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Home , Deep state, Israeli Labor Party

NO. 50 DECEMBER 2019 Introduction

The and : The Risk of Growing Apart If Prevails in Israel, the Special Relationship May Not Survive Mark A. Heller

United States Secretary of Mike Pompeo’s assertion that “ of Israeli civilian settlements in the is not per se inconsistent with inter- national law” is merely the latest example of how US and Israeli policies have marched almost in lockstep since ’s inauguration as president. However, the United States and Israel have shared an intense and intimate relationship that long predates the Trump Administration and goes beyond the chemistry of individual leaders. In many respects, in fact, that relationship is unique in American foreign relations and uniquely critical to Israeli security. It is grounded in a shared narra- tive of biblically inspired frontier societies that have gathered in immigrants and refu- gees, tamed the wilderness, and built liberal democracy. This explains the broadly receptive environment in the United States for the message of US-Israeli commonality. Nevertheless, the durability of the relationship is not guaranteed. If the societies and political cultures of the two countries either continue to develop along parallel, illiberal lines or shift simultaneously in a more liberal direction, the connection be- tween them will be preserved, or even strengthened. However, if they diverge, and especially if Israel maintains its rightward drift while America moves in an opposite direction, the normative foundation of the relationship will erode, with ominous implications for Israel.

Following the inconclusive Israeli election any particular or party. That tie of September 17, 2019, President Donald is indisputable and is manifest in the fact Trump did not call Israeli Prime Minister that the United States provides the kind Binyamin Netanyahu, either to congratu- of alternative strategic depth that Israel late or to commiserate. In view of the has always sought in order to compensate ostensibly tight connection between the for its relative lack of territorial and other two, Trump was pressed for an explanation. resources needed to blunt threats to its In response, he tweeted that the United security. States is tied to Israel the country, not to

The Nature of the pean Union as a whole), and the United US-Israeli Relationship States is a major source of investment capi- tal. And diplomatically, the United States Contrary to popular impression, however, has provided a political shield against efforts the United States was not always Israel’s of Israel’s adversaries to isolate, sanction, major great power partner. In 1948, as the and otherwise punish it in international United States applied an arms embargo to fora. Furthermore, the relationship with both sides in the Arab-Israeli War (and the United States has not only prevented or Great Britain continued to train and supply deterred damaging actions by others hostile several Arab client armies), it was actually to Israel; Israel’s ties with and putative the that provided the critical, influence in the United States have even albeit fleeting, support needed to stave off induced some third parties to cultivate a Arab attempts to abort the birth of the closer relationship with Israel in the hope Jewish state. In the 1950s and early 1960s, that that link would somehow help im- as the Soviet Union turned hostile and the prove their own standing in Washington. United States was at best standoffish, it was Finally, the United States has been the pri- France that took on the role of Israel’s great mary broker of efforts to contain or resolve power patron. It was only after 1967, and conflicts with and and has especially after 1973, that American politi- served as the most reliable intermediary cal leadership and American public opinion from Israel’s perspective in efforts to acknowledged a convergence of interests contain/resolve the Israeli-Palestinian con- and values, which permitted US-Israel ties flict – an agenda item for most American to deepen and broaden. Since then – and presidents over the last four decades. notwithstanding periodic tensions, primarily For the United States, the political-stra- about differing approaches to Arab-Israeli tegic benefits that have accrued from this conflicts – the relationship has grown relationship are more limited but still note- more intense and intimate, to the point worthy. During the , Israeli power where the two countries share a special helped blunt advances by Soviet clients relationship of the sort that neither Israel and fortify US-aligned regimes, and Israeli nor, arguably, the United States has with battlefield successes allowed the American any other foreign partner. security establishment to enhance its The benefits of these ties for Israel have understanding of Soviet technol- been undeniable. The United States has ogies and doctrines. Since the end of the provided Israel with lavish military assis- Cold War, continuing intelligence exchang- tance (currently amounting to $3.8 billion es and joint development and evaluation of per annum, equivalent to about 1% of new technologies have helped improve the Israel’s GDP), granted access to advanced American ability to analyze the Middle East technologies and weapons systems (64% of and respond to military challenges, and not all Israeli weapons purchases in the period only in the field of counter-terrorism. 2014–2018 were made in the United It is clear, however, that the strategic ben- States), and offered participation in joint efits of this relationship, while reciprocal, development projects that have helped are not symmetrical, and the American Israel to sustain a qualitative military edge embrace of Israel is explained at least as over its adversaries. The United States has much by common values as by convergent also been a source of real-time resupply interests. The commonalities go beyond of military consumables in times of high- membership by both in the club of liberal intensity conflict and of considerable intel- democracies; America shares that member- ligence assets. In economic terms, the ship with dozens of other countries in volume of Israel’s trade with the United the world. Nor do domestic politics explain States is larger than that with any other the singularity of the US-Israeli relation- single country (though not with the Euro- ship. True, the United States is home to the

SWP Comment 50 December 2019

2 largest, most prosperous, and most self- – has begun to fray. Over the past few assured Jewish community in the diaspora, decades, Israel has witnessed a strengthen- one which has historically identified strongly ing of traditionalist and conservative forces with Israel and acted to promote American- inclined to interpret democracy as little Israeli relations. But the United States is more than the will of the majority and in- also home to many other large diasporas, tent on whittling away at the cultural and and these have also played an important institutional “obstacles” to the majority’s role in American “ethnic” politics; some, unfettered rule. Such obstacles include such as Cuban-Americans, for example, (especially an inde- have influenced US policy vis-à-vis the pendent judiciary), the rule of law, and country of their concern, but others, such the protection of basic liberties of speech, as the “China Lobby,” have registered very assembly, religion, and property, as well as partial successes, at best. independent, that is, critical, mass media – In any case, what seems to be unique all underpinned by tolerance, if not respect about Israel – and what explains the for, minority cultures, interests, and opin- degree to which the message of its advo- ions, and for the individual rights and cates resonates with the broader American liberties of citizens. These features are the public – is the extent to which its story is hardware and software of liberal democracy, seen to overlap America’s own. Both coun- and if they are undermined – even as the tries see themselves as the executors of consequence of the outcome of free elec- some exceptional historical mission rooted tions – the result will be illiberal democ- in biblical sources to redeem land and racy, or “majoritarian authoritarianism.” people while freeing themselves from the The strengthening of illiberal parties has undemocratic background of their his- come at the expense of left-wing and secu- torical origins. The millenarian idea of larist forces, and the principal loser in this building “the New Jerusalem” was a com- trend has been the Israeli Labor Party in its mon religious theme in America from the various guises. Labor, when still in the form 17th to 19th centuries, analogous to the of (the Israel Workers’ Party), created millenarian theme even among secular Israel’s pre-state institutions, established Zionists of redeeming the Jewish people; the state, and dominated its the original 13 American colonies are for the first three decades of the country’s dotted with towns bearing names taken existence. Since 1977, however, the Labor from the Old Testament. It is the perception Party has led or co-led ruling coalitions for of narrative convergence that has provided only 12 years; for the rest of the time, cen- a broadly receptive environment for the ter-right or right-wing coalitions have domi- message of American-Israeli commonality. nated, and the Labor Party and its socialist Absent that environment, it is doubtful and social-democratic partners have been whether any amount of activism by Jewish reduced to shells of their former selves. pro-Israel elements could have produced This trend certainly reflects a shift the kind of outcomes characterizing Ameri- toward more hardline public attitudes on can policy over the past half-century. How- relations with Arab/Muslim adversaries, ever, if that environment changes because especially the Palestinians – the cumula- of changes in the society and political cul- tive result of inconclusive war processes ture of one or both countries, the narrative and counter-terror campaigns, but also of overlap could be put to a serious test. disappointing peace processes. Perhaps the single most important inflection point came in 2000, when what was widely A Changing Israel viewed, even by President Bill Clinton, as a very forthcoming Israeli proposal that went At least part of the convergence – the part beyond the parameters suggested by Clin- relating to the culture of liberal democracy ton himself, was met, in the view of most

SWP Comment 50 December 2019

3 Israelis, not by Palestinian acceptance or in the same direction. One is the persis- even by continuing negotiations, but rather tence of identity politics, coupled with by a protracted campaign of terror that growing socio-economic inequality. This included dozens of bombings of civilians, is not just a question of the “ethnic divide” causing hundreds of deaths. The experience among Israeli Jews. This division, per se, of the “” persuaded many has not intensified: “inter-marriage” be- Israeli voters that the “peace process” was tween Ashkenazi (European) and Sephardi an illusion, enough of one, in fact, to pro- (Eastern) Jews, for example, has actually duce a shift in the center of political gravity become much more common and socially that has persisted for almost two decades. acceptable, and it now accounts for more However, the focus on the Israeli-Pales- than 20% of all Jewish marriages, as op- tinian conflict tells only part of the story, posed to only about 5% in the 1970s. How- because attitudinal studies over time still ever, socio-economic inequality has grown show greater support for conciliatory appreciably in recent decades; from the policies than for the political parties that mid-1980s to the late 2000s, Israel’s Gini espouse those conciliatory policies. Even in coefficient – measuring the inequality of 2018, years after the “death” of the peace distribution of income after taxes and trans- process had become conventional wisdom, fers – rose from 0.326 to 0.371; among the 58% of Israeli Jews (and 89% of Israeli Arabs) 36 member countries of the Organisation still supported a two-state resolution of the for Economic Co-operation and Develop- conflict, and 62% of Israeli Jews felt that ment (OECD), only the United States, Chile, Israel’s best option was to strive either for , and Mexico had more unequal a comprehensive agreement with the Pales- income distribution. Moreover, growing tinians or for transitional agreements socio-economic gaps find expression in resulting in separation from the Palestini- growing educational gaps; PISA (Programme ans. In other words, “the Palestinian issue” for International Student Assessment) tests is not the sole – and perhaps not even in 2018 (which did not even include ultra- the central – wedge issue of the left-right Orthodox students, whose independent but divide in Israeli worldviews, in general, state-financed school system does not teach and in voting behavior, in particular. minimum core curriculum requirements in Instead, the successes of the right-wing mathematics, science, and English) showed bloc are due to a combination of factors. that advantaged students outperformed dis- The Palestinian issue/peace process is cer- advantaged students in reading by 121 score tainly one of them; it may even be the points (compared with an OECD-wide aver- case that the perception that the positions age difference of 89 score points), and that adopted by left-wing governments and this performance gap had actually grown parties abroad (especially in Europe) are by 18 score points since 2009 (whereas the driven by an anti-Israel animus exposes the average OECD performance gap rise in the Israeli left to the criticism that it is a co- same period had been only two points). conspirator with its ideological soulmates These inequalities overlap much of the overseas. The extent to which the left can residual ethnic divide that still separates be tarred by the European brush is reflected Ashkenazi and (not to speak in the finding that 51% of Israeli Jews (but of Arabs and Jews as a whole). Among the only 14% of Israeli Arabs) view the Euro- latter, the consequence of all this is often pean Union as a foe, whereas only 24% a gulf between center and periphery and view it as a friend (as opposed to 48% of between “the elites” and “the people.” This Israeli Arabs). sort of gulf sustains feelings of prejudice However, in addition to the strengthen- and victimization and provides fodder for ing of the nationalist right – whether political exploitation, including the kind of for ideological reasons or security calcula- incitement against “the establishment,” the tions – there are social changes trending left, socialists, foreigners, and minorities

SWP Comment 50 December 2019

4 frequently seen in other illiberal democra- The result has been policy “packages” cies. A dramatic example of this mindset is (grand bargains) combining many of the the complaint of a campaign advisor following elements: “hardline” positions and former speechwriter for Prime Minister on the Palestinian issue; efforts to constrain Netanyahu, more than 40 years after the “judicial activism” (i.e., independent judi- Likud first came to power: “The left set up cial review of the legality/constitutionality the state and left it in ruins; it left most of of actions taken by the executive branch Israel’s citizens oppressed. Two countries and laws enacted by the legislative major- were built here – the country of the owners, ity) by means of attacks on the Supreme of the hegemony, the elites, and a second Court for thwarting “the will of the people”; country of the second-, third-, fourth- and attempts to domesticate critical media by fifth-class citizens – and that’s us, the either corrupting them or delegitimizing majority of the people...” them (for allegedly helping Israeli’s enemies A second trend is the “traditionalization” in their campaign to delegitimize the state); of society due to higher birth rates in the attacks on the public prosecutor and other Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox communities, unelected officials, including even the hence the growing electoral weight of reli- (for investigating corruption by gious voters and the preservation – if not elected officials); attempts to discredit the enhancement – of the influence of the loyalty of the “leftist” opposition; budgetary Orthodox/ultra-Orthodox religious estab- favoritism for religious institutions; acqui- lishment. The average fertility rate of ultra- escence in demands of religious zealots to Orthodox women is currently 7.1 children refuse allocation of a mixed-gender prayer per woman, as opposed to 4 for modern space at the Western Wall; receptivity to religious women, 2.7 for “traditional” conspiracy theories about “the deep state”; women, and 2.1 for secular Jewish women. accommodation of xenophobic sentiments If these patterns continue, the ultra-Ortho- (e.g., attempts to deport grown Israeli-born dox, who are now about 12% of the popula- children of foreign workers); and passage tion, will account for 32% of the population of a Nationality Law that changes virtually by 2065. nothing in the material reality of the coun- The hardening of attitudes toward the try but articulates preferential symbolic Palestinians alone could not have produced status to Jews. the seemingly durable shift toward right- It must be added that many of these wing illiberalism in Israel. Nor could socio- attempts have been thwarted by legal and/ economic and socio-ethnic polarization or political opposition, and none of the alone have brought about that result. Even trend lines identified here, even the demo- religious traditionalization alone could not graphic one, is unstoppable. In fact, there have been a sufficient condition. However, are some signs of growing pushback, in- though the peculiarities of the proportional cluding massive demonstrations against a representation system of elections have proposed Immunity Law that would have made it impossible for security hawks, ideo- shielded a serving prime minister from logical hawks, national-religious or ultra- prosecution for criminal acts, and rejection Orthodox streams, or the socio-ethnic of a proposed Override Clause that would “dispossessed” from attaining an electoral have allowed the to nullify Su- majority on their own, they have encour- preme Court rulings – not to speak of two aged the convergence of all these streams recent elections that denied victory to the and produced coalitions marked by sym- partners of the illiberal coalition. Israel bolic and rhetorical posturing and material remains a vibrant democracy, but unless pandering to the components of the coali- the trends identified here are reversed, tions, which the left and center-left, tradi- Israel will remain at risk of its ethnic tional as well as secular, have been unwill- democracy being turned into ethnic chau- ing/unable to accommodate. vinism, of being pulled further away from

SWP Comment 50 December 2019

5 the liberal socio-political principles in spheres. Theoretically, Israel and the United which it is historically grounded, and of States could begin to march to different being transformed into a populist polity drummers if Israel pivots in a more liberal that is intolerant of minorities or political direction and the United States maintains opposition of any kind. its populist course, at least in the near term. After all, most polls show Trump retaining the bulk of his supporters from the 2016 A Changing America? election, and the main economic indicators, especially unemployment, which political At first glance, there is little here that pundits insist are the most important pre- would seem to distinguish Israel from simi- dictors of election outcomes, appear to be lar developments in the United States. After working in his favor. Nevertheless, of the all, America also seems to be moving in the two possible causes of divergence, the more direction of illiberal democracy and popu- likely one is that Israel will continue to list nationalism in recent years. Donald evolve over the foreseeable future as it has Trump appears to have tapped a deep vein (with a few deviations) in the recent past, of American nativism and isolationism that but that the United States will change course. goes back at least as far as the Know Nothing There are several reasons why this is so. movement of the 1850s, and as president, First of all, the shift that has taken place in he seems to be leading America away from the United States is neither as pronounced its liberal tradition, in terms of both domes- nor as prolonged as the one in Israel. In- tic politics and international order. America, deed, the “illiberal” American shift that too, has been experiencing growing socio- took place in 2016 is something of a quirk economic inequalities of the sort that ap- of the electoral system and also something pear to encourage illiberal populism. There of an optical illusion, because most of its is therefore no prima facie reason to con- manifestations are championed by a can- clude that American-Israeli commonality is didate who lost the popular vote and are diminishing, and that intimacy between the not necessarily supported by public opin- two countries is therefore likely to decline. ion. In fact, the rhetoric of illiberalism has On the contrary, parallel trends in the two so far outpaced actions of domestic or inter- countries might actually tighten the ties. national illiberalism; NAFTA was abolished This is exactly what has happened since but replaced by NAFTA-II; NATO was de- 2017. Notwithstanding some remaining dif- clared “obsolete” but then the declaration ferences, such as attitudes toward Turkey, was declared “obsolete”; the Border Wall American endorsement of Israeli policy and was announced but not actually built; entry American actions that are consistent with of Muslims into the country was banned Israeli objectives on the Pales- and then the ban was reversed; the with- tinian question and other regional issues, drawal of American troops in Syria was especially Iranian nuclear ambitions and loudly proclaimed and quietly reversed. cultivation of ties between Israel and the Secondly, there is an established pattern Arab Gulf states, have reached unprece- of fluctuation between “left” and “right” in dented levels. That kind of complementarity American politics, and every time someone could well continue if both countries either explains why a fundamental and durable maintain their present political vector or change has taken place, the thesis is almost else change direction more or less simul- immediately discredited by an electoral taneously. reversal. In fact, this is frequently evidenced However, there is a distinct possibility almost immediately in mid-term congres- that trend lines in the coming years will not sional elections – including those of move in parallel fashion but will actually 2018 – where the normal pattern has been begin to diverge, and that gaps between the for the incumbent president’s party to lose two countries will begin to widen in many some strength, as if the electorate is trying

SWP Comment 50 December 2019

6 to remind him or her not to get carried but their efforts are not universally endorsed. away. Israel has no such tradition. Many of the constituencies of “liberalism,” Thirdly, the federal system and the con- at least as embodied in the stitutional separation of powers and par- of the 21st century, have less of an affin- allel electoral systems (for chief executive ity with Israel’s historical narrative, and and legislature, as well as for state govern- some – to judge by the explicit preferences ments) in the United States provide a some- of a few in the radical wing of the Demo- what greater check on executive power cratic Party, and even by the content of because, in the case of clearly hostile public debates in the 2019 Democratic presidential opinion, legislators can more easily sepa- primary campaigns – are prepared to advo- rate their own political destinies from that cate changes in the quality of the bilateral of the head of government. The constitu- relationship that had previously been voiced tional separation of state and religion in only infrequently in the mainstream of the America, hence, the absence of any estab- American political discourse. lished religious authority, also means that, Moreover, the changing composition of however pious Americans may be in their the American electorate will not eliminate personal beliefs, their political system is not the core of voters attached by emotive links subject to the “traditionalizing” influence to Israel, especially among evangelicals, of a religious establishment with formal but there will be larger numbers of voters powers. with no religious or ethno-national roots Finally, to the extent that demographic in Israel’s identity and history and among factors do play a role in determining the whom Israel’s narrative is less resonant. To political texture of society, the sector most cite just one dramatic example of the change: identified with the “illiberal democracy” 60 years ago, Hubert Humphrey, a vigorous allegedly ushered in after 2017 – white, supporter of Israel, was one of the senators non-Hispanic voters (lacking higher edu- from Minnesota; today, Ilhan Omar, perhaps cation) – is already diminishing in propor- the fiercest opponent of Israel in Congress, tional terms and will begin to decline in is a representative from the same state. absolute numbers in 2030. In many critical Furthermore, barring a change in the states, non-Hispanic whites are already in vector of Israeli society and politics, Israel the minority, and many projections suggest may not even be able to count on the degree that before 2045, Trump’s main linguistic- of support from the American Jewish com- racial constituency will be a minority in the munity to which it has become accustomed. entire country. The majority of American Jews are com- All these factors are highly relevant mitted liberals, and some exhibit growing for the quality of American relations with signs of discomfort with the illiberalism of Israel. A “liberal” swing of the pendulum Israeli governments in recent years, not just in the United States, unless accompanied by with respect to “the peace process,” but also a similar swing in Israel, may well produce with respect to domestic politics. For exam- an American government of a different tex- ple, the majority of those affiliated with ture, one less favorably disposed to Israel, some stream of American Judaism (them- even if there is no lingering resentment of selves only about two-thirds of American the way in which both Trump and Netan- Jews) are members of Conservative or Re- yahu have become identified with the form congregations, precisely those streams transformation of US-Israeli relations into subject to dismissive comments and dis- a partisan issue. The Republicans have criminatory practices by the Chief Rabbin- certainly tried to do this, but the extent to ate in Israel. Moreover, as the immediacy which they succeed depends at least in part of the Holocaust fades with the passage of on the Democratic response. Centrist Demo- time, so, too, does emotional identification cratic presidential candidates – those run- with Israel’s raison d’être. Consequently, ning to the middle – are trying to resist, younger generations of Jews may well come

SWP Comment 50 December 2019

7 to feel less identified with, and committed leaders with whom he could share friend- to, Israel than were their parents or grand- ship and “bonds of trust.” parents. Criticizing Israeli policy has long Nor do the risks of a loosening of ties been commonplace. But in recent years, include the withdrawal of a guarantee of even more radical Jewish voices have been direct American intervention in Israel’s raised, identifying with extreme left-wing, defense in extremis; that has never been anti-Semitic movements that question a formal part of the relationship, and it is Israel’s essential legitimacy. These voices something that Israel has never requested are still truly marginal, amounting, by one or needed – in part precisely because of estimate, to no more than about 3% of the the magnitude of American assistance, © Stiftung Wissenschaft Jewish community. Nevertheless, a recent short of physical presence. Still, the erosion und Politik, 2019 poll shows that 51% of Israeli Jews already of the relationship, even if incremental, All rights reserved feel that US Jews are not supportive enough. would have potentially serious consequences Other things being equal, the alienation of for the military, diplomatic, and economic This Comment reflects American Jews from Israel may well inten- security of the country, and that risk in- the author’s views. sify in the future. heres in the degree to which Americans The online version of looking into the Israeli “mirror” come to this publication contains see less and less of themselves. functioning links to other Conclusions Israeli leaders have always striven to SWP texts and other relevant avoid international isolation and invested a sources. In short, many of the traditional founda- great deal in public diplomacy. They have SWP Comments are subject tion stones of an intimate American-Israeli also factored anticipated reactions of others, to internal peer review, fact- relationship may be subject to weakening especially the United States, into discrete checking and copy-editing. or erosion. There is nothing in the foresee- foreign and security policy decisions. How- For further information on able future to suggest a complete discon- ever, although domestic politics have often our quality control pro- nect, much less the transmogrification of influenced these calculations (as they do cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- the United States into a hostile adversary. everywhere), the degree to which “purely” berlin.org/en/about-swp/ Israel and the United States will continue to domestic political decisions affect the quality quality-management-for- share important interests that can underlie of foreign relations has not been sufficiently swp-publications/ a strong transactional relationship, even appreciated. In fact, since chains of causality more than during the Cold War, when the run in both directions, the entire distinction SWP United States felt the need to compete with between domestic and international politics Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik the Soviet Union for the of Arab and security may be an artificial construct. German Institute for and Muslim states. After all, it is possible That does not mean, of course, that any International and for two countries, even without any con- actor can easily shape any other society’s Security Affairs vergence of narratives, to retain strong political structure or political culture. In bilateral ties based on transactional ben- almost all instances, any influence that may Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin efits. This is clear from the example of US- inhere in a relationship is marginal and in- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Turkish relations. Despite the absence of cremental rather than determinative – but Fax +49 30 880 07-100 any congruence in either their personal not inconsequential for all that. Therefore, www.swp-berlin.org or their national stories, President Barack since the United States is such a central fac- [email protected] Obama, a liberal democrat by almost any tor in Israel’s wellbeing, the need to main- criterion, felt no compunction about claim- tain some kind of narrative convergence ISSN 1861-1761 doi: 10.18449/2019C50 ing that Turkish President Recep Tayyip ought to be a compelling reason for Israelis Erdoğan, an illiberal democrat by almost to pay more attention to the international any reckoning, was one of the foreign ramifications of their “domestic” politics.

Mark A. Heller, PhD, is Principal Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies, University, and Visiting Fellow in the project “Israel in a Conflicting Regional and Global Environment: Internal Developments, Security Policy and External Relations.” The project is part of the SWP Middle East and Africa Division and is funded by the Federal Foreign Office.

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