Jeegir Banditry: Rebellion by Frontier Nomads 1941–1943

CHAPTER TWELVE JEEGIR BANDITRY: REBELLION BY FRONTIER NOMADS 1941–1943 After the collapse of the African Orientale Italian administration in Ethiopia in 1941, a new form of banditry emerged on the southern frontier of Borana. Within ten days of the Italians’ departure, fighting between Somali raiders and Borana pastoralists erupted, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people and the theft of thousands of heads of livestock. The British OETA took over briefly and the fighting died down for a while. After the termination of OETA and the signing of the 1942 treaty with emperor Haile Selassie, well-trained irregular forces, mostly Somalis but including other Islamic groups such as the Arsi Oromo, joined the insur- rection. The ex-Italian banda, trained in guerrilla tactics, unleashed a civil war known locally as olki Jeegira (Jeegir war). Somalis named the group dan usukentei, which refers to the way the gang members shaved their heads in a distinctive manner as a marker of identity. The Jeegir used Islam to unify and mobilize their followers against non- Muslims, although their primary political motivation was to resist the return of the Ethiopian administration. This chapter, analyzes the political environment in which the Jeegir rebellion emerged and the features that differentiated the Jeegir from other frontier bandits. It examines the genesis and goals of these bandit groups, their relationship to frontier communities and how the returning Ethiopian administration’s initial denial of the existence of banditry provided the bandits with the space to operate. It also focuses on the complex diplomacy that arose after the murder of the district commissioner of Mandera district. The Jeegir Banditry The Jeegir represented those sections of the frontier communities that felt disempowered by the return of the Ethiopian government. They refused to accept a government that they believed had trampled on their civil lib- erties and they used religion as a basis for organizing resistance, which allowed the development of a broad agenda. In contrast to the Tigre, who formed small shadowy bands, the Jeegir deployed large military forma- tions, equivalent to platoons and battalions, which spread fear in both the <UN> <UN> 256 chapter twelve imperial administrators and the pastoralists. Their military organization and the large number of combatants involved meant that their resistance could be seen as a nascent rebellion. Although the Jeegir does not fit neatly into the ‘social banditry’ category, the concept of ‘primitive rebellion’ might well apply (Hobsbawm 1969; Wagner 2007). However, the crite- ria the bandits used in distinguishing between supporters (Muslims) and victims (non-Muslims) in the frontier populations limited the scope of their motives. For this reason, I categorize this group as ‘bandits’ rather than as ‘rebels’, largely because of the way they preyed on some sections of the frontier communities. Before long, the initial political objectives of the group were overshad- owed by their attacks on particular frontier peoples, making it difficult to distinguish their activities from the ethnic feuding and primitive banditry that had characterized the southern frontier for some time. Attacks by Jeegir bandits on non-Somali frontier pastoralists created the impression that the war was one of attrition waged by Muslim Somalis against non- Muslim Borana and Gabra. This resulted in two competing conflicts— Jeegir banditry and ethnic conflict—occurring within the same theatre. Armed from the large stocks of light automatic weapons and ammuni- tion left behind by the Italians, the Jeegir organized raiding parties to cross the frontier (Pankhurst 1951:157). The raiding parties were led by various ringleaders who used Islamic symbols, such as green flags with Koranic script, marked with a crescent to underscore their ideological underpin- ning. Another important source of recruits was the hundreds of prisoners released from Thika by the British military authorities. During the war, the British had employed them as interpreters and information gatherers.1 The emerging conflict involved the usual ethnic protagonists: Jeegir allies were the Marehan and the Ogaden (Eji); their opponents were the Borana, the Gabra and Sakuye, and sometimes the Garre. By February 1942, a few months after the return of the Ethiopian administration, British intelligence recorded rumors of gangs of well-organized Somali bandits going around recruiting followers. There were reports that the Somalis in Liban, with the exception of the Marehan, resisted Amhara rule, but the Marehan chief, Sheikh Hussein, apparently had a good relationship with the new Ethiopian administrator, Fitaurari Tademe. Then in April ‘the storm broke.’2 Somali bandits began to attack frontier communities. According to information received by the Ethiopian administrator 1 NFD annual report, 1942, p.2, KNA/PC/NFD1/1/8. 2 Political history of Moyale District, 1942, KNA/DC/MLE/2/2. <UN> <UN>.

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