AC Vol 43 No 2
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www.africa-confidential.com 25 January 2002 Vol 43 No 2 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL KENYA 3SOUTH AFRICA The generation game At New Year, President Moi backed Crossing the Limpopo KANU’s ‘Young Turks’ and their Zimbabwe threatens the grand African plans of Presidents Mbeki allies in Raila Odinga’s NDP in the and Obasanjo succession race. Two weeks later he switched back to the old From the splendour of Pretoria’s Union Buildings, President Thabo Mbeki’s vision of a resurgent Africa guarders, George Saitoti and is obscured by the sprawling crisis in Zimbabwe. Almost everything Mbeki wants to do in foreign policy Nicholas Biwott. Neither side seems to know his real plans. – win more foreign capital, get South African companies to invest in mineral-rich Congo-Kinshasa and Angola and launch a continent-wide development programme – is threatened by Zimbabwe. It is the tail wagging the dog. South Africa’s economy is 20 times the size of Zimbabwe’s but it cannot support hordes ANGOLA 4 of refugees heading south across the Limpopo River or bear the collateral damage done to its currency and credit ratings. Russian roulette The Limpopo is crocodile-infested but for many foreign bankers, the border is a technicality; President Luanda’s secret oil-backed loans Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe might as well be a troublesome northern province of South Africa. The have derailed its relations with the United States Chamber of Commerce estimated that by mid-2001, South Africa has lost US$3 billion IMF. An IMF team goes to Luanda of potential investment because of the Zimbabwe crisis. That’s apart from the damage to its private and next month, armed with new data, but there is much concern about a state sector suppliers, such as Eskom (electricity) and Sasol (fuel), to which Zimbabwe owes hundreds mysterious multi-billion dollar of millions of dollars. buyback of Russian debt Zimbabwe will also be – in the eyes of the USA and Europe – a critical test of the New Partnership negotiated by arms dealer Arkady for Africa’s Development (Nepad), an Africa-wide development plan which needs Western financial Gaydamak. support (AC Vol 42 No 14). Central to Nepad is the idea of peer pressure: that African states can be encouraged to liberalise their politics and reform their economies by other African states, rather than by CONGO-KINSHASA 6 overbearing Western-based institutions imposing micro-conditions on loans and aid. Under the volcano Peer pressure on Mugabe The mile-wide river of lava spewing Crudely put, if South Africa and Nigeria don’t contain the crisis in their back yard, there won’t be much from Mount Nyiragonga last week Western cash for Nepad. That would derail the scheduled summit with the Group of Eight countries in devastated the rebel capital of Canada in July to discuss Western support for the plan. Both Mbeki and his close colleague, Nigerian Goma but didn’t change the President Olusegun Obasanjo, insist that the Nepad philosophy and peer pressure work. Mugabe’s combatants’ entrenched positions in the war. Rebel chief Adolphe Zimbabwe is testing their optimism to the limit. Onusomba insists his movement Some frustrated voices in Pretoria and Abuja argue that much of Zimbabwe’s crisis is unfinished is staying put and rebuffed a rescue colonial business (the failure of land reform) and that Britain’s poor relations with Harare are partly to mission from President Joseph blame. Differences between Europe and Africa over Zimbabwe are set to deepen, with the European Kabila’s government in Kinshasa. Union preparing to impose smart sanctions on the Mugabe government after its meeting on 28 January. Peer pressure for Mbeki and Obasanjo means constructive engagement and quiet diplomacy but AFRICA/ECONOMY 6 emphatically not big-stick tactics, such as sanctions or covert destabilisation. For example, South Africa (which runs Eskom), Zambia (Kafue Dam) and Mozambique (Cabora Bassa) could jointly cut off more Bear markets than 80 per cent of Zimbabwe’s power if they wanted. They don’t. If Pretoria rejects sanctions of any The new year confirms the description before the elections, that means the Southern African Development Community and the gloomiest of forecasts about African Union (ex-Organisation of African Unity) will do the same. Mugabe values his African Africa’s economies: Nigerians face liberation stance enormously; he would hate to be isolated as a corrupt tyrant who stole an election. So a 50 per cent fuel price hike; South Mbeki believes that diplomatic isolation would be more powerful than sanctions. Africans have a currency crash Plenty of South Africans disagree. Some, predictably, are Mbeki’s die-hard opponents, such as the and Zimbabweans are running out of maize. Democratic Party’s Tony Leon; others are sometime allies, such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions; yet others are even closer to home, such as Mbeki’s brother Moeletsi, who argued in December for Pretoria to pull the plug on Zimbabwe’s economy. Moeletsi is Deputy Chairman of the SA Institute of International Affairs and says he’s completely at odds with his presidential brother on Zimbabwe. POINTERS 8 Mbeki and Obasanjo share the same analysis: there has to be a negotiated rather than a coercive resolution; the Movement for Democratic Change isn’t ready to take over power by itself; and the Benin, Algeria, preferred outcome would be a power-sharing government between ‘moderates’ in the Zimbabwe African Madagascar & National Union-Patriotic Front and MDC. Sudan They agree that a big-stick policy would be disastrous for South Africa. Pretoria would be cast in the mould of post-apartheid neighbourhood bully; the African National Congress would be accused of 25 January 2002 Africa Confidential Vol 43 No 2 Managing foreign affairs In 2000 South Africa’s ministries were grouped in ‘clusters’, to rationalise General Alistair Ruiters. The DTI is to cut most foreign postings for its policy-making and eliminate contradictions. The Department of Foreign officials, while its Trade and Investment South Africa Division, whose Affairs is grouped with the Departments of Defence, Tourism, Safety and Chief Executive Officer is Rafiq Bagus, will organise trade missions. The Security, along with Trade and Industry in the International Relations, DTI still intends to place trade negotiation specialists in key appointments Peace and Security (IRPS) cluster, which promotes the New Partnership such as at the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for Africa’s Development (Nepad). Other clusters are Economics, Social headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana, and the mooted Southern African Services, Inter-Governmental Relations, and Criminal Justice. Customs Union (SACU) Secretariat in Lesotho. The civil service Chairman of the IRPS is the outgoing Foreign Affairs Zimbabwe’s crisis has highlighted civil society and business input into Director General, Sipho Pityana. Under Pityana at the DFA are eight foreign policy. Significant think-tanks are the Institute for Security deputy directors general (DDG). The DDG for Multilateral Security and Studies (ISS) in Pretoria, headed by Dr. Jakkie Cilliers; and the South Governance is Abdul Minty, an anti-apartheid stalwart, who is also acting African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) at Wits University in DDG for Multilateral Development and Cooperation. The acting DDG for Johannesburg. The SAIIA is chaired by the President of British Petroleum Asia and Australasia is Anil Sooklal, while the DDGs for Europe and the Africa, Fred Phaswana, with Deputies Elisabeth Bradley and Moeletsi Americas/Caribbean are under one acting head, Ndimiso Ntshinga. Mbeki, President Thabo Mbeki’s brother. Day-to-day operations are Two separate chief directorships have been created for Europe: Eastern headed by Greg Mills. and Central under Gert Grobler, Western Europe under Ismail Coovadia The Africa Institute in Pretoria, directed by Eddy Maloka, has drawn – and the Americas: South America under Tom Wheeler, a former closer to government with its constitution subject to an act of parliament. Ambassador to Turkey, and North America under Ntshinga. It is rumoured The SA Foundation, which operated abroad as an informal diplomatic that Grobler and Coovadia are leaving to head missions in Spain and body during the apartheid years, now focuses on local economic and Sweden. At the end of 2001, Welile Nhlapo was DDG for Africa and the governance issues and on building trade and investment links. Its Director Middle East, but he too may be moving. Corporate Services are headed by today is Neil van Heerden, the former DFA Director General and E.S.J.S. Hlapolosa, State Protocol byAmbassador Billy Modise. Ambassador to the European Union. A DFA policy planning unit was established under Pityana’s office last South Africa’s growing regional role has spawned academic institutions year, headed by Iaan Basson, while the search for a permanent chief in Cape Town, Durban and Pretoria. Parliament’s role in shaping foreign director is under way. The main research unit in the Department of Trade policy remains limited, since its committees have tight budgets and the and Industry (DTI) is the Chief Economist’s Office of a former University executive is distinct from parliament. of Cape Town lecturer, Dave Kaplan. The Economic Analysis and Nonetheless, the Foreign Affairs Committee, led by African National Research section in the DTI’s International Trade and Economic Congress veteran Ebrahim Ebrahim, the Trade and Industry Portfolio Development division is headed by the former University of Natal academic, Committee under former academic and ANC exile Dr. Rob Davies, and Peter Draper. the Joint Standing Committee on Defence chaired by Ntsiki Mashimbye, Despite the clusters, there remain problems of coordination between the are targeted by non-governmental organisations and foreign donors DFA and the DTI, where the Minister is Alec Erwin and the Director interested in capacity-building.