structure, reducing the number of subordinate commands from nine to seven and the number of regional air forces from six to four. Most important, however, was the restoration of the tactical and air defense missions to positions of preeminence and the promise that the command of the 9th Air

Force as its operational branch would restore TAC to its former prestige.

The internal reorganization of ConAC was also part of a general trend within the Air Force to erode command boundaries and cultivate a . greater degree of cooperation between the major commands. ConAC’s original mission, for example, included support of emergency operations of the Strategic Air and Military Air Transport Commands. In 1950, USAF gave SAC fightei— escort units the secondary mission of ground support and made them available for tactical training and support of AFF units.

Prior to ConAC’s reorganization, USAF Headquarters contemplated a similar use of SAC fighter wings in air defense. Overall, even ConAC conceded that the disadvantages of the reorganization

®“"Air Force Reorganization of the Continental Air Command," Department of Defense Press Release, May 23, 1950, TAC History, 1 Jan. 30 June, 1950, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #24.

e^ConAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 30 June, 1950, Vol. I, p. 16. 113 commands."37 The move toward breaking down rigid organizational boundaries within USAF served a dual purpose. On the one hand, it probably did increase institutional unity and overall efficiency by allowing the assets of various commands to shift as operational expediency dictated. On the other hand, it allowed USAF to create the appearance of a new and fortified Tactical Air Command without, in reality, devoting significantly more resources to the mission. As long as TAC remained at least partially dependent on other commands, it posed significantly less of a threat as a "fifth column" through which outside forces might usurp control of one third of USAF’s mission.

The so-called "renaissance" of the Tactical Air Command came only after USAF felt confident of its status as an independent and coequal service. The Key West Agreement, the Finletter Report, and the Vinson

Committee hearings established strategic air power as the "first line" of

US national defense, and inaugurated the Air Force, for the time being, as the unchallenged master of that realm. In winning the battle over the

B-36, the Air Force won much more than another state-of-the-art weapons system (in fact, with the all-jet B-47 and B-52 already in the works, the propeller driven B-36— conceived and then cancelled during World War II — was both unnecessary and virtually obsolete before it came on line and saw only seven years of active service). More important, it won its long-sought-after guarantee that only it could properly conduct sustained, long-distance, strategic bombing operations. The Navy’s bid for a bigger piece of the strategic pie backfired, ultimately bolstering

'Ibid. , pp. 33-35. 114

USAF's position. The admirals’ fight for a share of the strategic bombing mission (which they had little realistic hope of winning) amounted to a de facto admission that strategic air power was indeed the pivotal factor in the US defense posture. Had the Navy recognized, as

TAG’S vocal minority had already suggested, that power projection through tactical air power might in the future prove equally decisive, it might have launched a more successful campaign to acquire a dominant share of that mission as insurance for the future growth of its air arm, perhaps to the ultimate advantage of tactical aviation in general. Strategic bombing’s position as the cornerstone of USAF’s institutional independence and military decisiveness and the other services’s failure to comprehend the strategic significance of tactical aviation hereafter colored the growth and development of the Tactical Air Command, and not always to the benefit of the tactical mission.

While the reinstatement of TAG as an independent and self-contained command reflected increased appreciation of its mission, the fact that it remained a "subordinate command", inferior in status to SAG, stood as a reminder that USAF did not yet regard tactical aviation as one of its central priorities. The Air Force had not quite found a place for tactical air power in its institutional identity and deemed it a necessary but not entirely agreeable obligation. World events in mid-

1950 provided the necessary external catalyst and restored TAG’s former coequal status within USAF. While TAG worked to recreate it^ former command structure during the spring and summer of 1950, events in Korea brought the debate over the proper operational role of tactical aviation to a quick and painful resolution. For the next three years, USAF, TAG, 115 and the Army would unravel some of the lingering doctrinal and organizational questions, ignore others, and ultimately emerge with a

Tactical Air Command dramatically different in size, capabilities, and missions from any of its previous incarnations. CHAPTER III: TAC RESURRECTED, 1950-1951

The US military establishment in June 1950 stood at the threshold of one of the most traumatic periods in its history. The opening weeks

of the war in Korea called into question all the major strategic assumptions of US defense planning and preparedness since 1945. In the

new strategic order, the Air Force was the backbone of US defense and designed its force and established its priorities accordingly; but the much discussed "next war" turned out not to be World War III or a direct superpower confrontation and offered scant opportunity for USAF to flex

its strategic muscle. Of all the military services, the Air Force had most readily embraced the predicted obsolescence of conventional surface campaigns, leaving its force structure ill-prepared in terms of doctrine, equipment, and training for limited war. US military performance in the opening weeks of the war raised alarming questions as to how, in a few short years, a military establishment that helped defeat Nazi Germany and vanquished Imperial Japan could so deteriorate as to find itself virtually impotent in the face of a relatively small, emerging, revolutionary state that did not even exist in September, 1945.

The Korean War, as it evolved in July and August 1950, placed effective tactical air power, especially close support and battlefield interdiction, at a premium. The Far East Air Force— based in Japan and flying primarily FBOs, F51s, and B29s in the opening weeks of the war—

116 117

provided close support to the 8th Army and delivered UN forces from

certain, early defeat on the ground. The doctrinal and training

deficiencies that TAG commanders had disparaged for the past four years,

however, hampered USAF effectiveness in the opening phase of the war.

TAG had struggled since 1946 to perpetuate and modernize the body of

tactical doctrine that emerged from World War II, but reorganization

stripped it of its capability effectively to disseminate that doctrine to

operational units. As a result, the FEAF devoted valuable time and

energy— which might otherwise have provided the UN margin of victory— to

improvising doctrine and tactics, and adapting personnel and equipment to

the realities of combat. The relative unreadiness of tactical air units

in Korea would spark a new round of controversy: one in which the Army,

previously careful to maintain the appearance of solidarity with the Air

Force, joined the chorus of those openly critical of USAF stewardship of

its tactical mission.

The central theme of TAG’s development in 1950 and early 1951 was

transition. It was a period of abrupt and sometimes wrenching change from the highest levels of national policy to the everyday administration of the command. National security policy entered the era of NSG/68 with its expanded commitments and new emphasis on military flexibility.

Military priorities re-emphasized conventional capabilities for limited war scenarios, mitigating dependence on atomic scenarios. The Air Force had entered the jet-age, bringing greater diversity, changes in doctrine, and increased demands on USAF’s financial, material, and human resources.

TAG itself faced sometimes overwhelming transitions, beginning with its status within USAF. Reorganization— first to a subordinate command, and lia

later to a major command— would have been pressure enough, but the North

Korean regime forced another transition: from peace to war. Throughout

1950, TAG was in a constant state of flux. If the past four years had

represented TAG’S infancy, 1950 marked the beginning of its adolescence:

a period of growth, occasional ungainliness, changing complexion,

uncertainty, alternating insecurity and confidence, and a constant

struggle to define itself.

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea was the last in a series of

events leading to renewed emphasis on conventional capabilities.

Beginning with the declaration of the "Truman Doctrine," in April and

May, 1947, US foreign policy developed a gradually more confrontational approach to advancing communism. The Truman Doctrine’s original purpose

was to inspire congressional support for economic and military aid to

Greece and Turkey, rather than to expand direct military commitments or

create an edict for worldwide application. In promoting the perception of a world divided between two "alternative ways of life"— democracy and

totalitarianism— the administration had, nonetheless, unleashed an

ideological and political crusade against communism that implied global military commitments.^ Kennan’s Foreign Affairs article, "The Sources of

Soviet Gonduct," expressed more precisely the precepts of his earlier

"Long Telegram" and provided the intellectual foundation for the strategy

‘The Truman Doctrine stated that: "the policy of the United States [is] to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures" was likely designed to impress isolationists in Gongress on the issue of aid to Greece and Turkey rather than to announce a "doctrine" for worldwide application. See, for example, Thomas J. Shoenbaum, Waging Peace and War, (New York, 1986), pp. 149-150. 119

that came to be known as "Containment." Kennan described the

unrestrained expansionist tendencies of the Soviet revolution and the US

responsibility to "contain" the spread of communism through a strong and

persistent policy of resistance. Kennan understood the limits on US

military means, and emphasized economic and political over military

responses to Soviet expansionism. Force should be the last resort,

reserved for the defense of the most vital US i n t e r e s t s . ^ By the end of

1947, "containment" of international communism drove US foreign policy;

but by 1949, strategists deemed Kennan’s concept of peripheral defense

inadequate.

The post-1945 world order permanently altered what historian

Russell Weigley has called "the American way of war:" a two century-old

tradition of non-engagement peppered with all out wars of annihilation.

New responsibilities implied perpetual engagement requiring military force capable of proportionate response to threats at all levels.^

Capabilities trailed commitments, but only after a series of "crises" in

1949 that highlighted US weaknesses did the administration draft a

national security policy that put military muscle behind its strategic ambitions. In September 1949, the advent of Soviet atomic weapons

permanently ended the US atomic monopoly and the luxury of taking its military superiority for granted. The emergence of the Peoples’ Republic

of China (PRC) and the ongoing interservice debate over national strategy

intensified concern over the adequacy of existing military capabilities

^CGeorge Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXV, (July 1947), pp. 566-582.

BRussell Weigley, The American Wav of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, (New York, 1973), p. 366. 120 in meeting expanding threats and responsibilities and made the argument for more flexible capabilities compelling. Secretary of Defense

Forrestal’s warnings about conventional preparedness, which had fallen on deaf ears in 1947 and 1948, seemed vindicated after his death.

Official recognition of the need for change still left the formidable task of convincing a reluctant nation that the threat justified the economic sacrifice necessary to restore US conventional capabilities. In January, Truman named a special committee to consider future US national security policy in light of the Soviet A-bomb.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson appointed Paul Nitze— head of the State

Department’s Policy Planning Staff and former member of the US Strategic

Bombing Survey (and in Acheson’s view a more pragmatic policymaker than the e'hereal Kennan)— to chair the committee. Its primary mission was to compile a comprehensive statement of US national security interests, threats to them, appropriate responses, and feasible capabilities (in particular, the hydrogen bomb). Acheson and Nitze agreed that the Soviet

A-bomb and spiralling communist threats along the US strategic perimeter, made improvements in conventional capabilities imperative.'* "Selling" the concept of expanding US threats and capabilities to a Congress and public reluctant to allow military spending to jeopardize postwar economic growth was another, but essential matter.

National Security Council Memorandum Number 68 (NSC/68) detailed the US national security situation in graphic and sometimes exaggerated terms. Despite a Top Secret classification, its conclusions were drafted

'•Walter Issacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men, (New York, 1986), p.481, 489-490. 121 with an eye toward their "propaganda" value. NSC/68 portrayed a vastly more dangerous world in which the US faced global threats from the Soviet

Union and its client states, making it essential that the administration convince Congress and the public that whatever the sacrifices, the US must not fall significantly behind the Soviets in military capabilities, nuclear o£ conventional. If NSC/68 lapsed into exaggerated rhetoric and significantly overstated Soviet force capabilities (or made its points

"clearer than the truth, as Acheson would put it), its drafters felt

justified in their excess given the grave nature of their mission. Most remembered the struggle to develop capabilities during World War II, and knew that Soviet atomic weapons ruled out leisurely mobilization in future wars.= NSC/68 promoted the concept of steadily growing and theoretically unlimited means to match a spiralling threat and became the blueprint for US national security policy (to varying degrees) into the

1960s.a

NSC/68's shift of US military priorities heartened but did not surprise Army and Navy leadership. The "balanced forces" debate did not begin with NSC/68 and would not end with Korea. Army and Navy advocates had emphasized the risk of limited and conventional war and disparaged the deterioration of US surface forces into mere occupation police since at least 1948.? On the eve of the Korean War, General Matthew Ridgway,

° Ibid., p. 498.

^John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, (New York and Oxford, 1982), pp. 89-95.

■^In early 1950, General Douglas A. MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander in the Pacific Theater, ordered an evaluation of Army units in the Pacific Theater (in anticipation of a possible confrontation with the Chinese Communists) and established a goal for the Pacific Command of 122 one of the leading spokesmen for conventional force revitalization, argued that "only by the combined, skillful, balanced employment of Army,

Navy, and our Allies, welded into one all inclusive, persevering effort, can we both win the war [of the future] and more important still, the peace to follow." Immediate and significant improvements in training,

Ridgway warned, was the only way US forces could avoid "the almost certain failure. . .among insufficiently indoctrinated and inadequately trained troops in their initial exposure to battle."®

The impact of NSC/68 was, in long run, more profound than merely an expansion of US military capabilities; rather, it suggested a fundamental shift in the principles that permeated US strategic planning since 1946.

Even prior to NSC/68, JCS planning did not treat global atomic war as a likely scenario. OFFTACKLE, the emergency war plan to counter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, assumed a US withdrawal to the Iberian

Peninsula, and if necessary. North Africa, and a period of mobilization

(approximately 24 months) for a major air "liberation" campaign conducted from forward bases in Great Britain, North Africa, and the Pacific.? It was only a matter of time, however, before the Soviets would develop intercontinental delivery capability that would render war plans based on full combat readiness by June, 1950. General Walton Walker, commander of the 8th Army in Japan, estimated in May, 1950 that his forces were only about 40 percent combat capable. U.S. Army Military History Institute. Senior Officers Debriefing Program. Conversations between Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond and Capt. Thomas G. Ferguson thereafter cited as Almond Oral History], AMHI, 1975, pp. 15-16.

^Matthew B. Ridgway, "The Role of the Army in the Next War," Address to the Armed Forces Staff College, February 15, 1950, Papers of General Matthew B. Ridgway [hereafter cited as Ridgway Papers], AMHI, Box 21 : "Statements by Ridgway, CincFE," pp. 5-7.

?Condit, Historv of the JCS. Vol. II: 1947 - 1949, pp. 294-304. 123

post D-day mobilization obsolete. NSC/68 identified "piecemeal

aggression" conducted below the atomic threshold as the principal threat

to US strategic interests in the decades to come. While nuclear weapons

were the foundation of the US strategic deterrent, Soviet retaliatory

capability made conventional forces a vital link in deterrence. The US

faced the threat along its strategic periphery of a "descending spiral"

of "gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we

have sacrificed portions of vital interest." It had, therefore, become

"imperative to increase as rapidly as possible our general air, ground,

and sea strength and that of our allies to a point where we are

militarily not so heavily dependent on atomic weapons."i* In short,

NSC/68 called for military forces with "vertical flexibility" to enhance deterrence and avoid escalation.

The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in

April 1949, magnified concerns over US conventional readiness.

Membership in NATO implied a more permanent material commitment to the defense of Europe than the US had heretofore been willing to admit. NATO was designed as a mutual defense agreement and assumed that European member nations would contribute the majority of surface forces. In 1949, however, it was clear that the major NATO members— Great Britain and

France— were in no economic or military position to contribute a proportionate share of the approximately $45 billion price tag considered the minimum necessary to hold a defensive line at the Rhine. Britain and

France had already deployed most of their available troops in colonial

*°NSC/68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 15, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. I, (Washington, D.C., 19 ), pp. 235-292. 124

holding actions outside Europe. Secretary of State Acheson, less than

optimistic regarding allied capabilities, noted the ironic significance

of the music during the treaty signing: "I Got Plenty of Nothin’," and

"It Ain’t Necessarily So."^

Truman and his politically ambitious Secretary of Defense, Louis

Johnson, remained reluctant to accept the full implications of NSC/68 and

NATO: Truman did not want to surrender to deficit spending, and Johnson,

excluded from the formulation of NSC/68, suspected a plot to undermine

his authority over defense policy. Both Truman and Johnson clung to the

hope that the US defense establishment need not equal that of the USSR

provided it could absorb a first blow and "come back to make Stalin sorry

he ever started the war." The drafters of NSC/68 warned that the US could no longer afford such a "head-in-the-sand" approach. Johnson set

up a "straw man," arguing that in a democracy, the price of absolute non­ nuclear force parity with the Soviets was too high, ignoring the fact

that no one had proposed such a drastic build-up. He responded to fears of "another Pearl Harbor" by arguing that a repeat of December 1941 was

impossible since "there wasn’t any unification at Pearl Harbor, or Pearl

Harbor couldn’t have been."^^ While Truman gradually recognized the

incompatibility of "cheap" defense with US strategic realities, Johnson resisted implementation of NSC/68 even after the outbreak of war in Korea and seemed, to his contemporaries, less interested in building a sound military structure than in retaining his image as a ruthless budget-

iilssacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p. 489.

is"Defense: How We Stack up against Russia," Newsweek, March 13, 1950, Vol. 35, pt. 1, p. 18. 125 cutter to foster his own Presidential ambitions. After June 30, 1950, when the Truman administration formally committed US troops to fight on the Korean peninsula, it became impossible to ignore the prescience of

NSC/68's assessment of likely threats. If NSC/68 provided the policy

initiative to reinvigorate US conventional military forces, Korea made implementation of so broad an expansion of military commitments politically possible for the first time since 1945.

The Air Force also resisted the implications of NSC/68 and presumed that it did not augur a significant change in USAF’s role or capabilities. Even after events during the opening weeks of the Korean

War revealed the weakness of the air-ground link, Air Force spokesmen insisted that USAF’s force structure and priorities were sound. Air

Force planners, however, recognized that tactical air power would have to be a higher priority in future planning, if only to appease critics in the Army and the press who charged that USAF was negligent in its management of tactical aviation and joint operations. The ConAC proposal for reorganization released in May, 1950, stated that the elevation of

TAC to a subordinate command would "placate those critics of air power who argued that overemphasis of "strategic" considerations had resulted in a neglect of "tactical considerations."'^ General Spaatz, retired

USAF Chief of Staff turned military commentator, was outspoken in his contention that the Air Force had pursued the proper course in emphasizing strategic over tactical capabilities. In July, 1950, he

Letter, Headquarters ConAC to Comm. Gen. TAC, "Internal Organization of ConAC," May 18, 1950, TAC Historv, 1 July - 30 November 1950, vol. IV, Supp. Doc. #4. 126

endorsed the official view that USAF had maintained an acceptable ratio

of tactical air units to active Army divisions and warned against

changing military policy in response to momentary political furor; "What

each component part of each service needs to perform its role should be a

matter for military determination and not a decision by public clamor."

The danger of Korea (and by implication, NSC/68) was that in fighting a

"side-show war" the US might "lose sight of the world situation, thereby

winning a battle but placing ourselves in danger of losing a war."i*.

When US fortunes changed in December 1950, he wrote that the lesson of

the Chinese rout of MacArthur’s forces along the Yalu was that since the

US could never equal its likely opponents in manpower, air dominance was

more vital and the proper role of the Army was "to supplement and

implement air power."*® To Spaatz, Korea proved not that the Air Force

had mismanaged its tactical mission but that air power advocates must be ever more vigilant in protecting strategic capabilities from those who

might allow the US to become "sidetracked" from its vital interests.

The Senate Hearings on the situation in Korea and the Far East that

followed Truman’s firing of MacArthur in April 1951, revealed USAF views of the new national security posture and its impact on the early phases

of the war. Chief of Staff Vandenberg described a "shoestring Air

Force," the resources of which should not be used to "pick at the

periphery," but which, for the foreseeable future,

in view of our global commitments, must not be utilized until

*'*Carl Spaatz, "Some Answers to Korean Questions," Newsweek, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, July 31, 1950.

*®Carl Spaatz, "The Airplane Is Our Hope Now," Newsweek, Vol. 36, Pt. 2, December 11, 1950. 127

it is larger for anything except holding it intact as nearly as possible against a major threat, against a major power, because...it is the sole deterrent to war up to this time; and if we emasculate it, that sole deterrent will be gone.

Vandenberg cautioned that deployment of any part of USAF’s strategic

assets (which included a sizeable force of "tactical" aircraft) in Korea

— or any peripheral operation— would amount to "tipping our hand" to the

Soviets, giving them valuable intelligence regarding our air doctrine and

enabling them better to counter our air c a p a b i l i t i e s . V a n d e n b e r g ’s

concern regarding potential "squandering" of the US deterrent capability

was not entirely without merit: in June 1950 the US atomic stockpile

numbered about 299 warheads; and SAC stood at 18 wings, a relatively

small proportion of which were capable of delivering atomic weapons at

intercontinental ranges.

While the debate over the first major realignment of US defense

policy since 1945 went on at higher levels, TAC attempted to rebuild the capabilities it had lost during its tenure as a peacetime "operational

command." Internal USAF and ConAC studies indicating that "the myriad responsibilities assigned to the ConAC air forces have served to place

less emphasis on the air defense and tactical missions than can be

^'^United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Declassified Hearings, Joint Session: Dismissal of MacArthur and Far East Militarv Situation, April 30 - May 9, 1951, "Testimony of General Hoyt Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force," RG 46: Senate, 82A.F79, National Archives, Washington, D.C., reel #4, items 3395, 3670-3671, 3729.

^■^The atomic stockpile had never equalled its dominance of U.S. defense planning: in 1945 it stood at 2 warheads, 9 in 1946, 13 in 1947, 50 in 1948, 250 in 1949, 299 in 1950, and 447 in 1951. Futrell, "The Influence of the Air Power Concept on Air Force Planning, 1945-1962," pp.257, 262. 128

considered desireable" concluded that reorganization was essential.

Although TAC was not officially reinstated until July, the news of its

impending elevation to a subordinate command broke in May, and planning

for the reorganization began almost immediately, although TAC was not

officially reinstated until July. The Korean War broke out at roughly

the mid-point of the planning process, and TAC adjusted its command

priorities accordingly, putting greater emphasis on pipeline training for

combat air crews and joint training in air-ground operations for Army and

Air Force units bound for Asia. General Lee departed TAC at the end of

June, and the command assumed its new responsibilities in July, with a new commander, General Otto P. ("Opie") Weyland, a long-time "TAC man,"

at the helm.

The reorganization process was not without controversy, and once

again. Headquarters USAF, ConAC, and TAC frequently differed over the command’s mission and role, although all concurred that the operational

effectiveness of USAF’s tactical forces had declined significantly under

ConAC’s "pendulum" system of shifting units between operational headquarters.*? Headquarters USAF and ConAC issued reorganization guidelines in May that acknowledged the need for improved air-ground support and more joint training for airborne, troop carrier, and joint operations. To fulfill its expanded mission, TAC received seven new tactical groups, two battlefield support squadrons, and material strengthening of its provisional Air Force. USAF was optimistic that

*®"Proposed Reorganization of the Continental Air Command," TAC History, July - Nov. 1950, Vol. II, Supp. Doc. # 4.

*?Ibid. 129

strengthening TAC would quiet persistent criticism of Air Force "neglect"

of tactical aviation in favor of strategic air p o w e r . 2 0

TAC drafted its own organization and mission proposal, agreeing

with ConAC regarding the need for frequent and effective joint training

exercises and enhanced operational assets for the command but differing

over priorities. In light of events in Korea (and perhaps elsewhere),

TAC insisted that its operations should emphasize tactical unit and air

crew training.General Wolfinbarger at Ninth Air Force had identified

a nearly total lack of conformity among tactical air units in overseas

theaters, pointing to the need to establish TAC as the designated agency

to oversee formulation, standardization, review, and enforcement of joint

doctrine.ee

Despite TAC’s own recommendations regarding its new mission, and in

seeming contradiction to earlier USAF recommendations, ConAC’s

requirement, issued in August, contained elements that TAC found

"perplexing."ee ConAC Regulation 26-1 mandated that TAC’s primary

mission was "to support the operations of the Strategic Air Command and

^•’‘Letter, Headquarters ConAC to Comm. Gen. TAC, PO&R 320.3, "Internal Organization of ConAC," May 18, 1950, TAC Historv, 1 July - 30 November, 1950, Vol. I, p. 3, Supp. Doc. #4.

GiLetter, Headquarters TAC to Comm. Gen. ConAC, TC300, "Proposed Regulation on Organization and Mission of Tactical Air Command and Ninth Tactical Air Force," July 14, 1950; Draft of ConAC Regulation 26- , "Organization and Mission of Tactical Air Command," July 13, 1950, TAC History, 1 July - 30 Nov. 1950, Vol. II, Supp. Doc. # 6/1, 6/2.

G^Letter, Maj. Gen. W. R. Wolfinbarger, Comm. Gen., 9th Air Force to Comm. Gen. TAC, "A Review of Tactical Air in Joint Operations," n.d., TAC History, 1 July - 30 Nov. 1950, Vol. 4: Supporting Documents.

^^"Organization and Mission," TAC Historv, 1 July - 30 Nov. 1950, Vol. I, p. a. 130 the Military Air Transport Service as directed by the Headquarters

Continental Air Command.TAC commanders attached little practical importance to the SAC support provision, but found it difficult to explain since Air Force Basic Doctrine held that all air power is inherently flexible and that tactical air power was, thus, always prepared to support strategic operations when necessary. Contemporary operational experience offered little rationale for such a provision since combat operations in Korea had depended on tactical application of air assets to an unprecedented degree. TAC suspected that the curious clause reflected internal Air Force politics, but such a suspicion was difficult to prove and impossible to document.2 = Despite the

"perplexing" SAC support clause, TAC found the rest of the ConAC regulation— including cooperation with surface forces, conduct of anti­ submarine patrol, and training and preparing units for combat operations-

-generally conventional and acceptable.

As had been the case since TAC’s first incarnation in 1946, material and organizational support for the new subordinate command fell considerably short of its ambitious mission. Ninth Air Force

(redesignated Ninth Tactical Air Force) moved from Langley to Pope Air

Force Base along with new units including radio, motor transport, and air base squadrons, a signal battalion, and a tactical control group. The

Tactical Air Force (Provisional) was officially disbanded and its combat

G^ConAC Regulation 26-1, "Organization— Tactical Air Command," August 11, 1950, TAC Historv, July - Nov. 1950, Vol. II, Supp. Doc. #13.

==Ibid., p. 8. 131 support units reassigned to Headquarters TAC.^a The reorganization of

TAC provided for a full complement of administrative functions, (Command and Special Staff, Comptroller Staff, Air Adjutant General Staff,

Operations Staff, Materiel Staff, and a Headquarters and Headquarters

Squadron), but ConAC allocated personnel to man TAC’s administrative structure sparingly; 150 officers, 300 airmen, and 110 civilians.^?

Competition from other Headquarters involved in the reorganization

(including Air Defense Command and the regional air forces), also hurting for trained personnel and specialists, aggravated TAC personnel crisis but the transfers of excess personnel from the "reduced" Ninth Air Force offset the shortage somewhat. TAC became a sort of institutional

"melting pot," incorporating administrative and operational "old hands," former Ninth Air Force personnel, and some "imports" from outside the existing tactical h i e r a r c h y . ee

"Creeping mobilization" resulting from the Korean War and implementation of the 69-Wing Air Force aggravated personnel shortages during the early phase of TAC’s reorganization. Perhaps most

^*The Tactical Air Force (Provisional) and Ninth Air Force units reassigned to TAC at Langley were: 1st Shoran Beacon Unit, 2d Liaison Flight, 29th Communications Squadron, 84th Bombardment Squadron (Light, jet), 85th Bombardment Squadron (Light, jet), 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (Night Photo), and the 564th Air Force Band. "Proposed Reorganization of the ConAC," TAC Historv, July - Nov. 1950, Vol. II, Supp. Doc. #4.

^■’’Letter, Headquarters TAC to Comm. Gen. ConAC, DR320.3, "Table of Distribution," July 11, 1950, TAC Historv, 1 July - 30 Nov. 1950, Vol. 4 i Supporting Documents, Supp. Doc. #12.

ee"Organization and Mission," TAC Historv, 1 July - 30 Nov. 1950, Vol. I, pp. 12-13.

s^TAC History, July - Nov. 1950, Vol. I: Narrative, p. 79. 132

frustrating for TAC was a rapid command turnover as USAF rotated its

experienced tactical commanders to Asia, thwarting attempts to develop

the command’s organizational character. Previously, TAC had always had a

strong commander to rally support, promote morale, and give a sense of

direction to the command. General Weyland assumed command upon TAC’s

elevation to subordinate command status on July 0, but he uarely had time

to assemble a staff before he was sent to Korea on temporary duty status

to evaluate, and later command air operations. Major General Glenn 0.

Barcus succeeded Weyland on July 17. Barcus remained at TAC but spent

much of his tenure on temporary duty assignments including trips to USAF

and ConAC Headquarters, prospective TAC bases, a two-week war game in

Europe in September, and a sixty-day assignment to Far East Air Command

beginning in October. TAC’s junior command was equally unstable, with

its officers regularly reassigned on permanent or temporary duty during

the late summer and fall of 1950. As a result, TAC seldom had adequate

numbers of field grade officers, was consistently short of administrative

officers, and battled chronically low morale in an overworked officer corps. While both necessary and inevitable given the dual pressures of

reorganization and combat operations in Korea, TAC’s difficulty holding

key personnel undermined its stability.^*

TAC’s operational assets were likewise unstable during reorganization because the command controlled the only combat-ready units

in a number of key operational missions— units that were badly needed for combat duty in Korea. By August, TAC had lost its Tactical Control

Group, Signal Battalion, and Radio Relay Squadron along with tactical

3»Tbid., p. 14. 133

reconnaissance and shoran beacon squadrons. Some units, like the 20th

Fighter-Bomber Group, were reassigned to SAC for rotational training in

Europe in anticipation that the Soviets might take advantage of US vulnerability in that theater. During September, newly activated regular

and reserve units gradually replaced those reassigned to FEAF, but the command remained in a state of flux. The real problem for TAC lay not in

the physical loss of "workhorse" units, but in the drain of hard-earned

"know-how:" along with the transferred units went years of command experience that was not easily replaced. All too often, poor assignments

left TAC with replacement personnel activated in the wrong areas (bomber pilots in troop transport wings, for example), leaving the command either to arrange additional personnel transfers or completely retraining the mismatched airmen in appropriate areas.Activation of the newly constituted 2215th Combat Crew Training Squadron for pipeline training of

B-26 crews for air support operations relieved some of the pressure for replacement crews for the Fifth Air Force, but early operations also indicated a need for retraining airmen in basic military skills for combat and personal and base defense. By November, TAC had largely regenerated its operational capabilities, but it still faced the challenges of bringing new, incompletely trained units up to standard and creating an effective, combat ready command out of a diverse organization. 3=

31 Ibid., pp. 101- 102.

seibid., pp. 15- 24. 134 ,

If the Air Force hoped that TAC’s elevation to a subordinate

command would quiet critics of its tactical air capabilities once and for

all, it was soon disappointed. The development of tactical air power

over the previous four years had done little to foster the Army’s faith

in USAF’s commitment to its ground-support missions. Many Army officers

assumed they would not receive air support and doubted that

reorganization would bring significant improvement. General Mark W.

Clark, the new commander of the Army Field Forces, was one of those who

remained openly skeptical concerning the operational implications of the

TAC reorganization. Among Clark’s grievances were the insufficient

number of aircraft available for joint training with Army units, the questionable value of the types of aircraft employed in ground support operations, and the lack of cohesion between Army and Air Force units participating in joint tactical operations. Clark insisted that Army ground commanders should have direct operational control of those air units employed in ground support operations, a concept that the Army high command had surrendered during earlier debates over tactical air and that was anathema throughout the Air Force, including the otherwise sympathetic TAC.^^

General Lee, nearing the end of his command at TAC, denied Clark’s charges regarding USAF’s tactical capabilities, arguing that even prior to its reactivation as a subordinate command, TAC had provided all routine AFF requests for air support during FY1950 at the levels requested, even when TAC resources were overburdened with other Defense

B^ConAC H isto rv , 1 Jan. - 30 June 1950, Vol. IV: Operations and Training, pp. 91-92. 135

Department and Army requests. The only inconvenience for the AFF, even during TAC’s stint as an operational headquarters, came from the need to adjust the schedules of some exercises so as not to compete with other

ConAC training commitments. Lee also pointed out that if tactical units employed in such training exercises were, as Clark charged, under trained, that was largely because Army demands on support units did not allow sufficient home-base time to allow for the routine training necessary to maintain maximum effectiveness. Lee suspected, furthermore, that the AFF routinely inflated its aircraft requests— well beyond what could realistically be expected in wartime— to offset the possibility that

ConAC would cut the allocation for a particular exercise. Even after reorganization, Lee feared, the AFF’s unrealistic demands on its resources would impair TAC’s ability to maintain a desireable state of combat readiness among.its operational units in the Zone of Interior.^'*

Lee, whatever his feelings about the legitimacy of Clark’s objections, wanted TAC’s next commander to enjoy the same atmosphere of good will that Quesada and Devers had passed on to him. Before departing

TAC in July, he worked with Clark and the AFF to devise a program to streamline, rationalize, and strengthen joint training to the benefit of both services. TAC and the AFF agreed in June to cooperate in establishing joint teams to implement a regular program of training aimed at upgrading unit readiness in both Army and Air Force units and creating true "military teamwork" in tactical air support operations. The new program would emphasize cross-training: Army personnel participating in joint exercises flying in liaison aircraft to observe air-ground

=*^Ibid. . pp. 93-94. 136 collaboration from the airman’s point-of-view and air officers serving with ground units to gain a better appreciation for their special challenges. Lee and Clark hoped such training would serve to dispel skepticism among Army ground commanders, improve each service’s understanding of the other’s problems, and help expunge Air Force resistance to the concept of effective cooperation in air-ground operations.33

Progress in implementation of the new training program did not proceed to the Army’s satisfaction, and in October, Clark announced the formation of an Air-Ground School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.3* Under the command of Brigadier General Gerald J. Higgins, the Air-Ground School aimed at preparing field forces for joint operations. Drawing on the lessons of Korea, the school conducted continuing studies of doctrine, techniques, and tactics along with an in-depth review of Army requirements for tactical air support on the battlefield and in rear areas.37 Clark intended the center to provide a nucleus for "a true

Joint Air Support Center" and invited both the Navy and the Air Force to send liaison officers to the Bragg to advise and work with the Army staff.

TAC did not greet the new Army school with enthusiasm. It objected to the school’s location, arguing that it countered the benefits of having TAC and AFF Headquarters in close proximity (at Langley and Fort

33Austin Stevens, "Training to Stress Tactical Air Help," New York Times, June 15, 1950.

3*-General Mark W. Clark, Memorandum, "Close Air Support," October 24, 1950, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, Box 615, File 452.1.

37"Army Air Center Set Up," New York Times, October 24, 1950. 137

Monroe, Virginia) in facilitating cooperation and liaison between two important centers of training and doctrine. The establishment of yet another "joint" training center would, further, only result in decentralization and aggravate doctrinal confusion. TAC politely but firmly refused the Army request for liaison officers, stating that facilities for such cooperation already existed and the "the desired liaison might be maintained most expeditiously either by staff officer visits between Langley and Fort Monroe (a distance of about six miles) or by the exchange of qualified liaison officers between these two headquarters."33 General Wolfinbarger at Ninth Air Force, concerned that the Army Air-Ground School might give the Army the initiative in the field (or worse, pry open the door to its own tactical air force), established the Tactical Air Command School of Aii— Ground Operations at

Pope AFB. "As a result of the aggressive attitude of the AFF,"

Wolfinbarger admonished TAC that "we find that all fields of Joint

Operation are being systematically invaded and taken over, wherever the

Air Forces have not maintained their position." Unless USAF was willing to lose the initiative in the field it must take advantage of the "force- in-being" at the 9th Air Force and rejoin the vanguard of Joint

Operations.3?

Wolfinbarger's initiative resulted in the establishment of an

Advance Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, and the TAC School of Aii—

Ground Operations at Pope to work with the Army’s V Corps and the Army

38Letter, OCAFF to Commanding General TAC, "Liaison Officers from Army Air Support Center," December 13, 1950, TAC Historv, 1 July - 30 Nov., 1950, Vol. IV, Supp. Doc. # 839; Vol. I, pp. 314.

3?W olfinbarger, "Review of T actical A ir," p .7. 138

Support Center at Fort Bragg in training and development of new

techniques for close air support. Headquarters, USAF allocated a full­

time staff of 30 officers and 60 airmen to function as the Air Force half

of a Joint Operations Center (JOC) for exercises and to study the

problems of air support of ground troops. Limited facilities at Pope

prohibited permanent assignment of operational units, which were assigned

on a temporary duty basis from Ninth Air Force units. The Pope

headquarters, therefore, also served as a training and indoctrination

center for TAC’s operational units.The TAC Aii— Ground Operations

School soon outgrew the already cramped facilities at Pope and moved to

Southern Pines, North Carolina. Its full-time staff of 26 officers and

67 airmen offered four air-ground operations courses: General

Indoctrination, Ranger Air Contactor-Specialist, Forward Air Controller,

and Ail— Ground Specialist.'*^

Joint Doctrine enjoyed a apparent resurgence with the release on

September 1, 1950 of the Joint Training Directive (JTD) to update and

supplement FM 31-35. According to the JTD, the general mission of

tactical air power and its supported units were identical: defeat of the enemy’s military forces. It identified three basic principles of

employment. First, that the theater air force should gain and maintain air superiority in the theater of operations. Second, that tactical air

'♦'’Headquarters USAF, Tactical Air Requirements Board, Operational Requirements Division, Col. Stone and Maj. Rusk, "Pope Air Force Base, NC," [n.d./November 1950], National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, 1950, Box 616, file 452.1 (B-36 file).

'♦^History of the United States Air Force Air-Ground Operations School and the 4425th Squadron, 17 - 30 June 1951, AFS/HRC, file K417.07A, pp. 1-3. 139 forces should interdict the battle area to deny enemy troops, equipment, supplies, and freedom of movement. Third, that tactical air units should provide close support to surface forces in the battle area. Its principles of organization for tactical aviation did not overtly contradict existing USAF doctrine and asserted the importance of centralized control, mobility, flexibility, and integration of effort.'’S

The JTD was the product of a collaboration between TAC and AFF that began in 1949, while TAC was still an operational headquarters. TAC, its operational units, and the Army welcomed the JTD as a significant improvement over previous doctrine and a substantial step toward improved intei— service cooperation. When TAC routed the JTD through Headquarters

USAF and Air University, however, the reaction was at best mixed.

Lieutenant General I. H. Edwards, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, initially praised the JTD as

an excellent working doctrine for units of the field armies and tactical air forces....Candl the best available doctrine on air ground operations and...one which will provide proper guidance and training in a vital phase of joint operations....

Air University, on the other hand, objected to the JTD on a number of grounds, not the least of which was the contention that it was the USAF agency responsible for the formulation of doctrine. In addition, Air

University argued that until the JCS resolved all their policies regarding joint operations and published appropriate Joint Action Armed

'’^Office, Chief of the Army Field Forces and Headquarters, TAC, Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground Operations, September 1, 1950, AFS/HRC, file K417.549.4.

'’^Letter, Lt. Gen. I. H. Edwards, Dep. COS/Ops to Ennis C. Whitehead, ConAC, November 2, 1950, TAC Historv, July - Nov. 1950, Vol, II, Supp. Doc. #629. 140

Forces (JAAF) Manuals, new doctrine was inappropriate and the Air Force should continue to base its doctrine on FM 31-35 and use it as their guideline for joint training and operations.

Both Air University and Headquarters USAF expressed fundamental objections beyond the domain issue but conceded that TAC should have a hand in formulation of doctrine, particularly as concerns operational aspects of joint doctrine. In general terms, the JTD did not meet with their approval because "there are areas in which basic concepts and terminology depart from those expressed in FM 31-35."''"'’ More specifically, Air University objected to the narrowness of the doctrine in the JTD, which resulted from its "fundamentally flawed" concepts; that surface operations always define "theaters" and that the proper role of tactical aviation is always the support of ground forces. To accept those premises, Air University argued, was to oversimplify the role of tactical air power, perpetuate the false lessons of World War II, and ignore modern, post-atomic strategic realities. Modern war should properly be a coalition of air, surface, and sea campaigns with the

"theaters" defined according to which service can best achieve the desired objectives. Theater air forces, in the Air University view, would likely fight several types of campaign concurrently unless and until certain conditions exist: a guerrilla war in which strategic

'^‘*John F. Luzander, TAC History, 1 Jan. - 30 June, 1954, Special Study: Tactical Air Command's Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine since the Publication of the Joint Training Directive, pp.5-6.

'♦“Letter, Air University to Comm. Off. 3894th School Squadron (non- Air Force Schools), "Air University Policy on 'Joint Training Directive for Air Ground Operations' published by the Army Field Forces," 19 January 1951, TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1954, TAC's Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, appendix. 141

bombing would be ineffective; achievement of the primary theater

objective of air power; political restrictions on application of air

power; composition of enemy forces is such that no requirement for ground

campaign exists; one aspect of the campaign with transcending

importance.'**

The Air University rejection of the JTD also echoed Vandenberg's

earlier objection to the designations "tactical air force" and "tactical

air power." Instead, Air University promoted the concept of "theater"

and "strategic" air forces to minimize the impression that tactical

aviation was primarily ground support aviation. Doctrine for such

"theater air forces," according to Air University, had to emphasize the

following factors: the variable nature of the circumstances in which air

power was likely to be employed, the fundamental versatility of air

power, the principle of economy of force (which exploits versatility by

avoiding "prepackaging" of forces), and the concept that decentralization

inherently weakens versatility and serves to weaken not just the Air

Force but the entire theater. In conclusion. Air University proposed to

revise the JTD in conformity with those stated principals but retaining,

as far as possible the original character of the document

Air University’s objections prevented TAC from circulating the JTD

to its operational units as official Air Force doctrine. The result,

rather than the initial aim of doctrinal unity, was increased confusion

'**Letter, Maj. Gen. John DeF. Barker, Comm. Air University to Headquarters USAF, "Joint Training Directive for Air Ground Operations," April 16, 1951, TAC Historv. 1 Jan - 30 June 1954, TAC’s Role in Development of Joint Doctrine, appendix, p. 2-3.

'*'^Ibid ., pp. 3-5. 142

concerning joint doctrine. The Army and the AFF, having accepted the JTD

as a preliminary official doctrine for joint operations, commenced

employing its principals in unit training and Army schools. TAC believed

that the JTD, imperfect though it might be, was preferable to the clearly

inadequate FM 31-35 and accepted it as a interim guide for its unit

training although without the status of official doctrine. Air

University, having rejected the JTD out-of-hand, continued to insist that

FM 31-35 was the only "true" doctrine for joint operations, but USAF

provisionally approved the JTD in March 1951 in the interest of

"uniformity in all air-ground training and instruction throughout the Air

Force.This doctrinal confusion was debilitating to joint training;

led to a jurisdictional struggle between TAC and Air University, and

surely contributed to the inefficiency and tension between ground and air

forces during the opening phases of the Korean War.^?

The drafters of the JTD anticipated criticism from interested agencies and made plans for revision of the doctrine. In March, 1951,

the Commanders of TAC and the AFF appointed a ten-member joint "Steering

Committee" to consider recommendations and criticisms and to revise the

JTD. The committee was to meet beginning in July and complete a final revision by September 1. The committee would base its revisions on

comments received from various Army and Air Force agencies, including:

Continental Armies and Air Forces, overseas commands, operational theater commanders, schools, centers, and Boards. Joint training exercises

'»®Riley Sunderland, Evolution of Command and Control Doctrine for Close Air Support, (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 27.

4^TAC H isto ry , 1 Jan - 30 June 1954, TAC's Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, pp. 9-10. 143 conducted during the period of the revision paid particular attention to testing, evaluating, and proving the JTD doctrine and reported their findings to the committee.=* Doctrinal evaluation committees, including representatives of the Steering Committee would also evaluate doctrinal effectiveness in major exercises.=1 The Steering Committee quickly buckled under the pressure of interservice disagreement, particularly over the nature of the directive. The Army regarded it as a procedural guide of techniques, procedures, and operations, while the Air Force— loathe to tie itself down to step-by-step manuals— treated it as a broad doctrinal guide. TAC's insistence that the committee resolve the broad doctrinal issues that had plagued aii— ground operations since before

World War II doomed the effort from the start. Such issues were far beyond the capabilities and authority of TAC and the AFF to resolve.

Despite basic agreement concerning techniques, this attempt to create meaningful joint doctrine failed because of doctrinal differences of only peripheral relevance.

The failure of the Joint Steering Committee brought the joint revision effort to a close. Each service immediately undertook independent revision which would, they agreed, be submitted to the Joint

Support Board for final approval.== The TAC revision focused on

“'’Letter, Comm. OCAF to Comm. Gen. TAC, "Plans for Revision of Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground Operations," March 15, 1951, Tactical Air Command's Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, Supp. Doc. #14.

“‘"Plan for the Revision of the Joint Training Directive for Air Ground Operations Dated 1 September 1950," March 15, 1951, TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1954, TAC's Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, Supp. Doc. #14.

“ETAC's Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, p. 13. 144 producing a manual that would meet Air Fore requirements and conform to accepted air concepts. Air University and TAC representatives met during

September, 1951, and drafted "Tactical Air Operations." Ultimately,

Headquarters USAF decided that Air University should compile a series of manuals on tactical operations and decided not to release "Tactical Air

Operations" at all.=s Joint doctrine was dead, at least for the time being.

The deployment of US forces in Korea in July 1950 did not allow sufficient time for any new doctrine or training program, however well- intentioned, to have any real effect on air-ground effectiveness. The urgent need for joint doctrine once the war broke out forced cancellation of proposed testing of the JTD. By the time the doctrine was released in

September, however, it could have little effect on those units already deployed in Korea. As most Army ground commanders and at least one air force commander would later point out, there was at the beginning of the war "an alarmingly small percentage of officers who [could], in any respect, be considered well versed in Joint Air-Ground Operations and

Joint Doctrine," and an even smaller percentage "who [were] even interested in the subject.The air-ground system initially employed in Korea was the product not of the reorganized TAC but of the old,

"make-shift" system of air ground-training. The weaknesses did not lay entirely in the Air Force. There were many Army commanders in Korea with an understanding of air support limited to a vision of a fighter-bomber

s^Ibid., p . 14.

s^Wolfinbarger, "Review of Tactical Air." 145

coming over the horizon. Too many possessed little understanding of or

interest in how air power would get there.

Justly or not, USAF— specifically TAC— bore the brunt of the

criticism regarding the inadequacies of Army-Air Force cooperation in the

opening phase of the war, perhaps because USAF seemed most resistant to

"jointness." Ironically, most early reviews of tactical air support in

Korea, even from ground commanders, were favorable. One regimental

commander reported that "the close support rendered by the Fifth Air

Force and the complete coordination of the air and artillery are deeply

appreciated by all members of this command." He went on to conclude that

"the Fifth Air Force has contributed materially to. . .combat effectiveness" of ground units.®*

The rhetoric of renewed interservice wrangling over tactical

aviation soon drowned out any praise for the remarkable effectiveness of

the undermanned, undertrained, and ill-equipped Fifth Air Force, and its decisive role in preventing an early North Korean victory. During August and September, the House Armed Services Committee held closed hearings on

tactical aviation at which Army and USAF witnesses traded accusations concerning the shortcomings of the tactical air support system in Korea.

Air Force witnesses insisted that the Fifth Air Force was giving equal priority to all its missions— including close air support— and that its relations with ground commanders there were good. While USAF

®®Wolfinbarger, "Review of Tactical Air," p. 4-5.

®*Letter, J. H. Michael is. Col., Comm., EUSAK, August 29, 1950; Memorandum, Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Comm., 8th Army, September 7, 1950, "Observer’s Reports, 4 October 49 - 20 October 50," Related Documents; Barcus Report, 25 June - Dec. 1950, Vol. 19, AFS/HRC, file 168.041-1. 146

acknowledged that it had some trouble mobilizing tactical units, it

insisted that the ratio of air support to ground units was in line with

JCS requirements and existing operational doctrine. Army witnesses countered that the Air Force had not demonstrated the ability to provide

tactical aircraft in numbers adequate to support trained ground units under any but the most rarefied conditions.

The primary weakness of the air-ground support system in Korea was

the lack of an effective air control system, and a general unfamiliarity

(on the part of both air and ground personnel) with the system that was

in place. Joint exercises before the war, most notably Operation SWARMER

(April - May, 1950) laid bare the deficiencies of the air request and air control systems and the inefficiencies of the joint training system that accounted for the loss of much valuable operational experience.

Neither Air Force nor Army personnel involved in requests, targeting, and forward air control were particularly familiar with, or interested in the doctrine and procedures already formulated for these missions.

Ironically, given the AFF’s anxiety over USAF tactical air capabilities.

Army personnel were at least as poorly trained and ill-informed in strike request procedures as their USAF counterparts, and according to some assessments were notably worse. Largely in response to these perceived

“■^Lt. Col. Kaesser, "Notes on Closed Hearings by House Armed Services Committee on Tactical Air," August 1950, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, Box 615, file 452.1.

“®SWARMER led TAC to conclude that by disbanding operational headquarters at the end of each exercise and establishing new headquarters from scratch at the beginning of the next, much of the practical experience and continuity of joint maneuvers was lost. Thus, the Air Force was not getting the full benefit of its efforts. Arthur K. Marmor, "The Tactical Air Arm," in Goldberg, ed., A Historv of the United States Air Force, 1907-1957, (Princeton, 1957), p. 140. 147

weaknesses, TAC made improvement and enforcement of training doctrine for

tactical air control one of its highest priorities. Army officers were

guarded in their reaction to the effort, perhaps because they had watched

similar TAC efforts in the past four years fall victim to institutional

politics at higher levels within the USAF (TAC suspected they wanted the

mission for themselves). In general, the Army seemed to be taking a

"wait and see" attitude toward this latest TAC bid for doctrinal reform,

although TAC noted an impressive spirit of cooperation among Army and Air

officers directly involved in the project.

The first step toward improved air ground operations was the

establishment, manning, and training of mobile Joint Operations Centers

(JOCs) to coordinate joint operations and implement appropriate doctrine

and procedures i n - t h e a t e r . T A C and the AFF had codified doctrine for

air control, but because of shortages of forward air controllers (FACs),

tactical air coordinators (TACs), and Tactical Air Control Parties

(TACPs) to implement doctrine in operational units, the improved doctrine did not result in significantly better results in the field in Korea.

Two aspects of TAC policy contributed to these shortages. First, although the JTD allowed for Army air controllers, TAC required its air

controllers, whether operating from the ground or in light observation aircraft, to.be fully conversant with aircraft capabilities, thus

excluding most Army personnel, even those trained in aii— ground doctrine

“■'Wolfinbarger, "Review of Tactical Air," p.7; TAC Historv, 1 July - 30 Nov., 1950, Vol. I, pp. 223-225; "Army Air Center Set up," New York Times, October 24, 1950.

6*Letter, Headquarters TAC to Headquarters ConAC, "Air Transportable Display Units and Air-Ground Indoctrination Teams," [September, 1950], TAC Historv, Vol. II, Supp. Doc. 635/1. 148

from the air control mission. Second, all air control personnel were volunteers, and air control was not a popular assignment among combat pilots. Nor did the Air Force relish taking highly-trained, expensive combat pilots "out" of the air war to attach them to surface operations.

As a result, TAC found it virtually impossible to train specialists in numbers sufficient to keep up with the Army's demand even for Korea.

Inadequate TACPs, the lack of an in-country tactical air control system, and the general unfamiliarity with doctrine and procedures on both sides undermined communication between the Army and Fifth Air Force units during the opening weeks of the war, but the communication breakdown was greater and more persistent between Army-Air Force and

Navy-Marine u n i t s . D e s p i t e recommendations from Congress and Quesada’s

Tactical Air Review Board, all-service joint training before 1950 was rare and often broke down when one or more services withdrew over some doctrinal dispute. Direct radio communication between Navy-Marine pilots and USAF air controllers was either complicated or impossible because of radio incompatibility and the fact that carrier task forces, vulnerable to enemy air strikes, usually maintained radio silence. Ground or air commanders could not call directly for reinforcement from naval air units

61TAC Historv, July 1 - Nov. 30, 1950, Vol. I, pp. 226-228.

6^In a meeting with Ridgway in March 1951, General Earl E. Partridge, commander of Fifth Air Force, raised two points that he felt might improve communication and response time. First, he indicated that Army ground commanders (particularly in X Corps) were not familiar with the air request channels and that if they handled requests "by the book" they would find the results would be much better. Second, he indicated that Army commanders did not understand that Air Force liaison officers were not members of the TACPs and were thus not part of the air request link. Ridgway promised to .take steps to rectify both situations. Diary Entry, March 6, 1951, "Half-hour meeting with Partridge, Timberlake," AMHI, Ridgway Papers, Box 20, item 95. 149

in emergencies, and since naval air strikes had to be pre-arranged, the

Seventh fleet could seldom apply its air assets to their greatest

effect.63 After November 1950, UN air superiority enabled the Seventh

Fleet to establish daily VHP radio communications with the JQC, which

would request assignment of naval aircraft to various missions. Naval

air support remained poorly integrated with the FEAF effort because the

Navy liaison at the JOC did not have authority to order sorties but could

only relay requests.*'*

The centralized FEAF air request network posed similar frustrations

for Marine aviators. They were accustomed to a request system that

eliminated the extensive participation of intervening headquarters,

shortened the links between ground and air units, and gave Marine ground

commanders more influence concerning air support operations than their

counterparts in the Army enjoyed. An interservice agreement in late July

nullified the operational advantages of the Marine Corps system by

placing all ground based aviation (including Marine Aircraft Wings) under

the operational control of the FEAF.*^ As a result, neither Army nor

Marine commanders received the efficient, highly responsive Marine air support both had come to expect. Army ground commanders, however, never

forgot (and refused to let USAF forget) the halcyon days of July 1951 when they got a brief taste of marine close air support in its pure form.

Reviews of Korean operations by returning pilots and ground commanders

*3Hallion, Naval Air War in Korea, pp. 76-78.

**Sunderland, Evolution of Command and Control, p. 28.

*'^Allen R. Millett, "Close Air Support in the Korean War, 1950- 1953," draft for future publication, pp. 13-25. 150

would accent the need for improved Army-Navy-Air Force-Marine

communication links.

Poor lines of communication between the Air Force and the Army

impaired effective use of air intelligence. Army commanders repeatedly complained that Air Force "Situation Reports" put too much emphasis on

damage reports ("recital of damage done to vehicles, locomotives, bridges") and failed to provide valuable operational intelligence. Army

field commanders repeatedly complained that the Fifth Air Force made no serious attempts to provide intelligence valuable information— apparent

troop concentrations, supply areas, or vehicle concentrations— on a regular basis. Such information, the Army insisted, was vital to the success of their operations, yet it was forwarded to them haphazardly and occasionally by accident.TAC was aware of the problem, and in July

1950, General Partridge, Fifth Air Force commander, urged his field commanders to arrange for Army liaison officers at each operating base:

At interrogation these officers can frequently pick up information of vital importance to ground troops and at the same time they can supply Air Officers with data and assistance which will improve the effectiveness of our close support operations.67

66%n March, 1951, Almond reported an incident to Ridgway that demonstrated the failure of the Army-USAF intelligence link. Almond happened to be flying along the front when his plane encountered fighters attacking enemy concentrations along Songson-Ni, which he learned by monitoring radio traffic. Upon returning to his headquarters, Almond found nothing in USAF situation reports to indicate that there were enemy troop concentrations in that area, leading him to assume that 8th Army received no report from those tactical units. Letter from Gen. Almond to Gen. Ridgway, "Complaints re the Mature of Air Intelligence," March 16, 1951, AMHI, Ridgway Papers, Korean War, CinCFE: Correspondence, Box 17, folder A-C.

67£. E. Partridge, "Notes for Fifth Air Force," July 7, 1950, Tactical Air Control File (Korea 1950-51), AFS/HRC, file K730.3111-1. 151

The core of the problem was TAC's limited opportunity, during the two

years before the war, to train air crews in any but the most elemental

tactical doctrines and procedures. Tactical air crews had received

little training in how to spot, recognize, identify, and provide ground

coordinates for surface targets, and escalating pressure for pipeline

training of combat air crews left replacement training for specialized

RF-SO pilots a low priority. By September, however, TAC had taken steps

to improve general air crew training in these areas— especially artillery

spotting— and step up specialized training for reconnaissance pilots.*®

At the operational level. Army commanders, for their part, became convinced that the Air Force would not provide the air controllers

required, and that even if they did, "that that personnel would be rotated so rapidly and so uninterested in their job that that arrangement

will never work satisfactorily." Clark, at AFF, charged that "the Air

Force is fully capable of providing the desired type and amount of

tactical air support for our ground troops provided there is insistence that this problem be fully met." Army field commanders demanded unilateral Army action throughout early 1951. The commandant of the

Command and General Staff College at Leavenworth, among others, believed that "the consensus of opinion is that the Army must set forth their requirements and that if the Air Force cannot, or will not, provide the personnel and equipment necessary that the Army should take over."*^

*®TAC History, 1 July - 30 November 1950, Vol. I, pp. 228-231.

^^Clark Memorandum on Close Air Support, October 24, 1950; Letter from Maj. Gen. Horace McBride, Commandant, CGSC, Leavenworth to Gen. Almond, 9 February, 1951, Papers of General Edward M. Almond [hereafter cited as Almond Papers], Korean War: Tactical Air Support Studies, AMHI, 152

Almond, at X Corps, began pressuring Ridgway to push for more

cooperation from the Fifth Air Force almost immediately upon the letter’s

arrival in Korea. In a series of letters during January, 1951, Almond

argued that the nature of what he characterized as the "guerrilla" war

that his units faced on the ground limited the potential of artillery and

made the need for adequate TACPs even more urgent: the terrain involved

was often mountainous, and the enemy organization was best countered with

napalm strikes which destroyed both the "guerrillas" and their shelter.

Almond pointed out that since TAC had already had six months to train and

equip additional TACPs, their failure to do so indicated a lack of

"proper effort." In addition, Almond charged that the "cumbersome" air

control system, in which requests passed through too many hands, brought

inadequate results and pointed to the need for "a certain degree of

operational control by the responsible ground commander" in order to

obtain "the real potential that exists in tactical air support.

TAC and the Army also disagreed as to suitable aircraft for the

ail— ground support mission. Quesada’s Tactical Air Review Board in 1948

recommended against development of a designated light-bomber for close

air support, and the Army had concurred in that decision assuming its

future participation in procurement or modification programs for tactical

and other aircraft used for air-ground support missions. Two years

later. General Collins reminded USAF of its agreement to consult with the

Army, adding that in light of developments in Korea, "such aircraft must

be designed for this purpose, with other missions secondary." Final

7*Letter from Almond to Ridgway, March 2, 1951, Ridgway Papers: Korean War, CincFE, Correspondence, box 17, folder A-C, AMHI. 153 military characteristics of such aircraft were, in his view, best left to

USAF to determine, but close air support would "continue to be unsatisfactory, if developed and furnished without assured consideration of the Army's view and the Army’s requirements for training and combat support."71 USAF responded to Army pressure with a series of studies showing that its multi-purpose aircraft did not sacrifice effectiveness as compared to Marine Corps aircraft and were more economical given the broader scope of the Air Force tactical m i s s i o n . uSAF continued to insist that all tactical aircraft, regardless of mission, needed some air to air capabilities to ensure survivability. The Army effort to procure tactical aircraft designed in response to the Korean operational environment amounted to building aircraft to fit the exception rather than the rule.

Early tactical operations in Korea precipitated particularly vigorous debate over the virtues of propeller driven F-51s versus jets and the future of helicopters in support of ground operations. USAF deployed F-51s in Korea for two reasons; a shortage of suitable jet fighters for close air support (in order to deploy adequate numbers of F-

80s, USAF would have depleted those available for TAC training units) and the range and payload limitations on jets operating from bases in Japan.

7iMemorandum, General Collins to General Ridgway, "Close Air Support of Ground Operations," October 31, 1950, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, Box 615, File 452.1.

7^Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Development from General Nathan F . Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, "Multi-purpose vs. Single Purpose Fighters— Re-examination," [November 19501; Memorandum for General Twining from W. Barton Leach, Department of the Air Force, "Study on Tactical Aircraft," November 21, 1950, LC/MD, Papers of Nathan F. Twining [hereafter cited as Twining Papers], box 119: Korean Evaluation Project, 1950-51." 154

Despite TAC's energetic campaign to "sell" jets to Army ground commanders

(perhaps nostalgic for the support they received from P-51s during World

War II), they remained skeptical of jets in close support operations.

Their greater confidence in Marine F-4 Corsairs and F-7s and Air Force F-

51s and F-8Es hinged on those planes’ slower speeds and lower altitudes, which facilitated accurate airstrikes closer to the front lines. The F-

51s operated from the crude airstrips in South Korea making them more responsive with longer on-station time. In contrast, operating at low altitudes out of bases in Japan reduced both range and effectiveness of

jet fighters.

USAF was determined not to allow the Army to force procurement of additional propeller driven aircraft, and TAC stepped up the effort to convince the Army and Congress that modification of jets, combined with revised doctrine and training for joint operations, would prove their superiority in that mission.Jet aircraft offered numerous advantages

73The F-BOC, the first jet aircraft used for close air support in Korea, had high airspeed and fuel consumption at low altitudes and could not operated from airstrips available in country. With a normal ordinance load, its loiter time over the Korean peninsula when operating from bases in Japan, was less than 30 minutes. Later use of wing-tanks increased its range, but proportionately decreased ordnance loads. The aircraft could not carry napalm tanks until Fifth Air Force installed wing pylons later in the war. According to Millett, the absence of napalm and its positive psychological effect on ground forces may account for much of the Army resistance to jets as close air support aircraft. Millett, p. 25.

7'*Senator Richard Russell raised the F-51 issue during the MacArthur Hearings in May, 1951. Vandenberg defended jets arguing that the F-51s were more effective initially "because the forces that were then engaged on the ground did not have modern defensive armaments," but more recently, casualties among the propeller driven types were running about three to four times greater than among jets. "There has been an awful lot of foolish material written an expressed about tactical air support," Vandenberg charged. "The conventional type airplane takes roughly twice as much maintenance, it can absorb about half as much punishment, it can 155

that in most cases outweighed their problems; they were significantly

less vulnerable to ground fire, could provide twice the sorties with half

the maintenance time of F-51s and other reciprocating engine aircraft,

dramatically reduced pilot fatigue, and seemed to have greater shock

effect than propel le;— driven aircraft. USAF stressed the shock value of

jets in its campaign against reviving the production of propeller driven

aircraft and could cite considerable evidence to support its point.

Consistently, interrogation of North Korean and Chinese POWs indicated

that the jets terrified enemy forces, because the speed of the jet

aircraft enabled them to strike before the enemy was aware he was under

attack. An NKPA Colonel advised UN forces to make greater use of jets to

hasten the end of the conflict: "not only did they come in quickly and

destroy the target with great element of surprise, but also the soldiers

feared them because of the speed and way in which the jets appeared

before the sound of its flight reached them to make them aware of its

presence." Another remarked that "a jet fighter strafing a North Korean

column strikes terror into the heart of every man in that column." In general, NKPA prisoners credited jets with breaking morale in the North

Korean units, by creating a sense of futility, fatigue, supply shortages and delays, and, at least temporarily, breaking lines of communication.?=

Dire shortages existed in cargo and assault aircraft, and Air Force recalcitrance regarding procurement of the C-123 joined with operational pressures in Korea in late 1950 to prompt the Army to challenge existing only cover half the territory, it is not a stable a platform, and the casualties are much higher." Senate Hearing, Dismissal of MacArthur, June 24, 1951, Reel #4, item 3765.

■^“Dickens, Survev of Air Ground Doctrine, Appendix 3. 156

limits on its organic aircraft. General Clark led those within the Army

who charged that the delay jeopardized the Army’s ability to sustain its

combat operations in Korea and stemmed from USAF’s unwillingness to carry

out its support missions. The Army also suspected that USAF was

responding to industry concern that the C-123 would compete in foreign

markets with the C-119, which the Army had determined was unsuitable for

its airborne o p e r a t i o n s . A m o n g the options the Army considered was the

future development of helicopters for intra-theater logistical and troop

carrier support. Vandenberg reacted immediately to what he perceived as

an attempt to usurp part of USAF’s mission, arguing that the Air Force

had made every effort to improve its capabilities, had increased its

resources devoted to the mission, and was seriously studying the

development of helicopters to supplement Army ground transportation.

USAF further questioned whether new assault aircraft were justifiable

given the changing strategic environment, the cost of developing new

aircraft in the numbers required, and the urgency of the Army’s requirement since the outbreak of the Korean War. The interests of both

services, USAF argued, would better be served by modification of the C-

119, but it did agree to establish a Joint Board to consider the options

for future assault capabilities.’’’®

■’’^Memorandum from General Clark, Chief AFF to Lt. Gen. Ridgway, December IS, 1950, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, 1950, Box 615, file 452.1.

■^■’’Memorandum from Gen. Vandenberg, COS/USAF to General Collins, COS/USA, December 13, 1950, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, 1950, Box 615, file 452.1.

7®Memorandum, General Vandenberg, COS/USAF to General Collins, COS/USA, December 13, 1950; Memorandum, Vandenberg to Collins, December 22, 1951, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, 1950, Box 615, file 157

Throughout the opening phases of the Korean War, TAC attempted as best it could to remedy the defects in tactical aviation as they surfaced. The most pressing problem was the Tactical Air Control

Party/Air Liaison system; the primary obstacle to improvement was a shortage of experienced personnel, without whom the success of training exercises would be limited. In September, TAC introduced four Air

Transportable Display Units, miniature JOCs equipped to indoctrinate AFF personnel in tactical air doctrine and illustrate methods, techniques, and procedures for requesting and obtaining close air support. These units augmented close air support training at the battalion and regimental levels.TAC did not ignore its own shortcomings. A two- month course trained light bombardment crews for joint operations employing the B-26. The command instituted a number of new training programs in response to Korean operations, including: master training for Tactical Control Groups, refresher training for pilots recalled to active duty, reconnaissance pilot training, and ECM training.s* TAC also stepped up its training in basic military skills among all its personnel in response to reports that Fifth Air Force airmen were physically unprepared for combat.

452.1.

^^Headquarters, TAC to Comm. Gen. ConAC, "Air Transportable Display Units," TAC Regulation 353, [September 1950], TAC Historv, July - Nov., 1950, Vol. IV, Supp. Doc. #635.

G*"Special 60-Day Training Program for Light Bombardment Combat Crews and Units: B-26 type aircraft," August 1950; "Master Training for Tactical Control Groups," November 1950; TAC Regulation 51-2, "Flying Training: Refresher Training," September 27 and December 15, 1950; TAC Regulation 353, "ECM Training Requirement," September 14, 1950; TAC Historv, July - Nov. 1950, Vol. IV, Supp. Docs. #642/2, 643, 654, 656/658,677. 158

TAC sent its own observation teams to Korea to augment reports from its combat units. These missions sought to determine where TAC might incorporate the lessons of combat into its training and weapons programs.

While the command concurred in the USAF view that air combat in Korea was not a universal model, it still regarded much of the experience as applicable to tactical operations on a broader scale. The earliest TAC observers' reports found problems with FEAF personnel: they were too often undertrained physically and mentally unprepared for their functions. Forward air controllers and tactical air control parties were often staffed with grounded pilots, dissatisfied with their assignments and seldom well-versed in current aii— ground request techniques and doctrine. Air-ground teams seldom included Army representation and usually lacked trained ground liaison officers. Air operations suffered, in particular, from shortages in photo reconnaissance, combat intelligence, air liaison, and forward air controllers. A general dearth of staff officers with extensive training in tactical operations in both the Army and the Air Force retarded improvement.®^

Operational problems with tactics and techniques were most often attributable to two years of inefficient training during TAC's hiatus.

The most fundamental problem, in TAC's view, was the lack of an effective air request net that led to wasteful improvisation and inefficient application of available tactical aviation. An inefficient air request system and the initial shortages of Army artillery had, in TAC's assessment, created misconceptions among ground commanders concerning the

®’-Maj. Earl L. Smith to Comm. Gen. TAC, "Observer's Report: Korean Campaign, 15 September through 16 October," 25 June - December 1950, Vol. 19, K168.041-1, pp. 3-4. 159

proper role of tactical aviation and set impossibly high expectations.

Tactical air, one observer noted, was too often employed in lieu of

organic artillery or in scouting and patrol for ground units. While

acknowledging the weaknesses of USAF forces in the area, TAC observers

noted that ground commanders were too often unfamiliar with the

capabilities, potential, and conflicting demands on tactical air power.

The "air umbrella" that the UN forces enjoyed early in the war was a

necessary emergency expedient, but it represented, nonetheless, a

"wasteful and expensive application of air power" not to be maintained

once initiative passed to the friendly forces. To ensure that FEAF’s

other missions in Korea— especially fighter interdiction— were not

dangerously curtailed, observers urged TAC to initiate an indoctrination

program for ground commanders bound for Korea.®®

The defense of the Pusan perimeter in the summer of 1950 left the

Far East Air Force (FEAF), despite a heroic effort, unable to provide

adequate air support, forcing an emergency request for additional support

from Naval air: on July 22, the Navy commenced carrier based air support

with excellent results.®® The Navy and Air Force had very disparate

close air support systems and doctrine: the Navy’s were geared primarily

toward support of amphibious operations that were limited in scope and

duration, the Air Force’s were part of a general concept of tactical air power in support of entire theaters of operation. The Naval and Marine

support system’s decentralized request system and maintenance of "on-

eeibid., pp. 8-9.

®®Hallion, Naval Air War in Korea, pp. 68-69. 160 station" aircraft emphasized rapid response to compensate for artillery shortages inherent in amphibious operations in their early stages.

Finally, naval— especiall'' marine— close air support training emphasized strikes inside the bombline. While USAF operations generally defined the bombline according to the farthest range of Army corps artillery, Navy and Marine support operated as close as 500-200 yards in front of friendly forces.Their unique operational requirements rendered naval and marine air support "closer" and more responsive that the Air Force system.

The performance of USAF air support units in the opening weeks of the war and the use of Marine Air units as supplemental air support for

Army units after Pusan resurrected the debate over the relative merits of

Marine and Air Force close air support doctrine. The two principal points of contention were the relationship between the ground commander and supporting air units and the proximity of air strikes to the frontline forces. In the Air Force system— which the Army Staff had accepted in principle since 1943— all tactical air units remained under the centralized control of a theater air commander with all requests for air support strikes funnelled through the JOC, not always by the most direct route: requests for air strikes could pass through as many as 16 stations, taking thirty minutes or longer. The average distance from

Japanese and South Korean bases to targets was 160 miles (45 minutes flying time for propeller-driven and 25 minutes for jet aircraft)

"Hall ion. Naval Air War in Korea, 72-74; Millett, pp. 11-12. 161

limiting on-station time to less than 30 minutes for most jet aircraft.

The average time from request to strike was 67 minutes, but could range

from as few as 18 to as many as 145 minutes. On average, 49 percent of

requests took over one hour and only 16 percent took one half hour or

less.86

The Air Force had, since the disaster at Kasserine Pass in 1943,

resisted what it perceived as the Army’s desire to use USAF close air

support as airborne artillery. Air Force close support doctrine devised

during World War II assumed that the Army (unlike Marines in an

amphibious landing) would enjoy a sizeable contingent of organic

artillery support for its ground operations. In view of this fact, and because of the increased risk to both ground and air forces of air

strikes in very close proximity to friendly forces and artillery, USAF close support generally operated outside the bombline: seldom closer

than 1000 yards and often as distant as 5-8 miles.8? Based on existing

joint doctrine and training, the Air Force did not intend to provide close support strikes within the effective range cf artillery except in extraordinary circumstances, and the Army did not assume that such support would be available. Army ground commanders, however, suffered from a critical shortage of both artillery and ordnance during the early campaigns in Korea, and thus required a greater than normal percentage of

8=TAC development of wing and drop tanks improved the situation somewhat.

86"Tactical Air Support, X Corps, 10 May - 5 June 1951," National Archives, Washington, D.C, RG 319: 1951-52, Box 77A, 452.1 (Sec. 111).

8?War Department Field Manual 31-35, Air - Ground Operations, (Washington, D.C.: August 13, 1946); War Department Field Manual 100-20, Command and Emplovment of Air Power, (Washington, D.C.: July 21, 1943). 162 prompt air strikes inside the bombline.®® Under the pressure of these often desperate operations, the weaknesses of prewar doctrine and training became apparent, triggering considerable tension between the Air

Force and Army— at least at the operational command level— during the first six months of the war. The deployment of the 1st MAW, with its doctrine and training specifically designed for close-in operations, inflamed the existing tensions. A letter from an artillery officer at X

Corps written after the Inchon landing in September reflected the more general frustrations of ground commanders:

I believe the outstanding thing we learned was the support furnished by the 1st Marine Wing who really knew what tactical air support means and how to provide it....Some of the strikes were within 200 yards of the front lines but they were never in danger, which is a far different story than we had in WWII. From this experience, I am convinced that either the Air Force must furnish similar support or the Army must have its own tactical air and let the Air Force go off into the "wild blue yonder" with their strategic "hoopla."®'^

®®The Pacific Command in June 1950 was undermanned by roughly one- third: infantry regiments that normally consisted of three battalions only had two, and artillery regiments that normally had three batteries entered the Korean conflict with only two. The four infantry divisions in Japan in 1950 lacked nine of their organic 105mm howitzer batteries and stood at roughly 40 percent of combat effectiveness. Millett, p. 20. In a 1975 interview, General Edward M. ("Ned") Almond recounted the frustrations of the ordnance shortages: "When I made [a] request of General Tansey for ammunition necessary to sustain the artillery in battle. General Tansey was completely alarmed. And he asked the question 'Do you know that what you are requesting for this operation would take half of the ammunition in the United States Army that we have in storage?’ And my answer was, 'That means little to me from the tactical standpoint. If we took it all, I couldn't help the fact that we need it. It is up to you and the Department of the Army to go back home and resupply yourself and your depots as soon as possible. We need what we asked for.’" Almond Oral History, Section 2, p. 17.

®^Memo from Clark to COS/Army, "Letter from Artillery Officer, x Corps, Korea," October 8, 1950, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, 1950, Box 615, file 452.1. 163

In reality, criticism of FEAF support operations from Army ground commanders was neither unanimous nor entirely accurate. During July and

August 1950, the Fifth Air Force devoted virtually all of its available assets to close support and battlefield interdiction. When ground operations stabilized in September and October, FEAF launched its systematic interdiction campaign, but close air support continued to account for between twenty-eight and fifty-five percent of its sorties.'’-

In addition, the FEAF employed most of its medium bomber force in close support and battlefield interdiction until the introduction of Soviet

Mig-15s forced an end to unrestricted B-29 day raids.General Walton

Walker, as commander of the 8th Army, praised the FEAF, stating that "no commander ever had better air support than has been furnished by the

Fifth Air Force....if it had not been for the air support we received...we would not have been able to stay in Korea.

USAF and TAC responded to Army criticism by defending their basic principles of employment and occasionally criticizing "reactionary elements within the established military organization" that were "vocal and active in areas in which they have only superficial competence.

'’‘^Tactical Air Power in Support of Ground Forces (Historical), AFS/HRC, K168.04-44, Tab H.

'’■^USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, Employment of Strategic Bombers in a Tactical Role, 1941- 1951, USAF Historical Study no. 88, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, April 1954), pp. 134, 140. The vulnerability of the 8-29 bolstered the argument of those within TAC who were agitating for the development of a lighter, faster, more maneuverable, medium tactical bomber.

^^Tactical Air Power in Support of Ground Forces.

■’'^Whisenand on Tactical Air Forces, "Characteristics and Employment of the Tactical Air Force," January 1951, Papers of J. E. Whisenand, AFS/HRC, 168.7017-28, Introduction. 164

UBAF again dismissed comparisons to the Marine Corps system as a "straw man," since building an identical system for the Air Force would require a threefold increase in tactical units. Less seriously, one TAC commander suggested that if the Army insisted on its own air force, USAF might do well to demand an "Air Force army" and an "Air Force navy." . As

it would so often in the years ahead, USAF warned against drawing long­

term conclusions from Korean operations that might throw US military preparedness off-balance for a total war. Korea would be better

"recognized for what it is— a peripheral action going on under highly specialized, even artificial conditions."?^

Concern in Army Headquarters and the protests of Clark and Almond prompted Collins, in the late fall of 1950, to send Brigadier General

Gerald J. Higgins, commander of the Army Support Center at Fort Bragg, to tour Korea and evaluate the effectiveness of air-ground operations.

Higgins’ report concluded that although inadequate equipment and training had created deficiencies in early operations, the Korean experience had proved the air-ground system basically sound. Higgins paid special attention to comparisons between the Marine Corps and Air Force systems and drew some interesting conclusions. First, he acknowledged that the

Marine Corps system was more efficient and effective in very close-in support. More important, however, was his assertion that any discrepancies resulted from the fundamentally different Marine Corps mission rather than Air Force intransigence. The Air Force, unlike the

Marine Corps, had to design tactical aircraft and tactics to allow its forces to "live in the air" as well as to provide close air support to

Ibid., Section III. 165

ground forces. For the Air Force to adopt the Marine system, Higgins determined, would double aircraft requirements and involve costs far

beyond the nation’s economic and industrial capacity. In short, Higgins seemed to agree with USAF in his conclusion that while the Marine air

support in Korea was initially superior to that of the Air Force, it would be both illogical and potentially dangerous to impose the same system on the Air Force.

More impressed with the support his 7th Division received from the

Marines than with the arguments of Higgins and others in defense of USAF,

Almond enlisted the help of Clark at AFF and conducted his own study to pressure the Air Force into adopting the Marine close support system, including operational control of tactical air units by ground commanders. While Clark pressured TAC on the home front, Almond conducted a campaign from the frontlines that began soon after the battle for Pusan in July 1950. In July, he began pressing the Department of the

"^“Letter, Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins to Chief of Army Field Force, "Air Support in the Korean Campaign," December 1, 1950, cited in TAC History, 1 Jan - 30 June 1954, TAC’s Role in Development of Joint Doctrine, pp. 32-35.

^^The attitude of X Corps commanders toward USAF vs. Marine Corps close air support is best illustrated by a letter Almond received from one of his artillery officers who came ashore with the Marines at Inchon: "I believe the outstanding thing we learned was the support furnished by the 1st Marine Air Win who really know what tactical air support means and how to provide it. . . .to get a strike, all that was necessary was to have the tactical air control party with the front line battalion request a strike and within minutes it was there. . . .Some of the strikes were within 200 yards of the front lines but they were never in danger, which is a far difference story than we had in World War II. From this experience, I am convinced that either the Air Force must furnish similar support or the Army must have its own tactical air, and the Air Force to off into the 'wild blue yonder’ with their strategic 'hoopla.’" Letter from Artillery Officer, X Corps, Korea, October 8, 1950, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, 1950, Box 615, file 452.1. 166

Army for increased emphasis on the use of liaison aircraft for artillery and air support targeting and calling for the assignment of at least two

such aircraft to each infantry unit.^? By early 1951, he led a chorus of Army officers demanding either direct operational control of tactical air by ground commanders or, failing that, the transfer of the close air support mission to the Army. Almond’s X Corps released a "study" in

December proceeded from the assumption that determination of Army support requirements "must be based upon Army needs, devoid of Air Force or budgetary p.li ; , priorities, or missions" because the Army has the primary intere'h .uch support.

The > Corps study’s requirements for tactical air support followed from the operational experience of the Korean War, focusing on a comparison of the support provided by the Fifth Air Force and the First

Marine Air Wing (1st MAW). The report cited specific advantages of

Marine Corps over Air Force air support: the 1st MAW flew aircraft specifically designed for the air support mission; air support was its primary mission; Marine Corps aviators were extensively trained in both ail— ground operations and the problems, techniques, and tactics of the ground units they supported.Concerning air control, a standing point

9?Letter from Maj. Gen. Edward Almond to Department of the Army, Maj. Gen. Charles L. Boltè (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3), July 24, 1950, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, 1950, Box 616, file 373.2.

^^Headquarters, X Corps, U.S. Army, Army Tactical Air Support Requirements, December 9, 1950, AMHI, Almond Papers: Korean Wai-- Tactical Air Support Studies, p. 1.

^^All Marine Corps aviators were required, before receiving air training or entering an aviation unit, to spend two years serving as a "mud Marine." As a result, Marine aviators had a much more sophisticated understanding of the tactics of their surface units than did Air Force pilots. 167

of contention between the Army and the Air Force, the report again found

the 1st MAW— with 13 TACPs per infantry division— superior to the Fifth

Air Force— four TACPs per infantry division. Its designated local

support structure was simpler and more responsive than the JOC, which

coordinated numerous missions on a theatei— wide basis. The report

attributed the greater efficiency of the Marine Corps system to direct

operational control of supporting units by senior ground commanders. In

contrast, the JOC controlled Fifth Air Force tactical units and allocated

air support sorties according to a complex of requests and priorities.^**

In order to meet the Army’s operational needs, the report concluded, all supporting tactical air units should be under the direct operational

control of the Army or Corps commanders of the units they support.

The assessment of the Navy-Marine Corps system upon which both the

Army and the Air Force based their arguments was fundamentally wrong.

Marine Corps ground commanders did not, as both the Army and USAF seemed to think, directly control supporting aviation units. Naval aviators concurred with the Air Force view that all air assets should, in the

interest of maximum effectiveness, operate under a centralized command;

thus. Marine Corps air units operated under a single air officer from either the Navy (during the assault phase) or the Marine Corps (during extended operations ashore). In the Navy-Marine Corps system, the

individual ground commander did have a greater voice in the conduct and request of air support strikes, but he did not— as the Army and Air Force believed— have the authority to allocate more aircraft to the close

‘**X Corps, Tactical Air Support Requirements, p. 2.

leilbid., p. 2. 168

support mission.1*2

If somewhat skewed in its perspective, the X Corps report

nonetheless clearly defined those elements of the Army-Air Force system

that most disturbed ground force commanders in Korea. First, the Army

sought tactical air units equipped with designated, or at least modified,

close air support aircraft designed for the primary mission of direct

support of surface operations. Second, it sought more extensive and

effective joint training using actual supporting air and supported ground

units and a greater allocation of designated tactical units.Finally,

X Corps concluded, based on operational experience with USAF air support,

that "the only assurance a senior ground commander can have that any

supporting arm will be employed effectively, or at all, is by having operational control over that supporting arm."i*^

Army Chief of Staff Collins recognized that the Army field commanders’ complaints were to some extent influenced by their battlefield "tunnel vision," but he still ftiund cause for concern in the reports from Korea. In a memorandum to USAF Chief of Staff Vandenberg, he reiterated that the availability and reliability of tactical air support was one of the most vital requirements for successful ground combat operations. The Army, he said, concurred with the USAF view of the importance of strategic bombing, but close air support was equally

indispensible. "This support," he concluded, "will continue to be

ic^Miiiett, "Close Air Support in the Korean War," pp. 13-15.

io3The X Corps report specifically requested one TACP per infantry battalion and at least one tactical air squadron (24 planes), and preferably one tactical air group, per infantry division.

^*^lbid ., p. 4. 169 unsatisfactory, if developed and furnished without assured consideration of the Army’s view and the Army’s requirements for training and combat support." He went on to identify the deficiencies in existing doctrine, procedures, and materiel for close support of ground troops that most concerned the Army. First, Army ground commanders needed the same discretionary authority over tactical air support that they had over artillery support and a direct request link. Second, ground commanders needed to be able to rely on a minimum level of available support, preferably at least one tactical air group per infantry division. Third, the Army should have a voice in the development of tactical aircraft in the areas of mission, targets, all-weather and night operations, and endurance with such aircraft designed for air support and with any other missions secondary.Collins stressed that the Army had no interest taking over TAC or establishing an organic tactical air force which would

"result in duplication of effort and excessive cost." The Army crafted its demands, Collins asserted, to provide the minimum requirement for air support without interfering with the inherent flexibility of air power.

In a draft statement prepared for testimony before the House Armed

Services Committee in January 1951, Collins reiterated the Army’s support for the principle of unification. He insisted, however, that one of

i*“Memorandum, J. Lawton Collins to General Ridgway, "Close Support of Ground Operations," 31 October, 1950, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, Box 615, file 452.1.

lo^inclosure to memorandum, "Close Air Support of Ground Operations," October 31, 1950, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, Box 615, file 452.1. 170

those basic principles was that tactical air support would be a vital Air

Force mission concurrent with, not subordinate to, strategic bombing.

The Army did not seek to take over the tactical aviation mission, but it was not satisfied that it was receiving even the minimum required air support. The greatest misgiving among Army commanders, Collins reported, was that the Air Force would not provide basic air support if it did not have complete air superiority. All the Army sought, he concluded, was assurance from USAF that it would provide that minimum level of support in the opening phases of future conflicts and cooperate with the Army to prevent a repeat of the ad hoc air-ground operations that dominated in

World War II and Korea.i*?

Collins agreed with his field commanders that the greatest weakness lay in the command relationship. He proposed that ground commanders

"exercise a prerogative similar to air defense command" that would give them operational prerogatives, short of direct operational command, with the understanding that air units could be shifted to higher priority missions by the Theater Air or Joint Commanders. To the greatest extent possible, however, such air units should remain attached to their designated ground division until reallocated. In the interest of better implementation of existing doctrine and procedures, Collins urged both

TAC and AFF to emphasize joint and cross-training, since Korean operations indicated that progress to date in that area was not achieving optimum results. Vandenberg replied that the Air Force never intended to neglect its close air support mission but that progress depended on

io-7"investigation of Close Support Aviation," January 9, 1951, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File 1951-52, Box 770B, file 452.1, 171

further study by joint boards and the appropriate Army and Air Force

commands.

Collins and the Army did not intend to retreat on the question of

tactical air support, and Vandenberg rekindled Army apprehensions in

January 1951 when a Tokyo news release quoted him as saying that:

airplanes are inefficient weapons for killing individual soldiers. . . .The best way to support the Army is to knock out the mortar before it is made. The next best is to knock it out while it is in the convoy on the way to the front. The least efficient way is to knock it out after it is already dug in.'*?

The Army interpreted Vandenberg’s statement as an indication that TAC and

USAF had officially put close air support at the bottom of its list of operational priorities. Vandenberg again assured Collins that, while he did believe (and Collins agreed) that taking out troops at the front was the least efficient use of air power, his statement was taken out of context and did not represent a change in USAF’s priorities. General

George C. Kenney, World War II commander of the Fifth Air Force and the first commander of SAC, further calmed Army anxiety when he stated, in an address at the Air University, that:

Recently I read a statement that the duties of the Tactical Air Command were: First, to gain command of the Air. Second, to isolate the battlefield. Third, to furnish direct support to ground forces. The next day an Army officer pointed to the statement as indicating the low priority which we assigned to helping out the poor doughboy. Unfortunately, we have Air Force officers who think that these three jobs must be done in that order. Actually, we cannot be that inflexible if we are to be on the winning side. All three of

lo^Memorandum for Chief of Staff, Air Force from Chief of Staff, Army, and inclosure, "Close Air Support of Ground Operations," November 21, 1950, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, Box 615, file 452.1.

Corps, News and Views, January 19, 1951, Vol. Ill, no. 8, Almond Papers: Tactical Air Support Studies, AMHI. 172

those missions will go on concurrently until the enemy no longer takes the air. ^

Collins rejected hardliners’ charges that "the Air Force rejects the role

of ground support and that the Army should demand it" as unfounded, and

he refused to condone any attempt on the part of the Army to usurp the

■tactical air mission: the key to the improvement of tactical air support

lay, rather, in the continued improvement in the relationship between the

AFF and TAC.“ ^

If Collins succeeded in calming the interservice conflict over

tactical air support in Washington, Ridgway prevented it from

debilitating joint operations in Korea. During his command of the 8th

Army in Korea and later as CincFE, Ridgway demonstrated that he had

little taste for or patience with the sort of interservice wrangling that

^ his predecessors— General Walton Walker and MacArthur— had allowed. On

December 11, barely two weeks before Ridgway assumed command of the 8th

Army, General Stratemeyer (now commander of the FEAF) placed the 1st MAW

under the centralized command of the Fifth Air Force commander. General

Partridge. Both Almond and Marine General 0. P. Smith greeted Ridgway by

protesting the change. Almond urged Ridgway to pressure the Fifth Air

Force into providing responsive and plentiful air support and suggested

ii*Address by General George C. Kenney, January 8, 1951, Air University, AFS/HRC, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. It is interesting to note that USAF replaced Kenney as SAC commander in October 1948 at least in part because, as Fifth Air Force commander in the Pacific he had been primarily "tactical." Strategic bombing enthusiasts, including Lauris Norstad, objected to Kenny’s administration and urged his replacement with Lieutenant General Curtis LeMay, "an aggressive and experienced World War II bomber commander." Futrell, "Influence of the Air Power Concept on Air Force Planning," p. 258-259.

iiiLetter from Collins to Almond, February 1, 1951, Almond Papers: Tactical Air Support Studies, AMHI. 173 that the 1st MAW support his division in the meantime.Ridgway stood by Stratemeyer’s order because he could not allow "one out of seven divisions to have close air support capability far in excess of what I was able to provide for the other six divisions.

Ridgway had commanded airborne forces in Europe during World War II and sympathized with the frustrations of ground commanders in joint operations, but he also understood the limitations— both operational and political— on Partridge and Stratemeyer. "I deplore," he wrote Almond in

March, "the loss of any opportunity to accomplish the Army’s mission of destroying the enemy," and "I am extremely interested in increasing the effectiveness of air support."*^'* Throughout his command, both at 8th

Army and later as CincFE, he struggled to find compromises and found tactical air commanders in the field eager to cooperate, but as he later noted, any attempt to change, even slightly, the command relationship in the theater was vetoed by USAF Headquarters in Washington. "We tried to work out some scheme which would make a certain small fraction of our available close air support aircraft responsive directly to the Corps commander, but even that was unacceptable.Clark moderated his rhetoric against the FEAF once he took command of UN forces in Korea.

Almond did not abandon his campaign, but because Ridgway remained determined to maintain the best possible relations between the Army and

‘^^Letter from Almond to Ridgway, January 1, 1951, Ridgway Papers: Korean War, CincFE, Correspondence, Box 17, file A-C, AMHI.

*i3Ridgway/Blair Oral History, Vol. II, interview 4, p. 6.

ii^tetter from Ridgway to Almond, March 6, 1951, Ridgway Papers, Box 22, file; "Historical records, 12/50-1/51," AMHI.

ii=Ridgway/Blair Oral History, Vol. II, Interview 4, p. 6. 174

USAF in Korea, he found his efforts decreasingly fruitful.

Congress and the press— both of which had received repeated assurances from the Air Force (confirmed by the Army) that, on the off- chance that they would be needed, training and capabilities for tactical air operations were more than adequate— were understandably alarmed at early reports from the front of an air support system that seemed to be operating extempore. "The War in Korea," one journalist charged, "has mocked the pretensions of the Air Force.Events in Korea seemed to have invalidated USAF claims that its strategic air power could win quick victories with short casualty lists and without the help of the other services: despite nearly total USAF air superiority the war continued.

General Spaatz contention in September and October that US "victory" in

Korea established that the US force structure essentially sound proved premature by December.Ever more frequently, members of the press and

Congress began to hint that perhaps the tactical aviation mission should return to the Army. At least one critic went so far as to charge that:

As long as fighters are needed to protect the big bombers as well as to cooperate with the troops on the ground, the whole Air Corps might just as well be given back to the Army whose commander (who ought to be trained in air as well as land fighting) might then be left to decide where his fighter planes can do the most damage to the enemy.

ii*"Qive the Air Force Back to the Army," Washington Times-Herald, September 20, 1950.

ii?Carl Spaatz, "Learning the Lessons of Korea," Newsweek, Vol. 36, Pt. 2, October 16, 1950; Spaatz, "The Army-Navy-Air Force Team," Newsweek, Vol. 36, Pt. 1, September 18, 1950.

iia"give the Air Force Back to the Army." 175

Such concern sharpened as it became apparent that USAF did not

intend to change its fundamental force priorities in response to the

Korean conflict. In September, Major General T. H. Landon, USAF Director of Plans, testified before the Tactical Aviation Subcommittee of the

House Armed Services Committee that current USAF force distribution was in balance with ground forces and that TAC, as currently constituted, would be able to meet any expansion of ground operations and provide tactical support at the time and place required.One month later, an

Air Force review of its military program under NSC/68 established the following ranking of priorities for manning, training, and equipping its combat Units; 1) Strategic Air Command; 2) Air Defense Command; 3)

Tactical Air Units; 4) Military Air Transport Service (which provided the bulk of Army logistic, troop carrier, and airborne support). In USAF’s ranking of future program'priorities, development of new and urgently needed tactical aircraft was conditional on the expansion of its combat wings from forty-nine to ninety-five.*20 Vandenberg’s testimony in April

1951 that Air Force operations in Korea constituted a threat to its strategic force modernization did little to quell concerns that USAF had exempted itself from the revised priorities implied in NSC/68 and implemented in Korea.

ii^^rig. Gen. Robert E. L. Eaton, USAF, Memorandum for Files, "Meeting of the Tactical Aviation Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee," September 11, 1950, National Archives, RG 330, Decimal File, July - December 1950, Box 171, File 032.2.

iEci"Review of Military Programs under NSC 68: Military Personnel, Air Force," October 12, 1950, National Archives, RG 330, Decimal File, July - Dec. 1950, Box 201, File 381 (NSC 68). 176

The Air Force was not, as its critics charged, oblivious to the implications of the Korean conflict for future air power planning and doctrine, but it was reluctant to overturn five years of force planning based on a few months of operational experience. In an effort to define the long-term lessons of the Korean conflict. Major General Weyland, long-time member of the TAC and its "commander for a day" in July, 1950, conducted a study of Korean operations and published his findings in

October 1950. In his report entitled "Some Lessons of the Korean War,"

Weyland compiled a series of conclusions upon which the Air Force might base future planning for similar contingencies. While Weyland disagreed with critics’ charges that the Air Force had "starved" its tactical air assets to foster a "wrongheaded" strategy, he still found in the Korean

War evidence that both USAF and the Army should rethink some of the fundamental assumptions that underlay current doctrines, forces, and planning for joint operations.

Weyland’s three most fundamental conclusions concerned USAF’s basic responsibility for tactical operations. First, when operating in conjunction with any other services, the USAF should be prepared to conduct tactical air operations in cooperation with and support of those other services in addition to its other basic missions. Second, USAF could not expect to conduct quick, efficient, and flexible tactical air operations in combat until it built a tactical control organization and point-to-point communication adequate to support them. Third, Weyland

leiMaj. Gen. □. P. Weyland, "Some Lessons of the Korean War and Conclusions and Recommendations Concerning USAF Tactical Air Responsibilities," October 10, 1950, TAC Historv, 1 July - 30 Nov. 1950, Vol. IV, Supp. Doc. 742. 177

concluded that the US should expect to face more "Koreas" with similar

operational characteristics in the years to come.'^e From these basic

assumptions, Weyland went on to list a number of specific recommendations

including; establishment of truly "joint" theater staffs with

proportionate representation of all services involved, development of jet

fighter/bombers for tactical operations, and specialized training of air

crews for tactical bombardment. Weyland also believed that the Army bore

a share of the burden in improving joint operations. First, it needed to

scale down its expectations concerning air lift, which Weyland noted

could not, in the future, be expected to maintain "the Korean intra­

theater "Berlin Airlift" type air logistic support. Second, it needed to

improve its organic artillery capabilities in anticipation of the

likelihood that air superiority (easily achieved in Korea) might absorb a

major proportion of tactical air assets in the opening stages of a future

conflict.

Weyland warned against a number of "erroneous" conclusions that he

feared might be drawn from the Korean conflict: first, that air

superiority could be assumed in planning for future joint operations;

second, that the success with which the F-51 was applied in Korea

indicated that propeller-driven aircraft were superior to jets in the

close air support mission and should be perpetuated; third, that the essentially tactical character of the Korean air war indicated that

USAF’s emphasis on strategic bombing was unnecessary; and finally, that unlimited supplies of air support would always be available to ground

i2=Ibid., p. 8.

lesibid., p. 9. 178

forces. The naval air that had backed up USAF tactical air support in

Korea was, in Weyland’s view, valuable in a pinch, but would be less

effective in the face of enemy air or submarines, or under different

geographical conditions. Finally, that boundless supplies of air lift

could be sustained on a long-term basis and should normally be

expected.

Weyland concluded his report with a number of specific

recommendations concerning training, equipment, and doctrine for tactical

air units in the Air Force. His most important recommendation, however,

concerned the future structure of TAC and its role in planning future

tactical capabilities. TAC, Weyland argued, must be established as a

major command, co-equal with other USAF commands and with the AFF. All

its operational elements and overseas tactical units, furthermore, should

be equipped and indoctrinated to be highly mobile. Finally, Weyland urged USAF to make the build-up of TAC a high priority and to pledge to

keep it so upon the conclusion of the Korean conflict. To build TAC into

a viable force required a long-term commitment of material and human

resources and an energetic research and development program to provide

tactical aircraft, weapons, communications, and doctrine. In short,

Korea proved that USAF could not afford once again to allow TAC’s fortunes to wane as they did between 1946 and 1 9 5 0 .*^3

Despite rhetoric to the contrary in the Army and the press, few participants in military policymaking seriously considered restoring the

pre-World War II organization of military aviation or giving the Army its

i24^bid., pp. 8-9.

ie=Ib id . , p. 10-11, 179

own organic air force. Still, the inadequacies of tactical aviation in

Korea were seen as the result of the eighteen-month dormancy of TAC and

prompted Congress to consider legislation designed to insure that, as

Weyland recommended, TAC assets would not be subject to similar

atomization in the future. In October, the House Armed Services

Committee began work on a bill, HR 399, that would require USAF by law to

maintain TAC (along with ADC, SAC, Air Materiel Command, and European

Support Command) as an independent and coequal c o m m a n d . The bill did

not become law until early 1951, but the public debate over tactical air

power was enough to prompt the Air Force to take action to restore to TAC

the organizational status it enjoyed before 1948.

TAC’s historian referred to the events of November, 1950 as "the

final step in what has been described as the renaissance of Tactical Air

Command." On November 10, the Department of the Air Force announced

plans to reconstitute TAC as a major command effective December l.i^?

The elevation of TAC to major command status reflected, in part, a

growing realization within the Air Force that its tactical capabilities

had suffered as a result of the postwar emphasis on SAC and its

126HR 399, stated that "The Air Force shall be divided into the following major air command, the commanding generals of which shall have the grade of general; Continental Air Command, Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, Air Materiel Command, and European Support Command. U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee No. 2 of the Armed Services Committee, Hearings on HR 399, A Bill to Provide for the Organization of the Air Force and the Department of the Air Force, and for Other Purposes, (Washington, D.C.: January, 1951), Title III, Section 301.

ic^Headquarters ConAC, General Orders, Number **, "Redesignation of TAC as a Major Air Command," November 20, 1950; and. Letter, Department of the Air Force to Comm. Gen. TAC, "Designation of Tactical Air Command and Air Defense Command as Major Air Commands," November 10, 1950, TAC History, 1 July to 30 Nov. 1950, vol. II, supp. docs. 56, 54. 180 interests. NSC/68, as well as escalating criticism from outside USAF, had already forced a reconsideration of the role of tactical air power in future military planning. Korea, however, served to throw into grim relief the importance of maintaining balanced air capabilities and the consequences of failure to do so. The expansion of TAC in early 1950, prior to the outbreak of the war in Korea, attested to the fact that USAF had begun to acknowledge the vital nature of its tactical mission, but the commitment of tactical units to combat in Asia forced the issue. The recommendations of Weyland and other observers seemed to point to one prerequisite for effective tactical air and joint operations: the establishment of TAC as an independent and co-equal command within the

USAF hierarchy.

The dramatic metamorphosis of Tactical Air Command during 1950 and early 1951 marked the end of its troublesome genesis, but the most significant changes still unfolded beyond its immediate control. Two decisive events— the advent of NSC/68 as the blueprint for US foreign policy and the Korean War— carried implications far beyond the future of tactical air power, but they triggered a fundamental change in strategic priorities that gradually restored TAC to the military mainstream. The outbreak of war in Korea, further, forced USAF to give TAC the administrative and material assets necessary to build a viable tactical air capability. Certainly, the rump command of 1948 - 1949 would have been incapable of providing tactical aviation forces for even the most limited operations; but neither, it became apparent, could the

leeTAC Historv, 1 July - 30 Nov. 1950, Vol. I, pp. 24-25. 181

subordinate command of 1950. Korea demonstrated beyond a reasonable

doubt that even in the age of atomic warfare, tactical air war was a

distinct, and potentially decisive aspect of overall air power, fully

deserving of major command status.

The Army provided another catalyst for change within TAC. Events

in Korea— particularly ad hoc air support during the summer of 1950— left

some within the Army unwilling to remain quiet regarding their expectations from Air Force tactical aviation. Ever since gaining its

independence in 1947, USAF suspected that the Army sought to "steal" back all or part of the tactical air mission. If events provided little

evidence of such a conspiracy before 1950, increasingly vocal Army criticism and some outright demands for an organic Army tactical air

force finally seemed to confirm Air Force suspicion.

The Air Force, for its part, began to accept the necessity of an

independent TAC, if grudgingly at times. USAF plans to elevate TAC to a subordinate command began nearly two months prior to the North Korean

invasion of the South and were most likely a response to two forces: the change in military priorities resulting from NSC/68 and pressure from

increasingly aggressive critics of USAF policy in Congress, the military, and the press. A third factor may have been the impending development of smaller, tactical atomic weapons. The Air Force’s conversion was far from complete, and the May 1950 reorganization barely restored TAC to its pre-1948 capabilities, did little to compensate for nearly two years of lost time, and did not give TAC co-equal status with its twin combat air command, SAC. It would take several months of hard-earned combat experience and outside intervention to convince USAF that tactical air PLEASE NOTE:

Duplicate page number(s); text follows. Filmed as received.

UMI 182 power, in an age of "brushfire wars" and Soviet A-bombs, was as decisive as strategic air power in deterring, fighting, and winning wars. CHAPTER IV: TAC’S REDEMPTION, 1951-1953

Air Force reorganization and the resurrection of TAC in 1950 provided the means for expansion and modernization of the tactical mission; events and policy changes during the second phase of the Korean

War, beginning in April 1951, defined the character of its future development. Once the operational emergencies of 1950 had passed it seemed only a matter of time until peace returned to Korea. The United

States, the Air Force, and TAC all turned some of their attention to the postwar period: what were the likely future threats and what sort of air power was necessary to meet them? The Tactical Air Command that emerged from the Korean War bore scant resemblance to its prewar incarnation, and if its stature had not yet grown equal to that of its big brother, SAC, it certainly had reached its age of majority and was more in command of its own fate than at any point since its tenuous start in 1946.

Three pivotal events of the late-Korean War period changed the direction of TAC’s internal priorities and its future role in USAF planning. First, the stalemate between UN and Red forces on the ground in Korea reduced the urgency of Army dependence on close air support and allowed the FEAF to devote a greater share of its effort and resources to the missions it preferred: air interdiction and strategic bombing.

Second, concern that the Soviets might exploit the diversion of US forces to Asia by launching an offensive in Europe led the Truman administration

182 183

to commit six Army divisions to NATO for the permanent defense of Western

Europe. During the ensuing "Great Debate" in the Senate, it became

apparent that TAC would bear a major share of responsibility for the air aspects of an expanded European strategy. Third, the development of

smaller nuclear weapons that could be delivered by tactical aircraft led

TAC, in early 1951, to establish a "special weapons branch" and press for

a piece of USAF’s nuclear mission. The advent of a nuclear mission for

TAC would forever change the definition of "tactical air power" and the perception of the command’s mission both within and outside the Air

Force.

Lieutenant General John K. Cannon assumed command at Langley in

January 1951, ending the internal upheaval that plagued TAC during 1950.

Vandenberg had determined that as a major command, and in the face of

increasing pressure from the Army concerning tactical air support, TAC needed a strong, experienced, and permanent commander. With Cannon’s arrival, TAC acquired the leadership necessary to overcome the debilitating effects of General Lee’s departure the previous July and the subsequent turmoil over reorganization and mobilization. Cannon, like

Lee and Quesada before him, had extensive experience in tactical operations, having commanded the Twelfth Air Force and the Mediterranean

Allied Tactical Air Force in Italy during World War II. He was determined to modernize USAF’s tactical air capabilities— which he believed were an integral part of its mission— but not according to the

Army-Navy concepts of tactical aviation. Those, he argued, were based on doctrines developed for a specific and limited scenario— close air 184 support of amphibious operations in the World War II Pacific theatei-- that bore little relevance to the types of large scale scenarios likely

to develop in the future.*

Cannon’s agenda for TAC centered on the development of TAC’s strike and special weapons capabilities. In his view, TAC’s future role involved two central missions: nuclear-capable air superiority and denial in the European Theater and highly mobile, flexible air support for deployment in overseas emergencies. By developing TAC to its full capabilities— including nuclear weapons— the Air Force could free SAC assets to concentrate on the primary strategic goal: development of a viable strategic force to deter or conduct all out war with the Soviet

Union. "1 personally consider it extremely important," he wrote in

February 1951, "to have the strategic air forces tend to their own knitting, keep their minds on their own jobs and not be diverted from their primary mission."® Cannon, during his three year tenure at TAC, would lay the groundwork for the new Tactical Air Command that would grow in the 1950s to a stature that eventually threatened to outstrip SAC.

Cannon’s arrival on the heels of its elevation to a major command ushered in a new era of optimism within TAC. In an address to the Air

War College in March, General Wolfinbarger from the Ninth Air Force— who had presented a scathing review of USAF tactical aviation the previous

September— summed up the revived spirit of TAC. There was still a vital need to rebuild tactical aviation, and TAC still ran a "poor third" in

USAF priorities, but circumstances were changing. Expanded commitments

*Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, pp. 155-156.

®lbid., p. 156-157. 185 '

in Korea, the Pacific, and Western Europe depended on ground and tactical

air forces. USAF and the JCS could no longer ignore the need to expand

TAC; SAC, Wolfinbarger pointed out, could not keep the Red Army from

rolling across Europe. The new commitments also made it clear that it

was too early to rule out ground warfare in the future and that

technology still did not replace sound operational principles.

Wolfinbarger identified a number of continuing TAC weaknesses that needed

immediate attention: the lack of adequate tactical aircraft, the absence

of a night/all-weather fightei— bomber, and the scarcity of officers in both the Army and the Air Force with training and expertise, or even

interest, in joint operations. TAC, he concluded, was starting over

"from scratch," but it possessed a "sound core of true tactical air power" and was rapidly implementing its plans for the future.^

In April 1951 the character of the Korean War and the US forces deployed to fight it entered a new phase. President Truman, incensed over General MacArthur's interference in the political aspects of the war, fired the CinCFE and replaced him with the Eighth Army’s commander.

General Ridgway. The departure of MacArthur coincided with a significant change in UN strategy: the aim of UN military action became restoring

the status quo ante bellum and insuring the future security of the

Republic of Korea, not to liberating North Korea or unifying the country under the southern regime. The change reflected the fact that neither* side could gain any permanent advantage without risking escalation to

®Maj. Gen. W. R. Wolfinbarger, "Tactical Air in Joint Operations," Air War College Address, March 30, 1951, AFS/HRC, K239.716251-157. 186

general war between the US and the PRC, something both wanted to avoid.

Although UN forces succeeded in reversing early Chinese successes, it

became clear by the spring of 1951 that the war would most likely end in

a negotiated settlement. Peace talks began at Kaesong in July, and by

Qctobei— November military forces on both sides fell into a more or less

static war of attrition aimed at establishing for themselves the most

advantageous position in the event of an armistice.

As CinCFE, Ridgway remained the prototypical professional soldier;

if he had opinions as to what the political conduct of the war should be,

he kept them to himself. He discouraged interservice wrangling among his

field commanders as he had done as Eighth Army Commander. Through his

professionalism and no-nonsense approach to command, he was able to

retain the respect of all the services and allow each the latitude it

needed— within the limits of UN strategy and aims— to conduct its

operations to the best advantage. The emergencies of 1950 had placed an

inordinate demand on USAF’s close air support assets in Korea, but the

relatively static war after the UN spring counter-offensive of 1951

(Operations KILLER and RIPPER) allowed the Air Force to turn a greater

share of its attention to other aspects of the air war.

During March and April, TAC and the Air University held a series of

joint conferences on air-ground operations in Korea. The participants

were company grade officers (both air and ground) with combat experience

in Korea as recent as February 1951 discussed various subjects: inter­

service understanding, tactical aircraft, a^r tactics and techniques,

armaments, the air-ground operations system, and the air control system.

The conferees arrived at numerous conclusions and recommendations 187

concerning air-ground operations in Korea and areas for future

improvement. In general, they agreed that one of the greatest barriers

to efficient air-ground operations was the lack of inter-service familiarity and the shortage of trained liaison officers. They agreed,

however, that existing doctrine was essentially sound, with weaknesses

lying in inappropriate aircraft and the lack of sufficient, realistic

training. In particular, participants cited the need for greater attention among both air and surface forces to the proper procedures for

the air request link and air control. These joint conferences seemed to

indicate that the air-ground system had worked out most of its more

glaring operational problems by early 1951, and more important, that company commanders and pilots were in basic agreement as to lingering weaknesses and appropriate responses."

At higher command levels, consensus concerning Korean operations varied. Although claiming a decisive role for FEAF, both TAG and USAF repeatedly warned that air operations in Korea should not become the standard for future tactical air power. In particular, air commanders in

Korea had expressed concern that the degree of Army dependence on close air support risked "dissipating the air effort." Further, some saw in

the Army’s pressure on USAF to allocate even higher priorities to close air support an attempt to acquire greater control of air "with an obvious

"Headquarters TAG to Gommanding Generals, TAG Numbered Air Forces; Gommanding Officers, Wings and Bases assigned directly to this headquarters, "Consolidated Notes of Joint Conferences on Korean Action," July 31, 1951. AFS/HRG, 417.151. 188

ultimate intent of recreating an Army air force."= Headquarters USAF

initiated a number of investigations to evaluate the relative success of air operations in Korea and make recommendations for improvements. Two

of the most important appeared in early 1951. Air Force Vice Chief of

Staff Lauris Norstad sent an evaluation team headed by Lieutenant General

Barcus, former TAG commander, to observe FEAF operations during November and December 1950. To balance the internal evaluation by the Barcus

Board, Air Force Secretary Finletter recruited Robert L. Stearns, the

President of the University of Colorado, to conduct an "impartial but

informed" civilian evaluation of operations during the same period.*

The Barcus Board (March 12) and Stearns Report (January 16) conclusions, based on observations of FEAF operations in November and

December 1950, were similar to those expressed in the Weyland Report released in October 1950. First, while FEAF probably provided the margin of victory for UN operations. Air Force personnel did not adapt easily to living and operating under field conditions, indicating a need for more realistic training. Second, USAF needed to revise Air Force doctrine in light of technical and operational advances since the publication of FM

31-35 in 1946 and to take steps to improve the dissemination of doctrine within the Air Force and the other services. Third, a major hindrance to greater effectiveness was the lack of proper air representation on the joint theater staff. And finally, because of unique circumstances, the proportion of close air support the FEAF provided in Korea was

“Memorandum, Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, APO 9970, to General Timber lake, "Fifth Air Force Operations, Korea," March 4, 1951, AFS/HRC, Tactical Air Control File (Korea 1950-51), K730.3111-1.

*Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, p. 153. 189

extraordinarily heavy. Army planning for future operations should not,

therefore, assume similar levels of support since it was unlikely that

the total air superiority that FEAF enjoyed in Korea would be repeated in other contingencies."

A number of Air Force field commanders agreed that Korean

operations had established a dangerous precedent for future theater air power and had, perhaps, opened the door to organic Army tactical

aviation. A few warned that Army demands for close air support, met in a

"haphazard" manner without regard to target priorities or systems of attack, detracted from the overall success of a sustained and cumulative air effort. Some Fifth Air Force officers charged that Army field commanders requested air strikes that divisional artillery might have performed just as efficiently; as a result, they felt the Fifth Air Force had been reduced to little more than field artillery and TACPs to "ground force communications centers for coordinating air." In short, they chargend that the request system, the JOC, and the TACPs left Army corps and divisions in virtually direct control of a major percentage of the

Fifth Air Force effort. The exigencies of early Korean operations necessitated such deviation from established doctrine, but conditions in

1951 did not — it seemed to air commanders— justify the continued misapplication and depletion of air assets from their primary mission.

Disgruntled Fifth Air Force commanders were the kernel of a wider constituency within USAF disturbed over the degree of Army control over

^Headquarters, Air University, Evaluation Staff, "Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the USAF in Korea (Barcus and Stearns Reports)," August 3, 1951, AFS/HRC, K239.0429.5111.

®Fifth Air Force memo, "Fifth Air Force Operations, Korea," p. 5-6. 190

tactical aviation in Korea. Since it was impossible for the FEAF to provide air support in any proportion suitable to the Army, some within

USAF believed it should subject close air support to the same system of priorities and estimates that guided the overall air effort. As one

Fifth Air Force colonel suggested, USAF would be better off arguing that a division "was not given a flight of aircraft to expend in knocking out

a group of riflemen," because available assets were "used to neutralize an armored battalion which was on the way to the front" than it would be

if ground commanders "were given all they requested," but "that was not enough.'"' Colonel James F . Whisenand summed up this line of thought within USAF; Korean operations contributed to a situation in which "we are being forced more and more to accept the Air Force in a supporting role, and to limit the application of air power to the support of a surface strategy" and that "we are gradually losing the battle for an effective air force. "**■'

In August 1951, the Defense Department’s Operations Research

Office, the FEAF, and Johns Hopkins University compiled a preliminary analysis of close support operations in Korea. A number of assumptions underlay the study: that there were numerous deficiencies in all US services when hostilities began, that many of those had since been eliminated, and that the Marine close air support system benefitted from the necessary equipment and personnel in-being at the outset. The study

''Ibid., p . 6.

^'■'James F. Whisenand, Colonel, USAF, Memorandum to Professor Leach (Maj. Gen. USAF, Ret.), "Initial Presentation on Tactical Aviation," January 8, 1951, AFS/HRC, Papers of James F. Whisenand [hereafter cited as Whisenand Papers], K168.7017-28. 191

concluded that, in general, both the Air Force and the Navy had conducted

increasingly effective operations and continuously implemented

improvements. Still, the ORO found that USAF support had decreased

overall from forty-one sorties per day during Pusan to fifteen per day in

January 1951, of which fifty percent struck well beyond the bombline and were thus not technically close air support. Over the entire period, the

Air Force averaged thirteen sorties per day inside the bombline compared

to the 1st MAW’s thirty-seven sorties per day. In addition, the report

found that Marine close air support pilots attacked closer to the front, arrived more quickly, and stayed in the target area longer than

comparable air force units. While the Army needed to be able to depend on close air support within ten minutes on targets near friendly positions, the report recognized that USAF could not— indeed, should not-

-be expected to provide air support on the same scale as Marine support.

The Air Force and Army might benefit most from experiments with new command and control networks to improve responsiveness and accuracy. The greatest weaknesses in overall tactical capabilities by January 1951 were the inadequacy of air intelligence and the lack of al1-weather/night attack capabilities in the FEAF.**

The Army praised the ORO report as a "valuable contribution to the study of close air support," but found a need to amend some of its findings. The Army challenged the idea that the bombline constituted a hard and fast limit for close air support; it should rather serve as a

iiQepartment of Defense, Operations Research Office in conjunction with Johns Hopkins University and General Headquarter, FEAF, Report, Preliminary Evaluation of Close Air Support Operations in Korea, August 10, 1951, National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, 1951-52, Box 770A, file 452.1. 192

"safety precaution" without delineating a forward limit of air support.

It also called upon the Air Force to place greater emphasis on TACPs and

less on Mosquito FACs. The Army argued that the capability to provide air support within ten minutes already existed but that the Air Force

refused to provide adequate aircraft and, further, that Army ground commanders should not be required to establish minimum sortie requirements in advance, since such requirements depend on the exigencies of the tactical situation. Overall, the Army found that joint operations needed to be more joint, with commanders in all services more familiar with the requirements, capabilities, and limitations of the other. The

Army acknowledged that many close air support problems had technical solutions best left to the Air Force but continued to insist that as the primary user of tactical air the Army had an interest, and should have a voice, in the priorities of future tactical development. For example, the Army disagreed with the ORO’s contention that the USAF jets used for close air support in Korea (the F-BO and F-84) had no serious deficiencies beyond range: they were critically deficient in bombing, rocketing, or strafing ground targets; they delivered only one-fifth the munitions delivered by F-51s, despite their higher sortie rate; and requirements for long runways forced the jets to operate from bases in

Japan with reduced range and payloads.

Congress entered the debate over close air support during late 1951 as criticism of Korean operations escalated. In August, a number of influential members of the House Armed Services Committee pushed for a

i^Department of the Army, Evaluation of Operations Research Office Report ORO-R-3 (FEC), "Close Air Support Operations in Korea," National Archives, RG 319, Decimal File, 1951-52, Box 634, file 040. 193

committee investigation of USAF air support capabilities. Led by

Representative Sterling W. Cole (R-NY), the group held that the services’

inability to work out the problem internally made Congressional

intervention necessary. Cole cited the Air Force’s "near hypnotism" with

air-to-air combat and strategic bombing as the principal roadblock to development of suitable air-ground support and charged that since

unification, tactical aviation has been a "stepchild" of the Air Force.

Most alarming to USAF was Cole’s suggestion that close air support should

either be returned to the Army or made the sole responsibility of the

Marine Corps.

While not all critics of USAF tactical capabilities went as far as

Cole, the proposed expansion to 163 wings by 1954 raised a number of questions as to priorities for expansion. The ensuing "balanced forces"

debate amounted, to USAF, to whether it would continue to place the bulk of its expansion forces into SAC or give in to pressure to increase its

conventional capabilities. For the other services, the important question was whether the US would develop a "team of all services

integrated to a common strategy" or give clear priority to the Air

Force.The Army and Navy opposed the USAF 163-Wing plan for two

reasons. First, the composition of the planned increase neglected the need for improved troop transport and close support capabilities.

Second, the enormous cost of the expansion (estimated at 22 to 23 billion dollars annually, or over half the entire estimated defense budget for

i^Austin Stevens, "House Air Tactics Inquiry Backed; Cole Charges 'Basic' Service Rift," New York Times, August 3, 1951.

^'‘Hanson W. Baldwin, "Arms Decision Presses," New York Times, September 25, 1951. 194

1953 and 1954) would necessitate significant budget reductions in the

Army and Navy, where modernization was also badly needed.

At TAG, Cannon was acutely aware of the implications of the USAF expansion plan, both for the Air Force and his command. As commander of

the Air Force agency in closest contact with the Army, he understood the political as well as the military ramifications of an expansion program

that did not answer the pressing need for improved tactical air capabilities. Cannon had his own agenda for aggrandizing TAG, but he

also knew that Congress and the other military services would not stand still while the Air Force continued to pursue its strategic orientation

in apparent oblivion to the implications of the Korean conflict. He was particularly piqued over plans to funnel the majority of new medium bomber and fighter-bomber units into SAC and to supply TAG expansion with

SAC’s obsolete leftovers. He warned, in May, that implementation of the

Air Force program would "bring on a recurrence of the intense criticism from Army, Congressional, and press sources, to the effect that the Air

Force is not fulfilling its obligations to provide adequate tactical air." The rationale that USAF used during the "lean years"— that Air

National Guard units could pick up the slack in tactical missions— was of limited credibility in light of expansion. "I feel," he concluded, "that

it is neither necessary nor desireable to invite such criticism" when a more logical distribution of tactical units between TAG and SAC would defuse criticism without significantly reducing strategic readiness.**

*=Ibid.

**Letter, Lt. Gen. Cannon, Comm., TAG, to Gen. Vandenberg, COS, USAF, May 11, 1951, TAG History, 1 July - 30 December 1951, Vol. I: Organization and Mission, Supp. Doc. #49. 195

In October, Vandenberg announced that the USAF expansion plan would be primarily tactical, much of the build-up going to tactical units for

support of ground operations in Western Europe.

The debate over close air support continued in Korea during 1951.

It reached its zenith in December when General James A. Van Fleet,

Ridgway’s successor as 8th Army commander, wrote Ridgway a detailed

letter concerning the air support his units had received from FEAF. Van

Fleet acknowledged that after eighteen months at war UN forces had reached a fair balance of force strength. In light of this fact, and the changes in the operational environment, he asserted that Korea should become a laboratory and that "every means available should be explored within the limits of our authority to initiate changes that will make the joint effort more effective." Close Air Support to date fell short of ground commanders’ expectations and while successful showed considerable room for improvement. Most of Van Fleet's suggestions followed the lines of the ORO Report and Army response, but the two that did not were the most galling to the Air Force: that air units should be reorganized under decentralized control to be more responsive and that TAG train Army personnel as air controllers to alleviate the shortage of TACPs.

The day after he sent his letter to Ridgway, Van Fleet met with

Fifth Air Force commander General Frank Everest. Everest assured him that FEAF was eager to cooperate in improving aii— ground operations, but

^■^"Air Force to Stress Troop Support Units," New York Times, October 14, 1951.

'^Letter, Van Fleet to Ridgway, "Close Air Support," December 20, 1951, Ridgway Papers, Box 20, item 16. 196

that to experiment along the lines that Van Fleet suggested would result

in his having "his ears knocked down" by USAF Headquarters. In the

meeting, Everest refused to concur with Van Fleet’s contention that the

JOC should be decentralized, that pilots were under trained, or that

responsiveness was a particular problem. The two did agree, however,

that joint doctrine would benefit from using the remaining battle time in

Korea to test new procedures and techniques and that "little knowledge

[could] be gained from continuing to do the same thing we have been doing

for 18 months."19

General Weyland, commander of the FEAF and once and future TAG commander, answered Van Fleet’s criticisms in a letter to Ridgway several weeks later. Weyland had been in Korea, first as an observer and then as

FEAF commander, almost from the start of the war and felt his experience in the field equalled or exceeded that of any commander there, air or surface. Weyland principally objected to Van Fleet’s proposal to decentralize theater air power to enhance the ground support mission. He cited the operational experience of World War II, numerous postwar agreements between the Army and the Air Force, and the relative success of the air campaign in Korea as evidence that the existing organizational structure was sound.=* Weyland warned against over emphasis on the

i^Memorandum, Van Fleet to Ridgway, "Eyes Only: Account of conversation with Everest," December SI, 1951, Ridgway Papers, Box 19: Korea: Correspondence, 1951-52, T-2, item 64.

^""The most important of these agreements resulted from a May 1945 meeting attended by Eisenhower, Spaatz, Bradley, Vandenberg, the four U.S. Army field commanders under Bradley, and the commanders of the three U.S. tactical air commands under Vandenberg (including Weyland). The group unanimously agreed that the command organization and operational procedures developed in Europe were sound and should become part of permanent doctrine. In March 1951, a Joint Fifth Air Force-Eighth Army 197

particular needs of individual field commanders when those might conflict

with the overall success of the air campaign. He concluded by

acknowledging FEAF weaknesses and endorsing a program to modify and

refine systems and methods of forward control of close support aircraft

and any other areas of deficiency; the Army, however, also bore a share

of the responsibility to correct deficiencies in its performance that

"seriously affected air force capabilities and the overall joint

mission." In short, the Army and Air Force should resist the temptation

to reject an essentially sound system on the basis of deficiencies which,

while they did exist, could in nearly all cases be corrected within

current concepts of command and employment of air and surface forces.

As he had done so often in the past, Ridgway calmed the debate before it

could spread outside "the family" and endanger interservice relations,

deferring to Vandenberg, TAG, and the FEAF on the issue of decentralized control of tactical aviation.ee

Within Army circles, Ridgway speculated that USAF policy forced

Weyland to take an inflexible stand concerning close air support and any potential change in the existing system. While he acknowledged that few

ground commanders were completely satisfied with the tactical air support

they received, the overall campaign had been "reasonably effective,

Ridgway thus saw little potential gain in becoming embroiled in a serious

Board analyzed the air-ground situation in Korea and accepted the same basic principles as sound, adequate, and applicable to that theater.

eiMemorandum, Weyland to Ridgway, "General Van Fleet’s letter dated 20 December 1951, Subject: Close Air Support," January 12, 1952, Ridgway Papers, Box 20, item 16.

sepersonal Message: Weyland to Vandenberg, Cn.d.3; Diary Entry, M.B.R. [Ridgway], January 21, 1952, Ridgway papers. Box 20, item 22. 198

debate over interservice policies so late in the war. For the Commandei—

in-Chief to impose drastic changes in the policies of any service, unless

they could "materially affect current and future operations," seemed ill-

advised. Instead, Ridgway urged Weyland and Van Fleet to "sit down and

discuss frankly ways of improving tactical air support, particularly

'close air’" and encouraged Weyland to "acquaint himself with the well-

spread view of ground commanders that tac air support in Korea is not as

good as it should be."^3

Despite Ridgway’s efforts to keep disagreements over tactical air

support "in the family," reports of Army discontent triggered continuing

criticism of USAF doctrine at home. As early as the spring of 1951, the

debate had reached the JCS when General Collins called for a light

tactical bomber for close support operations. The Air Force countered

that the Army did not understand the implications of the unique air

superiority it enjoyed in Korea and failed to understand that the

survivability of small aircraft in Korea was the exception rather than

the rule. A false sense of security was leading the Army to pressure TAC

into developing aircraft to fit the exception.

A similar schism developed over Air Force procurement of the C-123 assault aircraft. The C-123 was conceived long before the outbreak of

hostilities in Korea as a relatively light, assault-type aircraft capable of landing on unprepared airstrips during the early phases of airborne or

rapid ground assaults. At the time, the Army and USAF agreed that there

G^CinCFE, memo for the Chief-of-Staff, "Close Air Support," [draft, Wright], January 15, 1952, Ridgway Papers, Box 20, item 16.

s^Dickens, "Survey of Air Ground D octrine," p. 40. 199

was no existing aircraft available to fulfill such a mission, even with

modification. The C-123 was programmed for research, development, and

testing that would allow it to roll out in 1950 with substantial

deliveries by 1952. The outbreak of the Korean war increased the

immediate demand for tactical aircraft, with priority on fighter and

bomber types, leading to delays in the C-123 program. By 1952, the Air

Force had still not purchased the first C-123 and was considering

abandoning the program altogether, but the Army persisted, arguing that

it was still the best hope for a timely assault capability even if no

longer the optimum aircraft. In defending the C-123, the Army argued

that in agreeing to surrender its organic tactical air capability, it

secured Air Force assurance that it would procure such aircraft as were

necessary to support the ground force mission but beyond the limits of

Army aviation.

The Department of Defense entered the C-123 debate in early 1953

and suggested that USAF re-evaluate the program. The comptroller’s office had issued a memorandum suggesting that since the initial delivery

date was now 1955 with substantial deliveries in 1956, the Army might be persuaded to drop the program in anticipation of a replacement program in

the future. The memo offered several justifications for dropping the C-

123 including the considerable delay in production and delivery, the

development of helicopters for light assault duty, the high per unit cost of the C-123, and the fact that numerous other transports including the

new C-130 were in, or near production. The Army, however, refused to

^“Memorandum for Sec. Def. from W. J. McNeil, Comptroller, "C-123 Assault Aircraft," n.d. [July 1953], National Archives, RG 330, Central Decimal File, 1953, Box 40, file 452.01. 200

surrender, arguing that it had cooperated with USAF in designing the C-

123 in response to a specific operational requirement and that to date no

suitable substitute existed. In his reply to the comptroller's office,

Army Secretary Robert T. Stevens insisted that "development of Army

airborne doctrines, procedures, tactics, and techniques are directly

dependent on the availability of the C-123" and urged immediate

reinstatement of the p r o g r a m .

Overall improvements in force strength in the Army and Air Forces

in Korea and stabilization of the ground war along the 38th parallel and redirection of the air war diluted the debate over close air support.

Air Force fear of Soviet air intervention subsided as air to air operations proved the new F-86's capabilities superior to the MiG-15 and

US pilots more proficient than any in the Red forces even when flying older, and clearly inferior, F-80s and F-8 4 5 .2 ? After January 1951, the bulk of the air effort shifted to a relatively successful interdiction campaign against the "middle miles" of the enemy logistical lines, contributing to the failure of major enemy offensives in January and

A p r i l . 2 8 Truman administration and UN political constraints on air operations remained an irritant, but the FEAF was confident that its

2&Secretary of tjie Army Reply to Comptroller Memorandum, July 29, 1953, National Archives, RG 330, Central Decimal File, 1953, Box 40, file 452.01.

2?Carl Spaatz, "The Far Eastern Air War," Newsweek, Vol. 37, pt. 1, February 26, 1951, p. 18.

28Between November 1950 and June 1951, the FEAF claimed to have killed 117,000 enemy troops and destroyed 1,315 gun positions, 296 tanks, 80,000 buildings used as troop and supply centers, 13,000 vehicles, 2,600 freight cars, and 250 locomotives. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, p. 152. 201 interdiction campaign would prove decisive in a UN victory. As

Vandenberg had expressed it;

The best way to use an Air Force is to knock out an enemy's industrial capacity before it can produce war materiel. The second best way is to destroy the equipment on its way to the front. The least efficient way is to hit it after its gets to the front, has sandbags all around it, and is well dug in. When the United Nations forces got up near the Yalu— and our planes could not operate above the river— we were reduced to the least efficient method. . . .we’ve never really used the most efficient method in Korea: Bomber targets in North Korea were so limited they were, and are, tactical targets. We haven’t really used strategic bombing in K orea.

If Vandenberg was overly optimistic in claiming in February 1951 that Army ground force commanders had credited tactical air with a sizeable percentage of enemy kills and that "commanders in the field have not complained" about tactical air support, by late 1952 it seemed that the Army and FEAF had reached a r a p p r o c h e m e n t . P e r h a p s most telling in this regard was General Clark’s approach to the issue upon taking over as

CinCFE in 1952. In a lengthy letter to the Chief-of-Staff, Clark supported the idea that Korean operations could provide a valuable laboratory to improve air-ground operations. He went on, however, to concede that Korea was not reflective of the general types of contingencies that US forces would face in the future and thus should not be the sole basis for formulating future doctrine. Clark agreed with

Weyland’s contention that unusually high demands on close air support in

Korea had raised unrealistic Army expectations. He found current TAC doctrine sound based on Korean operations, acknowledged the importance of

=?"Vandenberg Speaking: Our Air Might," Newsweek, Vol. 37, pt. 1, February 19, 1951, p. 24.

3*Ibid, p. 26. 202 the interdiction mission, and admitted that the Army had become overly dependent on air strikes when divisional artillery could do the job.^’-

Clark did not let FEAF and TAC off the hook entirely. Tactical Air

Command, he argued, had been "its own worst enemy" in presenting its position to Army officers as a hierarchy— air superiority, interdiction, close support— and creating the perception that it might ignore ground support pending accomplishment of the first two missions. Clark suggested that TAC revise its operational mission along the following lines: "In conjunction with surface forces to inflict maximum damage through air action upon enemy aircraft, materiel, and installations and personnel" through anti-air, anti-materiel/installations, and anti­ personnel. Further, Clark held that TAC must cooperate to improve joint training: to more thoroughly indoctrinate officers in the capabilities and limitations of the other services, to allow pilots and ground commanders to become more familiar with one another’s operations, and to improve communication between ground and air forces in the field.®®

Overall, Clark conceded that "during the entire time that I was in command in the Far East, the front-line infantry units and tactical air support units worked closely together, and understood and respected each other’s problems. When the foot soldier needed close air support, he got it."®® While Clark’s enthusiasm might be overstated, it still showed

®iMemo for Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor from Maj. Gen. C.D. Eddleman, Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3, "Resume of General Clark’s Directive on Aii— Ground Operations," September 18, 1952; incl.. General Clark’s letter re Air Ground Operations, August 11, 1952.

®®Ibid, Inclosure 1, "Factors Affecting the Close Air Support Situation in Korea."

®®Tactical Air Power in Support of Ground F orces. 203 that the debate over the proper relationship between ground and air forces was far from over, it had at least taken a new course.

The development of joint doctrine and training for air-ground operations remained a continuing source of pressure and frustration for

TAC through 1951 and 1952. The success of the USAF Aii— Ground Operations

School alleviated some of the joint training problems that Army critics so often cited, although relations between Pope AFB and Fort Bragg remained difficult. Beginning in October 1951, the deputy Commandant of the School was an Army officer appointed by the Chief of the AFF.^* The

Air-Ground Operations School staff, despite interservice tensions, attempted to revise its curriculum in response to the needs of both air and ground forces. A Marine liaison officer joined the staff in early

1952, and the school conducted a symposium, "Air Ground Operations,

Korea," led by six Army, Air Force, and Marine returnees. In general, the Air-Ground Operations School attempted to incorporate a broader scope of experience, knowledge, and opinion into its program.

Following the failure of the Joint Steering Committee's attempt to revise the JTD into a mutually acceptable doctrine for air-ground operations, TAC found itself in a vice, with the AFF on one side and Air

University on the other. All three agencies undertook the drafting of unilateral manuals, and TAC found both AFF and Air University unrealistic in their expectations for new doctrine. By mid-1952, air-ground

B^TAC Regulation 53-2 (revised), October 29, 1951, "Director of Doctrine Historical Report, 15 October - 15 November 1951," TAC Historv, TAC's Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, Supp. Doc. #16.

3=TAC H isto ry , 1 Jan. - 30 June 1952, Vol. IV, pp. 2-7. 204 doctrine seemed hopelessly confused. Instead of a single, joint doctrine there were now four different doctrines for air ground operations: the

AFF, TAC, and Air University doctrine, and the JTD, which operational units, schools, and joint exercises still used as their guideline. As

1952 drew to a close, two years after the initial release of the JTD, TAC and the AFF were no closer to agreement on a joint doctrine for air- ground operations.36 The USAF Aii— Ground Operations School summed up

TAC’s frustrations with Air University and Headquarters USAF recalcitrance concerning joint doctrine, charging that USAF basic doctrine was not "doctrinal" but "doctrinaire," quoting Webster’s definition: "Abstract doctrine or theories without enough regard for practical difficulties."3?

In July, TAC held a command conference to resolve the problem of tactical air doctrine in light of the apparent stagnation of the JTD revision. Whatever the future of the JTD, it solved only a portion of

TAC’s doctrinal problems since it covered only one phase of the command’s operational activities. After discussion of the proper scope of TAC doctrine, the conference agreed that the command should publish a series of five doctrinal manuals dealing with all aspects of tactical operations at all levels of command. The first would be a "command type" manual covering the overall mission, concepts, organization, and command relationships of tactical air. Subsequent manuals would cover fighter-

3^TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1952, Vol. 5, pp.94-96; TAC Historv. 1 July - 31 Dec. 1952, Vol. 5, pp. 66-67.

3?Letter, Headquarters USAFAGOS to Comm. Gen. TAC, "USAFAGOS Comment on Air University Brochure 'USAF Basic Doctrine’," December 6, 1951, TAC History, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1951, Vol. 5, Supp. Doc. #104. 205

bomber, reconnaissance, tactical bomber, and troop carrier operations.

In addition, the Intelligence section would develop a reference file on

potential enemies that various operational sections could use for more

timely and practical revision of general operational guidelines.

Air-ground doctrine did not remain entirely stagnant during 1951

and 1952, despite the inability of TAC and the AFF to resolve their broad

doctrinal differences. In cooperation with Cornell Laboratories, TAC

conducted Buffalo Bill Project "HIGHTIME," an operational analysis of the

close support operations and request systems, during the spring of 1951.

The primary goal of the project was to eliminate, as far as possible,

delays in the request system that threatened the long-term success of

close air support operations. The project applied Cornell Laboratories’

systems analysis and the operational expertise of TAC and the AFF to

designing a close air support system that would be both more responsive

and effective without sacrificing TAC’s air superiority and interdiction

capabilities. As a result of the project, TAC undertook to abbreviate

the air request network through streamlined request procedures and

development of more modern, high-speed communications.

In December 1951, USAF issued a requirement for night-intruder

systems, prompting TAC to launch a major investigation of possible

weapons systems and doctrine. Fifth Air Force operations in Korea had

3B"Report of Conference," July 17, 1951, TAC History, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1951, Vol. V, Supp. Doc. #98.

B^Work Statement, June 1, 1952, Buffalo Bill Project "HIGHTIME," Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory; Historical Report, Operations Analysis, February - March 1952; Operations Analysis, "Tactical Air Communication: A Search for Improvement Opportunities in execution of Close Support Missions;" TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 30 June, 1952, Vol. 5, Supp. Docs. #101/1, 101/2, and 102. 206

thoroughly shut down enemy movement during daylight hours, but the lack

of a viable night intruder capability prevented similar success during

the hours of darkness. The B-26 provided the sole night-intruder

capability, and its speed, vulnerability to ground action, lack of ECM,

and limited weapons capability made it less than ideal for the mission.

The ideal night-intruder would be capable of unescorted, low altitude

strikes with a full range of weapons capabilities.In the interest of

developing the best aircraft possible, TAC undertook to develop a

doctrine for night intruder operations as the basis for developing

specific aircraft requirements. The command established close contact

with the Air Proving Ground, which was working on the technical problems

involved in developing a night intruder system, and used what information

and doctrine could glean to develop an "experience pool" of pilots

trained in simulated night intruder operations using modified F-51 fighters and B-57 bombers.TAC night intruder pilots spent a foui— week

tour with Marine aviators, to practice night attack procedures, learn the

Marines' new night defensive maneuvers, and cooperate in development of

new instructional procedures for future pilot indoctrination.'*^

Interviews with tactical aviators returning from Korea had consistently indicated a need for reform of fire support coordination

'"^Department of the Air Force, "General Operational Requirement for a Night Intruder Weapon System," December 17, 1951, TAC History, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1952, Vol. 5, Supp. Doc. #112.

'*^TAC Historv, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1952, Vol. 5, p. 67.

'♦^Letter, Headquarters TAC to Headquarters 9th AF, "Fighter-Bomber Night Attack Indoctrination," August 20, 1952, TAC History, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1952, Vol. 5, Supp. Doc. # 66. 207 procedures and creation of improved all-service aii— ground doctrine.

In August 1952, the AFF forwarded a proposal to resolve the problems in synchronizing artillery and air support strikes. Poor communication between air and artillery units often led to long lapses between air strikes and follow-up artillery strikes, depleting the shock value of both. The AFF plan aimed at enabling artillery to operate right up to and resume fire immediately following an air strike to maximize the effect of the attack. The plan proposed sustained artillery fire of calibers and trajectories that did not endanger flying aircraft and continued artillery strikes on adjacent targets while air strikes were in progress. Improvements in the fire support coordination centers along with more direct communication between artillery and air support units would facilitate implementation of the AFF plan.'*'* TAC and the AFF agreed on a number of interim measures for immediate improvements in the fire support coordination system and made plans for an in-depth evaluation of plans and techniques aimed at permanent revisions in existing doctrine.'*“

TAC also drafted new doctrines for ECM and Troop Carrier operations. A TAC study of ECM procedures, released in August 1952, was the first practical investigation of the use of electronics in active and passive countermeasures to reduce the effectiveness of enemy defensive

'*®Sunderland. Evolution of Command and Control Doctrine, p. 31.

'*‘*Letter, Chief, AFF to Comm. Gen. TAC, "Coordination of Artillery and Tactical Fire," n.d. [August 19521, TAC Historv, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1952, Vol. 5, Supp. Doc. #67.

'•“Letter, Headquarters TAC to Chief, OCAFF, "Coordination of Artillery and Tactical Air," October 20, 1952, TAC Historv, 1 July - 31 Doc. 1952, Vol. 5, Supp. Doc. #68. 208 weapons and was the basis for a doctrine for ECM in tactical operations, published in November.'** In September, TAC began field testing to modernize its troop carrier doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment.

TAC initiated the program because in its view current troop carrier doctrine and capabilities, all developed during World War II, were not being fully exploited. Increasing criticism from the Army concerning

USAF troop carrier capabilities was undoubtedly also an incentive. The

Eighteenth Air Force, which controlled most of TAC’s troop carrier units, supervised the testing involving units from both the Eighteenth and Ninth

Air Forces. In conjunction with the troop carrier testing, TAC sponsored a conference to consider modification of pathfinder operations. The goal was to develop new techniques that might eliminate the need to parachute advanced assault echelons into the drop zone.^? Reform of troop carrier doctrine was urgently needed, but the project did not lend itself to quick solution and, along with the development of USAF assault aircraft, was complicated by interservice controversy.'*®

The continued commitment of a significant portion of US military forces to Korea led to anxiety in Washington over the possibility of a preemptive Soviet attack against the fledgling NATO alliance. To

'**Letter, Headquarters TAC to Comm. Gen. 9th AF, "Doctrine Governing Mission and Command Functions of ECM in Tactical Air Operations," November 19, 1952, TAC Historv, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1952, Vol. 5, Supp. Doc. #72.

^^Lettcr, Headquarters 18th AF to Comm. Gen. TAC, "Accomplishment of the Pathfinder Mission," August 26, 1952, TAC History, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1952, Vol. 5, Supp. Doc. 76.

'*®"Doctrine and Methods,"TAC H istory, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1952, Vol. 5, pp. 76-77. 209 minimize that threat, the Truman administration increased the permanent

US force commitment in Western Europe to six divisions while the JCS and the military services began planning in earnest for the possibility of a land war in Europe. There seemed little cause for optimism in US military performance in Korea, the political will to support a higher level of readiness either in the US or among its NATO allies, or the success with which the economy had mobilized in the wake of the Korean conflict. Within USAF, the increased commitment to the defense of Europe aggravated continuing apprehensions over SAC readiness and seemed to intensify the debate over the present and future profile of Air Force tactical capabilities.

The emergence of NATO and the ensuing concern over US preparedness in Europe resurrected the old postwar wrangle over the relative priorities of strategic and tactical aviation in USAF’s overall posture.

General Bradley, as Chairman of the JCS, expressed dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of a national strategy overly dependent on strategic air power. He warned that while a strategy that de-emphasized ground forces might bring short term security and allow the US to "escape the grim realities of fighting a war from foxholes" it could not provide adequate security for the nation in the long-run. Such a strategy, furthermore, was based on "fallacy," for it would not defend our allies but would rather "abandon our friends to being overrun on the ground." It was,

Bradley asserted, an easy principle that would "ring terribly counterfeit" to our allies who joined NATO as a "collective defense 210

bargain," not as a "liberation pact."'*''

Strategic air power advocates, generally undaunted by criticism

like Bradley's, perceived in the increased emphasis on Western Europe a

blank check for SAC. Some, like Spaatz, warned against a "wall of flesh"

strategy for the defense of Europe.that detracted from the "first and

crucial battle— the battle for command of the air. Instead, the US

should conduct the major air battle against the Soviet

military/industrial base, leaving theater combat on the ground to the

NATO allies. Ground forces in Europe existed, in Spaatz's view, to

support the air war by "preserveing] a vast base area from which our air

force could rise, meet the enemy, and establish air supremacy."=* The US

should provide the minimum ground forces necessary to shore up European

resolve and defend those forward air bases. Spaatz endorsed the concept

of cooperative defense that underlay the NATO agreement, arguing that

World War 11 proved that local defense could only lead to defeat in

detail. Ideally, NATO allies could provide tactical aviation and the

bulk of the ground forces freeing US forces to fight the "real" war.=®

'•‘'Gladwin Hill, "Victory Not Easy Bradley Asserts," New York Times, May 19, 1951. n-'

“"Spaatz, "The Airpower Odds against the Free World," Air Force, April 1951, pp. 23-26, 51-52, 59.

“ iCarl Spaatz, "Air Defense of the Future," Newsweek, August 6, 1951, p. 19.

“^General Carl Spaatz, perhaps the most well known and popular Air Power spokesman, expressed such sympathies in several of his regular columns in Newsweek, for example, "The Airplane Is Our Only Hope Now," Vol. 36, pt. 2, December 11, 1950 and "The Only Hope for Peace," vol. 37, pt. 1, March 5, 1951. 211

The commander of the US Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) and the Allied

Air Forces, Central Europe was Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, a

staunch SAC advocate since at least 1 9 4 4 . As commander of US air

forces in NATO, Norstad represented the dominant air force view: that

USAF should provide strategic air cover and leave the burden of tactical

air and air defense to the European allies. The primary role of USAF forces in Europe was, in his view, to provide adequate retaliatory

capability to counter any possible advantage the Soviets might see in

launching a preventive war in Europe. Norstad was, however, realistic

about the existing capabilities of the allies, especially the politically touchy problem of constructing adequate bases for US strategic bombers.

Other problems inherent in military coalitions also haunted Norstad: language, communications, jurisdiction, and fuel and equipment compatibility. It was clear from the start, however, that Norstad intended the presence of US tactical aviation in Europe to be temporary and planned to train allied air forces to take over its role.=^

The apparently vast Soviet superiority in Europe, improvements in

Soviet air power capabilities, and concern that the USSR might launch preventive war in Europe prompted réévaluation of the US strategic

“^Norstad was among those air officers who as early as December 1944 resisted the establishment of a postwar TAC, arguing that the maintenance of a postwar tactical air force would be wasteful and redundant at best and dangerous at worst. He argued that since tactical air forces could not be deployed until the strategic air campaign was complete, preparedness would require only a skeletal force that could be expanded in later stages of a war. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, pp. 101-102.

“'‘"General Norstad: Guardian of Western Europe’s Air," Newsweek, October 1, 1951, pp. 25-26. 212

posture throughout the US defense establishment.== Estimates of air •

capabilities indicated that the Soviet Air Forces had recovered from the

decimation of World War II to become the "world’s largest" and that

deployment of jet aircraft and improved strategic capabilities was

closing the gap in effectiveness. The Soviets’ ability to provide large

numbers of aircraft to their Chinese and North Korean allies during the

Korean conflict raised concern that its production rates dwarfed those of

the US and its allies.=* US analysts were certain that the Soviets would

soon rectify their lingering technological problems, especially in the areas of ground control and air-intercept radar, and close the gap even

further.=7

A Senate Preparedness Subcommittee under the direction of Lyndon B.

Johnson concluded in December 1951 that the US stood on the brink of

"another Pearl Harbor" in the event of a new communist drive elsewhere

==An intelligence estimate prepared for the Joint Intelligence Committee in September 1952 stated that "For some time the USSR has been systematically strengthening its own and satellite forces in Easter Europe and so has maintained its relative advantage over growing Western strength The highly mechanized group of armies in Eastern Germany is being maintained in such a state of combat readiness that it could undertake operations with little or no warning." The same report concluded that "the USSR has at present and will probably have through the period under review military strength of such magnitude as to pose a constant and serious threat to the security of the NATO power, especially in view of the aggressive nature of Soviet objectives and policies" and that "politically, economically, and militarily the Soviet Bloc is capable of undertaking a major war. Its over-all strength and war potential should increase considerably...." JIC 558/159, Note by the Secretaries to the JIC, "Intelligence Estimate of the Strength and Capabilities of the Soviet Bloc, 1953-1956," U.S. Army Center for Military History,Reel 8-1, paragraphs 41, 62, 63.

“'^"Rearmament Lags 'Dangerously’— Senators Denounce Fumbling," Newsweek, December 3, 1951, p.22.

“?Ibid., paragraph 60. 213

(IndoChina or Yugoslavia, for instance). The committee acknowledged that

armistice in Korea would ease the situation somewhat but insisted,

nonetheless, that the administration would have to face the prospect of

sacrificing some economic growth:

Once the number of guns necessary for our minimum strength build-up has been determined they must be produced as soon as possible within the limits of our productive power. And the amount of "butter" we can afford to have must be accordingly reduced....

The committee charged th= administration with what amounted to fraud in

reporting production rates, arguing that "airmen couldn't fly blueprints

into battle" and that a "big new plant which hadn’t yet started turning

out weapons, wasn’t as effective against the Chinese Reds as a tank."

Even if the Korean War ended, the committee concluded, US forces in

Europe faced the prospect of fighting the Third World War with Second

World War weapons.®®

Regarding air power, the Johnson Subcommittee concluded that "the

men responsible for our military protection....do not believe we have the

strength we need" and that Americans had to "raise our sights at once and

raise them drastically." The committee backed off from earlier

predictions of Armageddon, admitting that the US could still determine

its destiny but warned that those days were numbered. In the era of

modern warfare, the committee stated, survival would depend on correct

anticipation of defense requirements for years in advance; the days of hasty, last minute mobilization were over. The report specifically

recommended a 143-wing Air Force in-being by June 1954 and condemned the

Truman administration for postponing air power readiness in the interest

®®"Rearmament Lags Dangerously," pp. 19-22. 214 of fiscal conservatism. Not only did that action, in the committee's view, unnecessarily endanger the military capacity of US and NATO forces, it would waste money in the long-run since "the hard goods will cost more though less cash will be spent in this fiscal year." The Truman administration had to face that fact that adequate air forces in the post-nuclear, jet age would be geometrically more costly than a conventional, piston engine air force.While the committee acknowledged that there were possible areas for savings in military procurement, it insisted that "to save dollars...at the sacrifice of necessary airpower would be f o o l h a r d y . The committee also found cause for concern in shortages of engineers, technicians, and students in science related fields, labor strikes that slowed production, and shortages of crucial strategic materials (including steel). Finally, they criticized the Air Force for its apparent inability to decide what kinds of aircraft it needed. While acknowledging that freezing a design risked producing an aircraft that is obsolete before it leaves the plant, the committee also pointed out that "if you carry this principle too far

=^When it was last produced at the end of WW II, the P-51 fighter cost $54,000 a copy, the comparable jet fighter, the F-86 cost $334,000 a copy, considerably more even considering wartime price ceilings and the benefits of mass procurement. The cost of bombers had risen even more dramatically ($680,000/copy for the 8-29, $3,500,000/copy for the 8-36). During World War II, the airframe and engine accounted for 85 to 90 percent of the cost of an aircraft, but by 1951, nearly half of the cost went to electronic equipment. "What is Behind the Lag in Plane Production. . .A Lack of Men, Materials, and Machine Tools," Newsweek, December 10, 1951, pp. 82-83.

6*United States, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Interim Report on Defense Mobilization; Adequacy of our Air Power, (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1952). 215 you will never build anything."*’

Headquarters USAF was not uniformly enthusiastic about the new commitments to Europe. Vandenberg and Finletter both expressed concern

that the expanded commitment to Europe might lead to a build-up of tactical air at SAC’s expense. Neither US industrial production, they argued, nor the existing force infrastructure could support both the necessary expansion of USAF strategic and air defense forces and a major

increase in tactical assets and bases in Europe.While USAF stood to gain— likely an increase to at least 150 groups— its leadership feared it might lose the initiative in determining the direction of its growth.

Congressional leaders on both sides of the NATO debate favored Air Force expansion. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who was cautious regarding major deployments of ground forces in Europe, argued nonetheless that an increase of at least 100 percent was necessary to "get us started off the present dead center of disastrous military inadequacy."*^

In an effort to head off any possible increase of tactical aviation at SAC’s expense, USAF launched an unofficial campaign against the concept of "balanced forces." Brigadier General James Ferguson, USAF

Director of Requirements, issued one such attack in an address to the Air

War College in March 1953. Ferguson criticized USAF for giving in to

Army pressure and "segregating" TAC assets "for use as long range artillery at a time when the tactical portion of our air force may very well play an important role in the strategic mission." Ferguson went on

* ’"What is Behind the Lag..." p. 83.

*^Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, p. 163.

^-Congressional Record, 30 April 1951, pp. 4636-4644. 216

to question the entire concept of "balance": did it mean balance in

terms of circumstances surrounding future combat; or did it mean the

largest possible Army, Navy, and Air Force with the goal of being the strongest in every dimension? The latter, he charged, would cripple the

economy, exceed the nation’s resources, and result in a military machine

that could meet only one set of circumstanc e s . I n s t e a d , he proposed

that the JCS let go of military traditionalism and "redirect our defense dollars into a force so constituted as to provide the greatest deterrent

to war in time of peace." For NATO, Ferguson suggested that the US provide the strategic air power and general operational "know-how" while

NATO allies— "generally of a relatively low order of technical ability"— provide the soldiers and tactical air forces to hold the line against the

Soviets on the ground.TAC’s involvement would be limited to the counter-air mission which, he argued, required aircraft beyond the technical expertise of the European allies. The role of US surface forces could be limited to "securCing] bases and sea lanes while denying the enemy access to our coastal waters."**

**Brig. Gen. James Ferguson, "An Air Officer’s Concept for the Defense of Western Europe," Air War College Address, March 31, 1953, AFS/HRC, K239.716253.24.

*3Jn illustrating the "low order of technical ability," Ferguson used the Turks: "a fiercely proud people, violently opposed to communism and vowed to fight to the last man in the event of an attack from the north." He stated that although they were "expert riflemen from birth," at home on a horse, and proven courageous warriors with the saber, "modern weapons are far too complex for the average turkish soldier or airman." Ibid., p. 21.

**Ibid., p. 22, 27. 217

As the Korean War drew to its close and attention shifted back to

Europe, the debate over the post-war military structure began in earnest.

Despite the apparent Army-Air Force truce regarding close air support in

Korea, the Army was far from ready to trust USAF with the future of tactical aviation. In 1952, presidential candidate Eisenhower seemed to speak as an Army officer when he warned his party’s convention that obsession with economic growth and over reliance on strategic airpower had led to a sort of neo-isolationism that threatened, in the long-run, to turn the US into a "have-not" nation. He questioned how responsive a national strategy based on retaliatory air power could be to US interests below the level of superpower confrontation. Korea had proved that, however determined US leadership was to avoid such entanglements, a

"Gibraltar theory" of isolationism defended by retaliatory air power was obsolete.67

Army leadership was outspoken in defending its place in postwar military planning and seemed determined to prevent the Air Force from backing away from its obligation to provide air-ground support. Cannon’s plans for TAC provided little reassurance to Army ground force commanders concerned that USAF might not maintain the relatively effective tactical capabilities developed during the Korean War. General Ridgway, who left

Tokyo to become the Supreme Allied Commander/Europe (SACEUR), found that the air support system in Europe was no more responsive to the realities of surface warfare than it was when he commanded the Eighth Army in

Korea. The ramifications, however, were considerably more complex given

67Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Strategy of Scarcity," New York Times, July 3, 1952. 218 geography (a foui— thousand mile front extending from Norway to Anatolia) and the multinational nature of the NATO force. "It was ridiculous,"

Ridgway later recalled, "to think that the local commander, say the

Commander-in-Chief of the North, or the Commander— in-Chief of the

Turkish-Greek sector, shouldn’t have some air at his immediate command that he could e m p l o y . As in Korea, however, all US air assets— including virtually all NATO tactical aviation— were under centralized control of the USAFE Commander. As in Korea, any attempt to subdivide that control, even temporarily, was not open for negotiation.

As anxiety over Korea ebbed, the realization set in that in what all assumed to be a dangerous world, even the planned increase in the military establishment was likely to prove inadequate. The JCS issued a memorandum in May 1953, concluding that "the force levels currently being maintained would be wholly inadequate for the concurrent or rapidly cumulative implementation of all major aspect of United States policy."

The current allocation of resources to defense was, they held, characterized by calculated risk and austerity that would become acute in the opening stages of any conflict. In the continuing Cold War situation, furthermore, a lack of reserves to meet peripheral threats like Korea (later characterized as "half wars") that might drain forces allocated to principal threats aggravated the risk. Any attempt by the civilian government to cut defense authorizations below their current level would proportionately increase those calculated risks.a?

*°Ridgway oral history, interview #4, p.7.

^^Memorandum for SecDef from Hoyt Vandenberg and JCS, May 8, 1953, National Archives, RG 330, Central Decimal File, 1953, Box 31, file 380 (general). 219

For the post-Korea period, the JCS perceived five basic roles for

the military establishment: mobile force capabilities to deal with

limited contingencies like Korea (the likely candidates included

Indochina, Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, South Africa, Latin America, and

renewed hostilities in Korea), offensive striking power and a general

reserve, defense of critical key areas (like Western Europe and Japan),

defense of the homeland, and maintenance and protection of vital lines of

communication. The assessment of Air Force capability to carry out its

share of those missions was less than optimistic. Korean operations,

continued shortages of skilled personnel, and conversion to modern

equipment had hindered progress toward maximum effectiveness, although

aircraft production rates had reached nearly 95 percent of demand by

1953. Tactical air forces, however, were far below their desired level:

only 23 of 40 programmed units were activated by mid-1953. Overseas

commitments absorbed the bulk of active units, leaving a minimal reserve

in the US. In the event of demands for foreign deployments or defense,

tactical units would come from those already deployed in NATO or the Far

East. The budget cuts already proposed for 1953 would create a 12

percent shortfall in Air Force goals, and reductions in the 1954 allocation would raise the deficit to 46 percent. According to the new

Army chief, Ridgway, "air power is still the weakest link in our defense...our air forces today are still inadequate to carry out their

assigned tasks.

T^Ibid., Appendix A, "Potential Trouble Spots," and Appendix B, "The Ability of Forces Being Maintained to Meet United States Commitments." 220

Allocation of resources in the US and procurement of hardware were not the only problems created by new commitments to NATO. Shortages of tactical aircraft were still acute in NATO by 1953, especially in day and all-weather fighter capabilities, but deployment of new aircraft could create as many problems as it solved. Most of the NATO member states were still in the process of rebuilding their economic and military structures after World War II. Decolonization, or attempted recolonization, continued to deplete the military resources of both

France and Great Britain. As a result, US military representatives in

NATO found that the European allies were, for the time being, unable to absorb the additional tactical aircraft already available. The US would, they concluded, have to accept the burden of maintaining and manning any expanded tactical air capabilities for the foreseeable future. As the US

Military Assistance Advisory Group for Europe concluded in April, 1953:

The MAAG here is fully cognizant of the NATO problem of aircraft availability, especially in the fields of day and all-weather fighters. However, a problem which is equally important to us here is the realistic appraisal of the country’s capability to utilize aircraft properly.?^

It was thus clear that, for the time being, the burden of expanded tactical air capability in NATO would continue to fall on TAC’s shoulders.

The breach between TAC and USAF over the proper role of tactical aviation in Europe led to an ongoing controversy over the priorities for

■^‘Letter from T. E. de Shazo, Maj. Gen., USA, Chief of MAAG, France, to Frank C. Nash, Asst. Sec. Def. for International Security Affairs, April 1, 1953, National Archives, RG 330, Central Decimal File, 1953, Box 40, File 452.01. 221

the USAF expansion. The dispute most often surfaced in debates over

aircraft procurement, with TAC consistently, and usually unsuccessfully,

pushing for modernization of its tactical fighter and light bomber capabilities. In April, 1952, the Department of Defense’s Research and

Developments Board Committee on Aeronautics underlined the concern over air force tactical capabilities. Its report stated at the outset that

USAF had contracted too few prototypes to meet long-range requirements for day fighters and interceptors. At a minimum, USAF needed the

following new prototypes to meet Defense Department requirements: an

interceptor, a day fighter, a fighter bomber, and an escort fighter. The panel found that between 1948 and 1950 the Air Force had initiated relatively few prototypes for fighter types, relying instead on modification of existing production series. Although this approach had advantages, allowing performance improvements at lower cost, it could not continue indefinitely; all plans for such modification ended in 1955-56, with no new aircraft with performance comparable to anticipated enemy capabilities likely to come on-line before the end of the decade. The committee rejected reliance on one, all-purpose interim fighter (F-lOO) arguing that encounters with MIG-15s in Korea proved the unacceptable risks resulting from additional weight and that the cost was prohibitive.

Likewise, an all-purpose fighter could not substitute for a tactical fighter-bomber to replace the F-86 because of the unique performance requirements for close support and low-altitude work. The Committee insisted that USAF immediately undertake an effort to develop a day fighter to replace or augment the F-lOO by 1957 and a fighter bomber to 222 replace the F-86 by 1 9 5 6 . ^ 2 Later in the year, General Partridge, head of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC), acknowledged that the diverse missions of advancing tactical aviation had confused the overall procurement picture and that "the tactical air situation requires careful surveying.

The Army, still uneasy over USAF’s air support capabilities, seemed

TAC’s natural ally in the debate over priorities, but its continued insistence on development of a designated close air support aircraft and

TAC’s insistence that low survivability made such an aircraft impractical prevented the two from effectively joining forces. Overruling TAC’s objections, USAF reluctantly agreed in February 1951 to undertake a feasibility study for such an aircraft, beginning with modification of existing T-33s. The fate of those aircraft in combat testing in Korea,

TAC argued, would convince the Army of the unsuitability of the type, but at a high human cost.?^ General Cannon argued that the Army’s obsession with a designated close air support fighter demonstrated a failure to learn from the German experience with the German Stuka dive-bomber during

World War II, and he saw little logic in wasting time, effort and money, to prove the "already known infeasibility of the project." Nor, he

■^^Department of Defense, Research and Development Board, Committee on Aeronautics, Report of the Panel on Piloted Aircraft to the Committee on Aeronautics Concerning the Fighter Aircraft Development Program, April 1, 1952, National Archives, RG 330, Decimal file, 1952, CD 452.1, Box 383.

^^Historv of the Air Research and Development Command, July - December 1952, AFS/HRC, K243.01, Vol. 2, p. 55.

^^Headquarters, TAC, Record and Routing Sheet, "Report of Conference on Light Aircraft for Close Air Support," February 9, 1951, TAC History, 1 Dec. 1950 - 30 June 1951, Vol. V, Pt. 1, Supp. Doc. #30. 223

concluded, could "the inevitable loss of expensively trained pilots

in...battle testing in Korea. . . be justified by the results." In his

fight for modernization of TAC’s capabilities, Cannon took a hard line

against Army interference, insisting that "the Army must determine its

requirements for close air support, but the Air force must be given

freedom of action in determining how, and with what tools, such

requirements are to be met.Most of the objections leading the Army

to push for a designated close support bomber could, Cannon insisted, be resolved through improvements to the command and request relationship

without wasting effort on an expensive, dead-end experiment.

Despite TAC’s unanimity with Headquarters USAF on the issue of a

designated close support aircraft, the two did not present an entirely united front concerning the expansion and equipping of the post-Korean

War Air Force. Two issues were especially knotty; future procurement of

lightweight day fighters and development of a nuclear capable medium bomber. The requirement for a new lightweight day fighter became even more urgent in December when TAC trained its final class of propeller fighter pilots.The day fighter controversy hinged on the fundamentally different perceptions of TAC’s role in future conflicts, particularly in Western Europe. In 1952, USAF had plans to develop a single, relatively heavy, long-range fighter (the F-lOO "Super Saber") for deployment in all commands during the 1955-1959 period. Such an

■^“Letter, Gen. Cannon, CG TAC to Chief of Staff, USAF, "Light Aircraft for Close Air Support," February 19, 1951, TAC History, 1 Dec. 1950 - 30 June 1951, Vol. V, Pt. 1, Supp. Doc. #32.

76"Pighter Cadets Fly 'Props’ into Oblivion," New York Times. December 20, 1952. 224

aircraft could perform triple duty: long-range bomber escort, air

superiority, and air defense. Requirements for day-fighters should

emphasize characteristics such as range, payload, and active and passive

defenses to enhance survivability. The concept underlying development of

such an all-purpose day fighter was that the bulk of USAF would devote

the bulk of its fighter assets in the opening stages of a war to the

strategic air campaign and that any tactical applications would come in

later, less decisive phases.

Proponents of the lightweight fightei— bomber questioned USAF’s

position that the F-lOO alone constituted an adequate tactical fighter

capability. During discussion of the issue, TAC expressed two particular

objections to equipping all tactical units with the F-100. First, the

extra weight required for the multi-purpose fighter could lessen

performance in certain tactical roles. Second, its complex electronics,

fire control, and safety equipment made the F-100 too expensive to

procure in the numbers TAC regarded as necessary to provide adequate

capabilities to its units worldwide. As an alternative, TAC was willing

to consider development of a relatively lightweight, cheap, and simple

day fighter for shorter-range combat applications to augment the F-100

force.Such a fighter, because of its essentially tactical role, could

have a reduced action radius thus reducing weight without sacrificing

effectiveness. The major drawback of the aircraft would be its reduced

77jhe thumbnail requirements for a lightweight fighter-bomber type were: combat weight of 10,000 pounds, airspeed of Mach 1.1 at 35,000 feet, rate of climb of 10,000 feet/minute at 35,000 feet, and a combat operational radius of 400 nautical miles. The airframe weight and configuration would allow for eventual increase in speed to Mach 1.3. TAC History, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1952, Vol. 5, p.3. 225 utility in deep penetration missions, a role that could be adequately fulfilled by the heavier F-100. In aii— to-air fighting, however,

increased maneuverability and closing capabilities in a lighter aircraft would more than offset the disadvantages of reduced armament and fire control systems.

In a proposal for development of light fighters, the USAF

Directorate of Requirements pointed out that estimates of enemy capabilities ignored the fact that probably less than ten percent of enemy fighters would be the most modern types with performance characteristics comparable to the F-100 (top airspeeds of Mach 1.3 to

Mach 1.8). Against the remaining ninety percent of enemy fighters

(probably improved MIG-15s), the F-100 would have considerably greater capability than would be required to assure air superiority. In short, to equip the entire tactical air force with F-lOOs would be a waste of resources and a strain on the e c o n o m y . 7? A second fighter type— lightweight, low cost, easily maintained in the field, and quickly produced because of its simple design— could more than contend with transonic enemy fighters and save money (costing approximately

$155,200/copy compared to $342,000/copy for the F-100).8* Such an aircraft would also be well-suited to Air National Guard and reserve deployment and could be rapidly produced in the event of mobilization.

7®Letter, Maj. Gen. F . F. Everest, Depty. Comm. Gen., TAC to Dir. of Requirements, Hdqtrs. USAF, "Day Fighter Requirements," September 23, 1952, TAC History, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1952, Vol. 5, Supp. Doc. #7.

7^Memo, Directorate of Requirements, "Proposed Requirements for Lightweight Day Fighters," July 21, 1952, TAC History, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1952, Vol. V, Supp. Doc. #1.

=*Ibid., pp. 2,3. 226

Despite the command’s essential agreement with the principle behind the fighter proposal, individual TAC agencies found fault with many of the specifics of the proposal. Operations and Training was unwilling to accept the significant reductions in speed, climb, and turn capabilities that the proposal implied. The Director of Doctrine disagreed with the assumption that ninety percent of enemy fighters would be inferior types; it insisted that any day fighter be able to defeat the best aircraft it was likely to meet in combat. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence also rejected the presumption of the enemy’s qualitative inferiority, pointing out Soviet ability to produce new aircraft and improved enemy air defense capability.

Overall, TAC rejected the specifics of the proposal, but endorsed the concept of a lightweight, low cost fighter provided reduced weight provided enhanced rather than decreased performance. Cannon, however, expressed essential conservatism in relaying his agreement in principle to General Partridge at ARDC. Because the fighter-bomber was the

"backbone" of tactical air and a "workhorse" in all three essential tactical missions, any reductions in weight and cost must result in reduced performance capabilities. In defending his position, Cannon quoted Vandenberg that "fleets of cheap, 'hot-rod’ airplanes" will not bring economy and that the solution to fiscal problems did not lie in

"masses of relatively cheap and simple aircraft, but rather in the careful choice of the aircraft most effective for the jobs that must be done."81 Another, but unstated, concern of Cannon’s was the likelihood

®iLetter, General Cannon to Lt. Gen. E. E. Partridge, ARDC, September 23, 1952, TAC History, 1 July - 31 December 1952, Vol. V, Supp. Doc. #8. 227 that the smaller fighter-bomber might not be able to deliver relatively heavy tactical nuclear weapons.

As had the Johnson Preparedness Subcommittee, TAC found fault with an Air Force procurement system that caused unnecessary delays and often produced over-designed aircraft. The USAF Handbook of Instructions for

Aircraft Designers, in TAC’s view, placed unnecessary restrictions on design ingenuity. In particular, the procurement process discouraged progress in miniaturization, weight reduction, and combat effectiveness through its list of required "standard" equipment and non-essential safety, emergency, and convenience systems. "The aircraft," TAC argued,

"must be designed for combat." USAF could not afford "the false economy of losing more pilots and aircraft through reduced combat effectiveness than are saved through' excessive safety and emergency features." Given the clear need for such an aircraft and the ability of current technology to provide it, TAC urged USAF to expedite its procurement in "an absolute minimum of time."^^

More indispensible to Cannon’s plans for TAC was procurement of a nuclear capable medium tactical bomber. The Army had been pressuring

USAF for some time concerning its tactical bombardment capabilities and procedures, and TAC had already begun the search for a suitable aircraft in 1951. Beginning in early 1952, Cannon lobbied USAF Headquarters persistently on behalf of his tactical bombardment program. He expressed

*=TAC History. 1 July - 31 Dec. 1952, Vol. 5, p. 12.

83Everest letter, "Day fighter Requirements," TAC History, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1952, Vol. 5, Supp. Doc. #7, p. 3. 228 concern that current USAF planning did not include modernization of tactical bombardment capabilities. A modern tactical bombardment force- in-being was, Cannon insisted, required in order for TAC to fulfill it obligations according to existing doctrine. Cannon rejected plans to procure one medium bomber for both TAC and SAC on the grounds that strategic bombers made poor tactical bombers, and the common practice of reassigning of obsolete strategic bombers from SAC to TAC was an even less acceptable solution.

In mid-1952, USAF plans for expansion to 126 wings included the addition of 32 medium bomber wings: 30 for SAC and two for TAC. TAC's

Operations Analysis division challenged the logic of the 16 to 1 ratio, arguing that it was based on "some unrealistic thinking." Since the radius of action for medium jet bombers was roughly 2,000 miles, and the highest density of targets lay within 1,000 miles of the front, TAC calculated that about half the targets suitable to medium bombers were essentially tactical in nature. A more realistic distribution of new medium bomber wings would be sixteen each for SAC and TAC. TAC feared that should the Air Force go ahead with the 16 to 1 ratio, procurement of a suitable tactical bomber would become impossible: two tactical bomber units simply would not provide the incentive to manufacturers to develop aircraft that met tactical requirements.®'»

Cannon objected to depending on temporary assignment of SAC units for a number of reasons. First, SAC forces should be conserved for their primary mission. Second, tactical air had a distinct mission and needs forces appropriate and adequate to meet its operational needs, including

®‘*TAC History, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1952, Vol. 5, pp. 16-17. 229 designated tactical aircraft and air crews specifically trained for tactical operations. Cannon resisted an earlier plan to allocate only six of 28 fighter-bomber and fighter-interceptor wings to TAC, four of which were deployed overseas leaving only two fighter-bomber wings in

TAC. Tactical fightei— bomber operations, like tactical bombardment, were the most complex and difficult within the air force and training requirements were high. Cannon argued that if such tactical units must be shared, they should be primarily assigned to TAC, where they could be trained in tactical air operations, and allocated to SAC or ADC as needed. Units primarily trained for escort and interceptor mission did not have the "know-how" for proper conduct of tactical missions.®®

Ultimately, Cannon questioned the likely availability of SAC bombers in adequate numbers at a critical time and place. During an all out war, they would likely all be assigned to their primary mission; in a localized, "brushfire" type war, they would likely be too far away to be immediately available. Given existing emergency war plans, based on a strategy of immediate retaliation followed by a sustained campaign against hostile air and surface forces. Cannon concluded that a real tactical air capability was an absolute necessity. "A tactical bomber force," he insisted, "is a most important part of this capability."®* No existing strategic bombers in the SAC fleet were, in Cannon’s assessment, suitable to the tactical mission, and TAC’s two interim "medium" bombers-

-the B-29 and B-47— were not designed specifically for the tactical

®®Letter, Lt. Gen. Cannon to Gen. Vandenberg, May 11, 1951, TAC Historv, 1 July - 31 December 1951, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #49.

a*Ib id ., p. 14. 230

mission. Cannon urged USAF to take immediate action to rectify the

inadequacies of its tactical bomber force by initiating a realistic

tactical bombardment program and procuring an interim tactical bomber as soon as possible. Because the existing lack of capabilities was a matter

"of great concern," he urged USAF to take such action "at the earliest possible moment."87

Cannon’s desire to broaden TAC’s operational scope was clear in the requirements for the medium tactical bomber. TAC proposed that the aircraft would operate up to 750 miles behind enemy lines and thus needed a total range of 1,000 to 1,100 miles. The ordinance load should be between 10,000 and 12,000 pounds and the aircraft bomb bays configured to allow delivery of a range of tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, the tactical bomber would have to operate from smaller, forward airfields and thus needed a relatively light footprint and short take-off and landing capabilities. The less permissive environment a tactical bomber would likely face required active and passive defenses to enhance survivability. The need for reconnaissance and night-intruder capability aircraft led TAC to seek a prototype with potential in these roles as well.

The quest for a medium bomber for TAC produced three main candidates. USAF favored the Douglas B-66 with a projected availability in 1954 or 1955. TAC found the B-66 acceptable but only with modifications including: aerial refueling capability, state-of-the-art navigation, external guidance antennae, ECM to supplement tail armament.

8?Memorandum, Gen. John K. Cannon, Comm., TAC to USAF Chief of Staff, "Tactical Bombardment Program" February 12, 1952, Vandenberg Papers, Box 45, file: Command-Tactical, 1952. 231 and structural modification to allow for delivery of nuclear weapons.®®

TAC refused to consider the B-47, currently under production as a SAC medium bomber, on the grounds that the modifications necessary to make it a suitable tactical bomber would be "economically unfeasible."®^ TAC was also interested in the modified B-45A, all of which were currently assigned to SAC as a stop-gap aircraft in anticipation of the RB-47.

Under project "Second Call," the B-45As were scheduled for transfer to

TAC (after minor modification to accommodate appropriate bombsight) once the SAC B-47s were deployed. TAC harbored some doubts about the B-45A and did not regard it alone as constituting adequate medium bombardment capability. In particular, TAC critics questioned its usefulness in many tactical scenarios, citing its inadequate maneuverability.9° The only new tactical bomber was the Martin B-51 prototype, which showed some promise as a tactical bomber but had limited special weapons and reconnaissance capabilities, insufficient defensive armament, a small bomb bay, and poor short take-off capability when fully loaded.A final candidate was the British B-57 Canberra which would be produced in the US by Martin Aircraft, designers of the B-51. Air Force Secretary

Finletter praised the Canberra as providing "exceptional" capabilities while saving the cost of research and development. The B-57, however.

®®TAC Historv. 1 July - 31 Dec., 1952, Vol.5, p. 16.

=»TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1952, Vol. V, p. 20.

9*Ibid., pp. 17-20.

^’•Record and Routing Sheet, Headquarters TAC, "Comments on Study of B-51 Aircraft," July 11, 1951, TAC Historv, 1 Dec. 1950 - 30 June 1951, Vol. V., pt. 1, Supp. Doc. 21. 232

seemed best suited to night intruder m i s s i o n s . Despite pressure from

Cannon, USAF was slow making any decision concerning the light tactical

bomber, and in late 1952 TAC estimated that its force readiness for

tactical bombardment remained at zero percent."’’®

Development of a TAC fleet of medium bombers was the key to

Cannon’s overall plan to build the command into a sort of theater-level

SAC with a wide-range of short and medium-range capabilities, including

nuclear weapons. Korea had not changed the Air Force's essential view

that, while tactical and air defense aviation were important parts of its

mission, the only effective deterrent to war was the strategic striking

force. The build-up to 95-Wings thus seemed likely to devote the

greatest percentage of increase to SAC with TAC and ADC each receiving

less than their proportionate share.Through Cannon’s campaign to

build an atomic TAC, however, the command avoided such a total eclipse.

As part of its 1950 reorganization, TAC had created a Special Weapons

division and Cannon considered it the kernel of TAC’s future.

By late 1951, it seemed Cannon’s view of the changing role of

tactical aviation had spread through the upper echelon of USAF. In

August, Air Force Secretary Finletter announced USAF plans to develop new

tactical atomic weapons designed to "bring atomic power to bear directly

?‘®Austin Stevens, "Deterrent to War Cited by Finletter," New York Times, January 30, 1951.

"’’^Memorandum, General John K. Cannon to Chief of Staff, USAF, "TAC Quarterly Report," October 20, 1952, TAC History, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1953, Vol.: Organization, Mission, and Administration, Supp. Docs.

“’"’See "Deterrent to War Cited by Finletter." 233

on the enemy's ground forces." Such a capability, he suggested, would

allow the US to provide greater striking power with roughly the same

number of air units, and might prove a sufficient deterrent to a Soviet

attack on NATO forces. By giving greater net firepower to each tactical

air unit, furthermore, such tactical atomic weapons would enable USAF to

devote a larger share of its procurement to strategic aircraft.

Finletter urged Congress and the public not to be taken in by criticisms

of USAF capabilities, most of which failed to consider the two- to three-

year lag between programming and delivery of its aircraft and weapons.

The development of tactical a-bombs would, he insisted, give USAF and

NATO all the tactical muscle it needed to retard enemy advanced and prevent him concentrating his forces decisively. Those who failed to see

the implications of these new capabilities were, in his view, "fixed to hide-bound ideas which will no longer be valid once atomic weapons are

more plentiful.

Finletter acknowledged, in a speech before the Air Force

Association, that pressure from the other services, a reassessment of the capabilities of strategic aviation, and tiie operational lessons of the

Korean War reinforced by the development of tactical atomic weapons, had

led some within USAF to reconsider the relative role of strategic and

tactical air p o w e r . Korea showed that US military planning could not

yet abandon its traditional primary purpose: defeat of the enemy’s armed forces in the field. New US commitments to NATO, the necessity of

■’“"Finletter Depicts New Atomic Arms," New York Times, August 26, 1951.

"’’^Hanson W. Baldwin, "New Air Theory Shaped," New York Times, September 11, 1951. 234 defending its vastly outnumbered ground forces, and increased emphasis on advanced basing of medium-range aircraft rather than intercontinental bombers also contributed to USAF’s decision to rethink its air strategy.

What Finletter did not say was that the development of the "battlefield

A-bombs" might also undercut what USAF feared was a accelerating Army campaign to take over close support aviation and its development of nuclear artillery.

There is little indication that Vandenberg and the Air Staff concurred in Finletter's interpretation of the future development of air strategy. Vandenberg and Finletter agreed that the 143-Wing Air Force left no room for "fat" and would only provide the basic requirements of strategic air operations against an aggressor, air defense, and tactical air operations in Europe. Vandenberg made it clear in Congressional testimony that he would place the primary emphasis on strategic and air defense forces as "complementary parts of the air weapon system and...each...essential to the air defense of th? United States." In the

143-Wing Air Force SAC received 57 wings. Air Defense Command 29 wings, and TAC 57 wings.TAC would have to divide is assets among three primary areas of responsibility; tactical unit training requirements in the US, operational units to support the increased NATO commitment in

Europe, and whatever new defense obligations that might emerge after the

9?TAC’s 57 wings consisted of 2 tactical bomber, 5 light bombardment, 6 day fighter, 22 fighter bomber, 5 tactical reconnaissance, and 17 troop carrier wings.SAC’s wings broke down as follows: 7 heavy bombardment, 30 medium bombardment, 10 strategic fighter, 4 heavy strategic reconnaissance, and 6 medium reconnaissance wing. ADC consisted of 29 fighter interceptor wings, to be augmented by TAC assets in the Zone of Interior as needed. 235 end of the Korean conflict.'’® In explaining his concept of air power to

Congress in early 1952, Vandenberg again stressed that "the main defense of the United States lies in the strategic air arm's ability to destroy the bases. That is the only efficient way to knock a possible air force out of the air and get air superiority."^^

Cannon’s campaign to build TAC into another atomic air force— a miniature SAC— benefitted from the growing popularity of atomic and nuclear weapons as a replacement for more costly conventional systems.

The Army began to develop its own atomic artillery, charging that USAF was dragging its feet in developing atomic tactical air support, in part because of SAC’s public insistence that tactical support was an unproductive use of atomic resources. In 1951, Senator Brian McMahon received widespread support for his proposal that the US atomic energy program be expanded threefold, to allow for development of more advanced atomic weapons by 1955 or 1956. McMahon pictured arming all three services with atomic weapons (artillery shells, tactical a-bombs, and hydrogen "super bombs"), thus allowing a realignment of the military posture that would reduce the predominance of SAC by spreading atomic capabilities to tactical air, ground, and naval forces.By early

1952, TAC’s 20th Fighter Bomber Wing, equipped with specially modified

^^United States. Congress. House of Representatives. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1953. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. (Washington, D.C.; 1952), pp. 2-3, 10, 1028-1029.

^'’United States. Congress. House. Department of the Air Force Appropriations for 1953. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. (Washington, D.C.: 1953), p. 10, 42.

ioo"Atomic Arms Drive Gains in Congress," New York Times, September 23, 1951. 236

F84G's, was training for atomic tactical support missions. Because the

F84G was air refuelable, the range of these operations was limited only by air crew stamina. Another new TAC unit, the First Tactical Support

Squadron, was capable of delivering the tactical a-bombs to US air bases worldwide for transfer to the fighter bomber units.

Many of the arguments in favor of Cannon’s program to build a tactical a-bomb force also formed the roots of opposition to the idea within USAF, especially SAC. Advances in a-bomb technology meant that the new tactical weapons were about equal in power to those dropped on

Japan in 1945, but because they were much smaller, they could be delivered by tactical fighter bombers. Such aircraft were smaller and more maneuverable and were thus more survivable than big, slow, heavy strategic bombers. With the exception of extremely long-range strategic missions, the fighters bombers were capable of performing a sizeable proportion of the missions formerly assigned to strategic units. The fighter bombers, or light tactical bombers used in tactical a-bomb missions were also significantly cheaper than strategic bombers and required a less sophisticated basing system. As a result, they were more likely to be employed when needed for two reasons. First, the Air Force was more likely to risk a fighter bomber than an expensive strategic bomber in less than all-out war scenarios. Second, tactical air units could be more quickly deployed in regional or NATO contingencies because of their greater mobility and flexibility. Finally, TAC insisted that it would employ tactical a-bombs primarily battlefield interdiction— striking communications and rear area troop concentrations to keep reinforcements from reaching the battlefield— rather than direct 237 battlefield support. The great disadvantage of tactical air powei its dependence on vulnerable forward bases— would be tempered somewhat by advances in air-refuelling and, later, the concept of mobile tactical strike forces.

It is not altogether surprising that SAC and Headquarters USAF had qualms about the direction in which Cannon was leading TAC. At best, were his efforts to succeed, SAC would find it increasingly hard to justify procurement of large numbers of expensive heavy strategic bombers. At worst, an atomic TAC could undermine SAC’s position as the first line of defense and threaten its predominance within USAF. TAC’s atomic capability would make it significantly more flexible, responsive, and economical given likely threats to US interests than a strategic force designed specifically for one operational contingency: all-out nuclear war with the USSR. The strategic implications of Cannon’s plan extended beyond USAF. Because tactical employment of atomic weapons would, in most contingencies, be more efficient than strategic air power, the resources saved could be diverted to other services. More important, the public debate over TAC’s atomic weapons revealed a general feeling in the military and Congress that the US faced a complex threat environment for which SAC was not well suited. Cannon was not alone in his contention that "Strategic air power must be conserved for its primary mission and tactical air must possess integral forces appropriate and adequate to its needs," including aircraft and aircrews designed and trained specifically for tactical missions whose availability would not 238 be subject to the fortunes of SAC.If Cannon were to succeed, TAC could, for the first time in its history, pose a real threat to the traditional dominance of SAC within both the Air Force and the overall US military structure.

lo^Cannon le tte r , "Tactical Bombardment Program," February 12, 1952, TAC H istory, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1952, vol. 5. CHAPTER V: TRANSFIGURATION, 1953-1955

The Korean armistice of July 27, 1953 marked the end of more than

the first US "limited war" on the Asian mainland. Earlier in the year,

the inauguration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower ended the two-decade

Roosevelt-Truman administration. The McCarthyite "Red Scare" of the

early 1950s neared its end, but in its wake anti-communism seemed to

replace expertise as the principal requirement for political appointees

and policies. The "wise men" who had crafted postwar US foreign policy

entered involuntary retirement, victims of Presidential politics. The

Eisenhower elite excluded even apolitical bureaucrats like George Kennan:

their replacements were often long on rhetoric and short on experience.

The new President— supreme commander of the Allied invasion of the

European continent in 1944 and NATO’s first SACEUR— was a fiscal conservative unwilling to sacrifice economic growth for global military

power. The end of the Korean War, like the end of World War II, cleared the way for force reductions and economic reoil?ntation. The Korean demobilization, however, did not share the basic political continuity that characterized the post-1945 demobilization; it took place under a

new administration from another political party with a substantially different set of goals and priorities.

Tactical Air Command had emerged from World War II confident that

its operational performance in Europe ensured it a place of prominence in

■ 239 240

postwar Air Force planning. The rapid ascent of strategic bombing as the center of US strategy in the post-war years quickly dashed TAC’s hopes

and nearly destroyed it altogether. The command, however, managed to survive in the face, of adversity, and took on the status of David in

Korea when the SAC Goliath proved too lumbering— indeed, irrelevant — to meet the challenge of limited war. Even the most stubborn strategic

bombing enthusiasts admitted that the air war in Korea had been essentially tactical and that SAC assets would be misapplied in such a contingency.* TAC was confident of its redemption, certain that USAF and

the Pentagon would preserve tactical aviation’s prominent place in the

Air Force structure. To hedge its bets, TAC undertook its own atomic weapons program to further guarantee that it would remain in the forefront of US military policy.

Eisenhower administration policy and the continued dominance of

"SAC men" in the Air Force hierarchy would quash TAC’s optimism. The

President and the Air Force seemed to have observed a different war than

TAC and the other services, or at the very least had derived an entirely different set of lessons. Far from assuring the future of tactical aviation, the end of the limited war in Korea ultimately threatened the modest gains TAC had made in 1950, prior to the outbreak of the war. For

*The most graphic example is the testimony of USAF Chief of Staff Vandenberg before the Senate committee investigating the dismissal of General MacArthur. Numerous other Air Force analyses of the Korean War arrived at the same conclusion. Even the Air Force official history of the Korean War (first published in the mid-1950s) admitted that the air war there was essentially tactical, although it asserted in its conclusion that had USAF been allowed to use atomic weapons against North Korea or China the U.S. could have achieved the total victory that ultimately alluded it. See, R. Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, Rev. Ed., (Washington, 1983). 241 a variety of reasons, foreign, military, and especially Air Force policy seemed on the verge of once again decimating TAC’s capabilities. Faced with such a threat to the command’s survival, TAC’s leadership initiated a dramatic realignment of priorities, missions, and capabilities that it hoped would prevent a repeat of TAC’s disastrous exile of 1949. In the interest of survival, TAC developed a sort of "institutional camouflage," minimizing its support role and disguising itself, as best it could, as a

"strategic" force. It was an inspired strategy, but it involved a calculated risk: should TAC lose control of its "protective coloration," the entire spirit and mission of tactical aviation might be lost.

Most national security planning immediately following the Korean armistice rested on the assumption that the recent conflict was an omen of a coming era of "brushfire wars." The atom bomb and NATO seemed to^ have convinced the Soviets that they had little to gain from a frontal attack against US interests in Europe or Japan, prompting the USSR to turn to a strategy (as NSC/68 had predicted) of "pecking at the periphery," or challenging US interests through a series of debilitating,

"no-win," proxy wars. After Korea, the debate concerning US foreign policy centered not on the threat but on the appropriate response.

Eisenhower based his postwar foreign and military policy on his own set of "lessons." First, he held that the US economy could not withstand a series of costly limited wars on the Korean model. Second, the former commander of the Allied forces in Europe concluded from Korea that US military forces should never be committed to any war of which the goal was less than total victory. Third, the apparent connection between his 242

veiled threat to use nuclear weapons against North Korea and the

armistice of 1953 convinced Eisenhower that the US nuclear deterrent

could effectively contain communist expansion on all levels at a lower

overall cost than maintaining a conventional deterrent.^

The political and military environment at the end of the Korean War

reinforced Eisenhower’s conclusions. Initially, Truman’s decision to

intervene in Korea was a popular one, but as the war stalemated and the

cost and casualties mounted with little apparent result, public opinion

turned against the war.^ By 1953, a mood of economic austerity dominated

Congressional and public opinion, leading to demands for lower taxes and reduced government spending in order to promote accelerated economic

growth. With the war at an end, and in light of Eisenhower’s campaign promises of "no more Koreas," the defense budget provided a "target rich

environment" for budget cutters. The strategic approach— dependence on nuclear weapons as a deterrent to communist aggression and a "first line

of defense" in the event of wai looked "cheap" compared to a manpower- dependent conventional strategy. USAF’s popularity grew after Korea and

it continued to dominate defense budgets. Inside the Air Force, despite the apparent lessons of Korea, strategic bombing advocates monopolized

the Air Staff. As General Weyland would later recall, the majority of the Air Staff had "very little" tactical experience, and the "people in

^Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War, (New York, 1981).

®See Mark Lorell and Charles Kelly, Jr., Casualties, Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam War, RAND Report R-3060-AF, (Santa Monica, Ca., March 1985); although Lorell and Kelly focus on Vietnam, their study also provides statistical information concerning the collapse of public and Congressional support for the Truman administration’s conduct of the war in Korea. 243

the tactical business were outnumbered and outvoted.In short, there

were few voices of dissent strong enough to prompt the president to

reconsider the assumptions underlying his defense policy.

The administration drafted its defense policy, the "New Look," between July and October, 1953. Eisenhower agreed with the underlying

assumption of the Truman administration’s policy of "containment" — that

unrest in politically unstable nations originated ’n Moscow or Peking—

but he feared that literal implementation of NSC/68 would bankrupt the

United States. The economic debilitation that could result from

sustained heavy defense spending would more immediately threaten US

interests than would insurgencies abroad. The cornerstone of "New Look"

budget policy was National Security Memorandum 162/2, released in October

1953. The Eisenhower administration’s answer to NSC/68, NSC 162/2

conceded that Soviet inspired communist insurgency threatened US global

interests, but it rejected the great commitment of conventional

capabilities that NSC/68 demanded. Instead, it proposed to arm all the

US services with nuclear weapons in an effort to reduce manpower

requirements (and thus overall budget requirements) without seriously undermining the strategic deterrent. According to NSC 162/2, US allies would have to provide the conventional ground forces to fight local wars, and the US would provide the necessary strategic air and sea support.

The JCS concurred with NSC 162/2’s conclusions and called for greater emphasis on development of "tactical atomic weapons for US or allied military forces in general war or in a local aggression whenever

^Air Force Historical Division, Office of Information, Oral History, General Otto P. Weyland, interview with Arthur Marmor, [hereafter cited as Weyland Oral History], AFS/HRC, (un-numbered typescript). 244

employment of atomic weapons would be militarily advantageous.

In redesigning national strategy, Eisenhower rejected the concept

of a "year of maximum danger" that underlay Truman administration defense

planning after 1950. Instead, the new administration proposed military

readiness for the "long haul," aiming at "adequate protection to be

projected as far in the future as the actions and apparent purposes of

others may compel us." In so doing, Eisenhower reduced the sense of

urgency and allowed for abbreviated military requirements stretched out

over a longer period. The administration sought "security with

solvency," a slow, incremental growth of military spending that would

avoid the economic dislocation likely to result from rapid build-up.*

National strategy during the early Eisenhower administration rested

on five basic concepts. First, since the US would enjoy atomic

superiority for at least a few more years, it should rely on the atomic

deterrent rather than preventive war as the tool to protect its interests

and enforce its will. Second, Eisenhower had great faith in US

technology’s ability to solve the problems of warfare and, ultimately,

reduce military manpower requirements even in wartime. Future defense budgets should, therefore, stress new technology rather than promote

outmoded and wasteful military habits. The Air Force, as the service with the highest ratio of technology to manpower requirements stood to

gain from this particular aspect of Eisenhower policy. Third, through

the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, the administration sought to

“Futrell, "The Influence of the Air Power Concept on Military Planning," p. 264.

^Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics, (Lexington, 1977), p. 8. 245

create a system of regional collective security pacts in which the US would provide strategic support and regional allies would fight any land wars along the Soviet periphery. Fourth, because US military strength had always followed from its economic strength, reduced defense budgets would directly enhance national security. Finally, the Eisenhower administration painted the struggle against communism in broad strokes, as long-term economic attrition warfare. The only way the US stood to win, the administration argued, was by resisting the temptation to drain

its own resources fighting the Cold War on Soviet terms/?

Dulles unveiled "Massive Retaliation," the military strategy that became synonymous with the "New Look," during a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954. In his speech, Dulles noted that local, conventional defense was a strategy of reaction that weakened

US interests by giving the communists the initiative. Massive

Retaliation would give the US the initiative through "the great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means, and at places of our own choosing."

Dulles’ speech provided the "New Look" with a military doctrine and introduced the concept of instant, massive, nuclear retaliation to the existing strategy of deterrence.® The Dulles speech provided only a thumbnail sketch of the New Look and its strategies, and the lingering vagaries became the source of some concern in Congress and the press. In particular, there seemed to be inconsistency between the administration’s proposed reductions and its hardline anti-communist rhetoric. On the other hand, fiscal conservatives and the neo-isolationists in Congress

•?Ibid.

®Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, p. 213. 246

did not see actual defense policy as going far enough toward developing

the Air Force's strategic deterrent capabilities or reducing the

dependence of the other services on manpower-dependent, conventional

tactics. More important, while the administration talked about

withdrawing from local conflict, it increased US commitments to regional defense in a number of cases: technicians and military missions in

Indochina, new military bases under construction in Spain, and planned direct military aid to Pakistan, to name a few.

The reviews of the New Look and Massive Retaliation were mixed.

The Air Force, which stood to gain the most— or lose the least— from the

New Look threw its immediate support behind the Eisenhower policy. USAF

Chief of Staff Nathan Twining concurred. The New Look, in his view, satisfied the two-fold requirement of "preparedness for general war, should one occur; and maintenance of the capability to cope with lesser situations— with at the same time less of a drain on our manpower, material, and financial resources."^ The other services, especially the Army, were more guarded in their assessments. Critics questioned even the basic premise of massive retaliation— that an enemy could be bombed into submission, even with nuclear weapons. Japan, they pointed out, was thoroughly beaten on ground and sea before the atomic strikes on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tactical nuclear weapons, furthermore, had never been tested against an enemy in the field, and it was not at all certain that allied forces would be able to fight on an atomic battlefield.

Questions also surfaced concerning the wisdom of so one-dimensional a strategy: could the US and NATO guarantee the security of the forward

‘'Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, p. 213. 247

air bases upon which such a strategy would depend, and if not, should the

US withdraw its ground forces for a strategic reserve or leave some in

place where they might be quickly deployed in the event of flash wars?

Even the most staunch critics of the New Look conceded that nuclear

weapons would reduce manpower requirements over the long term, but warned that the "arithmetic" of the substitution of warheads for warriors was yet to be determined.

Perhaps the greatest concern over the New Look focused on the possible implications of a strategy reliant on the "great capacity to retaliate instantly." If the administration were concerned about a Third

World War's capacity to "bleed us white," there seemed little doubt that unlimited atomic war could do so much more efficiently than mass land warfare. Admiral Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, argued that while it was fine to "hedge our strategic bets," the US must also maintain its ability to "meet and rely on the methods of the recent past." The adminstration's frank characterization of the New Look as

"more security at less cost," or more succinctly, "more bang for the buck" was a source of some concern. As New Ycrk Times defense columnist

Hanson Baldwin wrote: "What the "New Look," with its reductions in manpower and other strength, really means is that we have slightly increased our calculated military risk in order to decrease our calculated economic risk."^’- General Ridgway summed up doubts over the such calculated risk: "If we do not put up the proper defense and there

’■'’'Elie Abel, "'Pros’ in Pentagon Cool to 'New Look’," New York Times, January 24, 1954.

’•'Hanson W. Baldwin, "'New Look’ to Where?," New York Times, February 24, 1954. 248

isn’t a war, you have saved a great deal of money," but if war came and the US lost "you lose everything of value." To Ridgway, "compared to fiscal bankruptcy, there [was no] question that spiritual bankruptcy would be the worst tragedy of the two."

Likewise, the Eisenhower defense program did not draw the unanimous approval of his Chiefs of Staff, and Ridgway led the forces of resistance. During late 1953, Ridgway made a series of public speeches warning against replacing US ground forces with "new and untested devices, weapons, and machines" and over-reliance on air power and massive retaliation. Such action, he insisted, would reduce US military effectiveness and hamper its efforts in the Cold War. Ridgway’s campaign raised the specter of yet another "great debate" within the Pentagon at least as divisive as the roles and missions controversies of the late

1 9 4 0 s . R i d g w a y would, throughout his term, resist the New Look’s assault on Army capabilities, an ongoing battle that Newsweek characterized as "a far bigger battle than any he fought in Korea and in the second world war, against overwhelming odds."i~

Ridgway’s criticism of administration defense policy centered on the need to preserve ground forces, but it was more than blind loyalty to the Army. In Ridgway’s view, the New Look amounted to "putting the cart before the horse"; it designed military strategy and foreign policy to

^^Ridgway, "Highlights of Guidance Given to Davidson," October 19, 1953.

^^Hanson W. Baldwin, "Ridgway to the Rescue," New York Times, November 25, 1953.

^'♦"Ridgway’s Biggest Battle...For Troops, Not Machines," Newsweek, July 26, 1954, p. 20. 249

fit the dominant weapon when the reverse should be the case. In October

1953“, Ridgway criticized what he called a "policy vacuum" that led

civilian policymakers to turn to the JCS for a statement of what future

military policy should be. To Ridgway, that was the reverse of the

proper civil-military relationship in which statesmen formulate the policy goals, and the military establishes the requirements to achieve

those goals. Responding, in part, to Air Force arguments that it would provide the most economical defense, Ridgway concluded that "from the

point of view of the professional military man, it is our first responsibility [to] give an objective [estimate of] what its

required...not to evaluate whether it is economically or politically feasible."IS While he participated in the JCS statement on military

strategy and posture (JCS 2101/111), he charged that "the conclusions of the JCS have been reached by an inversion of the normal process;" instead of devising its requirements based on "a statement of missions sufficiently accurate to permit a computation of force requirements," and were "circumscribed at the outset by the fixing of an overall control, namely, the funds expected to be available."^*

Tactical Air Command emerged from the Korean War larger and more confident than at any time in its short history. Combat experience and

increased budgets allowed TAC to resolve some of its most pressing

i=General Ridgway, Memorandum for the Record, "Highlights of Guidance Given to Maj. Gen. G. H. Davidson in MBR's Office," October 19, 1953, AMHI,Ridgway papers. Box 28.

i^Memorandum, Ridgway to the Secretary of the Army, "Military Strategy and Posture (JCS 2101/111)," December 9, 1953, AMHI, Ridgway Papers, Box 28. 250

problems in operations and capabilities. Increased US military

commitments to NATO resulted in a steady increase in USAF units stationed

in Europe and gave TAC a permanent mission that seemed to rule out a

repeat of the its post-World War II d e c l i n e . E n e r g e t i c and committed

leadership under Cannon gave the command a stronger organizational and

operational identity and a long-term plan for continued growth; all were

closely tied to the development of TAC’s nuclear capabilities. Even

Vandenberg, who orchestrated the dismantling of TAC in 1948, told

Congress in 1953 that TAC was vital to USAF ability to uphold its

responsibilities in NATO. "For us as well as for our more vulnerable

allies," he testified, "the defense of the NATO area is a matter of vital concern, and the importance of the part which can be played in it by

tactical air.power is being_increased by technological development."^®

The New Look did not threaten Tactical Air Command’s survival in

the post-Korea period, but it would contribute to a fundamental change in

the command’s mission and conformation. With its de-emphasis of conventional ground warfare and its increased reliance on atomic weapons,

the New Look served to accelerate TAC’s own nuclear weapons program. In

its own view and that of the Air Staff, TAC had become "SACercized" as

its traditional joint-operations mission gradually gave way to its role as part of USAF’s massive retaliatory capability. As Vandenberg told

Congress, tactical aviation constituted USAF’s "second strike" capability

‘■^See Appendix G.

i^United States Congress. House. Department of the Air Force Appropriations for 1954, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, 1953), pp. 18-13. 251 in NATO and was more closely tied to nuclear strategy than to fighting a conventional ground war in Europe. Within TAC, however, the conversion to massive retaliation was less complete and its leadership continued to protect its more conventional tactical capabilities. As TAC’s post-Korea commander. General 0. P. Weyland, would later note, a cadre of tactical air advocates in USAF managed to "hold together and improve a small, but very, very professional tactical air force structure" and were "obnoxious enough" to secure some improvements in tactical fighters, troop carriers, and tactical reconnaissance, radar, and communications equipment.^''

TAC may have'enjoyed greater institutional security in 1954 than in

1946, but demobilization after Korea took place under circumstances not unlike those following World War II. The command history for the last six months of 1953 cited problems that bore striking resemblance to those of 1946; personnel instability, lack of adequately trained airmen and officers, top-heavy organization, and lack of adequate joint doctrine.

As it had seven years earlier, demobilization came to dominate the concerns and activities of TAC until well into 1954 and frustrated most attempts to maintain the command’s forward momentum. TAC’s manpower troubles began with the triple pressures of mobilization for Korea, the loss of seven combat wings to overseas commands in Korea and Western

Europe, and reorganization after 1950. In 1954 the situation had improved only marginally. During the war years, TAC devoted as much as four percent of its annual budget to relocation expenses, and the average duty assignment within the command lasted only seven months. In key specialties, the turnover was even higher and more costly. The high

^■’’Weyland Oral H istory. turnover rate also led to low morale, proved a disincentive for reenlistment, and often led officers to request early relief from active duty.

The end of the war did not bring TAC any relief from personnel and training pressures. The armistice of July 1953 eased some of the pressure for combat training, but in TAC’s view it did not entirely relieve the sense of urgency. TAC viewed the Korean truce as "a rather precarious thing, quite capable of being dissolved into a renewal of hostilities," and further (and more fundamentally) "Korea represented but one localized phase of a global problem." The importance of maintaining an adequate military capability kept demand for training high.

Demobilization did allow TAC to cut back in some areas, particularly training for air crews flying aircraft scheduled for phase-out (B-26, C-

46, and C-119), and Congressional budget cuts forced TAC to cut flight time from over twenty to twelve hours per month for each pilot.^i

In 1954, the Air Force had begun its program to expand to 137 wings, and as had been the case in 1950, TAC found itself in keen competition with other commands for trained personnel. The necessity of carrying out an expansion plan during the Korean demobilization left command instability high well into 1955. TAC was seldom numerically undermanned, but too often the replacements it received were of lower grades, inexperienced, or unqualified for technical training leaving skill levels far out of balance. As TAC personnel became qualified, they

^°TAC Historv, Jan. - June 1954, Vol. I: Personnel Instabilitv and Unit Manning in Tactical Air Command, 1953-1954.

21TAC H isto rv , Ju l. - Dec 1953, Vol IV: Operations and T raining, p, 84. 253

were frequently rotated out of the command, necessitating a constant

program of intensive t r a i n i n g . T h e highest turnover resulted from

USAF’s practice of reassigning Korean returnees with less than six months

left in their tours. Even when they required minimum retraining, such

personnel offered little productive time in their new assignments, had

little incentive, and created new instability when they left.^s in

February, 1954, Cannon protested the pressures of USAF policies, arguing

that

By insisting on Tactical Air Command manning its programmed units from sources within the command, and at the same time filling its overseas quotas...your headquarters is forcing instability. Tactical Air Command cannot long continue losing its officers in such large percentages after such brief service and maintain an acceptable degree of operational efficiency.®'*

Budget cuts resulting from the New Look hit TAC hard and further undermined its personnel situation. In an effort to save money, USAF placed restrictions on flying hours for TAC pilots, resulting in reduced operational readiness in tactical units. USAF expansion, fully underway by 1955, created acute shortages in vital technical areas, further undermining unit readiness. In 1955, TAC finally responded by instituting a system of "Unit Priorities," based on the assumption that one fully operational wing was preferable to a number of underprepared wings.

Thus, TAC put its highest priority on maintaining the following combat ready units; three fightei— bomber wings, one tactical bombardment wing.

e=Ibid., p. 20.

®®TAC History, July - Dec. 1955, Vol. Ill: Critical Personnel Problems, p. 4.

®'*Letter, John K. Cannon to Nathan Twining, February 3, 1954, TAC H istory, Jan. - June 1954, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #22. 254

one tactical reconnaissance wing, and two aii— refuelling wings. The

remaining TAC wings were maintained at minimum strength but ready for

expansion in the event of mobilization.2= Between 1953 and 1955,

turnover rates for officers saw considerable improvement, but in the

enlisted ranks, improvement was much slower.

By mid-1954, the Eisenhower administration’s New Look and companion

strategy of Massive Retaliation had roused a national debate that struck

at the foundation of traditional interservice relationships and raised

serious questions as to the fate of conventional forces, especially the

Army. Massive Retaliation seemed to endorse the military predominance of

the Air Force over the other services, but it was not as cleai— cut as it

seemed. Events in 1953 and 1954 indicated that national security and

foreign policies did not experience the drastic change the all-or-nothing military structure might suggest. The Eisenhower policies also stirred

great concern among US allies, who observed a resurrection of post-World

War I-style isolationism. In particular, European allies &aw massive

retaliation as an isolationist, limited-1 Lability strategy that implied

the US would fight to help Europe only after it had been occupied rather

than send American troops to fight on the ground.2? In reality, while

the administration did retreat from the lofty ambitions set in NSC/68,

==TAC Historv, July - Dec. 1955, Vol. Ill, p. 27-28.

ca^urnover rates for 1953, 1954, and 1955 were as follows: Officers, 92 percent (1953), 59 percent (1954), 39 percent (1955); Airmen, 72 percent (1953), 74 percent (1954), and 65 percent (1955). TAC Historv, July - Dec. 1955, Vol. Ill, p. 3.

G^C. L. Sulzberger, "US Policy Trends Stir Fear Among Europeans," New York Times, December 27, 1953. Eisenhower and Dulles clung to the basic principle behind containment,

with the latter even hinting that he had not abandoned hope of "rolling

back" communist advances in some parts of the world. After the French

withdrawal from Indochina, and what some characterized as the "galling

spectacle" of the Geneva Conference— with the European powers seemingly

kowtowing to Asian communists— the more treacherous aspects of the new

policy became glaringly apparent.While Dien Bien Phu did not

entirely discredit the New Look, it did show that a bit of the "Old Look"

was still in order, particularly ground forces trained to deal with

guerrilla warfare.

In terms of the structure of military forces, most responsible

analysts still held that some limited— and presumably conventional-- military capabilities were imperative: there was no adequate substitute

for the psychological support that US troops on the ground provided to allied nations. What administration policy failed to do was to spell out— to the military. Congress, and the NATO allies— just what shape those capabilities should take. In fact, one of the paradoxes of Massive

Retaliation was the fact that US commitments of troops and tactical combat wings to Europe were higher during the first Eisenhower administration than at any other time since World War 11.="^ Also

“^Richard Klocko, in the introduction to Air Power in Limited Military Action, wrote that "The...Geneva Conference, with its obsequious wooing of the Communist Chinese aggressor by the Western Europeans, was a fitting last rite for the short-lived American policy," p. 4.

s^James Reston, "Foreign Policy Changed: Regrouping of US Forces Expedited under Program of 'Detachment’ in Asia," New York Times, August 19, 1954.

aogee Appendices G, H. 256 significant was the fact that, in spite of the New Look, peacetime defense spending as a percentage of the national budget and gross national product reached its highest levels since 1945 during the

Eisenhower administration.^^ In the relative vacuum of administration policy, a considerable debate arose among the military services.

Congress, and the press, over the need for "balanced forces." Of course, the means of delivery and operational control of new atomic weapons was no small factor in the "balanced forces" debate: in the era of massive retaliation, the Army and Navy were not willing to stand aside and let USAF monopolize the entire nuclear mission. It was obvious that atomic weapons had permanently changed the face of combat, but a new

"great debate" was underway to determine "whether and how much atomic

weapons [could] be substituted for manpower and conventional weapons."=2

The Army seemed to have the most to lose if the New Look were interpreted, and implemented, too literally, and under Ridgway’s guidance, it consistently took the high road in promoting itself as still decisive in the era of nuclear war. In 1955, the Department of the Army, undoubtedly capitalizing on increased public criticism of the New Look, published its official "doctrine" on the Army’s role in the post-nuclear world. The Role of the Army, published under the imprimatur of Ridgway

^^Comparisons of the percentage of Eisenhower administration defense spending to that of subsequent administrations are less valid for two reasons; the high "start-up" costs of nuclear weapons technology (both tactical and strategic), and the rapid increase of social spending during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations that expanded the overall budget "pie." See appendix E.

s^Hanson Baldwin, "Atomic Arms and Men-I: Debate Starts on Whether New Weapons Can Supplant Infantry and Usual Guns," New York Times, November 13, 1953. 257

and the Secretary of the Army, argued forcefully for the continued

decisiveness of ground forces, echoing a common theme of Ridgway’s: "the

decisive element of victory in war is still the trained fighting man who,

with his feet on the ground, defeats the enemy’s ground fighters, seizes

his land, and holds it." The Army pamphlet conceded that sea and air

power could also be decisive "at certain times, according to particular

strategic or tactical circumstances" and deemed it "nonsensical" to try

to determine which of the three essential forces is most essential. It

concluded, nonetheless, that while air and sea power are sometimes

decisive in certain circumstances, "they are not decisive in the broader

sense of being the war-winning campaigns."^®’ Nuclear weapons had changed

the face of war, and ground forces would not fight the next war with

exactly the same tactics as in World War II or Korea. Still, The Role of

the Army pointed out, the US power to annihilate life on the planet was

not the same thing as the willingness to use it nor, ultimately, did it

serve US goals of peace and freedom, which would "prove illusory if we

pursed them in such a way as to cause or allow mankind itself to be

destroyed."3^ The Army held that its fighting men were better trained,

more versatile, and more vital than ever now that even minor conflicts

threaten escalation to general war. The Role of the Army concluded that

any attempt to design "cheap" alternatives to ground combat would prove misguided :

The vision of a few technicians twisting the dials of complicated devices, or "pushing buttons," and thereby

G^Department of the Army, The Role of the Army, Pamphlet No. 21-70, (Washington: June, 1955), p. 9.

s^Ibid. , p. 10. 258

setting the destinies of nations, is an entertaining theme when we find it in a science fiction story; there is no place for it in the stern realities of our profession.3=

Until 1953, budget allocations for defense were divided more or less equally among the three service departments; but the Air Force interpretation of the New Look, if accepted as the basis for future defense planning, gave USAF the lion’s share of available financial resources and would render the Army and Navy little more than support forces. President Eisenhower, the first professional military officer to occupy the White House since Ulysses S. Grant, gradually built a JCS.that was more sensitive to White House politics than any to date. He selected service chiefs that he thought were unlikely to oppose his defense policy and regarded any public criticisms— especially before Congress— from within the JCS as "institutionalized i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n . T h e president made it clear that his military policies, once established, were not open for debate, and the Chiefs, despite their acknowledged abilities, could exercise minimal influence on defense policy. Some, like JCS Chairman

Arthur Radford and USAF Chief Twining, backed the administration enthusiastically, but few risked public criticism of Eisenhower’s policies even when the disagreed with them.

Ridgway, whom Eisenhower appointed because he believed he could count on his loyalty, continued his open criticism of administration policy alone, condemning the emasculation of ground forces in the wake of

New Look budget cuts and the collapse of Army-Air Force cooperation since

Korea. Two issues in particular poisoned Army-Air Force relations during

3=Ibid., p. 14.

G^See Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy. 259

the New Look: the future of airborne operations, and Army concern that

USAF would interpret massive retaliation as a license to abandon close

air support. Army concern centered on USAF aircraft procurement, which

favored strategic bombers and fighters over badly needed tactical support

aircraft, as one Army official stated: "The Air Force wants them higher

and faster; we want them lower and slower.Some carried their

criticism one step further:

The Army gave away too much to get unification....Close air support exists only by sufferance today....Plainly the Army had better look elsewhere for close air support. And where else but to itself.^®

It was this latter attitude within Army that most alarmed the Air

Force; and USAF suspected the Army of plotting to reclaim the close air

support mission despite constant reassurance at the highest levels that

the Army harbored no such ambition. Any attempt on the Army’s part to change existing doctrine and command relationships, or push for

development of new aircraft met with suspicion within USAF. In April

1955, the Evaluation Staff at the Air War College codified USAF’s charges

in a report entitled "Tactical Air Forces and National Security." The

Evaluation Staff identified what it saw as a trend in the Army, beginning

with General Almond’s agitation during the Korean War, toward establishment of an organic Army Air Force. Army criticism of USAF

tactical air support, the report argued, stemmed from its fundamental misunderstanding of "air power" and its inability to see the problems of

^■^"Army is Worried on Plane Policy," New York Times, October 16, 1955.

=*®Hanson Baldwin, "Armor’s War Role Gains: Ridgway Renews His Stress on Tanks But Trend Faces a Strong Challenge," New York Times, August 16, 1954. 260

national security from a "global perspective" as the Air Force did.=^

The Evaluation Staff report took issue with those (especially

Ridgway) who charged that a strategy ovei— reliant on strategic air power

would leave US interests vulnerable to limited threats. The essence of

air power's flexibility, the report argued, was that "the greater the

global capability, the greater the capability for limited c o n f l i c t .

To turn tactical aviation over to the Army, or to render tactical

aviation subordinate to ground commanders, would seriously undermine

national security in a number of ways. First, airplanes controlled by

the Army, because of their limited mission (and misapplication), would

not contribute to the nation's overall air power. Second, the cost of duplicating support facilities, aircraft, and training, and the general

cost-inefficiency of using airplanes as flying artillery, would deplete

the scarce resources available for national defense. Third, the Army,

lacking USAF's technical expertise, would find its tactical aviation quickly becoming obsolete and would, in the long run, be much worse off

than it started. Finally, unified air power promotes the global strategic perspective implied in Eisenhower administration strategy,

while the Army view promotes the "man for man" strategy that the New Look and massive retaliation were designed to avoid.

3?The Evaluation Staff, Air War College, "Tactical Air Forces and National Security," Air University, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: April 1955),

4^Ibid., p. 42.

4^Ibid., pp. 36-47. 261

General Cannon retired from the Air Force on March 31 after 35

years of service. His successor, General Weyland— who briefly commanded

TAC in 1950 but was immediately transferred to FEAF— ushered in the

command's post-Korean phase. Weyland, like his predecessors at TAC, had

been a tactical aviator for most of his military career. He entered the

Air Service as a Reserve Lieutenant in 1923 and became a regular Army

officer in 1927. During World War II, he commanded the XIX Tactical Air

Command in Europe (renowned for the close support it provided General

George Patton’s Third Army) and later the Ninth Air Force. Following the

'war, Weyland served as the Assistant Commandant of the Command and

General Staff School (CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth (September 1945 - June

1946), Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Plans (June 1946 - October

1947), and became the first USAF Director of Plans and Operations in

October 1947. Weyland served very briefly as TAC Commander following

Lee's departure, but almost immediately went to Korea where he served as

Vice-Commander and later Commander of the FEAF.'*^

Weyland's military education left him particularly well suited to

the TAC command. Weyland entered the Army with an engineering degree

from Texas A & M and attended the Air Corps Tactical School and CGSS during the late 1930s. Weyland took great pride in his formal education

in ground operations. "I knew the ground forces forward and backward," he remembered, "their organization, their tactics, their employment" so

ground doctrine "was not a strange language to me as it was to many Air

^^Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, "Biography; General 0. P. Weyland," TAC History, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1955, Vol. I; Status and Capabilities of the Command, Supp. Doc. #12. 262

Force officers.His greatest frustration as FEAF commander in Korea

was the lack of similar understanding among other' air and ground

commanders. As the Director of Plans before Korea, Weyland had concurred

with the general USAF view that strategic forces should take priority in

planning. As a result of his experiences in Korea, however, Weyland came

to believe that those pre-Korea assumptions were "either wrong or no

longer valid." He thus took command of TAG determined to maintain

adequate tactical aviation that was well-balanced with the rest of the

Air Force.

Throughout his tenure as TAG Gommander, Weyland would stand

virtually alone as an outspoken advocate of balanced forces within USAF.

The dominant Air Force view conformed to the public statements of

deSeversky that SAG, while well-led and well-manned, was "puny," of "last war vintage" and amounted to a modern "Maginot Line." At least two-

thirds of the national effort should go into offensive and defensive air power, he argued, since only an invincible SAG "can save America from

atomic d e s t r u c t i o n . W e y l a n d , in contrast, joined those who urged a balance between clearly vital strategic forces and conventional forces able to respond in the event that the atomic deterrent fails at lower

levels of conflict. By 1956, Weyland would become one of the first military leaders to warn of the coming era of "peripheral wars" in which a full spectrum of tactical aviation capable of being quickly deployed

^^Weyland Oral History.

~*Tbid.

'*="Air Force Galled 'Puny’," New York Times, January 4, 1954; "DeSeversky Prods U.S.," New York Times, February 3, 1954. 263

would be necessary. To ignore the need for a low-level deterrent, he warned, "would be an invitation to creeping disaster."

Despite his insight— unique among air commanders— into the complexities of the post-Korea international environment, Weyland recognized that TAC's most likely route to an expanded role lay in its growing atomic capabilities, and as TAC Commander he continued the

"SACercization" of the command that began under Cannon. Weyland’s approach, however, would be somewhat different from Cannon’s. Instead of transforming TAC into a miniature, theatei— level bombing force, Weyland would develop the concept of the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF), a highly mobile, fully integrated tactical air force for rapid deployment in regional emergencies. TAC would, under Weyland’s command, gradually develop into a "jack-of-al1-trades," an offensive striking force as well as a supporting force for conventional surface operations. Such an offensive force would increase the flexibility of US air power and reduce the risk that essential SAC resources might be placed under theater control in contingencies below the level of global war.^?

TAC’s struggle for survival during the era of Massive Retaliation centered on an extensive reassessment and revision of the entire concept- of tactical air power. Under Cannon, TAC had already begun to redesign its concepts of employment of tactical aviation and requirements for new

P. Weyland, "Tactical Air Power and Peripheral Wars," [Testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee], September 23, 1956, in Eugene M. Emme, The Impact of Air Power; National Securitv and World Politics, (New Jersey, 1959).

^^Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, p. 221. 264

tactical aircraft to conform to nuclear warfare. Under Weyland, TAC turned its attention to revising the organizational structure of tactical

aviation. "The entire history of warfare," one TAC report stated,

"demonstrates the importance of organizing the military machine in

accordance with the dominant weapon." In the new era, former concepts of mass employment of air power in conventional operations would be invalid, and TAC must not "be content to absorb these weapons into standard patterns and fit their use to the organization." Instead, the new organization should take into consideration the new political threats as well as the new weapons available to the US, its allies, and the communist world.

Throughout its history, TAC had struggled with an imbalance between operational demands— especially in Western Europe and Korea— and its manpower levels. In the post-Korea period, TAC chafed under the burden of maintaining a large tactical air arm in Europe, deployed in an essentially defensive arrangement, "in the shadow of a strong Soviet tactical air arm holding the power of initiative.The forward deployment of so major a portion of its assets not only made little organizational sense, TAC argued, but increased NATO’s vulnerability to sudden attack and risked paralyzing tactical aviation during the critical opening stages of the air campaign. TAC realized that withdrawing US ground or tactical air units from Western Europe would have disastrous political consequences, but new principles of employment could make more

'»®"A New Look at Tactical Air Power," 1954, AFS/HRC, K16B.17-32, pp. 3-4.

*?Ibid., p. 5. 265

efficient use of existing forces, reduce the requirement for expanded tactical air forces, and increase operational effectiveness in the event of war. TAC proposed to develop a new, highly resilient tactical air arm that could retain its operational effectiveness and maintain an immediate and sizeable retaliatory capability after an enemy surprise attack, and conduct a minimum level of operational activity during the initial stages of conflict. The essential requirement of such a force was flexibility: the ability to deploy a force-in-being rapidly to any area in need of a tactical striking force.=* In short, the essential guideline for the development of TAC’s new concept of tactical air power was the ability to withstand the first attack and retaliate immediately with nuclear weapons.

A new organization and concept of employment would back up the revised TAC mission. TAC conceived a system of forward air bases and highly trained, fully integrated, and highly mobile tactical air forces.

TAC would maintain the bulk of its combat units at bases in the United

States and deploy them, with the help of air refuelling, to forward bases as the operational need arose. In this way, TAC argued, tactical air assets could deploy rapidly in response to emergencies anywhere in the world, rather than being tied down to the more rigid system of ground force deployments. The foundation of the system in Europe would be forward bases, pre-stocked with essential supporting items, manned by small Air Force detachments, and defended by NATO ground forces. The bases would be fully operational, but would not permanently house large number of aircraft or major maintenance facilities. In the event of war.

=*Ibid. , p. 7-8. 266

a system of unmanned forward strips— operational runways with no

supporting facilities— could be developed and operated as the tactical

situation demanded. Rear bases would be situated beyond the effective

range of enemy tactical air forces, and would not constitute a lucrative

target for enemy strategic assets.

TAC argued that such a system would greatly increase the effective

striking power of tactical aviation without necessarily increasing the

actual size of the tactical air force. Since the striking power was "in-

being," any operational delay would amount only to the flying time from

the Zone of Interior to the assigned area. Such forces would arrive in­

theater as "an organized, efficient unit immediately capable of

delivering massive blows" at a time when forces deployed in the theater

would, in all probability, have to reorganize the remnants of its forces

after the initial enemy attack.=2 Reorganization of tactical air assets

according to this concept, TAC argued, would be in keeping with the New

Look’s emphasis on economy in a number of ways. First, reliance on

atomic weapons enabled tactical forces to achieve massive air strikes with a minimum operational force-in-being. Second, the system of

rear/forward basing maximized the inherent flexibility of tactical air power while requiring minimum operational overhead. TAC concluded that

its "ability to promptly employ a decisive striking force anywhere in the world will tend to discourage aggression" while "the dispersal of our

tactical air power from immediate reach of the enemy removes the

°^Ibid.. p. 9.

==Ib id . , p. 10-11, 267 temptation offered by the expected success of a surprise attack.

TAC’s proposal to reorganize tactical air power reflected the political and fiscal realities of the era of Massive Retaliation, but it did not amount to a complete surrender of more traditional tactical missions. Weyland warned against dismissing Korea as an aberration, suggesting instead that USAF use the experience it gained there to develop a concept for the employment of air power in limited wars with limited objectives. To Weyland, the air war in Korea represented "a short step in the direction of using air power as a persuasive force to attain limited objectives."=^ Weyland also understood, however, that in light of the priorities inherent in the New Look, TAC and the Army need not expect major expansion of conventional tactical capabilities. If TAC were to survive in the era of Massive Retaliation, Weyland believed it had to become part of the dominant atomic strategy or risk being absorbed by SAC. While the new concept of tactical air power might undermine

TAC’s close support capabilities somewhat it was better than the alternative. The extinction of TAC, which Weyland saw as a real possibility, would guarantee that air support for Army ground operations would be dead last on USAF’s priority list.==

The TAC concept of a mobile tactical strike force made the best of the implications of Massive Retaliation and capitalized on some of the most common criticisms of the new strategy. Air Force Secretary Harold

°^Ibid.. p. 11-12.

“**0. P. Weyland, "The Air Campaign in Korea," Air U niversity Quarterly Review, Vol. I, no. 3 (Fall 1953), pp. 3-28.

“^Weyland Oral H istory. 268

E . Talbott expressed the dominant view within USAF when he told Congress in 1954 that "it seems clear that airpowei particularly the striking power represented by the Strategic Air Command— is today the keystone of our military strength.It was just as clear that the development of a nuclear capable tactical air force, which Chief of Staff Twining called

"the most significant recent development in modern warfare," was not alone sufficient life insurance for TAC, since many within the Air Staff believed SAC was fully capable of carrying out tactical as well as strategic missions.TAC did not benefit proportionately from the proposed increase of USAF to 143 Wings; and when Congress cut the planned expansion to 137 Wings in 1954, the bulk of the reduction came out of

TAC.=8 To avoid repeating its post-World War II fate, TAC strove to develop a unique mission for itself within the context of massive retaliation, independent of its relationship with the Army, and beyond the operational scope of SAC.

Outside USAF, however, analysts like former Air Force Secretary

Finletter warned that strategic air power was not a panacea and could not

"do everything, as isolationists and tax-cutters may argue.

Finletter proposed three high priorities for US military policy: NATO

°^Department of the Air Force Appropriations for 1955, p. 2.

°?Ibid., p. 77.

=®The 143-Wing plan broke down as follows: SAC, 57 wings; ADC, 29 wings; TAC, 44 wings; and MATS, 11 wings. Under the 137-Wing plan, SAC lost 3 wings, TAC lost 6 wings, MATS lost 6 wings, and ADC gained 5 wings from the 143-Wing proposal. Department of the Air Force Appropriations for 1955, p. 157.

z^Thomas K. Finletter, Power and Policv: US Foreign Policv and Military Power in the Hvdroqen Age, (New York, 1954). 269

atomic air (including tactical atomic capabilities), US/NATO air defense, and ground, sea, and non-atomic air for NATO. To deal with strategic

"Grey Areas," he proposed a small, mobile striking force to conduct symbolic operations to demonstrate US resolve without running the risk of

"go-it-alone wars."*'^ Europeans, like Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, also expressed concern over the apparently one-dimensional US air strategy. In Slessor's view, the democratic nations had to decide where to draw the line against communist expansion and firmly, patiently, and consistently defend it. While the atomic deterrent could serve as the

"Big Stick" to keep peripheral aggression under control, the coming era of "brushfire wars" would put a premium on flexibility: the ability and willingness to respond with "the necessary forces of an appropriate type to meet the limited use of force by the limited use of force.

TAC kept an ear toward the more skeptical assessments of Massive

Retaliation and responded with an imaginative concept of air power for limited wars. While it did not represent a radical departure from USAF orthodoxy and did little to rectify weaknesses in air-ground support, the new TAC concept answered some of the doubts concerning the dominant "all- or-nothing" strategy in light of the post Korea threat environment. TAC based its new mission, which would be the inspiration for Weyland’s campaign for the CASF, on a number of assumptions about the future threat environment. First, given the existence of a state of relative atomic equilibrium between the superpowers, the probability of all-out war was

a^Ibid, p. 200, 224-227.

^’■Sir John C. Slessor, "Air Power and Strategy Today," [October 1954], The Great Deterrent, (New York, 1957), p. 147. 270

remote for the foreseeable future. Second, the Soviets showed no sign of

abandoning their expansionist policies but would likely find ways to

undermine peace and stability short of all out war. The US could thus

expect to face a series of local challenges to its interests of varying

degrees and intensities. Finally, to risk depleting the foundation of US

deterrence— SAC— in such limited conflicts over the long run could serve

Soviet interests.

Major Richard Klocko codified the new TAC concepts in his thesis at

the Air War College, Air Power in Limited Military Action, which became a

"bible" of limited war theory during the 1950s and helped break down

resistance in the Air Staff to Weyland’s i d e a s . Klocko outlined the

likely challenges to US interests, warning that the Air Force lacked

experience and expertise in conducting limited air campaigns and

concluded that "either the Air Force must develop a recognizable

capability to carry out this mission or the responsibility will pass by

default," presumably to the Army.*^ Klocko identified two fundamental

constraints on massive retaliation; the ever-present risk that

retaliation increases the risk of general war, and its questionable

effect in deterring aggression at local and limited levels. Further, the

success of massive retaliation depended on the capability and willingness

to use atomic weapons as well as the existence of appropriate strategic

targets. In most limited scenarios, US willingness to risk all out war

*^Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine, pp. 225-226.

*®Richard P. Klocko, Air Power in Limited Military Actions, Graduate Study Group Thesis No. 7, Air War College, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1954), p. 3. 271 and the availability of clear targets were likely to be missing.

To overcome these problems, Klocko proposed that USAF develop a new striking force capable of, but not limited to, atomic operations and that could provide a ready and credible deterrent to communist aggression on the local level. Klocko charged that strategic bombing theory had stifled USAF thinking:

Familiarity with the majestic beauty of the bomber stream and with the formalized mechanics of the Joint Operations Center seem to have blinded many airmen to the adaptability of aerial flexibility to the solution of other types of military problems.6=

Klocko identified a number of common patterns in US employment of air power in limited actions that could serve as the basis for designing a tactical striking force, first, both the political and military objectives of such operations were extremely limited. Second, the political leadership often entered into such operations before a funding mechanism was in place, creating budgetary problems that had a significant impact on tactical consideration. Third, the crises that prompted limited military action generally caught the US by surprise, forcing military action in the absence of a coherent and systematic political and military approach. Fourth, limited military actions were generally oriented toward a ground strategy and objective. Fifth, forces for such limited air actions had to be drawn from forces committed to other, usually more vital, contingencies: a designated strike force could prevent such depletion of air readiness for primary responsibilities. Finally, the only consistent similarity in limited

6*Ib id . , pp. 8-11

6=Ib id ., p. 43. 272

military action was communist instigation. The inherent flexibility of

air power was, thus, uniquely suited, since it allowed rapid and

proportional response to the sorts of "brushfire" insurgencies that the

communists favored.*^

Klocko proposed development of a "Ready Air Fleet," based on

reasonable pre-planning, that capitalized on the inherent flexibility of

air power while reducing the risk of entangling the US in "ineffectual

global surface actions." Such a force would entail both land and sea

based air assets, since carrier air could evade the often awkward

prob' , of foreign base rights. Klocko suggested a structure for the

fleet, but stressed that specific structures were, for the time being,

less important than the necessity for USAF to "develop a constructive

attitude and positive program for accepting its full responsibilities in

this field of warfare."*? In so doing, it need not speculate concerning

the political permutations of such actions or develop detailed plans for

every possible contingency. Rather, planning for a limited air

capability should concentrate on developing versatile air force-in-being

that could be deployed on a systematic, organized basis when US national

security required military operations on the local or limited level.

TAC’s case for the tactical strike force received another boost as

‘Ibid. ■ Chapter IV.

*?Klocko proposed the following structure: 1 medium bomb wing, 1 fighter-interceptor wing (all-weather), 1 light bomber wing (night and all-weather), 2 fightei— bomber wings, 1 tactical reconnaissance wing, 1 medium troop carrier wing, 2 medium air transport squadrons, 1 aerial resupply and communication group, and 1 ground defense task force (6 defense flights and 1 support flight). Ibid., p. 83.

*®Ibid., pp. 82-83. 273

a result of the French withdrawal from Indochina. The fall of the French

garrison at Dien Bien Phu, and more significantly the apparent US

impotence in the face of the crisis provided a graphic example of the

limitations of massive retaliation. The Eisenhower administration

weathered charges that its foreign policy was "80 percent domestic

politics" and its military strategy "a confused and confusing series of

politico-military pronouncements...that have added up, in actuality, to

hesitancy."69 The crisis at Dien Bien Phu raised two particular issues

regarding massive retaliation. First, it showed that the US nuclear

deterrent was not effective at the level of limited war and that its

careless application in such situations, unless accompanied by a firm US

resolve to carry out its ultimatum, could ultimately undermine its

credibility. Second, to apply the threat of nuclear retaliation

regardless of the enemy or the nature of aggression presented an

unjustifiable risk of escalation from local to general war. Military

commentators, even those who had praised the New Look and Massive

Retaliation earlier in the year, began to question the wisdom of

depending on an inflexible military structure incapable of responding to

threats to less-than-vital interests. Events in Indochina suggested that

national security in the atomic age was not an "either/or" proposition

but required reasonable readiness on both the nuclear and conventional

levels. As Klocko wrote, "the so-called ’New Look’ at national security

policy quietly died as a usable blueprint for defense with the fall of

69Hanson W. Baldwin, "Lessons of Dienbienphu: Too Little and Too Late," New York Times. May 16, 1954. 274

Dien Bien Phu."^°

By 1955, Weyland and TAC had initiated an energetic public relations campaign to "sell" tactical aviation’s new image, concentrating not on its air-ground mission but on its new role as the US deterrent to limited aggression. In May 1955, TAC sponsored a symposium for the Air

Force Association’s Industrial Associates (which included senior representatives of the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, key members of Congress, and representatives of the aviation industry), the purpose of which was to "provide this highly representative segment of the

American public with current and factual information" about the "globally deployed and operating tactical air forces.

In his "keynote" address, Weyland pointed out that tactical aviation, even given its weakness after years of budget cuts and institutional exile, "demonstrated its flexibility and mobility by closing with the enemy within eight hours" after the president committed

US forces to Korea. He went on to speculate that if TAC had stood at full strength and readiness in 1950, "there is considerable doubt that the Communists would have pursued these ventures.Weyland recognized, as well, TAC’s continuing responsibility for aii— ground operations, stressing that the advent of nuclear weapons had not fundamentally

?*Hanson Baldwin, "The Bomb and a Battle: Hydrogen Explosion Rattles the World But Cannot Air Dienbienphu Garrison," New York Times, April 1, 1954; Klocko, p. 4.

?iMemorandum, "Tactical Air Conference (TAC)," Progress Summary Memorandum No. 2, April 19, 1955, Tactical Air Power Symposium, AFS/HRC, 168.7082-495.

T^Gen. 0. P. Weyland, "Presentation to the AFA Industrial Associates," TAC History, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1955, Vol. Ill: Tactical Airlift, Supp. Doc. #2, p.9-10. 275

changed the underlying principles of tactical aviation. He insisted,

however, that the US policy of resisting communist aggression, whether

conventional, unconventional, atomic, or non-atomic, made it "mandatory

that tactical air achieve full capability for rapid assembly and global

deployment of tactical air strike forces which can cope with any military

situation."73 At the same conference. Major General Edward Timber lake

seconded Weyland’s views, warning that

We must keep foremost in our minds that this nation and all the nations of the world face a formidable and ever mounting communist threat. No longer can we depend alone on the vast retaliatory capability of our strategic air forces as a deterrent to aggression...for they have forced the enemy to turn to other means, such as limited, or "brushfire wars"....Tactical air power is our nation’s answer to this cancerous type of aggression.

Timber lake went on to argue that to deter limited aggression, TAC must be

given the resources to modernize both its conventional and nuclear capabilities, and must do so "as expeditiously as possible" in order to

"maintain the balance of power to hold the communists at bay. "7'*

TAC made some progress in convincing the Air Staff of the value of a tactical deterrent force for limited war. Promotional material

circulated to the Air Force Association quoted Vice Chief of Staff Thomas

D. White as saying that "the Tactical Air Command, as well as SAC, is being counted on to forestall Russian aggression and deter either total

73Ibid., p. 9.

7*Maj. Gen. Edward Timber lake, "Principles of Employment of Tactical Air Power," speech before the Air Force Association, TAC Historv, 1 Jan - 30 June 1955, Vol. Ill, Supp. Doc. #4. 276

or peripheral war. In May, USAF Headquarters announced a program to

develop small, atomic fighter aircraft for use in "little wars." The

new aircraft could carry either atomic or conventional weapons and would

allow USAF to cope with "nibbling communist aggression at any trouble

spot on e a r t h . "76 Such aircraft would not, however, be strictly limited

to "fringe wars" since aii— refuelling techniques had blurred the distinction between tactical and strategic forces. Such small fighters

would also prove useful for NATO, where tactical forces would presumably undertake a considerable portion of what would generally fall in the

category of "strategic" missions. As Weyland frequently pointed out, the opening phases of any war in Europe would necessarily involve

simultaneous strategic and tactical strikes against both the enemy's heartland and his forward deployed surface forces and logistical stocks.

Despite the reductions in TAC groups in the 137-Wing plan, Weyland found cause for optimism by early 1955: Congress had liberalized defense appropriations and USAF was showing greater interest in modernizing tactical air forces for both major and limited war contingencies.7?

While TAC’s image within the USAF seemed to thrive in spite of the new, and constricted priorities of the New Look, air-ground doctrine

languished. The Korean armistice relieved the operational pressures that

7=Letter, John R. Alison, President, Air Force Association, to AFA Industrial Associates, "Secret Briefing from Weyland and 68 Key Command Personnel," March 31, 1955, Tactical Air Power Symposium.

76"Small Planes Pack Bigger Atom Punch," New York Times, May 1, 1955.

77Q. p . Weyland, "Tactical Air Operations," Address to the Air War College, 2 February 1955, AFS/HRC, K239.716255-53. 277

contributed to doctrinal advances between 1950 and 1953, and the new

national strategy specifically de-emphasized the types of conventional

operations that employed air-ground doctrine. The increased emphasis on

nuclear armaments would further complicate the doctrinal disputes as the

Army and the Air Force competed for operational control of guided

missiles and other theater atomic weapons. In the struggle for a piece

of the nuclear mission and a share of the limited defense budget, the

mundane questions of tactical air support fell into the background.

Weyland remained sympathetic to Army concerns over the state of air-

ground doctrine; but in his campaign to make TAC an equal partner in the

New Look's air arm, he could not afford to tie the command too closely to

its support role and thereby risk undermining its new, independent image.

TAC remained reluctant, even in the wake of the experience and operational advances made during the Korean War, to consider any revision

of the fundamental principles and command relationships for tactical air support. As the debate over balanced forces and the New Look heated up

through 1954 and 1955, TAC’s position hardened, and communication with the CONARC concerning doctrine seemed to break down. TAC’s increasing commitment to its new "mobile strike force" mission did little to promote

improvements in joint doctrine. By 1955, TAC spokesmen took the position

that in any future war, "certain forces may have to fight under adverse circumstances while other forces are engaged in operations essential to

the future security and well-being of all forces a s s i g n e d . Nor did

the Army find cause for optimism in the contention that "land forces must

73Col. Shannon Christian, "Force Relations in Theater Tasks," February 24, 1955, AFS/HRC, K239.716255-9, p. 5. 278 be defensive in character until the outcome of the air battle is decided" and that "the greatest contribution land forces can make in the air battle is the avoidance of any large scale land actions that would require air action to relieve them from a bad situation.This position within TAC was closely tied to its new image as a theater strike force, but it sounded to the Army like a return to the old, pre-war shibboleths that it thought were put to rest in Korea. Such a view, if carried further, might be the first step toward eliminating specialized training for close support altogether, a concern intensified by TAC assertions that:

We must reexamine the contribution to the total theater effort made by close support in the past...it may show that we have been letting the tail wag the dog. We may reach the conclusion that by operating more effectively in other tasks, we may reduce that need for close support and bring the process into proper perspective.... It may now be possible to reverse the order and place the armies in support of the air forces.30

In September, 1953, TAC and the AFF took part in a three-nation Air

Standardization Coordinating Committee (more succinctly called Working

Party 42) that endeavored to develop a uniform air-ground doctrine for

American, British, and Canadian forces in NATO. The ABC Conference took place in August, 1953 in Old Sarum, England. There was some minor disagreement between the Canadian Air Force, the RAF, and USAF, but the greatest obstacle in drafting a doctrine was interservice differences within the US delegation. TAC, CAP, and RAF doctrine shared common operational roots, and TAC reports of the proceedings charged that "Army

T^Ibid., p. 12.

8*Ib id ., p. 16, 20. 279

and navy intransigence" endangered the process and led to a product that

amounted to "a compromise of various views" that "avoided the most

controversial areas altogether."®^ Despite interservice and

international disagreements, Working Party 42 succeeded in drafting an

ABC Manual of Tactical Operations. The ABC Manual was a true hybrid, an

"all things to all men" manual presenting both the majority consensus and

minority objections in those areas where service or national differences

were beyond resolution.

In the debate over whether to approve the ABC Manual, TAC was

highly critical of what it called Army and Navy "quibbling" over minor

points of semantics and doctrine. Not unexpectedly, the major point of

disagreement was over the command relationship between tactical aviation

and ground commanders: the Army and Navy demanding the phrase "in

support of ground operations," and the Air Force insisting that anything but "in coordination with" would subject air forces to "the whim of an

Army Commander who could use it as an extension of his artillery because of his lack of appreciation of air power."®® TAC remained highly

critical of the entire Working Party concept, charging that the US

Department of Defense should "take care of our own dirty wash" before

entering into such international doctrinal agreements.®® The command

®^Memorandum, Headquarters TAC to Dir. of Requirements., USAF, "Report of Temporary Duty Sub-panel, Working Party 42," September 15, 1953, TAC's Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, Supp. Doc. #18.

®®Disposition Form, "ABC Manual for Tactical Air Operations," [n.d.3, TAC History, 1 Jan - 30 June 1954, TAC's Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, Supp. Doc. #19/3.

®®Memorandum, Col. Ladd to Comm. Gen. TAC, "ABC Manual for Tac Air Ops," December 14, 1953, TAC's Role in Development of Joint Doctrine, Supp. Doc. #19/1. 280

remained convinced that the ABC Manual would be "dangerous to the Air

Force»" but it did not have to push its view very hard because the Army

also withheld endorsement, charging that the doctrine did not adequately

represent the concerns of ground commanders.®'*

In the absence of an approved Army-USAF doctrine for joint

operations, both TAC and the AFF had used the Joint Training Directive in

joint training exercises throughout the Korean War. Following the Korean armistice, the Chiefs of Staff, at the instigation of the Chief of Naval

Operations, took steps to resolve the differences that stood in the way of an approved, official joint doctrine. In September, 1953, the JCS

directed the Joint Tactical Air Support Board "to establish joint doctrine and procedures of governing command, employment, and control of

tactical air forces in support of ground forces." By late 1953, five agencies were involved in the formulation of joint doctrine: TAC, the

AFF, Air University, Working Party 42, and the JTASB.

USAF Headquarters had agreed to the JTASB project without consulting Weyland, and TAC immediately objected to the project on several grounds. First, the JCS statement implied that there was no existing joint doctrine: TAC pointed to FM 100-20 and FM 31-35 which, while somewhat outdated, nonetheless provided a basic doctrinal guide for

joint operations. Second, TAC had worked closely with the AFF, FEAF, and ground commanders in Korea in an effort to revise the JTD, an effort which TAC claimed had produced "virtual agreement on air-ground doctrine

®‘*TAC’s Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, pp.14-15. 281

to be published in a revised joint training manual.Third, the JTASB

program to devise a new doctrine seemed, to TAC, a usurpation of its

responsibilities as stated in APR 23-10. Finally, TAC's experience with

Joint Boards indicated that they most often undermined interservice

agreement and harmony, as the failure of the Joint Amphibious Board’s

attempt to develop interservice doctrine for amphibious operations

i n d i c a t e d . In its protest to the Chief of Staff, TAC added that the

Navy— whose Chief had initiated the JTASB program— "has not only sided

completely with the Army" in the JTASB but "influenced split views where

agreement once existed between Army and Air Force members.

Joint Tactical Air Support Board Project Number 2-53 proceeded in

spite of TAC’s objections and produced the first three chapters of a

draft joint operations manual in June, 1954. TAC objected to the format of the JTASB manual, which was patterned after the ABC Manual, presenting

opposing service views along with agreed upon doctrine, a format that TAC felt created new divisions and memorialized existing ones to the overall

detriment of joint doctrine. In particular, TAC felt the JTASB was promoting Army intransigence: "The Army may have entertained these same

radical views in the past," but "they had no means of officially presenting them, hence, they were obliged to comply with existing

®“Draft Letter, Comm. Gen. TAC to Chief of Staff, USAF, "Joint Tactical Air Support Board," Cn.d.l, TAC’s Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, Supp. Doc. # 20.

G^TAC History, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1953, Vol. IV: Operations and Training, Supp. Docs. #77, 7B.

G^TAC’s Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, Supp. Doc. #20. 282

doctrine."38 TAC further objected that the detail with which the draft

manual treated specific doctrinal issues was excessive and should

properly be left to the specific operational agencies and theater

commands. The JTASB, which TAC still accepted only grudgingly, should

define only broad doctrinal concepts rather than try to replace command

and theater handbooks.3? The specific doctrinal provisions that TAC

found objectionable were familiar: Army participation in theater air

planning, greater ground commander influence over air strike priorities

("if the Army would place proper emphasis on their air request net and

not burden it with routine and administrative traffic, diversion from JOC

can be timely and effective"), and attempts to provide for unified

commands below the theater level that would allow "the opposition" (i.e.

the Army) to tell the Air Force "how it must be organized to carry out

its assigned tasks.

TAC need not have exorcised itself over the JTASB Manual. Even as

TAC was reviewing chapters one through three, the Project 2-53 was in the process of disintegration. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, charging

that USAF was not appropriately concerned over the progress of joint doctrine, set about writing separate documents, each expressing

individual service views. Once again, the joint board approach had failed, leaving joint doctrine in a state of suspended animation. In the end, events proved that TAC’s initial misgivings were well founded: the

B^Letter, TAC to Director, JTASB, "JTASB Project No. 2-53," June 22, 1954, TAC’s Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, Supp. Doc. # 22.

B^ibid., p. 2-3.

9*Ibid. , pp. 3-4. 283

JTASB project ended farther from establishment of mutually acceptable

joint doctrine for air-ground operations than before it started. TAC and

USAF deserved their share of responsibility for the failure of the project, but TAC seemed vindicated in its contention that in the realm of

joint doctrine broader participation precipitated greater confusion. The

JTASB not only failed to draft a new joint doctrine, but seemed, in mid-

1954, to have jeopardized the entire process; it would be two years before TAC and the Army would make another attempt at a joint air-ground

doctrine manual.

The absence of adequate and approved joint doctrine had always been

a roadblock to effective joint planning between TAC and its equal number

in the Army (the AFF, and later, the Continental Army Command, CONARC).

As early as 1953, the absence of joint doctrine for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons made agreement in joint training exercises virtually impossible. During the war, TAC and the Air Ground Operations

School had established Joint Air-Ground Instruction Teams (JAGITs), to conduct training programs in the basics of aii— ground doctrine to those who could not attend the AGOS. Once regarded as a monument of

interservice cooperation, the lack of progress in joint doctrine seemed to render the JAGITs, in a TAC historian’s words, "more nearly a gravestone.

The impact of the doctrinal vacuum on joint training exercises reached its zenith with Operation SAGE BRUSH in November, 1955. Planning

9iTAC's Role in the Development of Joint Doctrine, pp. 16-18.

9=TAC H isto rv . 1 July - 31 Dec. 1953, Vol. IV, pp. 73, 80; Supp, Doc. # 89. 284

for SAGE BRUSH, the largest and most important joint exercise since the

Korean War, began in the spring with a two-fold aim: to increase the

combat capability of Army and Air Force units in both joint and

unilateral actions, and to test new units, doctrines, and weapons for

atomic combat. TAC and CONARC entered into planning well aware of the

weaknesses of the JTD— drafted in 1950 before tactical nuclear weapons

were widely available— in the area of atomic weapons. Earlier "joint"

operations, like the massive TACAIR-54 (April 1954), dealt with those

weaknesses by simply ignoring them. In TACAIR-54— basically a parallel

training exercise— Army and Air Force operations were coordinated, but

there was no unified command.Still, despite mutual awareness of the

potential pitfalls and extensive pre-planning, doctrinal disputes between

TAC and CONARC nearly doomed SAGE BRUSH before it ever started.

The controversies that threatened SAGE BRUSH stemmed primarily from

the continuing lack of accepted joint doctrine, particularly concerning

command relationships between ground and air forces. During the planning for SAGE BRUSH, the Army reluctantly agreed that the maneuver director would serve the same function as a theater commander, including resolution of any doctrinal problems that might arise in the course of

the exercise. Because one of the major missions of SAGE BRUSH was to test the applications of tactical nuclear weapons in the early phases of

a theater conflict, USAF demanded that an air officer head the maneuver.

The Army agreed, and Weyland was selected to head the operation, in part because of his history of cordial relations with CONARC. In the weeks

‘'^Hanson Baldwin, "Huge Maneuvers Test US Power," New York Times, April 25, 1954. 285 leading up to the opening of SAGE BRUSH, CONARC's commander, General

Dahlquist, began to chafe under the prerogatives given Weyland as exercise director. CONARC was especially concerned that TAC units participating in the exercise would not provide adequate close air support for the ground phase.The controversy peaked when Weyland announced, well into the exercise, that experimental Army "SkyCav" units would not be permitted to fly in behind-the-1ines missions. The Army protested Weyland’s decision, arguing that its organic aviation— primarily helicopters and small fixed-wing aircraft— had become an integral part of its force structure. To deny their use in SAGE BRUSH would amount to a reversal of existing doctrine, agreed upon and tested in combat in Korea.When the controversy over the SkyCav units threatened to disrupt the exercise, Weyland referred the problem to Air

Force Secretary Donald A. Quarles. Quarles overruled Weyland and allowed the Army units to complete the exercise, but made no statement regarding the underlying doctrinal i s s u e s . The decision allowed SAGE BRUSH to continue, but reopened the old pre-Korea wounds: USAF still believed that the Army’s push for greater organic aviation amounted to an attempt to reassert its operational control over the tactical air force.

The other major doctrinal conflict in SAGE BRUSH involved the

9*^AC History, 1 July - 31 Dec. 1955, Vol. VIII; Exercise SAGE BRUSH, pp. 53-54.

^^Anthony Leviero, "Army Resists Air Force Order; Its Planes Will Fly in Maneuvers," New York Times, November 22, 1955.

■^‘^Anthony Leviero, "Services’ Dispute Still Unsettled," New York Times, November 24, 1955.

^^"Armed Services: Dogfight," Newsweek, December 5, 1955, p. 23. 286

operational control of tactical nuclear weapons. The failure of the Army

and USAF to arrive at a satisfactory agreement in this area had already

forced cancellation of several joint exercises, including TOBACCO LEAF IV

and CLOVER LEAF I in the fall of 1954. Concerning control of nuclear

weapons, TAC insisted on strict adherence to the JTD, arguing that it

should control anything that flies and provides close support. Army

doctrine, however, presented a different picture: air delivered atomic

weapons (guided missiles) should be allotted to the Army, the ground

commander should determine when and if atomic weapons should be deployed,

and that the ground commander should determine the type of air weapon to

be used against a given close air support t a r g e t . Weyland interpreted

the Army position as another attempt to usurp operational control of the

tactical air arm— and, attempt to establish TAC as "merely a delivery

agent, applying atomic weapons to targets chosen by ground commander at the time and by the method chosen by them." He agreed to allow the

ground commander the prerogative concerning use of ground based atomic weapons but refused any similar influence over air weapons. The Army and

USAF finally worked out an agreement according to which the maneuver director, in strict adherence to the JTD and Joint Action Armed Forces, would resolve any outstanding doctrinal difference. He would do so, however, with the understanding that when the final decision did not represent the doctrinal viewpoints of the Army, USAF, CONARC, or TAC, the maneuver director would notify ground and air commanders that it did not represent jointly accepted doctrine and would apply for the maneuver

9STAC H isto rv , 1 Jul - 31 Dec. 1955, Vol. V III, pp. 56-57. 287 only.

SAGE BRUSH overcame the smoldering interservice conflict and made a number of significant contributions to air-ground doctrine for tactical atomic operations. The Army tested the effectiveness of more traditional airborne operations along with new divisional organizations and tactical concepts designed for the nuclear battlefield. The Air Force tested its new, unmanned Matador missiles and cooperated with Army commanders in determining the effect of new Army tactics on existing air-ground doctrine.109 Both the Army and Air Force units also simulated chemical, biological, and radiological weapons attacks in an effort to develop more effective defensive doctrine.‘oi in its own assessment of the operation,

TAG claimed most of the credit for the ultimate success of SAGE BRUSH for itself and CONARC. While the two service Headquarters became hopelessly entangled in an "academic debate," a later command historian asserted,

TAG and GONARG met the doctrinal problems "head-on" and circumvented the

shortcomings of the JTD "only through cooperation and compromise.

TAG’S satisfaction with the resolution of the controversies surrounding

SAGE BRUSH stemmed, no doubt, from the fact that every major doctrinal dispute was resolved to TAG’S advantage. In TAG’S post-mortem of SAGE

BRUSH, its historian concluded lhat a principal catalyst for disagreement in all such joint operations was the lack of communication between

99lbid., p. 61.

i99Hanson Baldwin, "Joint War Games Start This Week," New York Times, October 30, 1955.

‘9iHanson Baldwin, "US Planes Blast Invaders in Test," New York Times, November 30, 1955.

loG^ickens, Survey of Air Ground Doctrine, p. 45-47. 288 service headquarters and operational commands: in too many instances,

USAF or the Army would make decisions without consulting TAG or CONARC, and vice-versa, leading to conflict and confusion on the operational level.103

SAGE BRUSH provided a number of specific "lessons" that both TAG and CONARC would incorporate in subsequent planning and joint doctrine.

The most important lesson seemed to be that there is no such thing as

"limited," or purely tactical nuclear war. Even battlefield atomic weapons would, the exercise show, wreak crippling devastation and could easily escalate, especially in densely populated or heavily industrialized areas like Western Europe. Much of the twelve state area in which SAGE BRUSH took place (including most of the southeastern US) would have been partially or completely devastated in an actual war—

Sherman’s March would have looked like a picnic. Although tactical air units were, as expected, dominant, the exercise graphically demonstrated the vulnerability of tactical air fields. On the other hand, it also showed that atomic strikes against enemy air fields— which air doctrine held as essential to the battle for air superiority— would likely escalate the conflict because of the unavoidable effect on adjacent communities. Finally, SAGE BRUSH proved that air superiority in atomic wa>" would be relative since as long as the enemy could fly one sortie with one atomic weapon, he retained a dangerous capability. The lessons for the Army proved even harsher: its forces— especially lumbering armored columns and supply and administrative units— would have collapsed in chaos had the simulated nuclear attacks been real. SAGE BRUSH drove

^oajbid. , p. 55. 289 home what Ridgway and others had repeatedly warned: given existing Army organization and equipment, it was doubtful that an organized Army would continue to exist in an atomic war.^*^

By 1955, the Eisenhower administration had begun to rethink its military policy, particularly its heavy reliance on nuclear weapons.

While massive retaliation remained the cornerstone of US strategy for global or superpower war, international events and exercises such as SAGE

BRUSH revealed some of the practical limitations of nuclear weapons. It became increasingly clear that US nuclear arsenal did not deter limited or local aggression and that the forces of communist expansion in the

Third World, like the PRC’s Chairman Mao Zedong, considered the US deterrent capability a "paper tiger." Military exercises showed the risk of escalation in even tactical nuclear weapons and raised questions concerning the advisability of employing such weapons in a defensive war on friendly territory. In short, by 1955, SAC and its nuclear weapons no longer seemed the answer to all the forces challenging US interests, particularly the "brushfire wars" that seemed to crop up in the wake of

European decolonization.

In January, 1955, Eisenhower gave indications that he was willing to retreat somewhat from his earlier policies. He reiterated the official stand that the US would not rule out the use of nuclear weapons against any attack on its allies or interests, but he suggested that the he could not conceive of a scenario in which the US would use nuclear

ic^Hanson Baldwin, "Local Atom War Held Improbable," New York Times, December 5, 1955. 290

weapons in "brushfire wars." Instead, he proposed the creation of

light, mobile units from the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force, that

could deploy quickly in response to emergencies and provide "the stitch

in time that would forestall a major disaster." Eisenhower’s conversion

stemmed in part from the difficulty in distinguishing between tactical

and strategic nuclear weapons that became so apparent in SAGE BRUSH and

the fact that their use would be a grave political as well as military

decision. While reluctant to abandon his New Look, the president

conceded that the US needed a more rounded defense program because of the

impossibility of predicting where and under what circumstances US forces

might have to fight.

Increased awareness of the threat of local wars did not assuage

the anxieties of those who feared that US strategic airpower might fall

behind that of the USSR. The inability of US aircraft manufacturers to

keep up with demand during the Korean War led many, including USAF, to

demand an increase in the air force-in-being during peacetime. The

Korean War had also, however, alleviated some of the US inferiority

complex concerning its engineers when the F-84s proved technologically

equal or superior to Soviet MiG-15s. Some commentators even went so far

as to say that US aviation technology nearly equalled that of the

British, previously the undisputed leaders in the area.^'^^ The real

barrier to adequate air power, then, was not technology but rather the manufacturing process. Unlike the totalitarian states, air advocates

io=Eiie Abel, "President Warns on Atom Warfare," New York Times, January 13, 1955.

ic6 "F irst Team U p stairs," Newsweek, November 16, 1953, p. 34. 291 argued, the US air industry was hampered by labor concerns that slowed productivity and delayed production of new models.

By 1955, concern that the US was losing its lead in air power led the Senate Armed Services, at the instigation of then Senator (and former

Air Force Secretary) Stuart Symington, to hold hearing on the position of

US air power in relation to that of the Soviets. Symington charged, in calling for the hearings, that Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson had underestimated Soviet air strength with the result that "the United

States, along with the rest of the free world, may have lost control of the air, except for the possibility that we still have advantages in base location and training.Others within Congress shared Symington's concern, but some, like Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Walter F .

George, suspected that USAF was using the hearings to influence the budget process. In countering Symington’s argument, George cited the testimony of NATO Supreme Commander General Alfred M. Gruenther, who had recently testified that the Soviet air fleet did not measure up to that of the US. General Gruenther, George remarked, "certainly...should be in a better position to know what the Russians had than anyone else."i')#

Clearly, the debate over strategic air power was far from over.

Both of these veins of opinion— the concern over "brushfire wars," and fear of Soviet air supremacy— served Weyland’s ambitions for TAC. In

June 1954, Weyland unveiled a plan to create a new numbered air force within TAC specifically "designed, organized, and trained to be capable

^‘’"■'William S. White, "Air Power Study: Soviet Gain Cited," New York Times, May 10, 1955.

losHQeorge Discounts Pentagon’s Data," New York Times, May 14, 1955. 292

of rapid deployment to any area where military action was threatened.

The plan assumed potential aggressors were unlikely to strike in areas in

which the US had substantial military forces already in place (like

Korea, Japan, or the Philippines), nor would it be expedient for the US

to divert tactical air units from these areas and thereby deplete their

capabilities. The new tactical air force, as Weyland conceived it, would

fulfill three of the requirements for the military structure that

Finletter (among others)identified in Power and Policv; it would provide

a mobile striking force to deal with peripheral threats without being "a roving force which might get us into an unwanted and unplanned war;" it

would serve as a mobile theater striking force to supplement SAC capabilities in NATO; and it would enhance overall US air power, both

conventional and nuclear.*-”^ The Ninth Air Force, Weyland argued, was

already heavily engaged in training new units and replacements for committed units and thus could not take on the additional responsibility.

The new numbered Air Force would, further, enhance joint training exercises by alleviating the pressure on the Ninth’s available manpower and by providing friendly and aggressor teams from competing tactical air forces.Ill Weyland’s initial proposal met with a lukewarm reception at

USAF Headquarters on the grounds that the Air Staff was trying to

lo^Letter, Weyland to Chief of Staff, USAF, "Additional Tactical Air Force Headquarters," June 25, 1954, TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1955, Vol. I; Status of the Command, Supp. Doc. #15.

ii^Finletter, Power and Policv, pp. 52-54, 227.

iii"Origin of the Nineteenth Air Force," TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1955, Vol I, pp. 14-15. 293

minimize overhead costs by reducing the number of headquarters. In

August, Weyland forwarded a "comprehensive study" conducted at TAC that

showed "the vital need for an Air Force Headquarters immediately

available for deployment to an unprotected periphery area when required."

Weyland went on to express sympathy with the need to hold down overhead,

but stressed that his experience in Korea proved that "we should not sacrifice our fighting potential to do so."**^

TAC's "comprehensive study," along with Klocko's thesis on air power in limited wars, seemed to make an impression on the previously

reluctant factions at USAF Headquarters. In November, 1954, TAC and

Headquarters USAF agreed to establish the new tactical air force

headquarters with operational control of fully-trained, combat ready units. TAC proposed establishing the new headquarters initially under

the administrative control and jurisdiction of the Ninth Air Force with the understanding that as the pressure of additional units and responsibilities became too great, the new headquarters would be fully manned and moved to another base.^^'* USAF Headquarters, while acceding

to the concept of a "mobile tactical force" with all the elements of command and control, still maintained that a numbered air force was excessive and suggested that an operational headquarters would be sufficient. Weyland, in the interest of getting his mobile tactical

ii^Letter, Thomas D. White, Vice Chief-of-Staff to Comm. TAC, "Additional Tactical Air Force Headquarters," July 9, 1954, TAC Historv, 1 Jan - 30 June 1955, Vol I, Supp. Doc. #18.

ii^Letter, Weyland to Vice Chief-of-Staff, USAF, "Additional Tactical Air Force Headquarters," TAC History, 1 Jan - 30 June 1955, Vol, 1, Supp. Doc. #17.

ii^^AC H isto ry , 1 Jan - 30 June 1955, Vol. I, pp. 17-18. 294

force underway, was willing to accept the operational headquarters

organization, but only as an interim solution until it could build up to

a fully constituted status.

In arguing for his mobile tactical air force, Weyland capitalized

on traditional USAF-Army tensions. A primary role of the new air force would be the conduct of joint operations with the ground forces which

previous experience proved should be conducted at the ar'my-air force

level. To designate the new headquarters as an operational headquarters,

he argued, would play to a "positive and forceful Army program to force

TAC to decentralize planning and direction of operations to levels

comparable to corps and divisions" and ultimately further the Army’s aims. Finally, Weyland insisted that the mission of the new headquarters— direction and support of tactical air combat in peripheral areas— was unique, well beyond the purview of any existing tactical air headquarters, and thus deserving of independent numbered air force status. This final argument seemed to get Headquarters USAF’s attention, and in February 1955, Vice Chief of Staff Thomas D. White directed TAC to submit a detailed plan for the new air force to the Air Staff.

TAC submitted its plan for in April, 1955, specifying five basic missions for the new headquarters; operational control and training of

its combat units, testing and exercises in all phases of mobility for combat and support units, preparation for and execution of plans for deployment of any or all assigned units and direction and control of those units in combat, planning for and conduct of joint operations with

ii=TAC History, 1 Jan - 30 June 1955, Vol. I, p. 19.

iia^bid., pp. 19-20. • 295

surface forces, and planning with ADC for employment of assigned units in

emergency operations.'i? The TAC plan also proposed a four-phase

schedule for activation. During Phase One (beginning October 1955), the

mobile tacticaLair force would be activated as an operational

headquarters under the Ninth Air Force and programming of necessary

military facilities would begin. Phase Two would begin in mid-1956,

during which the new headquarters would begin operating and training its

first two tactical wings. During Phase Three (summer 1956), the mobile

air force would take over operational control of three additional

tactical wings. Finally, during Phase Four (fall 1958), upon completion

of any necessary military facilities, the organization would expand to a fully constituted headquarters with full administrative and logistic

control. Implementation of Phase Four could be adjusted according to the availability of adequate personnel, support units, and base

facilities.*

TAC's implementation plan limited the new headquarters to operational control in the first three phases, an approach that TAC favored over establishing an undermanned, underequipped headquarters unable to fulfill its full scope of responsibilities. Under the TAC plan, an air force headquarters, fully manned and capable of assuming full operational and administrative responsibility, would be in place by mid-1958. In its final form, the new air force would consist of nine combat units: four fighter-bomber groups, four day fighter groups, and

*‘•'^Letter, Headquarters TAC to Headquarters USAF, "Plan for Additional Tactical Air Force Headquarters," April 9, 1955, TAC Historv, 1 Jan - 30 June 1955, Vol. I, Supp. Doc. #26.

iieibid. 296

one light bomber wing.'^^ TAC wanted to base the new air force at Foster

Air Force Base, Texas, or somewhere else in the southwest to balance the

Ninth Air Force in the east, facilitate joint operations with Army units

in the area, and facilitate, operational control of combat and combat

support units already assigned to other bases in the southwest.

Headquarters USAF approved Weyland’s plan for a mobile tactical air force

in June, 1955. The approval was conditional, however, and eliminated

Phase Four of the TAC implementation plan, limiting the new air force to

operational headquarters status indefinitely, and TAC would have to man

the new headquarters from its own manpower resources for at least the

first six months. The Department of Defense also requested a revised

manpower plan, but Weyland replied that TAC’s initial request was based on the minimum essential requirement with no allowance for further

reductions.

The Nineteenth Air Force was activated on July 8, 1955 at Foster

Air Force Base, Texas. If it did not entirely fulfill Weyland’s ambitions, it nonetheless represented a victory for his campaign for a

global tactical air striking force. To maintain the momentum his plan had gained, Weyland appointed an Ad Hoc Committee to prepare a long-range plan for the effective utilization of TAC’s fighting power. The committee’s final report, which came to be known as the "TAC Concept," made a number of specific recommendations to improve command efficiency.

The backbone of the concept was a revised rotation system similar to that already employed at SAC by which TAC would retain centralized control of

ii^TAC Historv, 1 Jan. - 30 June 1955, Vol. I, p. 21-22.

^^'^Ibid ., p. 22. 297

its combat units on a global basis. Previously, TAC permanently lost

operational control of its units deployed overseas rendering it, in

effect, an advanced training operation. The new rotation plan would

deploy each TAC wing overseas once every two years for six months, after

which they would revert to TAC’s operational control. The other

essential aspect of the "TAC Concept" was the development of the

Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) as a rapidly fully integrated, rapid

deployment, tactical air striking force. TAC designed the CASF as a

self-contained forces available for emergency deployments anywhere in the world under the direct operational control of the Nineteenth Air Force

and TAC.iei

On the surface, a feeling of déjà vu pervaded the events of the

years immediately following the end of the Korean War. The political and military leadership of 1953 seemed remarkably willing to neglect the benefit of hindsight and follow in the footsteps of political and military leaders of 1946. The Air Force, dedicated from its inception to

the primacy of strategic bombing, once again saw the opportunity to build-up its bomber forces and rid itself of the burden of a large

tactical support force to support ground campaigns. This time, however, the civilian administration— led by one of the major Army figures of

World War II— shared the USAF vision of a nuclear umbrella that would allow the US to minimize defense spending and retreat to its pre-World

War II distance from the affairs of Europe without giving an inch to communist expansion. It was a vision that appealed to a public and

leilbid., p. 7. 298

Congress that was weary of devoting American lives and resources to fight

other nations' wars and that was ready to turn its energies and treasure

inward.

The New Look and the strategy of Massive Retaliation allowed the

United States to retreat into semi-isolationism without feeling it had abandoned its allies or the cause of world freedom. Within the military

establishment, most military spokesmen expressed only limited reservations concerning the new military agenda, with three exceptions.

The Air Force, which faced the prospect of finally realizing its ten-year goal of becoming the undisputably dominant military service, backed the president's programs energetically. The Army and the Tactical Air

Command, which would have to fight the next limited war with the same handicaps as they had the previous two, took issue with the assumption that conventional war was obsolete, warning that dismantling all military capabilities for limited war would imperil a large portion of US strategic interests and unnecessarily endanger US troops should such a war break out. Unfortunately, the Army and TAC could not overcome their interservice differences to join forces against the aspects of the New

Look to which they both objected; thus, their campaigns took very different and divergent courses that eventually threatened the hard-won progress in joint operations made during the Korean War. The Army, under

Ridgway, waged an energetic and public campaign to prevent the decimation of ground forces by convincing Congress and the public that the Army remained a decisive factor in warfare in the nuclear age. TAC, beginning with Cannon and accelerating under Weyland, undertook a program that focused on internal reform that would save tactical aviation by making it 299

an integral part of the deterrent capability that was the cornerstone of

massive retaliation.

With the activation of the Nineteenth Air Force, the implementation

of Weyland’s new TAC concept was underway along with the final

"SACercization" of the Tactical Air Command. Weyland had taken over TAC

in 1954 determined not to preside over another decline of tactical

aviation like the one that had followed World War II. As the former

commander of US Air Forces in Korea, he was keenly aware of the important

and unique contribution that tactical air power had made to saving the UN

effort there. As a career-long tactical aviator, he understood how vital

it was that tactical air and ground force commanders maintain a good

working relationship and that doctrine and capabilities for aii— ground operations stay dynamic. As a keen observer of military and diplomatic

events, he understood that those who argued that the US could continue to defend its complex global interests with a "one-size-fits-all" strategy

were at best overly optimistic, and at worst, dangerously deluded. As a member of the USAF ruling class, however, he knew that the overwhelming majority of his fellow airmen vehemently disagreed with his views and that for his plans for a vital and growing TAC to come to fruition would require imagination, compromise, and more than a little subterfuge. His course of action— to protect TAC from those who would destroy it by building it into an integral part of the strategy they so energetically espoused— succeeded, and by 1955 Tactical Air Command was safely entrenched as a major command within the Air Force and an important element of US deterrence policy. The question that remained to be answered was whether TAC, in its effort to defend itself against those 300 who would declare tactical aviation obsolete, had gone too far in its transfiguration and undermined the very capabilities it had set out to defend. CONCLUSION

During the decade following the end of World War 11, the Tactical

Air Command and tactical air advocates both within and outside the Air

Force found themselves engaged in an ongoing struggle to keep tactical

doctrine and capabilities alive. Through most of the period TAC, under

Quesada and Lee, struggled to find its place within an Air Force

hierarchy totally devoted to strategic bombing as the cornerstone of US

security. The battle became more difficult as domestic political and

economic realities demanded reductions in defense spending. The general

view that atomic forces were "cheaper" than conventional allowed the USAF

to impose most of its fiscal austerity on its non-strategic commands,

especially TAC. Soviet development of nuclear weapons in 1949

intensified interest in developing strategic capabilities and made

conventional forces seem all the more anachronistic.

The outbreak of war in Korea proved that conventional war would not

disappear in the post-nuclear world. The air war, in which USAF tactical

forces proved more decisive than its strategic forces, seemed to indicate

a revival of tactical air power, but the lessons of Korea were quickly

forgotten as the Eisenhower administration launched renewed austerity

programs. The New Look and its companion strategy, Massive Retaliation, placed more emphasis than ever before on reducing conventional

capabilities to the barest minimum and relying on strategic deterrence to protect US interests. Once again, the Air Force felt justified in

301 302

enhancing its strategic capabilities as much as possible, even at the

expense of its tactical forces. By 1954, it seemed likely that, despite

the lessons of TAC's previous demotion and its consequences in Korea,

USAF would once again reduce its tactical force structure and allow

doctrine and training to stagnate.

TAC’s leadership, under Cannon and Weyland, concluded that if the

command were to survive it had to do so in the context of the dominant

strategy— Massive Retaliation. As a result, instead of devoting the bulk

of its effort and resources to implementing the important tactical

lessons of the Korean War, TAC turned most of its attention to developing

its nuclear capability with an eye toward a future role as NATO's theater

strike force. The result was the CASF concept, the implementation of

which would ensure TAC’s continued growth, but as a miniature SAC.

During the 1950s, TAC moved farther away from traditional tactical

missions, concentrating instead on its regional or theater strike

capability. By the late 1950s, the command perceived itself primarily as

an extension of nuclear deterrence— a sort of massive retaliatory

capability on the regional rather than global level. Other missions,

especially aii— ground and air-air operations, fell into neglect as TAC became an increasingly specialized strike command. TAC's leadership

never abandoned its commitment to those missions in theory and conceived of the strike force concept, in part, as a means to protect them from

obliteration or absorbtion by SAC. The commitment, however, became

increasingly academic, and the tremendous effort devoted to the regional

strike force and TAC's increasing absorption with NATO strategy stifled progress in conventional tactical operations. 303

The serious implications of tactical aviation’s decline within USAF during the postwar period became apparent when, in the early 1960s, the

US became involved in Vietnam. As in Korea, the Air Force had to relearn the lessons of tactical operations at tremendous material and human cost.

Like Dorian Grey, TAC had sold its soul in exchange for vitality, and in

Vietnam, the world got a look at its aged and decrepit conventional structure. Doctrine and capabilities for tactical operations in a limited, non-nuclear war had improved little since 1950. The Air Force seemed to have dismissed nearly three years of combat experience in

Korea— not to mention the three years of World War II operations in

Europe and the Pacific— as irrelevant to its present needs and had done little to incorporate them into its institutional memory.

The United State Air Force was not solely responsible for the decline of tactical air power and joint capabilities during the postwar years. The Army bears some liability, especially for the stagnation of joint doctrine during the late 1940s and 1950s. For the most part. Army leadership was reluctant to take the political risks necessary to press its concerns over USAF’s management of tactical aviation. Army leadership tended to treat any controversy over joint operations as a

"family matter," and seemed reluctant to alienate the Air Staff in public debates, perhaps because it feared a Navy-USAF alliance against the Army.

Whatever their motives, the Army leaders repeatedly made demands for improvements in USAF tactical capabilities, watched passively while the

Air Force whittled them down, and then resigned themselves to accepting whatever bone USAF chose to throw their way.

Some within the Army, especially field commanders during the Korean 304

War, were less inclined to forgive the shortcomings of USAF tactical

capabilities. Individuals like Clark, Almond, and Van Fleet were, at

varying times, impatient with USAF excuses and kept the debate alive even when their superiors— like Ridgway and Collins during the Korean Wai--

were inclined to compromise. These renegades, however, too often operated from a limited or mistaken concept of tactical air doctrine— both land- and carrier-based— that produced exaggerated expectations and unreasonable demands. Their often faulty grasp of USAF, Navy, and Marine air doctrine made it easier for the Air Force to dismiss their arguments.

Like USAF, the Army too often allowed the debate over tactical aviation deteriorate into a squabble over numbers when the real issue was the absence of an effective system to coordinate USAF and Army operations.

Numbers of aircraft— even during the grim opening weeks of the Korean

War— were never the core of the problem. Even if USAF had tripled its tactical fleet, without a fundamental revision of the air request system, forward air control, and basic joint doctrine ground forces would not have received significantly improved air support. Another stumbling block to an improved joint operations system was the Army’s repeated demands that ground force commanders be given some degree of operational control of the air units that supported them. The demand— based on a complete misreading of the Marine Corps air support doctrine— was one to which no tactical air commander from any service would agree. The Army’s misunderstanding of tactical aviation’s capabilities, its reluctance to stir up political controversy, and USAF’s misconception that the Army sought to usurp the mission for itself combined to minimize its influence over the development of tactical air capabilities during the late 1940s 305

and early 1950s.

Civilian policymakers in Congress and the Executive were also

culpable in the deterioration of tactical aviation in particular, and essential conventional capabilities in general. Both the Truman and

Eisenhower administrations concocted military and foreign policies that were often contradictory and saddled the military with budget constraints

that made even minimal implementation difficult. Both presidents were overly suspicious of military professionals and tended to regard the JCS

and its recommendations with considerable skepticism. The inability of the JCS to resolve its differences without long, and too often public

squabbling further contributed to the executive branch's inclination to discount their opinions as interservice partisanship. Neither Truman nor

Eisenhower welcomed criticism from the JCS— either private or public— however well-intentioned. In general, as events like the Revolt of the

Admirals, the sacking of MacArthur, and the post-Korean balanced forces debate all indicated, relations between the military services and their

Commanders-in-Chief were less than amiable during most of the post-war decade.

Congress, in contrast, was all too willing to listen to military complaints and jump in the middle of interservice controversy. Well- intentioned congressional hearings frequently accomplished little more than to pour gasoline on the fires of interservice rivalry. Within the services, competition for the ears of Congress tended to undermine already tenuous interservice communication and counter attempts to establish meaningful cooperation. Too often, military representatives went to Congress before making serious attempts to resolve interservice 306

differences themselves. While such politicking usually succeeded in

drawing attention to their grievances, congressional action rarely fixed

the problem, and the ensuing rhetoric— as in the B-36 controversy— only

served to widen the gaps within the military. Tactical aviation, and its

sorry state, was a perennial favorite topic of congressional hearings and

always promised lively debate among the four services. Those hearings,

regardless of how earnestly they sought to discover the source of USAF’s

tactical malaise, were of little consequence as long as Congress and the

executive remained unwilling to take a political risk and make the fiscal

sacrifices necessary to rebuild adequate capabilities.

Ultimately, however, the fate of land-based tactical air power was

the Air Force’s responsibility. The reasons for the decline of tactical

air capabilities after World War II lay largely in the organization,

doctrine, and intellectual traditions of USAF. Of course, a major factor

in the equation was the Air Force’s fundamental, unwavering, and

sometimes blind devotion to the primacy of strategic bombing. USAF

independence served only to cement that dedication as strategic bombing

was the unique, independent, and potentially decisive mission that

provided its raison d ’etre. The National Security Act of 1947 gave USAF

its institutional independence, but it did not entirely sweep away its

inferiority complex. The same insecurity that would eventually make USAF

the most top-heavy military branch (18.2% officers in 1988) also contributed to the decline of its tactical capability. The Air Staff

could never let go of the suspicion that the Army wanted to reassert some of its former dominance over aviation, and TAC, because of its

necessarily close relations with the Army, seemed the most likely vehicle 307

through which such usurpation might take place. By organizing TAC out of existence in 1948, USAF guaranteed that the Army would have to negotiate for air support directly through the Air Staff rather than a more sympathetic tactical commander. Such attempts to minimize Army

influence over USAF tactical air forces continued— if less blatantly— throughout the postwar period, eventually filtering down to TAC. The

CASF represented, in large part, TAC’s attempt to build for itself an independent and decisive capability completely divorced from its joint operations mission.

The technological orientation of the Air Force and the intellectual traditions it spawned contributed as well to the stagnation of tactical aviation after World War II. Its adherence to strategic bombing theory

led USAF to become doctrinally rigid as it came to equate operational success with technological advancement. Because the Air Force

intelligentsia tended to view all military theory through the filter of strategic bombing doctrine, it was often unable or unwilling to assess the realities of overall US strategy objectively. It dismissed operational lessons that did not fit the dominant model— tactical operations in Western Europe, the Pacific, and Korea— as aberrations no matter how often they were repeated and tended to exaggerate the decisiveness of those that did fit— the atomic attacks on Japan or

Operation STRANGLE in Korea. Furthermore, despite its insistence that air power should not be "compartmentalized," USAF constructed for itself an organizational structure that discouraged the transmission of operational experience from the battlefield into the hands of those who wrote doctrine and planned future capabilities. As a result, doctrinal 308

innovations at TAC or Air University seldom reached combat units in overseas commands, and the combat experiences of those units were often

lost to TAC. As a result, valuable and hard-earned operational lessons about tactical air operations had little opportunity to find their way

into USAF’s institutional memory or, more important, into its doctrine and force planning.

The short term result of USAF’s rigidity was the decline, brief resurrection, and eventual inertia of its tactical capabilities. In both

Korea and Vietnam, the failure of USAF to keep its tactical capabilities, particularly air-ground and aii— air, up-to-date had unfortunate results for both ground and air forces that fought in those conflicts. In the

long term, USAF’s rigid adherence to theories of strategic bombing little changed since the 1920s threatened to render it irrelevant. In Korea,

the first major US military operation since World War II, USAF’s strategic forces were virtually impotent, and were employed primarily in

tactical roles. USAF’s first attempt to apply strategic bombing to limited war was at best inconclusive and to the extent that air power was decisive, it was in a clearly tactical role. Had USAF chosen to act upon the lessons of Korea and develop a somewhat more balanced force structure during the 1950s, it might have been spared the trauma of repeating its mistakes in Vietnam. By 1957 three facts seemed particularly evident: that the inevitable parity of US and Soviet nuclear capabilities would make a direct superpower confrontation unlikely; that communist expansion was most likely to occur on the strategic periphery in the form of limited wars; and that the advent of ICBMs, and later SLBMs, would eliminate the overwhelming need for an enormous fleet of manned strategic 309 bombers. If USAF were to achieve its fondest goal— military decisiveness— it would do so not through rigid adherence to a single concept, but by establishing a truly balanced force and an institutional hierarchy that regarded its tactical missions and strategic bombing with similar reverence. APPENDICES

310 311

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY CNF ACRONYMS

AAF Army Air Forces (pre- 1947) ACTS Air Corps Tactical School ADC Air Defense Command, USAF AFF Army Field Forces (until 1952) ARDC Air Research and Development Command, USAF CAF Continental Air Force, AAF (1945-46) CAF Canadian Air Force CASF Composite Air Strike Force, TAC CSSS Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth CincFE Commander-in-Chief, Far East ConAC Continental Air Command, USAF CONARC Continental Army Command, (beginning in 1952, previously AFF) ECM Electronic Counter Measures FAC Forward Air Controller FEAF Fear East Air Force, USAF JAG IT Joint Air-Ground Instruction Team JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JOC Joint Operations Center, USAF JTASB Joint Tactical Air Support Board JTD Joint Training Doctrine, September 1950 MAW Marine Aircraft Wing NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSC National Security Council OAF Operational Air Force (proposed, 1945) PRC Peoples’ Republic of China RAF Royal Air Force, Great Britain SAC Strategic Air Command, USAF SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, NATO TAC Tactical Air Command TACP Tactical Air Control Party UN United Nations USAF United States Air Force USAFE United States Air Forces-Europe 312

APPENDIX B

Table 1: USAF COMBAT WINGS 1946-1957 (Actual, and annual % change)

FY USAF SAC TAG

1946 54 13 6

1947 63 (+16%) 23 (+76%) *

1948 70 (+11%) 18 (-18%) 11

1949 56 (-20%) 19 (+5%) 0 (-100%)

1950 48 (-14%) 21 (+10%) 9

1951 87 (+81%) 31 (+48%) 27 (+200%)

1952 95 ( +9% ) 39 (+26%) 26 (-4%)

1953 106 (+10%) 43 (+10%) 14 (-46%)

1954 115 (+8%) 44 (+2%) 14

1955 121 (+5%) 50 (+14%) 14

1956 131 (+8%) 51 (+2%) 16 (+14%)

1957 134 (+2%) 45 (-11%) 21 (+31%)

SourcesrJactical Air Command, Monthly Statistical Summaries; Department of Defense, Summary Comparison of Forces.

«Unavailable or not applicable 313

APPENDIX C

Table 2: USAF MANPOWER LEVELS, 1940-1957 (By Command)

YEAR USAF SAC TAC .

1945 2,253,000 * * "

1946 455,515 32.190 26,810

1947 305,827 44,482 *

1948 387,730 45,600 31,731 .

1949 419,347 63,510 150

1950 411,277 77,200 13,686

1951 788,381 132,971 52,990

1952 973,474 154,354 53,275

1953 977,593 253,726 55,252

1954 977,919 174,913 52,416

1955 959,946 177,775 *

1956 909,958 197,041 58,324

1957 919,835 203,976 *

Sources; Alfred Goldberg, editor, A History of the United States Air Force, 1907 - 1957, (Princeton, NJ, 1957); Tactical Air Command, Monthly Statistical Studies.

*Unavailable or not applicable. 314

APPENDIX D

Table 3: US MILITfWY ŒRVICE STRENGTHS, 1945-1957

ARMY NAVY USAF YEAR DIVISIONS COMBATANTS WINGS"

1945 89 4,503 218

1946 16 780 54

1947 12 625 63

1948 11 641 70

1949 10 457 56

1950 10 447 48

1951 18 789 87

1952 20 831 95

1953 20 843 106

1954 19 824 115

1955 20 769 121

1956 18 737 131

1957 18 743 134

Sources: U.S. Department of Defense, Summary Comparison of Forces; Jeffrey Record, Revising US Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends, (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1984), Appendices C, D.

"USAF stated its strength in terms of groups until 1952. The change from group to wing designation represented primarily an administrative reorganization. In numbers of combat air units, groups and wings are equivalent. 315

APPENDIX E

Table 4: US DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS AS PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL SPENDING AND GNP: 1945-1957

FISCAL YEAR •/. OF FEDERAL BUDGET •/. OF GNP

1945 88.3 37.3

1946 17.3 20.6

1947 33.6 5.2

1948 26.3 3.2

1949 30.3 4.5

1950 29.1 4.7

1951 48.0 7.0

1952 64.0 12.8

1953 65.6 13.8

1954 65.3 12.7

1955 58.1 10.5

1956 56.4 9.7

1957 55.3 9.8

Source; Caspar W. Weinberqer, Annual Reoort to the Conoress for Fiscal Year 1983, (Washinoton, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1982). 316

APPENDIX F

Table 5: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: BUDGET AUTHORIZATIONS, 1951 - 1953 (in millions of dollars)

1950 1951 1952 1953

Total DoD 13,048 48,182 60,436 46,961

Army 4,234 19,360 21,640 13,194

Navy 4,027 12,481 16,098 12,628

USAF 4,596 15,896 22,265 20,588

Source: United States Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1954, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, DC, 1953). 317

APPENDIX G

Table 6: USAF ASSI«\ED RESOURCES: USAFE, 1946-1957

Year Personnel Aircraft Units

1946 75,618 <2,300 5 Wings

1947 45,645 428 1 Wing 2 Groups

1948 54,064 368 5 Groups

1949 36,390 381 5 Groups

1950 35,120 366 4 Groups

1951 75,856 668 7 Wings

1952 98,292 1,025 7 Wings

1953 96,679 1,509 11 Wings

1954 110,075 2,246 16 Wings

1955 136,475 2,210 16 Wings

1956 113,477 2,027 17 Wings

1957 103,501 2,021 15 Wings

Source; Dr. R. Bruce Harley, Historical Highlights: United States Air Forces in Europe, 1945 - 1975, USAFE Monograph Series 1974/4, 10 May 1974, AFS/HRC, K570.041-12. 318

APPENDIX H

Table 7: US MILITARY PERSONNEL EimOPEAN COraiAND, 1950-1960

YEAR MANPOWER LEVEL

1950 145,000

1951 346,000

1952 405,000

1953 427,000

1954 404,000

1955 405,000

1956 398,000

1957 393,000

1958 380,000

1959 380,000

1960 379,000

Source: Congressional Record (Senate), May 12, 1982, p. S4992. 319

APPENDIX J

Table 8: TAC COmANDERS, 1946 - 1959

Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada Mar. 21, 1946 - Nov. 23, 1948

Maj. Gen. Robert M. Lee Dec. 24, 1948 - June 20, 1950

Maj. Gen. Glenn 0. Barcus July 17, 1950 - Jan. 25, 1951

Gen. John K. Cannon Jan. 25, 1951 - Mar. 31, 1954

Gen. Otto P. Weyland Apr. 1, 1954 - July 31, 1959 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Standerwick, Robert L. U.S. Goals, the Cold War, and Air Force Doctrine. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University, Air Command and Staff College (thesis), May 1965.

Stevenson, John D. Strategic Mobility of a Tactical Air Command. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University, Air War College (thesis), February 1948.

Stringer, David L. Roles, Missions, and Politics: The USAF and the B- 36, 1945-50. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University, Air Command and Staff College (thesis), April 1987.

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OFFICIAL, GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

Air University. Air Command and Staff College. Tactical Air Operations. ACSC Pamphlet Number 36. Maxwell AFB, Alabama: ACSC, July 1948, July 1949.

Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. United States Defense Policv since World War II. 85th Congress, 1st Session. House Document number 100. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957.

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Subcommittee Hearings on H.R. 399 to provide for the organization of the Air Force and the Department of the Air Force and for other purposes. January 10, 1951. 82nd Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1951.

______. Investigation of the B-36 bomber program. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 234: "A resolution authorizing and directing thorough studies and investigations relating to matters involving the B-36 bomber. August 9 - October 5, 1949. 81st Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1949.

Study of Airpower. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on Armed Services. April 16 - July 19, 1956. 84th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1956.

______. Air Force Organization Act of 1951. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 1726: "An Act to provide for the organization of the Air Force and the Department of the Air Force. April 23, 24, 1951. 82nd Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1951.

ARTICLES

Barcus, Glen 0. "Tally for TAC." Flying. Volume 53, number 1 (1953), pp. 17, 65.

Borowski, Harry R. "Air Force Atomic Capability from V-J Day to the 326

Berlin Blockade: Potential or Real?" Military Affairs. Volume 44, Number 3 (1980), pp. 105-110.

Boston, Ronald G. "Doctrine by Default: The Historical Origins of Tactical Airlift." Air University Quarterly Review. Volume 34, number 4 (1983), pp. 64-75.

Boyne, Walter J. "The Evolution of Jet Fighters: A New Point of View." Air University Quarterly Review. Volume 35, number 2 (1984), pp. 35-45.

DeSantis, Vincent. "Eisenhower Revisionism." Review of Politics. April, 1976.

Dolan, Michael J. "What’s Right and Wrong with Close Air Support." Combat Forces Journal. Volume 1, number 72 (1951), pp. 24-30.

Coble, Donald W. "Air Support in the Korean War." Aerospace Historian. Vol. 16, No. 2 [Summer 1969], pp. 26-29.

Coughlin, William J. "Air Lessons of Korea." Aviation Week. Vol. 63 [May 25, 1953]: pp. 23-24.

Futrell, Robert Frank. "Air Power Lessons of World War II." Air Force Digest. Volume 48, number 9 (1965), pp. 42-53.

Huston, James A. "Tactical Use of Air Power in World War II: The Army Experience." Military Affairs. Volume 14, number 4 (1950), pp. 166-200.

Quesada, Elwood R. "Tactical Air Command." Military Review. Volume 27, number 6 (1947), pp. 3-8.

Sleeper, Raymond S. "Air Power, the Cold War, and Peace." Air University Quarterly Review. Volume 5, number 1 (1952), pp. 3-18.

Spaatz, Carl. "Air Power in the Atomic Age." Colliers. Volume 116, number 23 (December 8, 1945), pp. 11-12.

"The Evolution of Air Power." Military Affairs. Vol. 11 [Spring 1947]: pp. 3-16.

Stewart, Air Power, the Decisive Force in Korea. Nastrand, 1957.

Thompson, Annis G. "TAC’s Global Combat Airlift Airforce." Pegasus. Volume 25, number 3 (1956), pp. 65-69.

Vandenburg, Hoyt S. "The Truth About Our AirPower." Saturday Evening Post. Volume 223, number 34 (February 17, 1951), pp. 20-21.

Weyland, Otto P. "The Air Campaign in Korea." Air University Quarterly Review. Volume 6, number 3 (1953), pp. 3-28. 327

White, Thomas D. "USAF Doctrine and National Policy." Air Force. Volume 41, number 1 (1958), pp. 47-51.

Wiltz, John E. "The MacArthur Hearings of 1951; The Secret Testimony." Military Affairs. December, 1975.

DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

Almond, Edward M. Papers. US Army Military History Institute. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Chief of Staff, Army, Records. RG 319. National Archives. Washington, D.C.

Continental Air Command Historical Archives. Alfred F. Simpson Historical Research Center. Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

LeMay, General Curtis. Papers. Library of Congress. Manuscript Division. Washington, D.C.

Numbered Air Force Histories. Alfred F. Simpson Historical Research Center. Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

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Ridgway, Matthew Bunker. Papers. US Army Military History Institute. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

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