Changing Relationships in the Irish Borderlands

Kirk Simpson and Hastings Donnan

ABSTRACT: In this article we focus on Protestant and Catholic relationships in the bor- derlands of south in Northern and north Monaghan in the Irish Re- public. Studies that emphasise Protestant and Catholic relationships at the urban or macro level have done little to unravel the complex processes of relationship-building that operate along the border, where Catholic and Protestant not only live in close proximity to one another and cooperate in a range of everyday activities, but where in the recent past each ‘side’ has used ethnic identity to select targets for assassination. The complexities of intercommunal dynamics in rural border areas and the ways in which they impact upon relationships between border Protestants and Catholics are discussed, with particular reference to moments that have significantly shaped their political subjectivity, most notably the sectarian violence that erupted in 1969 and which was formally brought to a close by the Agreement of 1998. Such complexities, we suggest, muddy the over-dichotomised view of the Irish borderlands that often informs public policy making.

KEYWORDS: borders, conflict, , , violence

Introduction Much of the debate regarding power and identity amongst Catholics and Protestants in Studies that focus only on Protestant and Cath- Ireland, and in Northern Ireland especially, olic relationships at the urban or macro level is reducible to the question of political sover- have done little to illuminate the more complex eignty and a dichotomous examination of the processes of relationship-building that operate relationships between two, opposed, ethnopo- along the Irish border. In the borderlands of litical categories. However, this often does little south Armagh and north Monaghan, the Cath- to unravel the complex process of the operation olic majority and the Protestant minority reside and perception of political, social and cultural and work in close proximity to one another. power within the northern border Protestant They frequently cooperate and encounter mem- community in particular. In the context of the bers of the ‘other’ community in a host of every- south Armagh–north Monaghan border region, day (often mundane, rural) activities. However, Protestants are a minority population whose in the recent past each ‘side’ has used ethnic experience of residing in a ‘frontier’ zone is identity to select targets for assassination. The often incongruent with the more self-confident complexity of such ambivalent relationships and voice of political and cultural unionism that is the sinister history of intercommunal attacks articulated in areas of Northern Ireland where undermines the simplistic and dichotomised Protestants are in ‘safe’ majorities. As a result, view of the Irish borderlands that sometimes policies enacted with the latter in mind often forms the basis of public policy making. sit uncomfortably with the former. There has

Anthropology in Action, 13, 1–2 (2006): 69–77 © Berghahn Books and the Association for Anthropology in Action doi:10.3167/aia.2006.131209 AiA | Kirk Simpson and Hastings Donnan

always been an uneasy tension and ambiva- tant role within the grand political arena, most lence between border Protestants and their met- notably, defining and defending the bound- ropolitan co-religionists. In one sense, as the aries of Northern Ireland and the British state. custodians and frontline representatives of a This, however, has been complicated by the unionist committed to remaining part of recognition that Protestants are increasingly a the , border Protestants have small and unevenly distributed minority in the been symbolically central to the unionist project. borderlands, something exacerbated by the vi- Yet in another sense, as a peripheralised mi- olent events since the early 1970s which gener- nority on the edge of the Union that often feels ated a belief that an insidious process of ‘ethnic its voice is ignored by an urban, Protestant elite, cleansing’ was perpetrated by republican para- they have been marginal to the unionist cause militaries against local Protestants (see Harnden (see Buckland 1981; Stewart 1989). Caught be- 1999; Potter 2001; Dawson 2003). An acknowl- tween the fickle attentions of fellow Protestants edgement by border Protestants that they remain and the state on the one side, and their own wari- part of the wider ‘majority Protestant commu- ness of the growing Catholic majority around nity’ in Northern Ireland has been the source them on the other, it is an identity expressed of little comfort to those who feel isolated at and understood by engaging its own margin- the margins in south Armagh, and who have ality and sense of exclusion (Tsing 1993). It is felt themselves besieged and disempowered. within this zone of ambiguity that the regional identity of border Protestants has been forged, The Protestant people here got battered. We had to take it. Hold the line, you know? But we got increasingly so in the context of the growth of battered. And we were just expected to keep a cross-border policy making that followed the stiff upper lip and not say anything about it. political developments of the late 1990s. ‘That’s what Protestants do, you know? They can In this article we explore Catholic–Protestant take it’ (…) But then came ‘the big sell-out’ [i.e. relationships at the edges of the state where, the of 1998] (…) that’s we suggest, the distinctive dynamics of social just what a lot of people called it. A lot of people here are right against it. It has upset a lot of hon- relations at the limits of sovereignty exert a spe- est people here. A lot of people felt ‘what was it cial kind of influence upon public policy, which all for?’ (Protestant interviewee, south Armagh) must sometimes confront the reality of lives lived across states. As public policy ‘ripples out’ Such views have been central to relations be- from urban, political centres, affecting relation- tween Protestants and Catholics in the border ships at the limits of sovereignty at state bor- region, not least because of the ‘zero-sum’ na- ders, it may be reshaped and reconfigured by ture of the Irish political situation whereby any borderland residents whose daily existence rec- gain for the Catholic (nationalist) side is seen ognises and involves two states, on a pragmatic as a loss for the Protestant (unionist) group. Yet level if not always an ideological one. One re- at the same time, Catholics have often been sult of this process may be a ‘ripple back’ effect regarded by Protestants as ‘good neighbours’, that can unsettle historic affiliations within eth- people who pull together in times of trouble, nopolitical collectivities. ‘mucking in’ to milk the cows, helping Protes- tant farmers with the harvest or, before the vio- lence flared in the north, managing the farm Protestants and ‘Minority Status’ while Protestants attended parades.1 As those charged with upholding and main- The presence of this ‘good neighbour’ arche- taining the line, border Protestants were (and type within border Protestant narratives points many still are) acutely aware of their impor- to their belief in an alternate, ‘extraordinary rural

70 | Changing Relationships in the Irish Borderlands | AiA border community, one that is inclusive of Cath- For some border Catholics, Protestant memo- olics and that transcends the ‘ordinary’ politi- ries of Catholic neighbours in the border area as cal and historical divisions of Northern Ireland politically benign and of Protestants as a strong, and the Irish Republic. The construction of such cohesive, powerful community are both exag- alternative communities is arguably pragmati- gerated and linked to erroneous perceptions of cally advantageous to Protestants in the border- border Catholics as politically, socially and cul- lands, where they constitute a minority popula- turally disempowered prior to . tion, potentially negating the effects of political Nevertheless, there is some sense amongst and social power as exercised by a large Cath- the majority Catholic community in the border olic majority in the region (and in the Republic, areas that in spite of historical division, Protes- where it was anchored to a powerful Catholic tants and Catholics could be ‘good neighbours’ political centre). to one another (Donnan 2005). This is some- For northern border Protestants, the sociopo- what easier in north Monaghan than in south litical upheaval in the border area which began, Armagh because of the violence that broke out for them, in 1969—and their especially vulner- in the latter. able position within that bounded milieu— The Protestant perception of pre-Troubles Mon- was motivation enough for some to recommit aghan—when Catholic neighbours milked the enthusiastically to the wider group identity of cows on —was true. It definitely hap- Northern Ireland Protestant and British citizen pened. But they (southern Protestants) always (see Buckley 1989). The status of border Protes- say that. It was true, but who knows to what ex- tants as a marginalised, minority population tent the Catholics were thinking ‘I’m minding therefore became central to their need for mem- the cows for that black Protestant bastard who is away over the border on the Twelfth’. (Catholic bership of the wider political group, the Ulster interviewee, north Monaghan)2 or Northern Irish Protestant unionists, because this was still a powerful majority community, This quotation adds a dimension to the com- at least in numerical terms. This process has plex nature of minority–majority relationships been more complicated, however, for Protes- in the border region, and recalls an Irish Folk- tants in north Monaghan, who, because of their lore Commission anecdote about the fragility attempts since Partition to forge for themselves of such cooperation in which a border Catholic a new, inclusive Irish identity within the Irish kept tobacco to share with his Protestant friend Republic, and the dynamics of the political sit- in one pocket and a knife to kill him if necessary uation in which they found themselves, have in the other (Fitzpatrick 2002: 59). The quota- not had the opportunity to retreat to a familiar tion further underlines the extent to which be- ‘Ulster British’ position (at least not one of any fore and after the Troubles Catholics considered strength or practicality, though symbolically themselves to be a ‘safe majority’ along the bor- some north Monaghan Protestants have clung der, and under no threat from Protestants. For to a residual notion of ; see Coakley northern border Protestants, the pre-Troubles 1998). period was a halcyon era, in which they felt that The views of border Catholics are a particu- they were in total control of the mechanisms of larly interesting counterpoint here, and they power at both a national and a local level (see highlight to some extent how the ‘good neigh- Jenkins 1997). Yet this was sometimes a mis- bour’ archetype is part of a process of border leading mirage. As far as border Catholics were Protestant self-deception, particularly in terms concerned, in both North and South, the exer- of Protestant perceptions of intercommunal re- cise of Protestant power and associated notions lationships prior to the Troubles (as the eth- of identity in the border region have been things nopolitical conflict of 1969–1998 is referred to). that were ‘tolerated’, chiefly because Catholics

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regarded themselves as a large demographic neighbours—[since] they are the ones in power, majority which on a day-to-day, practical basis they are the ones who are in government, they are was ‘in charge’ and under ‘no threat’. the ones in the council and you have to deal with them to get things done. So they have learned to With such numerical strength, south Armagh cope with that. Some of them have become mem- and north Monaghan Catholics could afford to bers of the local political parties and see that as be culturally benevolent, but the Troubles and their way of making their voice heard in the lo- subsequent Protestant attempts to reassert their cality. But up here in the north, (…) you’re either political and cultural identity have soured re- a unionist or a Roman Catholic so therefore it lationships and now there are many border still keeps that polarised community as far as I can see. (Protestant interviewee, south Armagh) Catholics who feel less charitable towards the Protestant minority. Catholics in south Armagh Such differences between north and south in- and north Monaghan are aware that some Prot- flect local responses to central policy initiatives estants were and remain resentful of the fact that seek to encourage formal cross-border co- that they can no longer exert any sense of cul- operation and relationships, and generate the tural superiority. ripple-back effect mentioned earlier, opening up a gap between northern border Protestants We tried to keep good relationships with our Prot- estant neighbours even when the two communi- and those of the metropolitan core. ties (…) were becoming more and more separated, during the Troubles. But a lot of the other Cath- olic families in the area had been totally shunned Cross-border Relationships by Protestants. My father knew a lot of people through his work and a lot of the Protestant peo- There is evidence that some border Protestants ple—I have to say this—were no problem. But there’s still that unspoken tension—it’s easier to feel a greater affinity with their co-religionists see how things have changed now because you across the border in county Monaghan than have a big area around the border where Protes- with fellow Protestants (‘so-called Protestants’ tants are a minority. And I know that worries as more than one informant labelled them) in them, because I have Protestant friends now who the metropolitan centre of their own state. Sec- would tell me. But you would get the feeling that ularised, urban Protestants of are com- the Protestants here sort of resent that they have no control. (…) [E]ven when the parades and all pared unfavourably with the devout, practising were on before the Troubles it wasn’t like it is Protestants of north Monaghan from whom the now. When the Troubles started it showed that northern border Protestants feel themselves things had been wrong and it changed Catholic officially separated by the border. people’s attitudes. (Catholic interviewee, south Armagh) Alot of them up there in Belfast, you’d say to them ‘Are you a Protestant?’ and sure they wouldn’t Here there is a key difference between Protes- know what a Protestant is; what it means. (Prot- estant interviewee, south Armagh) tants residing on the northern side of the Irish border and those residing on the southern However, the potentiality of a cross-border Prot- side. In the Northern Ireland border region, estant community that defines itself and its ex- Protestant–Catholic group relations are shaped, ternal relationships in purely religious terms is often negatively, by an overarching, unionist weakened by the residual strength of northern, political identity. unionist political ideology and British sover- eignty and policy in Northern Ireland. This is in The relationship between Catholics and Protes- tants [in the northern borderlands] is quite dif- part due to the complex linkage between the re- ferent. In the south, I think the Protestants have formed Christian tradition and British national realised that they have to live with their Catholic identity, even amongst Protestants residing in

72 | Changing Relationships in the Irish Borderlands | AiA the Irish Republic (see Mitchell 2003). Many Prot- ‘picnics’, they are staged in rural retreats hid- estants with whom we have spoken believe that den far from public view. These picnics are field their religious liberty, and the idealised notion gatherings held in the summer when Protes- of democracy and freedom that they cherish, tants from surrounding areas on both sides of can only be accommodated within the confines the border come together to ‘celebrate their cul- of a ‘British state’, and this has obvious impli- ture’ with activities ranging from poetry and cations for their relationships with Catholics, song to quizzes and barbecues. The Orange particularly Irish nationalists and republicans. Order and Protestant marching bands are cen- For Protestants in south Armagh, the com- tral to these events, and ‘picnic’ is a known code- paratively positive experiential evidence of their word for Orange Order activity that is easily co-religionists living in the Irish Republic, with deciphered by the local Catholic community. whom some associate on a regular basis, would As one local Catholic man told us: seem to contradict the imperatives of unionist ideology. Indeed, some on the northern side We don’t have Orange Order parades here—they are picnics—you have to call them picnics [he of the border even go so far as to laud the treat- laughs]. They get together and march round the ment of Protestants in the Irish Republic. A ‘new field or the back roads with their bands. They Republic’ (multicultural and tolerant of diver- haven’t marched in any of the towns here for a long sity) has in one sense become a part of North- time. (Catholic interviewee, north Monaghan) ern Irish border Protestant folklore; one that they hold bears no resemblance to the suppos- Since 1931 there have been no Orange edly tyrannous, Rome-controlled state that they processions in the Republic (except for Done- and their ancestors fought so hard to resist. It is gal), and secluded country roads are now the likely, however, that this renegotiation of iden- only acceptable places in county Monaghan tity (‘We might be better off there’; ‘We would where Orangemen and their bands can march, be better being there’) is more an expression of an isolation that some northern border Protes- disaffection, even defiance, directed at the union- tants who visit these picnics argue is imposed ist political mainstream and the British govern- by the dominant Catholic majority in the Irish ment, than it is a real desire to reside in a unified, Republic. For them, it is a crucial indicator of Irish state. what would happen to Protestant culture within a reunified Ireland, namely, that it would be re- We get a far better deal down there. People are pressed by central and local government policy. curious about us. They are fair. They want to hear Some Orange halls and church buildings in us. Not like these northern nationalists. On RTE county Monaghan have been the subject of at- (Radio Telefís Éireann) they don’t let Sinn Féin away with it, they go after them. (Protestant in- tacks, vandalism and sectarian reprisals in times terviewee, south Armagh) of heightened tension (during the Drumcree dis- putes in Northern Ireland for example; see No border Protestants we have interviewed, Ryder and Kearney 2001). There remains, there- despite being in a minority on both sides of the fore, a key difference between the northern and border, have claimed that their religious free- southern border Protestants, a difference that dom (in terms of attendance at church services) symbolises the comparative disempowerment is seriously curtailed by the Catholic majority. of Monaghan Protestants, and which has im- In contrast, Orange Order parades—a key sym- portant implications for relationships between bol of Protestant cultural expression—are hugely Catholics and Protestants in each jurisdiction. contentious, especially in the north (see Hennes- Although Orange Order marches are always sey 1997). But even in Monaghan, where they potentially contentious in Catholic-dominated are euphemistically referred to as community south Armagh and require massive state secu-

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rity operations to maintain public order, recent acutely unsure of their identity and role within marches there have reasserted local Protestant the Irish state. They are not harassed by the Irish control by parading through some of the area’s security forces; indeed, many expressed to us larger towns and villages. Despite internal fis- their gratitude that the local Gardai did all they sures and local rivalries, the Orange Order has could to help, in logistic terms, with the small been a repository for Protestant culture in Ar- parades. Nor did we hear any reports of overt magh (cf. Bryan et al. 1996; Bardon 2001; Ryder sectarianism or discrimination by the Irish po- and Kearney 2001), as in Northern Ireland more lice, or by the local Catholic majority, which is generally (see Dudley-Edwards 1999). The cul- thought to be uninterested, and which appar- ture of Orange marches has traditionally pro- ently does not see neighbouring Protestants vided a mechanism through which border and the Orange Order as a political threat. Yet Protestants can integrate and fuse their diverse despite all this, Monaghan Protestants feel un- religious and political identities. In general able to parade publicly, and many reported to terms, therefore, the Orange Order remains a us occasional instances of verbal and, more key cultural and historical resource and refer- rarely, physical abuse. ence point for border Protestants, particularly The strength and significance of these senti- in Northern Ireland where it also fulfils a key ments vary between individuals and groups, political purpose, and where Protestants are even within a limited geographical space. Some still an overall majority (Jarman and Bryan 1996; Catholics in Monaghan, for example, also felt Jarman 1997). Consequently, the prohibition of that the Protestant minority has been compar- its parades is regarded by some as an infringe- atively disempowered and that more outreach ment of Protestant civil liberties, and by others work should be done with them. as a clear indication that Protestant demonstra- We were keen to get Protestants more involved tions of culture would not be tolerated in any in the community mainly because we have no- reconstructed all-Ireland state. ticed how badly Protestants were isolated not just These perceptions are crucially important in in the town, but in the county. We wanted them influencing Catholic–Protestant relationships. to feel welcome (...) Because they thought they As previously mentioned, in county Monaghan, weren’t welcome, they were waiting to be asked following major disturbances and nationalist to be involved in community things, in political things and when they were asked, some of them demonstrations in the early 1930s, the small were only too pleased to get involved. (Catholic Orange lodges have congregated far from the interviewee, north Monaghan) main settlements. As Fitzpatrick (2002: 54) puts it, ‘Southern hearts went out of the Orange af- Many Protestants on both sides of the border ter Ulster Day’.3 The tone of these events is in remain suspicious of this goodwill. Occasional stark contrast to the high visibility and stri- instances of religiously motivated vandalism dency of the northern parades, but it would be disproportionately influence the attitude of the naïve to suggest that this is entirely due to the minority in regard to how much work remains ‘problem’ of Protestant culture having been to be done to break down old, entrenched and ‘solved’ in the Irish Republic. Whilst Protestants ignorant attitudes, as the following (Catholic) in south Armagh, by virtue of being part of the account suggests: wider majority ethnicity in Northern Ireland, can still mobilise in large numbers and take to Some local Catholic ‘boys’ tried to burn down an Orange hall. It turned out these boys were only the streets of the towns and villages, the tiny 21. One of the boys pushed his mother’s car out Protestant minority in the Irish Republic has of the drive, then drove five of his drunken no influential political supporters to fall back friends to the Orange hall, which they intended on or to protest their case; and many remain to burn down. The Gardai intercepted them en

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route, and they were arrested. A policeman tried was a Catholic, there is absolutely no doubt about to reason with one of them. He said ‘But why that. So we are the ones who can appreciate that would you do that? Why would you burn an Or- things have actually changed. Maybe the young ange hall—sure what have they ever done on Catholics in south Armagh now don’t know what you?’ And you know what his reply was? ‘Don’t things were like, and they never encounter Prot- know, nothing I suppose. They’re just auld black estant people from the other side, or really under- Protestant bastards though aren’t they?’ I mean, stand how far we, the Catholic community, have what can you say to that sort of ignorance? That come. (Catholic interviewee, south Armagh) sort of thing worsens the isolation of the Protes- tants. (Catholic interviewee, north Monaghan) That some form of bipartisan regionality might transcend sectarian division in the bor- der region is still perhaps unlikely, at least un- Conclusion til some consensual concept of policy can be agreed at the macro, metropolitan level (the Some Catholics in the Irish borderlands are ‘ripple out’ effect). Whilst relationships con- supportive of the idea of a ‘cultural composite’ tinue to be broadly shaped by the competing and advocate speaking with a single, Catholic– ideologies of nationalism and unionism it will Protestant voice in pursuit of government aid remain extremely difficult for the border Prot- for this underdeveloped region where neglect estant minority to separate itself willingly from has long been experienced by both ‘sides’. At the wider unionist and Protestant family and the same time, they acknowledge that this is un- its reaction to political policy framed by the two likely to happen without dynamic input from governments (Mitchell 2006). This is particu- Protestant community leaders. However, there larly true when the alternative is presented as is also residual resistance amongst some Cath- greater if not total cooperation with an Irish olics to the idea that the Protestant borderland state, and more pertinently, a Gaelic-Celtic- minority, which is still perceived to be domi- Catholic definition of ‘Irishness’ which remains nated by the Orange Order and other sectarian unacceptable to them (Bruce 1986; Crawford organisations and believed to have exerted (and 1987; Bruce and Alderdice 1993; Dudley- abused) disproportionate influence and power Edwards 1999; McKay 2000). (often at the expense of Catholics), should con- The ‘backwash’ effect of reshaped Protestant– tinue to have ‘a say’ in influencing political or Catholic relationships might arguably still be cultural policy in areas where Catholics now of some significance, however. At the edge of constitute the large and powerful majority. In both the British (south Armagh) and Irish (north some cases, memories of perceived injustices Monaghan) states, some border Protestants have perpetrated by Protestant-controlled agencies embraced a political, cultural and social prag- of the British state were still fresh, but there was matism that remains alien to many urban Prot- a feeling that, paradoxically, it was perhaps only estants residing in majority unionist areas. This those who had experienced political and cul- has a potentially positive effect on intercom- tural disempowerment in the past who could munal relationships in the border area, since it appreciate that the ‘Catholic community’ was encourages greater dialogue between compet- now beginning to take control. ing groups. This could have implications for how urban Protestants in Northern Ireland begin to My age group, we are the ones who remember address particular political-cultural issues— the historical injustices, the discrimination by Prot- with parading a key example (see Bryan 2000; estants (…) by people in the Orange Order, the Unionist government and so on. I mean, I myself Dingley 2002). However, it should be acknowl- have anecdotal evidence of what happened to edged that stories of bad experiences retold by me—it was definitely discrimination because I border Protestants—often for instrumental and

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politically strategic purposes—have a dispro- ing pro-treaty and anti-treaty supporters in the portionately negative impact on metropolitan early 1920s continue to inform contemporary Protestant perceptions of the comparative pow- political divisions among Catholics in some parts of the Irish Republic in ways that have striking erlessness of Protestants in the borderlands similarities to the sectarian cleavages of North- (including those in the Irish Republic), and the ern Ireland. potential hostility of Catholics or republicans 2. The Twelfth of processions are organised in such areas. This prompts fear and anxiety, annually by the Orange Order to commemorate and a natural comparison with their own expe- the defeat of James II by William of Orange at the rience, and can reinforce a sense of apprehen- in 1690. For historical back- ground to the Twelfth of July, or ‘the Twelfth’ as sion about the possibility of unfair treatment it is known in Northern Ireland, see Bryan (2000) within any all-Ireland set-up. Further research and Larsen (1982). might reveal the extent to which metropolitan 3. Ulster Day refers to 28 September 1912, when Protestants’ perceptions of how border Protes- almost half a million men and women expressed tants are dealt with fuels their nervousness about their opposition to Irish Home Rule by signing how policy and power would be redistributed the Ulster Covenant. and re-enacted within any reunified Ireland. References Acknowledgement Bardon, J. 2001. A History of Ulster, Belfast: Black- staff Press. The fieldwork on which this article is based was Bryan, D. 2000. Orange Parades: The Politics of Rit- generously funded by a grant from the Higher ual, Tradition, and Control, London: Pluto Press. Education Authority through Strand 1 of the Bryan, D., T. Fraser and S. Dunn 1996. Political Rit- North-South Programme for Collaborative Re- uals: Loyalist Parades in , Coleraine: University of Ulster: Centre for the Study of search, and was part of a joint project with col- Conflict. leagues in University College Cork that explored Bruce, S. 1986. God Save Ulster! The Religion and Catholic-Protestant relationships in three ‘fron- Politics of Paisleyism, Oxford: Oxford University tier’ communities. Fieldwork included over fifty Press. recorded interviews, as well as participation Bruce, S. and F. Alderdice 1993. ‘Religious Belief and observation across a range of everyday and Behaviour’, in P. Stringer and G. Robinson (eds), Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland: The settings on both sides of the border. Third Report—1992–1993, Belfast: Blackstaff Dr Kirk Simpson is a Post Doctoral Fellow in the Press, 5–20. Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster. Buckland, P. 1981. A History of Northern Ireland, : Gill and Macmillan. His email is [email protected]. Hastings Buckley, A. 1989. ‘“We’re Trying to Find Our Iden- Donnan is Professor of Social Anthropology, School tity”: Uses of History Among ’, of History and Anthropology, The Queen’s Univer- in M. Chapman, M. McDonald and E. Tonkin sity of Belfast. His email is [email protected]. (eds) History and Ethnicity, London: Routledge, 183–197. Coakley, J. 1998. ‘Religion, Ethnic Identity and the Protestant Minority in the Republic’, in W. Crotty Notes and D. Schmitt (eds) Ireland and the Politics of Change, London: Longman, 86–106. 1. For an anthropological account of the Orange Crawford, R. 1987. Loyal to King Billy: A Portrait of Order and its processions, see Bryan (2000). For the Ulster Protestants, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. an interesting comparison between the legacy Dawson, G. 2003. ‘Mobilising Memories: Protes- of violence in north and south see Harris (1979), tant and Unionist Victims’ Groups and the Poli- who argues that memories of violence involv- tics of Victimhood in the Irish Peace Process’, in

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P. Gready (ed.) Political Transition: Politics and Jenkins, R. 1997. Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments Cultures, London: Pluto Press, 127–148. and Explorations, London: Sage. Dingley, J. 2002. ‘Marching Down the Garvaghy Road: Larsen, S. 1982. ‘The Glorious Twelfth: The Politics Republican Tactics and State Response to the of Legitimation in Kilbroney’, in A. Cohen (ed.) Orangemen’s Claim to March Their Traditional Belonging: Identity and Social Organisation in Route Home After the Drumcree Church Ser- British Rural Cultures, Manchester: Manchester vice’, Terrorism and Political Violence 14 (3): 42–79. University Press, 131–164. Donnan, H. 2005. ‘Material Identities: Fixing Eth- McKay, S. 2000. Northern Protestants: An Unsettled nicity in the Irish Borderlands’, Identities: Global People, Belfast: Blackstaff Press. Studies in Culture and Power 12 (1): 69–105. Mitchell, C. 2003. ‘Protestant Identification and Dudley-Edwards, R. 1999. The Faithful Tribe, Lon- Political Change in Northern Ireland’, Ethnic don: Harper Collins. and Racial Studies 26 (4): 612–31. Fitzpatrick, D. 2002. ‘The Orange Order and the ——— 2006. Religion, Identity and Politics in North- Border’, Irish Historical Studies 33 (129): 52–67. ern Ireland: Boundaries of Belonging and Belief, Harnden, T. 1999. Bandit Country, London: Hodder Aldershot: Ashgate. and Stoughton. Potter, J. 2001. ATestimony to Courage: The History Harris, R. 1979. ‘Community Relationships in of the Ulster Defence , 1969–1992, Lon- Northern and Southern Ireland: A Comparison don: Leo Cooper. and a Paradox’, The Sociological Review 27: 41–53. Ryder, C. and V. Kearney 2001. Drumcree: The Hennessey, T. 1997. A History of Northern Ireland, Orange Order’s Last Stand, London: Methuen 1920–1996, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. Publishing Ltd. Jarman, N. 1997. Material Conflicts: Parades and Stewart, A. 1989. The Narrow Ground: The Roots of Visual Displays in Northern Ireland, Oxford: Berg. the Conflict in Ulster, London: Faber. Jarman, N. and D. Bryan 1996. Parade and Protest: a Tsing, A. 1993. In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Discussion of Parading Disputes in Northern Ire- Marginality in an Out-of-the-Way Place, Prince- land, Coleraine: Centre for the Study of Conflict, ton: Princeton University Press. University of Ulster.

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