Early Decisions in the Development of the CANDU Program
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Early Decisions in the Development ofthe CANDU Program J.L. Gray (NRC) and later AECL, with the nuclear development Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, program; and the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), Ottawa, Ontario the regulatory agency - all reported to Howe. I need say no more about Howe, but I suspect that without him the nuclear development program would Abstract have died in its first few years, and probably have This paper identifies about twenty mator decisions of the been reborn in the 1950s with, hopefully, but not Canadian Nuclear Power Program from its inception in 1942 certainly, heavy water reactors in the program. to maturity - the decision of Ontario Hydro to complete the One of the earliest actions that produced a key Pickering Nuclear Power Station and proceed with a major decision resulted from the war in Europe and the fall nuclear power installation program. The decisions are dis of France. Both the British and the French were aware cussed briefly. in 1939 of the possibility of a nuclear weapon as a result of the work of the Curies and others. Hans von This paper reflects my views of the early years of the Halban, an Austrian, was working with Frederic Joliot CANDU program to the point of program maturity. I Curie, along with Lew Kowarski, a Russian, and the have drawn heavily on the research work of Professor French team had advanced to the point of outlining Robert Bothwell - who is writing a book on Atomic an arrangement of uranium and a moderatorthatcould Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) - particularly for sustain a chain reaction - a reactor. The team recog the period up to the incorporation of AECL, when I nized the worth of heavy water and cornered the became directly involved. I certainly learned much world's supply that had been produced in Norway, from having access to Bothwell's early drafts of the 185.5kg. period 1942 to 1952. I have also found A History of the With the invasion of France some of the scientists Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) by Gordon H.E. decided to depart, taking with them their heavy water. Sims to be a valuable reference. Halban and Kowarski arrived in England in 1941, and they were soon part of the British nuclear program. CD. Howe They joined other scientific colleagues at Cambridge The first 'key decision' was taken by Prime Minister University's Cavendish Laboratory. There was no short W.L. Mackenzie King when he appointed CD. Howe age of scientists, both British and from Europe, but as minister of the Department of Munitions and Sup Halban and Kowarski were the main proponents of a ply and, in October l~44, minister of the Department reactor system using heavy water and uranium. Others of Reconstruction - he was also the chairman of the were more involved in separating the fissile atom of Privy Council Committee for Scientific and Industrial natural uranium, U-235. They knew about plutonium Research, which, incidentally, almost never met. Howe, but seemed to feel that a nuclear weapon was more a former professor of engineering and a successful likely to be achieved, during World War II, with U-235 business man, had no trouble understanding nuclear than with plutonium, and the reactor development fission, and he was familiar with the management and program was not of the highest priority. promotion of large and expensive projects. The entry, by December 1941, of the USA into the His stature in the government and his more-than war, both in the Japanese and European theatres, persuasive powers allowed the nuclear program to changed the tempo of the us nuclear development obtain support during its early years, and he was able program. General Le:;lie Groves led the Manhattan to keep his finger on the three main areas of impor Engineering District, and by the winter of 1942 us tance: uranium, nuclear research and development, nuclear research was leading the way for the allies. and nuclear regulation and control. Eldorado, with its Hans von Halban visited the us in 1942, and recog uranium operations; the National Research Council nized that the effort and facilities in the us outclassed NUCLEAR JOURNAL OF CANADA / 1:2 / pp. 99-106 99 those of his group at Cambridge. It was suggested tion at the Montreal laboratory concerned not only that the British might send Halban's group to the us the British and Canadians, but the us as well. A or at least some individuals expert in heavy water reactor design and construction program had been developments. The British director of their program, proposed with a price tag of about $50 million. It Wallace Akers, was not too impressed with the us would be at Canada's expense. The British and Amer proposals, due partly to patent rights clauses, and icans were not getting on too well, partly because of Canada was considered as an alternative. But neither Halban and others of the British team in Montreal, was Akers very attracted to locating the British team but also because of personality conflicts among senior in Canada. personnel on both sides of the Atlantic. When details of the us offer were studied, Halban The British came close to abandoning the project, realized he would only be a part of a us laboratory, but instead of pulling out appointed a new director, with no overall authority. Canada had a small pro Professor John Cockcroft, who arrived in April 1944, gram at NRC, with Dr G.c. Laurence experimenting and things began to change rapidly. This appoint with uranium and coke - a rudimentary pile - and ment, leading to Cockcroft's arrival in Montreal, was Halban could expect to be placed in charge of a joint certainly a key decision. He took command and rele project; this was enough for him to press for a Cana gated Halban to head of physics. At the same time dian location, which would still have access to us Groves gave his consent to building a reactor - even information and supplies. The outcome was an agree though he knew it was obviously not going to con ment between the British and Canada, with the sup tribute to the supply of plutonium for the current port of the us, that moved the British Heavy Water war. So the military purpose of the Anglo-Canadian Project from Cambridge to Montreal in late 1942 - a project had disappeared. General relations with the key decision. It was to be headed by Halban, but us improved - as they had to. without Kowarski, and included among its personnel Halban eventually got himself into trouble by stretch several British, as well as Canadians and some 'refu ing security procedures to report to Juliot-Curie on the gees' from Europe, which posed a security question progress of work in North America, both Canadian IIlark fur the US; and rightly so, as we found out from and us. This action disturbed the British, the Cana the Gouzenko affair. This was the start of heavy water dians, and particularly the us. Halban was denied moderated reactor research and development in Can access to the labs and soon returned to England and a ada - an 'Anglo-Canadian Project' with support from post at Oxford. the us. Cockcroft was a highly respected scientist and an Hans von Halban, as director of the Montreal nu able leader, quiet but firm. He brought Lew Kowarski clear laboratory, had some good points to offer the to join him. project, but he also had some deficiencies. He was an Following discussions with the us and the labora able scientist from an aristocratic family, and he had tory staff it was recommended that a 10 MWt hetero strong personal ambitions to lead an important nuclear geneous reactor moderated with heavy water, fuelled program. He had a high opinion of his abilities, but it with natural uranium and cooled with light water be turned out that he lacked the personality and abilities built - NRX (National Research Experiment) - certainly of leadership and management. a key decision. The program proceeded with OIL as Halban was certainly persistent and believed in the the engineer and construction manager and Fraser heavy water natural uranium system, and knew it Brace as the contractor, in July 1944. was worth fighting for. The project faced severe diffi The selection of Chalk River as the reactor site was culties in 1943 and 1944. The us and Britain were a very good one, and some may view it as a key deci quarrelling, Groves was dissatisfied with the prog sion - the only 'key' I can see is that it is in the province ress of work at the laboratory, the morale of the staff where Ontario Hydro is located, a utility that might was very low, and the death of the lab a distinct be interested in nuclear power, still a dream in the possibility. Halban's work in France coupled with the scientists' minds. work of Kowarski - the foundation for the reactor In November of 1945, much to the surprise of c.J. project - was being questioned by the us Manhattan Mackenzie, president of NRC, it was learned from Engineering District, but stood up under review. Hal newspaper reports that Cockcroft was being appointed ban's insistence on the merits of the heavy water to head the new British Atomic Energy Establishment moderated natural uranium-fuelled reactor system re at Harwell. Attempts were made to keep him in Can sulted in its survival, but he was not around to see ada, at least until NRX was operating. He eventually the first reactor project committed.